[Redacted], Kyong L., 1 Complainant,v.Louis DeJoy, Postmaster General, United States Postal Service (Pacific Area), Agency.

Equal Employment Opportunity Commission

Jul 21, 2021

Appeal No. 2020003693 (E.E.O.C. Jul. 21, 2021)

U.S. EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION Office of Federal Operations P.O. Box 77960 Washington, DC 20013 Kyong L.,1 Complainant, v. Louis DeJoy, Postmaster General, United States Postal Service (Pacific Area), Agency. Appeal No. 2020003693 Hearing No. 541-2018-00113X Agency No. 4F-913-0185-09 DECISION On February 28, 2020, Complainant filed an appeal with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC or Commission), pursuant to 29 C.F.R. § 1614.403(a), from the Agency’s January 29, 2020, notice of final action concerning her equal employment opportunity (EEO) complaint alleging employment discrimination in violation Section 501 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 (Rehabilitation Act), as amended, 29 U.S.C. § 791 et seq. For the following reasons, the Commission MODIFIES the Agency’s final action. BACKGROUND At the time of events giving rise to this complaint, Complainant worked as a Mail Processing Clerk at the Monrovia Post Office in Monrovia, California. On March 29, 2009, Complainant filed an EEO complaint alleging that the Agency discriminated against her on the basis of reprisal for prior protected EEO activity2 when: 1 This case has been randomly assigned a pseudonym which will replace Complainant’s name when the decision is published to non-parties and the Commission’s website. 2 On July 12, 2006, Complainant filed a previous EEO complaint (Agency No. 4F-913-0083-06) alleging discrimination when her assignment was changed, she was sent home, and she received a Letter of Warning. The AJ found that the Agency discriminated against her on the basis of 2020003693 2 On April 8, 2009, she was told there was no work available for her within her medical restrictions and sent home. Thereafter, the Agency determined that the claim raised in Complainant’s complaint, because it referenced the same actions, was identical to the claim raised in Velva B., et al. v. U.S. Postal Serv., Agency No. 4B-140-0062-06, a class complaint. The Agency determined that Complainant's complaint would be held in abeyance pending the outcome of the appeal from the decision of the Administrative Judge in Velva B., Agency No. 4B-140-0062-06. Subsequently, in EEOC Appeal No. 0120093806 (July 29, 2011), we found that the Agency's determination to hold Complainant's claim, based on reprisal, in abeyance was incorrect. We specifically found that, unlike her disability claim, Complainant's claim of reprisal discrimination should not have been held in abeyance and was not properly subsumed within the Velva B. class complaint. We therefore affirmed the Agency's decision with respect to Complainant's disability claim but reversed the Agency’s decision with regard to reprisal. We remanded Complainant's reprisal claim to the Agency for an investigation. At the conclusion of the investigation on the reprisal claim, the Agency provided Complainant with a copy of the report of investigation and notice of her right to request a hearing before an Equal Employment Opportunity Commission Administrative Judge (AJ). Complainant requested a hearing. Over Complainant's objections, the AJ assigned to the case granted the Agency’s motion for a decision without a hearing and issued a decision without a hearing on October 16, 2015, in the Agency's favor. The Agency subsequently issued a final order fully implementing the AJ’s finding that Complainant failed to prove that the Agency subjected her to discrimination as alleged. Complainant appealed the Agency’s final order to the Commission. In EEOC Appeal No. 0120160752 (June 19, 2018), we reversed the entry of summary judgment in favor of the Agency and remanded the complaint for a hearing. On October 1, 2018, the AJ ordered the Agency to conduct a supplement investigation. The supplemental investigation was completed on November 28, 2018. The AJ held a hearing on April 23, 2019, and issued a decision on October 24, 2019. The AJ found Complainant proved by a preponderance of evidence that the Agency retaliated against her for prior protected activity when on April 8, 2009, she was sent home. As relief for her complaint, the AJ awarded Complainant nonpecuniary, compensatory damages. Specifically, the AJ stated that normally $8,333.00 would be reasonable to compensate Complainant for her emotional distress and its manifestations. disability only, and ordered that Complainant be returned to work. The Agency fully implemented the AJ’s decision on October 23, 2008. Complainant returned to work in November 2008. 