Raymond Interior Systems

National Labor Relations Board - Administrative Judge Opinions

Mar 5, 2010

21-CA-038492 (N.L.R.B. Mar. 5, 2010)

JD(SF)–08–10
Orange, CA
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
BEFORE THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
DIVISION OF JUDGES
SAN FRANCISCO BRANCH OFFICE
RAYMOND INTERIOR SYSTEMS
and Case 21-CA-38492
OPERATIVE PLASTERERS’ AND CEMENT
MASONS’ INTERNATIONAL ASSOCIATION
LOCAL UNION 200, AFL-CIO
and Case 21-CA-38589
SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA PLASTERING
INSTITUTE GROUP BENEFIT TRUST C/O
AMERICAN BENEFIT PLAN
ADMINISTRATORS, INC.
SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA PLASTERING
INSTITUTE GROUP PENSION TRUST C/O
AMERICAN BENEFIT PLAN ADMINISTRATORS, INC.
SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA PLASTERING
INSTITUTE APPRENTICESHIP AND TRAINING
TRUST C/O AMERICAN BENEFIT PLAN
ADMINISTRATORS, INC.
SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA PLASTERING
INSTITUTE ADMINISTRATIVE TRUST FUND C/O
AMERICAN BENEFIT PLAN ADMINISTRATORS, INC.
SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA PLASTERING
INSTITUTE LABOR-MANAGEMENT WORK
PRESERVATION TRUST C/O AMERICAN
BENEFIT PLAN ADMINISTRATORS, INC.
SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA PLASTERING
INSTITUTE VACATION TRUST AND
VACATION ADMINISTRATION TRUST C/O
AMERICAN BENEFIT PLAN ADMINISTRATORS, INC.
SOUTHWEST REGIONAL COUNCIL OF CARPENTERS
and Case 21-CB-14576
OPERATIVE PLASTERERS’ AND CEMENT
MASONS’ INTERNATIONAL ASSOCIATION
LOCAL UNION 200, AFL-CIO
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Lisa E. McNeill, Esq., for the General Counsel.
Eric B. Myers, Esq. (Davis, Cowell & Bowe, LLP)
of San Francisco, CA, for the Charging Party Plasterers.
Jeffrey L. Cutler, Esq. (Wohlner, Kaplon, Phillips,
Young and Cutler), of Sherman Oaks, CA,
for the Charging Party Trusts.
James A. Bowles, Esq. and Richard S. Zuniga, Esq.
(Hill, Farrer & Burrill, LLP), of Los Angeles, CA,
for Respondent Raymond Interior Systems.
Daniel M. Shanley, Esq. and Kathleen M. Jorgenson, Esq.
(DeCarlo,Connor, Shanley), of Los Angeles, CA,
for Respondent Carpenters.
DECISION
Statement of the Case
JOHN J. MCCARRICK, Administrative Law Judge: This case was tried in Los Angeles,
California, on September 22-25 and September 30, 2009, upon the order consolidating cases,
and consolidated complaint (Complaint) issued on June 30, 2009, by the Regional Director for
Region 21.
The Complaint alleges that Raymond Interior Systems (Respondent Raymond) violated
Sections 8(a)(1), (2), (3) and (5) of the Act: by refusing to recognize and bargain with Operative
Plasterers’ and Cement Masons’ International Association Local Union 200, AFL-CIO
(Plasterers’ Union) as the exclusive collective-bargaining representative of its plastering
employees, by refusing to make trust payments into various trust funds, by recognizing
Respondent Carpenters Union as the exclusive collective-bargaining representative of its
plastering employees and executing a collective-bargaining agreement at a time when the
Plasterers’ Union was the exclusive collective-bargaining representative of Respondent
Raymond’s plastering employees and, by threatening its plastering employees with loss of work
if they did not join Respondent Carpenters’ Union.
The Complaint alleges that Southwest Regional Council Of Carpenters (Respondent
Carpenters Union) violated Section 8(b)(1)(A) and (2) of the Act: by obtaining recognition from
and entering into a collective-bargaining agreement with Respondent Raymond as the
collective-bargaining representative of Respondent Raymond’s plastering employees, at a time
it was not the exclusive representative of the plastering employees and, by giving away tools
and money in order to induce Respondent Raymond’s plastering employees to become
members of Respondent Carpenters.
Respondents filed timely answers to the Complaint stating they had committed no
wrongdoing.
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Upon the entire record herein, including the briefs from the General Counsel, Charging
Parties and Respondent Raymond, I make the following findings of fact.
Findings of Fact
I. Jurisdiction
Respondents admitted that Respondent Raymond is a California corporation with an
office and place of business located in Orange, California, where it is engaged in the building
and construction industry as a contractor performing drywall, lathing and plastering work.
Annually, Respondent in the course of its business operations purchased and received at its
California jobsites goods valued in excess of $50,000 directly from points outside the State of
California.
Based upon the above, Respondent Raymond is an employer engaged in commerce
within the meaning of Section 2(2), (6), and (7) of the Act.
II. Labor Organizations
Respondents admitted and I find that the Unions are labor organizations within the
meaning of Section 2(5) of the Act.
III. The Issues
1. Did Respondent Raymond enter into a valid voluntarily recognition agreement with
the Plasterers’ Union as the 9(a) representative of its plastering employees?
2. Does Section 10(b) of the Act preclude Respondents from raising the validity of any
alleged voluntary recognition agreement?
3. Did Respondent Raymond violate Section 8(a)(1) and (5) of the Act by repudiating its
agreement with the Plasterers’ Union?
4. Did Respondent Raymond violate Section 8(a)(1) and (5) of the Act by ceasing to
make contributions to the Trust Funds?
5. Did Respondent Raymond violate Section 8(a)(1), (2) and (3) of the Act in
recognizing Respondent Carpenters Union as the exclusive collective-bargaining
representative of its plastering employees and signing a collective-bargaining
agreement?
6. Did Respondent Raymond violate Section 8(a)(1) and (2) of the Act by threatening its
employees with job loss if they did not join Respondent Carpenters Union?
7. Did Respondent Carpenters Union violate Section 8(b)(1)(A) and (2) of the Act by
accepting voluntary recognition and entering into a collective-bargaining agreement
with Respondent Raymond as the exclusive collective-bargaining representative of
Respondent Raymond’s plastering employees?
8. Did Respondent Carpenters Union violate Section 8(b)(1)(A) of the Act by giving
away tools and cash in order to induce Respondent Raymond’s plastering
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employees to become members of Respondent Carpenters Union when the
Plasterers Union was the exclusive collective-bargaining representative?
IV. The Alleged Unfair Labor Practices
A. The Facts
Respondent Raymond operates as a plastering contractor in southern California.
Gary Jaacks (Jaacks) was Respondent Raymond’s CEO from 1995 until July 2004 and has
continued to serve as a consultant and vice president of Respondent Raymond. Travis Winsor
(Winsor) has been Respondent Raymond’s CEO from July 2004 to the present and was
Respondent Raymond’s vice president for Southern California Operations from the early 2000’s
until July 2004.
Respondent Raymond, as a member, at all times material herein, of the Western Wall
and Ceiling Contractors Association, Plastering Conference (WWCCA), a multi-employer
bargaining association, has been signatory to a series of Section 8(f) pre-hire collective-
bargaining agreements with the Plasterers’ Union. The agreements with the Plasterers’ Union
covered Raymond’s plastering employees defined in Article 5, section 2 of the 2005-2008
collective-bargaining agreement. Respondent Raymond admitted that this is an appropriate unit
for collective-bargaining within the meaning of the Act. The most recent agreements were the
August 4, 1999 to August 5, 2003 agreement, the extension of that agreement to
August 2, 2005 and, the August 3, 2005 to August 5, 2008 agreement.1
The two most recent collective-bargaining agreements provided as follows concerning
bargaining rights:2
Preamble
This Agreement entered into the 5th day of August by and between designated
members of the California Plastering Conference of the Western Wall and Ceiling
Contractors Association, Inc., and individual contractors who are signatory hereto,
parties to the first part, herein after referred to as the Contractors, and Operative
Plasterers and Cement Masons International Association Local Union No. 200, . . . .
ARTICLE-II-UNION RECOGNITION
The exclusive bargaining rights are to be vested in the signatory parties to this
Agreement up to and including August 5, 2003.
ARTICLE XV
SECTION1. Entire Agreement
The foregoing Agreement constitutes the entire contract between the parties
signatory hereto, and no additions, alterations or modifications shall occur herein without
the voluntary, mutual consent of the parties, during the period of this Agreement;
provided, however, that either party may call for a conference on voluntary changes

