[Redacted], Anne C., 1 Complainant,v.Jeffrey A. Rosen, Acting Attorney General, Department of Justice (Federal Bureau of Prisons), Agency.

Equal Employment Opportunity Commission

Jan 14, 2021

Appeal No. 2020001238 (E.E.O.C. Jan. 14, 2021)

U.S. EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION Office of Federal Operations P.O. Box 77960 Washington, DC 20013 Anne C.,1 Complainant, v. Jeffrey A. Rosen, Acting Attorney General, Department of Justice (Federal Bureau of Prisons), Agency. Appeal No. 2020001238 Hearing No. 410-2019-00053X Agency No. BOP-2018-0359 DECISION On November 18, 2019, Complainant filed an appeal with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC or Commission), pursuant to 29 C.F.R. § 1614.403(a), from the Agency’s October 31, 2019, final order concerning her equal employment opportunity (EEO) complaint alleging employment discrimination in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (Title VII), as amended, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq. For the following reasons, the Commission AFFIRMS the Agency’s final order. ISSUES PRESENTED The issues presented are: (1) whether the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission Administrative Judge (AJ) properly issued a decision without a hearing; and (2) whether the preponderance of the evidence in the record establishes that Complainant was subjected to sexual harassment or disparate treatment based on sex and/or reprisal. 1 This case has been randomly assigned a pseudonym which will replace Complainant’s name when the decision is published to non-parties and the Commission’s website. 2020001238 2 BACKGROUND At the time of events giving rise to this complaint, Complainant’s position of record was a GS- 0007-08 Correctional Officer/Senior Officer Specialist at the Agency’s United States Penitentiary in Atlanta, Georgia (USP Atlanta). From August 20, 2017 through December 10, 2017, Complainant was temporarily promoted to GS-0007-09 Acting Lieutenant at USP Atlanta. Complainant is female, and she stated that she first participated in the EEO process when she contacted an EEO Counselor to initiate the instant complaint. Complainant stated that she was working as Acting Lieutenant on December 1, 2017, when she called a Correctional Officer (C1) to offer him an overtime assignment. Complainant averred that C1 accepted the overtime but “stated to me that he thought I was calling him for ‘a date.’” Report of Investigation (ROI) at 221. According to Complainant, when she had called C1 to offer overtime a few days before December 1, 2017, he turned down the overtime because he needed to clean his house, “unless [Complainant is] coming to help him” clean his house. Id. Complainant averred that these remarks constituted unwanted sexual advances and were inappropriate, nothing that she does not have any sort of personal or friendly relationship with C1. Complainant also stated that she had a negative interaction with C1 at work in March 2017 that resulted in Complainant receiving a cease and desist letter in May 2017 for allegedly cussing at C1. Complainant further alleged that C1’s romantic overtures were clearly unwanted because everyone at USP Atlanta, including C1, knows that she is a lesbian and only dates women.2 The record contains a December 1, 2017, email from Complainant to the Captain (S1) with a memorandum attached. Complainant copied the Warden (S2) on the email. The subject of the memorandum was “Sexual Harassment (Inappropriate Comment),” and in the memorandum Complainant described offering C1 overtime earlier that day and stated that C1 had responded that he thought Complainant was calling him for a date. ROI at 136. Complainant stated that she told C1 that his comment was inappropriate and offensive to her and reported C1’s remark to the Operations and Special Housing Unit Lieutenants. Complainant also noted that C1 had made an inappropriate comment to her “[a] few weeks ago” when he turned down an overtime assignment “unless [Complainant is] coming to help” C1 clean his house. Id. S2 stated that, after he reviewed Complainant’s memorandum, he directed S1 to investigate the allegations. According to S2, C1 denied making the statements in question to Complainant. S2 averred that, based on the information provided by S1’s investigation, C1 was directed to remain professional, and S1 told Complainant that she could have another Lieutenant call C1 if he was next on the list for overtime. S1 stated that, although C1 denied making the alleged comments, he received a cease and desist letter, which reminded him of the employee standards of conduct and reminded him to maintain professional communication in the workplace. S2 stated that no further incidents were reported to him after C1 was directed to remain professional and Complainant was instructed that she could have someone else contact C1 if his name was next on the overtime list. 2 Complainant did not identify her sexual orientation as a basis for the instant complaint. 