Raley's Inc.

National Labor Relations Board - Board Decisions

Aug 9, 1993

311 N.L.R.B. 1244 (N.L.R.B. 1993)

1244
311 NLRB No. 162
DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
1 On November 18, 1992, Administrative Law Judge Clifford H.
Anderson issued the attached decision. The Respondent filed limited
exceptions to the judge’s recommended remedy requiring the Re-
spondent to post the notice at all of its facilities, and the General
Counsel filed a letter in response to the exceptions.
2 The Respondent did not except to the judge’s finding that its
dress code rule which prohibited the wearing of unapproved union
insignia and union buttons violated Sec. 8(a)(1) of the Act. Further,
the Respondent did not except to the judge’s finding that its dress
code rule applied to its employees at all of its stores.
Under these circumstances, the Respondent was obligated to estab-
lish special circumstances justifying the rule at any or all of its
stores. Republic Aviation Corp. v. NLRB, 324 U.S. 793 (1945); Ken-
dall Co., 267 NLRB 963, 965 (1983). The Respondent failed to
make such a showing either at the hearing or in its exceptions. Ac-
cordingly, contrary to the Respondent’s contention, the judge was
warranted in requiring the Respondent to post the notice to employ-
ees at all locations where the unlawful rule has been or is in effect.
Albertsons, Inc., 300 NLRB 1013 fn. 2 (1990); Kinder-Care Learn-
ing Centers, 299 NLRB 1171, 1176 (1990). See also Postal Service,
303 NLRB 463 fn. 5 (1991).
1 As a result of the pleadings and the stipulations of counsel and
other representatives at the trial, there were few disputes of fact re-
garding collateral matters. Where not otherwise noted, the findings
herein are based on the pleadings, the stipulations of the parties, or
unchallenged credible evidence.
Raley’s Inc. and United Food & Commercial Work-
ers Union, Local 373, United Food & Commer-
cial Workers International Union, AFL–CIO–
CLC. Case 20–CA–24332
August 9, 1993
DECISION AND ORDER
BY CHAIRMAN STEPHENS AND MEMBERS
DEVANEY AND RAUDABAUGH
Limited exceptions filed to the judge’s decision in
this case1 present the issue of whether the remedial no-
tice should be posted at each of the Respondent’s retail
outlets.
The National Labor Relations Board has considered
the decision and record in light of the exceptions and
briefs and has decided to affirm the judge’s rulings,
findings,2 and conclusions and to adopt the rec-
ommended Order.
ORDER
The National Labor Relations Board adopts the rec-
ommended Order of the administrative law judge and
orders that the Respondent, Raley’s Inc., Fairfield,
California, its officers, agents, successors, and assigns,
shall take the action set forth in the Order.
Boren Chertkov, Esq., for the General Counsel.
John J. Baruch, Labor Relations Associate Food Employers
Council, Inc., of San Ramon, California, for the Respond-
ent.
Richard G. McCracken, Esq. (Davis, Coswell & Bowe), of
San Francisco, California, for the Charging Party.
DECISION
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
CLIFFORD H. ANDERSON, Administrative Law Judge. I
heard this case in trial on July 21, 1992, in Fairfield, Cali-
fornia, pursuant to a complaint and notice of hearing issued
by the Regional Director for Region 20 of the National
Labor Relations Board (the Board) on December 27, 1991,
based on a charge filed on November 12, 1991, and docketed
as Case 20–CA–24332 by United Food and Commercial
Workers Union, Local 373, United Food & Commercial
Workers International Union, AFL–CIO (the Charging Party
or the Union) against Raley’s Inc. (Respondent). Posthearing
briefs were due on September 25, 1992.
The complaint as amended at the hearing, and further
amended thereafter by posthearing order granting the General
Counsel’s motion to withdraw certain allegations, alleges that
Respondent has maintained a rule prohibiting its employees
from wearing trade union buttons unless approved by it and,
further, has disparately and selectively enforced the rule. The
complaint alleges this conduct violates Section 8(a)(1) of the
National Labor Relations Act (the Act). Respondent admits
the existence and enforcement of a uniform dress code in-
cluding a rule governing the wearing of union buttons, but
alleges both that the rule is permissible under the Act and
that it has not been inconsistently applied.
FINDINGS OF FACT
All parties were given full opportunity to participate at the
hearing, to introduce relevant evidence, to call, examine and
cross-examine witnesses, to argue orally, and to file
posthearing briefs.
On the entire record herein, including posthearing briefs
from the General Counsel and Respondent, and from my ob-
servation of the witnesses and their demeanor, I make the
following1
I. JURISDICTION
At all times material, Respondent has been a corporation
with an office and place of business in Fairfield, California,
where it has been engaged in the operation of a retail grocery
store. Respondent as part of its business operations annually
enjoys revenues in excess of $500,000 and annually pur-
chases and receives goods or services directly from outside
the State of California of a value in excess of $50,000. Re-
spondent is therefore an employer engaged in commerce
within the meaning of Section 2(2), (6), and (7) of the Act.
II. LABOR ORGANIZATION
The Union is a labor organization within the meaning of
Section 2(5) of the Act.
III. THE ALLEGED UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES
A. Background
Respondent operates a retail grocery store chain with over
50 supermarkets in northern California including the super-
market at issue herein which is located in Fairfield, Cali-
fornia (the Fairfield store or the store). The Union along with
other constituent locals of the United Foods & Commercial
Workers International Union, AFL–CIO (the International)
1245RALEY’S INC.
2 Respondent’s dress code establishes uniform dress among certain
employee job classifications including employees in both the retail
clerk unit and the meatcutter unit. For example male retail produce
employees wear knee length green bib aprons, white shirts, ties, dark
slacks, and dark shoes. Females cashiers wear brown smocks with
red and green stripes, white blouses or shirts, dark slacks or skirts,
and dark shoes. The required aprons and smocks are provided by
Respondent; the other items of clothing are provided by the indi-
vidual employees. All unit employees are required to wear Respond-
ent’s standard format name badge.
3 Four buttons or pins were described in testimony and placed in
evidence. First, is the ‘‘Solidarity Works’’ button, which is circular,
approximately the size of a half dollar coin and bears the word ‘‘sol-
idarity’’ in white on one line and the word ‘‘works’’ in red on a
second line immediately below—all on a black background.