1 GC Exhs., 2(a), (b) and (c).
2 Ibid.
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during the life of this Agreement, and both parties shall thereupon meet to confer on
such changes
Jaacks was a member of the WWCCA negotiating committee that negotiated the
August 4, 1999 to August 5, 2003 agreement with the Plasterers Union and was a member of
the WWCCA Board of Directors until July 2004. Winsor was an officer of the WWCCA and its
President from 2005 to 2007.
Under Article VII of the most recent collective-bargaining agreements, the members of
the WWCCA agree to make trust fund payments to the following Trusts: Southern California
Plastering Institute Group Benefit Trust, Southern California Plastering Institute Pension Trust
Fund, Southern California Plastering Institute Apprenticeship and Training Trust, Southern
California Plastering Institute Administrative Trust Fund, Southern California Plastering Institute
Labor-Management Work Preservation Trust, Southern California Plastering Institute Vacation
Trust and Vacation Administration Trust, collectively the Trusts.
In late 2002, the Plasterers Union presented the WWCCA with a voluntary recognition
agreement3 whereby the WWCCA and its members would recognize the Plasterers Union as
the Section 9(a) representative of members’ plastering employees. WWCCA rejected the
agreement. In 2003 the Plasterers Union began obtaining voluntary recognition agreements
from individual plastering contractors who were signatory to Section 8(f) collective-bargaining
agreements with the Plasterers’ Union, recognizing the Plasterers’ Union as the Section 9(a)
majority representative of their plastering employees, including members of the WWCCA.
On about June 20, 2003, Plasterers’ Union Business Manager Robert Pullen (Pullen)
sent Respondent Raymond a letter certified mail with an attached voluntary recognition
agreement4 seeking Section 9(a) representative status for the Plasterers’ Union among
Respondent Raymond’s plastering employees. The voluntary recognition agreement provides:
VOLUNTARY RECOGNITION AGREEMENT
FOR A SINGLE EMPLOYER BARGAINING UNIT
This agreement is made and entered into by and between Raymond Interior
Systems, (herein referred to as the “Employer”), and Local No. 200 of the Operative
Plasterers’ & Cement Masons International Association, AFL-CIO (herein referred to as
the “Union”).
1. The Union having unequivocally demanded recognition as the majority representative
of the employees of the employer in the collective bargaining unit described below,
and the Union having submitted satisfactory evidence to the Employer that the Union
represents, has the support of, and has been authorized to represent said employees
by a majority of the Employer’s employees working in the classifications within the
jurisdiction of the Union, as established and defined in the collective bargaining
agreement commonly known as the Labor Agreement between the Union and the
Western Wall & Ceiling Contractors Association, Inc., California Plastering
conference, (hereinafter referred to as the “Collective Bargaining Unit”), the Employer
hereby unequivocally recognizes the Union as the sole and exclusive majority
representative for collective-bargaining purposes for the Employer’s employees in

3 R. Exh. 2.
4 GC Exh. 3.
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said Collective Bargaining Unit, under Section 9(a) of the National Labor Relations
Act, as amended. This recognition refers to the work described in the said Labor
Agreement and applies only to the extent that such work is to be performed within the
territorial jurisdiction covered by the Labor Agreement.
2. This Voluntary Recognition Agreement shall be effective at the time and date that this
Agreement is signed by the Employer and the Union, and if signed on different days,
the effective day shall be the day of the latest signature.
On June 26, 20035, Pullen sent Plasterers Business Agent David Fritchel (Fritchel) to
Respondent Raymond’s office with a copy of the above voluntary recognition agreement and
supporting authorization cards. Fritchel met with Jaacks in Respondent Raymond’s conference
room where he explained why the Union wanted Respondent to sign a voluntary recognition
agreement. Fritchel presented Jaacks employee authorization cards and gave Jaacks the
voluntary recognition agreement which Jaacks signed6 as well as one or two more copies.
While Fritchel was not certain, he thought he signed copies of the Raymond voluntary
recognition agreement when he got back to the Union hall. Fritchel is certain that he signed a
copy of the Raymond voluntary recognition agreement on June 26, 2003, as represented by
General Counsel’s exhibit 4. Fritchel identified both his and Jaack’s signatures on General
Counsel’s exhibit 4. Jaacks also admitted that his signature and date was authentic and that he
had authority to sign contracts on behalf of Respondent Raymond. Jaacks admitted that he
made no formal objection to the validity of the voluntary recognition agreement to the Plasterers’
Union or to the WWCCA.
Jaacks claimed that Fritchel provided him with copies of the voluntary recognition
agreement a few days before he signed it on June 26, 2003. This would be consistent with
Pullen having mailed a copy of the agreement to Respondent Raymond on June 20, 2003.
Jaacks asserts that before he signed the agreement he consulted with WWCCA CEO Ian
Hendry (Hendry) and Mark Tredwell (Tredwell), legal counsel for the WWCCA. Hendry denied
receiving a call from Jaacks in June 2003 regarding a 9(a) recognition agreement. Jaacks
denies a meeting took place with Fritchel on June 26, 2003, where the voluntary recognition
agreement was signed and denied that Fritchel produced authorization cards. Jaacks claims he
mailed the signed recognition agreement to the Plasterers’ Union. However, from Jaacks’
affidavit of September 17, 2008, it is clear he has very little recollection concerning the events
surrounding his signature of the voluntary recognition agreement, including whether he
consulted an attorney before he signed the agreement or whether he signed the agreement in
the presence of a Plasterers’ Union official. Jaack’s testimony is not corroborated by Hendry.
I credit Fritchel’s testimony which was more detailed and specific than Jaacks’.
The Plasterers’ Union filed RC Petitions with the Board in 2005, seeking Section 9(a)
status with several plastering contractors. During the pendency of the RC petitions on July 29,

5 In its brief, Respondent contends that Pullen sent Fritchel to Respondent Raymond to get
a copy of the voluntary recognition agreement signed on June 25, 2003. (Tr. at 71, line 17).
Respondent incorrectly cites GC exhibit 5 for the proposition that the Raymond voluntary
recognition agreement was signed on June 25, 2003. General Counsel’s exhibit 5 clearly
shows that the Raymond agreement was signed June 26, 2003. However from the entire
context of Pullen’s testimony, it is apparent that he misspoke regarding June 25, 2003 and
actually meant June 26, 2003. (Tr. at 72, lines 4-6 and at 74, line 4). Having so found, it is
unnecessary to rule on Charging Parties’ Motion to Correct the Transcript.
6 GC Exh. 4.
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2005, Pullen sent Hendry a document7 purporting to show which WWCCA contractors, including
Respondent Raymond, the Plasterers’ Union had a Section 9(a) relationship with and when the
Section 9(a) recognition agreement was signed. This document showed Raymond signed a
9(a) recognition agreement on June 26, 2003. Winsor admitted that a few days after July 29,
2005, Hendry gave him a copy of the list provided by the Plasterers’ Union of member
contractors who had signed Section 9(a) recognition agreements. At the end of July 2005,
Winsor called Pullen and said, “I know Raymond has signed a 9(a). I would like to have a copy
of it.” On July 29, 2005, Pullen faxed a copy of the voluntary recognition agreement to Winsor
with Fritchel’s signature dated July 29, 2005.
On May 3, 2007, Pullen also sent various voluntary recognition agreements signed by
WWCCA members to the WWCCA, including the Raymond voluntary recognition agreement
bearing signatures by Jaacks and Fritchel and dates of June 26, 2003 and July 29, 20058.
According to Winsor in a May 2007 WWCCA Board meeting with Hendry and Tredwell
present a discussion of the various voluntary recognition agreements signed by WWCCA
contractors with the Plasterers’ Union took place. Winsor claimed Tredwell said the voluntary
recognition agreements were invalid. Winsor also claimed that at a July 29, 2005 WWCCA
membership meeting Tredwell said the voluntary recognition agreements signed by individual
contractors were invalid due to the Labor Agreement between WWCCA and the Plasterers’
Union. Winsor claimed that at a September 2007 WWCCA Board meeting with Hendry,
Tredwell and attorney James Bowles present it was agreed that the individual voluntary
recognition agreements were invalid due to the Labor Agreement between WWCCA and the
Plasterers’ Union.
Winsor also claims that at a December 2007 meeting with the Plasterers International
President, he expressed his objection to the validity of Raymond’s voluntary recognition
agreement with the Plasterers’ Union. However, in his September 4, 2008 affidavit, Winsor did
not mention his December 2007 conversation with the Plasterers’ international president,
objecting to the voluntary recognition agreement. Again in an early 2008 meeting with Pullen
and Fritchel, Winsor claims to have expressed his opinion that Raymond’s voluntary recognition
agreement was invalid. At no time did Winsor or the WWCCA make a formal written objection
to the voluntary recognition agreements.
Hendry was not as definitive as Winsor concerning Tredwell’s statements concerning
individual Section 9(a) plastering contractors’ recognition agreements. Thus in conversations
with Plasterers’ Union representatives, Hendry would venture no more an opinion than the
agreements may not be “bullet proof.” While Hendry contended that in negotiations WWCCA
did not agree to Section 9(a) language in the multi employer collective-bargaining agreement,
Hendry never claimed that Tredwell said the individual voluntary recognition agreements were
invalid. Since 2007, Hendry could not recall a WWCCA meeting where the validity of the
voluntary recognition agreements was discussed. At the WWCCA Board meeting in May 2007,
when the list of the contractors who had signed voluntary recognition agreements was
presented, none of the contractors present denied they had signed the agreements, nor did
Hendry take the position that the agreements were invalid. At no time did Hendry tell either the
Plasterers Union or WWCCA member contractors that the agreements were invalid.

