Ram Construction Co.

National Labor Relations Board - Board Decisions

Mar 16, 1977

228 N.L.R.B. 769 (N.L.R.B. 1977)

RAM CONSTRUCTION CO.
John M. Lastooka, trading as Ram Construction
Company and Germano Papi . Case 6-CA-8914
March 16, 1977
DECISION AND ORDER
BY MEMBERS FANNING, PENELLO, AND
WALTHER
On September 16, 1976, Administrative Law Judge
Joel A. Harmatz issued the attached Decision in this
proceeding. Thereafter, Respondent filed exceptions
and a supporting brief,' and the General Counsel
filed a motion to strike portions of Respondent's
exceptions to the Administrative Law Judge's Deci-
Sion.2
Pursuant to the provisions of Section 3(b) of the
National Labor Relations Act, as amended, the
National Labor Relations Board has delegated its
authority in this proceeding to a three-member panel.
The Board has considered the record and the
attached Decision in light of the exceptions and brief
and has decided to affirm the rulings,3 findings, and
conclusions4 of the Administrative Law Judge and to
adopt his recommended Order.
ORDER
Pursuant to Section 10(c) of the National Labor
Relations Act, as amended, the National Labor
Relations Board adopts as its Order the recommend-
ed Order of the Administrative Law Judge and
hereby orders that the Respondent, John M. Lastoo-
ka, trading as Ram Construction Company, Canons-
burg, Pennsylvania, its agents, successors, and
assigns, shall take the action set forth in the said
recommended Order except that the attached notice
is substituted for that of the Administrative Law
Judge.
i The Respondent has requested oral argument . This request is hereby
denied because the record, the exceptions , and the briefs adequately present
the issues and positions of the parties
2 In light of our disposition of this case , the General Counsel 's motion is
denied
3 The Respondent has excepted to certain credibility findings made by
the Administrative Law Judge . It is the Board's established policy not to
overrule an Administrative Law Judge 's resolutions with respect to
credibility unless the clear preponderance of all of the relevant evidence
convinces us that the resolutions are incorrect . Standard Dry Wall Products,
Inc., 91 NLRB 544 (1950), enfd. 188 F.2d 362 (C.A 3, 1951). We have
carefully examined the record and find no basis for reversing his findings.
We also find totally without meet the Respondent's allegations of bias
and prejudice on the part of the Administrative Law Judge . Upon our full
consideration of the record and the Administrative Law Judge 's Decision,
we perceive no evidence that the Administrative Law Judge prejudged the
case, made prejudicial rulings, or demonstrated a bias against the
Respondent in his analysis or discussion of the evidence.
4 Member Fanning would not, in any event, find that the issues
presented in the instant proceeding were appropriate for deferral to
arbitration for the reasons stated in his dissent in Collyer Insulated Wire, A
Gulf and Western Systems Co., 192 NLRB 837 (1971).
228 NLRB No. 94
APPENDIX
769
NOTICE To EMPLOYEES
POSTED BY ORDER OF THE
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
An Agency of the United States Government
After a hearing at which both sides had the
opportunity to present their evidence, the National
Labor Relations Board has found that we violated
the law and has ordered us to post this notice and we
intend to abide by the following:
The National Labor Relations Act gives you, as
employees, certain rights, including the right:
To engage in self-organization
To form, join, or help a union
To bargain collectively through a repre-
sentative of your own choosing
To act together for collective bargaining
or other mutual aid or protection
To refrain from any or all of these things.
WE WILL NOT bargain individually with our
employees outside the presence of their exclusive
representative with respect to any term or
condition of employment.
WE WILL NOT threaten our employees with
discharge if they refuse to sign any individual
contract at variance with the terms of an
applicable collective-bargaining agreement, nor
will we tell them to sign any such agreement or
quit.
WE WILL NOT discourage membership in
International Brotherhood of Teamsters, Chauff-
eurs, Warehousemen and Helpers of America,
Building Material and Construction Drivers
Local 341, or any other labor organization, by
transferring employees to less desirable positions,
by refusing to recall employees from layoff, by
discharging employees or in any other manner
discriminating against employees because they
claim benefits under a collective-bargaining
agreement or because they decline to sign
individual employment contracts inconsistent
with an agreement negotiated by that Union.
WE WILL NOT discourage access to the National
Labor Relations Board by discharging or other-
wise discriminating against an employee because
he has filed charges under the National Labor
Relations Act.
WE WILL NOT in any other manner interfere
with, restrain, or coerce employees in the exercise
of their rights protected by Section 7 of the Act.
WE WILL offer Germano Papi and Dennis
Weber immediate reinstatement to their former
770 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
positions or, if no longer available , to substantial-
ly equivalent positions , without loss of seniority
or other rights and privileges, and WE WILL pay
them for earnings lost as a result of our discrimi-
nation against them with interest at the rate of 6
percent per annum.
The complaint alleges, the answer as clarified at the
hearing admits , and I find that Respondent at all times
material herein has been an employer engaged in com-
merce within the meaning of Section 2(6) and (7) of the
Act.
II. THE LABOR ORGANIZATION INVOLVED
JOHN M. LASTOOKA,
TRADING AS RAM
CONSTRUCTION COMPANY
DECISION
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
JOEL A. HARMATZ, Administrative Law Judge: This
proceeding was heard in Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania, on June
28, 1976, upon an original charge filed on January 12, 1976,
and a complaint issued on March 31, 1976, which, as
amended, alleges that Respondent independently violated
Section 8(a)(1) of the National Labor Relations Act, as
amended, by bargaining directly with employees outside
the presence of their exclusive representative , by coercive
interrogation , by requesting that employees quit their
employment if they persist in union activities, and by
threatening employees with discharge for engaging in
union activity and for refusal to execute individual
employment contracts , and further that Respondent
violated Section 8(aX3) and (1) of the Act by refusing to
recall from layoff status and thereafter discharging Germa-
no Papi, and by transferring to a less desirable job and then
discharging Dennis Weber, all because of their concerted
activity and to discourage membership in the Union.
Finally, the complaint alleges that the aforesaid discharges
were violative of Section 8(aX4) of the Act, since also
motivated by the filing of unfair labor practice charges. In
its duly filed answer, Respondent denied that any unfair
labor practices were committed , and further affirmatively
asserts that the complaint presents a private controversy
based upon claims in violation of the provisions of a valid
existing collective-bargaining agreement, and hence the
dispute is one which the Board ought not adjudicate. After
the close of the hearing , briefs were filed on behalf of the
General Counsel and the Respondent.