Second is the ‘‘Union Yes’’ pin which is an approximately three-
fourth inches wide by five-eighth inches high rectangle with a white
enameled background framed in gilt. The pin has two lines of print.
The first bears the word UNION in blue letters outlined in gilt with
a small circled ‘‘AFL–CIO’’ symbol in substitution for the letter
‘‘O’’ in the word UNION. The pin’s second line bears the word
YES in red letters outlined in gilt followed by a gilt box bearing
a black check mark in apparent simulation of the marking of an elec-
tion ballot.
The third pin is simply the four cutout letters ‘‘UFCW’’ outlined
in gilt on a black background joined together and measuring ap-
proximately seven-eighth inches in length and one-fourth inch in
height. The fourth pin or service pin is a dime-sized gilt and enamel
pin bearing the International’s logo and a small red 15 or 20 in the
center designating years of membership in the organization.
represents a unit of retail food store employees which in-
cludes certain employees of Respondent’s Fairfield, Cali-
fornia store. The employers whose employees are within the
unit are represented for purposes of collective bargaining by
Food Employers Council, Inc., a multiemployer association,
of which Respondent is a member. The Food Employers
Council and the Union have negotiated a series of collective-
bargaining contracts covering the unit employees including
one effective from March 1, 1989, through February 28,
1992. A separate multiple employer unit of retail meatcutter
employees is represented by various locals of the Inter-
national, not including the Union. Those locals negotiate
with the Employers Council, Inc. on behalf of various em-
ployers concerning these employees in independent negotia-
tions. The Fairfield store’s meat department employees are in
this separate unit.
Respondent announced changes in its employee dress code
which apparently applied to its employees at all its stores in-
cluding all its Fairfield store employees in December 1988.
These new rules took effect in June 1989. The dress code,
which applies to employees ‘‘while on duty’’ requires unit
employees, inter alia, to wear standardized apparel.2 The
dress code further noted: ‘‘Only Raley’s or Raley’s approved
pins are allowed.’’ On or about August 25, 1989, Respondent
posted a notice to employees which stated:
As outlined in our new Dress Code policy, wearing of
buttons is prohibited by Raley’s. This includes union
buttons. There will be no exceptions.
There was no evidence that any union button has ever been
approved by Respondent at anytime.
B. Evidence Respecting the Wearing of Buttons and
Pins at Respondent’s Fairfield Store and Respondent’s
Response Thereto
1. Union buttons
In September 1991, the Union’s sister locals were either
in or approaching negotiations with Food Employers Council
respecting a new meatcutter contract. Peter Rockwell, the
Union’s business representative, testified without contradic-
tion:
And during the meat cutter negotiations in September
[1991], I believe was the beginning of the button cam-
paign. We had meat cutter and clerks locals all around
the area ordering buttons which said solidarity works
and urging their members to wear them in the stores as
a sign of solidarity between clerks and meat cutters in
the lead up to meat cutter negotiations, during meat cut-
ter negotiations.
Rockwell testified further that in September 1991 he distrib-
uted various union buttons3 to Fairfield store employees and
thereafter had occasion to observe the employees wearing the
buttons. Subsequently he noticed that the employees were no
longer wearing the buttons and was told that management
was not allowing the buttons to be worn. Rockwell spoke to
Store Manager Rich Paper who told him the ‘‘Solidarity
Works’’ buttons were not allowed by Respondent.
Rich Paper testified that in the fall of 1991 he observed
Rockwell pass out the union buttons to meatcutter employees
in one of the employees’ breakrooms and observed the em-
ployees put them on. Paper testified he told the employees
that they had to remove the buttons which they did. Paper
testified that Rockwell thereafter asked him what Respond-
ent’s policy was respecting the union buttons and he told
Rockwell the buttons were not approved by Respondent.
By letter dated October 23, 1991, the Union asked Re-
spondent to approve Fairfield store employees wearing the
‘‘Solidarity Works’’ button. By letter dated November 5,
1991, Respondent denied the request.
Various employees whose testimony was either
uncontradicted or corroborated by Paper testified that during
this period they wore one of the four buttons involved at the
Fairfield store and were told either by Paper directly or by
others at Paper’s admitted instruction to remove all union
buttons and insignia. There is no dispute that Respondent re-
quired one or more of its employees to remove each of the
four buttons or pins identified above under color of Respond-
ent’s dress policy no button rule. There is also no dispute
that in requiring the removal of the buttons and pins, the em-
ployees were told only that the dress policy no button rule
required the pin’s removal or that the button or pin was un-
approved and therefore must be removed. No contention was
made that further explanations were conveyed to employees
respecting why, when, or where such buttons must be re-
moved.
2. Other buttons and pins
Fairfield store checker, Victoria Scopesie, testified that she
regularly wore various decorative pins and adornments while
working without ever obtaining prior approval from manage-
ment or being told not to wear or to remove any particular
item. Produce Manager Douglas Caluya testified that he ob-
1246 DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
4 Respondent’s dress policy’s requirement that employees first ob-
tain Respondent’s permission to wear union buttons and pins cou-
pled with the fact that such permission was without exception with-
held by Respondent renders the rule at issue herein for purposes of
this analysis the same as an outright ban or prohibition on union but-
tons and insignia. If restrictions on buttons are inappropriate, prior
approval is equally wrong, Middletown Hospital Assn., 282 NLRB
541, 552–553 (1985).
served checker employees wearing buttons bearing the photo-
graphs of baseball little league players during the period at
issue without objection by management. Store Manager
Paper testified that he simply had not observed the various
pins and adornments allegedly worn by Scopesie and others
and, had he seen them, he would have required their removal
unless they were within the general themes permitted by Re-
spondent as described below.
There was no dispute that employees are regularly encour-
aged to wear and do wear promotional buttons, signs, and
logos of various sizes and colors in augmentation of par-
ticular product promotions then being held in the store. Thus,
for example, a tree pin was worn by employees to support
Respondent’s promotion of Nut Tree Ice Cream. California
Lotto pins prepared by Respondent were worn to encourage
the sale of lottery chances. Various adhesive signs or mes-
sages are stuck to employes’ clothing promoting particular
products on sale at the store. So, too, the employees’ wearing
of seasonal theme pins or other adornments is allowed or
even encouraged by Respondent without requiring specific
prior approval of given items to be worn for such celebra-
tions as Christmas, Halloween, and Valentine’s day. Indeed
on Halloween Eve and a few other occasions, Respondent’s
dress code is put in abeyance and employee costumes are en-
couraged in support of seasonal themes. Further, on special
occasions, Respondent has allowed or encouraged employee
wearing of particular items. For example, by memorandum
dated January 28, 1991, Respondent allowed employees to
wear American Flags or yellow ribbons in support of the
Desert Storm military campaign.
