R. C. Cobb, Inc.

National Labor Relations Board - Board Decisions

Aug 3, 1977

231 N.L.R.B. 99 (N.L.R.B. 1977)

R. C. COBB, INC.
R. C. Cobb, Inc. and Local 631, International
Alliance of Theatrical Stage Employees and
Moving Picture Machine Operators of the United
States and Canada. Case 12-CA-6322
August 3, 1977
DECISION AND ORDER
BY CHAIRMAN FANNING AND MEMBERS
PENELLO AND WALTHER
On October 17, 1974, Administrative Law Judge
Julius Cohn issued the attached Decision in this
proceeding. Thereafter, Respondent filed exceptions
and a supporting brief, and the Charging Party filed
a brief in support of the Administrative Law Judge's
Decision.
Pursuant to the provisions of Section 3(b) of the
National Labor Relations Act, as amended, the
National Labor Relations Board has delegated its
authority in this proceeding to a three-member panel.
The Board has considered the record and the
attached Decision in light of the exceptions and
briefs and has decided to affirm the rulings, findings,
and conclusions of the Administrative Law Judge
and to adopt his recommended Order, as modified
herein.'
Respondent excepts only to the Administrative
Law Judge's finding that it violated Section 8(a)(5)
and (I) of the Act by withdrawing recognition from
the Union and by making certain unilateral changes
in the terms and conditions of employment of the
bargaining unit members, and to his recommenda-
tion that a bargaining order issue to remedy the
violation found. Respondent takes the position that it
has sustained an affirmative defense to the 8(a)(5)
allegation and to the imposition of a bargaining
order; namely, that "[t]he Union is guilty of such
discrimination against blacks and females as to be
denied the status of exclusive representative of the
employees of the Company," citing N.L.R.B. v.
Mansion House Center Management Corporation, 473
F.2d 471 (C.A. 8, 1973).
Briefly, Respondent asserts that the Union, with
which it has had an exclusive referral arrangement to
furnish employees and a collective-bargaining rela-
tionship based upon voluntary recognition beginning
in 1971, discriminates against blacks and females.
Respondent notes in particular that the Union has
I In pars. I(b), I(c), and 2(b) of his recommended Order, the Administra-
tive Law Judge failed to describe, or to refer properly to, the appropriate
unit for bargaining. Accordingly, we shall modify these paragraphs of the
Order to refer to the unit which the parties agreed was appropriate for
bargaining.
Also, in par. I(d) of the recommended Order, the Administrative Law
Judge provided that Respondent shall cease and desist from "in any like or
related manner" infringing upon employee rights guaranteed in Sec. 7 of the
Act However, in cases of this kind, involving a violation of Sec. 8(aX3), it is
231 NLRB No. 19
had no black or female members since at least
January 1, 1964, nor has Respondent employed any
blacks or females when employing persons referred
by the Union, although blacks and women comprise
about 10 percent and 38 percent, respectively, of the
total work force in the relevant geographic labor
market. Respondent also points out that the Union
has had no apprenticeship training program since at
least January 1, 1964, that a 3-year collective-
bargaining agreement signed on January 1, 1971,
between Respondent and the Union referred to "pay
to the men represented by Union," and that the
Union's constitution and bylaws refer to members by
use of the male gender only.
The Administrative Law Judge found no merit in
Respondent's affirmative defense to the 8(a)(5)
allegation of the complaint, concluding that the
Union had not practiced discrimination against
blacks and women such as to disqualify it from
serving as the bargaining representative of the
employees. However, consistent with our recent
decision in Bell & Howell Company, 230 NLRB 420
(1977), we find that Respondent was not entitled to
raise the issue of alleged racial or sexual discrimina-
tion at all as an affirmative defense to an 8(a)(5)
complaint or to a bargaining order. 2
Whether a union has been certified by the Board as
the representative of employees in an appropriate
unit, as was the case in Bell & Howell, supra, or has
been voluntarily recognized as bargaining agent, as
here, the union's status as exclusive representative
"imposes upon it the statutory obligation to represent
all employees in the unit fairly and in good faith
without invidious discrimination." Bell & Howell,
supra. In addition, as the Board stated in Handy
Andy, supra at 450:
[A] union's status as the bargaining representative
gives it no right or authority to establish hiring
restrictions based on membership restrictions
whether or not such membership restrictions are
legitimate for other purposes. For, under the Act,
it is an unfair labor practice for a labor organiza-
tion, whether or not it is certified, to cause or
attempt to cause employers to hire on the basis of
membership or nonmembership in a union. The
Act further provides appropriate means to reme-
dy such an unfair labor practice. Furthermore, a
bargaining representative's right to enter into
the Board's established policy to use the broad injunctive language "in any
other manner." See N.L R.B. v. Entwistle Mfg. Co., 120 F.2d 532, 536 (C.A.
4, 1941). Accordingly, we shall modify the Administrative Law Judge's
recommended Order and notice.
2 See also Handy Andy, Inc., 228 NLRB 447 (1977), in which the Board
found that it was not constitutionally forbidden from certifying a union
after an election upon an allegation that the union practiced discnrimination
against minority group members, and that, indeed, the Board had a
statutory duty to issue such a certification.
99
DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