Upon the entire record in this proceeding , including my
observation of the witnesses while testifying and consider-
ation of the posthearing briefs, I make the following:
FINDINGS OF FACT
I. JURISDICTION
Respondent, an individual proprietorship, with a place of
business in Canonsburg, Pennsylvania , is engaged as an
excavation contractor in the construction industry. During
the 12-month period preceding issuance of the complaint, a
representative period, Respondent performed services
valued in excess of $50,000 outside the Commonwealth of
Pennsylvania . During this same period, Respondent has
also performed services valued in excess of $50,000 within
the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania for employers which
are themselves directly engaged in interstate commerce.
The complaint alleges, the answer admits, and I find
that, at all times material herein, International Brother-
hood of Teamsters, Chauffeurs, Warehousemen and
Helpers of America, Building Materials and Construction
Drivers Local 341, herein called the Union, is and has been
a labor organization within the meaning of Section 2(5) of
the Act.
III. THE ALLEGED UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES
A. The Issues
The complaint in this case alleges various acts of
coercion , restraint, and discrimination by Respondent,
growing out of a dispute concerning its policy whereby
drivers would be paid for travel time according to a preset
formula, rather than the time actually consumed in driving
certain trucks from worksites to Respondent's base facility,
or bam, in Canonsburg, Pennsylvania . The complaint
almost in its entirety relates to efforts on Respondent's part
to foster commitment by its drivers to such policy and to a
written agreement, which among other things incorporated
the travel time policy. The beneficiaries of the complaint,
drivers Dennis Weber and Germano Papi, declined to go
along with this policy, and the complaint in effect asserts
that Respondent engaged in various independent violations
of Section 8(axl) to coerce their approval, and then
stepped up the pressures by various acts of discrimination,
including the refusal to recall Papi from layoff on
December 15 , 1975, changing the job assignment of Dennis
Weber on or about that same date, and by subsequently,
on January 20, 1976, terminating the employment of both.
These discharges are alleged to be violative of 8(a)(1), (3),
and 4 of the Act.
B. Background
John Lastooka, through Ram Construction Company,
engages in both the heavy construction industry and coal
hauling. Its principal base of operation is Canonsburg,
Pennsylvania. Lastooka is party to collective -bargaining
agreements with various unions representing employees in
the building trades. Since 1966, Respondent has recognized
Local 341 as collective-bargaining agent for its truckdri-
vers, and the current collective-bargaining agreement has
an expiration date of January 1, 1978. That agreement is
multiemployer in scope, covering employees of 50 to 75
employers operating in 33 counties in western Pennsylva-
nia. On behalf of employees , that agreement is negotiated
by the Joint Council of Teamsters No. 40, as agent for 14
local unions, including Locals 341 and 249.
Respondent in connection with its operations utilizes
four different types of trucks ; namely, tractor trailers,
triaxle dump trucks, tandem trucks , and miscellaneous off-
highway trucks . The dispute in this case centers upon a
RAM CONSTRUCTION CO. 771
controversy which developed for the first time in October
1975, among drivers assigned to the triaxle dump trucks. At
that time four drivers, namely, John Pierce, Billy Jones,
Dennis Weber, and Germano Papi, were assigned to those
vehicles. These were relatively new vehicles purchased by
Respondent in March 1975. Unlike other equipment which
performed work essentially on an onsite basis, the triaxles
were regularly maintained at Respondent's Canonsburg
facility, with drivers bringing them to and from that facility
on a daily basis.
The triaxle drivers, prior to October 1975, were not paid
on a portal-to-portal basis,' receiving time and a half for all
hours worked daily in excess of 8. Instead, they only
earned overtime pay for daily hours in excess of 8 which
were worked at the jobsite. The focal point of the
controversy relates to the manner in which Respondent
compensated the drivers for time consumed in traveling to
and from the jobsite. For this phase of the daily work
routine, the drivers were paid on a straight-time basis, with
no overtime premiums, at a rate based upon Respondent's
determination of how long the trip to each jobsite should
take.2
During 1975, Respondent was engaged in the construc-
tion of a bypass in Freedom, Pennsylvania. That site was
located some 30 miles distant from Respondent's Canons-
burg facility. The triaxle drivers were informed that they
would earn a maximum of 2 hours' straight-time pay for
travel to this job. Prior to October, the drivers of the triaxle
trucks simply claimed 2 hours as compensation for their
travel time . Commencing on October 23, 1975, all four
drivers assigned to triaxle trucks started reporting 3 to 3-
1/2 hours of travel time on their daily timeslips. The
increase in the time claimed was attributed to rerouting
due to the closing of a bridge , and instructions from
Respondent's dispatcher that a rush on the Freedom job
required that they reach their jobsite precisely at the start
of work and that they not leave for Canonsburg until the
conclusion.3
Lastooka, upon discovery of these claims in December,
met with the drivers on December 10, 1975. At that time he
questioned the drivers as to the reason for their additional
travel time claims . In the course of the meeting , the view
was expressed on behalf of Respondent that the drivers
were charging excessive time in connection with their travel
and that they would be required to repay Respondent
through future payroll deduction. Before the close of the
meeting the drivers apparently agreed to abide by the prior
practice and limit their travel claims to 2 hours' straight
time. Weber was referred to as having gone along with the
rest of the drivers, but Respondent's own witness indicated
The term "portal to portal" is used to refer to the time that dnvers left
the Canonsburg facility in the morning to the time they returned to that
facility in the evening.
2 The testimony of Lastooka that this policy and the determination of the
travel time ascribed to each job was established by mutual agreement with
the dnvers is discredited to the extent that it implies that the so-called
agreements involved anything more than acquiescence by the dnvers to
policy dictates of management.
9 Previously, the drivers would leave the Freedom job to return to
Canonsburg in the evening about 15 to 20 minutes early, and they thereby
gained the time necessary to complete the round trip within a 10-hour
overall workday.
4 See the testimony of Michael Shuler.
that he was not happy in doing so.4 Papi did not attend the
meeting because he was temporarily laid off due to a truck
breakdown.
Later, Germano Papi and Dennis Weber signified their
disagreement with the travel time policy and there is little
conflict in the evidence which shows that Respondent, in
reaction, engaged in various acts of coercion and discrimi-
nation against them.
