Raymond Interior Systems

National Labor Relations Board - Board Decisions

Dec 30, 2011

357 N.L.R.B. 2174 (N.L.R.B. 2011)

DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
357 NLRB No. 193
2174
Raymond Interior Systems and Operative Plasterers’
and Cement Masons’ International Association,
Local Union 200, AFL–CIO

Raymond Interior Systems and Southern California
Plastering Institute Group Benefit Trust c/o
American Benefit Plan Administrators, Inc. and
Southern California Plastering Institute Pension
Trust Fund c/o American Benefit Plan Adminis-
trators, Inc. and Southern California Plastering
Institute Apprenticeship and Training Trust c/o
American Benefit Plan Administrators, Inc. and
Southern California Plastering Institute Admin-
istrative Trust Fund c/o American Benefit Plan
Administrators, Inc. and Southern California
Plastering Institute Labor-Management Work
Preservation Trust c/o American Benefit Plan
Administrators, Inc. and Southern California
Plastering Institute Vacation Trust and Vaca-
tion Administration Trust c/o American Benefit
Plan Administrators, Inc.

Southwest Regional Council of Carpenters and Oper-
ative Plasterers’ and Cement Masons’ Interna-
tional Association, Local Union 200, AFL–CIO.
Cases 21–CA–038492, 21–CA–038589 and 21–
CB–014576
December 30, 2011
DECISION AND ORDER
BY CHAIRMAN PEARCE AND MEMBERS BECKER
AND HAYES
On March 5, 2010, Administrative Law Judge John J.
McCarrick issued the attached decision. The Respond-
ents, Raymond Interior Systems (Raymond) and South-
west Regional Council of Carpenters (Carpenters), each
filed exceptions and a supporting brief. The General
Counsel, and the Charging Parties Operative Plasterers’
and Cement Masons’ International Association, Local
Union 200, AFL–CIO (Plasterers), and Southern Califor-
nia Plastering Institute Group Benefit Trust c/o American
Benefit Plan Administrators, Inc., Southern California
Plastering Institute Pension Trust Fund c/o American
Benefit Plan Administrators, Inc., Southern California
Plastering Institute Apprenticeship and Training Trust
c/o American Benefit Plan Administrators, Inc., Southern
California Plastering Institute Administrative Trust Fund
c/o American Benefit Plan Administrators, Inc., Southern
California Plastering Institute Labor-Management Work
Preservation Trust c/o American Benefit Plan Adminis-
trators, Inc., and Southern California Plastering Institute
Vacation Trust and Vacation Administration Trust c/o
American Benefit Plan Administrators, Inc. (collectively
Plasterers Trusts), filed answering briefs to Raymond’s
and Carpenters’ exceptions. Raymond and Carpenters
each filed a reply brief to Plasterer’s and Plasterers
Trusts’ answering briefs.1
The Charging Parties Plasterers and Plasterers Trusts
each filed cross-exceptions and supporting briefs. Ray-
mond and Carpenters filed answering briefs to these
cross-exceptions, and Plasterers filed a reply brief.
The National Labor Relations Board has considered
the decision and the record in light of the exceptions and
briefs, and has decided to affirm the judge’s rulings,2
findings,3 and conclusions, to modify his remedy, to

1 Plasterers filed a motion to strike Raymond’s reply brief insofar as
it relates to when Raymond received the recognition agreement that
Plasterers mailed in. As the date of Raymond’s receipt is not critical to
our findings that Raymond entered into a 9(a) agreement on June 26,
2003, and later unlawfully withdrew recognition from Plasterers, we
find it unnecessary to pass on Plasterers’ motion.
2 The Respondents have excepted to some of the judge’s credibility
findings. The Board’s established policy is not to overrule an adminis-
trative law judge’s credibility resolutions unless the clear preponder-
ance of all the relevant evidence convinces us that they are incorrect.
Standard Dry Wall Products, 91 NLRB 544 (1950), enfd. 188 F.2d 362
(3d Cir. 1951). We have carefully examined the record and find no
basis for reversing the findings.
3 In view of the judge’s finding that Plasterers Business Manager
Robert Pullen sent Business Agent David Fritchel to Raymond’s office
on June 26, 2003, with a copy of the voluntary recognition agreement
and supporting authorization cards, we agree with the judge that it is
unnecessary to correct the transcript of Pullen’s testimony as to the date
of that event, as Plasterers request. Further, in adopting the judge’s
finding that Fritchel showed Gary Jaacks, Raymond’s vice president, a
set of authorization cards on June 26, 2003, we find it unnecessary to
rely on the judge’s inference that a showing of majority support must
have been made or else Raymond would not have signed the agreement
on that date.
In finding that Raymond and Plasterers validly converted their 8(f)
bargaining relationship to a 9(a) relationship, the judge applied Staun-
ton Fuel & Material, 335 NLRB 717, 719–720 (2001), which holds that
a written agreement that meets certain requirements is sufficient to
prove a 9(a) relationship. In Nova Plumbing, Inc. v. NLRB, 330 F.3d
531 (D.C. Cir. 2003), the D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals declined to
affirm the Board’s finding of a 9(a) relationship where the Board had
relied solely on contract language “despite strong record evidence that
the union may not have enjoyed majority support.” Id. at 533. The
court observed that “contract language and intent cannot be dispositive
at least where, as here, the record contains strong indications that the
parties had only a section 8(f) relationship.” Id. at 537. In the present
case, in contrast to Nova Plumbing, the record is devoid of any indica-
tion that the Union did not enjoy majority support.
Member Hayes would apply the holding of Nova Plumbing that con-
tract language alone is insufficient to establish a 9(a) relationship in the
construction industry. Contrary to his colleagues, he does not view the
court’s Nova Plumbing holding as limited to circumstances in which
there is affirmative extrinsic evidence that the parties had only an 8(f)
relationship. Id. at 534. Notwithstanding this difference in interpreta-
tion of Nova Plumbing, Member Hayes agrees with his colleagues that
the 8(f) bargaining relationship between Raymond and Plasterers valid-
ly converted to a 9(a) relationship. In this regard, based on the credited
testimony of Plasterers Business Agent David Fritchel, the judge found
that Plasterers provided supporting authorization cards contemporane-
RAYMOND INTERIOR SYSTEMS 2175
adopt the recommended Order as modified and set forth
in full below,4 and to substitute a new notice to conform
to the Order as modified.
AMENDED REMEDY
Having found that the Respondents have engaged in
certain unfair labor practices, we shall order them to
cease and desist from their unlawful conduct and to take
certain affirmative action designed to effectuate the poli-
cies of the Act.
Respondent Raymond is ordered to cease assisting and
recognizing Respondent Carpenters as the representative
of its plastering employees while Plasterers is the 9(a)
representative of those employees. In addition, Re-
spondent Carpenters is ordered to cease accepting Ray-
mond’s unlawful assistance and recognition. Both Re-
spondents are required to cease and desist giving any
effect to the collective-bargaining agreement they en-
tered into on August 6, 2008.
In addition, Respondent Raymond is required to rec-
ognize and, on request, bargain with Plasterers as the
exclusive collective-bargaining representative of Ray-
mond’s plastering employees with respect to wages,
hours, and other terms and conditions of employment.

ous with its demand for recognition as the majority representative of
Raymond’s plastering employees. Accordingly, the result here would
be the same under the D.C. Circuit’s decision in Nova Plumbing as
under Staunton Fuel & Material. See American Firestop Solutions,
356 NLRB 468 (2011); and M&M Backhoe Service, 345 NLRB 462
(2005), enfd. 469 F.3d 1047 (D.C. Cir. 2006).
The judge incorrectly found that at the raffle operated by Carpenters
on August 6, 2008, each plastering employee received a tool and a cash
award totaling $1600 in value. The record shows that each employee
received either a tool or a cash award and that the 10 cash awards had a
total value of $3000. However, neither factual error affects our deci-
sion to adopt the judge’s finding, for the reasons set forth in his deci-
sion, that Carpenters violated Sec. 8(b)(1)(A) and (2) by conducting
this raffle.
For the reasons stated in his decision, we agree with the judge that
Raymond provided unlawful assistance to the Carpenters in violation of
Sec. 8(a)(3), (2), and (1) by threatening to enforce the union-security
provision of the Carpenters’ contract. We also agree that the Carpen-
ters violated Sec. 8(b)(1)(A) and (2) by accepting this unlawful assis-
tance. We note the judge’s further findings that Raymond violated Sec.
8(a)(3),(2), and (1) by providing Carpenters with the use of company
facilities, holding a mandatory employee meeting with Carpenters
officials on company time, and promising increased benefits under a
Carpenters contract, and that Carpenters violated Sec. 8(b)(1)(A) and
(2) by accepting this unlawful assistance. These matters were not al-
leged in the complaint and, in any event, we find it unnecessary to pass
on them as any findings of the violations would be cumulative of the
above unlawful assistance violations and thus would not affect the
remedy.
4 We shall also modify the judge’s recommended Order to conform
to the Board’s standard remedies for the violations found and to pro-
vide for the posting of the notice in accord with J. Picini Flooring, 356
NLRB 11 (2010). For the reasons stated in his dissenting opinion in J.
Picini Flooring, Member Hayes would not require electronic distribu-
tion of the notices.
As discussed below, we find that an affirmative bargain-
ing order is warranted in this case as a remedy for Ray-
mond’s unlawful withdrawal of recognition. Respondent
Raymond is also required to restore the status quo ante
and make its plastering employees whole for any loss of
earnings and other benefits attributable to its unlawful
conduct. The make-whole remedy shall be computed in
accordance with Ogle Protection Service, 183 NLRB 682
(1970), enfd. 444 F.2d 502 (6th Cir. 1971), with interest
at the rate prescribed in New Horizons, 283 NLRB 1173
(1987), compounded daily as prescribed in Kentucky
River Medical Center, 356 NLRB 6 (2010).
Respondent Raymond is additionally required to make
whole its plastering employees by making all delinquent
Plasterers Trust fund contributions on behalf of these
employees that have not been made since August 5,
2008, including any additional amounts due the funds in
accordance with Merryweather Optical Co., 240 NLRB
1213, 1216 fn. 7 (1979).5 Further, Raymond shall be
required to reimburse its plastering employees for any
expenses ensuing from its failure to make the required
fund contributions, as set forth in Kraft Plumbing &
Heating, 252 NLRB 891 fn. 2 (1980), enfd. mem. 661
F.2d 940 (9th Cir. 1981). Such amounts should be com-
puted in the manner set forth in Ogle Protection Service,
supra, with interest at the rate prescribed in New Hori-
zons, supra, compounded daily as prescribed in Kentucky
River Medical Center, supra.
Further, Respondents Raymond and Carpenters are or-
dered jointly and severally to reimburse all present and
former employees who joined Carpenters on or since
August 6, 2008, for all initiation fees, dues, and other
moneys paid by them or withheld from them pursuant to
the collective-bargaining agreement between Raymond
and Carpenters, computed in accordance with Ogle Pro-
tection Service, supra, with interest as prescribed in New
Horizons, supra, compounded daily as prescribed in Ken-
tucky River Medical Center, supra. However, reim-
bursement does not extend to those employees who vol-
untarily became members of Carpenters before August 6,
2008. See, e.g., Dairyland USA Corp., 347 NLRB 310,
314 (2006), enfd. sub nom. NLRB v. Food & Commer-
cial Workers Local 348-S, 273 Fed. Appx. 40 (2d Cir.
2008).
Finally, as stated above, for the reasons set forth in
Caterair International, 322 NLRB 64 (1996), we find

