[Redacted], Adah P., 1 Complainant,v.Louis DeJoy, Postmaster General, United States Postal Service (Pacific Area), Agency.Download PDFEqual Employment Opportunity CommissionFeb 9, 2021Appeal No. 2020005167 (E.E.O.C. Feb. 9, 2021) Copy Citation U.S. EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION Office of Federal Operations P.O. Box 77960 Washington, DC 20013 Adah P.,1 Complainant, v. Louis DeJoy, Postmaster General, United States Postal Service (Pacific Area), Agency. Appeal No. 2020005167 Hearing No. 480-2017-00737X Agency No. 4F-926-0061-17 DECISION On September 3, 2020, Complainant filed an appeal with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC or Commission), pursuant to 29 C.F.R. § 1614.403(a), from the Agency’s July 31, 2020 final order concerning her equal employment opportunity (EEO) complaint alleging employment discrimination in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (Title VII), as amended, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq. BACKGROUND At the time of events giving rise to this complaint, Complainant worked as a City Carrier at the Agency’s Upland Post Office in Upland, California. Complainant has been with the Agency for more than thirty years. On March 10, 2017, Complainant filed an EEO complaint alleging that the Agency discriminated against her on the basis of reprisal for prior protected EEO activity (prior EEO complaints dating back to 2007) when: 1 This case has been randomly assigned a pseudonym which will replace Complainant’s name when the decision is published to non-parties and the Commission’s website. 2020005167 2 1. on December 20, 2016, management issued Complainant a 7-day suspension, and 2. management failed to reimburse Complainant for mileage for attending EEO-related meetings on July 25, 2016 and August 3, 2016. The Agency accepted Complainant’s complaint for EEO investigation. During the EEO investigation, with regard to (1), management witnesses stated that it issued Complainant a suspension for expanding break and lunch periods on four occasions in November 2016 and December 2016. Management stated that it conducted an investigative interview prior to issuing discipline. Management stated that the Postal Service Information System reflected the expanded times. Complainant responded stating it was difficult, several weeks after an incident occurs, to explain the reasons she spent additional time at a location. Complainant noted that November and December have heavy mail loads due to the holidays. Regarding (2), management witnesses stated that Complainant’s reimbursement request had to be approved at a higher level because local management did not know how to process it. Management stated, on March 9, 2017, the Agency reimbursed Complainant $78.65 for mileage for July 25, 2016 and August 3, 2016. According to Complainant, after she filed the instant EEO complaint, the Agency eventually reimbursed her for mileage as requested. Following the EEO investigation, the Agency provided Complainant with a copy of the report of investigation and notice of the right to request a hearing before an EEOC Administrative Judge (AJ). Complainant timely requested a hearing. Following an Agency motion for summary judgment, the assigned AJ determined that the complaint did not warrant a hearing. On July 24, 2020, the assigned AJ issued a decision without a hearing, finding no discrimination. The AJ found that the Agency articulated legitimate, nondiscriminatory reasons for its actions, and Complainant failed to prove that those articulated reasons were pretextual. On July 31, 2020, the Agency issued a final order adopting the AJ’s finding that Complainant failed to prove that the Agency subjected her to retaliation as alleged. The instant appeal from Complainant followed. ANALYSIS AND FINDINGS The Commission's regulations allow an AJ to issue a decision without a hearing when he or she finds that there is no genuine issue of material fact. 29 C.F.R. § 1614.109(g). This regulation is patterned after the summary judgment procedure set forth in Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. The U.S. Supreme Court has held that summary judgment is appropriate where a court determines that, given the substantive legal and evidentiary standards that apply to the case, there exists no genuine issue of material fact. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 255 (1986). In ruling on a motion for summary judgment, a court's function is not to weigh the evidence but 2020005167 3 rather to determine whether there are genuine issues for trial. Anderson at 249. The evidence of the non-moving party must be believed at the summary judgment stage and all justifiable inferences must be drawn in the non-moving party's favor. Anderson at 255. An issue of fact is “genuine” if the evidence is such that a reasonable fact finder could find in favor of the non-moving party. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322-23 (1986); Oliver v. Digital Equip. Corp., 846 F.2d 103, 105 (1st Cir. 1988). A fact is “material” if it has the potential to affect the outcome of the case. To successfully oppose a decision by summary judgment, a complainant must identify, with specificity, facts in dispute either within the record or by producing further supporting evidence and must further establish that such facts are material under applicable law. Here, Complainant has failed to point with any specificity to particular evidence in the investigative file or other evidence of record that indicates such a dispute. For the reasons discussed below, we find that, even construing any inferences raised by the undisputed facts in favor of Complainant, a reasonable fact-finder could not find in her favor. A claim of disparate treatment is examined under the three-part analysis first enunciated in McDonnell Douglas Corporation v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973). For Complainant to prevail, she must first establish a prima facie case of discrimination by presenting facts that, if unexplained, reasonably give rise to an inference of discrimination, i.e., that a prohibited consideration was a factor in the adverse employment action. See McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 802; Furnco Construction Corp. v. Waters, 438 U.S. 567 (1978). The burden then shifts to the agency to articulate a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for its actions. See Texas Dep’t of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 253 (1981). To ultimately prevail, Complainant must prove, by a preponderance of the evidence, that the Agency's explanation is a pretext for discrimination. Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Products, Inc., 530 U.S. 133, 143 (2000); St. Mary's Honor Center v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502, 519 (1993); Burdine, 450 U.S. at 256. This established order of analysis in discrimination cases, in which the first step normally consists of determining the existence of a prima facie case, need not be followed in all cases. Where the agency has articulated a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for the personnel action at issue, the factual inquiry can proceed directly to the third step of the McDonnell Douglas analysis, the ultimate issue of whether complainant has shown by a preponderance of the evidence that the agency’s actions were motivated by discrimination. See U.S. Postal Service Board of Governors v. Aikens, 460 U.S. 711, 713-714 (1983); Hernandez v. Dep’t of Transportation, EEOC Request No. 05900159 (June 28, 1990); Peterson v. Dep’t of Health and Human Services, EEOC Request No. 05900467 (June 8, 1990); Washington v. Dep’t of the Navy, EEOC Petition No. 03900056 (May 31, 1990). It is undisputed that the Agency’s information system showed that Complainant was taking extended break and lunch periods and did so on four occasions between November and December 2016. Management stated that it conducted an investigative interview on the matter prior to issuing the suspension and Complainant did not justify the extended periods to the Agency’s satisfaction. 2020005167 4 Separately, Agency officials stated higher management had to process Complainant’s mileage reimbursement request because lower management did not know the process to do so. The Agency reimbursed Complainant in March 2017 and Complainant acknowledged said payment, stating it did not occur until after she filed the instant complaint. We find that Complainant has not shown that her suspension or management’s delay in providing mileage reimbursement were motivated by retaliatory animus for prior EEO activity as alleged. CONCLUSION Based on a thorough review of the record and the contentions on appeal, including those not specifically addressed herein, we AFFIRM the final agency decision finding no retaliation in violation of Title VII. STATEMENT OF RIGHTS - ON APPEAL RECONSIDERATION (M0920) The Commission may, in its discretion, reconsider this appellate decision if Complainant or the Agency submits a written request that contains arguments or evidence that tend to establish that: 1. The appellate decision involved a clearly erroneous interpretation of material fact or law; or 2. The appellate decision will have a substantial impact on the policies, practices, or operations of the agency. Requests for reconsideration must be filed with EEOC’s Office of Federal Operations (OFO) within thirty (30) calendar days of receipt of this decision. If the party requesting reconsideration elects to file a statement or brief in support of the request, that statement or brief must be filed together with the request for reconsideration. A party shall have twenty (20) calendar days from receipt of another party’s request for reconsideration within which to submit a brief or statement in opposition. See 29 C.F.R. § 1614.405; Equal Employment Opportunity Management Directive for 29 C.F.R. Part 1614 (EEO MD-110), at Chap. 9 § VII.B (Aug. 5, 2015). Complainant should submit his or her request for reconsideration, and any statement or brief in support of his or her request, via the EEOC Public Portal, which can be found at https://publicportal.eeoc.gov/Portal/Login.aspx Alternatively, Complainant can submit his or her request and arguments to the Director, Office of Federal Operations, Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, via regular mail addressed to P.O. Box 77960, Washington, DC 20013, or by certified mail addressed to 131 M Street, NE, Washington, DC 20507. In the absence of a legible postmark, a complainant’s request to reconsider shall be deemed timely filed if OFO receives it by mail within five days of the expiration of the applicable filing period. See 29 C.F.R. § 1614.604. An agency’s request for reconsideration must be submitted in digital format via the EEOC’s Federal Sector EEO Portal (FedSEP). See 29 C.F.R. § 1614.403(g). 2020005167 5 Either party’s request and/or statement or brief in opposition must also include proof of service on the other party, unless Complainant files his or her request via the EEOC Public Portal, in which case no proof of service is required. Failure to file within the 30-day time period will result in dismissal of the party’s request for reconsideration as untimely, unless extenuating circumstances prevented the timely filing of the request. Any supporting documentation must be submitted together with the request for reconsideration. The Commission will consider requests for reconsideration filed after the deadline only in very limited circumstances. See 29 C.F.R. § 1614.604(c). COMPLAINANT’S RIGHT TO FILE A CIVIL ACTION (S0610) You have the right to file a civil action in an appropriate United States District Court within ninety (90) calendar days from the date that you receive this decision. If you file a civil action, you must name as the defendant in the complaint the person who is the official Agency head or department head, identifying that person by his or her full name and official title. Failure to do so may result in the dismissal of your case in court. “Agency” or “department” means the national organization, and not the local office, facility or department in which you work. If you file a request to reconsider and also file a civil action, filing a civil action will terminate the administrative processing of your complaint. RIGHT TO REQUEST COUNSEL (Z0815) If you want to file a civil action but cannot pay the fees, costs, or security to do so, you may request permission from the court to proceed with the civil action without paying these fees or costs. Similarly, if you cannot afford an attorney to represent you in the civil action, you may request the court to appoint an attorney for you. You must submit the requests for waiver of court costs or appointment of an attorney directly to the court, not the Commission. The court has the sole discretion to grant or deny these types of requests. Such requests do not alter the time limits for filing a civil action (please read the paragraph titled Complainant’s Right to File a Civil Action for the specific time limits). FOR THE COMMISSION: ______________________________ Carlton M. Hadden, Director Office of Federal Operations February 9, 2021 Date Copy with citationCopy as parenthetical citation