[Redacted], Billi L., 1 Complainant,v.Marcia L. Fudge, Secretary, Department of Housing and Urban Development, Agency.

Equal Employment Opportunity Commission

Mar 10, 2022

Appeal No. 2020004641 (E.E.O.C. Mar. 10, 2022)

U.S. EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION Office of Federal Operations P.O. Box 77960 Washington, DC 20013 Billi L.,1 Complainant, v. Marcia L. Fudge, Secretary, Department of Housing and Urban Development, Agency. Appeal No. 2020004641 Hearing No. 410-2020-00059X Agency No. HUD-00002-2019 DECISION On August 21, 2020, Complainant filed an appeal with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC or Commission), pursuant to 29 C.F.R. § 1614.403(a), from the Agency’s July 31, 2020, final order concerning her equal employment opportunity (EEO) complaint alleging employment discrimination in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (Title VII), as amended, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq. For the following reasons, the Commission AFFIRMS the Agency’s final order. BACKGROUND At the time of events giving rise to this complaint, Complainant worked as a Contract Specialist, 1102, GS-13, at the Agency’s Office of Chief Procurement Officer in Atlanta, Georgia. Complainant’s first-level supervisor was Branch Chief. Her second-level supervisor was Southern Field Contract Division Director (Contract Director). On November 20, 2018, Complainant filed an EEO complaint alleging that the Agency discriminated against her on the basis of sex (female) when: 1 This case has been randomly assigned a pseudonym which will replace Complainant’s name when the decision is published to non-parties and the Commission’s website. 2020004641 2 1. The Office of the Chief Procurement Officer subjected Complainant to disparate treatment and hostile work environment harassment (2b) based on sex (female) when she learned on August 21, 2018, that she was not selected for the position of Senior Contract Specialist under Vacancy Announcement Number 18- HUD-873. 2. The Office of the Chief Procurement Officer subjected Complainant to hostile work environment harassment based on sex (female) consisting of the following events: a. on or about August 7, 2018, management divulged information in her resume in front of staff; b. [see 1 above];2 c. during a meeting on September 25, 2018, and on other various occasions, management referred to her as "Ms. [Complainant's first name]" or "Missy" although she asked that she not be referred to in that manner; and d. on or about October 4, 2018, she was not assigned duties as other similarly situated male colleagues. The investigative record reflects the following pertinent matters relating to the subject claims. Complainant applied for a position as Senior Contract Specialist under Vacancy Announcement Number 18-HUD-873. She was on the approved list of candidates sent forward from Administrative Resource Center (ARC) Human Resources. Report of Investigation (ROI) at 257. As such, she was interviewed telephonically on August 9, 2018. Id. at 217, 258. The interview panel consisted of Contract Director, Branch Chief, and Director, Risk Management and Compliance Unit (Director), with Contract Director as the selecting official. Id. at 217, 258, 323. Contract Director stated she asked the interview questions of all applicants, and she asked the same questions of each. Id. at 258-59. She also averred that the other panelists asked follow- up questions, if they had them. Id. at 259. Branch Chief said she asked Complainant to clarify some of her responses. Id. at 217. After the interviews, the interview panel discussed the applicants’ responses and the documents and information provided by them. Id. at 258-60. The interview committee unanimously agreed on Selectee (male), based on the qualifications and the interviews conducted, according to Assistant Chief Procurement Officer for Field Operations (Assistant Chief). ROI at 382. Regarding the interview, Contract Director said Complainant did not directly answer the questions, and her lack of focus gave the impression that she lacked leadership skills. Id. at 261. Contract Director also opined that Complainant exaggerated her role at work. Id. at 261-62. Finally, she contended Complainant lacked the organizational skills necessary to be a good leader. Id. at 262. 2 Claim 2(b) is the same claim for hostile work environment harassment that is listed in claim 1. 