[Redacted], Brenton W., 1 Complainant,v.Christine Wormuth, Secretary, Department of the Army, Agency.Download PDFEqual Employment Opportunity CommissionAug 16, 2021Appeal No. 2021002556 (E.E.O.C. Aug. 16, 2021) Copy Citation U.S. EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION Office of Federal Operations P.O. Box 77960 Washington, DC 20013 Brenton W.,1 Complainant, v. Christine Wormuth, Secretary, Department of the Army, Agency. Appeal No. 2021002556 Hearing No. 430-2021-00021X Agency No. ARBRAGG20FEB00758 DECISION On March 25, 2021, Complainant filed an appeal, pursuant to 29 C.F.R. § 1614.403(a), from the Agency’s February 22, 2021 final action concerning an equal employment opportunity (EEO) complaint claiming employment discrimination in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (Title VII), as amended, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq. BACKGROUND During the relevant period, Complainant worked as a Supply Technician at the Agency’s Company C, Headquarters and Headquarters Company, Womack Army Medical Center in Fort Bragg, North Carolina. On May 4, 2020, Complainant filed the instant formal complaint. Complainant alleged that the Agency discriminated against him in reprisal for protected EEO activity (prior activity) when: on February 10, 2020, he was issued a Financial Liability, Investigation of Property Loss (FLIPL), notifying him that a financial liability has been assessed against him by the United States Government in the amount of $349.99 for loss Government Property. 1 This case has been randomly assigned a pseudonym which will replace Complainant’s name when the decision is published to non-parties and the Commission’s website. 2021002556 2 After an investigation, the Agency provided Complainant with a copy of the investigative file, and Complainant requested a hearing before an EEOC Administrative Judge (AJ). The AJ assigned to the case issued a Notice of Intent to Issue a Decision Without a Hearing on January 19, 2021. Neither party submitted a response. On February 5, 2021, the AJ issued a decision by summary judgment in favor of the Agency. In his Notice of Intent to Issue a Decision Without a Hearing, the AJ noted that Complainant had asserted that Agency managers held him responsible for the cost of a defective cell phone that could not be accounted for. Complainant stated that on or about October 29, 2019, a named employee (E1) brought him a cell phone that would no longer power on. Complainant stated that he took steps to ensure E1’s cell phone data was transferred from the nonworking phone to a new phone, and then returned the nonworking phone to Verizon via United Parcel Service. However, Complainant admitted that he did not obtain a receipt or any type of proof that he returned the cell phone to Verizon. When the phone could not be tracked, Complainant was ultimately issued a FIPL for the cost of the phone ($349.99) in February 2020 because he was the last person in possession of it. Thereafter, Complainant contacted a Verizon Representative, who informed him the phone had been received in the warehouse on November 5, 2019. When Complainant relayed this to the Chief of Property Management Branch, the FLIPL was rescinded and Complainant was not charged for the phone. The AJ noted that the Agency’s legitimate, non-discriminatory reason for the FLIPL “is simple; Complainant was the last person in possession of the phone which could not be accounted for because Complainant did not secure a receipt when he returned the phone to Verizon. The AJ further stated had Complainant done so, the FLIPL would never have been issued. Once, however, the Agency confirmed that Verizon was in possession of the phone, the Agency no longer held Complainant responsible. Moreover, the AJ found no evidence in the record that the Agency’s reasoning was pretext or that reprisal was the true reason the Agency held Complainant responsible for the missing phone until its whereabouts were determined. The Agency issued its final action, adopting the AJ’s decision. The instant appeal followed. ANALYSIS AND FINDINGS The Commission's regulations allow an AJ to grant summary judgment when he or she finds that there is no genuine issue of material fact. 29 C.F.R. § 1614.109(g). An issue of fact is “genuine” if the evidence is such that a reasonable fact finder could find in favor of the non- moving party. Celotex v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322-23 (1986); Oliver v. Digital Equip. Corp., 846 F.2d 103, 105 (1st Cir. 1988). A fact is “material” if it has the potential to affect the outcome of the case. In rendering this appellate decision, we must scrutinize the AJ’s legal and factual conclusions, and the Agency’s final order adopting them, de novo. See 29 C.F.R. § 1614.405(a) (stating that a “decision on an appeal from an Agency’s final action shall be based on a de novo review…”); see also Equal Employment Opportunity Management Directive for 29 C.F.R. Part 1614 (EEO-MD-110), at Chap. 9, § VI.B. (as revised, August 5, 2015) (providing 2021002556 3 that an administrative judge’s determination to issue a decision without a hearing, and the decision itself, will both be reviewed de novo). To successfully oppose a decision by summary judgment, a complainant must identify, with specificity, facts in dispute either within the record or by producing further supporting evidence, and must further establish that such facts are material under applicable law. Such a dispute would indicate that a hearing is necessary to produce evidence to support a finding that the agency was motivated by discriminatory animus. Here, however, Complainant failed to establish such a dispute. Even construing any inferences raised by the undisputed facts in favor of Complainant, a reasonable fact-finder could not find in Complainant’s favor. A claim of disparate treatment is examined under the three-party analysis first enunciated in McDonnell Douglas Corporation v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973). For complainant to prevail, she must first establish a prima facie of discrimination by presenting facts that, if unexplained, reasonably give rise to an inference of discrimination, i.e., that a prohibited consideration was a factor in the