5 To the extent that an employee has made personal contributions to
Plasterers Trust that have been accepted by them in lieu of Raymond’s
delinquent contributions during the period of the delinquency, Ray-
mond will reimburse the employee, but the amount of such reimburse-
ment will constitute a setoff to the amount that Raymond otherwise
owes Plasterers Trust.
DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD 2176
that an affirmative bargaining order is warranted in this
case as a remedy for Raymond’s unlawful withdrawal of
recognition. The Board has consistently held that an
affirmative bargaining order is “the traditional, appropri-
ate remedy for an 8(a)(5) refusal to bargain with the law-
ful collective-bargaining representative of an appropriate
unit of employees.” Caterair International, supra at 68.
In several cases, however, the United States Court of
Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit has required
the Board to justify, on the facts of each case, the imposi-
tion of an affirmative bargaining order. See, e.g., Vin-
cent Industrial Plastics, Inc. v. NLRB, 209 F.3d 727
(D.C. Cir. 2000); Lee Lumber & Building Material Corp.
v. NLRB, 117 F.3d 1454, 1462 (D.C. Cir. 1997);
Exxel/Atmos, Inc. v. NLRB, 28 F.3d 1243, 1248 (D.C.
Cir. 1994). In Vincent Industrial Plastics, supra at 738,
the court stated that an affirmative bargaining order
“must be justified by a reasoned analysis that includes an
explicit balancing of three considerations: (1) the em-
ployees’ Section 7 rights; (2) whether other purposes of
the Act override the rights of employees to choose their
bargaining representatives; and (3) whether alternative
remedies are adequate to remedy the violations of the
Act.” Although we respectfully disagree with the court’s
requirement for the reasons set forth in Caterair, supra,
we have examined the particular facts of this case and we
find that a balancing of the three factors warrants an af-
firmative bargaining order.6
(1) An affirmative bargaining order in this case vindi-
cates the Section 7 rights of the plastering employees
who were denied the benefits of collective bargaining
through their designated representative by Raymond’s
unlawful withdrawal of recognition from Plasterers, its
resulting refusal to collectively bargain with Plasterers,
and its recognition of Carpenters. At the same time, an
affirmative bargaining order, with its attendant bar to
raising a question concerning Plasterers’ continuing ma-
jority status for a reasonable time, does not unduly preju-
dice the Section 7 rights of employees who may oppose
continued representation by Plasterers. The order’s dura-
tion is not indefinite; it extends only for a reasonable
period of time sufficient to remedy the ill effects of the
violation. It is only by restoring the status quo ante and
requiring Raymond to bargain with Plasterers for a rea-
sonable period of time that employees’ Section 7 right to
union representation is vindicated. It will also give em-
ployees an opportunity to fairly assess Plasterers’ effec-
tiveness as a bargaining representative and determine

6 Member Hayes agrees with the D.C. Circuit that a case-by-case
analysis is required to determine if an affirmative bargaining order is
appropriate. He finds that imposing a bargaining order here is appro-
priate under that analysis.
whether continued representation by Plasterers is in their
best interest.
(2) An affirmative bargaining order also serves the
policies of the Act by fostering meaningful collective
bargaining and industrial peace. That is, it removes
Raymond’s incentive to delay bargaining in the hope of
discouraging support for Plasterers. It also ensures that
Plasterers will not be pressured to achieve immediate
results at the bargaining table—results that might not be
in the employees’ best interest. It fosters industrial peace
by restoring the bargaining representative chosen by a
majority of the employees and allowing their representa-
tive an opportunity to bargain on their behalf without
undue time pressure to achieve an agreement. Also, as
mentioned, providing this temporary period of insulated
bargaining will afford employees a fair opportunity to
assess Plasterers’ performance in an atmosphere free of
the effects of Raymond’s unlawful conduct.
(3) A cease-and-desist order alone would be inadequate
to remedy Raymond’s withdrawal of recognition and re-
fusal to bargain with Plasterers, because it would allow a
challenge to Plasterers’ majority status before the taint of
Raymond’s unlawful withdrawal of recognition and sub-
sequent recognition of and agreement with Carpenters has
dissipated. Allowing a challenge to Plasterers’ majority
status without a reasonable period for bargaining would be
particularly unfair given that Plasterers needs to reestablish
its representative status with Raymond’s plastering em-
ployees. Indeed, permitting a decertification petition to be
filed immediately might very well allow Raymond to prof-
it from its own unlawful conduct. We find that these cir-
cumstances outweigh the temporary impact that the af-
firmative bargaining order will have on the rights of em-
ployees who oppose continued representation by Plaster-
ers.
For all the foregoing reasons, we find that an affirma-
tive bargaining order with its temporary decertification
bar is necessary to fully remedy the violation in this
case.7

7 Charging Parties Plasterers and Plasterers Trusts seek to amend this
remedy to: (1) rescind the unilateral changes to the hiring procedures
that occurred when Raymond repudiated its agreement with Plasterers
on August 5, 2008; (2) expand the make-whole remedy to include
backpay not only for Raymond’s plastering employees, but also for
those employees denied employment as plastering employees as a
result of the unilateral changes in hiring procedures; and (3) rescind the
unilateral change of ceasing dues-checkoff on August 6, 2008. We
deny these requests because the remedies are not related to the com-
plaint allegations sought by the General Counsel or supported by the
evidence. A charging party has standing to seek additional remedies
not sought by the General Counsel. However, a charging party is not
free to seek remedies that require amendment of the complaint or a
theory of the case different from the General Counsel’s. ATS Acquisi-
tion Corp., 321 NLRB 712 fn. 3 (1996), enfd. mem. 127 F.3d 1105 (9th
RAYMOND INTERIOR SYSTEMS 2177
ORDER
The National Labor Relations Board adopts the rec-
ommended Order of the administrative law judge as
modified and set forth in full below and orders that
A. The Respondent, Raymond Interior Systems, Or-
ange, California, its officers, agents, successors, and as-
signs shall
1. Cease and desist from
(a) Withdrawing recognition from and failing and re-
fusing to bargain with Operative Plasterers’ and Cement
Masons’ International Association, Local 200, AFL–CIO
(Plasterers) as the exclusive collective-bargaining repre-
sentative of its plastering employees.
(b) Repudiating its collective-bargaining agreement
with Plasterers at a time when Plasterers was the exclu-
sive representative of its plastering employees.
(c) Failing to make contributions to the Southern Cali-
fornia Plastering Institute Group Benefit Trust c/o Amer-
ican Benefit Plan Administrators, Inc., Southern Califor-
nia Plastering Institute Pension Trust Fund c/o American
Benefit Plan Administrators, Inc., Southern California
Plastering Institute Apprenticeship and Training Trust
c/o American Benefit Plan Administrators, Inc., Southern
California Plastering Institute Administrative Trust Fund
c/o American Benefit Plan Administrators, Inc., Southern
California Plastering Institute Labor-Management Work
Preservation Trust c/o American Benefit Plan Adminis-
trators, Inc., and Southern California Plastering Institute
Vacation Trust and Vacation Administration Trust c/o
American Benefit Plan Administrators, Inc. (collectively
Plasterers Trusts), as provided in the 2005–2008 collec-
tive-bargaining agreement between Plasterers and the
Western Wall and Ceiling Contractors Association
(WWCCA), California Plastering Conference.
(d) Granting recognition to and entering into a collec-
tive-bargaining agreement including a union-security
provision with Southwest Regional Council of Carpen-
ters (Carpenters) as the bargaining representative of its
plastering employees when Plasterers is their 9(a) exclu-
sive bargaining representative, thereby encouraging
membership in Carpenters and discriminating against
employees regarding hiring and the terms and conditions
of employment.
(e) Giving assistance to Carpenters by threatening
plastering employees with job loss for failure to join
Carpenters.
(f) Maintaining or giving force and effect to its collec-
tive-bargaining agreement with Carpenters covering its

Cir. 1997) (citing Sunland Construction Co., 311 NLRB 685, 706
(1993)). Raymond correctly contends that the complaint did not in-
clude allegations for which these remedies would be appropriate.
plastering employees when Plasterers is their 9(a) exclu-
sive collective-bargaining representative.
(g) In any like or related manner interfering with, re-
straining, or coercing employees in the exercise of the
rights guaranteed them by Section 7 of the Act.
2. Take the following affirmative action necessary to
effectuate the policies of the Act.
(a) Recognize and, on request, bargain with Plasterers
as the 9(a) exclusive collective-bargaining representative
of its plastering employees concerning terms and condi-
tions of employment and, if an understanding is reached,
embody the understanding in a signed agreement.
(b) Apply to its plastering employees the terms and
conditions of the collective-bargaining agreement be-
tween Plasterers and WWCCA, California Plastering
Conference, in effect from August 3, 2003, to August 5,
2008, and any automatic extensions thereof.
(c) Notify Plasterers in writing of all changes made
since August 5, 2008, to plastering employees’ terms and
conditions of employment and, on Plasterers’ request,
rescind any changes and restore terms and conditions of
employment retroactively to August 5, 2008.
(d) Make its plastering employees whole for any loss
of earnings or other benefits suffered as a result of its
withdrawal of recognition from Plasterers, plus interest,
as set forth in the remedy section as amended.
(e) Make all contributions, including any additional
amounts due, that it was required to make to Plasterers
Trusts pursuant to the 2005–2008 collective-bargaining
agreement between Plasterers and the WWCCA, Cali-
fornia Plastering Conference, but which it has not made
since August 5, 2008, and reimburse its plastering em-
ployees, with interest as provided in the remedy section
as amended, for any expenses resulting from its failure to
make the required payments.
(f) Withdraw recognition from Carpenters as the col-
lective-bargaining representative of its plastering em-
ployees.
(g) Make whole all of its plastering employees who
joined Carpenters on or since August 6, 2008, for all
dues and fees paid by them or withheld from them pursu-
ant to the terms of the union-security clause incorporated
in the August 6, 2008 memorandum agreement, plus in-
terest, as set forth in the remedy section as amended.
(h) Preserve and, within 14 days of a request, or such
additional time as the Regional Director may allow for
good cause shown, provide at a reasonable place desig-
nated by the Board or its agents, all payroll records, so-
cial security payment records, timecards, personnel rec-
ords and reports, and all other records, including an elec-
tronic copy of such records if stored in electronic form,
DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD 2178
necessary to analyze the amount of backpay and benefits
due under the terms of this Order.
(i) Within 14 days after service by the Region, post at
its Orange, California facility copies of the attached no-
tice marked “Appendix A”8 in both English and Spanish.
Copies of the notice, on forms provided by the Regional
Director for Region 21, after being signed by the Re-
spondent’s authorized representative, shall be posted by
the Respondent and maintained for 60 consecutive days
in conspicuous places, including all places where notices
to employees are customarily posted. In addition to
physical posting of paper notices, notices shall be dis-
tributed electronically, such as by email, posting on an
intranet or an internet site, and/or other electronic means,
if the Respondent customarily communicates with its
employees by such means. Reasonable steps shall be
taken by the Respondent to ensure that the notices are not
altered, defaced, or covered by any other material. If the
Respondent has gone out of business or closed the facili-
ty involved in these proceedings, the Respondent shall
duplicate and mail, at its own expense, a copy of the no-
tice to all current employees and former employees em-
ployed by the Respondent at any time since August 5,
2008.
(j) Within 21 days after service by the Region, file
with the Regional Director for Region 21 a sworn certifi-
cation of a responsible official on a form provided by the
Region attesting to the steps that Raymond has taken to
comply.
B. The Respondent, Southwest Regional Council of
Carpenters, Los Angeles, California, its officers, agents,
and representatives shall
1. Cease and desist from
(a) Receiving assistance and accepting recognition
from Raymond Interior Systems (Raymond) at a time
when Operative Plasterers’ and Cement Masons’ Interna-
tional Association, Local 200, AFL–CIO (Plasterers) is
the 9(a) representative of Raymond’s plastering employ-
ees.
(b) Maintaining or giving force and effect to any col-
lective-bargaining agreement with Raymond covering
Raymond’s plastering employees or acting as their col-
lective-bargaining representative while Plasterers is the
9(a) representative of those employees.
(c) Maintaining a union-security clause in its collec-
tive-bargaining agreement with Raymond at a time when
Carpenters does not represent an uncoerced majority of

