RAADZ INC.

Patent Trials and Appeals Board

Jan 26, 2022

2022000911 (P.T.A.B. Jan. 26, 2022)

UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE United States Patent and Trademark Office Address: COMMISSIONER FOR PATENTS P.O. Box 1450 Alexandria, Virginia 22313-1450 www.uspto.gov APPLICATION NO. FILING DATE FIRST NAMED INVENTOR ATTORNEY DOCKET NO. CONFIRMATION NO. 17/069,837 10/13/2020 Matthew Clark Miller 2800.CON1 USP 8079 159068 7590 01/26/2022 Kelly J. Hollowell 1804 Foxhound Ln Virginia Beach, VA 23454 EXAMINER SNIDER, SCOTT ART UNIT PAPER NUMBER 3688 NOTIFICATION DATE DELIVERY MODE 01/26/2022 ELECTRONIC Please find below and/or attached an Office communication concerning this application or proceeding. The time period for reply, if any, is set in the attached communication. Notice of the Office communication was sent electronically on above-indicated "Notification Date" to the following e-mail address(es): amanda@21stcip.com kelly@21stcip.com PTOL-90A (Rev. 04/07) UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE ____________ BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD ____________ Ex parte MATTHEW CLARK MILLER ____________ Appeal 2022-000911 Application 17/069,837 Technology Center 3600 ____________ Before HUBERT C. LORIN, NINA L. MEDLOCK, and AMEE A. SHAH, Administrative Patent Judges. MEDLOCK, Administrative Patent Judge. DECISION ON APPEAL STATEMENT OF THE CASE Appellant1 appeals under 35 U.S.C. § 134(a) from the Examiner’s final rejection of claims 1-20. We have jurisdiction under 35 U.S.C. § 6(b). We AFFIRM. 1 We use the term “Appellant” to refer to “applicant” as defined in 37 C.F.R. § 1.42. Our decision references Appellant’s Appeal Brief (“Appeal Br.,” filed June 14, 2021) and Reply Brief (“Reply Br.,” mailed November 18, 2021), and the Examiner’s Answer (“Ans.,” mailed September 24, 2021), Advisory Action (“Advisory Act.,” mailed April 28, 2021), and Final Office Action (“Final Act.,” mailed March 17, 2021). Appellant identifies the inventor, Matthew Clark Miller, and RAADZ, Inc. as the real parties in interest (Appeal Br. 3). Appeal 2022-000911 Application 17/069,837 2 CLAIMED INVENTION The Specification states, “[t]he present disclosure is directed to a system, method, and apparatus configured to rank and reward users that complete reviews” (Spec. ¶ 5). Claims 1 and 17 are the independent claims on appeal. Claim 1, reproduced below with bracketed notations added, is illustrative of the claimed subject matter: 1. A method to encourage thoughtful review of advertisements, comprising: [(a)] causing, via a processor, an advertisement to be presented at a plurality of user devices to a plurality of users during a feedback session that is related to the advertisement; [(b)] receiving, in the processor from the user devices, an answer value from each of the plurality of users in response to a query to predict how effective each user of the plurality of users thought the advertisement would be for the typical person, wherein the query is included in or regards the advertisement; [(c)] calculating, via the processor, a comparison value representative of a thoughtful answer determined as a function of the answer values from the plurality of users; [(d)] determining, via the processor, for each of the users, the thoughtfulness of each user’s answer, based on calculating a deviation value between the respective answer value for each user and the comparison value; [(e)] ranking, via the processor, the plurality of users based on the respective thoughtfulness of each user’s answer such that a lower ranking corresponds to a more thoughtful answer; and [(f)] causing, via the processor, a reward to be provided to at least one user associated with the lower ranking. REJECTIONS Claims 1-20 are rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 101 as directed to a judicial exception without significantly more. Appeal 2022-000911 Application 17/069,837 3 Claims 1-20 are rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103 as unpatentable over Marsh et al. (US 8,554,601 B1, issued Oct. 8, 2013) (“Marsh”) and Mallon et al. (US 2015/0213483 A1, published July 30, 2015) (“Mallon”). ANALYSIS Patent-Ineligible Subject Matter Under 35 U.S.C. § 101, “[w]hoever invents or discovers any new and useful process, machine, manufacture, or composition of matter, or any new and useful improvement thereof, may obtain a patent therefor.” 35 U.S.C. § 101. The Supreme Court, however, has long interpreted § 101 to include an implicit exception: “[l]aws of nature, natural phenomena, and abstract ideas” are not patentable. Alice Corp. v. CLS Bank Int’l, 573 U.S. 208, 216 (2014). The Supreme Court, in Alice, reiterated the two-step framework previously set forth in Mayo Collaborative Services v. Prometheus Laboratories, Inc., 566 U.S. 66 (2012), “for distinguishing patents that claim laws of nature, natural phenomena, and abstract ideas from those that claim patent-eligible applications of those concepts.” Alice Corp., 573 U.S. at 217. The first step in that analysis is to “determine whether the claims at issue are directed to one of those patent-ineligible concepts.” Id. If the claims are not directed to a patent-ineligible concept, e.g., an abstract idea, the inquiry ends. Otherwise, the