[Redacted], Joi J., 1 Complainant,v.Jelena McWilliams, Chairman, Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, Agency.

Equal Employment Opportunity Commission

Aug 25, 2021

Appeal No. 2020002173 (E.E.O.C. Aug. 25, 2021)

U.S. EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION Office of Federal Operations P.O. Box 77960 Washington, DC 20013 Joi J.,1 Complainant, v. Jelena McWilliams, Chairman, Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, Agency. Appeal No. 2020002173 Hearing No. 570-2019-00521X Agency No. FDICEO-18-001 DECISION On January 17, 2020, Complainant filed an appeal with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC or Commission), pursuant to 29 C.F.R. § 1614.403(a), from the Agency’s December 19, 2019 final decision concerning her equal employment opportunity (EEO) complaint alleging employment discrimination in violation of Section 501 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 (Rehabilitation Act), as amended, 29 U.S.C. § 791 et seq. BACKGROUND At the time of events giving rise to this complaint, Complainant worked as a Chief, Consumer Response Center, CM-01, at the Agency’s Kansas City Regional Office, Division of Depositor and Consumer Protection facility in Kansas City, Missouri. On December 13, 2017, Complainant filed an EEO complaint alleging that the Agency discriminated against her on the bases of disability (Diabetes - Type I, perceived as being alcoholic) and reprisal for prior protected EEO activity under Section 501 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 when: 1. Since October 3, 2017, Complainant has been subjected to harassment; 1 This case has been randomly assigned a pseudonym which will replace Complainant’s name when the decision is published to non-parties and the Commission’s website. 2020002173 2 2. On October 3, 2017, Complainant was issued a Letter of Warning - Performance (LOW); 3. On October 27, 2017, Complainant was issued a letter of admonishment; 4. On January 24, 2018, Complainant was issued a performance appraisal with an overall performance rating of "II" for 2017; 5. On January 24, 2018, Complainant was told that she was being reassigned to the Washington Office; 6. On January 29, 2018, and February 4, 2018, Complainant requested medical telework but her requests were denied; 7. On April 13, 2018, Complainant was issued a Notice of Proposed Demotion; and 8. On July 11, 2018, Complainant was involuntarily transferred to work in Dallas, Texas. At the conclusion of the investigation, the Agency provided Complainant with a copy of the report of investigation and notice of her right to request a hearing before an Equal Employment Opportunity Commission Administrative Judge (AJ). Complainant timely requested a hearing but subsequently withdrew her request. Consequently, the Agency issued a final decision (FAD) pursuant to 29 C.F.R. § 1614.110(b). The Agency’s FAD concluded that Complainant failed to prove that the Agency subjected her to discrimination as alleged. Specifically, the FAD2 found that, with regard to claims 2 through 8, management officials articulated legitimate nondiscriminatory reasons for their actions. With regard to the LOW, the letter itself stated that Complainant was overly casual with emails, tardy in producing monthly reports, and was not always available to address various harassment and misconduct allegations made by her subordinates against coworkers. The same rationale supported the performance appraisal. With regard to the letter of admonishment, Complainant’s second-level supervisor (S2) averred that Complainant’s timesheet showed “discrepancies” where on nine occasions her time and attendance records did not match the parking lot entry/exit records. With regard to the reassignment to the Washington Office, the Notice of Proposed Demotion, and the involuntary transfer, the FAD found that the actions were due to Complainant compromising the fairness of the selection process for an Agency vacancy. The FAD further found that Complainant failed to show that the Agency’s articulated reasons for its actions were pretextual. With regard to Complainant’s request to telework, the FAD found that the request was initially denied because Complainant’s medical documentation did not support the request but that once Complainant supplied additional paperwork, the request was granted. Finally, with regard to the harassment allegations, the FAD found that the actions complained of neither involved nor were they based on Complainant’s protected bases. The instant appeal from Complainant followed. 2 We note that the FAD ordered the incidents differently than we have in our decision. 2020002173 3 ANALYSIS AND FINDINGS As this is an appeal from a decision issued without a hearing, pursuant to 29 C.F.R. § 1614.110(b), the Agency's decision is subject to de novo review by the Commission. 