2020004641 3 In contrast, Contract Director contended, Selectee provided direct responses to interview questions. Id. at 261. He was also succinct and on point. Id. at 262. The record indicates that Complainant did not have previous supervisory experience, but Selectee did. ROI at 340-41. Complainant submitted that, other than a supervisory detail (discussed below), she had more experience and education than Selectee had. Id. at 70, 72-77. Complainant further averred that, except for one question by Director, Contract Director asked her all of the questions. Id. at 67. While Complainant said she was not offered a reason for her non-selection, she attributed it to discrimination based on sex because Selectee was shown favoritism and thus had an advantage. Id. at 71, 75-77. For example, she said, management assigned him to a supervisory detail in 2014 that put him in a good light for the vacancy at issue, even though she was more qualified for that detail. Id. at 70-71. Complainant also maintained that Selectee was “pre-selected” for the position at issue and that Branch Chief coached Selectee before the interview. Id. at 69, 71, 75. Branch Chief, Contract Director, and Director affirmed that sex was not a factor in the selection process. ROI at 219, 262, 325. Complainant also claims that she was harassed based on sex, evidenced by her non-selection, discussed supra, and the matters below. In claim 2a, Complainant stated that Branch Chief divulged at a staff meeting details about a Contract Specialist position at which Complainant had been employed. ROI at 80. Complainant submitted, because Branch Chief did not divulge Selectee’s resume information and only divulged hers, that this action was based on Complainant’s sex. Id. at 82. A co-worker, Contracting Officer, confirmed Complainant’s account while another co-worker, Contract Specialist 1, believed Complainant was asked about a former position or it was mentioned. Id. at 389, 404. Branch Chief denied divulging information from Complainant’s resume in front of staff. Id. at 220. In claim 2c, Complainant alleged that Branch Chief referred to her as “Ms. [Complainant’s first name]” or “Missy,” even after Complainant had verbally asked her not to call her “Missy” in 2011. Id. at 82-83. She stated that Branch Chief continued to call her “Ms. [Complainant’s first name]” as late as April 30, 2019, which was after she emailed Branch Chief asking her to address Complainant by first name or as “Ms. [Complainant’s last name].” Id. at 82. Complainant also conveyed that Branch Chief always called males in the office: “Mr. [Employee’s last name].” Id. at 83. Of the four co-workers who gave affidavits, Contracting Officer corroborated Complainant’s account. Id. at 390. He also said that Branch Chief called other co-workers Mr. Last Name, Ms. Last Name, or by their first name. Id. Contract Specialist 1 stated she had heard the words "Ms. or Mr." used within the office as a term of endearment among staff. Id. at 404-05. Contract Specialist 2 said she could not recall a specific time when Complainant was called “Missy,” “Ms. [Complainant’s first name],” or “Ms. [Complainant’s last name].” Id. at 407-08. Instead, Contract Specialist 2 attested she had heard Branch Chief call Complainant by her first name and refer to male staff by their first names. Id. at 408. 2020004641 4 Selectee said that he could not remember Branch Chief referring to Complainant as “Missy” or “Miss [Complainant’s first name].” Id. at 410. He added that Branch Chief called other individuals by their first name and used Mr. or Miss to individuals who were senior to Branch Chief. Id. at 411. Complainant maintained that Branch Chief’s behavior in this regard was toxic, discriminatory, and created a hostile work environment as well as being offensive and demeaning. Id. at 84, 86. Contracting Officer (male) described the work atmosphere as “intimidating.” Id. at 390. On the other hand, Contract Specialist 2 (female) said the environment was generally good, while Selectee (male) called it respectful. Id. at 408, 411. Branch Chief stated she referred to all employees as Ms. or Mr. and their first name. ROI at 221. She did not recall Complainant asking her in 2011 not to call Complainant “Missy.” Id. However, Branch Chief denied ever calling Complainant that. Id. Prior to learning via Complainant’s email of September 9, 2018, that Complainant did not want to be called “Ms. [Complainant’s first name],” Branch Chief admitted she did refer to Complainant that way. Id. at 222. After receiving Complainant’s email, Branch Chief said she believed she had not referred to Complainant as "Ma[’a]m," "Ms. [Complainant’s first name]," or "Ms. [Complainant’s last name]." In claim 2d, Complainant alleges, Branch Chief did not assign Complainant the same level of work as male colleagues were assigned. Id. at 86-89. Complainant put forward that not being assigned more often to Administrative Contracting Officer duties hurt her chances at promotion, as the subject came up during the interview for the complained-of non-selection. Id. at 86-87. Because she was the only female warranted Contracting Officer in the office other than Branch Chief, and Selectee was assigned these duties, Complainant believed her non-assignment was based on her sex. Id. at 89. Branch Chief asserted that Complainant was assigned duties similar to her male and female colleagues. ROI at 223; Agency Supplement to the Record with Combined Exhibits, Exhibit 2, Branch Chief’s Declaration (Branch Chief’s Declaration). According to Branch Chief, longstanding practice was that administrative duties are always given back to the Contracting Officer or Contracting Specialist who was assigned the area prior to a protest. ROI at 224. Branch Chief maintained that she likewise assigned Complainant as the Administrative Contract Officer when it was in Complainant’s assigned area prior to a protest. Id. At the conclusion of the investigation, the Agency provided Complainant with a copy of the report of investigation and notice of her right to request a hearing before an Equal Employment Opportunity Commission Administrative Judge (AJ). Complainant timely requested a hearing. On February 6, 2020, the EEOC AJ issued an Acknowledgment Order. Therein, the AJ scheduled the Initial Conference for February 27, 2020. The AJ advised the parties to be prepared to discuss the case, in detail, at the Initial Conference and to supplement the record (prior to the Initial Conference) by producing any document that would further their position. 