01985942
04-05-2000
Randall V. Hawkins, Complainant, v. William J. Henderson, Postmaster General, United States Postal Service, Agency.
Randall V. Hawkins v. United States Postal Service
01985942
April 5, 2000
Randall V. Hawkins, )
Complainant, )
)
v. ) Appeal No. 01985942
) Agency No. 4H-350-1189-96
William J. Henderson, )
Postmaster General, )
United States Postal Service, )
Agency. )
)
DECISION
On July 29, 1998, Randall V. Hawkins (hereinafter referred to as
complainant) filed a timely appeal from the July 1, 1998, final
decision of the United States Postal Service (hereinafter referred
to as the agency) concerning his complaint of unlawful employment
discrimination in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964,
as amended, 42 U.S.C. � 2000e et seq. The appeal is timely filed (see 64
Fed. Reg. 37,644, 37,659 (1999) (to be codified and hereinafter referred
to as 29 C.F.R. � 1614.402(a)))<1> and is accepted in accordance with
64 Fed. Reg. 37,644, 37,659 (to be codified as 29 C.F.R. � 1614.405).
For the reasons that follow, the agency's decision is AFFIRMED.
The issue presented in this appeal is whether the complainant has proven,
by a preponderance of the evidence, that the agency discriminated
against him on the basis of race (black) with regard to certain events
in March-April 1996.
Complainant filed his formal complaint on September 19, 1996. Following
an investigation, he was given notice of his right to a hearing before
an EEOC Administrative Judge or an immediate final agency decision
(FAD). He did not respond, and the agency issued a FAD, finding no
discrimination.
Complainant began his service with the agency in April 1989 and worked as
a letter carrier in Florence, Alabama. Complainant stated that he had
been injured in an automobile accident and required follow-up medical
attention. He complained that in March and April 1996, agency managers
(a) did not allow him leave to visit his doctor, charged him AWOL (absence
without leave), and did not excuse his overtime assignments in order to
keep his doctors' appointments; (b) did not permit him to meet with a shop
steward; and (c) violated his right to privacy by calling his doctor.<2>
In response, agency managers explained that complainant did not make
his requests in writing for leave or did not provide sufficient advance
notification to arrange his leave. Nevertheless, the agency stated
that it attempted to afford complainant leave except where his absence
conflicted with the needs of the service. Also, agency managers stated
that complainant was "charged an overtime opportunity" in accordance
with an arbitration decision<3> and that he was charged AWOL when he did
not return from a doctor's appointment and stayed away without leave.
His supervisors further explained that they called his doctor when he did
not return from the appointment out of concern for complainant and did
not inquire into private medical issues. Agency managers also stated
that complainant did not make a request in writing to meet with a shop
steward, although the record indicates that he met with a steward who
explained why he was charged the overtime opportunity.
In his statement in support of his appeal, complainant criticizes the
FAD and charges that the investigation was incomplete because information
had been removed. He does not describe what information was removed or
how it impacted his complaint.
In general, claims, such as the complainant's, alleging disparate
treatment are examined under the tripartite analysis first enunciated in
McDonnell Douglas Corporation v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973). Initially,
for complainant to prevail, s/he must first establish a prima facie
case of discrimination by presenting facts that, if unexplained,
reasonably give rise to an inference of discrimination, i.e., that a
prohibited consideration was a factor in the adverse employment action.
McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 802; Furnco Construction Corp. v. Waters,
438 U.S. 567 (1978). Following this established order of analysis is
not always necessary where the agency articulates an explanation for
its actions. In such cases, the factual inquiry can proceed directly to
the third step of the McDonnell Douglas analysis--the ultimate question of
whether complainant has shown by a preponderance of the evidence that the
agency's action was motivated by discrimination. United States Postal
Service Board of Governors v. Aikens, 460 U.S. 711, 713-14 (1983).
It is complainant's burden to demonstrate by a preponderance of the
evidence that the agency's action was based on prohibited considerations
of discrimination, that is, its articulated reason for its action
was not its true reason but a sham or pretext for discrimination.
Texas Department of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 253
(1981); St. Mary's Honor Center v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502 (1993).
We find that the agency articulated legitimate, nondiscriminatory reasons
for its actions, i.e., the agency acted properly and in accordance with
the collective bargaining agreement with regard to complainant's leave
for medical appointments, a charge of AWOL, and a charge of an overtime
opportunity. Agency managers explained why they called complainant's
doctor and denied that it was improper, stating that they did not inquire
into his medical affairs. Finally, the managers denied that complainant
was denied an opportunity to meet with a shop steward.
The burden now returns to complainant to demonstrate that the agency's
articulated reasons for its actions were the result of discrimination.