2020001238 3 Complainant alleged that management did not appropriately respond to her complaint of sexual harassment and that, as a result, C1 continued to harass her. According to Complainant, one day when she was working as Acting Lieutenant in the Control Center, she advised over the radio that a zone alarm had gone off. Complainant stated that C1 responded over the radio, “a black kitty cat got away.” ROI at 223. Complainant alleged that C1’s comment was unprofessional and that it was a clear reference to Complainant. Complainant alleged that, although there are cats inside USP Atlanta that sometimes set off the alarms, “it was obvious by his tone and the manner in which he said it that he was taunting me.” Id. Complainant averred that normally a Correctional Officer would respond over the radio, “Perimeter to Control the zone is clear,” possibly adding a comment that “it was a cat that alarmed the zone.” Id. Complainant alleged that on December 13, 2017, she noticed that three time-off awards she received in July 2017 were not reflected on her Employee Personal Page (EPP). The record contains a screenshot from Complainant’s electronic Official Personnel File (eOPF), which shows that three time-off awards were added between August 6, 2017, and September 3, 2017, and were available for Complainant to use. Complainant averred that on December 16, 2017, she learned that her son was ill. Complainant stated that she contacted the Operations Lieutenant, who told her to leave and placed her on sick leave. According to Complainant, when her son was still sick on December 17, 2017, she called the Operations Lieutenant and asked to be placed on family leave for the day. Complainant was charged absent without leave (AWOL) for December 16 and 17, 2017. The Administrative Lieutenant (L1) stated that Complainant was charged AWOL on December 16 and 17, 2017, because she did not have enough sick leave to cover her absences. According to the record, Complainant had two hours of sick leave available on December 16, 2017, and these two hours were applied to her absence that day. Complainant was charged AWOL for the remainder of her shift on December 16, 2017, and for her absence on December 17, 2017. Complainant noted that she had properly reported her absences and that she had 123.5 hours of annual leave that could have been used. Complainant stated that on January 5, 2018, she began to receive emails stating that certain certifications had been removed from her training record. According to Complainant, management removed the certifications to deter her from participating in the EEO process. A Human Resource Assistant Manager (HR1) stated that the certifications that were removed from Complainant’s training record were related to her temporary placement in the Lieutenant position. According to HR1, the certifications Complainant no longer needed as a Correctional Officer were removed from her training record when her temporary promotion ended, but it could take up to two pay periods for the removal to be reflected in her training record. According to Complainant, she came to work on January 12, 2018, and began feeling ill, experiencing chest pain and having trouble breathing. Complainant averred that she contacted Operations and stated that she was ill and was going to go to the emergency room. 2020001238 4 Initially, Complainant was charged four hours of sick leave and four hours AWOL for January 12, 2018. L1 stated that Complainant was mistakenly charged AWOL for January 12, 2018, and noted that Complainant’s time and attendance was later corrected to reflect eight hours of sick leave for that date. Complainant stated that the AWOL charge was not removed until sometime in February 2018, which was after management was aware that she had contacted an EEO Counselor. On February 2, 2018, a Letter of Reprimand that was issued to Complainant November 7, 2017, appeared in her eOPF. 3 Noting that she had initiated contact with an EEO Counselor on January 12, 2018, Complainant alleged that the Letter of Reprimand was uploaded to her personnel file in February to retaliate against her for engaging in protected EEO activity. According to the record, on November 8, 2017, the USP Atlanta Human Resource Manager (HR2) created a Help Desk ticket to have the November 7, 2017, Letter of Reprimand added to Complainant’s eOPF. According to HR2, the Agency’s Human Resource Services Center in Grand Prairie, Texas responded to the Help Desk ticket by adding the Letter of Reprimand to Complainant’s eOPF. HR2 stated that it can take awhile for the Human Resource Services Center to process such requests. Complainant initiated contact with an EEO Counselor on January 12, 2018. On March 1, 2018, Complainant filed an EEO complaint alleging that the Agency discriminated against her on the bases of sex (female) and reprisal for prior protected EEO activity when: 1. On December 1, 2017, she was subjected to sexual harassment when a Correctional Officer made an unwanted sexual advance toward her. Since Complainant reported the incident, management failed to address the issue, and the Correctional Officer addressed her unprofessionally on