29 C.F.R. § 1614.405(a). See Equal Employment Opportunity Management Directive for 29 C.F.R. Part 1614, at Chapter 9, § VI.A. (Aug. 5, 2015) (explaining that the de novo standard of review “requires that the Commission examine the record without regard to the factual and legal determinations of the previous decision maker,” and that EEOC “review the documents, statements, and testimony of record, including any timely and relevant submissions of the parties, and . . . issue its decision based on the Commission’s own assessment of the record and its interpretation of the law”). Disparate Treatment Where, as here, complainant does not have direct evidence of discrimination, a claim alleging disparate treatment is examined under the three-part test set forth in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973). Under this analysis, a complainant initially must establish a prima facie case of discrimination by presenting facts that, if unexplained, reasonably give rise to an inference of discrimination, i.e., that a prohibited consideration was a factor in the adverse employment action. See St Mary's Honor Center v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502, 507 (1993); Texas Dep't of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 252-53 (1981); McDonnell Douglas 411 U.S. at 802. Next, in response, the agency must articulate a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for the challenged actions. See Burdine, 450 U.S. at 253-54; McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 802. Finally, it is complainant's burden to demonstrate by a preponderance of the evidence that the agency's action was based on prohibited considerations of discrimination, that is, its articulated reason for its action was not its true reason but a sham or pretext for discrimination. See Hicks, 509 U.S. at 511; Burdine, 450 U.S. at 252-53; McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 804. This established order of analysis need not be followed in all cases. Where the agency has articulated a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for the personnel action at issue, the factual inquiry can proceed directly to the third step of the McDonnell Douglas analysis, the ultimate issue of whether complainant has shown by a preponderance of the evidence that the agency's actions were motivated by discrimination. See U.S. Postal Serv. Bd. of Governors v. Aikens, 460 U.S. 711, 713-14 (1983). For purposes of analysis we will assume, but do not find, that complainant established her prima facie case of discrimination. We next find that Agency officials articulated legitimate, nondiscriminatory reasons for their actions. With regard to the LOW, the document itself, signed by S1, states that Complainant: Sent out email communications [that] were not always professional in tone or content. Some emails were frenzied in nature. You also did not consider impact [sic] of working in a union-environment when you included a statement in a CRC staff email . . . . that a work assignment change was coming before the change in working conditions was fully approved 2020002173 4 and vetted with the local union. Due to your email and lack of awareness how [sic] to manage in a union environment, staff were left wondering what you meant for 4 months. In a discussion with me, you couldn’t answer basic questions about how the new teams were going to structurally work. You responded that [name omitted] would know the information I requested as she did the most work on it. As CRC Chief it is your responsibility to be fully informed of all current and proposed operations of the section. In a meeting with [S2] you failed to demonstrate basic knowledge about the section staffing, such as authorized FTEs, current staff counts and other statistics (retirements, part time, etc.). Again, as Section Chief it is your responsibility to always be fully knowledgeable of you [sic] section’s staffing, FTE’s and other key factors. You sent an email to [S2] requesting help for the CRC to help fill the gap created after your intern was terminated. She arranged two individuals who had previously worked for the CRC, but [you never] used them for work assignments. . . . The email [to S2] appears to have been more reaction and of [sic] request by someone who had monitored the work pending to determine need. Your failure to utilize the resources provided raises questions if you really needed assistance or not. . .. Staff raised concerns about why you were visibly walking [two subordinates] to their cars. It was raised that you made it known publicly that you were there to walk with them. Other staff saw this as favoritism and since [one coworker was already walking the other] there was no need for you to go along. Your lack of professionalism, discreetness and awareness how [sic] this affected other staff in the area was harmful to the team morale. . .. You approved an award for employee [sic] . . . who was under investigation . . .. You were part of a management meeting that agreed to this investigation. . .. Even if the award was warranted, you should have discussed this pending award with me . . .. Staff who participated in interviews during a recent management review pointed out the appearance of a lack of management availability and involvement with staff, specifically at the time of tense staff disagreement and interactions. You must be present and available to staff in order to provide adequate oversight.. .. Frequently you do not provide me with the monthly director report updates until after I remind you they are due. These are due by the 10th of every month. This is unacceptable because our branch report to [the Director] is delayed and reflects badly on my team. You validated and certified timesheeets that indicated hours worked that were inconsistent with your time present in the office. S1 provided testimony reiterating many of these points and further averred that these same factors were the reasons for Complainant’s performance rating of “II” during that period. 