[Redacted], Gloria D., 1 Complainant,v.Debra A. Haaland, Secretary, Department of the Interior (National Park Service), Agency.

Equal Employment Opportunity Commission

Jul 20, 2021

Appeal No. 2020004804 (E.E.O.C. Jul. 20, 2021)

U.S. EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION Office of Federal Operations P.O. Box 77960 Washington, DC 20013 Gloria D.,1 Complainant, v. Debra A. Haaland, Secretary, Department of the Interior (National Park Service), Agency. Appeal No. 2020004804 Hearing No. 530201900268X Agency No. NPS180315 DECISION Complainant timely appealed, pursuant to 29 C.F.R. § 1614.403, the Agency’s Final Order concerning an equal employment opportunity (“EEO”) complaint alleging employment discrimination in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (“Title VII”), as amended, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq., and the Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967 (“ADEA”), as amended, 29 U.S.C. § 621 et seq. BACKGROUND At the time of events giving rise to this complaint, Complainant was employed by the Agency as a Data Maintenance Clerk, GS-04, at the Asset Preservation and Maintenance Office (“APM”) for the Independence National Historical Park (“INHP”) located in Philadelphia, Pennsylvania. On June 4, 2018, Complainant filed a formal EEO complaint alleging that she was subjected to a hostile work environment/harassment on the bases of age (69) and reprisal for prior protected EEO activity2 when: 1 This case has been randomly assigned a pseudonym which will replace Complainant’s name when the decision is published to non-parties and the Commission’s website. 2020004804 2 1. On or about March 6, 2018, her first level supervisor (“S1,” age 50), denied Complainant’s requests for an informal meeting to discuss work assignments, 2. On March 12, 2018, S1 instructed Complainant to attend a “pre-disciplinary meeting” with S1 and three (3) other management officials to review her conduct and low quantity and quality of work, 3. On March 12, 2018, during the pre-disciplinary meeting, S1 instructed Complainant to respond, either in writing or verbally, to 15 questions. Complainant asserts that the meeting was demeaning and denigrating to her, and, 4. On or about April 11, 2018, S1 monitored Complainant’s telephone calls and office visitors, yet did not monitor or answer calls to Complainant’s younger co- worker (“C1,” age 38), Chief of Administration and Business Services, GS-14. The record developed during the investigation into the complaint revealed the following facts. Complainant worked for the federal government for 44 years, spending approximately 17 years assigned to various offices within the INHP APM. She was friendly with numerous Agency employees, and kept bottled water and snacks, which she paid for, at her desk to hand out to the maintenance workers when she worked in their division. When she was reassigned, Complainant continued to stock her workspaces with candy, bottled water, and snacks such as cookies and chips, for anyone who stopped by. Various managers, including S1, told her to stop this practice (or at least limit it to one candy dish) because they found it distracting. During the relevant time frame, INHP APM was headed by the Chief of Maintenance, GS-12, Complainant’s second level supervisor (“S2,” age 49). Complainant’s first level supervisor (“S1,” age 50) was a Supervisory Facility Management Specialist, GS-11. 2 The Agency erred by limiting Complainant’s prior protected activity to an EEO action from 2012. In her affidavit, Complainant confirmed that she filed an EEO complaint since then, and her representative clarified that she had two additional active EEO actions when she filed the instant complaint. Complainant testifies that her representative told S1 about the EEO activity around February 23, 2018. AO, who was responsible for responding to EEO document requests for the office, and S2 testified that they were aware that Complainant engaged in EEO activity at the relevant time. S1’s meeting notes from the PDM state that Complainant’s representative told her that “they would need time to file another EEO case because this is clearly retaliation,” making her aware of Complainant’s EEO actions associated with the EEO complaint. See also EEOC Hearing No. 530201800335X (Feb. 13, 2020) (granting the Agency’s request for summary judgment, finding a proposed 5-day suspension for actions between 2017 and 2018 such as carelessness when completing assignments and failure to follow instructions, not motivated by discrimination based on age and reprisal). 