R. G. Barry Corp.

National Labor Relations Board - Board Decisions

Feb 7, 1967

162 N.L.R.B. 1472 (N.L.R.B. 1967)

1472 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
AFL-CIO, or in any other labor organization of our employees, by discharg-
ing or in any other manner discriminating against employees in regard to hire
and tenure of employment or any term or condition of employment.
WE WILL NOT threaten to go out of business if a majority of the employees
select International Union, United Automobile, Aerospace and Agricultural
Implement Workers of America (UAW), AFL-CIO, or any other labor orga-
nization of our employees, to represent them.
WE WILL NOT interrogate employees concerning their or other employees'
membership in, or activity on behalf of, International Union, United Automo-
bile, Aerospace and Agricultural Implement Workers of America (UAW),
AFL-CIO, or any other labor organization of our employees, in a manner
constituting interference, restraint, or coercion within the meaning of Section
8(a)(1) of the Act.
WE WILL NOT solicit employees to testify falsely in a Board proceeding.
WE WILL NOT institute and/or maintain shop rules for the purpose of retal-
iating against employees for their organizational activity or to discourage orga-
nizational activity.
WE WILL NOT in any other manner interfere with, restrain, or coerce our
employees in the exercise of their right to self-organization, to form, join, or
assist any labor organization, to bargain collectively through representatives of
their own choosing, and to engage in other concerted activities for the purpose
of collective bargaining or other mutual aid or protection, or to refrain from
any and all such activities, except to the extent that such right is affected by
the proviso to Section 8(a)(3) of the Act.
WE WILL offer' to Charles T. Withrow immediate and full reinstatement to
his former or substantially equivalent position without prejudice to his senior-
ity or other rights and privileges, dismissing if necessary any employee hired
subsequent to his discharge, and make him whole for any loss he may have
suffered as a result of our discrimination against him.
WE WILL rescind the shop rules and regulations posted in January 1966.
All our employees are free to become or remain,, or to refrain from becoming or,
remaining, members of the above-named Union or any other labor organization.
QUALITY PRODUCTION COMPANY,
Employer.
Dated------------------- By-------------------------------------------
(Representative) ( Title)
NOTE.-We will notify the above-named employee if presently serving in the
Armed Forces of the United States of his right to full reinstatement upon applica-
tion in accordance with the Selective Service Act and the Universal Military Train-
ing and Service Act, as amended, after discharge from the Armed Forces.
This notice must remain posted for 60 consecutive days from the date of posting,
and must not be altered, defaced, or covered by any other material.
If employees have any question concerning this notice or compliance with its pro-
visions, they may communicate directly with the Board's Regional Office, 500 Book
Building, 1249 Washington Boulevard, Detroit, Michigan 48226, Telephone
226-3200.
R. G. Barry Corporation and Textile Workers Union of America,
AFL-CIO. Cases 9-CA-3192 and 3404. February 7, 1967
DECISION AND ORDER
On July 14, 1966, Trial Examiner Lowell Goerlich issued his Deci-
sion in the above-entitled proceeding, finding that the Respondent had
engaged in and was engaging in certain unfair labor practices and
recommending that it cease and desist therefrom and take certain
affirmative action, as set forth in the attached Trial Examiner's Deci-
sion. The Trial Examiner further found that the Respondent had not
162 NLRB No. 135.
R. G. BARRY CORP. 1473
engaged in other unfair labor practices alleged in the complaint and
recommended that such allegations be dismissed. Thereafter, the
Respondent filed exceptions to the Decision and a supporting brief,
and the General Counsel filed a reply brief.
Pursuant to the provisions of Section 3(b) of the National Labor
Relations Act, as amended, the National Labor Relations Board has
delegated its powers in connection with this case to a three-member
panel [Members Fanning, Brown, and Zagoria].
The Board has reviewed the rulings of the Trial Examiner made at
the hearing and finds that no prejudicial error was committed. The
rulings are hereby affirmed. The Board has considered the Trial
Examiner's Decision, the exceptions and briefs, and the entire record
in the case, and hereby adopts the findings, conclusions, and recom-
mendations of the Trial Examiner, with the following modifications.
We agree with the Trial Examiner that the Respondent violated the
Act by threatening its employees with more difficult working condi-
tions, reduction of their wages, and loss of work, if the Union was
selected as their bargaining representative; by interfering with the
right of its employees to give statements to Board agents; and by
interrogating them as to their union affiliation. In our view the
Respondent's conduct reasonably tended to coerce the employees.,
However, we cannot agree with his finding that the Respondent vio-
lated Section 8(a) (1) of the Act by maintaining its no-solicitation
rule. The provision, which appears in the employees handbook, is as
follows :
United Appeal, which supports many of Columbus and Franklin
County Health and Welfare Agencies, is the only solicitation
within our plant authorized or permitted by the Company.
Requests for funds for other charitable purposes, or for gifts to
individuals, are permitted only when approved by the Personnel
Department.'
As we read it, this rule is reasonably interpreted as applying only
to the solicitation of charitable contributions. It is significant, in this
regard, that the rule in question requires approval only for "requests
for funds for other charitable purposes, or for gifts to individuals."
While the first sentence does prohibit all "solicitations" at any time,
other than for United Appeal, we cannot say that, when read in its
entirety, the rule can be construed as prohibiting employees from
soliciting for the Union during their nonwork time.
In these circumstances, the rule, at worst, remains ambiguous, and
collateral evidence was properly admitted as to its interpretation and
'Monroe Auto Equipment Company, 146 NLRB 1267 , 1275, footnote 23
2 The Trial Examiner found, and we agree, that another rule prohibiting employees
from " leaving work stations . .. or visiting during working hours " was lawful.
264-047-67-vol. 162-94
1474 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
application.3 In this connection the Respondent testified, without con-
tradiction, that the rule was neither intended to apply, nor understood
by the employees as applying, to union solicitation, as demonstrated
by the fact that employees in fact solicited continuously for the Union
during their nonworking time in accordance with a long-standing
policy of the Respondent. As we cannot conclude, in view of this
undisputed evidence, that the rule interfered with the employees'
right to self-organization,4 we shall dismiss the pertinent allegations
of the complaint.