2020002173 5 With regard to the letter of admonishment, the letter, again signed by S1, stated: This letter is to admonish you for your submission of incorrect time and attendance records. On October 3, 2017, I informed you that your time and attendance reported on the dates and times noted below were inconsistent with the length of time you were in the office. You provided the following responses to each occurrence; however, even if you had teleworked after you left the office to fulfill the hours you claimed, the manner in which you requested and coded your time is inappropriate. Further, even if you have someone validate your time and attendance in your absence if you are on leave, you are still responsible for ensuring that your time was properly coded when you return to work. I expect you to follow all leave and telework requesting procedures in the same manner that all other employees are expected to follow. As a second level manager, you are held to the highest standards, and your failure to follow these procedures is unacceptable and disappointing. Your subordinate employees look to you to hold yourself accountable to the same standards to which they are held, and it is of paramount importance that you set a worthy example for them to follow. With regard to claims 5, 7, & 8, Complainant’s third-level supervisor (S3: no claimed disability) averred that the actions were taken because: The record put before me indicated that there was an extensive investigation of a particular hiring process that the Complainant was involved in as the head of the interview panel. What I saw in that record were multiple instances of one or two things - either extremely poor judgment or the intent to unfairly bias the hiring process. I cannot speak to what was in the Complainant's heart while she was engaged in those actions, but committing either action in my mind was sufficient enough to disqualify her from a supervisory position and from any high level of responsibility. Understand that the Complainant supervised and managed a team that has significant interactions with the public. The leadership position she served in requires someone who has sound judgment and unimpeachable integrity. For the Complainant to have either a pattern of lapses in judgment or an intentional strategy of attempting to influence the integrity of a hiring process would disqualify her from serving in a supervisory role. The record raised significant concerns regarding Complainants honesty and integrity. . .. There were numerous instances in the record put before me where the Complainant engaged in actions that would impair the integrity of the hiring process or she made statements and representations that simply were not true. Just to point to one of the more egregious misrepresentations. She communicated to her superiors that her interview panel was recommending for selection [a candidate, name omitted (IS)] for a supervisory consumer affairs position in the Kansas City CRC, with [IS] supposedly being the consensus highest rated and ranked candidate coming out of the interview process. This was simply not true, with neither one of the other two panelists supporting the Complainant's representations. 2020002173 6 Finally, with regard to the denial of telework, S2 averred that Complainant: [S]ubmitted a request and I initially denied [it]. We have a directive governing medical telework that sets forth criteria that must be met in order for the telework to be approved. The Complainant's initial request did not meet those criteria. The medical documentation the Complainant submitted to support her initial request indicated that her medical condition caused her to be unable to drive. However, this did not indicate that she could not perform her job responsibilities at the jobsite once she availed herself of alternative ways to get to her office such as by means of public transportation. Consequently, the initial request did not meet the directive's specific requirements for medical telework and was denied. . .. Her initial request was received on our [sic] about 1-30-2018 and approved on or about 2-16-2018. The Agency having articulated legitimate nondiscriminatory reasons for its actions, the burden shifts back to Complainant to establish, by a preponderance of the evidence, that the Agency’s reasons were not its true reasons, but were pretexts for discrimination. See Hicks; Burdine; McDonnell Douglas. Following a review of the record we find that Complainant has failed to meet this burden. With regard to the LOW and the 2017 performance rating, Complainant averred that many of the incidents identified in the LOW, including unprofessional emails, actually occurred in prior years and had been addressed in her 2016 evaluation, and were “matters of which I took corrective action on.” With regard to the emails, Complainant maintained that her staff welcomed her “relaxed communication style” and that she had discussed her communication style with a managerial coach who advised her that “offering personal information goes a long way in building relationships with your staff.” Complainant further maintained that the reports that S1 claimed were late, in fact “several were submitted on the due date.” With regard to her failure to consider union approval, Complainant averred that she: [H]ad been in contact with KC LERS [sic] and had determined that the change in process would not require Union