7 GC Exh. 5.
8 GC Exh. 9.
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Tredwell admitted that in late 2002 the Plasterers’ Union began trying to get signatory
plastering contractors to sign Section 9(a) voluntary recognition agreements and in January
2003 the Plasterers’ Union filed an RC Petition with the Board naming the WWCCA as
employer. The petition was withdrawn when Tredwell told the Plasterers’ Union to seek
voluntary recognition agreements with individual employers. Tredwell, who has represented the
WWCCA in collective bargaining from 1981 to the present, said that the WWCCA took the
position in bargaining with the Plasterers’ Union in 2002, 2003 and 2005 that if the Plasterers’
Union wanted to seek Section 9(a) agreements with individual contractors they could do so.
Tredwell claimed that the WWCCA has never taken the position that the Labor Agreement
between WWCCA and the Plasterers’ Union prohibits the Plasterers’ Union from seeking
individual voluntary recognition agreements.
In assessing the credibility conflict between Tredwell and Winsor concerning the validity
of the Plasterers’ voluntary recognition agreements, I am persuaded that Tredwell was telling
the truth. Winsor’s responses were simply too convenient, particularly on cross examination.
His testimony lacked substance, detail, was self serving and was not corroborated by Hendry
concerning Tredwell’s statements. On the other hand Tredwell’s testimony was given in a
forthright manner and is all the more credible since it is adverse to his client WWCCA and its
former member Respondent Raymond. I also do not credit Winsor concerning his alleged
objection to the recognition agreement made to the Plasterers’ Union given the omission of the
December 2007 meeting from his affidavit as well as for the other reasons stated above. I credit
Tredwell’s testimony over that of Winsor.
During the course of the trial a dispute arose as to the authenticity of the Raymond
voluntary recognition agreement. Counsel for the General Counsel also produced a copy of the
Raymond voluntary recognition agreement that bears the date July 29, 2005 next to Fritchel’s
signature9. Fritchel identified the signature as his. The Jaack’s signature and date affixed to
General Counsel’s exhibit 7 is identical to the date and signature on General Counsel’s
exhibit 4. Fritchel explained that on July 29, 2005, he dated an undated copy of the Raymond
voluntary recognition agreement he had signed when he obtained it from Jaacks on June 26,
2003. Fritchel dated the agreement July 29, 2005 at Pullen’s direction when Pullen sent a copy
of the Raymond voluntary recognition agreement to Winsor on July 29, 2005. Fritchel’s
explanation is supported by the documents10 sent by the Plasterers’ Union to its attorney Jeffrey
Cutler on March 25, 2005 which contains a copy of the signature page of the Raymond
voluntary recognition agreement that contains Fritchel’s undated signature.
In addition to the copies of the Raymond voluntary recognition agreement received as
General Counsel’s exhibits 4 and 7, two additional copies were introduced by Respondent as
exhibits 8 and 13. Each of Respondent’s copies of the Raymond voluntary recognition
agreement bear the date June 26, 2003 together with Jaack’s signature as well as Fritchel’s
signature and the date July 29, 2005. Respondent’s exhibit 13 and General Counsel’s exhibit 7
are identical. There is no doubt that both Jaack’s and Fritchel’s signatures are authentic on
each copy as are the dates printed next to Jaack’s and Fritchel’s signatures. There are slight
variations in the copies. For example on General Counsel’s exhibit 4 Fritchel’s title is printed as
Business Agent #200 while on General Counsel’s exhibit 7, Respondent’s exhibits 8 and 13
Fritchel’s title is printed as Business Agent. The only difference between General Counsel’s
exhibit 7, Respondent’s exhibit 8 and Respondent’s exhibit 13 is the reduction in size of the
copies of General Counsel’s exhibit 7 and Respondent’s exhibit 13 as a result of copying or

9 GC Exh. 7.
10 GC Exh. 10.
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faxing. There is no evidence that there was any fraud in the execution of the Raymond
voluntary recognition agreement. Fritchel explained why some copies of the Raymond
voluntary recognition agreement bear the date July 29, 2005. There is no doubt that the
Raymond voluntary recognition agreement was signed by both Jaacks and Fritchel on
June 26, 2003. Fritchel merely re-dated a copy of the agreement on July 29, 2005.
By letter11 dated May 9, 2008, Respondent Raymond notified the Plasterers’ Union that
it was terminating its collective-bargaining agreement and withdrawing from the WWCCA. By
letter12 dated August 5, 2008, Respondent Raymond notified the Plasterers’ Union that it
repudiated its collective-bargaining agreement and collective-bargaining relationship with the
Plasterers’ Union. By letter13 of August 11, 2008, the Plasterers’ Union requested to meet and
bargain with Respondent Raymond and by letter14 of August 12, 2008 advised that the
Plasterers’ Union had a Section 9(a) bargaining relationship with Respondent Raymond and
renewed its request for bargaining. In its letters15 of August 12, 2008, Respondent Raymond
refused to bargain with the Plasterers’ Union, denied it had signed a valid voluntary recognition
agreement establishing a Section 9(a) bargaining relationship and stated that it had entered into
a collective-bargaining agreement16 with the Respondent Carpenters Union covering its
plastering employees.
On August 6, 2008, a meeting involving 30 of Respondent Raymond’s plastering
employees took place at Raymond’s Orange, California facility. Hector Herrera (Herrera),
Respondent Raymond’s plastering superintendent, Raymond CEO Winsor as well as about 15
of Respondent Carpenter’s representatives were present. Winsor advised the employees that
Raymond was not with the Plasterers’ Union any longer and that they had switched to the
Carpenters Union. Winsor said if the employees wanted to continue with Raymond, they had to
join the Carpenters Union within 8 days. A memo17 was circulated among the employees that
stated:
Plastering employees who were not previously member of the Carpenters must join the
Carpenters Union under the union security provision of the Carpenters labor agreement.
This provision allows employees to continue working for 8 work days without joining the
Carpenters Union. However, at the expiration of this time all Raymond plastering
employees must be members of the Carpenters Union.
At the meeting Herrera said journeymen would get a $5 raise and foremen a $7 raise with the
Carpenters. After about five Carpenters representatives spoke to the employees, a raffle of
tools of the plastering trade, valued between $5.15 and $69.97 each was conducted, with each
of the 30 employees receiving a prize, as well as an award of cash prizes amounting to about
$1600.