Thus, on December 11, 1975, the day after the meeting
between Respondent's officials and drivers concerning the
travel time issue , Weber confronted Lastooka and Shuler,
indicating he had changed his mind and would not work
under the circumstances previously "agreed upon," asking
that he be fired . Lastooka refused to fire him, but indicated
that, if Weber was dissatisfied with working conditions
under which he had been working for a long period of time,
he could quit .5
Also, shortly after the December 10 meeting, Papi
appeared at the Canonsburg office to pick up his pay.
Shuler asked if he had heard about the meeting and, when
Papi responded in the negative , Shuler explained that
Lastooka charged the drivers with "padding" or "stealing"
time, and that he was going to take an hour and a half from
their wages to allow drivers to pay back the stolen time.
Papi indicated that he disagreed with Respondent's
position, indicating that he did not mind the straight-time
pay, but that he would not agree to do 11 hours' work for
9-1/2 hours' pay. Shuler then said, "well, Mr. Lastooka
says if you don't like it, there won't be no hard feelings, to
leave." 6
Thereafter, on Monday, December 15, Weber received a
telephone call from Shuler, who advised Weber that he was
being transferred from the triaxle truck to a tandem truck
at Respondent 's jobsite in Blue Run, Pennsylvania. Weber
asked Shuler if he would receive the triaxle rate on the
tandem truck, inasmuch as the normal rate for the latter
was lower. Shuler was unable to give a response. Weber
therefore refused to accept the reassignment.? Weber
reported to work on the tandem truck only after Shuler
advised him that he would receive the same rate of pay as
called for on the triaxle. Nonetheless, as a result of this
reassignment, Weber forfeited the opportunity to earn
travel pay as he had to drive his own car to the Blue Run
jobsite,8 and he was required to operate equipment which
was in a less desirable working order than the relatively
new triaxle truck . The only explanation for this transfer is
that explanation afforded by Lastooka himself, which is to
the following effect:
S The foregoing is based upon a composite of the testimony of Weber
and John Lastooka , and is in accord with suggested Finding of Fact 31 as it
appears in Respondent's brief.
6 Based upon Papi's uncontradicted testimony.
7 Art. IV, sec. 5, of the applicable bargaining agreement, in material part,
provides as follows:
Any workmen may be temporarily shifted by the contractor from one
classification of work to another ... provided ... [he is 1 ... paid the
highest rate of wages for the day of the classification of work
performed.
8 The tandem trucks were kept on the jobsites and hence no travel pay
could be earned by drivers of these vehicles.
772 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
he was transferred from working out of the shop office
area to a jobsite to eliminate the difference on the travel
pay. We thought if we would assign him to a jobsite,
there would be no difference of opinion on the travel
pay.
Parenthetically, it is noted that Weber's transfer was
accompanied by his replacement on the triaxle by another
driver, Richard A. Mondine, who formerly drove a tractor
trailer. Germano Papi at that time was in layoff, but was
not recalled when the position on the triaxle became
available. Papi had an initial hire date with the Respondent
of September 2, 1975. Mondine was initially employed by
Respondent in late 1974 but, in April 1975, quit Respon-
dent's employ, after giving 3 days' notice, in order to take
another job. Mondine returned to work for Respondent in
October 1975.
Papi and Weber on December 15 filed separate grievanc-
es protesting Respondent's failure to pay overtime in
accordance with the collective -bargaining agreement, as
well as Respondent 's action in working Mondine on a
triaxle while the more senior triaxle driver, Papi, remained
in layoff status . The Weber grievance also protested his
involuntary reassignment to a lower rated truck .9
On December 17, a grievance session was held at
Respondent's facility concerning the aforedescribed griev-
ances. Discussion at that time centered upon the travel
time issue and Papi's seniority claim. Respondent stood its
ground on the travel pay formula. Respondent also
defended Papi's claim for seniority, on the ground that
Mondine was in fact senior to Papi due to Mondine's prior
employment with Respondent . In this respect , Respon-
dent's position was predicated on its regarding Mondine's
seniority as having been continuous despite his earlier
quit.'° However, article XII, section 9, of the contract
provides in unqualified terms that seniority is "broken or
lost" by a "voluntary quit."
Uncontradicted testimony by Papi and Weber indicates
that in the course of that grievance session, when it became
apparent that a mutually acceptable solution would not be
reached, Papi and Weber advised Respondent 's representa-
tives that they would file charges with the Wage-Hour
Division of the United States Department of Labor. At
that point Lastooka referred to them as "a couple of
pricks," stating further that he would weed them out of his
"family" because they were "cancerous." 11
Also during the grievance session, Lastooka stated that
Weber's transfer to the Blue Run job was a "slap on the
wrist," describing this action as an assignment from a
"Cadillac" to a "junker." 12
9 Respondent, pointing to art. IV, sec . 5, of the bargaining agreement,
states that the transfer of Weber was consistent with this provision of the
agreement . See fn . 7, supra It is noted, in this connection , that nothing in
that provision authorizes involuntary transfers based upon considerations
proscribed by the National Labor Relations Act, and indeed the parties to
collective bargaining are not free , except in highly unusual circumstances, to
license an impairment of employee rights embodied in Sec. 7 of the Act.
10 In this connection, Mondine credibly testified that, as late as January
1976, he was not aware that Respondent treated his seniority unbroken by
his quit.
11 This testimony is based on the testimony of Papi and Weber as
partially corroborated by Chuck Heineman , Local 34l's vice president and
On the day after the grievance session, December 18,
1975, a document entitled "Memorandum of Understand-
ing" was prepared by Lastooka. That document was
defined as "an Addendum to the Contract . . . with the
Joint Council of Teamsters #4," and pertained to several
working conditions. The document was circulated by
Respondent's agents among drivers for signature, signify-
ing their approval to the practices set forth therein,
including the travel pay policy.13
On December 29, 1975, Papi filed a second grievance
again protesting a violation of his seniority rights through
Respondent's retention of Mondine, while his layoff
continued. Weber also filed a second grievance on
December 30, 1975.
During the first week of January 1976 a second grievance
meeting was held. Discussion at that time again concerned
Respondent's failure to recall Papi and the overtime
problem. Representatives of the Union were for the first
time given a copy of the "Memorandum of Understand-
ing." At the time, said document bore the signature of
several of Respondent's drivers. At the close of this session,
Heineman , after being shown company payroll records,
was of the view that the Company's position on the
seniority issue was correct.