8 If this Order is enforced by a judgment of a United States court of
appeals, the words in the notice reading “Posted by Order of the Na-
tional Labor Relations Board” shall read “Posted Pursuant to a Judg-
ment of the United States Court of Appeals Enforcing an Order of the
National Labor Relations Board.”
employees in the bargaining unit, thereby causing and
attempting to cause Raymond to violate Section 8(a)(3)
by encouraging membership in a labor organization and
discriminating against employees regarding hiring and
the terms and conditions of employment.
(d) Making monetary payments or giving away work
tools to induce employees to join the Carpenters when it
is not the collective-bargaining representative of the em-
ployees.
(e) In any like or related manner restraining or coerc-
ing employees in the exercise of the rights guaranteed
them by Section 7 of the Act.
2. Take the following affirmative action necessary to
effectuate the policies of the Act.
(a) Make whole all of Raymond’s plastering employ-
ees who joined Carpenters on or since August 6, 2008,
for all dues and fees paid by them or withheld from them
pursuant to the terms of the union-security clause incor-
porated in the August 6, 2008 memorandum agreement,
plus interest, as set forth in the remedy section as amend-
ed.
(b) Within 14 days after service by the Region, post at
its Los Angeles, California facility copies of the attached
notice marked “Appendix B”9 in English and Spanish.
Copies of the notice, on forms provided by the Regional
Director for Region 21, after being signed by Carpenters’
authorized representative, shall be posted by Carpenters
and maintained for 60 consecutive days in conspicuous
places, including all places where notices to members are
customarily posted. In addition to physical posting of
paper notices, notices shall be distributed electronically,
such as by email, posting on an intranet or an internet
site, and/or other electronic means, if Carpenters custom-
arily communicates with its members by such means.
Reasonable steps shall be taken by Carpenters to ensure
that the notices are not altered, defaced, or covered by
any other material.
(c) Within 21 days after service by the Region, file
with the Regional Director for Region 21 a sworn certifi-
cation of a responsible official on a form provided by the
Region attesting to the steps that Carpenters has taken to
comply.

9 See fn. 8, supra.
RAYMOND INTERIOR SYSTEMS 2179
APPENDIX A
NOTICE TO EMPLOYEES
POSTED BY ORDER OF THE
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
An Agency of the United States Government

The National Labor Relations Board has found that we vio-
lated Federal labor law and has ordered us to post and obey
this notice.
FEDERAL LAW GIVES YOU THE RIGHT TO
Form, join, or assist a union
Choose representatives to bargain with us on
your behalf
Act together with other employees for your bene-
fit and protection
Choose not to engage in any of these protected
activities.

WE WILL NOT withdraw recognition from and fail and
refuse to bargain with Operative Plasterers’ and Cement
Masons’ International Association, Local Union 200,
AFL–CIO (Plasterers) as the exclusive collective-bar-
gaining representative of our plastering employees.
WE WILL NOT repudiate our collective-bargaining
agreement with Plasterers at a time when Plasterers is
your exclusive representative.
WE WILL NOT fail to make contributions to the South-
ern California Plastering Institute Group Benefit Trust
c/o American Benefit Plan Administrators, Inc., Southern
California Plastering Institute Pension Trust Fund c/o
American Benefit Plan Administrators, Inc., Southern
California Plastering Institute Apprenticeship and Train-
ing Trust c/o American Benefit Plan Administrators, Inc.,
Southern California Plastering Institute Administrative
Trust Fund c/o American Benefit Plan Administrators,
Inc., Southern California Plastering Institute Labor-
Management Work Preservation Trust c/o American
Benefit Plan Administrators, Inc., and Southern Califor-
nia Plastering Institute Vacation Trust and Vacation Ad-
ministration Trust c/o American Benefit Plan Adminis-
trators, Inc. (collectively Plasterers Trusts), as provided
in the 2005–2008 collective-bargaining agreement be-
tween Plasterers and the Western Wall and Ceiling Con-
tractors Association (WWCCA), California Plastering
Conference.
WE WILL NOT grant recognition to or enter into a col-
lective-bargaining agreement containing a union-security
provision with the Southwest Regional Council of Car-
penters (Carpenters) when Plasterers is your exclusive
bargaining representative.
WE WILL NOT give assistance to Carpenters by threat-
ening you with job loss for failure to join Carpenters.
WE WILL NOT maintain or give force and effect to our
collective-bargaining agreement with Carpenters cover-
ing you while Plasterers is your exclusive collective-
bargaining representative.
WE WILL NOT in any like or related manner interfere
with, restrain, or coerce you in your exercise of the rights
listed above.
WE WILL recognize and, upon request, bargain with
Plasterers as the exclusive collective-bargaining repre-
sentative of our plastering employees and embody any
agreement reached regarding employee terms and condi-
tions of employment in writing.
WE WILL apply to you the terms and conditions of the
collective-bargaining agreement between Plasterers and
WWCCA, California Plastering Conference, in effect
from August 3, 2003, to August 5, 2008, and any auto-
matic renewals thereof.
WE WILL notify Plasterers in writing of all changes
made to your terms and conditions of employment since
August 5, 2008, and on Plasterers’ request rescind any
changes and restore terms and conditions of employment
retroactively to August 5, 2008.
WE WILL withdraw recognition from Carpenters as the
collective-bargaining representative of our plastering
employees while Plasterers is your exclusive representa-
tive.
WE WILL make whole all of our plastering employees
who joined the Carpenters’ Union on or since August 6,
2008, for all dues and fees paid by them or withheld from
them pursuant to the terms of the union-security clause
incorporated in the August 6, 2008 memorandum agree-
ment, plus interest.
WE WILL make whole our plastering employees for
any loss of earnings or other benefits suffered as a result
of our withdrawal of recognition from Plasterers and
repudiation of our agreement with Plasterers, plus inter-
est.
WE WILL make all fund contributions, including addi-
tional amounts due, that we were required to make but
did not make since August 5, 2008, to Plasterers Trusts
pursuant to the 2005–2008 collective-bargaining agree-
ment between Plasterers and the WWCCA, California
Plastering Conference, and WE WILL, make employees
whole for any losses incurred as a result of our failure to
make required contributions.

RAYMOND INTERIOR SYSTEMS
DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD 2180
APPENDIX B
NOTICE TO EMPLOYEES AND MEMBERS
POSTED BY ORDER OF THE
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
An Agency of the United States Government

The National Labor Relations Board has found that we vio-
lated Federal labor law and has ordered us to post and obey
this notice.
FEDERAL LAW GIVES YOU THE RIGHT TO
Form, join, or assist a union
Choose representatives to bargain on your behalf
with your employer
Act together with other employees for your bene-
fit and protection
Choose not to engage in any of these protected
activities.

WE WILL NOT receive assistance or accept recognition
from Raymond Interior Systems (Raymond) when Oper-
ative Plasterers’ and Cement Masons’ International As-
sociation, Local 200, AFL–CIO (Plasterers) is the exclu-
sive bargaining representative of its plastering employ-
ees.
WE WILL NOT maintain or give force and effect to any
collective-bargaining agreement with Raymond covering
its plastering employees, or act as their collective-
bargaining representative while Plasterers is the exclu-
sive representative of those employees.
WE WILL NOT maintain a union-security clause in a
collective bargaining agreement with Raymond at a time
when we do not represent an uncoerced majority of em-
ployees in the bargaining unit, thereby causing and at-
tempting to cause Raymond to violate Section 8(a)(3) by
encouraging membership in a labor organization and
discriminating against employees regarding hiring and
the terms and conditions of employment.
WE WILL NOT make monetary payments or give away
work tools to induce employees to join us when we are
not their collective-bargaining representative.
WE WILL NOT in any like or related manner restrain or
coerce you in your exercise of the rights listed above.
WE WILL make whole all of Raymond’s plastering em-
ployees who joined the Carpenters’ Union on or since
August 6, 2008, for all dues and fees paid by you or
withheld from you pursuant to the terms of the union-
security clause incorporated in the August 6, 2008 mem-
orandum agreement, plus interest.