2020004804 3 Complainant shared a workspace outside S1’s office with a coworker (“C1,” age 38), a Facility Services Assistant, GS-7. C1 also reported to S1. Complainant was the only Maintenance Data Clerk, GS-04, and had been in the position for approximately 10 years. Complainant was responsible for some administrative tasks like answering the phone and greeting visitors, but her primary function was data entry. The “major duties” listed in the Maintenance Data Clerk, GS-04, position description (“PD”) included “compiles, organizes and tracks through systematically developed computer programs all data collected for the necessary implementation of the Park's Maintenance Management System.” According to the PD, the Maintenance Data Clerk was expected to work directly with Management, staff and technicians, “to gather, collect, compile and input [data] into the computer,” such as recording “payroll, daily work forms, verifying activity codes, locations, personnel and cost data.” Management relied on reports generated using data timely entered by the Maintenance Data Clerk. In June 2016, S1 became Complainant’s supervisor and assigned her additional data entry tasks which involved using the Supervisory Facility Management Software System (“FMSS”). Among other things, Complainant was tasked with entering information for “Kiosk Reports” which tracked what work was accomplished each pay period, which were discussed in the supervisors’ meetings. Complainant contends that she was being targeted, “I did my job well before she came and now, [S1’s] changing everything around ….so that I should fail, they just want me to leave” Complainant states that her “prior tasks involved solely labor hours, etc.” now to her “chores” (i.e. work assignments) involve “minute numbers on spreadsheets, pay period concerns, etc.” It also appears that the FMSS interface was updated during the relevant time frame, adding to Complainant’s confusion. S1 met with Complainant informally numerous times to address her productivity and accuracy, answering her questions throughout the day, and attempting to demonstrate how to navigate FMSS to complete her assignments. Complainant testified that she found S1’s teaching methods extremely difficult to follow, so she completed her assignments by using “trial and error.” S2 observed that “[Complainant] creates work for [S1], who checks “every single entry she makes” and takes just as much time to check it than to do it herself.” Complainant’s former supervisor (“FS,” age 33) testified that Complainant used FMSS for years, and that S1 assigned all the same tasks that she assigned Complainant when she was her supervisor. FS testified that she did ask Complainant to do certain things, but as a trainer, she was “able to sit there with her and do these baby steps with her every time I needed her to help.” S1 simply expected Complainant, who had been in the position for 10 years, to be able to do the work. FS opined that she, “can see why Complainant feels she is being harassed” because “she is doing what she's been doing forever” and now she has a supervisor asking her to do additional assignments. On February 23, 2018, the Vice President of Complainant’s local union chapter asked S1 if they could meet to “talk about the things you feel [Complainant] needs to correct in her work so that we can come up with a plan to reduce and/or eliminate the errors.” 2020004804 4 He also suggested that they “sit down with” Complainant together, “so that she understands what she needs to do,” and to provide her with resources that would help her succeed. S1 consulted with S2 and the Administrative Officer, GS-14 (“AO,” 48) and they agreed that granting the meeting request would result in the union overstepping its authority and inserting itself into informal management decisions about work assignments. They checked with the Agency Human Resources Specialist for Employee and Labor Relations, who responded later that day, that S1 was not legally required to agree to the informal meeting, but she would need to include the Union for formal meetings. Two weeks later, on March 6, 2018, S1 responded to the Union, declining the invitation to meet informally. She also emailed Complainant, notifying her that she was “scheduling an interview with [Complainant] while considering taking a disciplinary action. You have the right to have Union Representation during this meeting if you should choose.” Complainant’s Union Representative coordinated with S1 and the Pre-Disciplinary Meeting (“PDM”) was scheduled for March 12, 2018. This was the second PDM S1 held with Complainant. She recounted that following the first PDM in September 2017, “right away I saw improvement, you turned in several Daily Assignment Sheets with no errors…and [out of 23] materials transactions in one day, all done with less than a 10% error rate. However, since then, things have fallen right back to a minimum of a 60% error rate [based on S1’s unverified account].” Along with the prior PDM, multiple management officials testified in the record that Complainant’s performance and conduct issues predated S1’s tenure by years. During the March 12, 2018 PDM, Complainant alleges that S1 “demanded” that she answer a list of 15 questions and demeaned her by speaking to her like she was a child in the presence of multiple management officials. For instance, S1 asked simple questions that S1 already knew the answer to, such as “how many materials cards do you do in a day.” S1 also questioned her about making personal phone calls and giving out snacks and bottles of water to coworkers while on duty. AO and S2 testified that managers are supposed to prepare and ask questions during PDMs as part of the investigatory process when determining whether to issue discipline. Complainant and her representative were permitted to leave the room to discuss and answer the 15 questions in