another occasion; 2. On December 13, 2017, she became aware that her time-off awards were not reflected on her EPP; 3. On December 16 and 17, 2017, and on January 12, 2018, she was charged AWOL; 4. Beginning on January 5, 2018, she received emails stating that several certifications had been removed from her training record; and 5. On February 2, 2018, a Letter of Reprimand that was issued on November 7, 2017, was uploaded to her personnel file.4 At the conclusion of the investigation, the Agency provided Complainant with a copy of the report of investigation and notice of her right to request a hearing before an EEOC AJ. 3 Complainant also stated that the issuance of the Letter of Reprimand on November 7, 2017, was discriminatory. However, Complainant did not raise this issue in her EEO complaint, and this decision will not analyze the issuance of the Letter of Reprimand. 4 Complainant withdrew two additional claims during the hearing process. 2020001238 5 Complainant timely requested a hearing. Over Complainant's objections, the AJ assigned to the case granted the Agency’s August 23, 2019, motion for a decision without a hearing and issued a decision without a hearing on September 23, 2019. The Agency subsequently issued a final order adopting the AJ’s finding that Complainant failed to prove that the Agency subjected her to discrimination as alleged. The instant appeal followed. CONTENTIONS ON APPEAL On appeal, Complainant contends that, in finding that she could not establish a claim of sexual harassment, the AJ inappropriately evaluated the credibility of witnesses, arguing that the statements of C1 were overtly sexual in nature and that the only way that the AJ could conclude otherwise was by crediting C1’s denial and discounting Complainant’s allegations. According to Complainant, a hearing is required to determine regarding whether the harassment was severe or pervasive and whether the harassment resulted in tangible employment actions. Complainant further contends that there are genuine issues of material fact concerning the AWOL charges, her time-off awards, the removal of certifications from her training record, and the appearance of the Letter of Reprimand in her personnel file. Complainant requests that the matter be remanded for a hearing. The Agency did not submit a statement in response to Complainant’s appeal. ANALYSIS AND FINDINGS In rendering this appellate decision we must scrutinize the AJ’s legal and factual conclusions, and the Agency’s final order adopting them, de novo. See 29 C.F.R. § 1614.405(a) (stating that a “decision on an appeal from an Agency’s final action shall be based on a de novo review . . .”); see also Equal Employment Opportunity Management Directive for 29 C.F.R. Part 1614 (EEO MD-110), at Chap. 9, § VI.B. (Aug. 5, 2015) (providing that an administrative judge’s determination to issue a decision without a hearing, and the decision itself, will both be reviewed de novo). This essentially means that we should look at this case with fresh eyes. In other words, we are free to accept (if accurate) or reject (if erroneous) the AJ’s, and Agency’s, factual conclusions and legal analysis - including on the ultimate fact of whether intentional discrimination occurred, and on the legal issue of whether any federal employment discrimination statute was violated. See id. at Chapter 9, § VI.A. (explaining that the de novo standard of review “requires that the Commission examine the record without regard to the factual and legal determinations of the previous decision maker,” and that EEOC “review the documents, statements, and testimony of record, including any timely and relevant submissions of the parties, and . . . issue its decision based on the Commission’s own assessment of the record and its interpretation of the law”). 2020001238 6 Decision without a Hearing We determine whether the AJ appropriately issued the decision without a hearing. The Commission’s regulations allow an AJ to issue a decision without a hearing upon finding that there is no genuine issue of material fact. 29 C.F.R. § 1614.109(g). EEOC’s decision without a hearing regulation follows the summary judgment procedure from federal court. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56. The U.S. Supreme Court held summary judgment is appropriate where a judge determines no genuine issue of material fact exists under the legal and evidentiary standards. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 255 (1986). In ruling on a summary judgment motion, the judge is to determine whether there are genuine issues for trial, as opposed to weighing the evidence. Id. at 249. At the summary judgment stage, the judge must believe the non-moving party’s evidence and must draw justifiable inferences in the non-moving party’s favor. Id. at 255. A “genuine issue of fact” is one that a reasonable judge could find in favor for the non-moving party. Celotex v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322-23 (1986); Oliver v. Digital Equip. Corp., 846 F.2d 103, 105 (1st Cir. 1988). A “material” fact has the potential to affect the outcome of a case. An AJ may issue a decision without a hearing only after determining that the record has been adequately developed. See Petty v. Dep’t of Def., EEOC Appeal No. 01A24206 (July 11, 2003). We carefully reviewed the record and find that it is adequately developed. To successfully oppose a decision without a hearing, Complainant must identify material facts of record that are in dispute or present further material evidence establishing facts in dispute. Here, Complainant contends that the AJ inappropriately made credibility assessments in finding that Complainant could not establish a prima facie case of sexual harassment. We disagree that the AJ assessed the credibility of Complainant or C1. The AJ’s decision appropriately assumed for the purposes of considering the Agency’s motion for a decision without a hearing that C1 made two offensive comments to Complainant that could be construed as related to her sex. We further find that there are no genuine issues of material fact. Even if C1 made the comments in question, as discussed below, no reasonable finder of fact could find that Complainant established that she was subjected to sexual harassment. Similarly, Complainant has not identified a genuine issue of material fact related to the AWOL charges, the time-off awards, the disappearance of the certifications, or the appearance of the Letter of Reprimand in her eOPF. Accordingly, the AJ appropriately issued a decision without a hearing. Sexual Harassment Harassment of an employee that would not occur but for the employee’s race, color, sex, national origin, age, disability, genetic information, or religion is unlawful, if it is sufficiently patterned or pervasive. McKinney v. Dole, 765 F.2d 1129, 1138-1139 (D.C. Cir. 1985). A single incident or group of isolated incidents will not be regarded as discriminatory harassment unless the conduct is severe. Walker v. Ford Motor Co., 684 F.2d 1355, 1358 (11th Cir. 1982). 2020001238 7 Whether the harassment is sufficiently severe to trigger a violation of Title VII must be determined by looking at all of the circumstances, including the frequency of the discriminatory conduct, its severity, whether it is physically threatening or humiliating, or a mere offensive utterance, and whether it unreasonably interferes with an employee’s work performance. Harris v. Forklift Systems, Inc., 510 U.S. 17, 23 (1993). In order to establish a prima facie case of sexual harassment, a complainant must prove, by a preponderance of the evidence, the existence of five elements: (1) that she is a member of a statutorily protected group; (2) that she was subjected to unwelcome sexual advances, requests for sexual favors, or other verbal or physical conduct of a sexual nature; (3) that the harassment of which she complained is based on sex; and (4) that the harassment affected a term or condition of employment and/or had the purpose or effect of unreasonably interfering with her work environment and/or creating an intimidating, hostile, or offensive work environment; and (5) that there is a basis for imputing liability to the employer. Henson v. City of Dundee, 682 F.2d 987, 903-05 (11th Cir. 1982). The harasser’s conduct should be evaluated from the objective viewpoint of a reasonable person in the victim’s situation. Enforcement Guidance on Harris v. Forklift Sys., Inc., EEOC Notice No. 915.002 (Mar. 8, 1994). Complainant alleged that C1 made three remarks that amounted to sexual harassment: (1) when he stated that he could not accept the overtime assignment unless Complainant helped him clean his house; (2) on December 1, 2017, when he accepted an overtime assignment but told Complainant that he thought that she was calling him for a date; and (3) when he announced over the radio that “a black kitty cat got away.” Regarding the third comment, although Complainant assumed that C1 was referring to her as a “black kitty cat,” Complainant has provided no support for this assumption, and we find that no reasonable finder of fact could find that this remark constituted harassment based on Complainant’s sex. We further find that preponderant evidence in the record does not establish that a reasonable person in Complainant’s work environment would find that the first and second remarks were sufficiently severe or pervasive to constitute sexual harassment. Complainant alleges only two comments that a reasonable finder of fact could find were based on sex. Moreover, although asking a coworker for help cleaning one’s house or stating that one thought a coworker was calling to ask for a date may not be appropriate for the workplace, we do not find that Complainant has established by preponderant evidence in the record a reasonable person working in Complainant’s position in a correctional facility would find these two remarks sufficiently severe or pervasive to establish a hostile work environment based on sex. Accordingly, Complainant has not established that she was subjected to sexual harassment as alleged. Disparate Treatment To prevail in a disparate treatment claim such as this, Complainant must satisfy the three-part evidentiary scheme fashioned by the Supreme Court in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973). 