inquiry proceeds to the second step where the elements of the claims are considered “individually and ‘as an ordered combination’” to determine whether there are additional elements that “‘transform the nature of the claim’ into a patent-eligible application.” Id. (quoting Mayo, 566 U.S. at 79, 78). This is “a search for an ‘inventive concept’ - i.e., an element or combination of elements that is ‘sufficient to ensure that the Appeal 2022-000911 Application 17/069,837 4 patent in practice amounts to significantly more than a patent upon the [ineligible concept] itself.’” Id. at 217-18 (alteration in original). The U.S. Patent and Trademark Office (the “USPTO”) published revised guidance on January 7, 2019, for use by USPTO personnel in evaluating subject matter eligibility under 35 U.S.C. § 101. 2019 REVISED PATENT SUBJECT MATTER ELIGIBILITY GUIDANCE, 84 Fed. Reg. 50 (Jan. 7, 2019) (the “2019 Revised Guidance”).2 That guidance revised the USPTO’s examination procedure with respect to the first step of the Mayo/Alice framework by (1) “[p]roviding groupings of subject matter that [are] considered an abstract idea”; and (2) clarifying that a claim is not “directed to” a judicial exception if the judicial exception is integrated into a practical application of that exception. Id. at 50. The first step, as set forth in the 2019 Revised Guidance (i.e., Step 2A), is, thus, a two-prong test. In Step 2A, Prong One, we look to whether the claim recites a judicial exception, e.g., one of the following three groupings of abstract ideas: (1) mathematical concepts; (2) certain methods of organizing human activity, e.g., fundamental economic principles or practices, commercial or legal interactions; and (3) mental processes. 2019 Revised Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. at 54. If so, we next determine, in Step 2A, Prong Two, whether the claim as a whole integrates the recited judicial exception into a practical application, i.e., whether the additional elements recited in the claim beyond the judicial exception, apply, rely on, or use the judicial exception in a manner that imposes a meaningful 2 The MANUAL OF PATENT EXAMINING PROCEDURE (“MPEP”) incorporates the revised guidance and subsequent updates at Section 2106 (9th ed. Rev. 10.2019, rev. June 2020). Appeal 2022-000911 Application 17/069,837 5 limit on the judicial exception, such that the claim is more than a drafting effort designed to monopolize the judicial exception. Id. at 54-55. Only if the claim (1) recites a judicial exception and (2) does not integrate that exception into a practical application do we conclude that the claim is “directed to” the judicial exception, e.g., an abstract idea. Id. If the claim is determined to be directed to a judicial exception under revised Step 2A, we next evaluate the additional elements, individually and in combination, in Step 2B, to determine whether they provide an inventive concept, i.e., whether the additional elements or combination of elements amounts to significantly more than the judicial exception itself; only then, is the claim patent eligible. 2019 Revised Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. at 56. Here, in rejecting the pending claims under 35 U.S.C. § 101, the Examiner determined that the claims recite “rewarding reviewers of items for ratings with lower deviations from the mean rating of the item,” i.e., a concept falling within the “[c]ertain methods of organizing human activity” and the “[m]ental processes” groupings of abstract ideas (Final Act. 4-5). The Examiner also determined that the recited abstract idea is not integrated into a practical application, and that the claims do not include additional elements sufficient to amount to significantly more than the abstract idea itself (id. at 5-7). Independent Claim 1 Step One of the Mayo/Alice Framework (2019 Revised Guidance, Step 2A) We are not persuaded by Appellant’s argument that the Examiner erred in determining that claim 1 is directed to an abstract idea (Appeal Br. 9-20). The Federal Circuit has explained that “the ‘directed to’ inquiry Appeal 2022-000911 Application 17/069,837 6 applies a stage-one filter to claims, considered in light of the specification, based on whether ‘their character as a whole is directed to excluded subject matter.’” Enfish, LLC v. Microsoft Corp., 822 F.3d 1327, 1335 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (quoting Internet Patents Corp. v. Active Network, Inc., 790 F.3d 1343, 1346 (Fed. Cir. 2015)). It asks whether the focus of the claims is on a specific improvement in relevant technology or on a process that itself qualifies as an “abstract idea” for which computers are invoked merely as a tool. See id. at 1335-36. Here, it is clear from the Specification (including the claim language) that claim 1 focuses on an abstract idea, and not on an improvement to technology and/or a technical field. The Specification is titled “SYSTEM, METHOD, AND APPARATUS FOR RANKING AND REWARDING USERS THAT COMPLETE REVIEWS,” and describes, in the Background section, that various parties may desire feedback from the public regarding particular items; for example, a company or organization may want feedback regarding a new product or the quality of a particular service that it provides