C. Analysis and Conclusions
1. General union button law under the Act
The Board with Court approval has long held the wearing
of union buttons or insignia activity protected under Section
7 of the Act absent ‘‘special considerations,’’ Republic Avia-
tion Corp. v. NLRB, 324 U.S. 793 (1945); Control Services,
303 NLRB 481 (1991). See also the historical discussion in
Nordstrom, Inc., 264 NLRB 698, 700 (1982). The Court in
Republic Aviation, supra, 324 U.S. at 798–799, characterized
the analysis involved in such cases as one of
working out an adjustment between the undisputed right
of self-organization assured to employees under the
Wagner Act and the equally undisputed right of em-
ployers to maintain discipline in their establishments.
The Board has evolved a substantial body of law on the
question. The cases deal with a variety of ‘‘special cir-
cumstances’’ offered to justify restriction on the wearing of
union buttons by employees. Obscene or derogatory material
may be denied protection. Language which improperly in-
cites or causes disruption or results in an adverse impact on
production may be barred in certain circumstances. The bur-
den of proof respecting the existence of special cir-
cumstances which justify prohibition or limitation of union
buttons is on the employer who seeks to justify the limitation
of employees’ Section 7 rights.
As set forth in greater detail, infra, the Board and courts
have also considered the argument that certain employers
have a business interest in preserving their employees’ uni-
formity of appearance when they are dealing with the public.
Such interests may be a factor supporting the limitation of
union insignia. Nordstrom, supra. In evaluating such argu-
ments, the Board considers whether the employer has in fact
strictly limited the wearing of similar adornments.
Albertsons, Inc., 300 NLRB 1013 (1990). Further the cases
require that any rule justified under such a rationale not be
overboard and prohibit the wearing of buttons in areas out-
side the public eye. Albertsons, Inc., 272 NLRB 865 (1984).
2. Arguments of the parties
Initially the General Counsel attacks Respondent’s dress
code union button prohibition4
because, on its face, it is overly broad. Respondent’s
policy applies to employees everywhere on Respond-
ent’s facility, including noncustomer areas such as the
employee breakroom. Such as overly broad rule violates
Section 8(a)(1) of the Act. Mack’s Supermarkets, Inc.,
[288 NLRB 1082 (1988)]; Brunswick Food and Drug,
284 NLRB 663, 638–4 (1987); Alert Medical Trans-
port, [276 NLRB 631 (1985)]; Page Avjet Corp., 275
NLRB 773, 776–777 (1985); Albertson’s Inc., 272
NLRB 865, 866 (1984). [The G.C. Br. at 9–10.]
Respondent argues on brief at 16:
The Employer’s Dress Code Policy, as it refers to
the prohibition of wearing Union buttons, is reasonable
since it applies solely to employees during working
hours. There is no evidence in the case at bar that the
rule has been applied to non-selling areas nor is there
any evidence that the rule as been applied to employees
during nonworking time.
The General Counsel cites the appropriate cases for the
proposition that Respondent must demonstrate special cir-
cumstances to justify its prohibition. Respondent defends its
rule based on two special circumstances. Initially Respondent
notes that only some employees attempted to wear the ‘‘Soli-
darity Works’’ buttons and, accordingly, it may be fairly in-
ferred that others did not wish to wear it and therefore there
were divergent opinions amongst the employees in the
Employer’s Fairfield store with respect to supporting
the Union’s attempt to have employees wear the ‘‘Soli-
darity Works’’ button while at work. [R. Br. at 17.]
Thus the argument is that the prohibition avoids employee
dissension and disruption.
Second, Respondent argues on brief at 18:
[T]he Employer has a legitimate business right to main-
tain a uniform dress code which will attract and retain
customers so that the business can increase profits and
1247RALEY’S INC.
5 Store Manager Paper testified he saw Rockwell passing out ‘‘Sol-
idarity Works’’ buttons to meat department employees. He testified
as follows in the response to Respondent’s representative Baruch’s
questions:
Q. Did you say anything to anybody about it?
A. I must clarify that it wasn’t in the meat department. It was
back by the smoke break room.
Q. Okay. But the employees that [Rockwell] was handing the
buttons to, were they meat department employees?
A. Yes they were.
Q. What, if anything, did you say to him about it, or the the
employees?
A. I had told the employees that they would have to remove
them.
Q. And what did they do.
A. They removed them.
6 Even were the rule as written and applied to be viewed as some-
how ambiguous, the Board with court approval has long held that
any limitation on employee exercise of Sec. 7 rights on company
premises must be clear and ambiguous. As the Second Circuit has
noted:
[T]he risk of ambiguity must be held against the promulgator of
the rule rather than the employees who are supposed to abide
by it. [NLRB v. Miller-Charles & Co., 341 F.2d 870, 874 (2d
Cir. 1965).]
See also St. Joseph’s Hospital, 263 NLRB 375 (1982);
Presbyterian/St. Lukes Center v. NLRB, 723 F.2d 1468 (10th Cir.
1983).
expand its operations. The expansion of the Employer’s
business is directly related to productivity and customer
satisfaction. The dress code is grounded in a legitimate
concern for the Employer’s business and in no way
interferes with the employee’ right under the Act.
Respondent cites two cases supporting this proposition:
Burger King Corp. v. NLRB, 725 F.2d 1053 (6th Cir. 1984),
and Hertz Rent-A-Car, 305 NLRB 487 (1991).
Answering Respondent’s first special circumstances argu-
ment, the General Counsel argues that Respondent failed on
this record to offer any evidence that there was any difficulty
whatsoever respecting the wearing of the buttons among ei-
ther employees or customers. Addressing Respondent’s asser-
tion that Respondent’s rule is justified by its legitimate desire
for a uniform employee appearance before the public, the
General Counsel argues that no specific evidence was offered
to support such a need. The General Counsel further asserts
that Respondent’s employees’ appearance and the nature of
their contact with the public does not justify such a prohibi-
tion citing Burger King Corp., 265 NLRB 1507 (1982). See
also Hertz Rent-A-Car, 297 NLRB 363 (1989).