approval; however, we would be conservative and request approval anyway. This had been communicated to [S1]. Additionally, my management team and I had been working diligently on a communication strategy for staff to avoid surprises and keep staff better informed. Together, we had determined that to obtain staff buy-in we would put information forward in the CRC weekly followed by discussions in their team meetings. [S1] had reduced my weekly check-ins with her from an hour down to sometimes 15 minutes. The communication strategy did not rise to the level of importance as did other items happening in the CRC. Complainant denied that her action in walking an employee to her car was unprofessional and maintained that the employee had previously made allegations against an intern who was subsequently fired, which made the employee feel unsafe. 2020002173 7 Complainant averred that she was only complying with advice from the HR department when she accompanied the employee to her parked car. With regard to the charge that management was not present and available to employees when contentious issues arose in the workplace, Complainant disagreed and argued that one incident occurred at 5:45 am before her she arrived in the office but that once she arrived “I immediately had conversations with both employees. Another occurrence happened which was immediately addressed by their immediate supervisor (IS).” Complainant averred that IS was overworked and that S1 had advised her to work behind closed doors. [IS] was operating without a team lead and as such was having to perform her own managerial assignments as well as perform team lead functions. It was not uncommon for [IS] to have a 10 to 12 hour day. Her daily amount of work was crippling and such [sic] she complied with [S1]'s suggestion to keep her office door shut. Unfortunately, [S1]'s suggestion resulted in staff feeling that she was unavailable to them. My office door was closed a considerable amount of time having meetings with an executive coach, briefing [S1] and also having phone conversations with LERS. I teleworked quite infrequently and was only absent from the office for required meetings in Washington DC or approved leave. Complainant averred that she felt that the LOW was based on her disability because one of the requirements in the LOW was that Complainant provide 48 hours-notice of any planned leave requests but her diabetic condition caused her blood sugar levels to spike unpredictably, requiring sudden need to take leave without being able to provide the required 48 hours-notice. Because she was making efforts to comply with earlier corrective directives from management, Complainant maintained, her evaluation of “II” was unwarranted. Finally, Complainant argued that because two of her subordinates received ratings of “outstanding” it “does not make any sense” that she, as their supervisor, would be rated as “unsatisfactory”. With regard to the letter of admonishment, Complainant averred that S1: [I]ndicates that my timesheets were prepared incorrectly. This is a correct statement. I failed to record 'telework' as such on my timesheet. I believe there were 7 instances under question. For three of the seven, I was hospitalized and my timesheet was completed by the timekeeper who was unaware that I had teleworked. I was able to provide email records requesting telework for all but one of the instances recorded. The other instance I recalled requesting telework via text message. Despite my email records, I was provided a Letter of Admonishment for completing timesheets incorrectly. Two of my staff members were recently found falsifying work hours (claiming time they did not actually complete - a much more serious offense) and they were issued Letters of Counseling. 2020002173 8 With regard to claims 5, 7, & 8, Complainant maintained she behaved appropriately, and she denied each of the various charges used by the Agency in support of its decision to reassign, demote, and involuntarily transfer her. Complainant denied the first charge, pointing out that she openly disclosed the fact that she knew the candidate (IS) and that she told the other panel members that if they had any qualms about Complainant being on the panel, they could remove her. She averred that her email to the panel was not an instruction to select IS for the position: [B]ut was intended to let the other panel members know that they would have to rate and rank the candidates without me participating in the actual scorings on the matter since I was not totally impartial given my work and personal relationship with one of the candidates. I was trying to let my fellow panel members know that even though I was on the panel, I will follow their lead on the scorings and rankings reached. I believe I did exactly what I was supposed to do by reporting my relationship with one of the candidates and that is why the subject email was sent. Complainant next denied the charge that she discussed the interview questions with IS beforehand, explaining that in fact IS was reluctant to apply for the position because she believed S1 & 2 “had it out for her.” Complainant maintains she encouraged IS to apply and assured her that the process would be fair, whereupon IS, according to Complainant, asked what kinds of questions would be asked during the interview. Complainant maintains that she told IS that the questions would be: [T]the same kinds of questions that are asked