[Redacted], Kim S., 1 Complainant,v.Louis DeJoy, Postmaster General, United States Postal Service (Southern Area), Agency.Download PDFEqual Employment Opportunity CommissionJun 7, 2021Appeal No. 2020000819 (E.E.O.C. Jun. 7, 2021) Copy Citation U.S. EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION Office of Federal Operations P.O. Box 77960 Washington, DC 20013 Kim S.,1 Complainant, v. Louis DeJoy, Postmaster General, United States Postal Service (Southern Area), Agency. Appeal No. 2020000819 Hearing No. 461201900104X Agency No. 1G701006018 DECISION Complainant timely appealed to the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (“EEOC” or “Commission”), pursuant to 29 C.F.R. § 1614.403, from a September 13, 2019 Final Agency Decision (“FAD”) concerning an equal employment opportunity (“EEO”) complaint alleging employment discrimination in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (“Title VII”), as amended, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq., Section 501 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 (“Rehabilitation Act”), as amended, 29 U.S.C. § 791 et seq., the Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967 (“ADEA”), as amended, 29 U.S.C. § 621 et seq., and the Equal Pay Act (“EPA”) of 1963, as amended, 29 U.S.C. § 206(d) et seq. BACKGROUND At the time of events giving rise to this complaint, Complainant was employed by the Agency as a Mail Processing/Quality Improvement Clerk, P-06, at the Shreveport Processing & Distribution Center (“P&DC”) located in Shreveport, Louisiana. On October 16, 2018, Complainant filed an EEO complaint alleging that he was subjected to discrimination by the Agency on the bases of race (black/American),2 sex (male), color (brown), 1 This case has been randomly assigned a pseudonym which will replace Complainant’s name when the decision is published to non-parties and the Commission’s website. 2020000819 2 physical disability (asthma, allergies, 100% disabled veteran), age (59), and reprisal for prior protected EEO activity when: 1. On or about June 26, 2009, he was excessed from his position, 2. On or about December 17, 2009, he was issued a letter of demand for $239.49, 3. On April 8, 2015, he sent a letter to the Manager of Human Resources about pay anomalies issues which was not properly handled, 4. Since on or about August 31, 2017, his request to be placed on a PS Form 1723, Assignment Order, for higher level work was denied, and, 5. On date(s) to be provided, handicap3 parking has not been made available to him. The Agency accepted Claims 4 and 5 for investigation, but dismissed Claims 1, 2 and 3 pursuant to 29 C.F.R. § 1614.107(a)(2), for untimely contact with an EEO counselor. The Agency alternately dismissed Claim 3 for failure to state a claim, pursuant to 29 C.F.R. § 1614.107(a)(1), as Claim 3 concerned an administrative proceeding under the Debt Collection Act, which falls outside the scope of EEOC’s statutory authority. At the conclusion of its investigation, the Agency provided Complainant with a copy of the report of investigation (“ROI”) and notice of his right to request a FAD or a hearing before an EEOC Administrative Judge (“AJ”). Complainant requested a hearing but subsequently withdrew his request and requested a FAD. The AJ remanded the matter to the Agency, which then issued a FAD pursuant to 29 C.F.R. § 1614.110(b). The ROI provides the following facts regarding the accepted claims: Complainant identifies the Executive Plant Manager, PCES-3, (“M1” white, male, 58) and one of M1’s reports, a Manager In-Plant Support, EAS-23, (“M2” white, male, 58), as the management officials responsible for the alleged discrimination. Complainant and M1 met when Complainant started working for the Agency in 1984, and M1 was a Postal Supervisor on the workroom floor. 2 Complainant’s formal complaint identified his race as “brown” however, the investigative record clarified that Complainant also identifies his race is black/African American, we have not included Complainant’s allegation of discrimination based his status as an Armed Forces Veteran, as it is not a protected category under EEO statutes. 3 The terms “handicap parking” and “accessible parking” are considered interchangeable for purposes of this Decision. 