11 GC Exh. 2(f).
12 GC Exh. 2(h).
13 GC Exh. 2(j).
14 GC Exh. 2(k).
15 GC Exhs. 2(l) and (m).
16 GC Exh. 2(e).
17 GC Exh. 2(n).
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B. The Analysis
1. The 8(a)(1) and (5) allegations.
a. Was the Plasterers’ Union Status Converted from a Section 8(f) to a Section 9(a) bargaining
relationship with Respondent Raymond?
The Complaint alleges at paragraphs 11(b) and 22 that Respondent Raymond violated
Section 8(a)(1) and (5) of the Act by refusing to recognize and bargain with the Plasterers Union
at a time when the Plasterers’ Union was the exclusive collective-bargaining representative of
Respondent Raymond’s plastering employees pursuant to Section 9(a) of the Act.
The heart of this case is whether Respondent Raymond entered into a valid voluntary
recognition agreement with the Plasterers Union that altered the parties’ extant Section 8(f)
bargaining relationship and conferred Section 9(a) status upon the Plasterers’ Union as
representative of Respondent’s plastering employees.
Section 8(f) of the Act provides in pertinent part:
It shall not be an unfair labor practice under subsections (a) and (b) of this section for an
employer engaged primarily in the building and construction industry to make an
agreement covering employees engaged (or who, upon their employment, will be
engaged) in the building and construction industry with a labor organization of which
building and construction employees are members ( not established, maintained, or
assisted by any action defined in section 8(a) of this Act [subsection (a) of this section]
as an unfair labor practice) because (1) the majority status of such labor organization
has not been established under the provisions of section 9 of this act prior to the making
of such agreement, or (2) such agreement requires as a condition of employment,
membership in such labor organization after the seventh day following the beginning of
such employment . . . .
Thus an employer engaged primarily in the construction industry may enter into a pre-
hire agreement requiring union membership as a condition of employment notwithstanding the
undetermined majority status of the union. Ordinarily such an employer would be guilty of an
unfair labor practice under Section 8(a)(2) of the Act for extending recognition to a minority
union.
The Board in Allied Mechanical Service, Inc., 351 NLRB 79, 81 (2007) noted that the
distinction between a Section 8(f) and a Section 9(a) bargaining relationship is significant:
The distinction between a union’s representative status under Section 8(f) and under
Section 9(a) is significant because an 8(f) relationship may be terminated by either the
union or the employer upon the expiration of their collective-bargaining agreement. John
Deklewa & Sons, 282 NLRB 1375, 1386–1387 (1987), enfd. sub nom. Iron Workers
Local 3 v. NLRB, 843 F.2d 770 (3d Cir. 1988). By contrast, a 9(a) relationship (and the
associated obligation to bargain) continues after contract expiration, unless and until the
union is shown to have lost majority support. Levitz Furniture Co., 333 NLRB 717 (2001).
81-82 In furtherance of this objective, Deklewa adopted a rebuttable presumption that a
bargaining relationship in the construction industry was established under Section 8(f),
and placed the burden of proving that the relationship instead falls under Section 9(a) on
the party making that assertion. Id. at 1385, fn. 41. In so doing, however, Deklewa did
not foreclose an 8(f) representative from achieving 9(a) status.
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In Allied Mechanical from all of the circumstances, including a demand for recognition as
majority representative, an offer to demonstrate majority status, Respondent’s agreement to
recognize and bargain with the Union as majority representative as a result of a settlement
agreement and other relevant extrinsic evidence, the Board found that the parties intended and
did establish a 9(a) relationship. Thus, it is clear that a 9(a) relationship may be established by
the parties’ conduct.
In addition to establishing a Section 9(a) relationship through conduct, the parties may
agree to form a Section 9(a) relationship through a written agreement. In Staunton Fuel and
Material, 335 NLRB 717, 719-720 (2001), the Board set forth the test to determine if a
recognition agreement alone creates a Section 9(a) relationship. The Board held:
A recognition agreement or contract provision will be independently sufficient to
establish a union’s 9(a) representation status where the language unequivocally
indicates that (1) the union re-quested recognition as the majority or 9(a) representative
of the unit employees; (2) the employer recognized the union as the majority or 9(a)
bargaining representative; and (3) the employer’s recognition was based on the union’s
having shown, or having offered to show, evidence of its majority support.
The Board also found in Staunton that an employer may only challenge its grant of
Section 9(a) status to a union within six months of granting that status:
If the employer recognizes the union and then discovers that the union did not in fact
have majority support, it may challenge the union’s 9(a) status at any time within the 6-
month limitations period after wrongfully extending recognition, pursuant to Sec. 10(b) of
the Act. Oklahoma Installation, 325 NLRB 741, 742. If the employer fails to act within the
10(b) period, it may terminate its bargaining obligation only by affirmatively showing that
the union has lost majority support. The burden of making such a showing rests on the
employer. Levitz Furniture Co., supra at 8. Staunton at footnote 10.
See also Triple C Maintenance, Inc., 327 NLRB 42, n1 (1998); MFP Fire Protection, Inc.,
318 NLRB 840, 842 (1995); Casale Industries, 311 NLRB 951, 953 (1993). Respondent cites
American Automatic Sprinkler Systems, Inc., v. NLRB, 163 F3d 209, 218 fn. 6 (4th Cir. 1998) for
the proposition that Section 10(b) does not preclude a challenge to majority support. While
Court of Appeals cases may hold that Section 10(b) does not bar a challenge to majority
support, I am bound to follow Board precedent that the Supreme Court has not overruled. Los
Angeles New Hospital, 244 NLRB 960, 962 fn. 4 (1979) enfd. 640 F. 2d 1017 (9th Cir. 1981).
In Madison Industries, 349 NLRB 1307 (2007), without discussing the 10(b) implications,
the Board found that a recognition agreement did not establish a Section 9(a) relationship
despite language that appeared to conform to the Staunton standard. The Board concluded
that there was an ambiguity in the recognition agreement that had been entered into three years
prior to the Respondent withdrawing recognition which permitted it to consider extrinsic
evidence of the parties’ intent. The extrinsic evidence showed that the Union did not offer to
prove majority status.
In this case General Counsel has shown that Respondent Raymond and the Plasterers
Union entered into a voluntary recognition agreement on June 26, 2003. As noted above, I have
found that the voluntary recognition agreement is genuine. The agreement comports with the
Staunton requirements in that the terms of the agreement provide that the Plasterers’ Union
requested recognition as the majority or Section 9(a) representative of the plastering unit
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employees, Respondent Raymond recognized the Plasterers’ Union as the majority or Section 9(a)
bargaining representative, and Respondent Raymond’s recognition was based on the Plasterers’
Union having shown, or having offered to show, evidence of its majority support.
However, Respondent Raymond argues that the third prong of the Staunton test is not
fulfilled, because the language of the recognition agreement does not unequivocally say that the
Section 9(a) recognition was based upon a contemporary showing of majority status. Rather
Raymond contends that the recognition agreement language, “. . . and the Union having
submitted satisfactory evidence to the Employer that the Union represents, has the support of,
and has been authorized to represent said employees by a majority of the Employer’s
employees . . . .” only shows that at some unknown time in the past the Union submitted
evidence of majority support, creating an ambiguity and permitting extrinsic evidence to be
introduced under Madison Industries.
Raymond’s contention that the recognition agreement requires language that the
showing of majority status be contemporaneous with the demand for recognition is not
supported by Staunton. The Board in Staunton at 720 requires only that the voluntary
recognition agreement provide: “. . . a statement to the effect that, for example, the union “has
the support” or “has the authorization” of a majority to represent them.” The Board’s later
reference in Staunton at 720 to “. . . recognition was based on a contemporaneous showing, or
offer by the Union to show, that the Union had majority support” must be read in conjunction
with the Board’s finding that the contract language in Staunton did not establish the union had
the “support of” or “authorization of” a majority to represent them. The Board was
reemphasizing that the parties’ contract language in Staunton did not reflect that the Union had
majority support of the employees. The significant point made by the Board was not that the
showing was not contemporaneous but that there was no showing of majority support. Here the
language of the parties’ recognition agreement is unambiguous that the Union submitted
evidence to Raymond “that the Union represents, has the support of, and has been authorized
to represent said employees by a majority of the Employer’s employees,” fulfilling the Staunton
test. It can be inferred that the showing of majority support was made at the time the agreement
was signed in 2003 or else Raymond would not have signed the agreement.18 Moreover, at this
late date, more than five years from granting Section 9(a) status to the Plasterers’ Union,
Respondent Raymond’s challenge to the Union’s majority status will not be countenanced.
Staunton, supra.
In addition Respondent Raymond contends that the Plasterers Union did not make a
contemporaneous showing of union support citing Golden West Electric, 307 NLRB 1494, 1495
(1992). Raymond argues that since the recognition agreement was not signed, at the earliest in
2005, the Union’s 2003 showing of majority support could not be contemporaneous.
Respondent’s argument is of no avail for two reasons. First I have found that the
agreement was effective when it was signed by Fritch On June 26, 2003, when Fritch showed
Jaacks authorization cards.19 Further, Raymond may not now challenge the Union’s majority
showing over 5 years after it granted Section 9(a) status to the Plasterers’ Union.
Respondent Raymond challenges the validity of the recognition agreement on additional
grounds.