2020003693 3 However, from this amount, he deducted 25% or $2,083.00 “in recognition that the events of April 2009 exacerbated her pre-existing harm suffered from the events of 2006, for which Complainant received a compensatory damages award.”3 Additionally, the AJ deducted an additional $1,750.00 he found was already awarded in compensatory damages in the Velva B. class complaint based upon the same facts, for a total compensatory damages award in this case of $4,500.00. Moreover, the AJ found the Agency demonstrated that Complainant failed to mitigate her damages and thus, determined she was not entitled to backpay. The AJ declined to reinstate Complainant to her prior position after finding that the preponderance of evidence showed that subsequent to April 2009, she voluntarily applied for and accepted disability retirement in settlement of a grievance challenging her removal. The AJ did not order training for the responsible management official because it was undisputed that the Postmaster (the responsible management official) retired from the Agency. Further, the AJ ordered the Agency to post a notice of the finding of discrimination. On November 1, 2019, Complainant filed a Statement of Costs and Objection to Damages Regarding Complainant. The Agency did not respond. On December 23, 2019, the AJ issued an Order Re: Complainant’s Statement of Costs and Objection to Damages Regarding Complainant; and Order Entering Judgment. The AJ noted Complainant sought re-evaluation of the damages award. She argued that she mitigated her damages, asserting that her OWCP benefits partially offset her lost wages. She contended she was separated from her employment, and that the separation was due to her being on OWCP for over a year, which in turn was due to the Agency’s discriminatory actions. She claimed that she did not accept disability retirement and received no disability retirement benefits. Finally, she sought a modification of the damages to include an award of backpay and benefits, as well as reinstatement. The AJ acknowledged Complainant requested $150.00 in costs. However, the AJ denied Complainant’s request for costs since she did not provide any supporting documentation. Regarding backpay, the AJ recognized that OWCP wage replacement benefits count as an offset against an award of back pay. However, under the circumstances of the case, the AJ found Complainant did not mitigate her damages. The AJ recognized Complainant did not receive OWCP benefits for an injury caused by the Agency’s retaliation on April 8, 2009; but rather, when she was sent home on April 8, 2009, she once again began drawing OWCP benefits for her 1989 and 2006 injuries. The AJ noted Complainant did not seek work outside the Agency. The AJ noted Complainant stated any employment she obtained would not mitigate losses at the level of the OWCP pay she received. The AJ found this a conclusory statement unsupported by any evidence in the record. 3 Complainant was awarded $12,500 in nonpecuniary, compensatory damages as the result of a finding of disability discrimination in her 2006 EEO complaint. 2020003693 4 The AJ stated despite being “ready, willing, and able” to work, Complainant elected to fall back on collecting OWCP benefits for old injuries and did not seek other gainful employment. The AJ concluded under these circumstances Complainant’s conduct demonstrated a failure to mitigate her damages. Thus, the AJ denied an award of backpay. Upon reconsideration, the AJ found Complainant was entitled to reinstatement. The AJ ordered the Agency to reinstate her into a clerk position at the Monrovia Post Office with duties within her current medical restrictions, if any. The Agency subsequently issued a notice of final action on January 29, 2020. The Agency fully implemented the AJ’s finding of discrimination and the relief ordered. On appeal, Complainant states that after she was advised there was no work available, and walked off the job, she was compelled to file for wage-loss compensation with OWCP. She argues there is no requirement that an employee collecting wage-loss compensation from OWCP is required to mitigate any loss of income. Complainant states she was subjected to the National Reassessment Process (NRP) and advised that there was no work available to her within her medical restrictions. She claims under such circumstances she would not have been able to locate work for which she was otherwise qualified. Additionally, Complainant claims the AJ erred when he concluded that she received an award of $1,750.00 awarded in compensatory damages in the Velva B. class case. Complainant contends she did not receive any such award pursuant to the Velva B. class case. Further, she argues that in a November 7, 2018 decision, the Commission ordered the Agency to vacate all final decisions on disputed claims for individual relief in the Velva B. class where an AJ has not issued a decision resolving the disputed amount. ANALYSIS AND FINDINGS Pursuant to 29 C.F.R. § 1614.405(a), all post-hearing factual findings by an AJ will be upheld if supported by substantial evidence in the record. Substantial evidence is defined as “such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.” Universal Camera Corp. v. National Labor Relations Board, 340 U.S. 474, 477 (1951) (citation omitted). A finding regarding whether or not discriminatory intent existed is a factual finding. See Pullman-Standard Co. v. Swint, 456 U.S. 273, 293 (1982). An AJ's conclusions of law are subject to a de novo standard of review, whether or not a hearing was held. An AJ’s credibility determination based on the demeanor of a witness or on the tone of voice of a witness will be accepted unless documents or other objective evidence so contradicts the testimony, or the testimony so lacks in credibility that a reasonable fact finder would not credit it. See EEOC Management Directive 110, Chapter 9, at § VI.B. (Aug. 5, 2015). 