2020000819 3 M1 testified that he was aware that Complainant engaged in EEO and other protected activity over the years, noting that he recently participated in an EEO mediation session where Complainant represented the employee who raised the EEO complaint. Among other things, Complainant’s protected EEO activity also included filing claims in multiple venues between 1996 and 2004, alleging that there was insufficient accessible parking at the Shreveport P&DC employee parking lot.4 M1 also was aware that Complainant identified asthma and allergies as disabilities, as he requested a reasonable accommodation in 2009. Complainant and M2 met in 2015, when M2 became Complainant’s immediate supervisor. M2 was present throughout the relevant time frame, except June 2017 through February 2018, when he was on a detail assignment at another facility. M2 was aware that Complainant made references to “writing to Washington” regarding work matters but did not know the specifics of Complainant’s prior EEO activity. M2 states that he was unaware of Complainant’s disability. Claim 4 At Level 6, Complainant is at the highest level for his position as a Mail Clerk. Complainant alleges that he was assigned higher level duties on a daily basis, which overlapped with the duties of Data Control Technician, General “Dock” Expeditor, Lead Clerk, and Review Clerk. He has memorized the street addresses (as opposed to just the zip codes) to be able to visually confirm addresses in nearly all of the zip codes covered by the Shreveport P&DC. He recounts how he is regularly called away from his duties to provide assistance because he is a “qualified on-the-job instructor and having vast knowledge, skills, and abilities (“KSAs”) that he has acquired during his 34 years postal employment.” He also works regular overtime as a result of the additional responsibility, and often worked through his lunch breaks. Complainant submitted a PS Form 1723, requesting a higher pay assignment based on his higher level duties. If approved, the PS Form 1723 would result in a non-contractual agreement where the Agency could compensate Complainant for higher level work without formally promoting him. M1 recounts that on separate occasions M2 and the Acting Plant Manager who filled in while M2 was on detail, both came to him after Complainant inquired about higher placement. Each time, after reviewing Complainant’s work assignments and posted duties, they determined that Complainant was working the duties of his position, so a higher level assignment was not warranted. On December 4, 2017, Complainant provided M1 with a list of twenty (20) assignments that were higher level, mixed duty applicable to the Data Control Technician, General “Dock” Expeditor, Lead Clerk, and Review Clerk. Again, M1 determined that Complainant was performing level 6 duties that did not warrant higher level pay. 4 Shalow v. United States Postal Serv., EEOC Appeal No. 0120080623 (Jun. 18, 2010) reconsideration denied EEOC Request No. 0520100558 (Oct. 22, 2010) (EEOC Hearing No. EEOC No. 270200500099X, Agency Case No. 1G711000304) (Complainant’s most recent EEO activity with the Commission prior to the instant complaint, also referenced in the FAD and record, but the allegations did not concern M1 and M2). 2020000819 4 Accessible Parking Complainant is a 100% disabled veteran with a permanent service-connected disability. He also has asthma and allergies, which impair his breathing and sleeping in his personal life. Complainant parked in accessible parking spaces based on his disabled veteran status, but did not request accessible parking as a reasonable accommodation, believing it was not “job-related.” M1 was responsible for approving all parking plans at the Shreveport P&DC, and, among other things, was responsible for ensuring that the parking lot was configured so that it complied with the Americans for Disabilities Act (“ADA”). He testified that the employee parking lot contained 252 spaces, 8 of which were accessible parking spaces located “closest to the accessible route to the Employee Entrance.” Additionally, two of the ten parking spaces reserved for Management were accessible. In June 2005, following Complainant’s EEO activity related to accessible parking, the Access Board reviewed the modifications Management made to the employee parking lot and approved the parking configuration as ADA compliant. Since then, the only change to the configuration occurred in June 2012, when some employee parking spaces, including several accessible spaces, were paved over to allow more maneuverability when a truck entrance security gate was installed. However, M1 contends that the parking lot is still ADA complainant. Complainant disagrees, alleging that the Agency has a history of disregarding laws related to accessibility. On May 22, 2018, M1 issued a Notice to employees that accessible parking spaces are limited to those with handicap licenses, and appropriate documentation must be on record with Maintenance. The Notice also stated that the customer parking lot and the 10 parking spaces reserved for Management would be monitored, and only authorized individuals could park in those spaces. As a result, Complainant would be limited to parking in the employee parking lot, where the accessible spaces are all behind the designated smoking area. Based on his own assessment of the law and the parking lot, Complainant asserted that only one employee parking space as it is the shortest distance from the employee entrance was ADA complaint. He further alleges that the parking spaces reserved for Management are closer to the building than the accessible employee parking spaces. The FAD affirmed its dismissal of Claims 1, 2, and 3, and for Claims 4 and 5, concluded that Complainant failed to prove that the Agency subjected him to discrimination as alleged. The instant appeal followed. ANALYSIS AND FINDINGS As this is an appeal from a decision issued without a hearing, pursuant to 29 C.F.R. § 1614.110(b), the Agency's decision is subject to de novo review by the Commission. 