SOUTHEST REGIONAL COUNCIL OF CARPENTERS

Lisa E. McNeill, Esq., for the General Counsel.
James A. Bowles, Esq. and Richard S. Zuniga, Esq. (Hill, Far-
rer & Burrill, LLP), of Los Angeles, California, for Re-
spondent Raymond Interior Systems.
Daniel M. Shanley, Esq. and Kathleen M. Jorgenson, Esq.
(DeCarlo, Connor, Shanley), of Los Angeles, California,
for Respondent Carpenters.
Eric B. Myers, Esq. (Davis, Cowell & Bowe, LLP), of San
Francisco, California, for the Charging Party Plasterers.
Jeffrey L. Cutler, Esq. (Wohlner, Kaplon, Phillips, Young and
Cutler), of Sherman Oaks, California, for the Charging Par-
ty Trusts.
DECISION
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
JOHN J. MCCARRICK, Administrative Law Judge. This case
was tried in Los Angeles, California, on September 22–25 and
30, 2009, upon the order consolidating cases, and consolidated
complaint (complaint) issued on June 30, 2009, by the Regional
Director for Region 21.
The complaint alleges that Raymond Interior Systems (Re-
spondent Raymond) violated Section 8(a)(1), (2), (3), and (5) of
National Labor Relations Act (the Act): by refusing to recog-
nize and bargain with Operative Plasterers and Cement Ma-
sons’ International Association Local Union 200, AFL–CIO
(Plasterers Union) as the exclusive collective-bargaining repre-
sentative of its plastering employees, by refusing to make trust
payments into various trust funds, by recognizing Respondent
Carpenters Union as the exclusive collective-bargaining repre-
sentative of its plastering employees and executing a collective-
bargaining agreement at a time when the Plasterers Union was
the exclusive collective-bargaining representative of Respond-
ent Raymond’s plastering employees and, by threatening its
plastering employees with loss of work if they did not join Re-
spondent Carpenters Union.
The complaint alleges that Southwest Regional Council of
Carpenters (Respondent Carpenters Union) violated Section
8(b)(1)(A) and (2) of the Act: by obtaining recognition from
and entering into a collective-bargaining agreement with Re-
spondent Raymond as the collective-bargaining representative
of Respondent Raymond’s plastering employees, at a time it
was not the exclusive representative of the plastering employ-
ees and, by giving away tools and money in order to induce
Respondent Raymond’s plastering employees to become mem-
bers of Respondent Carpenters.
Respondents filed timely answers to the complaint stating
they had committed no wrongdoing.
Upon the entire record here, including the briefs from the
General Counsel, Charging Parties, and Respondent Raymond,
I make the following findings of fact
FINDINGS OF FACT
I. JURISDICTION
Respondents admitted that Respondent Raymond is a Cali-
fornia corporation with an office and place of business located
in Orange, California, where it is engaged in the building and
construction industry as a contractor performing drywall, lath-
RAYMOND INTERIOR SYSTEMS 2181
ing and plastering work. Annually, Respondent in the course of
its business operations purchased and received at its California
jobsites goods valued in excess of $50,000 directly from points
outside the State of California.
Based upon the above, Respondent Raymond is an employer
engaged in commerce within the meaning of Section 2(2), (6),
and (7) of the Act.
II. LABOR ORGANIZATIONS
Respondents admitted and I find that the Unions are labor
organizations within the meaning of Section 2(5) of the Act.
III. THE ISSUES
1. Did Respondent Raymond enter into a valid voluntarily
recognition agreement with the Plasterers Union as the 9(a)
representative of its plastering employees?
2. Does Section 10(b) of the Act preclude Respondents from
raising the validity of any alleged voluntary recognition agree-
ment?
3. Did Respondent Raymond violate Section 8(a)(1) and (5)
of the Act by repudiating its agreement with the Plasterers Un-
ion?
4. Did Respondent Raymond violate Section 8(a)(1) and (5)
of the Act by ceasing to make contributions to the Trust Funds?
5. Did Respondent Raymond violate Section 8(a)(1), (2),
and (3) of the Act in recognizing Respondent Carpenters Union
as the exclusive collective-bargaining representative of its plas-
tering employees and signing a collective-bargaining agree-
ment?
6. Did Respondent Raymond violate Section 8(a)(1) and (2)
of the Act by threatening its employees with job loss if they did
not join Respondent Carpenters Union?
7. Did Respondent Carpenters Union violate Section
8(b)(1)(A) and (2) of the Act by accepting voluntary recogni-
tion and entering into a collective-bargaining agreement with
Respondent Raymond as the exclusive collective-bargaining
representative of Respondent Raymond’s plastering employ-
ees?
8. Did Respondent Carpenters Union violate Section
8(b)(1)(A) of the Act by giving away tools and cash in order to
induce Respondent Raymond’s plastering employees to become
members of Respondent Carpenters Union when the Plasterers
Union was the exclusive collective-bargaining representative?
IV. THE ALLEGED UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES
A. The Facts
Respondent Raymond operates as a plastering contractor in
southern California. Gary Jaacks (Jaacks) was Respondent
Raymond’s CEO from 1995 until July 2004, and has continued
to serve as a consultant and vice president of Respondent Ray-
mond. Travis Winsor (Winsor) has been Respondent Ray-
mond’s CEO from July 2004 to the present and was Respond-
ent Raymond’s vice president for Southern California Opera-
tions from the early 2000’s until July 2004.
Respondent Raymond, as a member, at all times material
here, of the Western Wall and Ceiling Contractors Association,
Plastering Conference (WWCCA), a multiemployer bargaining
association, has been signatory to a series of 8(f) pre-hire col-
lective-bargaining agreements with the Plasterers Union. The
agreements with the Plasterers Union covered Raymond’s plas-
tering employees defined in article 5, section 2 of the 2005–
2008 collective-bargaining agreement. Respondent Raymond
admitted that this is an appropriate unit for collective bargain-
ing within the meaning of the Act. The most recent agreements
were the August 4, 1999, to August 5, 2003 agreement, the
extension of that agreement to August 2, 2005, and, the August
3, 2005, to August 5, 2008 agreement.1
The two most recent collective-bargaining agreements pro-
vided as follows concerning bargaining rights:2

Preamble

This Agreement entered into the 5th day of August by and be-
tween designated members of the California Plastering Con-
ference of the Western Wall and Ceiling Contractors Associa-
tion, Inc., and individual contractors who are signatory hereto,
parties to the first part, herein after referred to as the Contrac-
tors, and Operative Plasterers and Cement Masons Interna-
tional Association Local Union No. 200, . . . .

ARTICLE II—UNION RECOGNITION

The exclusive bargaining rights are to be vested in the signa-
tory parties to this Agreement up to and including August 5,
2003.

ARTICLE XV

SECTION 1. Entire Agreement
The foregoing Agreement constitutes the entire con-
tract between the parties signatory hereto, and no addi-
tions, alterations or modifications shall occur herein with-
out the voluntary, mutual consent of the parties, during the
period of this Agreement; provided, however, that either
party may call for a conference on voluntary changes dur-
ing the life of this Agreement, and both parties shall there-
upon meet to confer on such changes.

Jaacks was a member of the WWCCA negotiating commit-
tee that negotiated the August 4, 1999 to August 5, 2003
agreement with the Plasterers Union and was a member of the
WWCCA board of directors until July 2004. Winsor was an
officer of the WWCCA and its president from 2005 to 2007.
Under article VII of the most recent collective-bargaining
agreements, the members of the WWCCA agree to make trust
fund payments to the following trusts: Southern California
Plastering Institute Group Benefit Trust, Southern California
Plastering Institute Pension Trust Fund, Southern California
Plastering Institute Apprenticeship and Training Trust, South-
ern California Plastering Institute Administrative Trust Fund,
Southern California Plastering Institute Labor-Management
Work Preservation Trust, Southern California Plastering Insti-
tute Vacation Trust, and Vacation Administration Trust, collec-
tively the Trusts.

1 GC Exhs. 2(a), (b), and (c).
2 Id.
DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD 2182
In late 2002, the Plasterers Union presented the WWCCA
with a voluntary recognition agreement3 whereby the WWCCA
and its members would recognize the Plasterers Union as the
9(a) representative of members’ plastering employees.
WWCCA rejected the agreement. In 2003, the Plasterers Un-
ion began obtaining voluntary recognition agreements from
individual plastering contractors who were signatory to 8(f)
collective-bargaining agreements with the Plasterers Union,
recognizing the Plasterers Union as the 9(a) majority repre-
sentative of their plastering employees, including members of
the WWCCA.
On about June 20, 2003, Plasterers Union Business Manager
Robert Pullen (Pullen) sent Respondent Raymond a letter certi-
fied mail with an attached voluntary recognition agreement4
seeking 9(a) representative status for the Plasterers Union
among Respondent Raymond’s plastering employees. The
voluntary recognition agreement provides:

VOLUNTARY RECOGNITION AGREEMENT
FOR A SINGLE EMPLOYER BARGAINING UNIT

This agreement is made and entered into by and be-
tween Raymond Interior Systems, (herein referred to as
the “Employer”), and Local No. 200 of the Operative Plas-
terers & Cement Masons International Association, AFL–
CIO (herein referred to as the “Union”).
1. The Union having unequivocally demanded recog-
nition as the majority representative of the employees of
the employer in the collective bargaining unit described
below, and the Union having submitted satisfactory evi-
dence to the Employer that the Union represents, has the
support of, and has been authorized to represent said em-
ployees by a majority of the Employer’s employees work-
ing in the classifications within the jurisdiction of the Un-
ion, as established and defined in the collective bargaining
agreement commonly known as the Labor Agreement be-
tween the Union and the Western Wall & Ceiling Contrac-
tors Association, Inc., California Plastering conference,
(hereinafter referred to as the “Collective Bargaining
Unit”), the Employer hereby unequivocally recognizes the
Union as the sole and exclusive majority representative for
collective-bargaining purposes for the Employer’s em-
ployees in said Collective Bargaining Unit, under Section
9(a) of the National Labor Relations Act, as amended.
This recognition refers to the work described in the said
Labor Agreement and applies only to the extent that such
work is to be performed within the territorial jurisdiction
covered by the Labor Agreement.
2. This Voluntary Recognition Agreement shall be ef-
fective at the time and date that this Agreement is signed
by the Employer and the Union, and if signed on different
days, the effective day shall be the day of the latest signa-
ture.