2020004641 5 The AJ then determined sua sponte that the complaint did not warrant a hearing and issued a decision without a hearing on June 22, 2020, finding no discrimination. The AJ simultaneously denied Complainant’s request for discovery, citing U.S. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission Handbook for Administrative Judges, Ch. 4, Discovery, Paragraph I (July 1, 2002) (stating “While discovery is generally permitted, in appropriate circumstances, the Administrative Judge has the discretion to limit or preclude the parties from engaging in discovery.”). On claim 1, the AJ found that Complainant did not show that the Agency’s reasons were pretextual or masked illegal discrimination. The AJ determined the record established that the interviewers chose Selectee because they believed that Selectee was better qualified and would be better equipped to meet the Agency's needs. In addition, the AJ noted, someone outside of Complainant’s protected basis was also not selected for the position at issue. Thus, the AJ concluded, Complainant failed to rebut the Agency's reasons with evidence that would undermine the Agency's explanation and failed to show the Agency's reasons for her non- selection were pretext for discrimination. On claim 2, the AJ found that Complainant failed to establish a prima facie case of hostile work environment. Specifically, the AJ found the record did not show that any of the Agency’s conduct involved Complainant’s protected basis or that the alleged harassment was based on it. The AJ also found that Complainant was treated the same as her other colleagues. As for the incidents involving Branch Chief purportedly divulging information from Complainant’s resume in front of staff and addressing Complainant as “Missy” or “Ms. [Complainant’s first name],” the AJ found Complainant failed to demonstrate that the actions complained of were sufficiently severe or pervasive to affect a reasonable person or create an intimidating, hostile, or offensive work environment. The Agency subsequently issued a final order adopting the AJ’s finding that Complainant failed to prove that the Agency subjected her to discrimination as alleged. CONTENTIONS ON APPEAL On appeal, Complainant argues that the AJ erred in issuing a decision finding no discrimination without first providing Complainant Notice of Intent to Issue a Decision and giving Complainant an opportunity to argue her case, present evidence in support of her case, or show why summary judgment should not be issued. Next, the AJ erred in denying Complainant’s request for discovery. Third, the AJ erred in issuing a decision finding no discrimination because the AJ deprived Complainant of the opportunity to respond, employed the incorrect legal standard, and made multiple findings of disputed facts. Complainant asks the Commission to reverse the Agency’s final order, remand to the AJ for a hearing, and allow Complainant to conduct discovery. 2020004641 6 The Agency contends that the AJ properly issued a decision based on the evidence presented at the tailored initial conference and the subsequent filings by the parties. It also submits that the AJ properly denied Complainant’s motion to extend discovery. Lastly, the AJ properly found that further development of the record was unlikely to lead to a finding of discrimination and the preponderant evidence failed to show that Complainant was subjected to discrimination. It asks the Commission to affirm its final order. ANALYSIS AND FINDINGS Initial Matters In rendering this appellate decision, we must scrutinize the AJ’s legal and factual conclusions, and the Agency’s final order adopting them, de novo. See 29 C.F.R. § 1614.405(a) (stating that a “decision on an appeal from an Agency’s final action shall be based on a de novo review . . .”); see also Equal Employment Opportunity Management Directive for 29 C.F.R. Part 1614 (EEO MD-110), at Chap. 9, § VI.B. (Aug. 5, 2015) (providing that an administrative judge’s determination to issue a decision without a hearing, and the decision itself, will both be reviewed de novo). This essentially means that we should look at this case with fresh eyes. In other words, we are free to accept (if accurate) or reject (if erroneous) the AJ’s, and Agency’s, factual conclusions and legal analysis - including on the ultimate fact of whether intentional