The General Counsel also contended, and the Trial Examiner
found, that the Respondent violated the Act by refusing to allow the
Union to address the employees at the Respondent's plant while it
maintained in effect an unlawful no-solicitation rule. Even if it be
assumed that such conduct would be violative of the Act, it is clear
that an essential premise of the General Counsel's contention as stated
by him has not been established, since we have found that Respondent
did not maintain an unlawful no-solicitation rule. We shall, therefore,
dismiss that allegation of the complaint.
[The Board adopted the Trial Examiner's Recommended Order
with the following modification:
[Delete paragraphs 1(c) and (d) of the Recommended Order and
indented paragraphs 4 and 5 of the attached notice.]
8 See, e g , Ferguson -Lander Boo Co , 151 NLRB 1615.
' The Lion Knitting Mills Company, 160 NLRB 801 ; Ferguson-Lander Box Company,
supra; Harvey Aluminum ( Incorporated ), 156 NLRB 1353 , TXD section III, E. ' '
TRIAL EXAMINER'S DECISION
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Upon charges , filed by the Textile Workers Union of America , AFL-CIO, herein
called the Union, the General Counsel of the National Labor Relations Board,
herein called the Board , on behalf of the Board by the Regional Director for
Region 9 on July 21 , 1965 , and upon February 25, 1966 , issued a complaint and
notice of hearing respectively in Case 9-CA-3492 and Case 9-CA-3404 naming
as the Respondent R. G. Barry Corporation . On February 25, 1966 , these cases
were consolidated for hearing . The complaint in Case 9-CA-3492 alleged that the
Respondent had violated Section 7 of the Act by posting or causing to be posted a
notice to employees advising them in effect not to talk or otherwise cooperate with
agents of the Board in regard , to the latter's investigation of unfair labor practices
filed by Charging Party pending against the Respondent in Case 9-CA-3404, by
urging them to have Respondent 's attorney present during any interviews by agents
of the Board and by instructing them not to sign any statements for any agents of
the Board . The complaint in Case 9-CA-3404 alleged among other things that the
Respondent had violated Section 8(a)(1) of the Act by compelling Respondent's
employees to attend small group meetings during working time at which meetings
employees were threatened that the Respondent would make working conditions
more difficult , including a reduction of hourly wages, and that the Respondent
might go out of business if the employees selected the Union as their bargaining
agent ; by unlawfully interrogating employees; by maintaining , distributing , enforc-
ing, and giving effect to an illegal no-solicitation rule; by denying the Union's
request on November 17, 1964 , for an opportunity to address the Respondent's
employees assembled during worktime at the Respondent 's plant in the same man-
ner and under the same circumstances existing during Respondent 's addresses to its
R. G. BARRY CORP. 1475
employees while it maintained in effect an unlawful no-solicitation rule; and by
failing and refusing to grant the Union's request on November 30, 1964, for a list
containing the names and addresses of Respondent's employees who were potential
eligible voters. The Respondent denied these allegations by answer timely filed.
The questions before the Trial Examiner concern the validity of the foregoing
allegations.
The foregoing cases came on to be heard before Trial Examiner Lowell Goer-
lich on May 16 and 17, 1966, at Columbus, Ohio. At the hearing each party was
afforded a full opportunity to be heard, to call, examine and cross-examine wit-
nesses, to argue orally upon the record, to submit proposed findings of fact and
conclusions of law, and to file briefs. A brief was filed by the Respondent, but the
General Counsel and the Union failed to file briefs.
Upon the whole record and from my observation of the witnesses I make the
following:
FINDINGS OF FACT
1. THE BUSINESS OF THE RESPONDENT
The Respondent, R. G. Barry Corporation, is an Ohio corporation engaged in
the manufacture of soft goods with its office and plants located in Columbus, Ohio.
During the past 12 months, which is a representative period, Respondent had a
direct outflow of goods in interstate commerce valued at $50,000 which it sold and
shipped from its Columbus, Ohio, plants to points directly outside of the State of
Ohio.
I find that the Respondent is now and has been at all times material herein
engaged in commerce within the meaning of Section 2(6) and (7) of the Act and
that it will effectuate the policies of the Act to exercise jurisdiction herein.
II. THE LABOR ORGANIZATION INVOLVED
Textile Workers Union of America, AFL-CIO, is a labor organization within the
meaning of Section 2(5) of the Act.
III. THE UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES
Case 9-CA-3492
On February 8, 1966, the Respondent posted the following notice in its plant.
SPECIAL NOTICE
It has come to my attention that some of our Barry team members have
been bothered at their homes by strangers who say that they want to interro-
gate our people. One employee was told to be at home at a certain time so
the stranger could question her.
We have no idea who these people are. One said he was a "government
man". He said he did not want our team members to tell the company about
the call.
The whole thing seems very strange and completely out of keeping with the
normal American way of life. No government people have informed us about
any such thing.
I immediately checked into this with our attorney. He said you do not have
to see any of these mistery callers-whether they are union men, government
men, or simply some salesman trying to get into your house.
Our attorney says we should advise you of one thing; DO NOT SIGN
ANYTHING THESE PEOPLE ASK YOU TO SIGN.
You have a right to have your attorney or our company attorney present
before you say or sign anything!
As far as we know, the NLRB has finished its investigation of the Union
"charges" that were filed after you rejected the Union on December 2. We
cooperated with the NLRB and will do so at any time they want any further
information to which they are legally entitled.
Don't let these strangers upset you or force you to say anything or sign
anything against your will. You have a perfectly legal right to refuse to see or
talk to them.
I am sorry this union trouble keeps causing you problems, and I hope that
it will soon be a completely dead issue-as it should have been after you
turned the Union down flat in your overwhelming vote on December 2. The
1476 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
important thing now is don't be frightened by any mystery callers. You have
a perfect legal right to refuse to talk with them or to sign anything.
If anyone causes you any trouble about this, see your supervisor or call me,
if you want to.
Regards, Gordon Zacks
The notice was posted at a time when charges were pending in Case 9-CA-3404.
The General Counsel contends that by posting the notice the Respondent violated
Section 8(a)(1) of the Act.
It appears to me that the notice posted by the Respondent is of the same import
as the remarks found by the Board to have been in violation of Section 8(a) (1)
of the Act in Certain-Teed Products Corporation, 147 NLRB 1517, 1519, 1520.
Hence I find that the Respondent by posting the notice on February 8, 1966, dur-
ing a period when unfair labor practice charges were pending against it with the
Board, interfered with the rights of employees to obtain redress from the Board
and thereby violated Section 8(a)(1) of the Act. It is clear that the notice tended
to discourage employees from supplying information to a Board agent and to
hinder the Board in investigating charges pending before it against the Respondent.