2020003693 5 At the outset, we note that on appeal that the Agency does not challenge the finding that the Agency retaliated against her for prior protected activity when on April 8, 2009, she was sent home. Thus, we AFFIRM the finding that the Agency subjected Complainant to retaliation. Backpay When an agency or the Commission finds that an employee of the agency was discriminated against, the agency shall provide the individual with non-discriminatory placement into the position she would have occupied absent the discrimination, with back pay computed in the manner prescribed by 5 C.F.R. § 550.805. See 29 C.F.R. § 1614.501(c)(1). The purpose of a backpay award is to restore to the complainant the income he would have otherwise earned but for the discrimination. See Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. at 418-419 (1975); Davis v. U.S. Postal Service, EEOC Petition No. 04900010 (Nov. 29, 1990). The Commission has held that a backpay claimant has a duty to mitigate damages by making a reasonable effort to find other suitable employment. Simmons v. U.S. Postal Service, EEOC Request No. 05900957 (Dec. 10, 1993). The burden is on the Agency, however, to establish that the employee failed in her duty to mitigate. Id. An agency must generally satisfy a two-prong test which requires it to show: (1) the complainant failed to use reasonable care and diligence in seeking a suitable position; and (2) there were suitable positions available which the complainant could have discovered and for which she was qualified. Id. Where a complainant does not make an effort to mitigate damages and does not explain the lack of effort, the agency does not have to meet the second prong. Id. In the present case, Complainant made no effort to mitigate damages; and because she has not explained her lack of effort, the Agency does not have to meet the Agency prong of the mitigation test. At the hearing, Complainant testified that she did not look for any jobs outside of the Agency after 2006. Further, she did not explain her lack of effort at the hearing or in her investigative affidavit, except to testify on re-direct that she received no vocational rehabilitation from the Agency after 2009, which, the AJ properly found is not a sufficient explanation. We also note it was never Complainant’s intention to seek other employment; she testified if her OWCP benefits stopped for some reason, she would have filed for disability retirement. Moreover, we find that this case is distinguishable from Paolozzi v. U.S. Postal Service, EEOC Request No. 05920423 (August 3, 1992). In Paolozzi, the complainant was receiving workers compensation benefits, and argued that these were mitigation of the agency’s damages. He had testified that he did not seek employment because jobs for which was qualified would not have paid more than the benefits. Paolozzi makes it clear that the complainant in that case had proffered evidence that he had met his statutory duty to mitigate. In contrast, Complainant here presented no such evidence. Thus, we find Complainant failed to mitigate damages and is not entitled to backpay. 2020003693 6 Nonpecuniary damages When discrimination is found, the agency must provide a complainant with a remedy that constitutes full, make-whole relief to restore her as nearly as possible to the position she would have occupied absent the discrimination. See, e.g., Franks v. Bowman Transp. Co., 424 U.S. 747, 764 (1976); Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405, 418-19 (1975); Complainant v. U.S. Postal Service, EEOC Appeal No. 01933395 (July 21, 1994). Pursuant to section 102(a) of the Civil Rights Act of 1991, a complainant who establishes unlawful intentional discrimination under either Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (Title VII), as amended, 42 U.S.C. §2000e et seq., or Section 501 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 (Rehabilitation Act), as amended, 29 U.S.C. § 791 et seq. may receive compensatory damages for past and future pecuniary losses (i.e., out-of-pocket expenses) and nonpecuniary losses (e.g., pain and suffering, mental anguish) as part of this “make whole” relief. 