The General Counsel and Respondent also disagree re-
specting whether the wearing of the buttons was protected
under the Act. The General Counsel relies on the case law
holding the wearing of union buttons to be a Section 7 activ-
ity and therefore providing general protection to employees
wearing such buttons, the timing of Respondent’s prohibition
wearing of the buttons, and his contentions respecting the
disparate enforcement of the rule to establish protected con-
duct. Respondent cites NLRB v. Harrah’s Club, 337 F.2d
177 (9th Cir. 1964), for the proposition that the button wear-
ing of employees must be undertaken for a protected purpose
and notes that in the instant case during the period in ques-
tion unit employees were under a contract with at least 6
months remaining before its expiration date. Thus Respond-
ent argues no protected activities took place. Respecting the
‘‘Solidarity Works’’ button, Respondent argues the button
‘‘makes no reference to the negotiations which were about
to begin and in no way identified the button as supporting
the Meat Cutters’ in their forthcoming negotiations’’ (R. Br.
at 17 fn. 17).
Finally, the General Counsel argues that Respondent has
enforced the dress code in a disparate and discriminatory
manner which independently renders the rule invalid. Re-
spondent contests these factual assertions of the General
Counsel.
3. Analysis
The various arguments of the parties noted in part above
deserve separate consideration.
a. The contention that Respondent’s no button rule is
fatally overboard
Respondent’s posted rule prohibits button wearing while
‘‘on duty’’ without further elaboration. No evidence was of-
fered respecting either the division of employee time work-
ing in public and nonpublic areas of the facility nor of the
circumstances of employee breaks and meal periods. There
was no record contention made or evidence offered to sup-
port the proposition that there were any exceptions to or lim-
itations on Respondent’s agent’s general instructions to em-
ployees not to wear union buttons. It appears that most em-
ployees were told to remove buttons during the time they
were at work in public areas of the facility. The store man-
ager on at least one occasion, however, told employees in the
breakroom to remove pins they were wearing there.5
Respondent’s rules does not on its face limit its prohibi-
tion of employee wearing of union buttons to public areas of
its store. There is simply no geographical or locational limi-
tation in the rule’s reach. Nor did Respondent at any time
either orally add such a limitation to its rule or limit its en-
forcement of the rule to employees working in public areas
of the facility. I find the rule therefore applied unambig-
uously to both public and nonpublic areas of Respondent’s
store.6
The Board in Albertsons, Inc., 272 NLRB 865, held a
union button prohibition fatally overboard and violative of
Section 8(a)(1) of the Act because it improperly applied to
nonselling as well as selling areas and because it applied to
employee breaktime as well as times when employees were
working. Based on that decision and the cases cited by the
General Counsel in his argument on the issue quoted supra,
I find that Respondent’s rule is fatally overboard and there-
fore violates Section 8(a)(1) of the Act. It follows further,
and I find, that all Respondent’s agents’ directions to em-
ployees to remove their union buttons and pins pursuant to
the invalid rule also violate Section 8(a)(1) of the Act. Saint
Vincent’s Hospital, 265 NLRB 38 (1982).
b. The contention that Respondent’s no button rule is
justified by special circumstances
Given my findings that Respondent’s rule prohibiting the
wearing of union buttons is overboard and hence invalid,
there is no further need to consider the validity of the rule
as applied to selling areas or as applied to particular buttons.
Reviewing authority may differ with my analysis, however,
making it possible that this matter will be remanded for fur-
1248 DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
ther consideration of these issues. Further, a narrow holding
that the rule is invalid because applied to nonselling areas,
such as held in Albertsons, Inc., supra, may result in the rule
thereafter being limited to public areas and thus simply invite
further litigation respecting the unanswered issues presented.
See for example the subsequent litigation of the same rule
more narrowly applied in Albertsons, Inc., 300 NLRB 1013.
Accordingly, I shall consider the additional arguments of
the parties respecting the validity of Respondent’s no button
policy, assuming for purposes of the analysis that the rule is
not defeated by its application to nonselling or nonpublic
areas and to employee break and meal periods.
(1) Respondent’s employee dissention argument
As set forth, supra, Respondent argues that its button pro-
hibition had the salutary effect of dampening employee dis-
sent in the case of the ‘‘Solidarity Works’’ button. The evi-
dence offered to support this argument was limited to the
simple assertion that, given that only some employees wore
the button and other employees did not, there was a dif-
ference of opinion between and among employees respecting
the issue underlying the button. From this assertion Respond-
ent argues that such differing employee opinions would be
publicized and differences in views between employees exac-
erbated by the wearing of ‘‘Solidarity Works’’ pins which
could in turn cause employee dissension. This risk and the
fact that limiting button wearing diminishes or eliminates it,
argues Respondent, independently justifies a prohibition of
the ‘‘Solidarity Works’’ button and other union buttons.
The employer bears the affirmative burden of dem-
onstrating the special circumstances advanced as justifying
restrictions on employees’ Section 7 rights. This burden ex-
tends to the demonstration that the buttons were provocative
on their face or were reasonably likely to or did in fact cause
diminution in employee discipline or decorum. Virginia Elec-
tric & Power Co., 260 NLRB 408 (1982).
Respondent’s argument, while certainly ingenious, is not
sustainable on this record. Thus I find that the slogan on the
button, ‘‘Solidarity Works,’’ is not facially provocative and
may not reasonably be expected to cause employee dissen-
sion, disruption, or other discipline problems justifying its
prohibition. Respondent offered no evidence of actual disrup-
tion or other adverse effects at the facility. Accordingly, Re-
spondent’s argument here fails, Nordstrom, Inc., 264 NLRB
698 (1982).
(2) Respondent’s argument that its uniform dress code
justifies its button prohibition
Respondent argues that its employees are required to wear
uniform clothing which presents a desirable and wholesome
image to the public. One part of this uniform appearance pol-
icy is the restriction against any buttons or pins of any kind,
trade union, or otherwise, unless approved by management.
This policy, Respondent argues, augments the uniform,
wholesome, professional appearance of its employees and
therefore constitutes a legitimate business reason why it is
entitled to prohibit its employees from wearing union but-
tons.