3 R. Exh. 2.
4 GC Exh. 3.
On June 26, 2003,5 Pullen sent Plasterers Business Agent
David Fritchel (Fritchel) to Respondent Raymond’s office with
a copy of the above voluntary recognition agreement and sup-
porting authorization cards. Fritchel met with Jaacks in Re-
spondent Raymond’s conference room where he explained why
the Union wanted Respondent to sign a voluntary recognition
agreement. Fritchel presented Jaacks employee authorization
cards and gave Jaacks the voluntary recognition agreement
which Jaacks signed6 as well as one or two more copies. While
Fritchel was not certain, he thought he signed copies of the
Raymond voluntary recognition agreement when he got back to
the Union hall. Fritchel is certain that he signed a copy of the
Raymond voluntary recognition agreement on June 26, 2003, as
represented by General Counsel’s Exhibit 4. Fritchel identified
both his and Jaack’s signatures on General Counsel’s Exhibit 4.
Jaacks also admitted that his signature and date was authentic
and that he had authority to sign contracts on behalf of Re-
spondent Raymond. Jaacks admitted that he made no formal
objection to the validity of the voluntary recognition agreement
to the Plasterers Union or to the WWCCA.
Jaacks claimed that Fritchel provided him with copies of the
voluntary recognition agreement a few days before he signed it
on June 26, 2003. This would be consistent with Pullen having
mailed a copy of the agreement to Respondent Raymond on
June 20, 2003. Jaacks asserts that before he signed the agree-
ment he consulted with WWCCA CEO Ian Hendry (Hendry)
and Mark Treadwell (Treadwell), legal counsel for the
WWCCA. Hendry denied receiving a call from Jaacks in June
2003 regarding a 9(a) recognition agreement. Jaacks denies a
meeting took place with Fritchel on June 26, 2003, where the
voluntary recognition agreement was signed and denied that
Fritchel produced authorization cards. Jaacks claims he mailed
the signed recognition agreement to the Plasterers Union.
However, from Jaacks’ affidavit of September 17, 2008, it is
clear he has very little recollection concerning the events sur-
rounding his signature of the voluntary recognition agreement,
including whether he consulted an attorney before he signed the
agreement or whether he signed the agreement in the presence
of a Plasterers union official. Jaack’s testimony is not corrobo-
rated by Hendry. I credit Fritchel’s testimony which was more
detailed and specific than Jaacks’.
The Plasterers Union filed RC Petitions with the Board in
2005, seeking 9(a) status with several plastering contractors.
During the pendency of the RC petitions on July 29, 2005, Pul-
len sent Hendry a document7 purporting to show which
WWCCA contractors, including Respondent Raymond, the

5 In its brief, Respondent contends that Pullen sent Fritchel to Re-
spondent Raymond to get a copy of the voluntary recognition agree-
ment signed on June 25, 2003. (Tr. at 71, L. 17.) Respondent incor-
rectly cites GC Exh. 5 for the proposition that the Raymond voluntary
recognition agreement was signed on June 25, 2003. GC Exh. 5 clearly
shows that the Raymond agreement was signed June 26, 2003. How-
ever from the entire context of Pullen’s testimony, it is apparent that he
misspoke regarding June 25, 2003, and actually meant June 26, 2003.
(Tr. at 72, LL. 4–6 and at 74, L. 4.) Having so found, it is unnecessary
to rule on Charging Parties’ motion to correct the transcript.
6 GC Exh. 4.
7 GC Exh. 5.
RAYMOND INTERIOR SYSTEMS 2183
Plasterers Union had a 9(a) relationship with and when the 9(a)
recognition agreement was signed. This document showed
Raymond signed a 9(a) recognition agreement on June 26,
2003. Winsor admitted that a few days after July 29, 2005,
Hendry gave him a copy of the list provided by the Plasterers
Union of member contractors who had signed 9(a) recognition
agreements. At the end of July 2005, Winsor called Pullen and
said, “I know Raymond has signed a 9(a) [recognition agree-
ment]. I would like to have a copy of it.” On July 29, 2005,
Pullen faxed a copy of the voluntary recognition agreement to
Winsor with Fritchel’s signature dated July 29, 2005.
On May 3, 2007, Pullen also sent various voluntary recogni-
tion agreements signed by WWCCA members to the WWCCA,
including the Raymond voluntary recognition agreement bear-
ing signatures by Jaacks and Fritchel and dates of June 26,
2003 and July 29, 2005.8
According to Winsor in a May 2007 WWCCA Board meet-
ing with Hendry and Treadwell present a discussion of the var-
ious voluntary recognition agreements signed by WWCCA
contractors with the Plasterers Union took place. Winsor
claimed Treadwell said the voluntary recognition agreements
were invalid. Winsor also claimed that at a July 29, 2005
WWCCA membership meeting Treadwell said the voluntary
recognition agreements signed by individual contractors were
invalid due to the labor agreement between WWCCA and the
Plasterers Union. Winsor claimed that at a September 2007
WWCCA Board meeting with Hendry, Treadwell, and attorney
James Bowles present it was agreed that the individual volun-
tary recognition agreements were invalid due to the labor
agreement between WWCCA and the Plasterers Union.
Winsor also claims that at a December 2007 meeting with
the Plasterers International president, he expressed his objec-
tion to the validity of Raymond’s voluntary recognition agree-
ment with the Plasterers Union. However, in his September 4,
2008 affidavit, Winsor did not mention his December 2007
conversation with the Plasterers International president, object-
ing to the voluntary recognition agreement. Again in an early
2008 meeting with Pullen and Fritchel, Winsor claims to have
expressed his opinion that Raymond’s voluntary recognition
agreement was invalid. At no time did Winsor or the WWCCA
make a formal written objection to the voluntary recognition
agreements.
Hendry was not as definitive as Winsor concerning Tread-
well’s statements concerning individual 9(a) plastering contrac-
tors’ recognition agreements. Thus in conversations with Plas-
terers union representatives, Hendry would venture no more an
opinion than the agreements may not be “bullet proof.” While
Hendry contended that in negotiations WWCCA did not agree
to 9(a) language in the multiemployer collective-bargaining
agreement, Hendry never claimed that Treadwell said the indi-
vidual voluntary recognition agreements were invalid. Since
2007, Hendry could not recall a WWCCA meeting where the
validity of the voluntary recognition agreements was discussed.
At the WWCCA board meeting in May 2007, when the list of
the contractors who had signed voluntary recognition agree-
ments was presented, none of the contractors present denied

8 GC Exh. 9.
they had signed the agreements, nor did Hendry take the posi-
tion that the agreements were invalid. At no time did Hendry
tell either the Plasterers Union or WWCCA member contrac-
tors that the agreements were invalid.
Treadwell admitted that in late 2002, the Plasterers Union
began trying to get signatory plastering contractors to sign 9(a)
voluntary recognition agreements and in January 2003, the
Plasterers Union filed an RC Petition with the Board naming
the WWCCA as employer. The petition was withdrawn when
Treadwell told the Plasterers Union to seek voluntary recogni-
tion agreements with individual employers. Treadwell, who
has represented the WWCCA in collective bargaining from
1981 to the present, said that the WWCCA took the position in
bargaining with the Plasterers Union in 2002, 2003, and 2005,
that if the Plasterers Union wanted to seek 9(a) agreements with
individual contractors they could do so. Treadwell claimed that
the WWCCA has never taken the position that the labor agree-
ment between WWCCA and the Plasterers Union prohibits the
Plasterers Union from seeking individual voluntary recognition
agreements.
In assessing the credibility conflict between Treadwell and
Winsor concerning the validity of the Plasterers voluntary
recognition agreements, I am persuaded that Treadwell was
telling the truth. Winsor’s responses were simply too conven-
ient, particularly on cross-examination. His testimony lacked
substance, detail, was self-serving and was not corroborated by
Hendry concerning Treadwell’s statements. On the other hand
Treadwell’s testimony was given in a forthright manner and is
all the more credible since it is adverse to his client WWCCA
and its former member Respondent Raymond. I also do not
credit Winsor concerning his alleged objection to the recogni-
tion agreement made to the Plasterers Union given the omission
of the December 2007 meeting from his affidavit as well as for
the other reasons stated above. I credit Treadwell’s testimony
over that of Winsor.
During the course of the trial a dispute arose as to the au-
thenticity of the Raymond voluntary recognition agreement.
Counsel for the General Counsel also produced a copy of the
Raymond voluntary recognition agreement that bears the date
July 29, 2005, next to Fritchel’s signature.9 Fritchel identified
the signature as his. The Jaack’s signature and date affixed to
General Counsel’s Exhibit 7 is identical to the date and signa-
ture on General Counsel’s Exhibit 4. Fritchel explained that on
July 29, 2005, he dated an undated copy of the Raymond volun-
tary recognition agreement he had signed when he obtained it
from Jaacks on June 26, 2003. Fritchel dated the agreement
July 29, 2005, at Pullen’s direction when Pullen sent a copy of
the Raymond voluntary recognition agreement to Winsor on
July 29, 2005. Fritchel’s explanation is supported by the doc-
uments10 sent by the Plasterers Union to its attorney Jeffrey
Cutler on March 25, 2005, which contains a copy of the signa-
ture page of the Raymond voluntary recognition agreement that
contains Fritchel’s undated signature.
In addition to the copies of the Raymond voluntary recogni-
tion agreement received as General Counsel’s Exhibits 4 and 7,

9 GC Exh. 7.
10 GC Exh. 10.
DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD 2184
two additional copies were introduced by Respondent as Exhib-
its 8 and 13. Each of Respondent’s copies of the Raymond
voluntary recognition agreement bear the date June 26, 2003,
together with Jaack’s signature as well as Fritchel’s signature
and the date July 29, 2005. Respondent’s Exhibit 13 and Gen-
eral Counsel’s Exhibit 7 are identical. There is no doubt that
both Jaack’s and Fritchel’s signatures are authentic on each
copy as are the dates printed next to Jaack’s and Fritchel’s sig-
natures. There are slight variations in the copies. For example
on General Counsel’s Exhibit 4, Fritchel’s title is printed as
Business Agent #200 while on General Counsel’s Exhibit 7,
Respondent’s Exhibits 8 and 13, Fritchel’s title is printed as
Business Agent. The only difference between General Coun-
sel’s Exhibit 7, Respondent’s Exhibit 8, and Respondent’s Ex-
hibit 13 is the reduction in size of the copies of General Coun-
sel’s Exhibit 7 and Respondent’s Exhibit 13 as a result of copy-
ing or faxing. There is no evidence that there was any fraud in
the execution of the Raymond voluntary recognition agreement.
Fritchel explained why some copies of the Raymond voluntary
recognition agreement bear the date July 29, 2005. There is no
doubt that the Raymond voluntary recognition agreement was
signed by both Jaacks and Fritchel on June 26, 2003. Fritchel
merely redated a copy of the agreement on July 29, 2005.
By letter11 dated May 9, 2008, Respondent Raymond noti-
fied the Plasterers Union that it was terminating its collective-
bargaining agreement and withdrawing from the WWCCA. By
letter12 dated August 5, 2008, Respondent Raymond notified
the Plasterers Union that it repudiated its collective-bargaining
agreement and collective-bargaining relationship with the Plas-
terers Union. By letter13 of August 11, 2008, the Plasterers
Union requested to meet and bargain with Respondent Ray-
mond and by letter14 of August 12, 2008, advised that the Plas-
terers Union had a 9(a) bargaining relationship with Respond-
ent Raymond and renewed its request for bargaining. In its
letters15 of August 12, 2008, Respondent Raymond refused to
bargain with the Plasterers Union, denied it had signed a valid
voluntary recognition agreement establishing a 9(a) bargaining
relationship and stated that it had entered into a collective-
bargaining agreement16 with the Respondent Carpenters Union
covering its plastering employees.
On August 6, 2008, a meeting involving 30 of Respondent
Raymond’s plastering employees took place at Raymond’s
Orange, California facility. Hector Herrera (Herrera), Re-
spondent Raymond’s plastering superintendent, Raymond’s
CEO Winsor as well as about 15 of Respondent Carpenter’s
representatives were present. Winsor advised the employees
that Raymond was not with the Plasterers Union any longer and
that they had switched to the Carpenters Union. Winsor said if
the employees wanted to continue with Raymond, they had to
join the Carpenters Union within 8 days. A memo17 was circu-
lated among the employees that stated:

11 GC Exh. 2(f).
12 GC Exh. 2(h).
13 GC Exh. 2(j).
14 GC Exh. 2(k).
15 GC Exhs. 2(l) and (m).
16 GC Exh. 2(e).
17 GC Exh. 2(n).