2020001238 8 Complainant must initially establish a prima facie case by demonstrating that she was subjected to an adverse employment action under circumstances that would support an inference of discrimination. Furnco Constr. Co. v. Waters, 438 U.S. 567, 576 (1978). Proof of a prima facie case will vary depending on the facts of the particular case. McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 802 n. 13. The burden then shifts to the Agency to articulate a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for its actions. Tex. Dep’t of Cmty. Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 253 (1981). The prima facie inquiry may be bypassed if the Agency has articulated legitimate and nondiscriminatory reasons for its conduct. See U.S. Postal Serv. Bd. of Governors v. Aikens, 460 U.S. 711, 713-17 (1983); Holley v. Dep’t of Veterans Affairs, EEOC Request No. 05950842 (Nov. 13, 1997). To ultimately prevail, Complainant must prove, by a preponderance of the evidence, that the Agency’s explanation is pretextual. Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Products, Inc., 530 U.S. 133, 120 S.Ct. 2097 (2000); St. Mary's Honor Ctr. v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502, 519 (1993). Complainant alleged that she was subjected to discrimination when she did not see her time-off awards on her Employee Personal Page. We find that Complainant has not established a prima facie case of discrimination with respect to this claim. Because the record reflects that Complainant’s three time-off awards were reflected on her eOPF and that the time-off awards were available for Complainant’s use, we find that Complainant has not established that she was subjected to an adverse employment action. Complainant also alleged that she was discriminated against when she was charged AWOL on December 16 and 17, 2017, and on January 12, 2018. We will forego the analysis of the prima facie case, as the Agency has provided legitimate, nondiscriminatory reasons for the AWOL charges. The Agency charged Complainant AWOL on December 16 and 17, 2017, because she did not have sufficient sick leave to cover her absence, and the Agency charged her AWOL on January 12, 2018, as a mistake. As evidence of pretext, Complainant generally alleges that L1 is biased against other females, whom L1, a female working in a male-dominated environment, views as a threat. Regarding the December 2017 AWOL charges, Complainant contends that she had annual leave that could have been used. However, the existence of Complainant’s annual leave balance does not establish that the Agency’s legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for charging her AWOL in December 2017, that she did not have enough sick leave, was untrue or that discriminatory animus was the real reason for the AWOL charges. In January 2018, the Agency mistakenly charged Complainant AWOL. A mistake made by an agency is not evidence of pretext unless there is evidence that the mistake was based on a complainant's protected classes. See Vickey S. v. Dep't of Defense, EEOC Appeal No. 0120112893 (Nov. 17, 2015); Hsieh v. Dep't of Veterans Affairs, EEOC Appeal No. 0120120980 (June 4, 2012); Carroll v. Dep't of Justice, EEOC Appeal No. 01A20985 (Jan. 21, 2003). Although Complainant states that L1 was biased against her because of her sex, Complainant has not established that L1’s mistake was based on her sex, and we find that Complainant has not otherwise established pretext for discrimination. 2020001238 9 Complainant alleged discrimination with respect to receiving email notifications that certifications were being removed from her training records. The Agency’s legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for removing certain certifications from Complainant’s training record was that Complainant’s temporary promotion to the Acting Lieutenant position had ended. As evidence of pretext, Complainant argues that some of the certifications removed from her training record were not related to her Acting Lieutenant position. However, even if it is true that some unrelated certifications were removed from her record, we find that no reasonable finder of fact could find that Complainant established that the Agency’s proffered reason was a pretext for discrimination based on sex and/or reprisal. Finally, Complainant alleged that she was subjected to discrimination when her November 7, 2017, Letter of Reprimand was uploaded to her personnel file on February 2, 2018, which was after she had contacted an EEO Counselor. The Agency’s legitimate, nondiscriminatory explanation was that HR2 completed a Help Desk ticket to have the Letter of Reprimand added to Complainant’s personnel file on November 8, 2017, the day after it was issued, but that the Human Resource Service Center in Grand Prairie did not immediately complete the request. As evidence of pretext, Complainant points to the temporal proximity between her EEO