Following that grievance session but on the same day,
Mondine, at Weber's behest, accompanied the former to
the union hall where he signed a statement to the effect that
he had voluntarily quit his job with Respondent in April
1975. This step was obviously taken to counter the payroll
evidence furnished by the Company at the grievance
session . Weber and Mondine then proceeded to Respon-
dent's facility to pick up their paychecks. Mondine told
Castagna, Respondent's vice president, that he had signed
such a statement at the union ball. Castagna admittedly
responded by telling Mondine "you had a job!"
The original unfair labor practice charge in this proceed-
ing was filed on January 12, 1976.
On or about January 16, 1976, Respondent's drivers
attended a union meeting for purposes of discussing the
"Memorandum of Understanding." Union representatives
in attendance at that time were Heineman, Hank Trotto,
Local 341's president, and a Mr. Kress. At that time Shuler,
an admitted supervisor, and Mueller, neither of whom
appears to have driven a triaxle truck during the period
coextensive with this controversy, added their signatures to
the "Memorandum of Understanding." Triaxle drivers
Jones, Pierce, and Mondine had previously appended their
signatures.14
By letter dated January 20, 1976, Lastooka informed
Weber as follows:
business agent . Company Agents Lastooka, Castagna, and Shuler attended
this grievance session and , while all testified , none was examined as to the
above statements attributed to Lastooka.
i2 Based upon the credited uncontradicted testimony of Papi.
13 Lastooka testified that this agreement was simply a memorial of oral
understandings with drivers in existence since 1973. Through highly
prejudicial, leading questions Respondent succeeded in eliciting testimony
from triaxle drivers Jones and Pierce which corroborated I.astooka in this
regard.
14 It is noted that Mgndine served as a triaxle operator only by virtue of
the transfer of Weber and Respondent 's failure to recall Papi, transactions
which are the subject of 8(a)(3) allegations in this complaint.
RAM CONSTRUCTION CO.
At a meeting which was held at Local 341 office on
January 16, 1976 , our Company's Shop Agreement was
ratified by the majority of our drivers . Consequently it
was accepted by your Local , therefore, we are enclosing
a copy of this shop agreement for your acceptance and
signature.
In the event that you do not sign and agree to abide
by the terms and conditions of this Shop Agreement,
we have no alternative except dropping you from our
seniority list and you will no longer be an employee of
our Company.
The Shop Agreement was made because it is
mutually beneficial to our drivers and to the Company.
It provides for conditions not covered in the Joint
Council of Teamsters No. 40 , Independent Heavy and
Highway Agreement in that our Company has some
unique conditions . In the event that you do agree to
sign and abide by this Agreement you will retain your
seniority . However, in the event that you return to our
Company and try to undermid [sic] the conditions
and the intent of the Agreement and have a belligerent
attitude towards your supervisors and your fellow
workmen, this will be cause for immediate dismissal.
Weber, apparently at the time of receipt of this letter,
was in layoff status due to inclement weather . He at no
time met the conditions specified by Lastooka therein, and
has not been recalled by the Company, though subsequent-
ly Respondent 's operations reached full employment levels.
By letter also dated January 20 , 1976, Lastooka informed
Papi as follows:
This letter is written as a notice of dismissal and the
elimination of you on our seniority roster. Our
Company has taken this position because of the
following reasons.
1. You are a member of Local 249 Ready Mix
Concrete Drivers . You voluntarily quit Duquesne Slag
Products Company but still hold a seniority position
there.
2. You hired on at our Company on a temporary
basis and worked here over thirty (30) days but did not
transfer into Local 341, as per the Teamsters bylaws.
3. Since you are not a member of the Local in
which we have an Agreement and will not give up your
seniority position in another Company, we feel it unfair
for you to hold a seniority position here and eliminate
other people from work.
4. Also, we have a Shop Agreement that has been
ratified by Local 341 because of the majority of our
drivers agreeing to the conditions of this Shop Agree-
ment. You have stated in several meetings that we have
had that you would never agree to the conditions of the
Shop Agreement , therefore , we feel it quite impossible
for you to work in harmony and abide by the special
conditions set forth in our Shop Agreement.
5. You have instituted proceedings against our
Firm by way of a Federal Wage and Hour Investiga-
tion and the National Labor Relations Board Proceed-
ings . We will defend our Company's position to the
utmost.
773
Until a decision is reached by these two (2) agencies,
you are no longer a part of this Organization and will
not receive any benefits.
Also on January 20, Lastooka wrote Local 341 , advising
that, as it was the Company's understanding that a
majority of the drivers had signed and thereby ratified the
shop agreement, Respondent assumed that the Union had
also ratified the agreement . The Union never responded to
this letter . Heineman credibly testified that the Union
declined to do so, refusing to take a formal position with
respect to the matter because of its election to defer to the
then pending unfair labor practice proceeding.
C. Concluding Findings
1. The claim of contract privilege
There is no question on this record that Respondent at
all times material herein was committed to a policy
whereby drivers of triaxle trucks would earn a maximum of
2 hours' straight-time pay for time expended in transit
between its Canonsburg facility and the Freeport jobsite. It
is clear that no union representative agreed to or participat-
ed in the negotiations leading to formulation of Respon-
dent's policy from its alleged inception in 1973 , or at any
time relevant to this proceeding. As of October 23, in
defiance of this policy, Weber , Papi , Jones, and Pierce, the
four drivers who were then assigned to triaxle trucks,
claimed additional travel pay based upon their actual time
spent on the road. Lastooka reacted quickly and sought to
enforce an understanding among his drivers whereby they
would adhere to a practice which was not sanctioned by or
consistent with the governing collective-bargaining agree-
ment.
Respondent does not question the established principle
that the National Labor Relations Act protects employees
in their efforts to enforce terms of a viable collective-
bargaining agreement against their employer . Furthermore
many factual findings , set forth above, are either based on
admission or stand unchallenged despite their clear
indication that Respondent commencing on December 10,
1975, embarked upon a coercive course of conduct to force
its triaxle drivers to affirm the preexisting travel pay policy.
Nonetheless, as I understand Respondent's primary
defense, it is claimed that it was not Respondent, but the
drivers whose position contravened the contract , and hence
Respondent was privileged to pressure recalcitrant employ-
ees into compliance therewith, by any disciplinary means,
including threats of reprisal and even outright discrimina-
tion.