Plastering employees who were not previously member[s] of
the Carpenters must join the Carpenters Union under the un-
ion security provision of the Carpenters labor agreement.
This provision allows employees to continue working for
8 work days without joining the Carpenters Union. However,
at the expiration of this time all Raymond plastering employ-
ees must be members of the Carpenters Union.

At the meeting Herrera said journeymen would get a $5 raise
and foremen a $7 raise with the Carpenters. After about five
Carpenters representatives spoke to the employees, a raffle of
tools of the plastering trade, valued between $5.15 and $69.97
each was conducted, with each of the 30 employees receiving a
prize, as well as an award of cash prizes amounting to about
$1600.
B. The Analysis
1. The 8(a)(1) and (5) allegations
a. Was the Plasterers Union status converted from an
8(f) to a 9(a) bargaining relationship with
Respondent Raymond?
The complaint alleges at paragraphs 11(b) and 22 that Re-
spondent Raymond violated Section 8(a)(1) and (5) of the Act
by refusing to recognize and bargain with the Plasterers Union
at a time when the Plasterers Union was the exclusive collec-
tive-bargaining representative of Respondent Raymond’s plas-
tering employees pursuant to Section 9(a) of the Act.
The heart of this case is whether Respondent Raymond en-
tered into a valid voluntary recognition agreement with the
Plasterers Union that altered the parties’ extant 8(f) bargaining
relationship and conferred 9(a) status upon the Plasterers Union
as representative of Respondent’s plastering employees.
Section 8(f) of the Act provides in pertinent part:

It shall not be an unfair labor practice under subsections (a)
and (b) of this section for an employer engaged primarily in
the building and construction industry to make an agreement
covering employees engaged (or who, upon their employ-
ment, will be engaged) in the building and construction indus-
try with a labor organization of which building and construc-
tion employees are members (not established, maintained, or
assisted by any action defined in section 8(a) of this Act [sub-
section (a) of this section] as an unfair labor practice) because
(1) the majority status of such labor organization has not been
established under the provisions of section 9 of this act prior
to the making of such agreement, or (2) such agreement re-
quires as a condition of employment, membership in such la-
bor organization after the seventh day following the beginning
of such employment . . . .

Thus an employer engaged primarily in the construction in-
dustry may enter into a prehire agreement requiring union
membership as a condition of employment notwithstanding the
undetermined majority status of the union. Ordinarily such an
employer would be guilty of an unfair labor practice under
Section 8(a)(2) of the Act for extending recognition to a mi-
nority union.
RAYMOND INTERIOR SYSTEMS 2185
The Board in Allied Mechanical Service, 351 NLRB 79, 81
(2007), noted that the distinction between an 8(f) and a 9(a)
bargaining relationship is significant:

The distinction between a union’s representative status under
Section 8(f) and under Section 9(a) is significant because an
8(f) relationship may be terminated by either the union or the
employer upon the expiration of their collective-bargaining
agreement. John Deklewa & Sons, 282 NLRB 1375, 1386–
1387 (1987), enfd. sub nom. Iron Workers Local 3 v. NLRB,
843 F.2d 770 (3d Cir. 1988). By contrast, a 9(a) relationship
(and the associated obligation to bargain) continues after con-
tract expiration, unless and until the union is shown to have
lost majority support. Levitz Furniture Co., 333 NLRB 717
(2001). . . . In furtherance of this objective, Deklewa adopted
a rebuttable presumption that a bargaining relationship in the
construction industry was established under Section 8(f), and
placed the burden of proving that the relationship instead falls
under Section 9(a) on the party making that assertion. Id. at
1385, fn. 41. In so doing, however, Deklewa did not foreclose
an 8(f) representative from achieving 9(a) status.

In Allied Mechanical from all of the circumstances, includ-
ing a demand for recognition as majority representative, an
offer to demonstrate majority status, Respondent’s agreement
to recognize and bargain with the Union as majority representa-
tive as a result of a settlement agreement and other relevant
extrinsic evidence, the Board found that the parties intended
and did establish a 9(a) relationship. Thus, it is clear that a 9(a)
relationship may be established by the parties’ conduct.
In addition to establishing a 9(a) relationship through con-
duct, the parties may agree to form a 9(a) relationship through a
written agreement. In Staunton Fuel & Material, 335 NLRB
717, 719–720 (2001), the Board set forth the test to determine if
a recognition agreement alone creates a 9(a) relationship. The
Board held:

A recognition agreement or contract provision will be inde-
pendently sufficient to establish a union’s 9(a) representation
status where the language unequivocally indicates that (1) the
union requested recognition as the majority or 9(a) representa-
tive of the unit employees; (2) the employer recognized the
union as the majority or 9(a) bargaining representative; and
(3) the employer’s recognition was based on the union’s hav-
ing shown, or having offered to show, evidence of its majority
support.

The Board also found in Staunton that an employer may only
challenge its grant of 9(a) status to a union within 6 months of
granting that status:

If the employer recognizes the union and then discovers that
the union did not in fact have majority support, it may chal-
lenge the union’s 9(a) status at any time within the 6-month
limitations period after wrongfully extending recognition,
pursuant to Sec. 10(b) of the Act. Oklahoma Installation
[Co.], 325 NLRB 741, 742 [(1998)]. If the employer fails to
act within the 10(b) period, it may terminate its bargaining ob-
ligation only by affirmatively showing that the union has lost
majority support. The burden of making such a showing rests
on the employer. Levitz Furniture Co., supra at 8. Staunton at
footnote 10.

See also Triple C Maintenance, Inc., 327 NLRB 42 fn. 1
(1998); MFP Fire Protection, Inc., 318 NLRB 840, 842 (1995);
Casale Industries, 311 NLRB 951, 953 (1993). Respondent
cites American Automatic Sprinkler Systems v. NLRB, 163 F.3d
209, 218 fn. 6 (4th Cir. 1998), for the proposition that Section
10(b) does not preclude a challenge to majority support. While
court of appeals cases may hold that Section 10(b) does not bar
a challenge to majority support, I am bound to follow Board
precedent that the Supreme Court has not overruled. Los Ange-
les New Hospital, 244 NLRB 960, 962 fn. 4 (1979), enfd. 640
F.2d 1017 (9th Cir. 1981).
In Madison Industries, 349 NLRB 1307 (2007), without dis-
cussing the 10(b) implications, the Board found that a recogni-
tion agreement did not establish a 9(a) relationship despite lan-
guage that appeared to conform to the Staunton standard. The
Board concluded that there was an ambiguity in the recognition
agreement that had been entered into 3 years prior to the Re-
spondent withdrawing recognition which permitted it to consid-
er extrinsic evidence of the parties’ intent. The extrinsic evi-
dence showed that the Union did not offer to prove majority
status.
In this case General Counsel has shown that Respondent
Raymond and the Plasterers Union entered into a voluntary
recognition agreement on June 26, 2003. As noted above, I
have found that the voluntary recognition agreement is genuine.
The agreement comports with the Staunton requirements in that
the terms of the agreement provide that the Plasterers Union
requested recognition as the majority or 9(a) representative of
the plastering unit employees, Respondent Raymond recog-
nized the Plasterers Union as the majority or 9(a) bargaining
representative, and Respondent Raymond’s recognition was
based on the Plasterers Union having shown, or having offered
to show, evidence of its majority support.
However, Respondent Raymond argues that the third prong
of the Staunton test is not fulfilled, because the language of the
recognition agreement does not unequivocally say that the 9(a)
recognition was based upon a contemporary showing of majori-
ty status. Rather Raymond contends that the recognition
agreement language, “. . . and the Union having submitted sat-
isfactory evidence to the Employer that the Union represents,
has the support of, and has been authorized to represent said
employees by a majority of the Employer’s employees. . . .”
only shows that at some unknown time in the past the Union
submitted evidence of majority support, creating an ambiguity
and permitting extrinsic evidence to be introduced under Madi-
son Industries.
Raymond’s contention that the recognition agreement re-
quires language that the showing of majority status be contem-
poraneous with the demand for recognition is not supported by
Staunton. The Board in Staunton, at 720, requires only that the
voluntary recognition agreement provide: “. . . a statement to
the effect that, for example, the union “has the support” or “has
the authorization” of a majority to represent them.” The
Board’s later reference in Staunton, supra at 720, to “. . . recog-
nition was based on a contemporaneous showing, or offer by
DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD 2186
the Union to show, that the Union had majority support” must
be read in conjunction with the Board’s finding that the con-
tract language in Staunton did not establish the union had the
“support of” or “authorization of” a majority to represent them.
The Board was reemphasizing that the parties’ contract lan-
guage in Staunton did not reflect that the Union had majority
support of the employees. The significant point made by the
Board was not that the showing was not contemporaneous but
that there was no showing of majority support. Here the lan-
guage of the parties’ recognition agreement is unambiguous
that the Union submitted evidence to Raymond “that the Union
represents, has the support of, and has been authorized to repre-
sent said employees by a majority of the Employer’s employ-
ees,” fulfilling the Staunton test. It can be inferred that the
showing of majority support was made at the time the agree-
ment was signed in 2003, or else Raymond would not have
signed the agreement.18 Moreover, at this late date, more than
5 years from granting 9(a) status to the Plasterers Union, Re-
spondent Raymond’s challenge to the Union’s majority status
will not be countenanced. Staunton, supra.
In addition Respondent Raymond contends that the Plaster-
ers Union did not make a contemporaneous showing of union
support citing Golden West Electric, 307 NLRB 1494, 1495
(1992). Raymond argues that since the recognition agreement
was not signed, at the earliest in 2005, the Union’s 2003 show-
ing of majority support could not be contemporaneous.
Respondent’s argument is of no avail for two reasons. First I
have found that the agreement was effective when it was signed
by Fritch on June 26, 2003, when Fritch showed Jaacks author-
ization cards.19 Further, Raymond may not now challenge the
Union’s majority showing over 5 years after it granted 9(a)
status to the Plasterers Union.
Respondent Raymond challenges the validity of the recogni-
tion agreement on additional grounds.
Raymond contends that Jaacks’ did not have authority to en-
ter into the recognition agreement since only the WWCCA, as
Raymond’s designated bargaining representative under article
II of the collective-bargaining agreement between the Plasterers
Union and Raymond through the WWCCA, could enter into
collective-bargaining agreements with the Plasterers Union.
Raymond takes the position that only the WWCCA could mod-
ify the extant collective-bargaining agreement from its 8(f) to
9(a) status.
Respondent Raymond cites District Council of Painters
(Northern California Drywall Assn.), 326 NLRB 1074 (1998)
(union negotiates separate agreements with individual members
of a multiemployer bargaining association), and Enterprise
Assn. of Steamfitters, Local 638, 170 NLRB 385, 387 (1968)
(union negotiates separate agreements with individual members
of a multiemployer bargaining association) support its position
that the Plasterers Union could not bypass the WWCCA and
enter into voluntary recognition agreements with member em-
ployers of the WWCCA.