writing. It is undisputed that during the PDM, none of the participants raised their voice or did anything physically threatening, like pointing fingers. On March 27, 2018, FS, now the Northeast Regional Asset Management System Program Manager, GS-12, Philadelphia, Pennsylvania at the Northeast Regional Office, came in to personally train Complainant. S1 arranged the training, because in the PDM 15 questions, Complainant responded that training with FS would help her do her job. Also, Complainant had a good working relationship with FS and FS was “the highest-trained employee that deals with the Asset Management System” that she worked with. S1 also provided Complainant with a draft desktop manual for FMSS, then provided her with the final version when it became available on April 11, 2018. FS testified, that after her training session with Complainant, she was “confident enough to know if [S1] were to tell her to go into this work order, that she could find that work order, that she knew where she was supposed to put her data entry point.” 2020004804 5 FS also acknowledged that Complainant took longer to complete tasks, often because she added unnecessary steps, such as printing each FMSS entry, “but she does know … where to go in Systems and what to do. And she even told me that [S1] had taught her how to do it … I do believe that she is capable. I don't believe that she wanted to do that job.” On April 11, 2018, S1 sent a standing calendar invite to Complainant for a daily 7:30 am meeting, with a stated purpose of discussing complainant’s assignments and performance as part of an “Action Plan” and discuss how Complainant’s ideas from a prior discussion “relate to the duties of [her] current position.” According to Complainant, during their meetings, S1 “would discuss some work, but then she’d start telling me about…. How good C1 is and the work that he does and the great job that he does.” Complainant also felt that S1 wanted to create conflict between her and C1 by stopping by C1’s desk and, with her back to Complainant, loudly telling him what a wonderful job he’s doing, so Complainant could hear. Complainant alleges that management wanted her to retire because of her age. On an unspecified date prior to February 9, 2018 (when he left to work at another agency) the Former Facility Manager (“FM,” age 64), who was not in Complainant’s chain of command, allegedly stopped by her desk and asked her when she would retire and suggested that she work at Wal-Mart. Complainant’s prior Union representative testified that FM told him, in reference to Complainant, that she was old and needed to retire. FM denies referencing Complainant’s age, but admits, “I might have [told] that union official …that there were several individuals of low quality work that might need to retire to make room for better people to come in and assist the National Park Service in doing better work.” FM alleged that Complainant would “just walk the hallways, call my subordinates and ask…would they like to come over and get some cookies or chips.” He also testified that “for the two years I was there, we struggled to get information” because the Maintenance Data Clerk routinely failed to enter labor hours into FMSS. Complainant’s union representative interpreted FM’s comments as speaking for all of management, as sometimes he stood in for C2 as “Acting Chief.” Complainant alleges that S1 used the comparisons to C1 an indirect way of denigrating her based on her age. She further alleges that S1 subjects her to micromanagement and a level of scrutiny far more invasive than she does C1. Complainant alleges S1 checked all of her entries in FMSS every day and notified her of each mistake. Complainant explains that S1’s attempts to schedule regular meetings, particularly the standing 7:30 am meeting, were a harassment tactic because S1 allegedly knew that arriving early would be “torture” for Complainant. She alleges that the purpose of the 7:30 am meeting was not to help her but to “berate” her, by identifying each of Complainant’s mistakes, then comparing her to C1. Complainant only went to one meeting, then stopped at the advice of the Union. S1 did not discipline Complainant or reschedule the meeting, rather, Complainant comes into S1’s office when she has a question “any time she wants” which is multiple times a day. In addition, Complainant alleges that S1 monitored her calls and visitors. Complainant and S1’s phones were, allowing S1 to see when Complainant was on her phone, the duration of the call, and the phone number of the individual she was speaking to. 2020004804 6 Complainant argues that this was invasive, and in once instance, a friend of hers in another office tried to call her at her desk and S1 picked up and asked who was calling. C1’s phone was not connected to S1’s phone. Also, S1 did not admonish C1 when he had visitors at his workspace for a prolonged amount of time, which was, by Complainant’s account, a regular occurrence. By comparison, Complainant alleges that S1 barely allowed her to say “hello” to someone entering the office and forbid her from giving out snacks and water to coworkers. Moreover, S1 would blame Complainant for the presence of the coworkers who were there to socialize