18 The evidence has shown that Fritch showed Jaacks authorization cards on
March 26, 2003.
19 There is no evidence that the particular cards Fritch showed Jaacks were “stale.”
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Raymond contends that Jaacks’ did not have authority to enter into the recognition
agreement since only the WWCCA, as Raymond’s designated bargaining representative under
Article II of the collective-bargaining agreement between the Plasterers’ Union and Raymond
through the WWCCA, could enter into collective-bargaining agreements with the Plasterers’
Union. Raymond takes the position that only the WWCCA could modify the extant collective-
bargaining agreement from its Section 8(f) status to Section 9(a) status.
Respondent Raymond cites District Council of Painters (Northern California Drywall
Association, 326 NLRB 1074 (1998) (Union negotiates separate agreements with individual
members of a multi-employer bargaining association) and Enterprise Association of
Steamfitters, Local 638, 170 NLRB 385, 387 (1968) (Union negotiates separate agreements
with individual members of a multi-employer bargaining association) support its position that the
Plasterers’ Union could not bypass the WWCCA and enter into voluntary recognition
agreements with member employers of the WWCCA.
General Counsel and the Plasterers’ Union contend that by soliciting recognition
agreements to obtain Section 9(a) status, the Plasterers’ Union did not bypass the WWCCA
since a Section 9(a) recognition agreement is not a collective-bargaining agreement but rather
an expression of employees’ representational desires under Section 7 of the Act.
In District Council of Painters, supra at 1078 citing John Deklewa and Sons, 282 NLRB
1375, fn 42 (1987) the Board affirmed the ALJ who found that, “. . . the employees of a single
employer cannot be precluded from expressing their representational desires simply because
their employer has joined a multiemployer association. In Kephart Plumbing, 285 NLRB 612
(1987), the Board interpreted Deklewa, in the context of multi-employer bargaining, as requiring
a union, in order establish that its Section 8(f) status has been converted to full Section 9(a)
status, to, “. . . prove that it achieved such status among the Respondent's employees on a
single-employer basis. Such showing is accomplished only by traditional means, i.e., a Board
election or voluntary recognition based on a prior demand for recognition supported by a
showing of majority employee support.”
I find that the Plasterers’ Union, in obtaining recognition agreements from WWCCA
member employers, including Respondent Raymond, did not bypass the WWCCA. There is a
fundamental difference between bargaining over terms and conditions of employment and
employees’ choice under section 7 of the Act to be represented by an exclusive bargaining
representative. A union’s status as a Section 9(a) representative is not a term and condition of
employment but rather the expression of a majority of an employer’s employees to be
represented by an exclusive bargaining agent of their choice under the Act. The above cited
Board decisions confirm that employees do not lose the right to have their union seek Section
9(a) recognition from a single employer simply because the union is also signatory to a
multiemployer collective-bargaining agreement. The cases cited by Respondent Raymond are
inapposite in that they deal with unions who bargained with individual members of a multi
employer association over terms and conditions of employment. Nothing in Respondent
Raymond’s June 26, 2003 voluntary recognition agreement modifies the substantive terms of
the 2005-2008 WWCCA/Plasterers’ Union collective-bargaining agreement. Rather the
voluntary recognition agreement alters the nature of the bargaining relationship between
Raymond and the Plasterers’ Union, precluding Respondent Raymond from walking away from
bargaining with the Union at the end of the contract and mandating ongoing bargaining.
As a corollary argument, Respondent Raymond argues that Jaacks had no authority to
sign the recognition agreement. First, while Raymond admitted Jaacks was both an agent and
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supervisor of Respondent within the meaning of the Act, it argues there is no evidence that it
authorized Jaacks to sign labor related agreements particularly in view of the WWCCA’s
exclusive representation of Jaacks in collective bargaining. This argument is without merit.
Jaacks was CEO of Raymond and admitted he had authority to sign many types of contracts
binding Raymond. At no time did Jaacks disavow his signing the recognition agreement as an
ultra vires action. I find that Jaacks is both a supervisor and agent of Respondent Raymond
cloaked with authority to bind Raymond to all types of contractual obligations. Moreover,
Raymond’s argument that Jaacks had no authority to sign the voluntary recognition agreement
since the Plasterers’ Union knew Raymond was represented by the WWCCA for purposes of
collective-bargaining must fail since the Raymond voluntary recognition agreement did not alter
the substantive terms and conditions of the 2005-2008 WWCCA/Plasterers’ Union collective-
bargaining agreement which would have required the consent of the WWCCA.
In addition, Raymond argues that the recognition agreement is invalid since the
collective-bargaining agreements themselves provide at Article XV, Section 1 that the collective-
bargaining agreement is the entire contract which cannot be changed without the consent of the
parties. Hence, the recognition agreement is invalid since it modifies the collective-bargaining
agreement without the assent of the WWCCA. Further, because the 2005-2008 collective-
bargaining agreement is defined as the whole agreement between the parties, it supersedes the
2003 recognition agreement between Respondent Raymond and the Plasterers’ Union.
Having found that the Raymond recognition agreement does not alter the terms and
conditions of employment embodied in the parties’ 2005-2008 collective-bargaining
agreement,20 but rather is an independent agreement affirming employees’ Section 7 rights to
be represented in a full Section 9(a) status, the 2005-2008 WWCCA agreement did not
supersede the Raymond recognition agreement.
Finally, both all parties argue that each side should be estopped from asserting the
validity or invalidity of the recognition agreement.
In Red Coats, Inc., 328 NLRB 205, 206-207 (1999), the Board found that principles of
equitable estoppel applied in circumstances involving voluntary recognition. The Board cited
McClintock, In Principles of Equity, at 80 (2d ed. 1948):
The gist of equitable estoppel is that a party who has by his statements or conduct,
asserted a claim based on the assumption of the truth of certain facts, whereby he has
obtained a benefit from another party, cannot later assert that those facts are not true if
thereby the other party will be prejudiced.
The Board added it, “has long identified the essential elements of equitable estoppel as
knowledge, intent, mistaken belief, and detrimental reliance.”
In RPC, Inc., 311 NLRB 232, 233 (1993), the Board discussed the meaning of the
estoppel doctrine, citing Lehigh Portland Cement Co., 286 NLRB 1366, 1382–1383 (1987):
[. . .] a party that, in obtaining a benefit, engages in conduct that causes a second party
to reasonably rely on the ‘‘truth of certain facts’’ that are assumed may not controvert