Complainant has not shown that he was treated differently than other
employees or that he was singled out for disparate treatment. He refers
to other employees treated similarly, which does not establish disparate
treatment. Further, he has not shown that the agency acted on the
basis of a prohibited factor, such as race. Based on our review of
the record, we find therefore that complainant has not shown that the
agency's reasons for its actions were pretextual.
CONCLUSION
Accordingly, the agency's decision was proper and is AFFIRMED.
STATEMENT OF RIGHTS - ON APPEAL
RECONSIDERATION (M0300)
The Commission may, in its discretion, reconsider the decision in this
case if the complainant or the agency submits a written request containing
arguments or evidence which tend to establish that:
1. The appellate decision involved a clearly erroneous interpretation
of material fact or law; or
2. The appellate decision will have a substantial impact on the policies,
practices, or operations of the agency.
Requests to reconsider, with supporting statement or brief, MUST BE FILED
WITH THE OFFICE OF FEDERAL OPERATIONS (OFO) WITHIN THIRTY (30) CALENDAR
DAYS of receipt of this decision or WITHIN TWENTY (20) CALENDAR DAYS OF
RECEIPT OF ANOTHER PARTY'S TIMELY REQUEST FOR RECONSIDERATION. See 64
Fed. Reg. 37,644, 37,659 (1999) (to be codified and hereinafter referred
to as 29 C.F.R. � 1614.405); Equal Employment Opportunity Management
Directive for 29 C.F.R. Part 1614 (EEO MD-110), 9-18 (November 9, 1999).
All requests and arguments must be submitted to the Director, Office of
Federal Operations, Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, P.O. Box
19848, Washington, D.C. 20036. In the absence of a legible postmark, the
request to reconsider shall be deemed timely filed if it is received by
mail within five days of the expiration of the applicable filing period.
See 64 Fed. Reg. 37,644, 37,661 (1999) (to be codified and hereinafter
referred to as 29 C.F.R. � 1614.604). The request or opposition must
also include proof of service on the other party.
Failure to file within the time period will result in dismissal of your
request for reconsideration as untimely, unless extenuating circumstances
prevented the timely filing of the request. Any supporting documentation
must be submitted with your request for reconsideration. The Commission
will consider requests for reconsideration filed after the deadline only
in very limited circumstances. See 29 C.F.R. � 1614.604(c).
COMPLAINANT'S RIGHT TO FILE A CIVIL ACTION (S1199)
You have the right to file a civil action in an appropriate United States
District Court WITHIN NINETY (90) CALENDAR DAYS from the date that you
receive this decision. If you file a civil action, YOU MUST NAME AS
THE DEFENDANT IN THE COMPLAINT THE PERSON WHO IS THE OFFICIAL AGENCY HEAD
OR DEPARTMENT HEAD, IDENTIFYING THAT PERSON BY HIS OR HER FULL NAME AND
OFFICIAL TITLE. Failure to do so may result in the dismissal of your
case in court. "Agency" or "department" means the national organization,
and not the local office, facility or department in which you work. If you
file a request to reconsider and also file a civil action, filing a civil
action will terminate the administrative processing of your complaint.
RIGHT TO REQUEST COUNSEL (Z1199)
If you decide to file a civil action, and if you do not have or cannot
afford the services of an attorney, you may request that the Court appoint
an attorney to represent you and that the Court permit you to file the
action without payment of fees, costs, or other security. See Title VII
of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended, 42 U.S.C. � 2000e et seq.;
the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, as amended, 29 U.S.C. �� 791, 794(c).
The grant or denial of the request is within the sole discretion of
the Court. Filing a request for an attorney does not extend your time
in which to file a civil action. Both the request and the civil action
must be filed within the time limits as stated in the paragraph above
("Right to File A Civil Action").
FOR THE COMMISSION:
April 5, 2000
Date Carlton Hadden, Acting Director
Office of Federal Operations
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
For timeliness purposes, the Commission will presume that this decision
was received within five (5) calendar days of mailing. I certify that
the decision was mailed to complainant, complainant's representative
(if applicable), and the agency on:
______________ _______________________
Date
1On November 9, 1999, revised regulations governing the EEOC's federal
sector complaint process went into effect. These regulations apply to all
federal sector EEO complaints pending at any stage in the administrative
process. Consequently, the Commission will apply the revised regulations
found at 64 Fed. Reg. 37,644 (1999), where applicable, in deciding the
present appeal. The regulations, as amended, may also be found at the
Commission's website at www.eeoc.gov.
2To the extent that complainant's complaint alleges a violation of and
seeks remedy under the Privacy Act, the Commission has previously held
that enforcement of the Privacy Act is not within its jurisdiction.
Dawson v. USPS, EEOC Appeal No. 01822261 (February 8, 1983).
3Apparently, an arbitration decision concerning opportunities for overtime
created a system whereby overtime work is assigned in rotation, and an
employee who is unavailable loses his turn for that cycle.