Setting aside the critical issues of when and where such
a rule could be applied and, further, whether Respondent’s
dress code has been uniformly applied at relevant times, the
question presented is whether, under Board law, Respond-
ent’s uniform appearance arguments rise to the level of a
‘‘special circumstance’’ sufficient on the facts of this case to
justify a union button prohibition. That narrow question is
considered below.
(a) Case law on employee appearance as a special
circumstance or business justification for prohibiting
employee wearing of union insignia or buttons
The Board in Floridan Hotel of Tampa, 137 NLRB 1484
(1962), enfd. as modified on other grounds 318 F.2d 545
(5th Cir. 1963), specifically held that the fact that employees
come into contact with customers of the employer does not,
standing alone, rise to the level of a special consideration
justifying employer prohibition of employees wearing union
buttons. In Harrah’s Club, 143 NLRB 1356 (1963), the
Board found the employer violated Section 8(a)(1) of the Act
by prohibiting the wearing of small neat and inconspicuous
union buttons on the uniforms of waiters in a world class
theater-restaurant even where the prohibition applied to all
jewelry and was part of a longstanding benignly initiated,
rigorously and consistently applied appearance policy. The
Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals denied enforcement of the
Board’s order, NLRB v. Harrah’s Club, 337 F.2d 177 (1964),
finding the wearing of a union button on the facts of that
case not to be protected activity. The court further held that,
even assuming the employees actions were protected, the
Board had failed to balance those employee activities against
the employer’s right to maintain discipline. In this regard
Judge Hamlin writing for the court held at 180:
Most business establishments, particularly those which,
like respondent, furnish services rather then goods, try
to project a certain type of image to the public. One of
the most essential elements in that image is the appear-
ance of its uniformed employees who furnish that serv-
ice in person to customers. The evidence shows that re-
spondent has paid close attention to its public image by
a uniform policy of long standing against the wearing
of jewelry of any kind on the uniform. . . . This is a
valid exercise of business judgment, and it is not the
province of the Board or of this court to substitute its
judgment for that of management so long as the exer-
cise is reasonable and does not interfere with a pro-
tected purpose.
In Pay’N Save Corp. v. NLRB, 641 F.2d 697 (9th Cir.
1989), enfg. 247 NLRB 1346 (1980), the same court distin-
guished its earlier holding in NLRB v. Harrah’s Club, supra,
on the grounds that the button wearing at issue before it had
a protected purpose unlike that in Harrah’s. The court at 641
F.2d 701 noted that its earlier holding that the need for a
consistent appearance of an employer’s uniformed staff could
justify prohibiting the wearing of buttons was dictum unnec-
essary to the decision of the case. The court went further,
641 F.2d at 701 fn. 10:
10 Moreover Harrah’s Club would be distinguishable
from the instant case even if wearing union buttons
were a per se protected right without the need for a link
with an otherwise protected purpose. For in Harrah’s
the court’s dictum indicates that the strong employer in-
1249RALEY’S INC.
7 Thus the Board declined to modify its general holdings as a re-
sult of the court’s decision. Black’s Law Dictionary (5th ed. 1979)
defines the term ‘‘law of the case’’ in part as follows:
Doctrine of ‘‘Law of the Case’’ provides that when appellate
court has rendered a decision and states in its opinion a rule of
law necessary to decision, that rule is to be followed in all sub-
sequent proceedings in the same action.
In limiting its decision on remand to the law of the case, the Board
specifically declines to reverse or modify its general holdings to the
contrary. ‘‘Law of the Case’’ decisions do not represent the general
position of the Board and are not binding authority on administrative
law judges in cases other than the single specific case under discus-
sion.
8 As noted, supra, the cases frequently discuss the size and/or
gaudy nature of particular pins which were prohibited by an em-
ployer who allowed other, smaller less gaudy pins to be worn by
employees. This is not the case herein. Respondent did not argue
that any particular pin was overly large or gaudy and for that reason
should be prohibited, Further, the four pin types herein are simply
neither large nor gaudy and include several which were highly in-
conspicuous, yet the wearing of each was prohibited by Respondent.
The issues of size and color discussed in those decisions are there-
fore not a part of the instant case.
terest in the image its employees presented to the pub-
lic would outweigh the weak employee interest in wear-
ing union insignia in the absence of any organizing or
collective-bargaining activity. In our case the employee
interest is much stronger, since an organizing drive was
underway, and the employer’s interest in employee ap-
pearance is much weaker, since Pay’N Save’s clerks in
their bright orange smocks have little in common with
the service personnel of a casino/restaurant ‘‘on a par
with . . . the finest theater-restaurants in the world.’’
337 F.2d at 178 n. 1.
In subsequent cases the Board has more favorably consid-
ered employer’s uniform appearance arguments. Thus in
United Parcel Service, 195 NLRB 441, 441 fn. 2 (1972), the
Board specifically noted the judge’s finding that Respondent
had a
history of presenting to the customers and the general
public its image of a neatly uniformed driver and the
fact that this is an important part of Respondent’s pub-
lic image.
The appearance justification may also come into play
where no employee uniforms are involved. Thus in Davison-
Paxon Co. v. NLRB, 462 F.2d 364 (5th Cir. 1972), denying
enf. to 191 NLRB 58 (1971), the court found a high fashion
department store could prohibit the wearing of large gaudy
union election buttons by its employees in selling areas dur-
ing an organizing campaign when it permitted other less ob-
trusive and disruptive buttons to be worn. In Nordstrom, Inc.,
264 NLRB 698 (1982), another high fashion department
store employer was held not privileged to prohibit the wear-
ing of small, discrete union buttons bearing the designation
‘‘steward’’ by employees in selling area.
In Burger King Corp., 265 NLRB 1507 (1982), the Board,
reversing the judge below, found that an employer’s prohibi-
tion of small union buttons was violative of the Act and re-
jected the argument that simple customer contact by uni-
formed employees does not justify employer prohibition of
small unobtrusive buttons simply to achieve a neat standard
appearance. The Sixth Circuit of the court of appeals denied
enforcement of the decision in Burger King Corp. v. NLRB,
725 F.2d 1053 (6th Cir. 1984), holding broadly that employ-
ers whose employees wear uniforms in dealing with the pub-
lic may prohibit those employees in a consistent and non-
discriminatory way from wearing union buttons.
The Board and Sixth Circuit remain of different views.