Case 9-CA-3404
A: The remarks of President Gordon Zacks
During - a union organizational campaign which culminated in an election for
bargaining representative on December 2, 1965 , Gordon Zacks, president of the
Respondent Employer, addressed about 50 meetings of employees on company
time and property. The meetings followed the same format with President Zacks
reading the same prepared text at the commencement of each meeting . After the
conclusion of his prepared text , the meetings were opened to questions and dis-
cussions . Some employees asked questions and made comments.
The meetings were held in a 20-foot-square lunchroom in the Employer's plant
customarily used by employees. Twelve to fifteen employees attended each meeting.
Two to four meetings were held a day. The employees were advised of the meet-
ings by their supervisors . Meetings were kept small and were scheduled "so there
would be no crippling effect" to production in any plant area, and to cause a
"minimum disruption" to the Respondent's "production flow." Respondent's Vice
President Scott recorded the names of employees attending the meetings.
When the employees arrived at the lunchroom they found on the tables in front
of them a copy of America's Textile Reporter containing "The Henderson Story"
and a copy of the letter which the Union had written to the Respondent demand-
ing recognition.
Zacks offered the employees a cup of coffee and doughnuts and then allowed
them to look over the materials on the tables in front of them. Zacks announced
that he did not want to say anything illegal and that his attorney had approved
the remarks he would read . He then commenced reading from a prepared text
from which he did not deviate.
Not all of the employees attended a group meeting inasmuch as there was not
enough time before the election to get around to all of them. A mass general
meeting was held to contact the remaining employees.
Zacks ' remarks were trenchantly antiunion in tone and were a part of the
Respondent's antiunion preelection campaign .' Zacks prefaced his remarks with
the statement:
Now before we get started I want everybody to know that you are not
required to stay. If you want to leave, now, feel perfectly free to leave. You
know what we are going to talk about and if you are not interested in what
we are going to say or if you don't think you want to hear it, you are perfect-
ly free to leave. Or, if during this meeting you want to get up and leave feel
perfectly free to do so. But what I want to do today is present some facts
to you-nothing more-I want to put some facts on the table and let you
consider them or do whatever you want to do with them so you can stay, or
leave, or whatever you want to do. However, under our company policy the
time spent here will be paid to you at average.
1 Respondent 's letters addressed to employees contained the footnote:
LET US CONTINUE WITH PEACE, PROGRESS AND PROSPERITY
VOTE "NO" ! !
R. G. BARRY CORP. 1477
The record is barren of any evidence that an employee was compelled to attend
a meeting or that an employee who appeared at a meeting did not remain
throughout the meeting . The meetings were voluntary in the sense that the
-employee was free not to attend or to leave a meeting , if he were willing to accept
the inferences which might be drawn therefrom.
The reoccurring theme of Zacks' remarks was the lugubrious consequences of
the employees ' choice for the Union.
First: The complaint alleges that Zacks' remarks were coercive in that Zacks
threatened employees that "Respondent would make working conditions more diffi-
cult, including a reduction of hourly wages " if its employees chose the Union as
their bargaining agent . Zacks' remarks directly bearing upon these alleged threats
are as follows:
Too many people at Barry are under the definite mistaken belief that if the
union wins the election that the very next day there is going to be a con-
tract signed containing all these promises that the Union has been making.
Well, that's not the way this thing works at all? You sit down and you start
bargaining and talking about how many holidays we are going to give, watch
the vacation policy, what are the fringe benefits going to be. We don't
necessarily start from where you are now and try to talk up-the only obli-
gation that the law imposes on us about bargaining and negotiating a con-
tract is to bargain in good faith and only legal obligation concerning wages
is to pay $1 .25 per hour. We certainly don't mean to imply that we will go
back to $1.25. We are merely pointing out our legal obligations . So you see
you might end up with more but you might end up with less . And when the
union comes in and when we sit down and negotiate you put all the things
that you now have and your current wage program right out there on the
table and we bargain about them. If they are not agreed to and if they are not
included in the contract you may not have them . Why is my family
and I-why are we opposed to a union coming into Barry. Well, the reason
that we are opposed to this union coming in here is not that we are afraid
of the union or afraid of what the union can get from us-believe me they
can't get any more for you than you can get for yourself by coming in here
and talking to me man to man. But we are opposed to this union because we
might lose the flexibility that we now have. We have a lot of flexibility in
this operation right now. Under a union contract we might not have this
flexibility . If we didn 't have a job for you, we couldn 't transfer you to other
work as we do. We might have to send you home. We might have to lay you
off. In the past we 've traded work for you to avoid layoffs and tried to pro-
vide instead year round employment , the union might demand that we lay
you off and hire somebody else on the other job . Because that means another
$5. in monthly dues. Every time we would do something like that we might
have a grievance-every time we would do a thousand things for you that
we do now, we might get involved in a grievance session and not only would
we get involved in a grievance but we might end up in court . There are just
so many things that could be completely changed and completely different
here. But the primary reason that we are opposed to a union at Barry is
because it could destroy the personal relationship that we have developed
with each other. As I've said, you couldn ' t talk to me or my father or Bessie
or your supervisor or anybody else about these matters-you would have to
see the shop steward .3 A wall of separation could be built between us. We
could be divided . We have grown and prospered together because we have
worked well together . Because we have respected each other as individuals-
we have different skills and different jobs-but we've been on the same team.
In the foregoing excerpts from Zacks ' remarks it is observable that the employ-
ees were told that bargaining would not commence with the assurance of a con-
tinuance of current employee benefits but on the contrary, current employee bene-
fits would be exposed to the chance of diminution in that the fruits of bargaining,
7 All emphasis appears in the transcribed text of Zack 's remarks offered into evidence
8 The implication of this language is that the Respondent would not , if the employees
chose the Union , honor the employees ' statutory right to "present grievances to their
employer and to have such grievances adjusted without the intervention of the bargaining
representative ." See Section 9(a) of the Act . Implicit in the Respondent ' s portentous
rejection of this right , considered by Congress to be of such importance as to justify its
placement by amendment in the Act , was the threat that working conditions would be
more difficult if the Union were successful in the election
1478 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
conditioned upon the Respondent's agreement, might result in fewer benefits.
