[Redacted], Brenton W., 1 Complainant,v.Lloyd J. Austin III, Secretary, Department of Defense (National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency), Agency.

Equal Employment Opportunity Commission

Oct 7, 2021

Appeal No. 2021000847 (E.E.O.C. Oct. 7, 2021)

U.S. EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION Office of Federal Operations P.O. Box 77960 Washington, DC 20013 Brenton W.,1 Complainant, v. Lloyd J. Austin III, Secretary, Department of Defense (National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency), Agency. Appeal No. 2021000847 Hearing No. 520-2020-00202X Agency No. 2020000061 DECISION On November 5, 2020, Complainant filed an appeal, pursuant to 29 C.F.R. § 1614.403(a), from the Administrative Judge’s (AJ) October 29, 2020 decision concerning his equal employment opportunity (EEO) complaint alleging employment discrimination in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (Title VII), as amended, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq., and Section 501 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 (Rehabilitation Act), as amended, 29 U.S.C. § 791 et seq. For the following reasons, we AFFIRM the AJ’s decision. ISSUES PRESENTED The issues presented are: whether the Agency was entitled to a grant of its motion for summary judgment as a matter of law; and whether Complainant has shown by a preponderance of the evidence that the Agency subjected him to a hostile work environment and discrimination based on his sex, disability, and prior protected EEO activity. 1 This case has been randomly assigned a pseudonym which will replace Complainant’s name when the decision is published to non-parties and the Commission’s website. 2021000847 2 BACKGROUND At the time of events giving rise to this complaint, Complainant worked as a Geo-Intelligence Analyst, Pay Band 3, at the Analysis Operational Engagement Pentagon Directorate at the Agency’s facility in Springfield, Virginia. On April 7, 2014, Complainant filed a formal complaint alleging that the Agency subjected him to a hostile work environment and discriminated against him on the bases of sex (sexual orientation, gender stereotyping, male)2, disability (mental, physical, sleep apnea, and perceived disability), and prior protected EEO activity (opposition and participation). Complainant raised 28 events in support of his claim of harassment. Examples of the events listed included: his interactions with management and his coworkers; his work requirements and performance; his extracurricular activities and collateral duties; training and/or meeting attendance; requests that Complainant report to the Employee Assistance Program; and his requests for reasonable accommodation to accommodate his sleep apnea. On January 29, 2018, the Agency submitted a Motion for Summary Judgment. Complainant did not file an opposition. On June 1, 2018, Complainant emailed the AJ stating that the Agency thought he was going to sue in federal court. The AJ read this as a withdrawal request and issued an Order of Dismissal on June 1, 2018. After the Agency failed to issue a final decision, Complainant submitted an appeal to the Commission. Complainant noted that he never intended to withdraw his hearing request and that he had not filed any court filings. Following Complainant’s appeal, the Commission determined that Complainant did not intend to withdraw the case and that the AJ erred in interpreting Complainant’s email. The Commission remanded the matter back for further processing. Brenton W. v. Dep’t. of Def., EEOC Appeal No. 2019002574 (Sept. 20, 2019). A new Acknowledgment Order was issued July 28, 2020, and an Initial Conference held August 6, 2020. During that conference, it was discussed that the Agency had previously filed a motion for summary judgment on January 29, 2018. On October 29, 2020, the AJ issued summary judgment in favor of the Agency. In reaching this determination, the AJ determined that Complainant failed to establish a prima face case of discrimination or retaliation on any of the protected bases. The AJ also determined that even if Complainant established a prima facie case, the Agency had articulated legitimate non- discriminatory reasons for its actions in the numerous events. 2 In Bostock v. Clayton Cty., the Supreme Court held that discrimination based on sexual orientation or transgender status is prohibited under Title VII. 590 U.S. ___, 140 S. Ct. 1731 (2020); see also Baldwin v. Dep’t of Transp., EEOC Appeal No. 0120133080 (July 15, 2015) (an allegation of discrimination based on sexual orientation states a claim of sex discrimination under Title VII because sexual orientation is inherently a sex-based consideration). 2021000847 3 When an AJ has issued a decision under 29 C.F.R. § 1614.109(b), (g) or (i), the Agency shall take final action on the complaint by issuing a final order within 40 days of the receipt of the hearing file and the AJ's decision. 