for any leadership position advertised and then I directed her to go and look at the question bank in the database. That is the extent of my response to her inquiry about the interview questions. I did not specify in any way the questions that were going to be asked. Understand that the generalized response I gave to [IS] would have been the same response I would have given to any other candidate who asked me what interview questions were going to be asked during the interview process. Hence, my response to [IS] inquiry gave her no distinct advantage in the interview process. With regard to the charges that she spoke negatively about the highest-scoring candidate, and that she tried to bolster the candidacy of IS, Complainant denied that her comments about the high-scoring candidate were in any way negative and argued that both comments were taken out of context. With regard to the charge that she sent an email to S2 & 3 falsely implying that the panel had scored or ranked the candidate’s resumes, Complainant averred that “The panel did collectively review and evaluate the resumes while discussing whose resume was the strongest. To me, that constituted scoring and ranking the resumes.” With regard to the charge that Complainant had sent an email to S2 & 3 inaccurately announcing that the panel had “determined that [IS] would be our recommendation,” Complainant denied that specification, averring that “ I asked each panel member whom would they recommend at that time knowing that there would be a round of second interviews. 2020002173 9 They both told me they would recommend [IS], which is what I related to my superiors.” Complainant further denied all the remaining charges the Agency made in support of its decision to reassign, demote, and involuntarily transfer her. Following a review of the record, we find that Complainant has not shown, by a preponderance of the evidence, that the Agency officials’ articulated reasons for the disputed actions were a pretext designed to mask discriminatory animus against her protected bases. While Complainant disagrees with the Agency’s actions, we find that she has presented insufficient evidence, other than her own belief, that the Agency’s actions were motivated by discriminatory or retaliatory animus. Even assuming arguendo that Complainant’s rebuttals are true and Agency officials misunderstood her actions, Complainant has not shown that the Agency’s actions in response were discriminatory or retaliatory as opposed to being merely an unfortunate misunderstanding. Furthermore, to the extent Complainant’s request to telework constituted a request for a reasonable accommodation, Complainant does not dispute S2’s testimony to the effect that Complainant’s first request to telework was denied but that once she submitted additional medical documentation in support of her request, the request was granted “sometime in February 2018” which is within a month of Complainant’s initial, unsuccessful request on January 29, 2018. Under the circumstances presented here, such a time period is too short to constitute a denial of the request and we therefore find no denial of reasonable accommodation. Hostile Work Environment We note initially that, to the extent that Complainant is alleging that she was subjected to a hostile work environment when she was issued a LOW, a letter of admonishment, and a lowered performance appraisal, she was reassigned to the Washington Office, her telework requests were denied, she was issued a Notice of Proposed Demotion, and she was involuntarily transferred to work in Dallas, Texas, we find under the standards set forth in Harris v. Forklift Systems, Inc., 510 U.S. 17 (1993) that any claim of hostile work environment that includes such claims must fail. See Enforcement Guidance on Harris v. Forklift Systems, Inc., EEOC Notice No. 915.002 (March 8, 1994). A prima facie case of hostile work environment that includes such claims is precluded based on our finding that Complainant failed to establish that any of the actions taken by the agency were motivated by discriminatory animus or retaliatory motive. See Oakley v. United States Postal Service, EEOC Appeal No. 01982923 (September 21, 2000). Complainant alleges she was instructed not to interact with coworkers and subordinates during the investigation into the allegation that she interfered with the selection process of a candidate for employment. In considering whether this action constitutes harassment, the Commission notes that in Harris, the Supreme Court reaffirmed the holding of Meritor Savings Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57 (1986), that harassment is actionable if it is sufficiently severe or pervasive that it results in an alteration of the conditions of the complainant’s employment. See EEOC Notice No. 915.002 (March 8, 1994), Enforcement Guidance on Harris v. Forklift Systems, Inc. at 3. 