20 A union recognition clause in a collective-bargaining agreement is not a mandatory
subject of bargaining. NLRB v. Borg-Warner Corp., Wooster Div., 356 U.S. 342 (1958).
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those facts later to the prejudice of the second party. The gravamen of the harm is not
the first party’s original conduct but rather the inconsistency of its later position. A party
may be estopped from denying representations even though that party had no timely
knowledge of their falsity. Thus, the estoppel doctrine does not operate only when a
party makes an assertion or acts in accord with a valid belief. Rather, the key is that the
estopped party, by its actions, has obtained a benefit. Basically, as discussed in Lehigh,
the validity of a party’s belief is irrelevant. Otherwise, a party to be estopped could often
escape the application of the estoppel doctrine by simply claiming that it was unaware of
all the facts when it acted. Here, the General Counsel has made a persuasive case for
application of the estoppel doctrine. The elements of estoppel—knowledge, intent,
mistaken belief, and detrimental reliance—have all been satisfied.
Respondent Raymond contends that General Counsel should be estopped from relying
on the recognition agreement represented by General Counsel’s Exhibit 4, the copy containing
both Jaack’s and Fritchel’s signatures but only the date of June 26, 2003 next to Jaack’s
signature. General Counsel argues that it is Respondent Raymond who should be estopped
from denying the validity of the recognition agreement while the Plasterers’ Union contends that
Respondent Raymond has failed to prove estoppel should apply.
In support of its estoppel theory, Respondent Raymond posits that the Plasterers’ Union
knew there was a dispute concerning the existence and validity of the Raymond recognition
agreement because this was why a copy of the document had been requested in 2005 and
2007 by Hendry and Winsor. It is claimed that the Plasterers’ Union knew Fritchel signed the
recognition agreement on July 29, 2005, which caused Winsor to believe this copy was the
operative document. Winsor relied on the document dated July 29, 2005, in concluding it was
invalid and Winsor was mistaken as to the real recognition agreement date in terminating the
2005-2008 agreement with the Plasterers’ Union because the Plasterers’ Union now claims that
General Counsel’s exhibit 4 is the operative document.
Here, I have found that on June 26, 2003, Respondent, through its CEO and President
Jaacks, was aware that it had signed a recognition agreement. On July 29, 2005 the Plasterers’
Union sent the WWCCA a list of employers who had signed recognition agreements, including
Respondent Raymond, noting Raymond had signed a recognition agreement June 26, 2003.
Winsor received a copy of the list a few days later. On July 29, 2005 the Union also sent
Winsor a copy of Raymond’s recognition agreement with Fritchel’s signature bearing the date
July 29, 2005.
Again on May 3, 2007, Pullen sent various voluntary recognition agreements signed by
WWCCA members to the WWCCA, including the Raymond voluntary recognition agreement
bearing signatures by Jaacks and Fritchel and dates of June 26, 2003 and July 29, 2005.
The essence of estoppel is that a party who has obtained a benefit by causing another
party to reasonably rely on claims it has made may not later change its representations to the
detriment of the other party.
Respondent contends that the Plasterers’ Union, in providing the copy of the recognition
agreement bearing the date July 29, 2005 caused it to rely to its detriment on the fact that the
effective date of the agreement was July 29, 2005. The trouble with this argument is that
Respondent ignores that it was concurrently given another document, General Counsel’s
Exhibit 5, by the Plasterers’ Union that stated Respondent Raymond’s recognition agreement
was “signed June 26 ‘03”. Having knowledge of the conflicting dates, Respondent made no
effort to resolve this ambiguity but rather waited over 3 years and then terminated its agreement
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with the Plasterers’ Union and signed a new collective-bargaining agreement with Respondent
Carpenters Union. Further for over 3 years Respondent Raymond suffered no harm until it
renounced its bargaining relationship with the Plasterers’ Union in August 2008. Estoppel will
not apply where there is no reasonable reliance and where there is no harm. Lehigh Portland
Cement Co., 286 NLRB 1366, 1382–1383 (1987). Since Respondent Raymond failed in any
way to resolve the discrepancy in signing dates on the recognition agreement for over three
years, any harm was self imposed. General Counsel will not be estopped in relying on General
Counsel’s exhibit 4.
Based upon the above, I find that the recognition agreement signed by both parties on
June 26, 2003 effectively converted the Plasterers’ Union status from a Section 8(f) to a Section
9(a) bargaining representative on June 26, 2003. By its August 5, 2008, repudiation of its
collective-bargaining agreement and collective-bargaining relationship with the Plasterers’ Union
at a time when the Plasterers’ Union was the Section 9(a) representative of its plastering
employees, Respondent Raymond violated section 8(a)(1) and (5) of the Act.
b. The Trust fund Contributions
The Complaint alleges at paragraphs 12, 13 and 22 that Respondent Raymond violated
Section 8(a)(1) and (5) of the Act by ceasing to pay contributions to the Trust Funds without
notice to or bargaining with the Plasterers Union.
The parties stipulated at the hearing that on August 5, 2008, Respondent Raymond
ceased making contributions into the Trust Funds pursuant to the 2005-2008 collective-
bargaining agreement without bargaining with the Plasterers’ Union.
In Made4Film, 337 NLRB 1152 (2002) the Board affirmed that an employer has a
statutory obligation to continue to follow the terms and conditions of employment governing the
employer-employee relationship in an expired contract until a new agreement is concluded or
good-faith bargaining leads to impasse. See also Air Convey Industries, Ltd., 292 NLRB 25
(1988). Having found that the parties had converted their relationship from a Section 8(f) to a
Section 9(a) bargaining relationship, Respondent Raymond was no longer privileged to walk
away from the expired collective-bargaining agreement and was obligated to continue making
trust fund payments pursuant to that agreement. Having failed to continue to make the required
trust payments, Respondent Raymond violated section 8(a)(1) and (5) of he Act.
c. The Recognition of the Carpenters’ Union and the Carpenters Collective Bargaining
Agreement
The Complaint alleges at paragraphs 14 and 22 that Respondent Raymond violated
Section 8(a)(1) and (5) of the Act by recognizing and entering into a contract with Respondent
Carpenters Union as the exclusive collective-bargaining representative of Respondent
Raymond’s plastering employees at a time when the Plasterers Union was the exclusive
collective-bargaining representative of Respondent Raymond’s plastering employees pursuant
to Section 9(a) of the Act.
In view of my findings above that Respondent Raymond violated section 8(a)(1) and (5)
of the Act by refusing to recognize and bargain with the Plasterers’ Union at a time when the
Plasterers’ Union was the exclusive collective-bargaining representative of Respondent
Raymond’s plastering employees pursuant to Section 9(a) of the Act and my findings below that
both Respondents Raymond and Carpenters Union violated section 8(a)(1), (2) and 8(b)(1)(A)
of the Act, it is unnecessary to pass on these allegations.
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2. The 8(a)(1), (2) and (3) and the 8(b)(1)(A) and (2) allegations.
a. Respondent Raymond Recognizes the Respondent Carpenters Union and Signs a Collective
Bargaining Agreement
The Complaint alleges at paragraphs 14, 16, 18, 20, 23 and 24 that Respondent
Raymond violated Section 8(a)(1), (2) and (3) of the Act on August 6, 2008, by recognizing and
entering into a contract with Respondent Carpenters Union as the exclusive collective-
bargaining representative of Respondent Raymond’s plastering employees at a time when the
Plasterers Union was the exclusive collective-bargaining representative of those employees
pursuant to Section 9(a) of the Act thereby encouraging its employees to join Respondent
Carpenters Union. It is further alleged that on August 6, 2008 at a jointly held meeting at
Respondent Raymond’s facility, Raymond rendered assistance to the Carpenters Union by
threatening employees with job loss if they did not join the Carpenters Union within 8 days.
b. Respondent Carpenters Union Obtains Recognition and enters into a Contract with
Respondent Raymond.
The Complaint alleges at paragraphs 15,17,19, 21, 25 and 26 that Respondent
Carpenters violated sections 8(b)(1)(A) and (2) of the Act by obtaining recognition from and
entering into a contract with Respondent Raymond as collective-bargaining representative of
Raymond’s plastering employees when the Plasterers Union and not the Carpenters Union was
the 9(a) representative of those employees thus causing Raymond to encourage its plastering
employees to join the Carpenters Union, by receiving assistance and support from Respondent
Raymond by entering into a collective-bargaining agreement as collective-bargaining
representative of Raymond’s plastering employees and by giving away tools and money to
Raymond’s plastering employees to induce them to become members of the Carpenters Union.
On August 6, 2008, Respondent Raymond recognized Respondent Carpenters Union as
the bargaining representative of its plastering employees and entered into a collective-
bargaining agreement embodying that recognition. I have previously found that at this time the
Plasterers’ Union was the exclusive collective-bargaining representative of Respondent
Raymond’s plastering employees pursuant to Section 9(a) of the Act. This agreement contains
a union security clause requiring employees to become members of Respondent Carpenters
Union within 8 days as a condition of further employment with Respondent Raymond.
An employer violates section 8(a) (1) (2) and (3) of the Act when it recognizes and
enters into a collective-bargaining agreement with a union which contains a union-security
clause at a time when the union does not represent an uncoerced majority of its employees.
Similarly a union violates Section 8(b)(1)(A) and (2) of the Act by receiving and accepting such
assistance from an employer by accepting recognition and entering into a collective-bargaining
agreement with an employer containing a union-security clause at the time when it does not
represent an uncoerced majority of the employer’s employees. Clock Electric, Inc., 338 NLRB
806 829-30 (2003).
Having found that Respondent Raymond recognized Respondent Carpenters Union as
the bargaining representative of its plastering employees and entered into a collective-
bargaining agreement embodying that recognition and containing a union security clause when
the Plasterers’ Union was the exclusive collective-bargaining representative of Raymond’s
plastering employees pursuant to section 9(a) of the Act, I find that Respondent Raymond
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violated section 8(a) (1) (2) and (3) of the Act and that Respondent Carpenters Union violated
section 8(b)(1)(A) and (2) of the Act.
In addition on August 6, 2008, a meeting was jointly conducted at Respondent
Raymond’s facility. Present were Carpenters Union representatives and Respondent Raymond
supervisors including Winsor. At this meeting Winsor advised the employees that Raymond
was not with the Plasterers’ Union any longer and that they had switched to the Carpenters
Union. Winsor said if the employees wanted to continue with Raymond, they had to join the
Carpenters Union within 8 days. A memo was circulated among the employees that stated
Raymond’s plastering employees were required to join the Carpenters Union under the union
security provision of its contract with Raymond within 8 working days. Raymond’s supervisor
Herrera said that employees would get raises with the Carpenters Union. Later the Carpenters
Union conducted a raffle for tools of the trade as well as for monetary awards.
Employer conduct that benefits a preferred labor organization over an incumbent
violates Section 8(a)(2) of the Act. Thus an employer who provided unlawful assistance to a
union by making meeting space available on company time and required employees to attend
organizational union meetings violated Section 8(a)(2) of the Act. Duane Reade, Inc., 338 NLRB
943, 944 (2003). Also a supervisor’s assistance to a competing union in organizing efforts is
unlawful. Dobbs International Services, Inc., 335 NLRB 972, 987 (2001).
Concurrently a union that accepts an employer’s unlawful assistance, including threats
of termination for failing to sign authorization cards and promises of improved benefits, violates
section 8(b)(1)(A) of the Act. Dairyland USA Corp., 347 NLRB No. 30 (2006). A union that
made payments of $2241 in amounts ranging from $4.80 to $114 to 48 of 64 employees in a
bargaining unit in pre-election period violated section 8(b)(1)(A) of the Act. Flatbush Care
Center, 287 NLRB 457 457-8 (1987).
At the August 6, 2008 meeting both Respondents Raymond and Carpenters conduct
violated the Act since Respondents had entered into a contract that violated section 8(a)(1)(2)
and (3) and 8(b)(1)(A) and (2) of the Act. Respondent Raymond by threatening to enforce the
union security provision of the Carpenters contract, by providing meeting space for the
Carpenters, by holding a mandatory meeting on company time, and by telling plastering
employees that the Carpenters would increase their pay 21 gave assistance to the Carpenters
Union in violation of Section 8(a)(1) and (2) of the Act. In accepting this assistance and in giving
employees cash and tools, the Carpenters Union concurrently violated Section 8(b)(1)(A) of the
Act.
Conclusions of Law
On the basis of the above findings of fact and the record as a whole and Section 10(c) of
the Act, I make the following conclusions of law.
1. Respondent Raymond Interior Systems has been at all times material an employer
engaged in commerce within the meaning of Section 2(2), (6) and (7) of the Act.