adverse employment action. See McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 802; Furnco Construction Corp. v. Waters, 438 U.S. 567 (1978). The burden then shifts to the agency to articulate a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for its actions. See Texas Department of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 253 (1981). Once the agency has met its burden, the complainant bears the ultimate responsibility to persuade the fact finder by a preponderance of the evidence that the agency acted on the basis of a prohibited reason. See St. Mary’s Honor Center v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502 (1993). The AJ noted that the Deputy Commander for Administration stated that the FLIPL came across her desk because Agency management asked Complainant about the subject Government cellphone and he asserted that he mailed it. She stated, however, Complainant had no proof that he mailed the cellphone. The Deputy Commander explained when an employee signs for Government Property, the employee has to either turn the property in, or show that another person signed for it. She stated that employees are required to have a hand receipt or the property. Furthermore, the Deputy Commander stated that a receipt came in and the subject cellphone was found and “we reversed the changes and nothing happened to [Complainant].” Here, the undisputed facts fully support the AJ’s determination that the responsible management officials clearly articulated legitimate, non-discriminatory reasons for its actions. Complainant did not prove, by a preponderance of the evidence, that these proffered reasons were a pretext designed to mask unlawful retaliation. We AFFIRM the Agency’s final action, implementing the AJ’s decision without a hearing, finding no discrimination. 2021002556 4 STATEMENT OF RIGHTS - ON APPEAL RECONSIDERATION (M0920) The Commission may, in its discretion, reconsider this appellate decision if Complainant or the Agency submits a written request that contains arguments or evidence that tend to establish that: 1. The appellate decision involved a clearly erroneous interpretation of material fact or law; or 2. The appellate decision will have a substantial impact on the policies, practices, or operations of the agency. Requests for reconsideration must be filed with EEOC’s Office of Federal Operations (OFO) within thirty (30) calendar days of receipt of this decision. If the party requesting reconsideration elects to file a statement or brief in support of the request, that statement or brief must be filed together with the request for reconsideration. A party shall have twenty (20) calendar days from receipt of another party’s request for reconsideration within which to submit a brief or statement in opposition. See 29 C.F.R. § 1614.405; Equal Employment Opportunity Management Directive for 29 C.F.R. Part 1614 (EEO MD-110), at Chap. 9 § VII.B (Aug. 5, 2015). Complainant should submit his or her request for reconsideration, and any statement or brief in support of his or her request, via the EEOC Public Portal, which can be found at https://publicportal.eeoc.gov/Portal/Login.aspx Alternatively, Complainant can submit his or her request and arguments to the Director, Office of Federal Operations, Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, via regular mail addressed to P.O. Box 77960, Washington, DC 20013, or by certified mail addressed to 131 M Street, NE, Washington, DC 20507. In the absence of a legible postmark, a complainant’s request to reconsider shall be deemed timely filed if OFO receives it by mail within five days of the expiration of the applicable filing period. See 29 C.F.R. § 1614.604. An agency’s request for reconsideration must be submitted in digital format via the EEOC’s Federal Sector EEO Portal (FedSEP). See 29 C.F.R. § 1614.403(g). Either party’s request and/or statement or brief in opposition must also include proof of service on the other party, unless Complainant files his or her request via the EEOC Public Portal, in which case no proof of service is required. Failure to file within the 30-day time period will result in dismissal of the party’s request for reconsideration as untimely, unless extenuating circumstances prevented the timely filing of the request. Any supporting documentation must be submitted together with the request for reconsideration. The Commission will consider requests for reconsideration filed after the deadline only in very limited circumstances. See 29 C.F.R. § 1614.604(c). 2021002556 5 COMPLAINANT’S RIGHT TO FILE A CIVIL ACTION (S0610) You have the right to file a civil action in an appropriate United States District Court within ninety (90) calendar days from the date that you receive this decision. If you file a civil action, you must name as the defendant in the complaint the person who is the official Agency head or department head, identifying that person by his or her full name and official title. Failure to do so may result in the dismissal of your case in court. “Agency” or “department” means the national organization, and not the local office, facility or department in which you work. If you file a request to reconsider and also file a civil action, filing a civil action will terminate the administrative processing of your complaint. RIGHT TO REQUEST COUNSEL (Z0815) If you want to file a civil action but cannot pay the fees, costs, or security to do so, you may request permission from the court to proceed with the civil action without paying these fees or costs. Similarly, if you cannot afford an attorney to represent you in the civil action, you may request the court to appoint an attorney for you. You must submit the requests for waiver of court costs or appointment of an attorney directly to the court, not the Commission. The court has the sole discretion to grant or deny these types of requests. Such requests do not alter the time limits for filing a civil action (please read the paragraph titled Complainant’s Right to File a Civil Action for the specific time limits). FOR THE COMMISSION: ______________________________ Carlton M. Hadden’s signature Carlton M. Hadden, Director Office of Federal Operations August 16, 2021 Date Copy with citationCopy as parenthetical citation