The Board in Page Avjet Corp., 275 NLRB 773 (1985), and
Nemacolin Country Club, 291 NLRB 456 (1988), has ap-
proved administrative law judge decisions noting that the
Board has not acquiesced in the Sixth Circuit’s holding in
Burger King, supra. In Hertz Rent-A-Car, 297 NLRB 363
(1989), the Board again held that mere exposure to the pub-
lic by uniformed employees is not a sufficient justification
for banning union buttons. The Sixth Circuit in an
unpublished decision denied enforcement and remanded the
case to the Board. The Board in Hertz Rent-A-Car, 305
NLRB 487, accepted the court’s remand as the ‘‘law of the
Case.’’7
(b) The interests to be balanced
Given the authority cited, it follows that it is appropriate
to balance the employees’ rights to engage in Section 7 ac-
tivities with the employer’s rights under the particular facts
presented to maintain proper discipline in the workplace. Re-
public Aviation Corp. v. NLRB, 324 U.S. 793, 798–799
(1945).
(i) The nature and strength of employee’s Section 7
right to wear the union button insignia at issue herein8
Respondent argues that the employees union button wear-
ing activities at issue herein were not for any special purpose
such as for organizational reasons or for purposes of obtain-
ing better working conditions. Citing NLRB v. Harrah’s
Club, 337 F.2d 177 (9th Cir. 1964), Respondent argues the
activities were unprotected. While it may be argued that sub-
sequent cases in the Ninth Circuit, as cited and discussed,
supra, have distanced themselves from the discussion in
Harrah’s of a necessary ‘‘purpose’’ to protected button
wearing and that the Board has not acquiesced or adopted the
concept, the context of employee button wearing deserves
further consideration.
The four buttons, noted supra, involved herein were passed
by the union business representative and others to both meat-
cutter unit employees and retail clerk unit employees during
the time that meatcutter contract negotiations were either
soon to begin or just underway. Were the retail clerk unit
employees to support the collective-bargaining demands of
the meatcutter employees, the latter’s bargaining position
would to some degree be enhanced. The store’s meatcutter
unit employees were therefore directly engaged in actions for
their own mutual aid and protection and in support of collec-
tive-bargaining respecting their own terms and conditions of
employment when they wore the pins touting the Union and
the benefits of ‘‘solidarity.’’ This is clearly protected activity
in support of collective-bargaining and noted as such in
Harrah’s, supra. Since the meatcutter unit employees were
1250 DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
9 As Respondent notes under the Sixth Circuit cases, cited supra,
the very existence of a uniform policy for employees exposed to the
public is a sufficient business justification to admit restrictions on
union buttons. Under those cases, this further analysis would not be
necessary. To the extent Respondent relies on the Sixth Circuit’s re-
jection of the Board’s position, it may simply be said that I am
bound to follow current Board law unless and until it is overturned
by the Supreme Court or the Board.
Respondent’s citation of the Board’s decision in Hertz Rent-A-Car,
305 NLRB 487, for the proposition that the Board now agrees with
the Sixth Circuit’s holdings in this area is not correct since, as noted
supra, the Board in Hertz specifically asserts the court’s ruling
stands only as ‘‘the law of the case,’’ 305 NLRB at 488.
also asked by Respondent to remove their buttons pursuant
to the dress code rule, Respondent’s arguments that the retail
clerk unit employees were engaged in activities too attenu-
ated to be protected does not apply to the meatcutters.
The Union also encouraged the employees in the retail
clerk unit to wear the distributed pins. Some did and were
asked by Respondent to remove them pursuant to the dress
code rule. The retail clerk unit employees, whose own con-
tract negotiations were not then pending, were showing soli-
darity with the meatcutters by wearing the pins, especially
the pin bearing the slogan ‘‘Solidarity Works.’’ Employee
actions making common cause with or supporting other em-
ployees in other bargaining units or employed by other em-
ployers have long been regarded as protected concerted ac-
tivity under the Act. The Board in Boise Cascade Corp., 300
NLRB 80 (1990), recently considered whether an employee
wearing a button supporting employees on strike against an-
other employer was engaged in protected concerted activity.
In that case, Judge Robert A. Giannasi noted with Board ap-
proval at 82:
By wearing the pin, which he had obtained from a sis-
ter local on strike against International Paper, another
. . . . manufacturer in nearby Jay, Maine, [the em-
ployee] . . . . was making common cause with those
employees in their dispute against International Paper.
This type of activity is protected even though it relates
to the working conditions of another employer. See
Eastex Inc. v. NLRB, 437 U.S. 556, 564–565 (1978). As
Judge Learned Hand observed long ago, employees
making common cause with fellow employees of an-
other employer are engaged in protected concerted ac-
tivity because, even though ‘‘the immediate quarrel
does not itself concern them,’’ the solidarity thus estab-
lished assures them, if their ‘‘turn ever comes,’’ of the
support of those ‘‘whom they are all then helping.’’
NLRB v. Peter Cailler Kohler Swiss Chocolates Co.,
130 F.2d 503, 505–506 (2d Cir. 1942). Accordingly, I
find that [the employer’s agent’s] conduct in barring the
IP pin was violative of Section 8(a)(1) of the Act.
Surely the activities of the instant nonmeatcutter employ-
ees in showing ‘‘solidarity’’ with their fellow employee
meatcutters are no less protected activity than those found in
Boise Cascade. I so find. I find therefore that the activities
of the employees wearing the buttons at issue herein were
engaged in both direct support collective-bargaining and in
actions for mutual aid protection. The Section 7 activities are
direct and unattenuated.
Finally the activities at issue here necessarily include any
and all possible protected activity expressible by means of a
button or pin. This is so because Respondent’s rule prohibits
all union and other buttons irrespective of their content or the
underlying employee or union cause or grievance.
(ii) Respondent’s uniform appearance argument
on its facts9
Under the cases cited supra, it is appropriate to consider
Respondent’s employee appearance policy as applied by it to
determine the extent to which union buttons may be incon-
sistent with or destructive of that policy.
While the record is not replete with details of Respond-
ent’s store’s operations, it is sufficient to support a finding
that Respondent’s store is a large retail grocery store of the
modern variety offering a broad range of grocery and related
items for sale. There is no suggestion that Respondent’s op-
erations differ significantly from those of large modern gro-
cery stores generally or that its employees has been assigned
or assumed duties and responsibilities different from those in
such other grocery stores.