Indeed the suggestion is trenchant that wages might fall to $1.25 an hour, the
amount which the Respondent asserted it was legally required to pay to its employ-
ees. The ineluctable import of Zacks' language is that the risk of choosing the
Union was the risk of ending up with fewer employee benefits because the
Respondent, an antiunion employer, would be likely to so will, and because union
represented employees might expect fewer concessions from an antiunion employer.
Such idea again appears in Zacks' remarks to the effect that under a union con-
tract, if the Respondent had no job for an employee, he could not be transferred
but might be sent home or laid off.4 Hence, according to Zacks, union selection
entailed the risk of whether an employee would be laid off or retained on the
Respondent's payroll.
Second: The complaint also alleges that Zacks' remarks were coercive in that
"the Respondent might go out of business if the employees selected the Union
as their bargaining agent."
Zacks' remarks bearing on this alleged threat are as follows:
My family has had a lot of fun out of building this business together. But
to be very frank with you neither my. father or mother or I would be
interested in coming to work in a hostile atmosphere. There has been a lot of
talk about profits. . . We've had many chances to sell this business in the
past but we didn't want to. We could sell this whole operation today but we
don't want to because my whole family gets a lot of fun out of this opera-
tion. I think you know that-I think you know that I get a lot of fun, a lot
of bounce from this business and it gives me something to look forward to.
In fact I'd get no kick out of quitting tomorrow and never working again.
But we could sell this whole operation and take the cash that we get from
it and put it in tax-free municiple bonds and we could come out with as
much profit as we get from coming in here and enjoying these headaches.
And I assure you that we do enjoy them. We like every problem that comes
up every day. All we ask is the opportunity to continue in the future as we
have in the past. We'd would rather have our headaches together than clip
coupons from municiple bonds.,
It would have been a dull employee indeed who, from the foregoing, would
not have grasped the Respondent's implication that, if the Union succeeded, the
Respondent would sell the plant, put the proceeds in bonds, and clip coupons.
Zacks thus posed to the Respondent's employees the alternatives of uncertain
job tenure vis-a-vis the status quo if the Union were defeated. That Zacks intended
his message to be a warning is clear from its emphasis and emotional context.
Moreover, there is not the slightest suggestion in the record that Zacks, who
repeated his remarks approximately 50 times to groups of the Respondent's
employees at the Respondent's expense,' engaged in vapid discourse. Zacks' objec-
tive was to defeat the Union. Pervading Zacks' remarks was a conscious and
studied effort to achieve coercive persuasion by the use of words and phrases so
camouflaged as to hide their definitive meaning yet nevertheless to implant in the
employees' minds fear of economic jeopardy if they chose the Union as their
bargaining agent. One versed in expertise in the field of industrial relations may
not overlook the fact that such devices for the production and dissemination of
antiunion election propaganda have become a widely practiced art. An employer
does not commit an unfair labor practice if he expresses or disseminates "views,
argument or opinion" whether in written, printed, graphic, or visual form if such
expressions or disseminations contain "no threat of reprisal or force or promise of
benefit." (See Section 8(c) of the Act.) This provision of the Act allows employers
to participate in preelection campaigns for bargaining representatives. An employer
may engage in noncoercive antiunion solicitation, a right which is "protected by
the so-called `employer free speech' provision of Section 8(c) of the Act."
N.L.R.B. v. United Steelworkers of America, 357 U.S. 357, 362. Nevertheless,
the General Counsel maintains that the above-quoted statements were not privi-
leged under Section 8(c), but were threats of reprisal. I agree, for a Respondent
employer's representations that the selection of a union as bargaining agent will
result in loss of employee benefits or adversely affect the employees' job tenure
over which the employer has complete control are inherently coercive in nature
and fall without the protection of Section 8(c) of the Act. The Respondent, by
A Cf. Harvey Aluminum (Incorporated), 156 NLRB 1853.
R. G. BARRY CORP. 1479
threatening employees with loss of benefits and jobs in the language above set
forth, encroached upon employees' rights guaranteed by Section 7 of the Act, for
which reason I find the Respondent violated 8(a)(1) of the Act.
By reason of the subtleties employed, it is many times difficult to categorize the
indicia of unlawful union preelection propaganda. However, there seems to emerge
from the cases on this subject a proposition that may be expressed thusly: if the
antiunion preelection propaganda arguably falls within the proscription of Section
7 of the Act, it is unlawful and exceeds the permissive limits of Section 8(c) of
the Act. Hence, if the antiunion preelection propaganda is "arguably coercive,"
(that is to say that an employee's natural response to such propaganda is less
than the untrammeled expression of a freedom of choice for a bargaining
representative), the propaganda encroaches upon the rights guaranteed employees
under Section 7 of the Act and is in violation of Section 8(a)(1) of the Act.
The use- of words "arguably coercive" exposes the employee indubitably to
coercive impact and persuasion, for it is the employee's probable response
which is controlling. "Since it is the policy of the Act to protect employees in a
free choice-of a bargaining representative, the law looks to what the listener-
employees reasonably could have inferred from what was said and done by one
authorized to engage in the antiunion preelection campaign." Hendrix Manufactur-
ing Company v. N.L R.B., 321 F.2d 100, 104 (C.A. 5).
I have no doubts that the excerpts from President Zacks' remarks set out above,
as well as his remarks as,a whole, were "arguably coercive."
B. The interrogations
President Zacks testified that the Respondent's supervisors were expected to
report to him those issues in which the employees were interested and whether the
employees' meetings described above "were dealing with the issues and answering
questions that were on the minds of the people." Zacks testified, "I instructed the
employees' supervisors to make themselves available and be accessible to the people
whether they came back from the meeting today or whether they hadn't been to the
meeting or whether they came back a month ago from the meeting or 20 days ago,
so they would be available to answer questions. If they do not know the answers
to the questions, I requested them to bring them to me so we could get an answer."
According to Zacks this procedure was followed to "evaluate the impact" of the
meetings upon the employees.
Sometime during the month of November 1965 Supervisor Ethel Moore en-
gaged in conversation with employee Barbara Blevens at her work station both
before and after Blevens had attended one of the employees' meetings described
above. In the conversation with Blevens before the meeting Moore said that she
"just wondered what [Blevens] thought about the Union and why [she] thought
the girls wanted a Union." Moore also asked Blevens whether she was "satisfied"
with her job. After the meeting Supervisor Moore came to Blevens' machine and
said "Boy, the tension is getting me down " Blevens replied, "It's not bothering
me," whereupon Moore said, "I just as soon have the Union election over with,
wouldn't you?" Blevens answered, "Yes." Then Supervisor Moore inquired, "Do
you know why the women, why the girls want the Union?" Blevens answered
"I imagine . to protect their job. Most places have a union for that reason."