to individuals (Spec. ¶¶ 3-4). Likewise, advertisers may desire feedback from individuals who view their advertisements (id. ¶ 3). Users, however, may not want to participate in telephone surveys, mail surveys, or online surveys in that they can be time consuming, and require individuals to mail documents; or, if the users actually participate in the surveys, they may give rushed answers, which often do not provide an accurate representation of the viewers’ opinions regarding an advertisement (id.). The claimed invention is ostensibly intended to address these issues by providing a system and method that “encourages individuals to complete reviews by incentivizing users with rewards, and allowing users to easily Appeal 2022-000911 Application 17/069,837 7 access items to be reviewed and answer questions using a website or web application” (Spec. ¶ 5). Claim 1, thus, recites a method, for encouraging and rewarding users for providing thoughtful reviews of advertisements, comprising: (1) presenting an advertisement to a number of users during a feedback session, i.e., “causing, via a processor, an advertisement to be presented at a plurality of user devices to a plurality of users during a feedback session that is related to the advertisement” (step (a)); (2) receiving an answer value from each of the users in response to a query; calculating a comparison value for the answer values, e.g., an average or median value; and determining the thoughtfulness of each user’s answer based on the extent to which the answer value deviates from the comparison value, i.e., receiving, in the processor from the user devices, an answer value from each of the plurality of users in response to a query to predict how effective each user of the plurality of users thought the advertisement would be for the typical person, wherein the query is included in or regards the advertisement; calculating, via the processor, a comparison value representative of a thoughtful answer determined as a function of the answer values from the plurality of users; [and] determining, via the processor, for each of the users, the thoughtfulness of each user’s answer, based on calculating a deviation value between the respective answer value for each user and the comparison value (steps (b) through (d)); and (3) ranking the users according to the thoughtfulness of their respective answers and rewarding the user with the most thoughtful answer, i.e., “ranking, via the processor, the plurality of users based on the respective thoughtfulness of each user’s answer such that a lower ranking corresponds to a more thoughtful answer” and “causing, via the processor, a reward to be provided to at least one user associated with the lower ranking” (steps (e) and (f)). We agree with the Examiner that the Appeal 2022-000911 Application 17/069,837 8 claim limitations, when given their broadest reasonable interpretation, describe acts that can be performed by a human mentally or manually, using pen and paper; in other words, claim 1 recites mental processes and, therefore, an abstract idea. See 2019 Revised Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. at 52. See also Versata Dev. Grp., Inc. v. SAP Am., Inc., 793 F.3d 1306, 1335 (Fed. Cir. 2015) (“Courts have examined claims that required the use of a computer and still found that the underlying, patent-ineligible invention could be performed via pen and paper or in a person’s mind.”); CyberSource Corp. v. Retail Decisions, Inc., 654 F.3d 1366, 1373 (Fed. Cir. 2011) (holding that method steps that can be performed in the human mind, or by a human using a pen and paper, are unpatentable mental processes). Appellant maintains that the claimed features cannot be practically implemented by a human because “a single user could not in [his or her] mind alone execute the several-step manipulation of data required to determine what each individual user of the plurality of users thinks an advertisement’s effect will be on a typical user” (Appeal Br. 16). Yet, with the exception of the recited “processor,” we find nothing in claim 1 that precludes the claimed steps from being performed by a human. Cf. Intellectual Ventures I LLC v. Symantec Corp., 838 F.3d 1307, 1318 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (where the claims were directed to a post office for receiving and redistributing email messages on a computer network, the court observed that “with the exception of generic computer-implemented steps, there is nothing in the claims themselves that foreclose[s] them from being performed by a human, mentally or with pen and paper”). Claim 1 calls for (1) collecting information (i.e., an answer value, from each of a plurality of users to whom an advertisement was presented, in Appeal 2022-000911 Application 17/069,837 9 response to a query to predict how effective each user thought the advertisement would be for the typical person); (2) analyzing the information (i.e., calculating a comparison value for the answer values, e.g., an average or median value; and determining the thoughtfulness of each user’s answer based on the extent to which the answer value deviates from the comparison value); and (3) reporting the results of the collection and analysis (i.e., ranking the users based on the thoughtfulness