[Redacted], Aleshia C., 1 Complainant,v.Denis R. McDonough, Secretary, Department of Veterans Affairs (Veterans Health Administration), Agency.Download PDFEqual Employment Opportunity CommissionJul 22, 2021Appeal No. 2020001185 (E.E.O.C. Jul. 22, 2021) Copy Citation U.S. EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION Office of Federal Operations P.O. Box 77960 Washington, DC 20013 Aleshia C.,1 Complainant, v. Denis R. McDonough, Secretary, Department of Veterans Affairs (Veterans Health Administration), Agency. Appeal No. 2020001185 Hearing No. 520201700379X Agency No. 200H06202014104953 DECISION Complainant timely appealed to the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (“EEOC” or “Commission”), pursuant to 29 C.F.R. § 1614.403, from an October 31, 2019 Final Agency Decision (“FAD”) concerning an equal employment opportunity (“EEO”) complaint alleging employment discrimination in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (“Title VII”), as amended, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq., and the Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967 (“ADEA”), as amended, 29 U.S.C. § 621 et seq. BACKGROUND At the time of events giving rise to this complaint, Complainant was employed by the Agency as a Program Support Assistant, GS-06, for the VA Hudson Valley Health Care System Health Administration Service (“HAS”), Health Information Management Section (“HIMS”), at the VA Medical Center, Montrose Campus, in Montrose New York. On December 23, 2014 Complainant filed a Formal EEO Complaint alleging that she had been subjected to a hostile work environment and discrimination by the Agency on the bases of sex (female), race (African American), and age (39) when: 1 This case has been randomly assigned a pseudonym which will replace Complainant’s name when the decision is published to non-parties and the Commission’s website. 2020001185 2 1. On September 5, 2014, her first level supervisor (“S1”) threatened her, stating, “you need to find another job because you are not going to make it”; 2. On September 17, 2014, S1 denied her request for six (6) hours of sick leave; 3. On September 18, 2014, S1 verbally counseled her regarding her performance and threatened to have her terminated; 4. On September 19, 2014, S1 told her that the Agency’s phone lines are recorded and dictated when she could take her break; 5. On September 22, 2014, S1 proposed that she transfer to the Castle Point Travel Office; 6. On September 23, 2014, S1 repeated his threats and said that he would be conducting a 45-day evaluation of her performance; 7. On October 2, 2014, the Chief of Health Information Management Systems (HIMS), Joan Tubbs (S2), issued Complainant a “Notification of Unacceptable Performance” letter placing her under a Performance Improvement Plan (PIP); 8. On December 23, 2014, S2 met with Complainant but failed to allow her to have a union representative present; and 9. On January 20, 2015, she was issued a “Proposed Reduction in Grade (Demotion)” letter by the Acting Chief of Health Administration Services. The record developed during the investigation of the complaint includes the following evidence. On August 24, 2014, Complainant was hired as a Program Support Assistant, GS-06. She reported to the Assistant Chief Health Management Section, GS-11, as her first level supervisor (“S1,” male, African American, age 46). The Chief of the HIMS Health Management Section, GS-12, was Complainant’s second level supervisor (“S2,” female, white, age 55). According to the Position Description (“PD”), the Program Support Assistant, GS-06, must be able to effectively communicate about medical information requests from veterans and their families, or with third parties (e.g. medical providers), while providing excellent customer service. When fulfilling a request, the Program Support Assistant, GS-06, analyzes, selects, and compiles appropriate information from the veteran’s health records, copies the relevant documents and sends them to the requesting party. The veteran’s medical confidentiality must be maintained in accordance with Agency policies, the Privacy Act of 1974, the Freedom of Information Act, and HIPPA. This involves ensuring that consent forms are signed and properly completed prior to sending medical documents. 