Counselor contact and the appearance of the Letter of Reprimand in her eOPF. However, because the record contains the November 8, 2017 request, the cited temporal proximity does not establish that the Agency’s legitimate, nondiscriminatory reasons were a pretext, and Complainant has not otherwise established pretext for discrimination. CONCLUSION Based on a thorough review of the record and the contentions on appeal, including those not specifically addressed herein, we AFFIRM the Agency’s final order because the issuance of a decision without a hearing was appropriate and because the preponderance of the evidence in the record does not establish that discrimination occurred. STATEMENT OF RIGHTS - ON APPEAL RECONSIDERATION (M0920) The Commission may, in its discretion, reconsider this appellate decision if Complainant or the Agency submits a written request that contains arguments or evidence that tend to establish that: 1. The appellate decision involved a clearly erroneous interpretation of material fact or law; or 2. The appellate decision will have a substantial impact on the policies, practices, or operations of the agency. Requests for reconsideration must be filed with EEOC’s Office of Federal Operations (OFO) within thirty (30) calendar days of receipt of this decision. If the party requesting reconsideration elects to file a statement or brief in support of the request, that statement or brief must be filed together with the request for reconsideration. 2020001238 10 A party shall have twenty (20) calendar days from receipt of another party’s request for reconsideration within which to submit a brief or statement in opposition. See 29 C.F.R. § 1614.405; Equal Employment Opportunity Management Directive for 29 C.F.R. Part 1614 (EEO MD-110), at Chap. 9 § VII.B (Aug. 5, 2015). Complainant should submit his or her request for reconsideration, and any statement or brief in support of his or her request, via the EEOC Public Portal, which can be found at https://publicportal.eeoc.gov/Portal/Login.aspx Alternatively, Complainant can submit his or her request and arguments to the Director, Office of Federal Operations, Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, via regular mail addressed to P.O. Box 77960, Washington, DC 20013, or by certified mail addressed to 131 M Street, NE, Washington, DC 20507. In the absence of a legible postmark, a complainant’s request to reconsider shall be deemed timely filed if OFO receives it by mail within five days of the expiration of the applicable filing period. See 29 C.F.R. § 1614.604. An agency’s request for reconsideration must be submitted in digital format via the EEOC’s Federal Sector EEO Portal (FedSEP). See 29 C.F.R. § 1614.403(g). Either party’s request and/or statement or brief in opposition must also include proof of service on the other party, unless Complainant files his or her request via the EEOC Public Portal, in which case no proof of service is required. Failure to file within the 30-day time period will result in dismissal of the party’s request for reconsideration as untimely, unless extenuating circumstances prevented the timely filing of the request. Any supporting documentation must be submitted together with the request for reconsideration. The Commission will consider requests for reconsideration filed after the deadline only in very limited circumstances. See 29 C.F.R. § 1614.604(c). COMPLAINANT’S RIGHT TO FILE A CIVIL ACTION (S0610) You have the right to file a civil action in an appropriate United States District Court within ninety (90) calendar days from the date that you receive this decision. If you file a civil action, you must name as the defendant in the complaint the person who is the official Agency head or department head, identifying that person by his or her full name and official title. Failure to do so may result in the dismissal of your case in court. “Agency” or “department” means the national organization, and not the local office, facility or department in which you work. If you file a request to reconsider and also file a civil action, filing a civil action will terminate the administrative processing of your complaint. RIGHT TO REQUEST COUNSEL (Z0815) If you want to file a civil action but cannot pay the fees, costs, or security to do so, you may request permission from the court to proceed with the civil action without paying these fees or costs. Similarly, if you cannot afford an attorney to represent you in the civil action, you may request the court to appoint an attorney for you. 2020001238 11 You must submit the requests for waiver of court costs or appointment of an attorney directly to the court, not the Commission. The court has the sole discretion to grant or deny these types of requests. Such requests do not alter the time limits for filing a civil action (please read the paragraph titled Complainant’s Right to File a Civil Action for the specific time limits). FOR THE COMMISSION: ______________________________ Carlton M. Hadden’s signature Carlton M. Hadden, Director Office of Federal Operations January 14, 2021 Date