with C1. Finally, Complainant acknowledges that she was provided with training, but argues that “learning is a private affair.” According to Complainant, she was “unable to grasp completely these strange functions, with poor tutorials, by supervisor’s intent on ending her employ.” After investigating the complaint, the Agency provided Complainant with a copy of the report of investigation and notice of right to request a hearing before an Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (“EEOC” or “Commission”) Administrative Judge (“AJ”). Complainant timely requested a hearing. The AJ assigned to the complaint held an Initial Status Conference and, on October 22, 2019, issued a Memorandum and Order detailing what was discussed, including the evidentiary requirements for Complainant to avoid summary judgment. After reviewing the parties’ responses, the AJ determined that a hearing was not warranted, and issued a decision by summary judgement in favor of the Agency on February 3, 2020. When the Agency failed to issue a final order within forty days of receipt of the AJ’s decision, the AJ’s decision finding that Complainant failed to prove discrimination as alleged became the Agency’s final action pursuant to 29 C.F.R. § 1614.109(i). The instant appeal followed. ANALYSIS AND FINDINGS The Commission's regulations allow an AJ to grant summary judgment when he or she finds that there is no genuine issue of material fact. 29 C.F.R. § 1614.109(g). An issue of fact is “genuine” if the evidence is such that a reasonable fact finder could find in favor of the non- moving party. Celotex v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322-23 (1986); Oliver v. Digital Equip. Corp., 846 F.2d 103, 105 (1st Cir. 1988). A fact is “material” if it has the potential to affect the outcome of the case. In rendering this appellate decision, we must scrutinize the AJ’s legal and factual conclusions, and the Agency’s Final Order adopting them, de novo. See 29 C.F.R. § 1614.405(a)(stating that a “decision on an appeal from an Agency’s final action shall be based on a de novo review…”); see also Equal Employment Opportunity Management Directive for 29 C.F.R. Part 1614 (EEO-MD-110), at Chap. 9, § VI.B. (as revised, August 5, 2015)(providing that an administrative judge’s determination to issue a decision without a hearing, and the decision itself, will both be reviewed de novo). In order to successfully oppose a decision by summary judgment, a complainant must identify, with specificity, facts in dispute either within the record or by producing further supporting evidence and must further establish that such facts are material under applicable law. Such a dispute would indicate that a hearing is necessary to produce evidence to support a finding that the agency was motivated by discriminatory animus. 2020004804 7 Alleged AJ Errors The regulation under 29 C.F.R. § 1614.108(b) requires the Agency to create an impartial and appropriate factual record upon which to make findings on the claims raised by the written complaint. An “appropriate factual record” is “one that allows a reasonable fact finder to draw conclusions as to whether discrimination occurred.” § 1614.108(b). However, the complainant, upon receipt of the ROI, is provided an opportunity to cure defects in the record by either notifying the agency (in writing) of any perceived deficiencies in the investigation or requesting a hearing before an AJ. See EEO MD-110, at Ch. 6, § XI and Ch. 7, § I. Here, the AJ did not err in determining that discovery was not necessary, and the ROI was sufficiently developed to create an “appropriate factual record” to allow for a decision without a hearing. The record contains thorough affidavits obtained via telephone interview, providing for clarifications and follow up questions. Complainant, her first and second level supervisors, and her former supervisor, who had knowledge of her capabilities and with whom she had a good working relationship, all provided testimony. Complainant’s former EEO representative and officials and who were familiar with Complainant, some having worked in the same building with her for over 10 years also testified. The record also includes the emailed meeting request from Complainant’s union representative to S1, various email exchanges regarding Complainant’s training, and notes and documents, including the 15 questions and Complainant’s answers, from the PDM. Likewise, the AJ did not erroneously disregard questions of fact. Complainant’s arguments regarding the Agency’s adherence to the collective bargaining agreement are outside the scope of EEOC jurisdiction, and therefore not material to the instant decision. The other questions of fact Complainant raises are not “material” and would not warrant a reversal of Summary Judgment. For instance, S1’s comparison of Complainant’s productivity to that of a summer intern, even if true, was not considered and would not impact the outcome of our Decision. Disparate Treatment A claim of disparate treatment based on indirect evidence is examined under the three-part analysis first enunciated in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973). For Complainant to prevail, he or she must first establish a prima facie case of discrimination by presenting facts that, if unexplained, reasonably give rise to an inference of discrimination, i.e., that a prohibited consideration was a factor in the adverse employment action. McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 802; Furnco Construction Corp. v. Waters, 438 U.S. 567 (1978). The burden then shifts to the Agency to articulate a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for its actions. Texas Dep’t. of Cmty. Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 253 (1981). Once the Agency has met its burden, Complainant bears the ultimate responsibility to persuade the fact finder by a preponderance of the evidence that the Agency acted on the basis of a prohibited reason. St. Mary’s Honor Ctr. v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502 (1993). 2020004804 8 This established order of analysis in discrimination cases, in which the first step normally consists of determining the existence of a prima facie case, need not be followed in all cases. Where the Agency has articulated a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for the personnel action at issue, the factual inquiry can proceed directly to the third step of the McDonnell Douglas analysis, the ultimate issue of whether Complainant has shown by a preponderance of the evidence that the Agency’s actions were motivated by discrimination. U.S. Postal Serv. Bd. of Governors v. Aikens, 460 U.S. 711, 713-714 (1983); Hernandez v. Dep’t. of Transp., EEOC Request No. 05900159 (June 28, 1990); Peterson v. Dep’t. of Health and Human Serv., EEOC Request No. 05900467 (June 8, 1990); Washington v. Dep’t. of the Navy, EEOC Petition No. 03900056 (May 31, 1990). The Agency, as the employer, has broad discretion to set policies and carry out personnel decisions absent evidence of unlawful motivation. See Burdine at 259, Furnco at 567, Vanek v. Dep’t of the Treas., EEOC Request No. 05940906 (Jan. 16, 1997). In other words, this Commission "does not second-guess the business judgment of Agency officials regarding personnel decisions without a demonstrably discriminatory motive." Camden v. Dep’t of Justice, EEOC Appeal No. 0120093506 (Jul. 27, 2012) rec. den. EEOC Request No. 0520120603 (Jan. 31. 2013). For Claim 1, there is no evidence that S1 ever denied Complainant a meeting. She denied a meeting request from a union official, which was legal and within the scope of her managerial discretion. Complainant establishes that she disagrees with the decision, arguing that “the request for a union representative to assist in communicating any problems to the complainant is not an “insertion of a ‘third party’ but a sincere attempt to help.” However, she does not show that S1’s stated explanation was pretext for discriminatory intent. As the March 12, 2018 PDM did not result in an adverse action (Complainant was not disciplined), we are reviewing Claims 2 and 3 as harassment allegations along with Claim 4. Harassment/Hostile Work Environment To prove her harassment claim, Complainant must establish that she was subjected to conduct that was either so severe or so pervasive that a “reasonable person” in Complainant’s position would have found the conduct to be hostile or abusive. Complainant must also prove that the conduct was taken because of age and/or her prior EEO activity. Only if Complainant establishes both hostility and motive, will the question of Agency liability present itself. See Henson v. City of Dundee, 682 F.2d 897 (11th Cir. 1982); Enforcement Guidance: Vicarious Employer Liability for Unlawful Harassment by Supervisors, EEOC Notice 915.002 (Jun. 18, 1999). The March 12, 2018 PDM and the 15 questions do not constitute harassment because Complainant’s performance and conduct issues identified as the reason for the PDM, are supported in the record, and the PDM was conducted in a manner consistent with the Agency’s disciplinary policy. 2020004804 9 The Agency’s Departmental Manual Personnel Management, under Part 370, Chapter 752, provides that before taking disciplinary action, managers must “first determine misconduct occurred and that corrective action is warranted,” in accordance with section 1.6(C) by conducting “a thorough inquiry into any apparent offense (collecting information to the greatest extent practicable directly from the subject employee)” in accordance with section 1.7. While Complainant understandably found the 15 questions condescending and AO’s presence unwarranted, the Agency acted within the scope of its authority in determining how to conduct a PDM. For Claim 4, Complainant’s allegations involve routine work assignments, instructions, and admonishments, which are “common workplace occurrences” and do not constitute harassment. See Gray v. United States Postal Serv., EEOC Appeal No. 0120091101 (May 13, 2010) citations omitted. To the extent Complainant alleges that she was singled out by S1, and subjected to micromanagement, we have previously found similar claims, while unpleasant, are also “common workplace occurrences.” See Gormley v. Dep’t of the Interior, EEOC Complaint No. 01973328 (Feb. 18, 2000) (finding the complainant’s allegation that her supervisor monitored her work duties and time in and out of the office more closely