of their answers, and providing an award to the user with the lowest ranking) - all acts that clearly could be performed by a human either mentally or with pen and paper. As the Examiner observes, “[o]ne could perform [the first of] these steps without a computer by simply showing a paper copy of an advertisement to a user and verbally querying a response to the advertisement” (Ans. 3). A human, receiving such user responses, could then calculate a comparison value and determine the thoughtfulness of each user’s answer, either mentally or using pen and paper, based on calculating a deviation value between the respective answer value and the comparison value. Such an individual also could rank the users in her or her mind or with pen and paper, and could provide a reward, e.g., in document form. Appellant responds, arguing that “no single user would be able to practically in [his or her] mind alone and without the benefit of Appellant’s claimed features, determine an ‘answer thoughtfulness ranking’ that considers what all of the plurality of users each think[s] the advertisement’s effect will be on the typical person” (Reply Br. 7). Yet, there is nothing in claim 1 that presupposes, or otherwise requires, any particular volume of information or number of users. And Appellant cannot reasonably maintain that there literally is no amount of information and/or no number of users for Appeal 2022-000911 Application 17/069,837 10 which the claimed method could be practically performed, either mentally or using pen and paper. We also are not persuaded that claim 1 is patent eligible because the claim includes additional elements that integrate the recited abstract idea into a practical application (Appeal Br. 12-20). The 2019 Revised Guidance references MPEP, Ninth Edition (rev. Jan 2018) (available at https://www.uspto.gov/web/offices/pac/ mpep/old/mpep_E9R08-2017.htm) § 2106.05(a)-(c) and (e) in non-exhaustively listing considerations indicative that an additional element or combination of elements may have integrated a recited judicial exception into a practical application. 2019 Revised Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. at 55. In particular, the Guidance describes that an additional element may have integrated the judicial exception into a practical application if the additional element (1) reflects an improvement in the functioning of a computer or an improvement to other technology or technical field; (2) applies or uses the judicial exception to effect a particular treatment or prophylaxis for a disease or medical condition; (3) implements the judicial exception with, or uses the judicial exception with, a particular machine or manufacture integral to the claim; (4) effects a transformation or reduction of an article to a different state or thing; or (5) applies or uses the judicial exception in some other meaningful way beyond generally linking the use of the judicial exception to a particular technological environment, such that the claim as a whole is more than a drafting effort designed to monopolize the exception. Id. At the same time, the Guidance makes clear that merely including instructions to implement an abstract idea on a computer, or merely using a computer as a tool to perform an abstract idea; adding insignificant extra-solution activity Appeal 2022-000911 Application 17/069,837 11 to the judicial exception; or only generally linking the use of the judicial exception to a particular technological environment or field are not sufficient to integrate the judicial exception into a practical application. Id. Appellant variously argues that the claimed subject matter, as recited in claim 1, is integrated into a practical application (Appeal Br. 12-20). For example, Appellant argues that claim 1 includes a combination of features that effects the transformation of an article to “a different state useful for a different purpose” (id. at 12-14, 19-20). Appellant notes that, according to the claimed method, a measurement is obtained in response to a query submitted to each of a plurality of users; and Appellant asserts that this measurement is transformed by processor activity to a different state, i.e., “an ‘answer thoughtfulness ranking’” (id. at 12; see also id. at 19-20). Yet, this alleged transformation does not involve a physical transformation, as contemplated in Bilski v. Kappos, 561 U.S. 593, 604 (2010) (describing that the transformation prong involves the transformation and reduction of an article to a different state or thing) or in Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175 (1981), where, as the Office notes, the claimed process transforms raw, uncured synthetic rubber into precision-molded synthetic rubber products. See 2019 Revised Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. at 55 n28. Instead, the “transformation” involves merely manipulating data, which is not sufficient to integrate the judicial exception into a practical application. Cf. CyberSource Corp. v. Retail Decisions, Inc., 654 F.3d 1366, 1375 (Fed. Cir. 2011) (holding that “[t]he mere manipulation or reorganization of data . . . does not satisfy the transformation prong” of the Bilski machine-or- transformation test). Appeal 2022-000911 Application 17/069,837 12 Appellant’s