29 C.F.R. § 1614.110(a). EEOC Regulation 29 C.F.R. § 1614.109(i) provides that if an agency does not issue a final order within 40 days of receipt of the AJ's decision in accordance with 29 C.F.R. § 1614.110, the decision of the AJ shall become the final action of the Agency. Therefore, in the instant matter, as the Agency has not issued a final action, the AJ’s decision became the Agency's final action by operation of law. Ela O. v Nat'l Sec. Agency, EEOC Appeal No. 0720130021 (Oct. 30, 2015) (AJ's finding of discrimination became agency's final decision by operation of law where agency failed to take action during the 40-day period).3 CONTENTIONS ON APPEAL On appeal, Complainant states that he would provide new medical evidence that he asserts was not available prior.4 Complainant states that the medical evidence demonstrates a variety of medical issues that he has suffered from as a result of the Agency’s discriminatory actions. Complainant notes that the Agency subjected him to a series of volatile, harassing and vicious anti-gay bashing which has caused him enduring medical issues such as Post Traumatic Stress Disorder (PTSD). Complainant reiterates several of the alleged Agency malfeasance, such as being unconstitutionally detained and questioned by armed guards, and more. Regarding the AJ’s decision, Complainant asserts that the AJ’s decision is clearly erroneous and should be overturned by the Commission. Complainant states that the decision is clearly biased and incorrectly determined that he had failed to establish a prima facie case of discrimination, when he had clearly done so. Complainant argues that the treatment he was subjected to was clearly based on nothing other than his protected classes and his protected EEO activity. The Agency did not provide an appellate brief. STANDARD OF REVIEW As this is an appeal from a decision issued without a hearing, pursuant to 29 C.F.R. § 1614.110(b), the Agency's decision is subject to de novo review by the Commission. 29 C.F.R. § 1614.405(a). See Equal Employment Opportunity Management Directive for 29 C.F.R. Part 1614, at Chapter 9, § VI.A. (Aug. 5, 2015) (explaining that the de novo standard of review “requires that the Commission examine the record without regard to the factual and legal determinations of the previous decision maker,” and that EEOC “review the documents, statements, and testimony of record, including any timely and relevant submissions of the 3 We note that Complainant's appeal, premature when filed in November 2020, is now cured and ripe for adjudication. 4 Complainant repeatedly references medical appointments to treat his PTSD and other associated medical needs but did not provide any medical documentation on appeal. 2021000847 4 parties, and . . . issue its decision based on the Commission’s own assessment of the record and its interpretation of the law”). ANALYSIS AND FINDINGS Summary Judgment We determine whether the AJ appropriately issued the decision without a hearing. The Commission’s regulations allow an AJ to issue a decision without a hearing upon finding that there is no genuine issue of material fact. 29 C.F.R. § 1614.109(g). EEOC’s decision without a hearing regulation follows the summary judgment procedure from federal court. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56. The U.S. Supreme Court held summary judgment is appropriate where a judge determines no genuine issue of material fact exists under the legal and evidentiary standards. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 255 (1986). In ruling on a summary judgment motion, the judge is to determine whether there are genuine issues for trial, as opposed to weighing the evidence. Id. at 249. At the summary judgment stage, the judge must believe the non-moving party’s evidence and must draw justifiable inferences in the non-moving party’s favor. Id. at 255. A “genuine issue of fact” is one that a reasonable judge could find in favor for the non-moving party. Celotex v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322-23 (1986); Oliver v. Digital Equip. Corp., 846 F.2d 103, 105 (1st Cir. 1988). A “material” fact has the potential to affect the outcome of a case. An AJ may issue a decision without a hearing only after determining that the record has been adequately developed. See Petty v. Dep’t of Def., EEOC Appeal No. 01A24206 (July 11, 2003). We carefully reviewed the record and find that it is adequately developed. To successfully oppose a decision without a hearing, Complainant must identify material facts of record that are in dispute or present further material evidence establishing facts in dispute. Ultimately, the AJ correctly determined that there are no genuine issues of material fact or credibility that merited a hearing. Therefore, the AJ’s issuance of a decision without a hearing was appropriate. Disparate Treatment Complainant alleges that he was subjected to disparate treatment. A claim of disparate treatment is examined under the three-part analysis first enunciated in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973). For a complainant to prevail, he must first establish a prima facie case of discrimination by presenting facts that, if unexplained, reasonably give rise to an inference of discrimination, i.e., that a prohibited consideration was a factor in the adverse employment action. McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 802, n. 13; Furnco Construction Corp. v. Waters, 438 U.S. 567 (1978). The burden then shifts to the agency to articulate a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for its actions. Tex. Dep’t of Cmty. Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 253 (1981). Once the agency has met its burden, the complainant bears the ultimate responsibility to persuade the fact finder by a preponderance of the evidence that the agency acted on the basis of a prohibited reason. St. Mary's Honor Ctr. v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502 (1993). 2021000847 5 This established order of analysis in discrimination cases, in which the first step normally consists of determining the existence of a prima facie case, need not be followed in all cases. Where the agency has articulated a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for its actions, the factual inquiry can proceed directly to the third step of the McDonnell Douglas analysis, the ultimate issue of whether complainant has shown by a preponderance of the evidence that the agency’s actions were motivated by discrimination. U.S. Postal Serv. Bd. of Governors v. Aikens, 460 U.S. 711, 713-714 (1983). Upon our review of the evidentiary record which consists of numerous affidavits and exhibits, and having fully considered and analyzed the record, and the AJ’s October 29, 2020 determination, we conclude that the preponderant evidence does not establish discriminatory animus.5 In reaching this conclusion, we carefully reviewed Complainant’s allegations of discrete events, which spanned 28 claims that alleged disparate treatment based on his sex, disability,6 and protected EEO activity. These events included, but are not limited to: allegations concerning removal of voluntary casualty affairs duty; exclusion from team assignments, meetings, and duties; lack of interest in his personal life by management; gender stereotyping, such as his desire to not wear ties; denial of in-person attendance at Human Resource briefings regarding same-sex partner benefits; micromanagement by superiors and accusations of sub-standard work; placement on administrative leave; denial of tuition assistance and removal of training; denial of overtime; subjection to a psychological examination without his prior consent; and poorly rated evaluations. In this matter, Complainant repeatedly argued that the Agency’s actions were based solely on his protected classes and EEO activity. However, based on the record, we find that Complainant has failed to show that the events raised were connected to any of his protected basis or motivated by discriminatory or retaliatory animus. 5 The record in this case is exhaustive and details numerous incidents in support of the claim. We will not individually address each incident of alleged discrimination. Although the incidents will not be individually addressed, all matters which Complainant raised have been considered and viewed in the context of all bases and in the context of disparate treatment and a hostile work environment. When considering harassment claims, “every incident comprising the harassment claim need not be listed.” Morris v. Dep’t of Defense, EEOC Appeal No. 0120102589, 2013 WL 653867, at *5 (Feb. 5, 2013). By the same token, not every listed incident requires specific addressing; the point is to address the allegation of hostile work environment in its totality. Such consideration has been given in this case. 6 For the purposes of analysis, we assume Complainant is an individual with a disability. 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(g)(1). 2021000847 6 While Complainant repeatedly asserted that others were treated better, he has not provided evidence that others outside of his protected classes were treated differently, or that the Agency’s reasons for its actions were pretext for discrimination. It has long been established that accusations alone, unsupported by objective evidence, are insufficient to demonstrate pretext. Such conclusory statements or bald assertions will not defeat a motion for summary judgment. See Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 324 (1986). Regarding the events in which he alleged disparate treatment, the Agency articulated legitimate, nondiscriminatory reasons for its actions. To illustrate this, we shall focus on some of the specific events Complainant raised. For example, in claim 17, Complainant alleged that he was removed from a job-related training course; in claim 21, Complainant alleged that he was denied the opportunity to work overtime while others were approved to do so for a crisis project; and in claim 28, Complainant was ordered to report to a new assignment that was further from his home despite his transfer request to be placed closer to his home. Regarding claim 17, Complainant was initially placed in the training course but was later removed by the Senior Geospatial Officer (SGO) (male, unknown