Respondent implicitly sells services as well as goods and
may properly aspire to distinguish its grocery stores and en-
hance their reputation and therefore their products’ sales and
general marketability by the appearance of its employees. I
find that Respondent’s dress code is a legitimate part of Re-
spondent’s attempt to improve the public’s impression of its
overall operations. Without detracting from any of the above,
however, I also find that Respondent’s business does not tra-
ditionally require nor does its uniform dress policy establish
the degree of rigor in appearance uniformity those of certain
other industries and employers.
The aprons and smocks of Respondent’s cashiers, clerks,
and meatcutters worn over employee selected white shirts,
dark slacks, and shoes are simply not the equivalent of tradi-
tional uniforms in the sense of distinctive clothing intended
to identify the wearer as member of a certain organization
or group. Thus, the employee appearance produced by con-
formity to Respondent’s dress code does not rise to the level
of the liveries and uniforms of the world class restaurants or
United Parcel Services drivers either in appearance or in tra-
dition. As the Ninth Circuit noted in Pay’N Save Corp. v.
NLRB, 641 F.2d 697 (9th Cir. 1989), a store clerk’s bright
apron does not match the formal attire of a maitre d’hotel
in either the importance of appearance or the need for metic-
ulous uniformity.
Further, the court in NLRB v. Harrah’s Club, 337 F.2d
177 (9th Cir. 1964), as quoted supra, noted that a uniform
public image of an employer’s employees is more important
to the providers of services rather than to providers of goods.
Respondent, however distinguished its service, is primarily a
purveyor of groceries and related items at retail. Again under
the cases, such enterprises have a lesser interest in minutely
controlling the appearance of their employees.
The Board cases cited and discussed, supra, which find a
substantial justification for restricting employee public wear-
ing of union buttons involve much more formal and stand-
ardized apparel or appearance and occur in industries where
such standardized service is a very important or critical ele-
ment of the service offered for sale. A grocery store, even
if its employees wear standardized aprons and smocks over
1251RALEY’S INC.
10 Inasmuch as I have found that Respondent’s uniform appearance
argument is insufficient to sustain its ban on all unapproved pins in-
cluding union buttons, even if consistently and vigorously enforced,
I need not and shall not resolve the disputed testimony respecting
whether Respondent uniformly applied and enforced its no pin pol-
icy.
employee selected clothing of standardized color and type is
not such a business.
As noted, supra, the Sixth Circuit is contrary, the Ninth
Circuit in Harrah’s Club, the Fifth Circuit in Davison-Paxon
Co. v. NLRB, while not allowing the Board to limit restric-
tions on large gaudy or electioneering buttons did not rule
on the smaller buttons at issue here.
As noted, the Ninth Circuit in Pay’N Save, supra, sus-
tained the Board’s decision disallowing regulation of em-
ployee buttons in a case involving an employer engaged, as
in the instant case, in the retail sale of goods rather than
services.
Thus, Respondent’s arguments that it has legitimate,
strong, and compelling interest in controlling employee ap-
pearance are weakened by the nature and traditions of gro-
cery store operations in our culture and the lack of record
evidence suggesting that Respondent’s store operations sig-
nificantly differ from such operations. Respondent’s claims
for the need for prohibition of union pins as part of its uni-
form appearance policy is further undermined by its admitted
policy of encouraging employees to wear buttons, pins, and
slogans which advertise products currently being promoted
by Respondent.
Respondent’s argument is further weakened by the fact
that it does not in actuality maintain a uniform appearance
of its employees free from various buttons and pins bearing
slogans or other sales messages. Thus, Respondent’s asserted
need to keep a discrete union service button from being used
as an employee’s tie tack to sustain a uniform employee ap-
pearance is seemingly diminished if the employee or other
employees are simultaneously wearing various product pro-
motional pins, logos, or slogans. So, too, Respondent’s al-
lowing the wearing of personally selected seasonal pins and
emblems and the occasional authorized button or insignia
discussed, supra, undermines Respondent’s argument that
uniform employee appearance and image requirements justify
restrictions on selling floor or public area employees wearing
union insignia or union buttons.
(c) Analysis and conclusions regarding Respondent’s
uniform appearance policy as a special consideration
justifying prohibition of union button
Based on the cases cited above and the record evidence of
the nature of Respondent’s operations, and further putting the
burden on Respondent to justify its prohibition of employee
protected activities, I find that there is insufficient evidence
to support a finding that Respondent’s uniform appearance
policy is a special circumstance justifying promulgation and
maintenance of a general rule against employee wearing of
union buttons or insignia even were such a rule limited to
selling or public area of Respondent’s store.
More specifically, I do not find that Respondent’s industry
or the manner it has operated its store provides a sufficient
justification for prohibiting employee wearing union buttons.
Thus, I find that neither the operations of a grocery store
generally nor the manner in which Respondent operates its
store, including its appearance requirements described above,
is so rigorous or sensitive that the Board would sustain a
finding of business justification allowing prohibition of em-
ployee wearing of buttons even in public areas.
I further find on the facts of this case, the wearing of the
union buttons or insignia at issue herein would not reason-
ably detract from the appearance of Respondent’s store em-
ployees which Respondent has created and maintained at rel-
evant times. This latter finding is strengthened by the fact
that Respondent’s uniform appearance policy respecting it
employees has at all times allowed and encouraged various
slogans and pins to be worn promoting commercial products.
Simply put, Respondent’s public appearance arguments in
support of a general union button prohibition as described
above are legally insufficient under the cases to overbalance
the right of employees to act in common cause for mutual
aid and protection and in furtherance of collective bargaining
by wearing union buttons. Respondent’s directions that em-
ployees remove their union buttons therefore violates Section
8(a)(1) of the Act. Hertz Rent-A-Car, 297 NLRB 363; Burg-
er King Corp., 265 NLRB 1507; Albertsons, Inc., 300 NLRB
1013; Nordstrom, Inc., 264 NLRB 698.10 Further Respond-
ent’s dress code rule regarding preapproval of union buttons
also violates the Act, Middletown Hospital Assn., 282 NLRB
541, 552–553 (1986). Further, Respondent’s dress code rule
requiring preapproval of union buttons also violates Section
8(a)(1) of the Act. Middletown Hospital Assn., supra.