2020001185 3 Beginning September 5, 2014 and ongoing through September 29, 2014, Complainant alleged S1 subjected her to a hostile work environment by regularly threatening to fire her and denigrating her ability to do her job. According to Complainant, S1 monitored her more closely than he did her white, male colleagues by directing when she could use the bathroom and take breaks and keeping track of her internet usage. He also counseled her for mistakes yet when her white male colleagues committed the same mistakes, S1 told them not to let it happen again. On September 17, 2014, Complainant notified S1 that she felt sick and needed to leave early. (Later she explained that she left early because she needed to get away from a hostile work environment created by S1). S1 instructed Complainant to enter a leave request into the system, before she left. Complainant failed to enter her leave request so S1 recorded her absence for the remaining six hours of the workday as Absent Without Leave (“AWOL”). Payroll documents reflect that management later corrected the six hours of AWOL to reflect approved leave. On September 18, 2014, S1 told Complainant to meet with him in his office. Complainant stopped by S2’s office first and asked her to attend the meeting as a witness because she “did not feel safe” meeting with S1 alone. With S2 present, S1 counseled Complainant that employees were required to enter leave requests prior to using their leave and asked her why she hadn’t followed his instructions to do this the day before. Complainant responded, “I told you I felt sick,” and claimed that she entered the request that morning. S1 said that he did not see any leave requests from Complainant in the system. Complainant repeated that she needed to leave on September 17, 2014, because she felt sick, and then abruptly walked out of S1’s office. About a week later, Complainant informed S2 that S1 was subjecting her to a hostile work environment. S2 notified her supervisor, the Chief of HAS, who initiated a fact-finding investigation. On Monday, September 29, 2014 (as S1 was on leave the previous week), S2 notified S1 in writing and in person that he was no longer to supervise Complainant during the fact-finding investigation. Instead, Complainant would report directly to S2 until the investigation concluded. S2 also told S1 to expect a call about the investigation from the Chief of HAS, and that he would be required to participate in mediation with Complainant. On October 2, 2014, S2 issued Complainant a Performance Improvement Plan (“PIP”) after Complainant did not achieve satisfactory performance for the critical elements of “Release of Information” and “Customer Service” on her annual performance appraisal. For a period of 90 days, S2 reviewed 100% of Complainant’s work and met with her once a week to discuss her progress and counsel her on ways to improve her performance. Complainant was also assigned training and encouraged to request specific training if she felt it would help her improve. Complainant felt the PIP was unfair, and that she was being held to a higher standard than her white, male coworkers, who also made mistakes. She noted that she received “Fully Successful” on all four Critical Elements, including customer service, of the Travel Clerk, GS-05 position which she held before becoming a Program Support Assistant, GS-06. On January 20, 2015, the Acting Chief, HAS, GS-13 (“AC,” Caucasian, female, age 47) issued a “Proposed Reduction in Grade (Demotion)” letter for “unacceptable performance.” 2020001185 4 According to the letter, which was accompanied by an excel spreadsheet listing and detailing Complainant’s mistakes while on the PIP, Complainant did not meet the standards identified for the critical elements of “Release of Information” and “Customer Service.” Additionally, while on the PIP, Complainant continued making the same mistakes as before the PIP was issued, including, but not limited to sending medical records to incorrect locations or recipients, and sending medical records unaccompanied by a consent form. S2 issued Complainant’s mid-year review on April 9, 2015, where she scored “needs improvement to be fully successful or better.” Complainant was ultimately reassigned to the position of Mail and File Clerk, GS-5. At the conclusion of its investigation, the Agency provided Complainant with a copy of the report of investigation (“ROI”) and notice of her right to request a FAD or a hearing before an EEOC Administrative Judge (“AJ”). Complainant initially requested a hearing, then withdrew her request and asked for a FAD instead. In accordance with Complainant’s request, the Agency issued a FAD pursuant to 29 C.F.R. § 1614.110(b). The FAD concluded that Complainant failed to prove that the Agency subjected him to discrimination as alleged. The instant appeal followed. ANALYSIS AND FINDINGS As this is an appeal from a decision issued without a hearing, pursuant to 29 C.F.R. § 1614.110(b), the Agency's decision is subject to de novo review by the Commission. 