Whereupon Supervisor Moore asked, "Are you satisfied with your job?" Blevens
replied, "I'm satisfied with everything except when we make bonus they take half.
I don't think that's fair. We work for money; they don't." Moore then asked
Blevens whether she was for the Union. Blevens didn't reply that she was for the
Union but she said she thought everybody should have a union. According to
Blevens, Moore asked her several times whether she wanted a union; she told
Moore that she "thought the reason why most of [the employees] wanted a union
was to protect their jobs, because they would transfer [them] around and then
[they] were supposed to be paid off-standard. Sometimes [they were]; some-
times [they weren't]."
Employee Virginia Cooley testified that Supervisor Bea Hyder inquired of
her shortly after October 8, 1964, why Cooley didn't like her. Cooley replied "Well,
its the manner that you treat the girls. . . If you happen to have trouble at
home . . . you usually come in here and take it out on us." Sometime during the
conversation Supervisor Bea Hyder said "[Y]ou surprised me when I learned that
you were for the Union." She further asked why the girls wanted a union . Cooley
replied that with a union the girls would at least get a "fair shake." Bea Hyder
said, "What do you mean by that?" Cooley replied, "Well, they wouldn't be tak-
1480 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
ing half of our bonus ," and "if a girl came in on Saturday . . . and she was
unable to come back in on Monday , she wouldn 't loose her overtime that way."
According to Cooley, Bea Hyder commented further that the Respondent would
not let the employees have a Union in this factory , . . [b]ecause the factory
could close its doors first ." Cooley commented that she didn 't "believe" that.
Whereupon Bea Hyder replied , "[T]hey would if they had to move out piece by
piece, . . . they would move at night, piece by piece."
Employee Alberta Warner, a witness for General Counsel , was ill . The parties
stipulated that if she were called she "would testify that on November 16, 1964,
after having attended one of the meetings which have been discussed here , that she
was approached by her supervisor , Bea Hyder , who asked her, "What do you think
about the Union?"
The Respondent presented no evidence to rebut the foregoing testimony. Thus I
credit the testimony of the General Counsel 's witnesses . The interrogations by
these supervisors appear to have been in response to the instructions of President
Zachs. It seems clear that the interrogations were used to elicit important informa-
tion which would be most useful to the Respondent for combating union affection.
Moreover , the questioning occurred in a background of employer hostility to union
organization and served no legitimate employer purpose.
The conduct of Supervisors Bea Hyder and Ethel Moore , detailed above, was
of such character as to reasonably tend to coerce , restrain , and interfere with
employees in the exercise of their rights guaranteed by Section 7 of the Act and
was in violation of 8(a)( 1) of the Act .5
C. The solicitation rules and the Respondent 's refusal to grant the Union facilities
for addressing the Respondent 's employees on company time and property
First- The General Counsel alleges that the following language appearing in The
R. G. Barry Employee Handbook constitutes an unlawful no-solicitation rule:
and leaving your work station or plant or visiting during working hours.
None of these acts is permitted . A violation can cause the loss of your
job....
The language is incorporated in the following paragraph.
Instructions
Traditionally at Barry we have always gotten along well together. For
example, your supervisor gives you instructions to help you in your job. Refusal
to follow them is a serious offense and can result in immediate dismissal.
Other serious practices include use of profane , foul, abusive and threatening
language; practical jokes and horse play; use of intoxicating beverages, and
leaving your work station or plant or visiting during working hours. None of
these acts is permitted . A violation can cause the loss of your job . These rules
are to protect you and provide a wholesome atmosphere in which to do your
job. [Emphasis supplied.]
Substantially the same language was approved by the Board in Livingston Shirt
Corporation , 107 NLRB 400, 405 for which reason I find that the rule is not
unlawful.6
Second: The General Counsel also alleges that the following language appearing
in The R. G. Barry Employee Handbook constitutes an unlawful no-solicitation
rule:
Solicitations
United Appeal , which supports many of Columbus and Franklin County
Health and Welfare agencies , is the only solicitation within our plant author-
ized or permitted by the Company . Requests for funds for other charitable
purposes , or for gifts to individuals , are permitted only when approved by the
Personnel Department.
In view of the Board 's holding in Peyton Packing Company, Inc., 129 NLRB
1275, 1280, 1281 , the rule is unlawful on its face . In the Peyton Packing Company
case, supra , a rule which provided "The only soliciting allowed at the plant will be
5 In respect to the General Counsel's claim that the alleged interrogation of Barbara
Blevens by President Zacks was unlawful, it is my opinion that the General Counsel has
not sustained his burden in this regard.
I The rule referred to in Livingston Shirt Corporation , supra, provided "Activities for
or against any union must not be carried on during working hours" [Emphasis supplied ]
R. G. BARRY CORP. 1481
for the United Fund or other recognized and established charities, and these must
be approved by the Company. No other soliciting of any kind will be allowed," was
declared "an unlawful restriction upon the rights of employees to self-organization"
and that by promulgating said rule, to the extent that it was applicable to non-
working time, Respondent interfered with, restrained, and coerced its employees
in the exercise of the rights guaranteed by Section 7 of the Act, within the mean-
ing of Section 8(a)(1) thereof. I find no substantial variance between the Peyton
Packing Company rule and the rule in the present case. However, President Zacks
explained.
The purpose of that rule was to prevent or to avoid the interruptions to work
and the inconvenience to our associates of outsiders coming into the plant and
interfering with them again on Company time and on Company property.
This rule did not apply internally, to employees within the Company.
The phrase 'for gifts to other individuals" was defined by Zacks as "referring to
the blind, the deaf and the handicapped, as well as . . . an Adopt-a-Family Pro-
gram at Christmas time, and other such efforts to relieve the needy." Zacks said
that at one time the Respondent had permitted these people to come into the plant,
and it just got to he unmanageable and it was too disruptive.
So [the Respondent] put this rule' into effect and [it] stopped this. This rule
was put into effect some time ago.