29 C.F.R. § 1614.405(a). See Equal Employment Opportunity Management Directive for 29 C.F.R. Part 1614, at Chapter 9, § VI.A. (Aug. 5, 2015) (explaining that the de novo standard of review “requires that the Commission examine the record without regard to the factual and legal 2020000819 5 determinations of the previous decision maker,” and that EEOC “review the documents, statements, and testimony of record, including any timely and relevant submissions of the parties, and . . . issue its decision based on the Commission’s own assessment of the record and its interpretation of the law”). Untimely EEO Contact - Claims 1, 2 and 3 Pursuant to 29 C.F.R. § 1614.107(a)(2), an agency shall dismiss a complaint or a portion of a complaint that fails to comply with the applicable time limits contained in §1614.105, §1614.106 and §1614.204(c), unless the Agency extends the time limits in accordance with §1614.604(c). Pursuant to 29 C.F.R. § 1614.105(a)(1), complaints of discrimination should be brought to the attention of the EEO Counselor within 45 days of the date of the matter alleged to be discriminatory or, in the case of a personnel action, within 45 days of the effective date of the action. The Commission has adopted a "reasonable suspicion" standard (as opposed to a "supportive facts" standard) to determine when the 45 day limitation period is triggered. See Howard v. Dep't of the Navy, EEOC Request No. 05970852 (Feb. 11, 1999). Thus, the time limitation is not triggered until a complainant reasonably suspects discrimination, but before all the facts that support a charge of discrimination have become apparent. (Complainant v. United States Postal Serv., EEOC Appeal No. 0120120499 (Apr. 19, 2012)). The Commission has consistently held that a complainant who has engaged in prior EEO activity is deemed aware of the time frames required for filing complaints in the EEO procedure. See Williams v. Dep’t of Homeland Security, EEOC Appeal No. 0120111236 (Oct. 4, 2011), Coffey v. Dep’t. of the Navy, EEOC Request No. 05901006 (Nov. 16, 1990), Kader v. United States Postal Serv., EEOC Request No. 05980473 (Jun. 24, 1999). In the instant case, Complainant initiated contact with an EEO Counselor on July 9, 2018. By then, years had passed since the 45-day limitation period expired Claims 1, 2, and 3. The record, and the nature of these allegations, support the Agency’s argument that reasonable suspicion existed on or close to the dates the alleged discriminatory actions occurred. Additionally, Complainant has imputed knowledge of the EEO process based on ample past experience exercising his EEO rights as a complainant, and as an advocate for his coworkers. The Agency properly dismissed Claims 1, 2, and 3 for untimely EEO contact. While it is unnecessary at this point to provide an analysis, we note that the Agency’s alternate grounds for dismissing Claim 3 were also proper. See The Debt Collection Act, 31 U.S.C. § 3711 et seq., Complainant v. United States Postal Serv., EEOC Appeal No. 0120130752 (Apr. 17, 2013) (citations omitted). Disparate Treatment - Claim 4 A claim of disparate treatment based on indirect evidence is examined under the three-part analysis first enunciated in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973). 2020000819 6 For Complainant to prevail, he or she must first establish a prima facie case of discrimination by presenting facts that, if unexplained, reasonably give rise to an inference of discrimination, i.e., that a prohibited consideration was a factor in the adverse employment action. McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 802; Furnco Construction Corp. v. Waters, 438 U.S. 567 (1978). The burden then shifts to the Agency to articulate a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for its actions. Texas Dep’t. of Cmty. Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 253 (1981). Once the Agency has met its burden, Complainant bears the ultimate responsibility to persuade the fact finder by a preponderance of the evidence that the Agency acted on the basis of a prohibited reason. St. Mary’s Honor Ctr. v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502 (1993). This established order of analysis in discrimination cases, in which the first step normally consists of determining the existence of a prima facie case, need not be followed in all cases. Where the Agency has articulated a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for the personnel action at issue, the factual inquiry can proceed directly to the third step of the McDonnell Douglas analysis, the ultimate issue of whether Complainant has shown by a preponderance of the