42 U.S.C. § 1981a(b)(3). In West v. Gibson, 527 U.S. 212 (1999), the Supreme Court held that Congress afforded the Commission the authority to award compensatory damages in the administrative process. Nonpecuniary losses are losses that are not subject to precise quantification, i.e., emotional pain, suffering, inconvenience, mental anguish, loss of enjoyment of life, injury to professional standing, injury to character and reputation, injury to credit standing, and loss of health. See EEOC Enforcement Guidance: Compensatory and Punitive Damages Available Under Section 102 of the Civil Rights Act of 1991, EEOC Notice No. 915.002, at II.A.2 (July 14, 1992) (Compensatory Damages Guidance). There is no precise formula for determining the amount of damages for nonpecuniary losses except that the award should reflect the nature and severity of the harm and the duration or expected duration of the harm. See Complainant v. Dep’t of the Treasury, EEOC Appeal No. 01955789 (Aug. 29, 1997). The Commission notes that nonpecuniary, compensatory damages are designed to remedy the harm caused by the discriminatory event rather than punish the agency for the discriminatory action. Further, compensatory damages should not be “monstrously excessive” standing alone, should not be the product of passion or prejudice, and should be consistent with the amounts awarded in similar cases. See Complainant v. Dep’t of the Interior, EEOC Appeal No. 01961483 (Mar. 4, 1999) (citing Cyngar v, City of Chicago, 865 F.2d 827, 848 (7th Cir. 1989)). Where a complainant’s emotional harm is due in part to personal difficulties, which were not caused or exacerbated by the discriminatory conduct, the agency is liable only for the harm resulting from the discriminatory conduct. See Compensatory Damages Guidance, at II, A.2. After a review of the record, we find that Complainant has proven her entitlement to nonpecuniary, compensatory damages due to the emotional distress she suffered from as a result of the Agency’s discrimination. Complainant testified she was a good employee for 23 years and that they “broke” her “mentally, physically, and emotionally.” She explained she could not sleep, lost weight, cried, was depressed, and felt worthless, ashamed, and embarrassed because she was the sole supporter for her two sons. She stated she stopped attending church, singing in the choir, and teaching Sunday school. She testified she had suicidal thoughts and felt she was worth more to her kids dead than alive. She stated she could no longer afford private Christian school for her youngest son, who began attending public school, which he resented. 2020003693 7 Complainant testified that she was hospitalized in 2010 or 2011 for a “stress anxiety attack, a nervous breakdown” for which she claimed to have supporting documentation. Complainant did not mention the surgery in her investigative affidavit. On cross examination, she testified that the surgery was in 2010 for her spine/neck. Complainant never provided any records of a stress- related hospitalization. Further, in her affidavit for compensatory damages she stated that she did not obtain psychological or psychiatric counseling because of the discrimination alleged in her complaint. Thus, we find the AJ properly disregarded Complainant’s testimony about a hospitalization for stress or anxiety in 2010 or 2011. Complainant’s older son testified that he left home for college after graduating from high school in 2005, and was still attending college in April 2009. He stated he called or visited his mother every other weekend and spent breaks with her. He testified there was a drastic change in her personality around the time he went to college and also stated he noticed a change in her personality when she was terminated. He stated that previously her “personality was always bubbly” and she was involved in the church and part of the choir. He noted she was always decorating the house for all the holidays and would always host family gatherings. Afterwards, he stated when he visited his mother, she was in her pajamas, her hair was not done, and he would hear her crying at night. She stopped going to church, quit the choir, stopped having friends and family over, and stopped decorating her home. He stated he saw bills lying around and that she expressed regret for not being able to help him financially with school. The Commission acknowledges that some of Complainant’s evidence reflects harm that began in 2005 through 2009, and not simply the retaliatory actions that occurred in 2009. However, the record reflects a nexus between the Agency’s discriminatory reprisal and Complainant’s emotional harm. Even if Complainant had pre-existing harm from the Agency’s 2006 actions, there is little doubt that the Agency’s reprisal aggravated that harm. Upon review, the Commission finds that generally $10,000.00 in compensatory damages would be appropriate. See Davida L. v. Dep’t of Veterans Affairs, EEOC Appeal No. 0120172609 (February 15, 2019) (finding Complainant subjected to retaliation and awarding $10,000.00 where she experienced panic attacks, insomnia, high blood pressure, irritability, headaches, feelings of isolation where record showed that harm began prior to retaliatory actions at issue); Melina K. v. Dep’t of Defense, EEOC Appeal No. 0120152834 (Aug. 10, 2017)(finding Complainant subject to retaliation and awarding $10,000.00 for emotional harm despite inconsistencies between medical documents and her statements), request for reconsideration denied, EEOC Request No. 0520170600 (Jan. 9, 2018). We find that some of Complainant’s current harm was due to harm previously suffered by Complainant from the actions at issue in her 2006 EEO complaint. Therefore, we reduce the award of damages in the present case by 25%, to reflect a total award of $7,500.00. Further, we find the AJ improperly reduced nonpecuniary damages in the amount of $1,750.00 found to have already been awarded in compensatory damages in the Velva B. class complaint. 