18 The evidence has shown that Fritch showed Jaacks authorization
cards on June 26, 2003.
19 There is no evidence that the particular cards Fritch showed Jaacks
were “stale.”
The General Counsel and the Plasterers Union contend that
by soliciting recognition agreements to obtain 9(a) status, the
Plasterers Union did not bypass the WWCCA since a 9(a)
recognition agreement is not a collective-bargaining agreement
but rather an expression of employees’ representational desires
under Section 7 of the Act.
In District Council of Painters, supra at 1078, citing John
Deklewa & Sons, 282 NLRB 1375 fn 42 (1987), the Board
affirmed the ALJ who found that, “. . . the employees of a sin-
gle employer cannot be precluded from expressing their repre-
sentational desires simply because their employer has joined a
multiemployer association. In Kephart Plumbing, 285 NLRB
612 (1987), the Board interpreted Deklewa, in the context of
multiemployer bargaining, as requiring a union, in order estab-
lish that its 8(f) status has been converted to full 9(a) status, to,
“. . . prove that it achieved such status among the Respondent’s
employees on a single-employer basis. Such showing is accom-
plished only by traditional means, i.e., a Board election or vol-
untary recognition based on a prior demand for recognition
supported by a showing of majority employee support.”
I find that the Plasterers Union, in obtaining recognition
agreements from WWCCA member employers, including Re-
spondent Raymond, did not bypass the WWCCA. There is a
fundamental difference between bargaining over terms and
conditions of employment and employees’ choice under Sec-
tion 7 of the Act to be represented by an exclusive bargaining
representative. A union’s status as a 9(a) representative is not a
term and condition of employment but rather the expression of
a majority of an employer’s employees to be represented by an
exclusive bargaining agent of their choice under the Act. The
above-cited Board decisions confirm that employees do not
lose the right to have their union seek 9(a) recognition from a
single employer simply because the union is also signatory to a
multiemployer collective-bargaining agreement. The cases
cited by Respondent Raymond are inapposite in that they deal
with unions who bargained with individual members of a multi-
employer association over terms and conditions of employ-
ment. Nothing in Respondent Raymond’s June 26, 2003 volun-
tary recognition agreement modifies the substantive terms of
the 2005–2008 WWCCA/Plasterers Union collective-
bargaining agreement. Rather the voluntary recognition
agreement alters the nature of the bargaining relationship be-
tween Raymond and the Plasterers Union, precluding Respond-
ent Raymond from walking away from bargaining with the
Union at the end of the contract and mandating ongoing bar-
gaining.
As a corollary argument, Respondent Raymond argues that
Jaacks had no authority to sign the recognition agreement.
First, while Raymond admitted Jaacks was both an agent and
supervisor of Respondent within the meaning of the Act, it
argues there is no evidence that it authorized Jaacks to sign
labor-related agreements particularly in view of the WWCCA’s
exclusive representation of Jaacks in collective bargaining.
This argument is without merit. Jaacks was CEO of Raymond
and admitted he had authority to sign many types of contracts
binding Raymond. At no time did Jaacks disavow his signing
the recognition agreement as an ultra vires action. I find that
Jaacks is both a supervisor and agent of Respondent Raymond
RAYMOND INTERIOR SYSTEMS 2187
cloaked with authority to bind Raymond to all types of contrac-
tual obligations. Moreover, Raymond’s argument that Jaacks
had no authority to sign the voluntary recognition agreement
since the Plasterers Union knew Raymond was represented by
the WWCCA for purposes of collective-bargaining must fail
since the Raymond voluntary recognition agreement did not
alter the substantive terms and conditions of the 2005–2008
WWCCA/Plasterers Union collective-bargaining agreement
which would have required the consent of the WWCCA.
In addition, Raymond argues that the recognition agreement
is invalid since the collective-bargaining agreements them-
selves provide at article XV, section 1, that the collective-
bargaining agreement is the entire contract which cannot be
changed without the consent of the parties. Hence, the recogni-
tion agreement is invalid since it modifies the collective-
bargaining agreement without the assent of the WWCCA.
Further, because the 2005–2008 collective-bargaining agree-
ment is defined as the whole agreement between the parties, it
supersedes the 2003 recognition agreement between Respond-
ent Raymond and the Plasterers Union.
Having found that the Raymond recognition agreement does
not alter the terms and conditions of employment embodied in
the parties’ 2005–2008 collective-bargaining agreement,20 but
rather is an independent agreement affirming employees’ Sec-
tion 7 rights to be represented in a full 9(a) status, the 2005–
2008 WWCCA agreement did not supersede the Raymond
recognition agreement.
Finally, all parties argue that each side should be estopped
from asserting the validity or invalidity of the recognition
agreement.
In Red Coats, Inc., 328 NLRB 205, 206–207 (1999), the
Board found that principles of equitable estoppel applied in
circumstances involving voluntary recognition. The Board
cited McClintock, In Principles of Equity, at 80 (2d ed. 1948):

The gist of equitable estoppel is that a party who has by his
statements or conduct, asserted a claim based on the assump-
tion of the truth of certain facts, whereby he has obtained a
benefit from another party, cannot later assert that those facts
are not true if thereby the other party will be prejudiced.

The Board added it, “has long identified the essential elements
of equitable estoppel as knowledge, intent, mistaken belief, and
detrimental reliance.”
In RPC, Inc., 311 NLRB 232, 233 (1993), the Board dis-
cussed the meaning of the estoppel doctrine, citing Lehigh
Portland Cement Co., 286 NLRB 1366, 1382–1383 (1987):

[. . .] a party that, in obtaining a benefit, engages in conduct
that causes a second party to reasonably rely on the ‘‘truth of
certain facts’’ that are assumed may not controvert those facts
later to the prejudice of the second party. The gravamen of
the harm is not the first party’s original conduct but rather the
inconsistency of its later position. A party may be estopped
from denying representations even though that party had no
timely knowledge of their falsity. Thus, the estoppel doctrine

20 A union recognition clause in a collective-bargaining agreement is
not a mandatory subject of bargaining. NLRB v. Borg-Warner Corp.,
356 U.S. 342 (1958).
does not operate only when a party makes an assertion or acts
in accord with a valid belief. Rather, the key is that the es-
topped party, by its actions, has obtained a benefit. Basically,
as discussed in Lehigh, the validity of a party’s belief is irrele-
vant. Otherwise, a party to be estopped could often escape the
application of the estoppel doctrine by simply claiming that it
was unaware of all the facts when it acted. Here, the General
Counsel has made a persuasive case for application of the es-
toppel doctrine. The elements of estoppel—knowledge, in-
tent, mistaken belief, and detrimental reliance—have all been
satisfied.