further argument that claim 1 includes features that reflect a technological improvement, i.e., an improvement to computer-related feedback incentive technology, is likewise unavailing (Appeal Br. 15, 18-19). Appellant maintains that claim 1 “improve[s] computer-related feedback incentive technology at least as a result of sampling a different data set, defin[ing] and us[ing] a particular machine, and effect[ing] ‘a transformation or reduction of a particular article to a different state or thing’” (id. at 18). But, we fail to see how, and Appellant does adequately explain how feedback incentive technology is thereby improved. We are not persuaded, for the reasons outlined above, that claim 1 reflects a transformation or reduction of a particular article to a different state or thing. And, although Appellant ostensibly contends otherwise, we find no indication in the Specification, nor does Appellant direct us to any indication, that the operations recited in claim 1 require specialized hardware or inventive computer components, i.e., a particular machine. Appellant relies on Figure 5 of the Specification as support, asserting that, in accordance with the claimed invention, user answers to a query may be received, for example, by a processor through a plurality of user interfaces, such as “the exemplary ‘particular machine’ aspect depicted . . . by Figure 5, configured by ‘special programming’ to transform . . . ratings received from each user . . . for an advertisement’s effect on the typical person into an answer thoughtfulness ranking” (Appeal Br. 19). Appellant argues that the only way to obtain a measurement of “what each user of a plurality of users . . . thinks another person will think about content is to specifically ask each user of the plurality of users what that other person will think about content, as depicted by Figure 5” (id.). However, as Appeal 2022-000911 Application 17/069,837 13 the Examiner points out, “Figure 5 is simply an implementation illustrated in the drawings” (Ans. 4). “The specific user interface depicted within Figure 5” is not claimed and for at least this reason Appellant’s assertion, i.e., that the exemplary “particular machine” aspect depicted by Figure 5, configured by “special programming” represents an improvement in computer-related feedback incentive technology, is not persuasive (id. at 6). The law is well settled that “whether a [recited] device is ‘a tangible system (in § 101 terms, a ‘machine’)’ is not dispositive.” ChargePoint, Inc. v. SemaConnect, Inc., 920 F.3d 759, 770 (Fed. Cir. 2019) (quoting Alice Corp., 573 U.S. at 224). For a machine to impose a meaningful limit on the claimed invention, it must play a significant part in permitting a claimed method to be performed, rather than merely providing the generic environment in which to implement the recited abstract idea. Cf. Versata Dev. Grp. Inc. v. SAP Am., Inc., 793 F.3d 1306, 1335 (Fed. Cir. 2015) (explaining that in order for a machine to add significantly more, “it must play a significant part in permitting the claimed method to be performed, rather than function solely as an obvious mechanism for permitting a solution to be achieved more quickly”). Here, although a processor is used to perform the method steps of claim 1, that processor performs the latter role. Rather than being tied to a particular machine, claim 1 merely implements an abstract idea using generic computer components, which is not enough for patent eligibility. See Alice Corp., 573 U.S. at 223 (“[T]he mere recitation of a generic computer cannot transform a patent-ineligible abstract idea into a patent- eligible invention.”); BASCOM Glob. Internet Servs., Inc. v. AT&T Mobility LLC, 827 F.3d 1341, 1348 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (“An abstract idea on ‘an Appeal 2022-000911 Application 17/069,837 14 Internet computer network’ or on a generic computer is still an abstract idea”) (citation omitted). We also are not persuaded that sampling data, i.e., soliciting user responses to a query, without more, amounts to a technological improvement. The Specification describes that advertisers desire feedback regarding their advertisements; yet users may not want to participate in telephone surveys, mail surveys, or online surveys because these surveys can be time consuming, and even if users do participate, they may give rushed answers to complete the survey as quickly as possible - answers that often do accurately represent the viewers’ opinions regarding the advertisement (Spec. ¶ 3). Considered in light of the Specification, the claimed invention clearly appears focused on “encourag[ing] individuals to complete reviews by incentivizing users with rewards, and allowing users to easily access items to be reviewed and answer questions using a website or web application” (Spec. ¶ 5), and not on any claimed means for achieving that goal that improves technology. We conclude, for the reasons outlined above, that claim 1 recites mental processes, i.e., an abstract idea, and that the additional elements recited in the claim beyond the abstract idea, i.e., “a processor” and “a plurality of user devices,” are no more than generic computer components used as tools to perform the recited abstract idea (see, e.g., Spec. ¶¶ 