21 While the Complaint did not allege the use of company facilities, holding a mandatory
meeting on company time and promising increased benefits as unlawful assistance, the matters
are closely related to extant charges and the matters were fully litigated at the hearing. Redd-I,
Inc., 290 NLRB 1115, 1115-1116 (1988); Hi-Tech Cable Corp., 318 NLRB 280 (1995).
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2. Respondent Southwest Regional Council of Carpenters has been at all times
material, a labor organization within the meaning of Section 2(5) of the Act.
3. The Charging Party Operative Plasterers’ and Cement Masons’ International
Association, Local Union 200, AFL-CIO is, and has been at all times material, a labor
organization within the meaning of Section 2(5) of the Act.
4. Respondent Raymond Interior Systems violated Sections 8(a)(1) (2) (3) and (5) of
the Act by recognizing and entering into a contract with Respondent Carpenters Union as the
exclusive collective-bargaining representative of Respondent Raymond’s plastering employees
at a time when the Plasterers Union was the exclusive collective-bargaining representative of
those employees pursuant to Section 9(a) of the Act thereby encouraging its employees to join
Respondent Carpenters Union. Respondent Raymond further violated Sections 8(a)(1) and (2)
of the Act by rendering assistance to the Carpenters Union by threatening employees with job
loss if they did not join the Carpenters Union within 8 days, by holding a mandatory meeting on
company time and premises and by promising increased wages.
5. Respondent Southwest Regional Council of Carpenters violated Sections 8(b)(1)(A)
and (2) of the Act: by obtaining recognition from and entering into a contract with Respondent
Raymond as collective-bargaining representative of Raymond’s plastering employees when the
Plasterers Union and not the Carpenters Union was the 9(a) representative of those employees
thus causing Raymond to encourage its plastering employees to join the Carpenters Union, by
receiving assistance and support from Respondent Raymond by entering into a collective-
bargaining agreement as collective-bargaining representative of Raymond’s plastering
employees and, by giving away tools and money to Raymond’s plastering employees to induce
them to become members of the Carpenters Union.
The Remedy
Having found that the Respondents violated the Act as set forth above, I shall order that
it cease and desist and post remedial Board notices addressing the violations found.
Based upon the above findings of fact and conclusions of law, and on the basis of the
entire record herein, I issue the following recommended Order.22
ORDER
Respondent Raymond Interior Systems, Orange, California, its officers, agents,
successors and assigns shall:
1. Cease and desist from:
a. Withdrawing recognition from and refusing to bargain with the Plasterers’ Union as
the exclusive bargaining representative of its plastering employees.

22 If no exceptions are filed as provided by Section 102.46 of the Board’s Rules and
Regulations, the findings, conclusions, and recommended Order shall, as provided in Section
102.48 of the Rules, be adopted by the Board and all objections shall be waived for all
purposes.
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b. Granting recognition to and entering into a collective-bargaining agreement with
the Carpenters’ Union as the bargaining representative of its plastering employees when the
Plasterers’ Union is the exclusive bargaining representative.
c. Stopping contributions to the Trust Funds as provided in the 2005-2008 collective-
bargaining agreement between the WWCCA Plastering Conference and the Plasterers’ Union.
d. Giving assistance to the Carpenters’ Union: by threatening its plastering
employees with loss of work for failure to join the Carpenters’ Union, by holding mandatory
meetings on company time and premises and, by promising increased wages and by entering
into a collective-bargaining agreement with the Carpenters’ Union at a time when the Plasterers
Union is the Section 9(a) representative of its plastering employees.
e. Maintaining or giving force and effect to the collective-bargaining agreement with
the Carpenters’ Union covering its plastering employees.
f. In any like or related manner interfering with, restraining, or coercing employees in
the exercise of the rights guaranteed them by Section 7 of the Act.
2. Take the following affirmative action designed to effectuate the policies of the Act:
a. Recognize and, upon request, bargain with the Plasterers’ Union as the Section
9(a) representative of its plastering employees and embody any agreement reached regarding
employee terms and conditions of employment in writing.
b. Withdraw recognition from the Carpenters’ Union as the collective-bargaining
representative of its plastering employees.
c. Notify the Plasterers’ Union in writing of all changes made to its plastering
employees’ terms and conditions of employment since August 6, 2008 and on request of the
Plasterers’ Union rescind any changes and restore terms and conditions of employment
retroactively to August 6, 2008.
d. Make whole its plastering employees for all wages and benefits, with interest, that
would have been paid since August 6, 2008.
e. Make whole all its plastering employees who joined the Carpenters’ Union on or
after August 6, 2008 for all dues and fees plus interest.
f. Resume contributions to the Trust Funds pursuant to the 2005-2008 collective-
bargaining agreement between the WWCCA Plastering Conference and the Plasterers’ Union
since August 6, 2008, and make employees whole for any losses incurred as a result of ceasing
contributions to the Trust Funds.
g. Preserve and, within 14 days of a request, or such additional time as the Regional
Director may allow for good cause shown, provide at a reasonable place designated by the
Board or its agents, all payroll records, social security payment records, timecards, personnel
records and papers, and all other records, including an electronic copy of such records if stored
in electronic form necessary to analyze the amount of backpay and benefits due under the
terms of this Order.
JD(SF)–08–10
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h. Within 14 days after service by the Region, post at its Orange, California facility
and at its job sites where its plastering employees are employed, copies of the attached notice
marked “Appendix A”23 in both the English and Spanish languages. Copies of the notice, on
forms provided by the Regional Director for Region 21, after being signed by the Respondent’s
authorized representative, shall be posted by the Respondent immediately upon receipt and
maintained for 60 consecutive days in conspicuous places including all places where notices to
employees are customarily posted. Reasonable steps shall be taken by the Respondent to
ensure that the notices are not altered, defaced, or covered by any other material. In the event
Respondent has gone out of business or closed any of the facilities involved in these
proceedings, the Respondent shall duplicate and mail, at its own expense, a copy of the notice
to all current plastering employees and former plastering employees employed by the
Respondent at any time since August 6, 2008.
i. Within 21 days after service by the Region, file with the Regional Director a sworn
certification of a responsible official on a form provided by the Region attesting to the steps that
the Respondent has taken to comply.
ORDER
Respondent Southwest Regional Council of Carpenters its officers, agents, and
representatives shall:
1. Cease and desist from:
a. Receiving assistance and accepting recognition from Respondent Raymond at a
time when the Plasterers’ Union is the Section 9(a) representative of Respondent Raymond’s
plastering employees.
b. Maintaining or giving force and effect to any collective-bargaining agreement with
Respondent Raymond covering its plastering employees, or acting as their collective-bargaining
representative unless it has been certified by the Board or while the Plasterers’ Union is the
Section 9(a) representative of those employees.
c. Making monetary payments or giving away work tools to induce employees to join
the Carpenters’ Union when they are not the collective-bargaining representative of the
employees.
d. In any like or related manner interfering with, restraining, or coercing employees in
the exercise of the rights guaranteed them by Section 7 of the Act.
2. Take the following affirmative action designed to effectuate the policies of the Act:
a. Make whole all Respondent Raymond’s plastering employees who joined the
Carpenters’ Union on or after August 6, 2008, for all dues and fees, plus interest.