Zacks testified without contradiction that the Respondent's employees were
allowed to solicit for "flower funds or other things like that." While the Respondent
did not have a written rule on solicitations Zacks explained that the practice "was
that solicitations for flower funds, deaths, or whatever it may have been, were
permitted on company property on non-working time. In other words, during the
breaks, during the lunch hours, this was permitted and this was done, and it is
still done today." During the election campaign employees without respondent
interference engaged in union solicitations and discussions.
Zacks testified that pursuant to the above-quoted written rule on solicitations
United Appeal had sent speakers into the plant "to speak to groups of people and
show film" and "pass out literature" While such solicitation was permitted and
did occur in the plant, according to Zacks, whether permission was granted
depended upon how "busy" the Respondent was "during the campaign period "
The above-quoted rule as construed and implemented by the Respondent was
patently discriminatory in that it banned solicitation by nonemployee union solic-
itors but allowed solicitation by other nonemployees. Thus by reason of the dis-
criminatory character of the rule, the Respondent Employer interfered with rights
of employees to self-organization by promulgating the rule and, while the rule was
in effect, refusing to permit nonemployee union representatives to solicit and com-
municate with the Respondent's employees in the same manner and under the
same circumstances as was permitted other nonemployees. Such conclusion is sup-
ported by the teachings of NL.R.B. v. Babcock & Wilcox Company, 351 U.S.
105, 112:
It is our judgment, however, that an employer may validly post his prop-
erty against nonemployee distribution of union literature if reasonable efforts
by the union through other available channels of communication will enable
it to reach the employees with its message and if the employer's notice or
order does not discriminate against the union by allowing other distribution.
The Respondent's rule does not satisfy the Supreme Court's criteria for validity
which are in the conjunctive. Thus the Respondent's rule is clearly invalid in that
it discriminates against the Union by allowing other nonemployee solicitation.
Third: On November 17 the Union, by Sol Stetin, regional director, requested
permission to address the Respondent's employees by transmitting the following
letter:
In April, 1962, the National Labor Relations Board established the principle
that, under certain circumstances, a union has a right to make in-plant reply
to any anti-union speech which the Employer makes to his workers.
This right comes into play if the Employer has prohibited pro-union talk
or solicitation among the workers, and if he or his agents make anti-union
speeches to the workers and if the Union requests equal time
If your practices meet the first two conditions set out above, we request
that we be given an opportunity to reply to any captive audience speech or
speeches you make. The actual mechanics should be resolved by discussion.
1482 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
However, you must give us fair advance notice so that we can prepare our-
selves so we can make an adequate reply; we would not have a meaningful
right if we were given just 24 hours to prepare a reply to a speech you had
spent two weeks preparing.
If you ignore this NLRB ruling and deny us the right to reply, and if we
lost the election as a result of this conduct, we will decide to file objections
with the NLRB. This would probably result in the election being quickly set
aside and a new one being run at the appropriate time. You should keep
this matter in mind, if you are considering violating the law on this point.
In addition to the NLRB rule discussion above, there is another `right to
communicate' which I believe our Union has under the law and the circum-
stances of this campaign. I believe that, regardless of the no-solicitation situ-
ation, our union has the right to make an in-plant reply to any captive audi-
ence speech you or your agents may choose to give. We therefore ask you
to work out arrangements for a reply if you choose to give such speeches.
Of course, if we are not given the right to reply, we may follow the objection
procedure outlined above.
The complaint raises the question whether, by refusing the Union's requests, the
Respondent violated Section 8(a)(1) of the Act in that the Union was thereby
denied the opportunity to "redress the imbalance created by Respondent's action
in delivering coercive speeches to its employees against the [Union] while it
maintained in effect its unlawful no-solicitations rules"
As a guide to the answer to this question the following language of the Board
is germane:
The Respondent's utilization of company time and premises to propagandize
against the Unions must be viewed against the background of its unlawful cir-
cumscription of its employees' union activity. Montgomery Ward & Co., Inc.,
145 NLRB 846, 848, affirmed Montgomery Ward & Co., Inc., 330 F.2d 889
(C.A. 6). [Emphasis supplied.]
and "absent unusual circumstances" an employer does not have to accede to a
union's request to give the union an equal opportunity to address the employer's
employees in an employee audience convened on the employer's time and property.
Livingston Shirt Corporation, 107 NLRB 400, 405.
In the present case during the preelection campaign the Respondent addressed
employees in small groups assembled in approximately 50 meetings held on com-
pany time and property, time for which was paid by the Respondent. The
Respondent's remarks at such company time and property meetings were anti-
union , coercive in character, and an infringement upon the employees' rights
guaranteed under Section 7 of the Act. Moreover, while the Respondent's dis-
criminatory solicitation rule banned nonemployee union solicitors from the
Respondent's premises, the rule permitted others access to its premises for solici-
tation. The rule was so applied when the Union was denied permission to address
the Respondent's employees during working hours on company property. As in the
Montgomery Ward & Co., Inc., case the Respondent's "unlawful no-solicitation
rule, coupled with its own use of company time and property to impress its anti-
union propaganda on employees `created a glaring imbalance in organizational
communication' that justified the Union's request to address employees under the
same circumstances as had Respondent."
The imbalance thus created gave rise to the Union's right of equal opportunity
to address the Respondent's employees in an employer time and property audience.
Either to have denied the Union the opportunity to have addressed employees,
under the same or similar circumstances as did the Respondent or to have denied
the Union the opportunity to solicit in the same manner and under the same
circumstances as was permitted other nonemployees interfered with freedom of
communication essential to employees' rights of self-organization guaranteed by
Section 7 of the Act. Indeed the one avenue of employee persuasion (the company
time and property audience ) which was least likely to have been blocked by lack
of employee receptiveness, distractions, inertia, subtle apprehensions and genuine
fear of employer reprisals was closed to the Union. Moreover, a detour to the
traditional media of union communication (see Livingston Shirt Corporation,
supra), under the unusual circumstances of the present case did not offset the
competitive advantage flowing to the Respondent from its use of the time and
company property audience. The competitive advantage flowing from the company
time and property audience is self-evident and is acknowledged both by the
R. G. BARRY CORP. 1483
Unions' constant struggle to gain participation therein and the employer's con-
tinued desire to retain their exclusive use. See General Electric Co., 156 NLRB
1247. It seems apparent that the empathy which results from the utilization of
group psychology implicit in the company time and property audience is usually
less attainable through other media normally utilized for the communication of
preelection campaign propaganda. By refusing to permit the Union upon request to
address the Respondent's employees convened in an audience on company time and
property in like manner as did the Respondent during the preelection campaign, the
Respondent violated Section 8(a)(1) of the Act.7
IV. THE EFFECT OF THE UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES UPON COMMERCE
The activities of the Respondent set forth in section III, above, occurring in
connection with its operations set forth in section I, above, have a close, intimate,
and substantial relation to trade, traffic, and commerce among the several States
and tend to lead to labor disputes burdening and obstructing commerce and the
free flow of commerce.