sexual orientation, disability, and EEO activity). The SGO testified that Complainant was removed because of performance on the related assessments. The SGO informed Complainant that he was not performing to par and that it could result in him failing the course. Therefore, the SGO decided to postpone, not cancel, Complainant’s training until he improved his performance. Regarding claim 21, management officials stated that Complainant was not permitted to work overtime during the September crisis response because of management’s determination that Complainant’s performance was not sufficiently to standard to justify authorizing the extra expenditure for overtime authorization. Others who were permitted to work overtime did not have the same performance issues as Complainant. Regarding claim 28, management reviewed Complainant’s work performance, considered his tardiness issues and workplace behavior, and determined it was best to transfer Complainant. While location requests are considered, management of operational needs dictated Complainant’s placement. In sum, the evidence does not support a finding of discrimination on any basis, or the presence of discriminatory animus. Many of the actions taken by the alleged discriminating officials were routine managerial actions, inquiries about her performance or non-performance, of assignments or duties, and decisions, all of which, absent discriminatory animus, will not be second-guessed by the Commission. Agencies generally have broad discretion to carry out personnel decisions and exercise business judgment. Shapiro v. Soc. Sec. Admin., EEOC Request No. 05960403 (Dec. 6, 1996). Regarding theses adverse actions, the Agency articulated legitimate nondiscriminatory reasons for its actions for which Complainant has failed to show were pretext for discrimination. Pretext inquiry is not concerned with bad judgment, impeccability, dislike, or a mistake. Marvin W. v. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., EEOC Appeal No. 0120170438 (Dec. 12, 2018). 2021000847 7 The question is not whether the Agency made the best, or even a sound, business decision; it is whether the real reason is discrimination. Mere assertions or conjecture that an agency’s explanation is a pretext for intentional discrimination is insufficient because subjective belief, however genuine, does not constitute evidence of pretext. The focus of pretext inquiry is whether an agency’s actions were motivated by discriminatory animus. Further, at all times the ultimate burden of persuasion remains with Complainant to demonstrate by a preponderance of the evidence that the Agency was motivated by prohibited discrimination. Upon review of the record, we find that Complainant has failed in this regard. Reasonable Accommodation To the extent Complainant alleged that he was denied a reasonable accommodation, under the Commission's regulations, an agency is required to make reasonable accommodation to the known physical and mental limitations of an otherwise qualified individual with a disability unless the agency can show that accommodation would cause an undue hardship. 29 C.F.R. §1630.9. We note that when making an accommodation request, an employee is not required to use the “magic” words “reasonable accommodation.” See Enforcement Guidance on Reasonable Accommodation and Undue Hardship Under the Americans with Disabilities Act (Enforcement Guidance), EEOC Notice No. 915.002 (Oct. 17, 2002) at Q.1. Instead, the employee need only inform the Agency that he needs an adjustment or change at work for a reason related to a medical condition. See Triplett-Graham v. U.S. Postal Serv., EEOC Appeal No. 0120044720 (Feb. 24, 2006). In this matter, we note that Complainant acknowledged during the investigation that while he contacted the Diversity Office regarding his undiagnosed sleep apnea, he never began the process to seek a reasonable accommodation. Accordingly, we find that Complainant failed to show that the Agency violated the Rehabilitation Act in this matter. Hostile Work Environment In considering whether any of the actions listed by Complainant, whether individually or collectively, constitute harassment, the Commission notes that in Harris v. Forklift Systems, Inc., 510 U.S. 17 (1993), the Supreme Court reaffirmed the holding of Meritor Savings Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57 (1986), that harassment is actionable if it is sufficiently severe or pervasive that it results in an alteration of the conditions of the complainant’s employment. See EEOC Notice No. 915.002 (March 8, 1994), Enforcement Guidance on Harris v. Forklift Systems, Inc. at 3. To establish a claim of harassment a complainant must show that: (1) he belongs to a statutorily protected class; (2) he was subjected to unwelcome verbal or physical conduct; (3) the harassment complained of was based on a statutorily protected class; (4) the harassment had the purpose or effect of unreasonably interfering with her work performance and/or creating an intimidating, hostile, or offensive work environment; and (5) there is a basis for