discrimination occurred, and on the legal issue of whether any federal employment discrimination statute was violated. See id. at Chapter 9, § VI.A. (explaining that the de novo standard of review “requires that the Commission examine the record without regard to the factual and legal determinations of the previous decision maker,” and that EEOC “review the documents, statements, and testimony of record, including any timely and relevant submissions of the parties, and . . . issue its decision based on the Commission’s own assessment of the record and its interpretation of the law”). We determine whether the AJ appropriately issued the decision without a hearing. The Commission’s regulations allow an AJ to issue a decision without a hearing upon finding that there is no genuine issue of material fact. 29 C.F.R. § 1614.109(g). EEOC’s decision without a hearing regulation follows the summary judgment procedure from federal court. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56. The U.S. Supreme Court held summary judgment is appropriate where a judge determines no genuine issue of material fact exists under the legal and evidentiary standards. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 255 (1986). In ruling on a summary judgment motion, the judge is to determine whether there are genuine issues for trial, as opposed to weighing the evidence. Id. at 249. At the summary judgment stage, the judge must believe the non-moving party’s evidence and must draw justifiable inferences in the non-moving party’s favor. Id. at 255. A “genuine issue of fact” is one that a reasonable judge could find in favor for the non- moving party. Celotex v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322-23 (1986); Oliver v. Digital Equip. Corp., 846 F.2d 103, 105 (1st Cir. 1988). A “material” fact has the potential to affect the outcome of a case. 2020004641 7 An AJ may issue a decision without a hearing only after determining that the record has been adequately developed. See Petty v. Dep’t of Def., EEOC Appeal No. 01A24206 (July 11, 2003). We carefully reviewed the record and find that it is adequately developed. To successfully oppose a decision without a hearing, Complainant must identify material facts of record that are in dispute or present further material evidence establishing facts in dispute. As an initial matter, we agree with Complainant that there is no evidence that the AJ issued a Notice of Intent to Issue a Decision Without a Hearing. However, as noted supra, both parties had an opportunity to supplement the record and, at the initial conference, the parties discussed the case in detail. In addition, Complainant has failed to establish on appeal that there is a genuine issue of material fact in dispute, to be discussed infra. For these reasons, we find that the failure of the AJ to issue a Notice of Intent was harmless error. We further find that the AJ properly denied Complainant’s request for discovery. We agree with the AJ that the record had been adequately developed and did not need to be supplemented. Disparate Treatment A claim of disparate treatment is examined under the three-part analysis first enunciated in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973). For a complainant to prevail, she must first establish a prima facie case of discrimination by presenting facts that, if unexplained, reasonably give rise to an inference of discrimination, i.e., that a prohibited consideration was a factor in the adverse employment action. McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 802, n.13; Furnco Construction Corp. v. Waters, 438 U.S. 567 (1978). The burden then shifts to the agency to articulate a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for its actions. Tex. Dep’t of Cmty. Affs. v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 253 (1981). Once the agency has met its burden, the complainant bears the ultimate responsibility to persuade the fact finder by a preponderance of the evidence that the agency acted on the basis of a prohibited reason. St. Mary’s Honor Ctr. v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502 (1993). This established order of analysis in discrimination cases, in which the first step normally consists of determining the existence of a prima facie case, need not be followed in all cases. Where the agency has articulated a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for its actions, the factual inquiry can proceed directly to the third step of the McDonnell Douglas analysis, the ultimate issue of whether complainant has shown by a preponderance of the evidence that the agency’s actions were motivated by discrimination. U.S. Postal Serv. Bd. of Governors v. Aikens, 460 U.S. 711, 713-714 (1983). We find that the Agency articulated legitimate, nondiscriminatory reasons for its action. Namely, Complainant did not perform well in the interview and lacked supervisory experience. For the interview component, Contract Director cited Complainant’s lack of focus, indirect answers, exaggeration of her role at work, and lack of organizational and leadership skills. In