V. THE REMEDY
It having been found that the Respondent has engaged in certain unfair labor
practices, it is recommended that it cease and desist therefrom and take certain
affirmative action designed to effectuate the policies of the Act.
At the commencement of the hearing the Respondent "offered to enter into a
settlement agreement" which was apparently satisfactory to the General Counsel.8
Counsel for the Charging Party objected to the settlement agreement "for the
primary reason that it does not offer an adequate remedy for the violations which
have been committed by the Company .. . ... 9 The Respondent offered the
settlement agreement as an exhibit and it was admitted. The General Counsel
presented his proof in support of the complaints and rested. The Charging Party
advised that it had "nothing additional" and rested. At this point I was disposed
to submit the Settlement Agreement to the Board with a recommendation for
approval; however, the Respondent withdrew the offer of settlement.IO Whereupon
the hearing continued until all the parties had rested.
Upon a review of the entire record and in view of my findings and conclusions
drawn herein, it is my opinion that the policies of the Act as contemplated by
Congress, under the circumstances of this case, will be sufficiently effectuated and
7 The Respondent recites at p. 33 of its brief to the Trial Examiner :
However, it is also clear that if an employer had in effect an invalid no-solicitation
rule, that his refusal to grant a Union's request for equal opportunity is in fact a
violation of the Act Bon-Wit Teller, 28 LRRM 1247 (NLRB 1961) ; May Depart-
ment Stores Co., 49 LRRM 1862 (NLRB 1962), reversed, 53 LRRM 2172 (6th Cir.
1963). Therefore, it appears that the key to whether or not such a refusal is un-
lawful is directly connected to the validity or invalidity of the employers' no solicita-
tion rule.
8 The counsel for the General Counsel said, "That should the Charging Party be willing
to execute the Settlement Agreement, that the Regional Office was prepared or is prepared
to approve it priorly
"This was the situation prior to the opening of the hearing. The Settlement Agreement
was drafted by me during the negotiations with Mr. Greene [the Respondent's Counsel]
by telephone several days before the hearing opened
"It was done at that time on the basis that the Charging Party would become a party
to it To that extent, the settlement is acceptable.
"Certainly, the position of the General Counsel now is that since the Charging Party
will not become a party to it and since complaint has been issued , It is not acceptable as
a matter of policy "
I I received no briefs from the General Counsel or the Charging Party. Thus it would
appear that the Charging Party, after a review of the Record , has abandoned its claim
that the settlement agreement does not "offer an adequate remedy." In any event I am
left in the dark as to what may be the present position of the Charging Party.
10 TRIAL EXAMINER : "I take it, your position is, if the Trial Examiner , in view of the
case, should be of the opinion that the policy of the Act would be effectuated by the
recommending of settlement for approval to the Board, that in that event you would not
participate in the settlement , if the Board approves?"
Mr. GREENE : "That is correct."
1484 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
the remedial objectives of the Act satisfied by requiring the Respondent to post
the notice" which was incorporated in the proposed settlement agreement with
the imposition of an appropriate order. Since the Union is not currently engaged
in an organizational campaign among the Respondent 's employees 12 and has with-
drawn its objections to the election13 any additional remedies at this time would
be illusory and highly speculative . In the event union organization again com-
mences among the Respondent 's employees , the Recommended Order herein will
be an adequate protection against a repetition of the Respondent 's infringement
upon employees ' organizational rights found herein to be unlawful.
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1. The Union is a labor organization within the meaning of the Act.
2 The Respondent is engaged in commerce within the meaning of Section
2(6) and (7) of the Act.
3. By maintaining , distributing , enforcing , and giving effect to an unlawful
no-solicitation rule, by addressing unlawful interrogations to its employees, by
unlawful coercive remarks made to employees assembled on company time and prop-
erty, by refusing to permit the Union upon request to address the Respondent's
employees on company time and property in like manner as did the Respondent,
and by hindering the Board agents in investigating charges pending before the
Board against it, the Respondent interfered with, restrained, and coerced its employ-
ees in the exercise of the rights guaranteed by Section 7 of the Act, thereby vio-
lating Section 8(a)(1) of the Act.
4. The aforesaid unfair labor practices are unfair labor practices within the
meaning of Section 2(6) and (7) of the Act.
RECOMMENDED ORDER
Upon the basis of the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law and
upon the entire record in this case , it is recommended that Respondent , its offi-
cers, agents , successors , and assigns , shall:
1. Cease and desist from:
(a) Coercively interrogating employees in regard to their union membership,
sympathies , or activities.
(b) Threatening employees with more difficult working conditions , a reduction
in hourly wages , and getting out of business if the Textile Workers Union of
America, AFL-CIO, is selected as the collective -bargaining representative of its
employees.
(c) Refusing to permit nonemployee union representatives the similar oppor-
tunity to solicit on company time and property as is permitted other nonemployees
under the Respondent 's no-solicitation rule as long as such rule is maintained.
(d) Making antiunion speeches to employees assembled on the Respondent's
premises during working hours without according , upon reasonable request, the
labor organization , against which the speeches are directed , a similar opportunity
to address employees so long as an unlawful no -solicitation rule bans non-
employee union representatives from solicitation on company time and property
but permits solicitation by other nonemployees.
(e) Hindering the Board agents in investigating charges pending before the
Board against the Respondent.
(f) In any like or similar manner interfering with, restraining , or coercing its
employees in the exercise of their rights to self-organization , to form labor organi-
zations, to join or assist Textile Workers Union of America , AFL-CIO, or any
other labor organization , to bargain collectively through representatives of their
own choosing , and to engage in concerted activities for the purpose of collective
"The notice was amended at the hearing to include a ban against the threat " to move
or sell" or "to get out of business."