evidence that the Agency’s actions were motivated by discrimination. U.S. Postal Serv. Bd. of Governors v. Aikens, 460 U.S. 711, 713-714 (1983); Hernandez v. Dep’t. of Transp., EEOC Request No. 05900159 (Jun. 28, 1990); Peterson v. Dep’t. of Health and Human Serv., EEOC Request No. 05900467 (Jun. 8, 1990); Washington v. Dep’t. of the Navy, EEOC Petition No. 03900056 (May 31, 1990). The Agency’s legitimate nondiscriminatory reason for denying Complainant’s request to be placed on a PS Form 1723, Assignment Order for higher level work is that Complainant’s duties and assignments were consistent with his position description, so compensation at a higher level was not warranted. As Complainant’s immediate supervisor, M2 testified that to his knowledge, Complainant did not perform any of the higher-level duties of Data Control Technician, General “Dock” Expeditor, Lead Clerk, and Review Clerk, nor was he aware of any other higher-level assignments that Complainant performed. M1 agreed with M2, but clarified that the “Review Clerk” refers to “an unauthorized and obsolete position.” Both M1 and M2 acknowledged that Complainant’s daily workload involved Quality Improvement duties, including verifying mail to ensure sortation accuracy, maintaining records of mails, and completing the Priority Audit Checklist. However, contrary to Complainant’s assertions, these actions fell within the responsibilities of his bid position. The Agency identifies another Mail Clerk working at Level 6 had also been assigned Quality Improvement duties. Complainant argues that he has never performed the standard position description of a Mail Processing Clerk, as he has never been instructed to perform any duties on the Automated Letter Sorting Machine. Yet, the record contains an April 1, 2009 formal written request to M1, requesting that he be moved from Automation (letters), as a reasonable accommodation because the duty aggravated his allergies and asthma. While Complainant alleges that “all of the duties [he is] directed and instructed to perform daily are mixed assignments compatible to the Data Control Technician, General “Dock” Expeditor, Lead Clerk, and Review Clerk,” and cites the Agency’s Employee and Labor Relations Manual (“ELM”) definition of “mixed” duties, he has not provided supporting evidence that the duties he performs are at a higher level. 2020000819 7 Rather, Complainant provides examples of how he often works harder than his colleagues, working late, and missing lunch in order to complete assignments, as he is often called on to assist coworkers, based on his 34 years of mail clerk experience. He also explains that he has memorized thousands of street addresses (as opposed to zip codes) making him far more efficient at checking addresses than his colleagues. While Complainant may believe that his productivity and higher level of expertise warrant approval of a PS Form 1723, the examples he offers still fall within the position description of a Level 6 Mail Clerk. To the extent that Complainant cites his typing of the daily report as evidence that he has the special skillset required of a Data Technician, we note that he does not appear to have applied for the Data Technician position when it became open. For purposes of establishing pretext, comparative evidence relating to other employees is considered relevant when they are “similarly situated.” See Anderson v. Dep’t of Treasury, EEOC Appeal No. 01A22092 (Mar. 13, 2003). In other words, all relevant aspects of the employees' work situation are identical or nearly identical, including, but not limited to, reporting to the same supervisor, performing the same job function, and working during the same time periods. See Stewart v. Dep’t of Defense, EEOC Appeal No. 01A02890 (Jun. 27, 2001); Jones v. United States Postal Serv., EEOC Appeal No. 01983491 (Apr. 13, 2000); See Grappone v. Dep’t of the Navy, EEOC No. 01A10667 (Sept. 7, 2001) recon. denied, EEOC Request No. 05A20020 (Dec. 28, 2002). Here, Complainant identifies four comparator employees, outside his protected classes: Comparator 1 (“C1,” African-American, female, 57, disability) was competitively awarded the position of Data Collection Technician, Level 7, on July 26, 2014, then was detailed to an EAS Supervisor position in December 2014, and retired on December 31, 2018. According to Complainant, M1 “conveniently created an assignment of Data Control Technician” for C1 so she could be utilized in dual assignments until the Union cited the violation. However, there is no evidence to support Complainant’s allegation, and it is not relevant to the issue of whether Complainant was performing the same work for less pay. Complainant’s allegation (also unsupported by evidence) that C1 took three lunch breaks, whereas he often skipped his lunch break, conflates the belief that he is more deserving of Level 7 pay than C1 based on his work ethic and productivity with the Agency’s system of paying employees based on their position and