29 C.F.R. § 1614.405(a). See Equal Employment Opportunity Management Directive for 29 C.F.R. Part 1614, (“EEO MD-110”) at Chapter 9, § VI.A. (Aug. 5, 2015) (explaining that the de novo standard of review “requires that the Commission examine the record without regard to the factual and legal determinations of the previous decision maker,” and that EEOC “review the documents, statements, and testimony of record, including any timely and relevant submissions of the parties, and . . . issue its decision based on the Commission’s own assessment of the record and its interpretation of the law”). Age Discrimination To establish a prima facie case of age discrimination, a complainant must show that she was over 40 years of age, that she was subjected to an adverse employment action, and that she was treated less favorably than other similarly situated employees younger than herself, i.e. she was accorded treatment different from that given to persons who are considerably younger than she. See Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Products, Inc., 530 U.S. 133 (2000); O'Connor v. Consolidated Coin Caterers Corp., 517 U.S. 308 (1996). Complainant cannot raise a claim of age discrimination because she was not over 40 years old when the alleged discrimination took place. Her most recent claim of discrimination occurred in January 2015, but Complainant was born in April 1975, making her 39 years old during the relevant time frame. Therefore, this analysis will be limited to Complainant’s allegations of discrimination based on race and sex. 2020001185 5 Union Representation - Claim 8 Under 29 C.F.R. § 1614.107(a)(1), the EEO process cannot be used to lodge a collateral attack against another proceeding. "A claim that can be characterized as a collateral attack, by definition, involves a challenge to another forum's proceeding, such as the grievance process, the unemployment compensation process, or the workers' compensation process." See Lingad v. United States Postal Serv., EEOC Request No. 05930106 (June 25, 1993), Kleinman v. United States Postal Serv., EEOC Request No. 05940585 (Sept. 22, 1994), Wills v. Dep't of Def., EEOC Request No. 05970596 (July 30, 1998). Thus, a claim involving an issue relating to union representation (e.g. denial of Weingarten Rights) constitutes a collateral attack on the grievance process. See Spiwak v. United States Postal Serv., EEOC Appeal No. 01991180 (Jan. 26, 2001); Shibel v. Dep't of the Navy, EEOC Appeal No. 01987064 (Aug. 12, 1999). For these reasons, Claim 8, as alleged by Complainant, constitutes a collateral attack on the grievance process. The proper forum for Complainant to raise her allegation that S2 met with her even though a union official was unavailable to attend, is through the grievance process under the collective bargaining agreement or before the Federal Labor Relations Authority. See Simensen v. United States Postal Serv., EEOC Appeal No. 0120021068 (Feb. 26, 2002). Disparate Treatment - Claims 2, 7, and 9 A claim of disparate treatment based on indirect evidence is examined under the three-part analysis first enunciated in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973). For Complainant to prevail, he or she must first establish a prima facie case of discrimination by presenting facts that, if unexplained, reasonably give rise to an inference of discrimination, i.e., that a prohibited consideration was a factor in the adverse employment action. McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 802; Furnco Construction Corp. v. Waters, 438 U.S. 567 (1978). The burden then shifts to the Agency to articulate a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for its actions. Texas Dep’t. of Cmty. Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 253 (1981). Once the Agency has met its burden, Complainant bears the ultimate responsibility to persuade the fact finder by a preponderance of the evidence that the Agency acted on the basis of a prohibited reason. St. Mary’s Honor Ctr. v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502 (1993). This established order of analysis in discrimination cases, in which the first step normally consists of determining the existence of a prima facie case, need not be followed in all cases. Where the Agency has articulated a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for the personnel action at issue, the factual inquiry can proceed directly to the third step of the McDonnell Douglas analysis, the ultimate issue of whether Complainant has shown by a preponderance of the evidence that the Agency’s actions were motivated by discrimination. U.S. Postal Serv. Bd. of Governors v. Aikens, 460 U.S. 711, 713-714 (1983); Hernandez v. Dep’t. of Transp., EEOC Request No. 05900159 (June 28, 1990); Peterson v. Dep’t. of Health and Human Serv., EEOC Request No. 05900467 (June 8, 1990); Washington v. Dep’t. of the Navy, EEOC Petition No. 03900056 (May 31, 1990). 2020001185 6 The Commission has held that allegations of harassing conduct that include discrete acts that would independently state claims outside of a harassment framework, assuming that they are timely, are properly reviewed in the context of disparate treatment. Conlin v. Dep’t of Veterans Affairs, EEOC Appeal No. 0120055310 (Dec. 5, 2006). Here, Claims 2, which alleges denied leave, Claim 7, where Complainant was placed on a PIP, and Claim9, which resulted in a are all disparate treatment allegations. For Claim 2, the Agency’s legitimate nondiscriminatory reason for S1 counseling Complainant and denying her 6 hours of leave on September 18, 2014, was that Complainant “left without proper authorization,” in violation of the Agency’s leave policy. The Agency’s manual, Employee Rights and Privileges - Article 