Respondent's contention in this regard is based on the
premise that the travel pay arrangement matured into a
"shop agreement" authorized by article XII, section 11, of
the collective-bargaining agreement , which provides as
follows:
It is agreed that `Shop Conditions ,' excluding wages,
may be discussed and settled individually with the
Company, the Employees and the Union Representa-
tive . Such conditions , when agreed upon , are to be
774 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
reduced to writing and copies furnished to the Compa-
ny, Local Union, and the Constructor's Association.
In this connection, Respondent asserts that the travel
pay policy was initially established by agreement between
Respondent and the drivers in 1973. On or about
December 18 , 1975, said understanding between the
drivers and Respondent was reduced to writing. It is
claimed that this understanding or arrangement conformed
with article XII, section 11, and, as such, was as much a
part of the collective-bargaining agreement as if specifically
incorporated therein.
Respondent 's defense in this respect is so lacking in an
appreciation for the clear terms of the contract, universally
accepted labor relations principles, and statutory concep-
tions of the role of the exclusive representative in collective
bargaining as to be considered frivolous, at worst, and
specious, at best. No doubt exists that a shop agreement
negotiated and reduced to writing in accordance with the
terms of article XII , section 11 , of the collective-bargaining
agreement would be binding on all covered employees and
failure by any to accept conditions embodied therein
would warrant discipline up to and including discharge.15
Respondent's position, however, discounts that article
XII, section 11, of the collective-bargaining agreement by
its plain terms, and quite consistent with Board policy,
regards the union representative as a party to discussions
leading to agreement on "shop conditions ." It is true, as
Respondent observes, that section 11 of article XII does
not explicitly require that the union representative be
present "at every stage" of discussions concerning shop
conditions. However, the plain import of that provision
requires that a union representative be present at least at
some stage of the deliberations , and indeed that he be an
equal party, with employees and the employer, to any
agreement reached which authorizes a variance in contract
terms.
Also significant is the fact that the contract is multiem-
ployer in scope and governs the employment standards of
many of Respondent's competitors.16 It borders on the
15 Apart from the matters raised in the above text , Respondent's
interpretation of art. XII, sec . 11, must overcome other obstacles as well.
Thus, it is entirely possible that the special privilege of contract variance was
not intended to cover such matters as Respondent's travel pay policy. Art.
X11 is a seniority provision and it is at least arguable that sec . II thereof was
designed merely to authorize local arrangements varying the basic seniority
formula set forth therein . The exclusion of wages in sec. 11, if broadly
construed, would be consistent with such a limited intent but, in any event, a
real question of interpretation would exist as to whether a variance in the
method of payment, as is involved in this proceeding , is within that
exclusion
IS The basic collective-bargaining agreement involved here covers 50 to
75 employers operating in 33 counties in western Pennsylvania. The
agreement contains a "more favorable agreement clause," set forth in art.
XXXII, which provides that any signatory contractor is entitled on request
to an agreement on more favorable terms which are granted to any
contractor doing business in this geographic area.
Ir Lastooka, on January 20, 1976, the same day that he discharged Papi
and wrote Weber, in effect expressing that he too would be terminated upon
failure to accept the memorandum of understanding , wrote the Union that it
was his "understanding" that the Union had ratified the memorandum of
understanding because a majority of the collective-bargaining unit members
at the union meeting of January 17, 1976, had signed it in the presence of
union representatives . Lastooka's self-serving interpretation of what tran-
spired at that time assumes that the Union lacked concern for its
relationship with other employers signatory to the master contract, and
absurd to assume that the joint council and the employer
association in negotiating that agreement contemplated
any interpretation of article XII, section 11, which would
allow a single employer member to undermine formally
negotiated labor standards uniformly applicable to com-
peting contractors, who are signatory to that agreement.
The superior economic power of an employer vis-a-vis his
employees historically has been a focal point of protective
labor legislation and collective bargaining. It is too late in
the game to overlook specific language in a collective-
bargaining agreement, and find that parties to collective
bargaining would authorize individual contract variances
through shop agreements established by a process which in
effect consists of unilateral employer action.
Article XII, section 11, of the contract refers to the
employer, the employee, and the union representative in
the disjunctive and with equanimity. This is in harmony
with the principles of collective bargaining and, most
assuredly, was designed to preserve benefits against the
type of conduct manifested by Respondent in this
proceeding. Thus, the campaign of intimidation and
coercion against Weber and Papi began well before the
memorandum of understanding embodying the travel time
policy was reduced to writing. The signatures affixed
thereto included two triaxle drivers, namely, Jones and
Pierce, who between October 21 and December 10, 1975,
had claimed travel pay in excess of that allowable under
Respondent's policy. Can it be said with any degree of
certainty that the object lesson afforded by Respondent's
treatment of Papi and Weber did not influence their
subsequent change in position? 17 The answer, on this
record, is obviously, no. Respondent's contention that the
so-called Shop Agreement arrived at against such a
background, and with employees being denied the services
of their exclusive bargaining agent, was condoned by
article XII, section 11, of the collective-bargaining agree-
ment, and thereby ought be deemed a binding byproduct
of collective bargaining is so plainly lacking in merit as not
even to raise a colorable claim.18
would condone a pattern of intimidation and coercion , which may well have
brought about the claimed "majority" employee support of Respondent's
position.
Is There is no merit in Respondent's position that the instant proceeding
be deferred to arbitration pursuant to the Board's policy in Collyer Insulated
Wire, 192 NLRB 837 (1971). Respondent's claim of contract privilege is
untenable and raises no genuine issue of interpretation . Board policy
designed to facilitate private dispute settlement machinery does not
countenance abdication of its jurisdiction to remedy unfair labor practices
simply because the party charged has interposed an unfounded contractual
defense, predicated upon little more than sophistry. Furthermore, this case
concerns a pattern of unlawful interference including discrimination, with
the efforts of Papi and Weber to assert rights afforded by the terms of a
collective-bargaining agreement . From my understanding of Board policy,
arbitration is not considered an effective vehicle for resolving such disputes.
Thus, in North Shore Publishing Co., 206 NLRB 42 (1973), and Joseph T.