contrast, according to Contract Director, Selectee was direct, succinct, and on point. Regarding previous supervisory experience, Complainant did not have it while Selectee did. 2020004641 8 As the Agency has articulated legitimate, nondiscriminatory reasons for its action, Complainant now bears the burden of establishing that the Agency’s stated reasons were merely a pretext for discrimination. In arguing pretext, Complainant contended that, with the exception of one question by Director, Contract Director asked her all of the questions. Complainant also submitted that Selectee was shown favoritism and thus had an advantage. Namely, management assigned him to a supervisory detail that set him up well for the vacancy at issue; Selectee was “pre-selected” for the position; and Branch Chief coached Selectee before the interview. Regarding the integrity of the interview process, Contract Director reported that she asked all candidates the interview questions, with Branch Chief and Director asking follow-up questions if or when they had them. Moreover, Branch Chief averred she asked Complainant questions. As for Complainant’s contentions regarding favoritism shown to Selectee, there is no proof of sex-based bias regarding Selectee’s supervisory detail or evidence of Branch Chief’s alleged pre- interview coaching of Selectee. As for any alleged pre-selection of Selectee, the Commission has held that even if pre-selection occurred, it is not unlawful unless a complainant can show that the pre-selection was driven by discriminatory animus. Bret B. v. U.S. Postal Serv., EEOC No. 2021000606 (Jan. 24, 2022) (citing Nickens v. Nat'l Aeronautics Space Admin., EEOC Request No. 05950329 (Feb. 23, 1996)). Here, there has not been such a showing. Regarding Complainant’s argument that she had more experience and education than Selectee had, before the preferential supervisory detail in which management placed him, the record does not support that she was a plainly superior candidate. Furthermore, the Agency does not dispute that Complainant was among the best qualified. It submits that she did not perform as well as Selectee in the interview and lacked previous supervisory experience. Agencies have broad discretion to carry out personnel decisions and should not be second-guessed by the reviewing authority absent evidence of unlawful motivation. Vanek v. Dep’t of the Treasury, EEOC Request No. 05940906 (Jan. 16, 1997). It is well established that employers have discretion to choose among qualified candidates, provided that the decision is not based upon unlawful criteria. See Burdine, 450 U.S. at 259. Furthermore, the Commission has long held that a person’s length of experience does not necessarily mean she is better qualified. See Macready v. Dep't of Justice, EEOC Appeal No. 01991433 (Apr. 4, 2002). Ultimately, it is not the function of this Commission to substitute its judgment for that of management officials who are familiar with the needs of their facility, and who are in a better position to make decisions, unless other facts suggest that proscribed considerations of bias entered the decision-making process. Shapiro, supra. In sum, Complainant has not shown that the Agency's reasons for Complainant’s non-selection are unworthy of credence or that discriminatory motivation more likely motivated the Agency's actions. As a result, we find that there was no discrimination. 2020004641 9 Harassment Finally, to the extent that Complainant is alleging that she was subjected to a hostile work environment because of her non-selection (claim 2b), the Commission finds that under the standards set forth in Harris v. Forklift Systems. Inc., 510 U.S. 17 (1993), Complainant's claim of hostile work environment must fail. See Enforcement Guidance on Harris v. Forklift Systems, Inc., EEOC Notice No. 915.002 (Mar. 3, 1994). Complainant's harassment claim is precluded based on the Commission's finding that she failed to establish the action taken by the Agency was motivated by discriminatory animus with regard to claim 1. See Oakley v. U.S. Postal Serv., EEOC Appeal No. 01932923 (Sept. 21, 2000). Similarly, with respect to claim 2d, we find that Complainant has not shown that the assignment of duties on the date in question was related to her protected basis. Branch Chief declared that males and females were assigned similar duties. She also pointed out that the Agency had a longstanding practice of assigning administrative duties to the original Contracting Officers, and that Complainant had been assigned administrative duties when she was the original Contracting Officer. With respect to claims 2a and 2c, we find that Complainant has not established that Branch Chief’s alleged divulging of information on Complainant’s resume and her referring to Complainant as “Missy” and “Ms. [Complainant’s first name],” assuming they occurred as alleged, were severe or pervasive enough to rise to the level of a hostile work environment. In looking at the totality of the circumstances, the record reflects that the claims raised were not so abusive as to rise to the level of a hostile work environment. The Commission notes that Title VII is not a civility code. Rather, it forbids “only behavior so objectively offensive as to alter the conditions of the victim's employment.” Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Servs., Inc., 523 U.S. 75, 81 (1998). Because the record does not support a finding that Complainant was subjected to Agency actions that rose to the level of a hostile work environment, we find that Complainant has not established that she was subjected to harassment, as alleged. CONCLUSION Based on a thorough review of the record and the contentions on appeal, including those not specifically addressed herein, we AFFIRM the Agency's final order adopting the AJ's decision. 2020004641 10 STATEMENT OF RIGHTS - ON APPEAL RECONSIDERATION (M0920) The Commission may, in its discretion, reconsider this appellate decision if Complainant or the Agency submits a written request that contains arguments or evidence that tend to establish that: 1. The appellate decision involved a clearly erroneous interpretation of material fact or law; or 2. The appellate decision will have a substantial impact on the policies, practices, or operations of the agency. Requests for reconsideration must be filed with EEOC’s Office of Federal Operations (OFO) within thirty (30) calendar days of receipt of this decision. If the party requesting reconsideration elects to file a statement or brief in support of the request, that statement or brief must be filed together with the request for reconsideration. A party shall have twenty (20) calendar days from receipt of another party’s request for reconsideration within which to submit a brief or statement in opposition. See 29 C.F.R. § 1614.405; Equal Employment Opportunity Management Directive for 29 C.F.R. Part 1614 (EEO MD-110), at Chap. 9 § VII.B (Aug. 5, 2015). Complainant should submit his or her request for reconsideration, and any statement or brief in support of his or her request, via the EEOC Public Portal, which can be found at https://publicportal.eeoc.gov/Portal/Login.aspx Alternatively, Complainant can submit his or her request and arguments to the Director, Office of Federal Operations, Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, via regular mail addressed to P.O. Box 77960, Washington, DC 20013, or by certified mail addressed to 131 M Street, NE, Washington, DC 20507. In the absence of a legible postmark, a complainant’s request to reconsider shall be deemed timely filed if OFO receives it by mail within five days of the expiration of the applicable filing period. See 29 C.F.R. § 1614.604. An agency’s request for reconsideration must be submitted in digital format via the EEOC’s Federal Sector EEO Portal (FedSEP). See 29 C.F.R. § 1614.403(g). Either party’s request and/or statement or brief in opposition must also include proof of service on the other party, unless Complainant files his or her request via the EEOC Public Portal, in which case no proof of service is required. Failure to file within the 30-day time period will result in dismissal of the party’s request for reconsideration as untimely, unless extenuating circumstances prevented the timely filing of the request. Any supporting documentation must be submitted together with the request for reconsideration. The Commission will consider requests for reconsideration filed after the deadline only in very limited circumstances. See 29 C.F.R. § 1614.604(c). 2020004641 11 COMPLAINANT’S RIGHT TO FILE A CIVIL ACTION (S0610) You have the right to file a civil action in an appropriate United States District Court within ninety (90) calendar days from the date that you receive this decision. If you file a civil action, you must name as the defendant in the complaint the person who is the official Agency head or department head, identifying that person by his or her full name and official title. Failure to do so may result in the dismissal of your case in court. “Agency” or “department” means the national organization, and not the local office, facility or department in which you work. If you file a request to reconsider and also file a civil action, filing a civil action will terminate the administrative processing of your complaint. RIGHT TO REQUEST COUNSEL (Z0815) If you want to file a civil action but cannot pay the fees, costs, or security to do so, you may request permission from the court to proceed with the civil action without paying these fees or costs. Similarly, if you cannot afford an attorney to represent you in the civil action, you may request the court to appoint an attorney for you. You must submit the requests for waiver of court costs or appointment of an attorney directly to the court, not the Commission. The court has the sole discretion to grant or deny these types of requests. Such requests do not alter the time limits for filing a civil action (please read the paragraph titled Complainant’s Right to File a Civil Action for the specific time limits). FOR THE COMMISSION: ______________________________ Carlton M. Hadden’s signature Carlton M. Hadden, Director Office of Federal Operations March 10, 2022 Date