4. Summary and conclusions
I have that Respondent’s dress code no union button or in-
signia rule impermissibly prohibits employees from wearing
union buttons and insignia in both nonpublic area and during
nonworking time. The entire rule is thus fatally overboard
and its maintenance, publication, and enforcement violates
Section 8(a)(1) of the Act. Consistent with this finding, I fur-
ther find that Respondent’s directions to employees in both
public and nonpublic areas and both on worktime and
breaktime to remove union buttons and insignia pursuant to
this invalid rule independently violate Section 8(a)(1) of the
Act.
In order to avoid the possibility of a remand should re-
viewing authority differ with my conclusion that the rule
fails in its entirely because of its overbreadth, I have also
considered the rule’s validity irrespective of its applicability
to nonpublic areas and employees’ break and lunch periods.
I have further concluded that Respondent’s business oper-
ations and the policy and practices it has maintained respect-
ing the appearance of its employees are not sufficient to sus-
tain its burden of showing special circumstances which jus-
tify a general prohibition of the wearing of union buttons and
insignia by its employees. Thus, I have found Respondent’s
no button rule invalid and violative of Section 8(a)(1) of the
Act even were it limited to public areas and working times.
IV. REMEDY
Having found the Respondent engaged in certain unfair
labor practices, I shall recommend that it be ordered to cease
and desist therefrom and to take certain affirmative action
designed to effectuate the policies of the Act. Consistent with
the teachings of Albertsons, Inc., 300 NLRB 1013, 1013 fn.
1252 DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
11 If no exceptions are filed as provided by Sec. 102.46 of the
Board’s Rules and Regulations, the findings, conclusions, and rec-
ommended Order shall, as provided in Sec. 102.48 of the Rules, be
adopted by the Board and all objections to them shall be deemed
waived for all purposes.
12 If this Order is enforced by a judgment of a United States court
of appeals, the words in the notice reading ‘‘Posted by Order of the
National Labor Relations Board’’ shall read ‘‘Posted Pursuant to a
Judgment of the United States Court of Appeals Enforcing an Order
of the National Labor Relations Board.’’
2, the remedy directed herein shall be coextensive with Re-
spondent’s application of its union button prohibition rule.
On these findings of fact and conclusions of law and on
the entire record, I issue the following recommended11
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1. Respondent is an employer engaged in commerce within
the meaning of Section 2(2), (6), and (7) of the Act.
2. The Union is a labor organization within the meaning
of Section 2(5) of the Act.
3. Respondent violated Section 8(a)(1) of the Act by en-
gaging in the following acts and conduct:
(a) Maintaining, applying, and enforcing a dress code
which requires employer approval of all employee pins and
buttons, and therefore prohibits the wearing of unapproved
union insignia and union buttons in all areas of Respondent’s
stores.
(b) Requiring employees to remove union buttons and in-
signia pursuant to its employee dress code rule.
4. The unfair labor practices described above are unfair
labor practices affecting commerce within the meaning of
Section 2(2), (6), and (7) of the Act.
ORDER
The Respondent, Raley’s Inc., Fairfield, California, its of-
ficers, agents, successors, and assigns, shall
1. Cease and desist from
(a) Maintaining, publicizing, applying, and enforcing its
employee dress code rule requiring employer approval of em-
ployee buttons and pins and which prohibits the wearing of
unapproved union insignia and union buttons, in public and
nonpublic areas.
(b) Telling employees to remove union buttons and insig-
nia pursuant to the employee dress code.
(c) In any like or related manner interfering with, restrain-
ing, or coercing employees in the exercise of the rights guar-
anteed them in Section 7 of the National Labor Relations
Act.
2. Take the following affirmative action necessary to ef-
fectuate the policies of the Act.
(a) Amend Respondent’s employee dress code to rescind
that portion which bans the wearing of all but approved
union buttons and insignia.
(b) Distribute and publicize the amended employee dress
code and its removal of limitations on employees’ rights to
wear union buttons and insignia to the same extent the em-
ployee dress code has previously been publicized and distrib-
uted among employees at any facility where the rule has
been applied.
(c) Preserve and, on request, make available to the Board
or its agents for examination and copying, all payroll records,
social security payment records, timecards, personnel records
and reports, and all other records necessary to analyze the
amount of backpay due under the terms of this Order.
(d) Post at its Fairfield, California facility, and all other fa-
cilities where Respondent’s December 14, 1988 dress code or
any subsequent dress code explanation or modification which
bans the wearing of unapproved union buttons and insignia
has been maintained and enforced copies of the attached no-
tice marked ‘‘Appendix.’’12 Copies of the notice, on forms
provided by the Regional Director for Region 20, in English
and such additional languages as the Regional Director deter-
mines are necessary to fully communicate with employees,
after being signed by the Respondent’s authorized representa-
tive, shall be posted by the Respondent immediately upon re-
ceipt and maintained for 60 consecutive days in conspicuous
places including all places where notices to employees are
customarily posted. Reasonable steps shall be taken by the
Respondent to ensure that the notices are not altered, de-
faced, or covered by any other material.
(e) Notify the Regional Director in writing within 20 days
from the date of this Order what steps the Respondent has
taken to comply.
APPENDIX
NOTICE TO EMPLOYEES
POSTED BY ORDER OF THE
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
An Agency of the United States Government
The National Labor Relations Board has found that we vio-
lated the National Labor Relations Act and has ordered us
to post and abide by this notice.
Section 7 of the Act gives employees these rights.
To organize
To form, join, or assist any union
To bargain collectively through representatives of
their own choice
To act together for other mutual aid or protection
To choose not to engage in any of these protected
concerted activities.
One of the rights guaranteed to employees by Section 7
of the National Labor Relations Act is the right to wear
union buttons or insignia free from employee prohibition or
restriction absent special circumstances requiring such regu-
lation for the preservation of discipline in their establish-
ments.
WE WILL NOT maintain a dress code requiring employer
approval of or prohibiting employees from wearing trade
union insignia or union buttons.
WE WILL NOT order employees to remove union insignia
or buttons pursuant to such a dress code.
WE WILL NOT in any like or related manner interfere with,
restrain, or coerce our employees in the exercise of the rights
guaranteed them in Section 7 of the National Labor Relations
Act.
WE WILL amend our employee dress code to delete our re-
striction on employee’s rights to wear unapproved union but-
tons or insignia.
1253RALEY’S INC.
WE WILL post or otherwise publicize our amended dress
code wherever our previous dress code was posted or pub-
licized and will post this notice in each of our grocery stores
where that improper dress code was maintained.
RALEY’S INC.