Ryerson & Sons, Inc., 199 NLRB 461 (1972), the Board deemed deferral to
arbitration inappropriate with respect to allegations that an employer, by
prohibited means, inhibited or precluded access to contractual grievance
procedures . Later, in Morrison-Knudsen Company, Inc., 213 NLRB 280
(1974), this limitation of the Collyer doctrine was extended to allegations
concerning discriminatory retaliation for an employee's verbal protestation
of an employer's assignment of work to other crafts in alleged violation of a
union contract. Accordingly, on authority of Morrison-Knudsen, supra, the
Board will exercise its exclusive jurisdiction with respect to alleged unlawful
acts of reprisal , coercion, or discrimination directed against employees who
RAM CONSTRUCTION CO. 775
2. Interference, restraint, and coercion
a. Direct dealing
Undisputed evidence shows that Respondent bargained
directly and individually with its truckdrivers in initially
seeking the understanding at the December 10 meeting,
and by urging them on after December 18, 1975, to sign the
memorandum of understanding . These actions were taken
without knowledge , consultation , or presence of a represen-
tative of Local 341. The claim by the Respondent that the
"memorandum of understanding" simply incorporated a
preexisting policy, understood and agreed to by the drivers,
is regarded as immaterial . On the basis of the testimony of
Shuler, Jones, Papi this so-called understanding actually
was based upon little more than the fact that employees
assigned to triaxle trucks , upon their hire , were told that
they would be compensated in accordance with Respon-
dent's travel policy.19 Any understanding in existence prior
to December 10, 1975, was therefore derived from positions
expressed by management to triaxle drivers and their
failure to protest . All triaxle drivers were willing to go
along with the straight-time arrangement, so long as the 2
hours called for, to and from the Freedom jobsite,
compensated them for the travel time expended . The fact
that they did so hardly compromised their right to
representation by their Union when this no longer proved
true ; i.e., when they were spending time on the road for
which they were not compensated at all. Lastooka's effort
to put an end to the additional claims for travel pay by all
four triaxle drivers , pursuant to a formula not sanctioned
by the collective-bargaining agreement , and outside of the
presence of any union representative , constituted direct
dealing with employees interfering with their Section 7
right to engage in collective bargaining through representa-
tives of their own choosing . Accordingly, Respondent
thereby violated Section 8(a)(1) of the Act.
b. The coercive threats in support of the travel time
policy
The complaint alleges that Respondent , through Lastoo-
ka, Shuler , and Castagna , on various dates threatened
employees under conditions violative of the Act. The
General Counsel argues that these alleged 8(a)(1) violations
were committed in support of Respondent 's effort to stifle
resistance to its travel time policy and to coerce employee
approval thereof.
protested contract violations , even where those protests had not matured
into formal grievances. Based upon the foregoing, and my further view that
nothing in Respondent's defense rests upon a colorable claim of contract
right, i find merit in the General Counsel's contention that the instant
proceeding is inappropriate for deferral to arbitration.
19 Although not necessary to the result reached , it is noted that I did not
believe Lastooka's testimony that the alleged agreement had in its ongin at a
meeting in 1973. This attempt to portray the "understanding" as having a
somewhat formal origin was not corroborated by a single witness. Lastooka
was a generally unreliable witness, having a penchant toward self-serving
argumentation. His propensity to twist facts in service of his own interests
aroused considerable mistrust and, absent corroboration , I am unwilling to
accept any of his self-serving testimony.
20 This remark to Mondine amounted to an expression of malice, made
in reaction to Mondine's report to Castagna that he had provided the Union
information in support of Papi's grievance, and was a warning calculated to
discourage an employee from making common cause with others engaged in
concerted activity.
These allegations are almost entirely substantiated by
credited uncontradicted evidence or admission. Based
thereon, I find that statements by Lastooka and Shuler, on
or about December 11, urging Weber and Papi to abide by
the travel time policy or quit, the threat by Lastooka at the
grievance session of December 17 to weed out Weber and
Papi in reaction to their expressed intent to carry their
protest to the Department of Labor, the threat of discharge
implicit in Respondent's letter to Weber of January 20,
1976, and the statement to Mondine by Castagna that he
"had a job!"20 all constituted independent violations of
Section 8(a)(1) of the Act, interwoven with a ruthless effort
by Respondent to force its will concerning travel time upon
its employees.21
c. The alleged discrimination 22
(1) The transfer of Weber
The facts concerning this instance of alleged discrimina-
tion are not disputed. Based upon Respondent's admission
that Weber was transferred to a tandem truck on
December 15 to eliminate differences relative to the travel
pay issue, I find that Respondent thereby violated Section
8(a)(3) and (1) of the Act.
(2) The refusal to recall Papi
The complaint alleges that Respondent violated Section
8(a)(3) and (1) by its refusal to recall Papi on or about
December 15, 1975. At that time Papi was temporarily laid
off because his triaxle truck was in disrepair. When Weber
was transferred to the tandem, Respondent elected not to
recall Papi. Instead, Mondine, a tractor trailer driver, who
apparently was not party to the travel pay controversy, was
designated as Weber's replacement. There is no real
question that Mondine had quit Respondent's employ
previously, and that by virtue of article XII, section 9, his
seniority was to be automatically terminated thereby. Nor
can there be any question that Papi, at least by operation of
the contract, was senior to Mondine. Nonetheless, Respon-
dent claims that Mondine possessed greater length of
service, by virtue of its unwillingness to regard the earlier
quit as affecting the continuity of his seniority. Lastooka
claimed that he believed that, despite a quit, the Company
had discretion to continue seniority. This belief, according
to Lastooka, was derived from conversations with Heine-
man as to what other companies had done. Here again,
21 The evidence does not support the allegation concerning coercive
interrogation , which therefore is dismissed.
22 Respondent contends that the instant record does not support any
8(aX3) findings whatever since there is no evidence that Respondent knew
of, or harbored any animus toward , union activity. Respondent's position
seems based upon a narrow construction of the proscriptive scope of that
section of the Act . For here no question exists that Respondent knew, and
acted in retaliation against , the efforts of Papi and Weber to avail
themselves of the benefits of union representation by opposing a manage-
ment policy which conflicted with the governing collective-bargaining
agreement. Sec. 8 (aX3), while protecting employees who engage in
"organizational" forms of union activity, contrary to Respondent's conten-
tion , also condemns the discouragement of union membership inherent in
reprisals against those who avail themselves of the employment benefits
derived from such status.