imputing liability to the employer. See McCleod v. Soc. Sec. Admin., EEOC Appeal No. 01963810 (Aug. 2021000847 8 5, 1999) (citing Henson v. City of Dundee, 682 F.2d 897 (11th Cir. 1982)). Generally, in assessing whether Complainant has set forth an actionable claim of harassment, the conduct at issue must be viewed in the context of the totality of the circumstances, considering, inter alia, the nature and frequency of offensive encounters and the span of time over which the encounters occurred. See 29 C.F.R. § 1604.11(b); EEOC Policy Guidance on Current Issues of Sexual Harassment, N 915 050, No. 137 (Mar. 19, 1990); Cobb v. Dep’t of the Treasury, Request No. 05970077 (Mar. 13, 1997). However, as noted by the Supreme Court in Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775, 788 (1998): “simple teasing, offhand comments, and isolated incidents (unless extremely serious) will not amount to discriminatory changes in the ‘terms and conditions of employment.’” The Court noted that such conduct “must be both objectively and subjectively offensive, [such] that a reasonable person would find [the work environment to be] hostile or abusive, and . . . that the victim in fact did perceive it to be so.” Id. See also Burlington Industries, Inc. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742, 752 (1998); Clark Cty. Sch. Dist. v. Breeden, 532 U.S. 268 (2001). We note that with regard to retaliatory harassment, Complainant only needs to show that such actions are the type of action that would dissuade a reasonable employee from making or supporting a charge of discrimination. See Burlington Northern & Santa Fe Railroad. Co. v. White, 548 U. S. 53 (2006); see also EEOC Enforcement Guidance on Retaliation and Related Issues, No. 915.004 (Aug. 25, 2016); Carroll v. Dep’t of the Army, EEOC Request No. 05970939 (Apr. 4, 2000). Assuming, arguendo, that Complainant established parts 1 and 2 of a prima facie case of harassment, we find that based on the record Complainant has not met the requirements of part 3. In support of his claim, Complainant provided a variety of claims to demonstrate a hostile work environment, such as: management not engaging with him regarding his personal life and interests as they did with other employees (claim 2); denying in person attendance of a benefits meeting (claim 6) and HR briefings (claim 7), and only allowing video teleconference attendance instead for both events; discussion on work attire such as ties (claim 5); being told his work performance was substandard and that his work was being excessively scrutinized (claim 10); removal from a work site gym’s fitness program (claim 13); not assisting Complainant to obtain tuition assistance (claim 16); and being referred to as “Sir” in a disrespectful manner (claim 18). Complainant provided detailed claims, however there is no evidence to causally connect such claims to Complainant’s protected bases or EEO activity. Furthermore, regarding part 4, we find that the examples provided, taken individually or as whole, do not demonstrate evidence of a pervasively hostile work environment. We note that discrimination statutes do not shield a complainant from a myriad of petty slights and annoyances. Rizzo v U.S. Postal Serv., EEOC Appeal No. 01A53970 (Aug. 29, 2005); see also Zabkowicz v. West Bend Co., 589 F. Supp. 780, 784, 35 FEP Cases 601 (E.D. Wis. 1984) (opining that Title VII does not serve “as a vehicle for vindicating the petty slights suffered by the hypersensitive”). 2021000847 9 Additionally, not every unpleasant or undesirable act which occurs in the workplace constitutes an EEO violation. See Shealey v. Equal Emp’t Opportunity Comm’n, EEOC Appeal No. 0120070356 (Apr. 18, 2011) (citing Epps v. Dep’t of Transp., EEOC Appeal No. 0120093688 (Dec. 19, 2009)). What is prohibited is “behavior so objectively offensive as to alter the conditions of the victim’s employment.” Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Svcs., Inc., 523 U.S. 75, 81 (1998). In sum, the evidence does not support a finding of discrimination on any basis, the presence of discriminatory animus, or the existence of a hostile work environment. The Commission also recognizes that ordinary managerial and supervisory duties include monitoring subordinates, scheduling the workload and attendance, scrutinizing and evaluating performance, providing job-related advice and counsel, and taking action in the face of performance shortcomings, are part of normal operational management. Erika H. v. Dep’t of Transp., EEOC Appeal No. 0120151781 (June 16, 2017).7 Lastly, regarding the events which constituted discrete acts of disparate treatment, a finding of a hostile work environment is precluded by our determination that Complainant failed to establish that any of the actions taken by the Agency were motivated by discriminatory or retaliatory animus. See Oakley v. U.S. Postal Serv., EEOC Appeal No. 01982923 (Sept. 21, 2000). CONCLUSION Upon careful review of the AJ’s decision and the evidence of record, as well as arguments made on appeal, we conclude that the AJ correctly determined