24, 26, 74). As such, they do not integrate the abstract idea into a practical application. See Alice Corp., 573 U.S. at 223-24 (“[W]holly generic computer implementation is not generally the sort of ‘additional featur[e]’ that provides any ‘practical assurance that the process is more than a drafting effort designed to monopolize the [abstract idea] itself.’” (quoting Mayo, Appeal 2022-000911 Application 17/069,837 15 566 U.S. at 77)). Accordingly, we agree with the Examiner that claim 1 is directed to an abstract idea. Step Two of the Mayo/Alice Framework (2019 Revised Guidance, Step 2B) Having determined under step one of the Mayo/Alice framework that claim 1 is directed to an abstract idea, we next consider under Step 2B of the 2019 Revised Guidance, the second step of the Mayo/Alice framework, whether claim 1 includes additional elements or a combination of elements that provides an “inventive concept,” i.e., whether an additional element or combination of elements adds specific limitations beyond the judicial exception that are not “well-understood, routine, conventional activity” in the field (which is indicative that an inventive concept is present) or simply appends well-understood, routine, conventional activities previously known to the industry to the judicial exception. 2019 Revised Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. at 56. Appellant argues that “the claimed subject matter relates to unconventional operations that are not well-understood, routine, or conventional in the feedback incentive field” (Appeal Br. 18). But, that argument is not persuasive at least because “the relevant inquiry is not whether the claimed invention as a whole is unconventional or non-routine.” BSG Tech LLC v. BuySeasons, Inc., 899 F.3d 1281, 1290 (Fed. Cir. 2018). Instead, the question under step two of the Mayo/Alice framework (i.e., step 2B) is whether the claim includes additional elements, i.e., elements other than the abstract idea itself, that “‘transform the nature of the claim’ into a patent-eligible application.” Alice Corp., 573 U.S. at 217 (quoting Mayo, 566 U.S. at 79, 78). See also Mayo, 566 U.S. at 72-73 (requiring that “a process that focuses upon the use of a natural law also Appeal 2022-000911 Application 17/069,837 16 contain other elements or a combination of elements, sometimes referred to as an ‘inventive concept,’ sufficient to ensure that the patent in practice amounts to significantly more than a patent upon the natural law itself” (emphasis added)). The Examiner determined here, and we agree, that the only claim elements beyond the abstract idea are “a processor” and “one or more user devices,” i.e., generic computer components (Final Act. 5) - a determination amply supported by, and fully consistent with the Specification (see, e.g., Spec. ¶¶ 24, 26, 74). Appellant cannot reasonably maintain that there is insufficient factual support for the Examiner’s determination that the operation of these components is well-understood, routine, or conventional, where, as here, there is nothing in the Specification to indicate that the operations recited in claim 1 require any specialized hardware or inventive computer components or that the claimed invention is implemented using other than generic computer components to perform generic computer functions, e.g., receiving, processing, and outputting information. Indeed, the Federal Circuit, in accordance with Alice, has “repeatedly recognized the absence of a genuine dispute as to eligibility” where claims have been defended as involving an inventive concept based “merely on the idea of using existing computers or the Internet to carry out conventional processes, with no alteration of computer functionality.” Berkheimer v. HP, Inc., 890 F.3d 1369, 1373 (Fed. Cir. 2018) (Moore, J., concurring) (citations omitted); see also BSG Tech, 899 F.3d at 1291 (“BSG Tech does not argue that other, non-abstract features of the claimed inventions, alone or in combination, are not well-understood, routine and conventional database structures and Appeal 2022-000911 Application 17/069,837 17 activities. Accordingly, the district court did not err in determining that the asserted claims lack an inventive concept.”). We are not persuaded, on the present record, that the Examiner erred in rejecting independent claim 1 under 35 U.S.C. § 101. Therefore, we sustain the Examiner’s rejection of claim 1. Independent Claim 17 Appellant notes that independent claim 17 relates to the same technology and includes apparatus features similar to those recited in independent method claim 1 (Appeal Br. 20). And Appellant argues that claim 17 is patentable under § 101 for the same reasons set forth with respect to claim 1 (id.). We are not persuaded for the reasons set forth above that the Examiner erred in rejecting claim 1 under 35 U.S.C. § 101. Therefore, we sustain the Examiner’s rejection of claim 17 for the same reasons. Dependent Claims 2-16 and 18-20 Claims 2-16 and 18-20 depend from independent claims 1 and 17, respectively. Appellant does not present any arguments in support of the patentability of these dependent claims except to assert that the claims are patentable under § 101 for the same reasons set forth with respect to the independent claims (Appeal