776 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
Lastooka impressed me as willing to stretch the truth to
serve his own ends in circumstances where the probabilities
render it entirely unlikely that any union representative
would ever have expressed such a view. The seniority
relationship between union members is a sensitive subject,
often giving rise to internal squabbles which, experience in
collective bargaining has shown, have been mitigated
through carefully drafted contract regulations. Aside from
the interest of union officials in avoiding such controver-
sies , any condonement by a labor organization of an
employer's discretion as to who shall have continuous
service and who shall not is to enable an employer to pick
and choose between employees, a result totally inconsistent
with the generally accepted purpose of a seniority system.
Once more, Lastooka was reaching for argumentation,
rather than fact, to avoid lawful consequences of his action.
In any event, the inference that the failure to recall Papi
was a further step in Respondent's campaign of intimida-
tion is hardly lessened by Lastooka's failure to explain why
he would overlook the fact that Mondine had voluntarily
quit his job, giving only 3 days' notice, in preferring his
retention over Papi.23
Other defenses raised by Respondent to its various
actions against Papi are equally unpersuasive. Thus,
Respondent points to Papi's membership in Local 249 of
the IBT,24 and his failure, upon obtaining a job with
Respondent, to transfer to Local 341. Lastooka claims that
he first learned of this at the grievance meeting of
December 17. He claims that he at that time also acquired
information that Papi was retaining seniority with his prior
employer, Duquesne Slag Products Company. According
to Papi, he quit his prior job at Duquesne Slag after 10
years of service, when notified by an official of that firm
that it was going out of business, and that Papi should seek
work elsewhere. Papi credibly testified that in September
1975, when he initially obtained a job with Respondent, he
informed Shuler that he would go to work, but would not
relinquish his seniority because of severance pay claims
against his former employer, Duquesne Slag Company.25
Shuler asked if Papi would transfer to Local 341, where-
upon Papi responded that he would do so as soon as the
severance pay issue with Duquesne Slag was worked out.
Duquesne Slag, at the time of the events in issue here, had
gone out of business and hence no seniority existed at that
firm. Thus, Papi was not holding or accumulating seniority
.,at more then one location" in violation of the contract.26
With respect to the issues concerning Papi's membership
in Local 249, it is noted that the applicable collective-
bargaining agreement contains an 8-day union-security
clause which authorizes an employer to discharge any
noncomplying employee, upon union request. Though
Local 34l's officials were apprised of Papi's membership
23 Curiosity is also aroused by the fact that no one ever informed
Mondine, pnor to January 1976, that Respondent did not regard his
seniority as having been prejudiced by the earlier quit.
24 Local 249 is a member of the Joint Counsel of Teamsters, No. 40, and
its members are covered by the same collective-bargaining agreement as
employees of Respondent.
2a Papi explained that he was not talking about seniority in the strict
sense of the term , but was only concerned that if Local 241 was entitled to
severance pay or any benefits from Duquesne Slag he did not want to lose
out
status, at no time was Respondent requested to enforce the
union-security clause against him.
The expressed concern of Lastooka for Papi's alleged
dual seniority status and his membership situation struck
me as entirely contrived in the effort to build a case against
Papi, so as to justify the reprisals taken against him because
of his lack of cooperation with Respondent concerning the
travel time issue . These asserted grounds for both denying
Papi recall on and after December 17, 1975, and for
discharging him on January 20, 1976, are rejected as
pretextual.
Upon the total record, including Respondent's honoring
continuous seniority on the part of Mondine in violation of
unambiguous terms in the collective-bargaining agree-
ment; by retaining Mondine on active employment status
while Papi, the more senior employee, was denied recall;
and by the direct animus manifested towards Papi as a
result of his refusal to accept the travel time policy, I find
that the denial of recall to Papi was in furtherance of
Respondent's unlawful effort to coerce acceptance among
its employees of the travel time arrangement. Respondent
thereby violated Section 8(a)(3) and (1) of the Act.
(3) The discharge of Papi
On January 20, 1976, Lastooka, by letter, notified Papi of
his termination, reciting the alleged grounds therefor.
Among those reasons were grounds heretofore rejected by
me as pretextual. The remaining factors listed by Lastooka
related to Papi's resistance to the "shop agreement," and
his initiation of proceedings before the Department of
Labor and the National Labor Relations Board , which, in
my opinion, constituted the real motivating factors leading
to his termination. Accordingly, I fmd that Papi was
discharged on January 20, 1976, in violation of Section
8(a)(1), (3), and (4) of the Act.
(4) The termination of Weber
On January 20, 1976, Lastooka, while Weber was in
layoff due to weather conditions, notified Weber by letter
that his refusal to adhere to the "shop agreement" would
result in immediate dismissal . Lastooka at no time agreed
to sign the "shop agreement" and he was never recalled,
despite the fact that Respondent's operations subsequently
reached full employment levels. Considering the content of
the January 20, 1976 letter, I find that the failure to recall
Weber was based upon his failure to meet the conditions
set forth therein, and for all intents and purposes was the
equivalent of a discharge. I fmd that Respondent thereby
violated Section 8(a)(3) and (1) of the Act.27
26 See art . XII, sec . 10, type 3.
27 Contrary to the General Counsel, I deem the evidence insufficient to
establish that the termination of Weber was motivated by considerations
prohibited by Sec. 8(aX4) of the Act. Although Weber was a beneficiary of
the charge filed by Papi on January 12, 1976, there is no evidence that
Respondent considered Weber responsible for that action, and no
reasonable grounds for drawing such an inference exists.
RAM CONSTRUCTION CO. 777
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1. Respondent, John M. Lastooka, trading as Ram
Construction Company, is an employer engaged in com-
merce within the meaning of Section 2(6) and (7) of the
Act.
2. International Brotherhood of Teamsters, Chauffeurs,
Warehousemen and Helpers of America, Building Material
and Construction Drivers Local 341, is a labor organiza-
tion within the meaning of Section 2(5) of the Act.
3. Respondent has independently violated Section
8(a)(1) of the Act by bargaining directly and individually
with its employees concerning terms and conditions of
employment and by entering into individual contracts with
them, setting conditions inconsistent with the terms of an
existing collective-bargaining agreement, without partici-
pation of the exclusive bargaining representative.
4. Respondent independently violated Section 8(a)(1)
of the Act by requesting that employees quit their
employment and by threatening discharge unless employ-
ees agreed to adopt policies or enter individual contracts,
which provided them less benefits then available under a
current collective-bargaining agreement, or because they
gave evidence in support of an employee's grievance
against the Respondent, or because they intend to seek
recourse under Federal law.