35, Time and Leave, states, under Sections 1(G) and 1(H), that employees should request, in advance, approval of anticipated leave, if they are on duty, they can do so electronically. The record reflects that Complainant was notified of the leave policy during her HAS/HIMS Orientation. Complainant does not dispute that she did not follow S1’s instructions to enter a leave request before she left for the day. She also offers no evidence that the Agency’s reasoning is pretext for discrimination. For Claim 7, the Agency’s legitimate nondiscriminatory reason for placing Complainant on a 90 day PIP was that Complainant’s Annual Performance Appraisal indicated that a PIP was warranted. Article 27 Section 1(B) of the Agency’s Employee Rights and Privileges manual provides that for employee performance appraisals “goals will be established, measured, and monitored in a systematic manner. The results of a performance appraisal may be used as a basis for… identifying developmental needs and recommending appropriate personnel actions.” According to the record, Complainant held the position of Program Support Assistant, GS-06, for 13 months and had yet to meet the stated goal for her position and grade: complete 18 requests per 7.5-hour workday at a 95% accuracy rate. Despite daily coaching in September 2014, Complainant would mix up first and third-party consent forms, a “basic aspect of her job,” providing the wrong form on five occasions between September 24 and 25, 2014. Complainant still required assistance entering and retrieving data from the Agency’s system. In one instance, Complainant released confidential medical information in violation of the Privacy Act, and the Agency’s Privacy Officer had to be notified. These are among an array of examples of developmental needs, identified in the performance appraisal, supporting the Agency’s decision to place Complainant on a PIP. Complainant argues, without evidence, that she was the only employee required to print documents and send via UPS with tracking number, other coworkers send using US Mail and send responses in CD format. Complainant was slower completing her work because the only available printer constantly jammed. Complainant does not challenge the Agency’s other reasons for issuing the PIP, particularly with respect to her knowledge of relevant Agency policy and privacy laws. Given the amount of examples provided by the Agency that Complainant leaves unanswered, Complainant has not demonstrated that the Agency’s legitimate nondiscriminatory reason was pretext for discrimination. 2020001185 7 For Claim 9, the Agency’s legitimate nondiscriminatory reason for issuing the Proposed Demotion (which ultimately led to demotion) to Complainant was “unacceptable performance.” Based on the PIP and S2’s weekly progress notes, Complainant did not meet established performance standards over a period of 90 days, despite coaching with S2 and additional training, as directed under the PIP. On appeal, Complainant disputes the PIP as justification for demotion. She alleges that her coworkers make mistakes yet are not subject to the same consequences. She further alleges that she was not placed on the PIP, for poor performance, but because S2 “agreed with everything [S1] gave her.” Also, Complainant disputes S1 and S2’s accounts that they provided her with regular ongoing training, asserting that the training they provided was ineffective, and both had to go and ask Complainant’s coworker for instructions, disrupting the training. Complainant offers no evidence her assertions. However, we note that Complainant was provided with training materials when she received the PIP, and she was informed that if she saw a training that she believed would improve her performance, to let Management know. The PIP also demonstrates that over the 90 days, Complainant did not improve performance deficiencies identified in the PIP and annual performance review. S2’s meeting notes indicate that Complainant continued to make the same types of mistakes, such as losing forms. Complainant also violated Agency privacy protocol by releasing sensitive information without a signed release from a veteran, and in a separate instance, allowing two veterans in her office at the same time. At the end of the PIP time frame, Complainant was still unable to work independently, she did not consistently meet the 18 requests per 7.5 hour workday at a 95% accuracy rate, and she did not demonstrate the necessary understanding of privacy laws related to medical documents. Complainant has not offered any evidence to establish that the Agency’s reason is pretext for discrimination. Harassment/Hostile Work Environment - Claims 1, 3, 4, 5, and 6 To prove her harassment claim, Complainant must establish that she was subjected to conduct that was either so severe or so pervasive that a “reasonable person” in Complainant’s position would have found the conduct to be hostile or abusive. Complainant must also prove that the conduct was taken because of her sex, and/or race. Only if Complainant establishes both hostility and motive, will the question of Agency liability present itself. See Henson v. City of Dundee, 682 F.2d 897 (11th Cir. 1982); Enforcement Guidance: Vicarious Employer Liability for Unlawful Harassment by Supervisors, EEOC Notice 915.002 (Jun. 18, 1999). An Agency is not liable for harassment when it takes prompt and appropriate remedial action upon learning of the harassment. See, e.g. Complainant v. Soc. Sec. Admin., EEOC Appeal No. 0120131065 (Jan. 24, 2014) (management acted within two business days of learning that the complainant was being harassed, by disciplining and training the harassing employee, and moving him to another office so that he would not interact with the complainant). 