Br. 20). Therefore, we sustain the rejection of dependent claims 2-16 and 18-20 under 35 U.S.C. § 101 for the same reasons set forth above with respect to independent claims 1 and 17. Obviousness Independent Claim 1 Appellant argues here that the rejection of independent claim 1 under 35 U.S.C. § 103 cannot be sustained because neither Marsh nor Mallon, Appeal 2022-000911 Application 17/069,837 18 individually or in combination, discloses or suggests “receiving . . . an answer value from each of the plurality of users in response to a query to predict how effective each user of the plurality of users thought the advertisement would be for the typical person,” as called for in claim 1 (Appeal Br. 21-23; see also Reply Br. 15-19). Marsh generally relates to techniques for analyzing the content of information, and discloses a software facility that manages a variety of types of content in order to identify content that has attributes of interest (Marsh 2:24-26). Marsh discloses that the system obtains evaluations of the available content (e.g., votes on or other forms of rating of one or more attributes of the content) from a plurality of users, and uses the evaluations to identify content with various attributes of interest (id. at 2:28-32). After sufficient evaluations are received, the evaluations are aggregated to generate one or more aggregate ratings for the content; the aggregate ratings are then used during a post-evaluation phase to determine whether and when to display or otherwise provide the content to other users (id. at 3:10-17). Marsh discloses that, in some embodiments, a reputation score is automatically calculated for each evaluator, and includes a reputation voting weight score that affects the amount of influence given to the evaluator’s evaluations (id. at 3:18-22). The reputation scores may, in some embodiments, additionally include quality-based reputation rating scores and/or reputation ranking scores that reflect both the quality and quantity of evaluations provided by the evaluators; overall rankings of evaluators relative to each other can then be generated based on the reputation ranking scores and/or the reputation rating scores, and can be used to provide awards Appeal 2022-000911 Application 17/069,837 19 of various types to evaluators (e.g., a top 10 or top 1000 evaluator) (id. at 3:31-42). Mallon is substantially similar, and discloses a method and system for conducting ad research, including identifying a plurality of panelists (Mallon Abstr.). A test advertisement is served to at least some of the panelists, who are then surveyed about the advertisement (id. ¶ 51). For example, the panelists may be asked whether they found the advertisement effective, how the advertisement compared to other ads, etc. (id.). Appellant acknowledges that Marsh ranks users based on what the user thinks about content, and that Mallon asks a panelist what the panelist thought about a test advertisement (Appeal Br. 22). But, Appellant argues that “[i]n contradistinction to Marsh and Mallon, Appellant’s claim 1 ranks users based on what the user thinks another user will think about an advertisement” (id.). Appellant, thus, maintains that March and Mallon, whether considered individually or in combination, do not disclose the argued limitation because “the key data used by Marsh and Mallon are different from the data measured by Appellant’s invention,” i.e., “Marsh and Mallon ask a user what the user thought about content already shown to the user” whereas “Appellant’s claim 1 ranks users based on what the user predicts another user will think about an advertisement in the future” (id. at 22-23). We begin our obviousness analysis by first considering the scope and meaning of the argued limitation, i.e., “receiving . . . an answer value from each of the plurality of users in response to a query to predict how effective each user of the plurality of users thought the advertisement would be for the typical person,” as called for in independent claim 1. In doing so, we bear in Appeal 2022-000911 Application 17/069,837 20 mind that, during prosecution, claims are to be given “their broadest reasonable interpretation consistent with the specification” and that claim language should be read “in light of the specification as it would be interpreted by one of ordinary skill in the art.” In re Am. Acad. of Sci. Tech Ctr., 367 F.3d 1359, 1364 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (citations omitted). We also bear in mind that although the claims are properly read in light of the Specification, limitations appearing in the Specification, but not recited in the claims are not to be read into the claims. See, e.g., E-Pass Techs., Inc. v. 3Com Corp., 343 F.3d 1364, 1369 (Fed. Cir. 2003). In the “Summary of Claimed Subject Matter” section of its Appeal Brief, Appellant identifies Figure 1 (elements 108, 110, and 112), Figure 2 (elements 206, 222, 224, 226, and 228), Figure 5 (elements 500 and 506), and paragraphs 6, 24-26, 34-35, and 40 in describing the argued limitation (Appeal Br. 5-6). The Specification generally describes, in paragraph 6, that, in one embodiment, a method of rewarding users for completing reviews includes causing an item to be presented, at a number of user devices, to a number