23 If this Order is enforced by a Judgment of the United States Court of Appeals, the words
in the notice reading “POSTED BY ORDER OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD”
shall read “POSTED PURSUANT TO A JUDGMENT OF THE UNITED STATES COURT OF
APPEALS ENFORCING AN ORDER OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD.”
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b. Within 14 days after service by the Region, post at its Los Angeles, California
union office copies of the attached notice marked “Appendix B”24 in both the English and
Spanish languages. Copies of the notice, on forms provided by the Regional Director for
Region 21, after being signed by the Respondent’s authorized representative, shall be posted
by the Respondent immediately upon receipt and maintained for 60 consecutive days in
conspicuous places including all places where notices to employees are customarily posted.
Reasonable steps shall be taken by the Respondent to ensure that the notices are not altered,
defaced, or covered by any other material. In the event Respondent has gone out of business or
closed any of the facilities involved in these proceedings, the Respondent shall duplicate and
mail, at its own expense, a copy of the notice to all current plastering employees and former
plastering employees employed by the Respondent at any time since September August 6,
2008.
c. Within 21 days after service by the Region, file with the Regional Director a sworn
certification of a responsible official on a form provided by the Region attesting to the steps that
the Respondent Carpenter’s Union has taken to comply.
Dated, Washington, D.C. March 5, 2010
____________________
John J. McCarrick
Administrative Law Judge

24 If this Order is enforced by a Judgment of the United States Court of Appeals, the words
in the notice reading “POSTED BY ORDER OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD”
shall read “POSTED PURSUANT TO A JUDGMENT OF THE UNITED STATES COURT OF
APPEALS ENFORCING AN ORDER OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD.”
JD(SF)–08–10
Orange, CA
APPENDIX A
NOTICE TO EMPLOYEES
Posted by Order of the
National Labor Relations Board
An Agency of the United States Government
The National Labor Relations Board has found that we violated Federal labor law and has
ordered us to post and obey this Notice.
FEDERAL LAW GIVES YOU THE RIGHT TO
Form, join, or assist a union
Choose representatives to bargain with us on your behalf
Act together with other employees for your benefit and protection
Choose not to engage in any of these protected activities
After a trial at which we appeared, argued and presented evidence, the National Labor
Relations Board has found that we violated the National Labor Relations Act and has directed
us to post this notice to employees in both English and Spanish and to abide by its terms.
Accordingly, we give our employees the following assurances:
WE WILL NOT do anything that interferes with these rights.
WE WILL NOT withdraw recognition from and refuse to bargain with the Operative Plasterers’
and Cement Masons’ International Association, Local Union 200 AFL-CIO as the exclusive
collective-bargaining representative of our plastering employees.
WE WILL NOT grant recognition to or enter into a collective-bargaining agreement with the
Southwest Regional Council of Carpenters’ as the bargaining representative of our plastering
employees when the Plasterers’ Union is the exclusive bargaining representative.
WE WILL NOT assist the Carpenters’ Union by threatening our plastering employees with loss
of work for failure to join the Carpenters’ Union, by holding mandatory meetings on company
time and premises and by promising increased wages.
WE WILL NOT maintain or give force and effect to the collective-bargaining agreement with the
Carpenters’ Union covering our plastering employees while the Plasterers’ Union is their Section
9(a) representative.
WE WILL NOT in any like or related manner interfere with, coerce or restrain you in your
exercise of your rights under Section 7 of the Act.
WE WILL recognize and, upon request, bargain with the Plasterers’ Union as the Section 9(a)
representative of our plastering employees and embody any agreement reached regarding
employee terms and conditions of employment in writing.
WE WILL withdraw recognition from the Carpenters’ Union as the collective-bargaining
representative of our plastering employees while the Plasterers’ Union is their Section 9(a)
representative.
JD(SF)–08–10
Orange, CA
WE WILL notify the Plasterers’ Union in writing of all changes made to our plastering
employees’ terms and conditions of employment since August 6, 2008 and on request of the
Plasterers’ Union rescind any changes and restore terms and conditions of employment
retroactively to August 6, 2008.
WE WILL make whole all our plastering employees who joined the Carpenters’ Union on or
after August 6, 2008 for all dues and fees plus interest.
WE WILL make whole our plastering employees for all wages and benefits, with interest, that
would have been paid since August 6, 2008.
WE WILL resume contributions to the Trust Funds pursuant to the 2005-2008 collective-
bargaining agreement between the WWCCA Plastering Conference and the Plasterers’ Union
since August 6, 2008, and make employees whole for any losses incurred as a result of ceasing
contributions to the Trust Funds.
RAYMOND INTERIOR SYSTEMS
(Employer)
Dated By
(Representative) (Title)
The National Labor Relations Board is an independent Federal agency created in 1935 to
enforce the National Labor Relations Act. It conducts secret-ballot elections to determine
whether employees want union representation and it investigates and remedies unfair labor
practices by employers and unions. To find out more about your rights under the Act and how
to file a charge or election petition, you may speak confidentially to any agent with the Board’s
Los Angeles, California Regional office set forth below. You may also obtain information from
the Board’s website: www.nlrb.gov.
888 South Figueroa Street, 9th Floor, Los Angeles, California 90017-5449
(213) 894-5200, Hours: 8:30 a.m. to 5:00 p.m.
THIS IS AN OFFICIAL NOTICE AND MUST NOT BE DEFACED BY ANYONE
THIS NOTICE MUST REMAIN POSTED FOR 60 CONSECUTIVE DAYS FROM THE DATE OF
POSTING AND MUST NOT BE ALTERED, DEFACED, OR COVERED BY ANY OTHER
MATERIAL. ANY QUESTIONS CONCERNING THIS NOTICE OR COMPLIANCE WITH ITS
PROVISIONS MAY BE DIRECTED TO THE ABOVE REGIONAL OFFICE’S COMPLIANCE
OFFICER, (213) 894-5229.
THIS NOTICE AND THE DECISION IN THIS MATTER ARE PUBLIC RECORDS
Any interested individual who wishes to request a copy of this Notice or a complete copy of the
Decision of which this Notice is a part may do so by contacting the Board’s Offices at the
address and telephone number appearing immediately above. The final decision and this notice
are available in either English or Spanish.
JD(SF)–08–10
Orange, CA
APPENDIX B
NOTICE TO MEMBERS
Posted by Order of the
National Labor Relations Board
An Agency of the United States Government
The National Labor Relations Board has found that we violated Federal labor law and has
ordered us to post and obey this Notice.
FEDERAL LAW GIVES YOU THE RIGHT TO
Form, join, or assist a union
Choose representatives to bargain on your behalf with your employer
Act together with other employees for your benefit and protection
Choose not to engage in any of these protected activities
After a trial at which we appeared, argued and presented evidence, the National Labor
Relations Board has found that we violated the National Labor Relations Act and has directed
us to post this notice to employees in both English and Spanish and to abide by its terms.
Accordingly, we give our members the following assurances:
WE WILL NOT do anything that interferes with these rights.
WE WILL NOT receive assistance and accept recognition from Respondent Raymond Interior
Systems when the Plasterers’ Union is the Section 9(a) representative of its plastering
employees.
WE WILL NOT maintain or give force and effect to any collective-bargaining agreement with
Respondent Raymond covering its plastering employees, or act as their collective-bargaining
representative while the Plasterers’ Union is the Section 9(a) representative of those
employees.
WE WILL NOT make monetary payments or give away work tools to induce employees to join
the Carpenters’ Union when we are not the collective-bargaining representative of the
employees.
WE WILL NOT in any like or related manner interfere with, coerce or restrain you in your
exercise of your rights under Section 7 of the Act.
JD(SF)–08–10
Orange, CA
WE WILL make whole all Respondent Raymond’s plastering employees who joined the
Carpenters’ Union on or after August 6, 2008 for all dues and fees plus interest.
SOUTHEST REGIONAL COUNCIL OF
CARPENTERS
(Employer)
Dated By
(Representative) (Title)
The National Labor Relations Board is an independent Federal agency created in 1935 to
enforce the National Labor Relations Act. It conducts secret-ballot elections to determine
whether employees want union representation and it investigates and remedies unfair labor
practices by employers and unions. To find out more about your rights under the Act and how
to file a charge or election petition, you may speak confidentially to any agent with the Board’s
Los Angeles, California Regional office set forth below. You may also obtain information from
the Board’s website: www.nlrb.gov.
888 South Figueroa Street, 9th Floor, Los Angeles, California 90017-5449
(213) 894-5200, Hours: 8:30 a.m. to 5:00 p.m.
THIS IS AN OFFICIAL NOTICE AND MUST NOT BE DEFACED BY ANYONE
THIS NOTICE MUST REMAIN POSTED FOR 60 CONSECUTIVE DAYS FROM THE DATE OF
POSTING AND MUST NOT BE ALTERED, DEFACED, OR COVERED BY ANY OTHER
MATERIAL. ANY QUESTIONS CONCERNING THIS NOTICE OR COMPLIANCE WITH ITS
PROVISIONS MAY BE DIRECTED TO THE ABOVE REGIONAL OFFICE’S COMPLIANCE
OFFICER, (213) 894-5229.
THIS NOTICE AND THE DECISION IN THIS MATTER ARE PUBLIC RECORDS
Any interested individual who wishes to request a copy of this Notice or a complete copy of the
Decision of which this Notice is a part may do so by contacting the Board’s Offices at the
address and telephone number appearing immediately above. The final decision and this notice
are available in either English or Spanish.