2020001185 8 What is appropriate remedial action will necessarily depend on the particular facts of the case, such as the severity and persistence of the harassment and the effectiveness of any initial remedial steps. See Taylor v. Dep’t of the Air Force, EEOC Request No. 05920194 (July 8, 1992). In addition, allegations found to be “common workplace occurrences” do not constitute harassment. Unless it is reasonably established that the actions were somehow abusive or offensive, and were taken in order to harass complainant on the basis of any of her protected classes, such everyday events are not sufficiently severe or pervasive so as to offend the general sensibility of an individual experiencing such occurrences in the workplace. See Wolf v. United States Postal Serv., EEOC Appeal No. 01961559 (July 23, 1998), see also Long v. Veterans Admin., EEOC Appeal No. 01950169 (Aug. 14, 1997), Bennett v. Dep’t of the Navy, EEOC Request No. 05980746 (Sept. 19, 2000). Common workplace occurrences include, but are not limited to, an employer questioning an employee about their performance and work duties, even if done in a confrontational manner, is a common workplace occurrence. See Odis D. Carver v. United States Postal Serv., EEOC Appeal No. 01980522 (Feb. 18, 2000). We have also previously determined that a supervisor closely monitoring an employee’s time in and out of the office on a daily basis, and treating the employee more harshly and unprofessionally than other employees is to be a common workplace occurrence that does not constitute harassment. Gormley v. Dep’t of the Interior, EEOC Complaint No. 01973328 (Feb. 18, 2000). Because we already found that the Agency established legitimate nondiscriminatory reasons for its actions in Claims 2, 7, and 9, they will not be included in this analysis. Claims 1, 3, 4, 5, and 6 all allege ongoing harassment by S1, in the form of threats to terminate Complainant, suggestions that she look for a new job, or transfer another location. The first instance was September 5, 2014, and the final instance, where S1 threatened to terminate her employment, then stated he would evaluate Complainant’s performance himself, occurred on September 23, 2014. Complainant further alleges (and S1 denies) that S1 would harass her by questioning her for taking her lunch break in her office or going to the restroom, as alluded to in Claim 4, as well as monitors what she does on her computer, told her not to go on USA Jobs even though it was on Complainant’s own time. Even considering these actions together, and assuming they occurred exactly as alleged, the Agency established that S2 took “prompt and appropriate remedial action upon learning of the harassment.” Based on Complainant’s account of events, the harassment by S1 appears to have ceased once S2 notified the HAS Chief and removed Complainant from S1’s supervision. Alternately, Claims 1 through 6 all describe “common workplace occurrences,” which fail to meet the level of severity or pervasiveness necessary to state an actionable claim of harassment. 2020001185 9 New Claims Raised on Appeal On appeal, Complainant submitted a number of statements and emails about incidents that are not related to the instant complaint, and in some instances, do not appear to relate to EEO matters at all (e.g. an email reporting a housekeeping employee for failing to set up a sign warning of a wet floor).2 The Commission cannot accept new claims of discrimination to add to a complaint at the appellate stage. At this stage, the Commission’s role is to review complaints that have already been decided in either an AJ’s decision or a FAD.3 In writing this decision, we have not considered any of Complainant’s appellate submissions that do not concern the nine accepted claims in the instant complaint. If Complainant wishes to pursue her new claims in an EEO complaint, then, if she has not already done so, she must contact an EEO counselor pursuant to 29 C.F.R. § 1614.105. See Hall v. United States Postal Serv., EEOC Appeal No. 0120031342 (Apr. 24, 2003). CONCLUSION Based on a thorough review of the record and the contentions on appeal, including those not specifically addressed herein, we AFFIRM the Agency’s Final Decision. STATEMENT OF RIGHTS - ON APPEAL RECONSIDERATION (M0920) The Commission may, in its discretion, reconsider this appellate decision if Complainant or the Agency submits a written request that contains arguments or evidence that tend to establish that: 1. The appellate decision involved a clearly erroneous interpretation of material fact or law; or 2. The appellate decision will have a substantial impact on the policies, practices, or operations of the agency. Requests for reconsideration must be filed with EEOC’s Office of Federal Operations (OFO) within thirty (30) calendar days of receipt of this decision. If the party requesting reconsideration elects to file a statement or brief in support of the request, that statement or brief must be filed together with the request for reconsideration. 