of users during a feedback session, and receiving, via the user devices, an answer value from each of the users in response to a query included in or regarding the item. Referencing Figures 1 and 2, paragraph 24 discloses “an example diagram of a system . . . for ranking and rewarding users that view advertisements,” and describes that users provide answer values 224, 228 into a device 108, 110, 112, e.g., a computer 108, a smart phone 110, or a tablet 112, to questions presented to the users concurrently with, prior to, or after perceiving an advertisement (Spec. ¶ 24). Figure 5 illustrates an example interface 500 that, as described in paragraph 34, may be presented to a user on a device 108, 110, 112 for Appeal 2022-000911 Application 17/069,837 21 rating advertisements (id. ¶ 34). Example interface 500, as shown in the figure, includes an ad user interface 504 for displaying an advertisement 212 (id.), and also includes a query user interface 506, which lists a number of queries that the user may answer about the advertisement (id. ¶ 35). For example, as shown in the figure, the user is asked, inter alia, “How emotional will the typical person find this ad” and “How attention-grabbing is this ad for the typical person.” Appellant maintains here, as described above, that the argued limitation, i.e., “receiving . . . an answer value from each of the plurality of users in response to a query to predict how effective each user of the plurality of users thought the advertisement would be for the typical person,” as called for in independent claim 1, is properly construed to mean that the claimed processor receives an answer value from each of the users in response to a query, and that the query asks each user what the user predicts another person, i.e., a “typical person,” will think about the advertisement when the advertisement is presented to that person at the future (see, e.g., Appeal Br. 22-23). Responding to Appellant’s interpretation, the Examiner observes that Appellant appears to be reading limitations from the Specification, particularly Figure 5, into the claim (Ans. 8). Contrasting Appellant’s interpretation, the Examiner opines that “[t]he claims do not contain language limiting the invention to ‘what the user predicts another user will think about an advertisement in the future’”; instead, “the claim limitation receives an answer value in response to a query, wherein the answer is used to ‘predict how effective each user of the plurality of users thought the advertisement would be for the typical person’” (id.). Appeal 2022-000911 Application 17/069,837 22 We find that the Examiner has the better position. And, when construed in this way, we agree with the Examiner that Marsh and Mallon meet the claim language. We also note, for the record, that the same result would be obtained even if we accept Appellant’s narrower claim construction at least because, as the Examiner also observes (Ans. 8), the content of the query is non- functional descriptive material, which cannot be relied on to distinguish over the prior art for purposes of patentability. Here, claim 1 recites that the processor receives an answer value from each of the plurality of users in response to a query, and that the processor calculates a comparison value and determines the thoughtfulness of each user answer based on calculating a deviation value between the respective answer value and the comparison value. This functionality remains the same regardless of the nature of the query, which does not further limit the claimed invention either functionally or structurally. Thus, the informational content of the query represents non-functional descriptive material, which cannot be relied on for patentability. See In re Ngai, 367 F.3d 1336, 1339 (Fed. Cir. 2004); cf. In re Gulack, 703 F.2d 1381, 1385 (Fed. Cir. 1983) (when descriptive material is not functionally related to the substrate, the descriptive material will not distinguish the invention from the prior art in terms of patentability). We are not persuaded, on the present record, that the Examiner erred in rejecting claim 1 under 35 U.S.C. § 103. Therefore, we sustain the Examiner’s rejection of claim 1. We also sustain the Examiner’s rejection of dependent claims 2-16, which are not argued separately except based on their dependence from claim 1 (Appeal Br. 24). Appeal 2022-000911 Application 17/069,837 23 Independent Claim 17 and Dependent Claims 18-20 Appellant argues that independent claim 17 is patentable for the same reasons set forth with respect to independent claim 1 (Appeal Br. 24). We are not persuaded, for the reasons set forth above, that the Examiner erred in rejecting claim 1 under 35 U.S.C. § 103. Therefore, we sustain the rejection, under 35 U.S.C. § 103, of claim 17 for the same reasons. We also sustain the rejection of dependent claims 18-20, which are not argued separately except based on their dependence from claim 17 (id.). CONCLUSION In summary: Claim(s) Rejected 35 U.S.C. § Reference(s)/Basis Affirmed Reversed 1-20 101 Eligibility 1-20 1-20 103 Marsh, Mallon 1-20 Overall Outcome 1-20 No time period for taking any subsequent action in connection with this appeal may be extended under 37 C.F.R. § 1.136(a). See 37 C.F.R. § 1.136(a)(1)(iv). AFFIRMED