5. Respondent engaged in no act of interrogation of
employees violative of Section 8(a)(1) of the Act.
6. Respondent violated Section 8(a)(3) and (1) of the
Act since December 15, 1975, by refusing to recall
Germano Papi from layoff and by changing the job
assignment of Dennis Weber because of refusals to assent
to a policy providing lesser benefits than available under
the terms of a subsisting collective-bargaining agreement.
7. Respondent violated Section 8(a)(4), (3), and (1) of
the Act by discharging Germano Papi, on January 20,
1976, because of his refusal to assent to a policy, or sign an
individual employment contract, whereby he would receive
lesser benefits than those required by the subsisting
collective-bargaining agreement, and because he filed
unfair labor practice charges against the Respondent with
the National Labor Relations Board.
8. Respondent violated Section 8(a)(3) and (1) of the
Act by, on January 20, 1976, discharging Dennis Weber
because he refused to adhere to a travel time policy, and to
sign an individual employment contract, authorizing
benefits less than those required by the terms of a
subsisting collective-bargaining agreement.
9. The unfair labor practices found above have an
effect upon commerce within the meaning of Section 2(6)
and (7) of the Act.
THE REMEDY
Having found that Respondent has engaged in various
unfair labor practices, it will be recommended that it cease
25 Counsel for Respondent devotes a substantial segment of his brief to a
charge that I "inappropriately interposed [my]self in the testimony." In
support of this claim , it is asserted that "the administrative law judge
actively advocated the position of the General Counsel to the detriment of
Respondent ." In my view , to join issue with Respondent on the merits of
such a claim would be entirely inappropriate, and of no conceivable value to
a reviewing authority in assessing the merits of such a charge.
and desist therefrom and take certain affirmative action to
effectuate the policies of the Act. Since the discriminatory
discharges involve conduct striking at the heart of the
statutory protection afforded under the Act, a broad order
is recommended, requiring Respondent to cease and desist
from "in any other manner" interfering with, coercing, or
restraining employees in the exercise of their Section 7
rights.
It having been found that Respondent discriminatorily
transferred Dennis Weber on December 15, 1975, to a less
desirable position, it will be recommended that Respon-
dent make him whole for any loss of earnings resulting
therefrom and, in compliance with other terms of this
Order, reinstate him to his former position. It having
further been found that Respondent unlawfully refused to
recall Germano Papi on December 15, 1975, and thereafter
discharged Germano Papi and Dennis Weber on January
20, 1976, it will be recommended that Respondent offer to
each of these employees immediate reinstatement to his
former position or, if such job no longer exists, to a
substantially equivalent position, without loss of seniority
or other rights and privileges, discharging if necessary any
replacements hired, and make each of these employees
whole for any loss of earnings they may have suffered by
payment to each of them a sum of money equal to that
which they would have earned, but for the discrimination
against them, less net interim earnings. Backpay shall be
computed on a quarterly basis as prescribed in F. W.
Woolworth Company, 90 NLRB 289 (1950), and shall
include interest at 6 percent per annum as provided in Isis
Plumbing & Heating Co., 138 NLRB 716 (1962).
Upon the foregoing findings of fact, conclusions of law,
and the entire record in this proceeding,28 and pursuant to
Section 10(c) of the Act, I issue the following recommend-
ed:
ORDER 29
John M. Lastooka, trading as Ram Construction Compa-
ny, Canonsburg, Pennsylvania, its agents, successors, and
assigns, shall:
1. Cease and desist from:
(a) Bargaining individually with employees with respect
to any term or condition of employment outside the
presence of their exclusive representative, and urging them
to sign an individual contract or quit, or threatening them
with discharge if they decline to sign any such agreement.
(b) Discouraging membership in a labor organization by
discharging, transferring to a less desirable position,
refusing to recall from layoff, or in any other manner
discriminating with respect to an employee's terms and
conditions of employment because he refuses to execute an
individual employment contract and insists that his
employer abide by the terms of an existing collective-
bargaining agreement.
29 In the event no exceptions are filed as provided by Sec. 102.46 of the
Rules and Regulations of the National Labor Relations Board, the findings,
conclusions , and recommended Order herein shall, as provided in Sec.
102 48 of the Rules and Regulations , be adopted by the Board and become
its findings, conclusions, and Order, and all objections thereto shall be
deemed waived for all purposes
778 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
(c) Discharging or otherwise discriminating against any
employee because he has filed charges under the Act.
(d) In any other manner interfering with, coercing, or
restraining employees in the exercise of their rights
protected by Section 7 of the Act.
2. Take the following affirmative action which is found
necessary to effectuate the purposes of the Act:
(a) Offer Germano Papi and Dennis Weber immediate
reinstatement to their former positions or, if no longer
available, to substantially equivalent positions, without loss
of seniority or other rights and privileges, and make them
whole for any loss of earnings sustained by reason of the
discrimination against them, in accordance with the
provisions in the section of this Decision entitled "The
Remedy."
(b) Preserve and, upon request, make available to the
Board or its agents, for, examination and copying, all
payroll records, social security payment records, time
cards, personnel records and reports, and all other records
30 In the event the Board 's Order is enforced by a Judgment of a United
States Court of Appeals, the words in the notice reading "Posted by Order
of the National Labor Relations Board" shall read "Posted Pursuant to a
necessary to analyze the amount of backpay due under the
terms of this recommended Order.
(c) Post at its place of business in Canonsburg, Pennsyl-
vania, copies of the attached notice marked "Appendix." 30
Copies of said notice, on forms provided by the Regional
Director for Region 6, after being duly signed by
Respondent's representatives, shall be posted by Respon-
dent immediately upon receipt thereof, and be maintained
by it for 60 consecutive days thereafter, in conspicuous
places, including all places where notices to employees are
customarily posted. Reasonable steps shall be taken by
Respondent to ensure that said notices are not altered,
defaced, or covered by any other material.
(d) Notify the Regional Director for Region 6, in writing,
within 20 days from the date of this Order, what steps
Respondent has taken to comply herewith.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED the complaint be, and it hereby
is, dismissed as to any alleged violation of the Act not
found herein.
Judgment of the United States Court of Appeals Enforcing an Order of the
National Labor Relations Board."