than her coworkers amounted to a common workplace occurrence.). Likewise, it is well established that instances of a supervisor questioning an employee with respect to their duties, even if done in a confrontational manner, is a “common workplace occurrence.” See Carver v. United States Postal Serv., EEOC Appeal No. 01980522 (Feb. 18, 2000). Upon careful review of the AJ’s decision and the evidence of record, as well as the parties’ arguments on appeal, we conclude that the AJ correctly determined that the preponderance of the evidence did not establish that Complainant was discriminated against by the Agency as alleged. CONCLUSION Accordingly, we AFFIRM the AJ’s decision, which became the Agency’s final order by operation of 29 C.F.R. § 1614.109(i), concluding no discrimination or unlawful retaliation was proven in these matters. STATEMENT OF RIGHTS - ON APPEAL RECONSIDERATION (M0920) The Commission may, in its discretion, reconsider this appellate decision if Complainant or the Agency submits a written request that contains arguments or evidence that tend to establish that: 1. The appellate decision involved a clearly erroneous interpretation of material fact or law; or 2. The appellate decision will have a substantial impact on the policies, practices, or operations of the agency. Requests for reconsideration must be filed with EEOC’s Office of Federal Operations (OFO) within thirty (30) calendar days of receipt of this decision. 2020004804 10 If the party requesting reconsideration elects to file a statement or brief in support of the request, that statement or brief must be filed together with the request for reconsideration. A party shall have twenty (20) calendar days from receipt of another party’s request for reconsideration within which to submit a brief or statement in opposition. See 29 C.F.R. § 1614.405; Equal Employment Opportunity Management Directive for 29 C.F.R. Part 1614 (EEO MD-110), at Chap. 9 § VII.B (Aug. 5, 2015). Complainant should submit his or her request for reconsideration, and any statement or brief in support of his or her request, via the EEOC Public Portal, which can be found at https://publicportal.eeoc.gov/Portal/Login.aspx Alternatively, Complainant can submit his or her request and arguments to the Director, Office of Federal Operations, Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, via regular mail addressed to P.O. Box 77960, Washington, DC 20013, or by certified mail addressed to 131 M Street, NE, Washington, DC 20507. In the absence of a legible postmark, a complainant’s request to reconsider shall be deemed timely filed if OFO receives it by mail within five days of the expiration of the applicable filing period. See 29 C.F.R. § 1614.604. An agency’s request for reconsideration must be submitted in digital format via the EEOC’s Federal Sector EEO Portal (FedSEP). See 29 C.F.R. § 1614.403(g). Either party’s request and/or statement or brief in opposition must also include proof of service on the other party, unless Complainant files his or her request via the EEOC Public Portal, in which case no proof of service is required. Failure to file within the 30-day time period will result in dismissal of the party’s request for reconsideration as untimely, unless extenuating circumstances prevented the timely filing of the request. Any supporting documentation must be submitted together with the request for reconsideration. The Commission will consider requests for reconsideration filed after the deadline only in very limited circumstances. See 29 C.F.R. § 1614.604(c). COMPLAINANT’S RIGHT TO FILE A CIVIL ACTION (S0610) You have the right to file a civil action in an appropriate United States District Court within ninety (90) calendar days from the date that you receive this decision. If you file a civil action, you must name as the defendant in the complaint the person who is the official Agency head or department head, identifying that person by his or her full name and official title. Failure to do so may result in the dismissal of your case in court. “Agency” or “department” means the national organization, and not the local office, facility or department in which you work. If you file a request to reconsider and also file a civil action, filing a civil action will terminate the administrative processing of your complaint. RIGHT TO REQUEST COUNSEL (Z0815) If you want to file a civil action but cannot pay the fees, costs, or security to do so, you may request permission from the court to proceed with the civil action without paying these fees or costs. 2020004804 11 Similarly, if you cannot afford an attorney to represent you in the civil action, you may request the court to appoint an attorney for you. You must submit the requests for waiver of court costs or appointment of an attorney directly to the court, not the Commission. The court has the sole discretion to grant or deny these types of requests. Such requests do not alter the time limits for filing a civil action (please read the paragraph titled Complainant’s Right to File a Civil Action for the specific time limits). FOR THE COMMISSION: ______________________________ Carlton M. Hadden’s signature Carlton M. Hadden, Director Office of Federal Operations July 20, 2021 Date