2020002173 10 To establish a claim of harassment a complainant must show that: (1) she belongs to a statutorily protected class; (2) she was subjected to unwelcome verbal or physical conduct involving the protected class; (3) the harassment complained of was based on the statutorily protected class; (4) the harassment had the purpose or effect of unreasonably interfering with her work performance and/or creating an intimidating, hostile, or offensive work environment; and (5) there is a basis for imputing liability to the employer. See McCleod v. Social Security Administration, EEOC Appeal No. 01963810 (August 5, 1999) (citing Henson v. City of Dundee, 682 F.2d 897 (11th Cir. 1982). In other words, to prove her harassment claim, Complainant must establish that she was subjected to conduct that was either so severe or so pervasive that a “reasonable person” in Complainant’s position would have found the conduct to be hostile or abusive. Complainant must also prove that the conduct was taken because of a protected basis - in this case, her disability. Only if Complainant establishes both of those elements - hostility and motive - will the question of Agency liability present itself. Following a review of the record, we find that Complainant has not shown that the alleged actions either involved or were based on her protected bases. CONCLUSION Based on a thorough review of the record and the contentions on appeal, including those not specifically addressed herein, we find that Complainant has not shown that discrimination or reprisal occurred, and we AFFIRM the FAD. STATEMENT OF RIGHTS - ON APPEAL RECONSIDERATION (M0920) The Commission may, in its discretion, reconsider this appellate decision if Complainant or the Agency submits a written request that contains arguments or evidence that tend to establish that: 1. The appellate decision involved a clearly erroneous interpretation of material fact or law; or 2. The appellate decision will have a substantial impact on the policies, practices, or operations of the agency. Requests for reconsideration must be filed with EEOC’s Office of Federal Operations (OFO) within thirty (30) calendar days of receipt of this decision. If the party requesting reconsideration elects to file a statement or brief in support of the request, that statement or brief must be filed together with the request for reconsideration. A party shall have twenty (20) calendar days from receipt of another party’s request for reconsideration within which to submit a brief or statement in opposition. See 29 C.F.R. § 1614.405; Equal Employment Opportunity Management Directive for 29 C.F.R. Part 1614 (EEO MD-110), at Chap. 9 § VII.B (Aug. 5, 2015). 2020002173 11 Complainant should submit his or her request for reconsideration, and any statement or brief in support of his or her request, via the EEOC Public Portal, which can be found at https://publicportal.eeoc.gov/Portal/Login.aspx Alternatively, Complainant can submit his or her request and arguments to the Director, Office of Federal Operations, Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, via regular mail addressed to P.O. Box 77960, Washington, DC 20013, or by certified mail addressed to 131 M Street, NE, Washington, DC 20507. In the absence of a legible postmark, a complainant’s request to reconsider shall be deemed timely filed if OFO receives it by mail within five days of the expiration of the applicable filing period. See 29 C.F.R. § 1614.604. An agency’s request for reconsideration must be submitted in digital format via the EEOC’s Federal Sector EEO Portal (FedSEP). See 29 C.F.R. § 1614.403(g). Either party’s request and/or statement or brief in opposition must also include proof of service on the other party, unless Complainant files his or her request via the EEOC Public Portal, in which case no proof of service is required. Failure to file within the 30-day time period will result in dismissal of the party’s request for reconsideration as untimely, unless extenuating circumstances prevented the timely filing of the request. Any supporting documentation must be submitted together with the request for reconsideration. The Commission will consider requests for reconsideration filed after the deadline only in very limited circumstances. See 29 C.F.R. § 1614.604(c). COMPLAINANT’S RIGHT TO FILE A CIVIL ACTION (S0610) You have the right to file a civil action in an appropriate United States District Court within ninety (90) calendar days from the date that you receive this decision. If you file a civil action, you must name as the defendant in the complaint the person who is the official Agency head or department head, identifying that person by his or her full name and official title. Failure to do so may result in the dismissal of your case in court. “Agency” or “department” means the national organization, and not the local office, facility or department in which you work. If you file a request to reconsider and also file a civil action, filing a civil action will terminate the administrative processing of your complaint. RIGHT TO REQUEST COUNSEL (Z0815) If you want to file a civil action but cannot pay the fees, costs, or security to do so, you may request permission from the court to proceed with the civil action without paying these fees or costs. Similarly, if you cannot afford an attorney to represent you in the civil action, you may request the court to appoint an attorney for you. You must submit the requests for waiver of court costs or appointment of an attorney directly to the court, not the Commission. The court has the sole discretion to grant or deny these types of requests. 2020002173 12 Such requests do not alter the time limits for filing a civil action (please read the paragraph titled Complainant’s Right to File a Civil Action for the specific time limits). FOR THE COMMISSION: ______________________________ Carlton M. Hadden’s signature Carlton M. Hadden, Director Office of Federal Operations August 25, 2021 Date