2020003693 8 Specifically, we note Complainant disputes receiving such an amount and we find there is no evidence that the Agency paid $1,750.00 in compensatory damages to Complainant as a result of the Velva B. class case. Thus, Complainant is awarded a total of $7,500.00 in nonpecuniary, compensatory damages. Finally, we note Complainant has not established that she was entitled to any other relief. CONCLUSION Accordingly, the Agency’s finding that Complainant was subjected to discrimination when the Agency retaliated against her is AFFIRMED. The decision on relief is MODIFIED and the matter is REMANDED to the Agency for compliance with the Order herein. ORDER To the extent it has not already done so, the Agency shall take the following actions: 1. Within 60 days of the date this decision is issued, pay Complainant $7,500.00 in nonpecuniary, compensatory damages. 2. Within 60 days of the date this decision is issued, reinstate Complainant to a clerk position at the Monrovia Post Office with duties within her current medical restrictions, if any. The Agency is further directed to submit a report of compliance, as provided in the statement entitled “Implementation of the Commission’s Decision.” The report shall include supporting documentation verifying that the corrective action has been implemented. POSTING ORDER (G0617) The Agency is ordered to post at its Monrovia Post Office facility copies of the attached notice. Copies of the notice, after being signed by the Agency's duly authorized representative, shall be posted both in hard copy and electronic format by the Agency within 30 calendar days of the date this decision was issued, and shall remain posted for 60 consecutive days, in conspicuous places, including all places where notices to employees are customarily posted. The Agency shall take reasonable steps to ensure that said notices are not altered, defaced, or covered by any other material. The original signed notice is to be submitted to the Compliance Officer as directed in the paragraph entitled "Implementation of the Commission's Decision," within 10 calendar days of the expiration of the posting period. The report must be in digital format, and must be submitted via the Federal Sector EEO Portal (FedSEP). See 29 C.F.R. § 1614.403(g). 2020003693 9 ATTORNEY'S FEES (H1019) If Complainant has been represented by an attorney (as defined by 29 C.F.R. §1614.501(e)(1)(iii)), she/he is entitled to an award of reasonable attorney's fees incurred in the processing of the complaint. 29 C.F.R. § 1614.501(e). The award of attorney's fees shall be paid by the Agency. The attorney shall submit a verified statement of fees to the Agency -- not to the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, Office of Federal Operations -- within thirty (30) calendar days of receipt of this decision. The Agency shall then process the claim for attorney's fees in accordance with 29 C.F.R. § 1614.501. IMPLEMENTATION OF THE COMMISSION’S DECISION (K0719) Under 29 C.F.R. § 1614.405(c) and §1614.502, compliance with the Commission’s corrective action is mandatory. Within seven (7) calendar days of the completion of each ordered corrective action, the Agency shall submit via the Federal Sector EEO Portal (FedSEP) supporting documents in the digital format required by the Commission, referencing the compliance docket number under which compliance was being monitored. Once all compliance is complete, the Agency shall submit via FedSEP a final compliance report in the digital format required by the Commission. See 29 C.F.R. § 1614.403(g). The Agency’s final report must contain supporting documentation when previously not uploaded, and the Agency must send a copy of all submissions to the Complainant and his/her representative. If the Agency does not comply with the Commission’s order, the Complainant may petition the Commission for enforcement of the order. 29 C.F.R. § 1614.503(a). The Complainant also has the right to file a civil action to enforce compliance with the Commission’s order prior to or following an administrative petition for enforcement. See 29 C.F.R. §§ 1614.407, 1614.408, and 29 C.F.R. § 1614.503(g). Alternatively, the Complainant has the right to file a civil action on the underlying complaint in accordance with the paragraph below entitled “Right to File a Civil Action.” 