that the preponderance of the evidence did not establish that Complainant was discriminated against by the Agency as alleged. As such, we AFFIRM the Agency’s final action. STATEMENT OF RIGHTS - ON APPEAL RECONSIDERATION (M0920) The Commission may, in its discretion, reconsider this appellate decision if Complainant or the Agency submits a written request that contains arguments or evidence that tend to establish that: 1. The appellate decision involved a clearly erroneous interpretation of material fact or law; or 2. The appellate decision will have a substantial impact on the policies, practices, or operations of the agency. Requests for reconsideration must be filed with EEOC’s Office of Federal Operations (OFO) within thirty (30) calendar days of receipt of this decision. 7 We note that Complainant alleged in claim 19 that, in late August or early September 2013, he overheard a loud conversation between people “deriding gays” and that they made comments to the effect, “Those gays; they all want to get married and have children now.” We note that this was the only alleged event that was raised of this type and that Complainant provided no support to his allegation. We find that this event alone was not sufficient to create a hostile work environment assuming it occurred as alleged. 2021000847 10 If the party requesting reconsideration elects to file a statement or brief in support of the request, that statement or brief must be filed together with the request for reconsideration. A party shall have twenty (20) calendar days from receipt of another party’s request for reconsideration within which to submit a brief or statement in opposition. See 29 C.F.R. § 1614.405; Equal Employment Opportunity Management Directive for 29 C.F.R. Part 1614 (EEO MD-110), at Chap. 9 § VII.B (Aug. 5, 2015). Complainant should submit his or her request for reconsideration, and any statement or brief in support of his or her request, via the EEOC Public Portal, which can be found at https://publicportal.eeoc.gov/Portal/Login.aspx Alternatively, Complainant can submit his or her request and arguments to the Director, Office of Federal Operations, Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, via regular mail addressed to P.O. Box 77960, Washington, DC 20013, or by certified mail addressed to 131 M Street, NE, Washington, DC 20507. In the absence of a legible postmark, a complainant’s request to reconsider shall be deemed timely filed if OFO receives it by mail within five days of the expiration of the applicable filing period. See 29 C.F.R. § 1614.604. An agency’s request for reconsideration must be submitted in digital format via the EEOC’s Federal Sector EEO Portal (FedSEP). See 29 C.F.R. § 1614.403(g). Either party’s request and/or statement or brief in opposition must also include proof of service on the other party, unless Complainant files his or her request via the EEOC Public Portal, in which case no proof of service is required. Failure to file within the 30-day time period will result in dismissal of the party’s request for reconsideration as untimely, unless extenuating circumstances prevented the timely filing of the request. Any supporting documentation must be submitted together with the request for reconsideration. The Commission will consider requests for reconsideration filed after the deadline only in very limited circumstances. See 29 C.F.R. § 1614.604(c). COMPLAINANT’S RIGHT TO FILE A CIVIL ACTION (S0610) You have the right to file a civil action in an appropriate United States District Court within ninety (90) calendar days from the date that you receive this decision. If you file a civil action, you must name as the defendant in the complaint the person who is the official Agency head or department head, identifying that person by his or her full name and official title. Failure to do so may result in the dismissal of your case in court. “Agency” or “department” means the national organization, and not the local office, facility or department in which you work. If you file a request to reconsider and also file a civil action, filing a civil action will terminate the administrative processing of your complaint. 2021000847 11 RIGHT TO REQUEST COUNSEL (Z0815) If you want to file a civil action but cannot pay the fees, costs, or security to do so, you may request permission from the court to proceed with the civil action without paying these fees or costs. Similarly, if you cannot afford an attorney to represent you in the civil action, you may request the court to appoint an attorney for you. You must submit the requests for waiver of court costs or appointment of an attorney directly to the court, not the Commission. The court has the sole discretion to grant or deny these types of requests. Such requests do not alter the time limits for filing a civil action (please read the paragraph titled Complainant’s Right to File a Civil Action for the specific time limits). FOR THE COMMISSION: ______________________________ Carlton M. Hadden’s signature Carlton M. Hadden, Director Office of Federal Operations October 7, 2021 Date