Respondent Raymond contends that General Counsel should
be estopped from relying on the recognition agreement repre-
sented by General Counsel’s Exhibit 4, the copy containing
both Jaack’s and Fritchel’s signatures but only the date of June
26, 2003, next to Jaack’s signature. The General Counsel ar-
gues that it is Respondent Raymond who should be estopped
from denying the validity of the recognition agreement while
the Plasterers Union contends that Respondent Raymond has
failed to prove estoppel should apply.
In support of its estoppel theory, Respondent Raymond pos-
its that the Plasterers Union knew there was a dispute concern-
ing the existence and validity of the Raymond recognition
agreement because this was why a copy of the document had
been requested in 2005 and 2007 by Hendry and Winsor. It is
claimed that the Plasterers Union knew Fritchel signed the
recognition agreement on July 29, 2005, which caused Winsor
to believe this copy was the operative document. Winsor relied
on the document dated July 29, 2005, in concluding it was inva-
lid and Winsor was mistaken as to the real recognition agree-
ment date in terminating the 2005–2008 agreement with the
Plasterers Union because the Plasterers Union now claims that
the General Counsel’s Exhibit 4 is the operative document.
Here, I have found that on June 26, 2003, Respondent,
through its CEO and President Jaacks, was aware that it had
signed a recognition agreement. On July 29, 2005, the Plaster-
ers Union sent the WWCCA a list of employers who had signed
recognition agreements, including Respondent Raymond, not-
ing Raymond had signed a recognition agreement June 26,
2003. Winsor received a copy of the list a few days later. On
July 29, 2005, the Union also sent Winsor a copy of Raymond’s
recognition agreement with Fritchel’s signature bearing the date
July 29, 2005.
Again on May 3, 2007, Pullen sent various voluntary recog-
nition agreements signed by WWCCA members to the
WWCCA, including the Raymond voluntary recognition
agreement bearing signatures by Jaacks and Fritchel and dates
of June 26, 2003, and July 29, 2005.
The essence of estoppel is that a party who has obtained a
benefit by causing another party to reasonably rely on claims it
has made may not later change its representations to the detri-
ment of the other party.
Respondent contends that the Plasterers Union, in providing
the copy of the recognition agreement bearing the date July 29,
2005, caused it to rely to its detriment on the fact that the effec-
tive date of the agreement was July 29, 2005. The trouble with
this argument is that Respondent ignores that it was concurrent-
DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD 2188
ly given another document, General Counsel’s Exhibit 5, by the
Plasterers Union that stated Respondent Raymond’s recognition
agreement was “signed June 26 ‘03’.” Having knowledge of
the conflicting dates, Respondent made no effort to resolve this
ambiguity but rather waited over 3 years and then terminated its
agreement with the Plasterers Union and signed a new collec-
tive-bargaining agreement with Respondent Carpenters Union.
Further for over 3 years Respondent Raymond suffered no
harm until it renounced its bargaining relationship with the
Plasterers Union in August 2008. Estoppel will not apply
where there is no reasonable reliance and where there is no
harm. Lehigh Portland Cement Co., 286 NLRB 1366, 1382–
1383 (1987). Since Respondent Raymond failed in any way to
resolve the discrepancy in signing dates on the recognition
agreement for over 3 years, any harm was self imposed. Gen-
eral Counsel will not be estopped in relying on General Coun-
sel’s Exhibit 4.
Based upon the above, I find that the recognition agreement
signed by both parties on June 26, 2003, effectively converted
the Plasterers Union status from an 8(f) to a 9(a) bargaining
representative on June 26, 2003. By its August 5, 2008 repudi-
ation of its collective-bargaining agreement and collective-
bargaining relationship with the Plasterers Union at a time
when the Plasterers Union was the 9(a) representative of its
plastering employees, Respondent Raymond violated Section
8(a)(1) and (5) of the Act.
b. The trust fund contributions
The complaint alleges at paragraphs 12, 13, and 22 that Re-
spondent Raymond violated Section 8(a)(1) and (5) of the Act
by ceasing to pay contributions to the trust funds without notice
to or bargaining with the Plasterers Union.
The parties stipulated at the hearing that on August 5, 2008,
Respondent Raymond ceased making contributions into the
Trust Funds pursuant to the 2005–2008 collective-bargaining
agreement without bargaining with the Plasterers Union.
In Made4Film, 337 NLRB 1152 (2002), the Board affirmed
that an employer has a statutory obligation to continue to fol-
low the terms and conditions of employment governing the
employer-employee relationship in an expired contract until a
new agreement is concluded or good-faith bargaining leads to
impasse. See also Air Convey Industries, Ltd., 292 NLRB 25
(1988). Having found that the parties had converted their rela-
tionship from an 8(f) to a 9(a) bargaining relationship, Re-
spondent Raymond was no longer privileged to walk away
from the expired collective-bargaining agreement and was obli-
gated to continue making trust fund payments pursuant to that
agreement. Having failed to continue to make the required trust
payments, Respondent Raymond violated Section 8(a)(1) and
(5) of he Act.
c. The recognition of the Carpenters Union and the
Carpenters collective-bargaining agreement
The complaint alleges at paragraphs 14 and 22 that Respond-
ent Raymond violated Section 8(a)(1) and (5) of the Act by
recognizing and entering into a contract with Respondent Car-
penters Union as the exclusive collective-bargaining repre-
sentative of Respondent Raymond’s plastering employees at a
time when the Plasterers Union was the exclusive collective-
bargaining representative of Respondent Raymond’s plastering
employees pursuant to Section 9(a) of the Act.
In view of my findings above that Respondent Raymond vio-
lated Section 8(a)(1) and (5) of the Act by refusing to recog-
nize and bargain with the Plasterers Union at a time when the
Plasterers Union was the exclusive collective-bargaining repre-
sentative of Respondent Raymond’s plastering employees pur-
suant to Section 9(a) of the Act and my findings below that
both Respondents Raymond and Carpenters Union violated
Section 8(a)(1), (2) and 8(b)(1)(A) of the Act, it is unnecessary
to pass on these allegations.
2. The 8(a)(1), (2), and (3) and the 8(b)(1)(A)
and (2) allegations
a. Respondent Raymond recognizes the Respondent Carpenters
Union and signs a collective-bargaining agreement
The complaint alleges at paragraphs 14, 16, 18, 20, 23, and
24 that Respondent Raymond violated Section 8(a)(1), (2), and
(3) of the Act on August 6, 2008, by recognizing and entering
into a contract with Respondent Carpenters Union as the exclu-
sive collective-bargaining representative of Respondent Ray-
mond’s plastering employees at a time when the Plasterers
Union was the exclusive collective-bargaining representative of
those employees pursuant to Section 9(a) of the Act thereby
encouraging its employees to join Respondent Carpenters Un-
ion. It is further alleged that on August 6, 2008, at a jointly
held meeting at Respondent Raymond’s facility, Raymond
rendered assistance to the Carpenters Union by threatening
employees with job loss if they did not join the Carpenters Un-
ion within 8 days.
b. Respondent Carpenters Union obtains recognition and en-
ters into a contract with Respondent Raymond
The complaint alleges at paragraphs 15,17,19, 21, 25, and 26
that Respondent Carpenters violated Section 8(b)(1)(A) and (2)
of the Act by obtaining recognition from and entering into a
contract with Respondent Raymond as collective-bargaining
representative of Raymond’s plastering employees when the
Plasterers Union and not the Carpenters Union was the 9(a)
representative of those employees thus causing Raymond to
encourage its plastering employees to join the Carpenters Un-
ion, by receiving assistance and support from Respondent
Raymond by entering into a collective-bargaining agreement as
collective-bargaining representative of Raymond’s plastering
employees and by giving away tools and money to Raymond’s
plastering employees to induce them to become members of the
Carpenters Union.
On August 6, 2008, Respondent Raymond recognized Re-
spondent Carpenters Union as the bargaining representative of
its plastering employees and entered into a collective-
bargaining agreement embodying that recognition. I have pre-
viously found that at this time the Plasterers Union was the
exclusive collective-bargaining representative of Respondent
Raymond’s plastering employees pursuant to Section 9(a) of
the Act. This agreement contains a union security clause re-
quiring employees to become members of Respondent Carpen-
ters Union within 8 days as a condition of further employment
with Respondent Raymond.
RAYMOND INTERIOR SYSTEMS 2189
An employer violates Section 8(a)(1), (2), and (3) of the Act
when it recognizes and enters into a collective-bargaining
agreement with a union which contains a union-security clause
at a time when the union does not represent an uncoerced ma-
jority of its employees. Similarly a union violates Section
8(b)(1)(A) and (2) of the Act by receiving and accepting such
assistance from an employer by accepting recognition and en-
tering into a collective-bargaining agreement with an employer
containing a union-security clause at the time when it does not
represent an uncoerced majority of the employer’s employees.
Clock Electric, Inc., 338 NLRB 806, 829–830 (2003).
Having found that Respondent Raymond recognized Re-
spondent Carpenters Union as the bargaining representative of
its plastering employees and entered into a collective-
bargaining agreement embodying that recognition and contain-
ing a union security clause when the Plasterers Union was the
exclusive collective-bargaining representative of Raymond’s
plastering employees pursuant to Section 9(a) of the Act, I find
that Respondent Raymond violated Section 8(a)(1), (2), and (3)
of the Act and that Respondent Carpenters Union violated Sec-
tion 8(b)(1)(A) and (2) of the Act.
In addition on August 6, 2008, a meeting was jointly con-
ducted at Respondent Raymond’s facility. Present were Car-
penters Union representatives and Respondent Raymond super-
visors including Winsor. At this meeting Winsor advised the
employees that Raymond was not with the Plasterers Union any
longer and that they had switched to the Carpenters Union.
Winsor said if the employees wanted to continue with Ray-
mond, they had to join the Carpenters Union within 8 days. A
memo was circulated among the employees that stated Ray-
mond’s plastering employees were required to join the Carpen-
ters Union under the union-security provision of its contract
with Raymond within 8 working days. Raymond’s supervisor
Herrera said that employees would get raises with the Carpen-
ters Union. Later the Carpenters Union conducted a raffle for
tools of the trade as well as for monetary awards.
Employer conduct that benefits a preferred labor organiza-
tion over an incumbent violates Section 8(a)(2) of the Act.
Thus an employer who provided unlawful assistance to a union
by making meeting space available on company time and re-
quired employees to attend organizational union meetings vio-
lated Section 8(a)(2) of the Act. Duane Reade, Inc., 338 NLRB
943, 944 (2003). Also a supervisor’s assistance to a competing
union in organizing efforts is unlawful. Dobbs International
Services, 335 NLRB 972, 987 (2001).
Concurrently a union that accepts an employer’s unlawful
assistance, including threats of termination for failing to sign
authorization cards and promises of improved benefits, violates
Section 8(b)(1)(A) of the Act. Dairyland USA Corp., 347
NLRB 310 (2006). A union that made payments of $2241 in
amounts ranging from $4.80 to $114 to 48 of 64 employees in a
bargaining unit in preelection period violated Section
8(b)(1)(A) of the Act. Flatbush Care Center, 287 NLRB 457,
457–458 (1987).
At the August 6, 2008 meeting both Respondents Raymond
and Carpenters conduct violated the Act since Respondents had
entered into a contract that violated Section 8(a)(1), (2), and (3)
and 8(b)(1)(A) and (2) of the Act. Respondent Raymond by
threatening to enforce the union-security provision of the Car-
penters contract, by providing meeting space for the Carpen-
ters, by holding a mandatory meeting on company time, and by
telling plastering employees that the Carpenters would increase
their pay21 gave assistance to the Carpenters Union in violation
of Section 8(a)(1) and (2) of the Act. In accepting this assis-
tance and in giving employees cash and tools, the Carpenters
Union concurrently violated Section 8(b)(1)(A) of the Act.
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
On the basis of the above findings of fact and the record as a
whole and Section 10(c) of the Act, I make the following con-
clusions of law.
1. Respondent Raymond Interior Systems has been at all
times material an employer engaged in commerce within the
meaning of Section 2(2), (6), and (7) of the Act.
2. Respondent Southwest Regional Council of Carpenters
has been at all times material, a labor organization within the
meaning of Section 2(5) of the Act.
3. The Charging Party Operative Plasterers and Cement Ma-
sons’ International Association, Local Union 200, AFL–CIO is,
and has been at all times material, a labor organization within
the meaning of Section 2(5) of the Act.
4. Respondent Raymond Interior Systems violated Section
8(a)(1), (2), (3), and (5) of the Act by recognizing and entering
into a contract with Respondent Carpenters Union as the exclu-
sive collective-bargaining representative of Respondent Ray-
mond’s plastering employees at a time when the Plasterers
Union was the exclusive collective-bargaining representative of
those employees pursuant to Section 9(a) of the Act thereby
encouraging its employees to join Respondent Carpenters Un-
ion. Respondent Raymond further violated Section 8(a)(1) and
(2) of the Act by rendering assistance to the Carpenters Union
by threatening employees with job loss if they did not join the
Carpenters Union within 8 days, by holding a mandatory meet-
ing on company time and premises and by promising increased
wages.
5. Respondent Southwest Regional Council of Carpenters
violated Section 8(b)(1)(A) and (2) of the Act: by obtaining
recognition from and entering into a contract with Respondent
Raymond as collective-bargaining representative of Raymond’s
plastering employees when the Plasterers Union and not the

21 While the complaint did not allege the use of company facilities,
holding a mandatory meeting on company time and promising in-
creased benefits as unlawful assistance, the matters are closely related
to extant charges and the matters were fully litigated at the hearing.
Redd-I, Inc., 290 NLRB 1115, 1115–1116 (1988); Hi-Tech Cable
Corp., 318 NLRB 280 (1995).
DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD 2190
Carpenters Union was the 9(a) representative of those employ-
ees thus causing Raymond to encourage its plastering employ-
ees to join the Carpenters Union, by receiving assistance and
support from Respondent Raymond by entering into a collec-
tive-bargaining agreement as collective-bargaining representa-
tive of Raymond’s plastering employees and, by giving away
tools and money to Raymond’s plastering employees to induce
them to become members of the Carpenters Union.
THE REMEDY
Having found that the Respondents violated the Act as set
forth above, I shall order that it cease and desist and post reme-
dial Board notices addressing the violations found.
[Recommended Order omitted from publication.]