assignments. Complainant has not shown that he is similarly situated to C1, who held a different job title and responsibilities. Comparator 2 (“C2” white, male, 40, disability status unknown), on paper was a Parcel Post Distribution-Machine Associate, with a different supervisor of record than Complainant. However, he reported to M2 as a Data Collection Technician, Level 7, for three years, on a PS Form 1723, then formally promoted the position on January 5, 2019. Complainant alleges that prior to his bid selection as “best qualified” for the Data Control Technician C2 “conveyed” to Complainant that he never performed any of the duties posted in the position. Complainant also argues that C2’s three years on a PS Form 1723 violated Agency policies and the Collective Bargaining Agreement (“CBA”) between the Agency and the Union, which M1 and M2 dispute. Neither of Complainant’s arguments establish that he was similarly situated to C2. 2020000819 8 Based on the record, Complainant and C2 had different duties and job titles. To the extent that he was granted a PS Form 1723, unlike the duties on Complainant’s denied PS Form 1723, C2’s duties were higher level than his position of record. Comparator 3 (“C3,” Hispanic, male, 45, disability status not specified) and Complainant are both Level 6 Mail Processing Clerks who report to M2. According to M1, Complainant and C3 are both assigned additional Quality Improvement duties, tailored to their assigned tour, and they are within the duties of the position so a PS Form 1723 Assignment Order for higher level work is “not appropriate, warranted, nor authorized.” There is no indication that C3 submitted a PS Form 1723 requesting a higher level of compensation, so C3 is not similarly situated to Complainant. However, C3 supports the Agency’s argument that the work Complainant is assigned is consistent with his bid at Level 6. Comparator 4 (“C4,” African-American, female, 63, disability status not specified) Data Collection Technician for the Louisiana District, who reports to the Supervisor, Statistical Programs in the Finance Unit of the Louisiana District in New Orleans, LA. C4 applied and was competitively selected for the position in 2007. As C4 reports to a different supervisor in a different office, she is not “similarly situated” to Complainant. Complainant has not offered any additional evidence to support that the Agency’s legitimate nondiscriminatory reason for denying his PS Form 1723 was pretext for discrimination. Reasonable Accommodation - Claim 5 An Agency is required to make reasonable accommodation to the known physical and mental limitations of a qualified individual with a disability unless the Agency can show that accommodation would cause an undue hardship. See 29 C.F.R. §§ 1630.2(o) and (p); EEOC Enforcement Guidance on Reasonable Accommodation and Undue Hardship under the Americans with Disabilities Act (Enforcement Guidance), EEOC Notice No. 915.002 (Oct. 17, 2002). A “qualified” individual with a disability is an “individual with a disability who satisfies the requisite skill, experience, education, and other job-related requirements of the employment position such individual holds or desires, and who, with or without reasonable accommodation, can perform the essential functions of such position.” 29 C.F.R. §1630.2(m). A modification or adjustment is “reasonable” if it appears to be “feasible” or “plausible.” Enforcement Guidance at 4. An accommodation also must be effective in meeting the needs of the individual. Id. at 4-5. As a preliminary matter, the Agency determined that Complainant failed to establish that he was a qualified individual with a disability in part because he did not request a “job-related” accommodation. It is undisputed that Complainant can perform the essential functions of his position, as well as all of the duties of all job assignments he receives without an accommodation. However, the alleged lack of an accessible parking space is “job-related” because it concerns Complainant’s ability to access the job site. 2020000819 9 As a 100% disabled veteran, Complainant should qualify for accessible parking. It is unclear if his license plate indicated his parking status, or if, in accordance with the April 22, 2018 Notice, he needed to provide documentation to the Agency establishing that he was authorized to park in accessible parking spaces. Assuming Complainant notified the Agency that he required accessible parking and completed any required paperwork, there were 8 accessible parking spaces in the employee parking lot available to him. Ultimately, Complainant is objecting to the Agency’s decision to enforce its policy that unauthorized employees are barred from parking in accessible parking spaces reserved for customers, and the spaces reserved for Management, which are much closer to the building, and would allow Complainant to avoid secondhand smoke. Complainant has not provided any evidence to support his assertions that the 8 accessible employee