"International Union Representative Kennedy testified that the Union was "not now
engaged in an attempt to organize the employees "
13 By withdrawing its objections to the election and allowing the validity of the election
to stand unimpaired it appears that it must be construed that the Union has conceded
that "the election which the Union lost, truly expressed the employees ' desires as to
representation " even though unfair labor practices were committed during the critical
preelection period. See Kolpin Bros ., Inc, 149 NLRB 1378, 1380
R. G. BARRY CORP. 1485
bargaining or other mutual aid or protection, or to refrain from any and all
such activities, except to the extent that such right may be affected by an agree-
ment requiring membership in a labor organization as a condition of employment
as authorized by Section 8(a)(3) of the Act, as amended.
2. Take the following affirmative action which it is found will effectuate the
policies of the Act:
(a) Post at its Columbus, Ohio premises copies of the attached notice marked
"Appendix." 14 Copies of said notice, on forms provided by the Regional Director
for Region 9, after being duly signed by Respondent's representative, shall be
posted by it immediately upon receipt thereof, and maintained by it for 60 con-
secutive days thereafter, in conspicuous places, including all places where notices
to employees are customarily posted. Reasonable steps shall be taken by Respond-
ent to insure that said notices are not altered, defaced, or covered by any other
material.
(b) Notify the Regional Director for Region 9, in writing, within 20 days
from the date of this Decision, what steps the Respondent has taken to comply
herewith.15
IT IS RECOMMENDED that the complaint be dismissed insofar as it alleges vio-
lations of the Act other than those found in this Decision.I6
"In the event that this Recommended Order is adopted by the Board , the words "a
Decision and Order" shall be substituted for the words " the Recommended Order of a
Trial Examiner" in the notice . In the further event that the Board 's Order is enforced
by a decree of a United States Court of Appeals , the words "a Decree of the United States
Court of Appeals Enforcing an Order" shall be substituted for the words "a Decision
and Order."
13 In the event that this Recommended Order is adopted by the Board , this provision
shall be modified to read : "Notify said Regional Director , in writing, within 10 days from
the date of this Order , what steps the Respondent has taken to comply herewith."
16 In view of the Board 's decision in Excelsior Underwear, Inc., and Saluda. Knitting
Inc., 156 NLRB 1236, and the withdrawal of the Union 's objections to the election, I
deem moot the question whether the Respondent violated Section 8(a) (1) of the Act by
its refusal , upon request , to furnish the Union with a list containing the names and
addresses of Respondent ' s unit employees on November 30, 1964.
APPENDIX
NOTICE TO ALL EMPLOYEES
Pursuant to the Recommended Order of a Trial Examiner of the National
Labor Relations Board, and in order to effectuate the policies of the National
Labor Relations Act, as amended, we hereby notify our employees that:
WE WILL NOT threaten our employees with more difficult working con-
ditions nor the reduction of their wages should they designate the Textile
Workers Union of America, AFL-CIO, or any other labor organization, as
their bargaining agent.
WE WILL NOT threaten to move or sell our plant or to get out of business
if our employees should designate the Textile Workers Union of America,
AFL-CIO, or any other labor organization, as their bargaining agent.
WE WILL NOT interrogate our employees in regard to their membership
in, sympathy for, or activities on behalf of, any labor organization.
WE WILL NOT promulgate or enforce any rule which forbids our employees
from soliciting on behalf of any labor organization during nonwork time in
areas of our plant.
WE WILL NOT, while maintaining and enforcing an unlawful no-solicitation
rule, make antiunion speeches to our employees assembled on our premises
during work time without affording, upon reasonable request, a similar
opportunity to the labor organization against which the speeches are directed.
WE WILL NOT advise our employees not to talk to or otherwise cooperate
with agents of the National Labor Relations Board who may be investigating
unfair labor practice charges filed against us.
WE WILL NOT in any like or related manner interfere with, restrain, or
coerce our employees in the exercise of their right to self-organization, to
form labor organizations, to join or assist the above-named, or any other
labor organization, to bargain collectively through representatives of their
1486 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
own choosing , or to engage in other concerted activities for the purpose of
collective bargaining or other mutual aid or protection , or refrain from any
or all such activities.
Our employees are free to become or remain , or refrain from becoming or
remaining, members of the above-named , or any other labor organization.
R. G. BARRY CORPORATION,
Employer.
Dated------------------- By-------------------------------------------
(Representative) (Title)
This notice must remain posted for 60 consecutive days from the date of post-
ing, and must not be altered , defaced , or covered by any other material.
If employees have any question concerning this notice or compliance with its,
provisions , they may communicate directly with the Board 's Regional Office,.
Room 2023 , Federal Office Building, 550 Main Street , Cincinnati , Ohio 45202,.
Telephone 684-3627.
Valleydale Packers, Inc., of Bristol and Meat Cutters, Packing
House Workers & Food Handlers, District Union No. 657,.
Amalgamated Meat Cutters and Butcher Workmen of North
America, AFL-CIO. Case 12-CA-3125. February 7, 1967
DECISION AND ORDER
On December 15, 1965, Trial Examiner Robert L. Piper issued his
Decision in the above-entitled proceeding, finding that the Respond-
ent had engaged in and was engaging in certain unfair labor practices
and recommending that it cease and desist therefrom and take certain
affirmative action, as set forth in the attached Trial Examiner's Deci-
sion. ' Thereafter, the Respondent and the General Counsel filed
exceptions and supporting briefs and the Respondent filed an answer-
ing brief.
The National Labor Relations Board has reviewed the rulings of
the Trial Examiner made at the hearing and finds no prejudicial error
was committed. The rulings are hereby affirmed. The Board has con-
sidered the Trial Examiner's Decision, the exceptions and briefs, and
the entire record in this case, and hereby adopts the findings, conclu-
sions, and recommendations of the Trial Examiner, with the follow-
ing modifications and additions.2
'The Trial Examiner did not decide whether the Respondent was bound by its predeces-
sor's collective-bargaining agreement with the Union ; he referred that issue directly to the
Board. The Board is of the opinion that in view of the agreement ' s expiration date of
March 6, 1967, and the Board 's affirmative bargaining order herein , no useful purpose
would be served in determining the Respondent 's liabilities , if any, under its predecessor's
collective -bargaining agreement in this case.
2 We find, in agreement with the Trial Examiner , that Respondent 's unilateral changes
were violations of the Act . In addition , we find that these changes might have resulted
in financial losses to the employees for which they should be reimbursed in accordance
with F. W. Woolworth Company, 90 NLRB 289, and Isis Plumbing & Heating Co., 138
NLRB 716.
162 NLRB No. 139.