29 C.F.R. §§ 1614.407 and 1614.408. A civil action for enforcement or a civil action on the underlying complaint is subject to the deadline stated in 42 U.S.C. 2000e-16(c) (1994 & Supp. IV 1999). If the Complainant files a civil action, the administrative processing of the complaint, including any petition for enforcement, will be terminated. See 29 C.F.R. § 1614.409. Failure by an agency to either file a compliance report or implement any of the orders set forth in this decision, without good cause shown, may result in the referral of this matter to the Office of Special Counsel pursuant to 29 C.F.R. § 1614.503(f) for enforcement by that agency. STATEMENT OF RIGHTS - ON APPEAL RECONSIDERATION (M0920) The Commission may, in its discretion, reconsider this appellate decision if Complainant or the Agency submits a written request that contains arguments or evidence that tend to establish that: 1. The appellate decision involved a clearly erroneous interpretation of material fact or law; or 2020003693 10 2. The appellate decision will have a substantial impact on the policies, practices, or operations of the agency. Requests for reconsideration must be filed with EEOC’s Office of Federal Operations (OFO) within thirty (30) calendar days of receipt of this decision. If the party requesting reconsideration elects to file a statement or brief in support of the request, that statement or brief must be filed together with the request for reconsideration. A party shall have twenty (20) calendar days from receipt of another party’s request for reconsideration within which to submit a brief or statement in opposition. See 29 C.F.R. § 1614.405; Equal Employment Opportunity Management Directive for 29 C.F.R. Part 1614 (EEO MD-110), at Chap. 9 § VII.B (Aug. 5, 2015). Complainant should submit his or her request for reconsideration, and any statement or brief in support of his or her request, via the EEOC Public Portal, which can be found at https://publicportal.eeoc.gov/Portal/Login.aspx Alternatively, Complainant can submit his or her request and arguments to the Director, Office of Federal Operations, Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, via regular mail addressed to P.O. Box 77960, Washington, DC 20013, or by certified mail addressed to 131 M Street, NE, Washington, DC 20507. In the absence of a legible postmark, a complainant’s request to reconsider shall be deemed timely filed if OFO receives it by mail within five days of the expiration of the applicable filing period. See 29 C.F.R. § 1614.604. An agency’s request for reconsideration must be submitted in digital format via the EEOC’s Federal Sector EEO Portal (FedSEP). See 29 C.F.R. § 1614.403(g). Either party’s request and/or statement or brief in opposition must also include proof of service on the other party, unless Complainant files his or her request via the EEOC Public Portal, in which case no proof of service is required. Failure to file within the 30-day time period will result in dismissal of the party’s request for reconsideration as untimely, unless extenuating circumstances prevented the timely filing of the request. Any supporting documentation must be submitted together with the request for reconsideration. The Commission will consider requests for reconsideration filed after the deadline only in very limited circumstances. See 29 C.F.R. § 1614.604(c). COMPLAINANT’S RIGHT TO FILE A CIVIL ACTION (T0610) This decision affirms the Agency’s final decision/action in part, but it also requires the Agency to continue its administrative processing of a portion of your complaint. You have the right to file a civil action in an appropriate United States District Court within ninety (90) calendar days from the date that you receive this decision on both that portion of your complaint which the Commission has affirmed and that portion of the complaint which has been remanded for continued administrative processing. 2020003693 11 In the alternative, you may file a civil action after one hundred and eighty (180) calendar days of the date you filed your complaint with the Agency, or your appeal with the Commission, until such time as the Agency issues its final decision on your complaint. If you file a civil action, you must name as the defendant in the complaint the person who is the official Agency head or department head, identifying that person by his or her full name and official title. Failure to do so may result in the dismissal of your case in court. “Agency” or “department” means the national organization, and not the local office, facility or department in which you work. If you file a request to reconsider and also file a civil action, filing a civil action will terminate the administrative processing of your complaint. RIGHT TO REQUEST COUNSEL (Z0815) If you want to file a civil action but cannot pay the fees, costs, or security to do so, you may request permission from the court to proceed with the civil action without paying these fees or costs. Similarly, if you cannot afford an attorney to represent you in the civil action, you may request the court to appoint an attorney for you. You must submit the requests for waiver of court costs or appointment of an attorney directly to the court, not the Commission. The court has the sole discretion to grant or deny these types of requests. Such requests do not alter the time limits for filing a civil action (please read the paragraph titled Complainant’s Right to File a Civil Action for the specific time limits). FOR THE COMMISSION: ______________________________ Carlton M. Hadden’s signature Carlton M. Hadden, Director Office of Federal Operations July 21, 2021 Date