spaces are not ADA compliant. To the extent that he requires a reasonable accommodation so that he can park in an accessible space that will not involve exacerbating his allergies and asthma, there is no indication that Complainant raised this matter with the Agency. Therefore, he has not shown that the Agency denied him a reasonable accommodation. CONCLUSION Based on a thorough review of the record and the contentions on appeal, including those not specifically addressed herein, we AFFIRM the Agency’s final decision finding no discrimination. STATEMENT OF RIGHTS - ON APPEAL RECONSIDERATION (M0920) The Commission may, in its discretion, reconsider this appellate decision if Complainant or the Agency submits a written request that contains arguments or evidence that tend to establish that: 1. The appellate decision involved a clearly erroneous interpretation of material fact or law; or 2. The appellate decision will have a substantial impact on the policies, practices, or operations of the agency. Requests for reconsideration must be filed with EEOC’s Office of Federal Operations (OFO) within thirty (30) calendar days of receipt of this decision. If the party requesting reconsideration elects to file a statement or brief in support of the request, that statement or brief must be filed together with the request for reconsideration. A party shall have twenty (20) calendar days from receipt of another party’s request for reconsideration within which to submit a brief or statement in opposition. See 29 C.F.R. § 1614.405; Equal Employment Opportunity Management Directive for 29 C.F.R. Part 1614 (EEO MD-110), at Chap. 9 § VII.B (Aug. 5, 2015). 2020000819 10 Complainant should submit his or her request for reconsideration, and any statement or brief in support of his or her request, via the EEOC Public Portal, which can be found at https://publicportal.eeoc.gov/Portal/Login.aspx Alternatively, Complainant can submit his or her request and arguments to the Director, Office of Federal Operations, Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, via regular mail addressed to P.O. Box 77960, Washington, DC 20013, or by certified mail addressed to 131 M Street, NE, Washington, DC 20507. In the absence of a legible postmark, a complainant’s request to reconsider shall be deemed timely filed if OFO receives it by mail within five days of the expiration of the applicable filing period. See 29 C.F.R. § 1614.604. An agency’s request for reconsideration must be submitted in digital format via the EEOC’s Federal Sector EEO Portal (FedSEP). See 29 C.F.R. § 1614.403(g). Either party’s request and/or statement or brief in opposition must also include proof of service on the other party, unless Complainant files his or her request via the EEOC Public Portal, in which case no proof of service is required. Failure to file within the 30-day time period will result in dismissal of the party’s request for reconsideration as untimely, unless extenuating circumstances prevented the timely filing of the request. Any supporting documentation must be submitted together with the request for reconsideration. The Commission will consider requests for reconsideration filed after the deadline only in very limited circumstances. See 29 C.F.R. § 1614.604(c). COMPLAINANT’S RIGHT TO FILE A CIVIL ACTION (S0610) You have the right to file a civil action in an appropriate United States District Court within ninety (90) calendar days from the date that you receive this decision. If you file a civil action, you must name as the defendant in the complaint the person who is the official Agency head or department head, identifying that person by his or her full name and official title. Failure to do so may result in the dismissal of your case in court. “Agency” or “department” means the national organization, and not the local office, facility or department in which you work. If you file a request to reconsider and also file a civil action, filing a civil action will terminate the administrative processing of your complaint. RIGHT TO REQUEST COUNSEL (Z0815) If you want to file a civil action but cannot pay the fees, costs, or security to do so, you may request permission from the court to proceed with the civil action without paying these fees or costs. Similarly, if you cannot afford an attorney to represent you in the civil action, you may request the court to appoint an attorney for you. You must submit the requests for waiver of court costs or appointment of an attorney directly to the court, not the Commission. The court has the sole discretion to grant or deny these types of requests. 2020000819 11 requests do not alter the time limits for filing a civil action (please read the paragraph titled Complainant’s Right to File a Civil Action for the specific time limits). FOR THE COMMISSION: ______________________________ Carlton M. Hadden’s signature Carlton M. Hadden, Director Office of Federal Operations June 7, 2021 Date Copy with citationCopy as parenthetical citation