2 These may be related to EEOC Appeal No. 2021001956, filed by Complainant on February 4, 2021, for Agency Case No. 200H06202020105129. 3 On appeal Complainant also repeatedly alleges that she is being denied due process because she has not been provided an attorney free of charge. The EEOC adjudicative process does not offer this service but allows complainants to independently retain an attorney or a non-legal representative, such as a union official, to assist her with her EEO case. Following our decision, we have included information on how Complainant can request an attorney if she opts to pursue her complaint in federal district court. 2020001185 10 A party shall have twenty (20) calendar days from receipt of another party’s request for reconsideration within which to submit a brief or statement in opposition. See 29 C.F.R. § 1614.405; Equal Employment Opportunity Management Directive for 29 C.F.R. Part 1614 (EEO MD-110), at Chap. 9 § VII.B (Aug. 5, 2015). Complainant should submit his or her request for reconsideration, and any statement or brief in support of his or her request, via the EEOC Public Portal, which can be found at https://publicportal.eeoc.gov/Portal/Login.aspx Alternatively, Complainant can submit his or her request and arguments to the Director, Office of Federal Operations, Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, via regular mail addressed to P.O. Box 77960, Washington, DC 20013, or by certified mail addressed to 131 M Street, NE, Washington, DC 20507. In the absence of a legible postmark, a complainant’s request to reconsider shall be deemed timely filed if OFO receives it by mail within five days of the expiration of the applicable filing period. See 29 C.F.R. § 1614.604. An agency’s request for reconsideration must be submitted in digital format via the EEOC’s Federal Sector EEO Portal (FedSEP). See 29 C.F.R. § 1614.403(g). Either party’s request and/or statement or brief in opposition must also include proof of service on the other party, unless Complainant files his or her request via the EEOC Public Portal, in which case no proof of service is required. Failure to file within the 30-day time period will result in dismissal of the party’s request for reconsideration as untimely, unless extenuating circumstances prevented the timely filing of the request. Any supporting documentation must be submitted together with the request for reconsideration. The Commission will consider requests for reconsideration filed after the deadline only in very limited circumstances. See 29 C.F.R. § 1614.604(c). COMPLAINANT’S RIGHT TO FILE A CIVIL ACTION (S0610) You have the right to file a civil action in an appropriate United States District Court within ninety (90) calendar days from the date that you receive this decision. If you file a civil action, you must name as the defendant in the complaint the person who is the official Agency head or department head, identifying that person by his or her full name and official title. Failure to do so may result in the dismissal of your case in court. “Agency” or “department” means the national organization, and not the local office, facility or department in which you work. If you file a request to reconsider and also file a civil action, filing a civil action will terminate the administrative processing of your complaint. RIGHT TO REQUEST COUNSEL (Z0815) If you want to file a civil action but cannot pay the fees, costs, or security to do so, you may request permission from the court to proceed with the civil action without paying these fees or costs. Similarly, if you cannot afford an attorney to represent you in the civil action, you may request the court to appoint an attorney for you. You must submit the requests for waiver of court costs or appointment of an attorney directly to the court, not the Commission. 2020001185 11 The court has the sole discretion to grant or deny these types of requests. Such requests do not alter the time limits for filing a civil action (please read the paragraph titled Complainant’s Right to File a Civil Action for the specific time limits). FOR THE COMMISSION: ______________________________ Carlton M. Hadden’s signature Carlton M. Hadden, Director Office of Federal Operations July 22, 2021 Date Copy with citationCopy as parenthetical citation