union-security agreements with employers condi-
tioning continued employment on union member-
ship or payment of agency shop fees is dependent
on the availability of membership in the bargain-
ing representative to any employees who choose
to join. Similarly, if access to a union hiring hall is
limited to union members, the exclusive hiring
hall agreement violates the Act. Further, any
membership policy of a union which would tend
to limit job opportunities for minorities is barred
by Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as
amended.
Also, the Board noted in both Bell & Howell and
Handy Andy that it had found violations of Section
8(b)(1)(A), (2), and (3) in a number of cases involving
various invidious discriminatory practices by unions,
and that proceedings under Section 8(b) of the Act
were best suited to the resolution of allegations of
such discrimination by unions.
In short, in view of the foregoing and for all the
reasons stated in Bell & Howell and Handy Andy,
neither finding Respondent guilty of violating Sec-
tion 8(a)(5) of the Act, imposing upon Respondent a
bargaining order to remedy the violation, nor court
enforcement of such a bargaining order, aids or
encourages invidious discrimination against blacks
wr women by the Union or significantly involves the
Geovernment in any such discrimination, in violation
of the Constitution. Therefore, Respondent's allega-
tjon of racial and sexual discrimination by the Union
does not constitute an affirmative defense in this
8(aX5) proceeding.
ORDER
Pursuant to Section 10(c) of the National Labor
Relations Act, as amended, the National Labor
Relations Board adopts as its Order the recommend-
ed Order of the Administrative Law Judge as
modifed below, and hereby orders that the Respon-
dent, R. C. Cobb, Inc., Orlando and Winter Park,
Florida, its officers, agents, successors, and assigns,
shall take the action set forth in the said recommend-
ed Order, as so modified:
1. Substitute the following for paragraphs l(b),
I(c), and l(d):
"(b) Refusing to recognize and bargain with Local
631, International Alliance of Theatrical Stage
Employees and Moving Picture Machine Operators
of the United States and Canada, as the collective-
bargaining representative of the employees in the
foglowing described appropriate unit:
"All motion picture machine operators em-
ployed at the Pine Hills Twin Theatres, Orlando,
Florida, and the Semoran Twin Theatres, Winter
Park, Florida, excluding all other employees,
watchmen, guards and supervisors as defined in
the Act.
"(c) Unilaterally changing the wages, or other
terms and conditions of employment, of the employ-
ees in the appropriate unit described above, without
prior consultation with Local 631, International
Alliance of Theatrical Stage Employees and Moving
Picture Machine Operators of the United States and
Canada.
"(d) In any other manner interfering with, restrain-
ing, or coercing employees in the exercise of their
rights guaranteed in Section 7 of the Act."
2. Substitute the following for paragraph 2(b):
"(b) Upon request, recognize and bargain with
Local 631, International Alliance of Theatrical Stage
Employees and Moving Picture Machine Operators
of the United States and Canada, as the collective-
bargaining representative of the employees in the
appropriate unit described above."
3. Substitute the attached notice for that of the
Administrative Law Judge.
APPENDIX
NOTICE To EMPLOYEES
POSTED BY ORDER OF THE
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
An Agency of the United States Government
WE WILL NOT discourage membership in Local
631, International Alliance of Theatrical Stage
Employees and Moving Picture Machine Opera-
tors of the United States and Canada, or any
other labor organization, by discharging or
otherwise discriminating against employees in
any manner with regard to their hire and tenure
of employment or any term or condition of
employment.
WE WILL NOT refuse to recognize and bargain
with Local 631, International Alliance of Theatri-
cal Stage Employees and Moving Picture Ma-
chine Operators of the United States and Canada,
as the collective-bargaining representative of the
employees in the following described appropriate
unit:
All motion picture machine operators
employed at the Pine Hills Twin Theatres,
Orlando, Florida, and the Semoran Twin
Theatres, Winter Park, Florida, excluding all
other employees, watchmen, guards and
supervisors as defined in the Act.
WE WILL NOT unilaterally change the wages, or
other terms and conditions of employment, of the
100
R. C. COBB, INC.
employees in the appropriate unit described
above, without prior consultation with Local 631,
International Alliance of Theatrical Stage Em-
ployees and Moving Picture Machine Operators
of the United States and Canada.
WE WILL NOT in any other manner interfere
with, restrain, or coerce employees in the exercise
of their rights guaranteed in Section 7 of the
National Labor Relations Act.
WE WILL make whole Joseph R. Bracciale and
Ofa H. Osborne for any loss of pay or other
benefits they may have suffered by reason of our
discrimination against them.
WE WILL, upon request, recognize and bargain
with Local 631, International Alliance of Theatri-
cal Stage Employees and Moving Picture Ma-
chine Operators of the United States and Canada,
as the collective-bargaining representative of the
employees in the appropriate unit described
above.
R. C. COBB, INC.
DECISION
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
JULIUS COHN, Administrative Law Judge: This case was
heard at Orlando, Florida, on July 9 and 10, 1974. Upon a
charge filed and served on March 29, 1974, the Regional
Director for Region 12 issued the complaint in this
proceeding on May 8 alleging that R.C. Cobb, Inc., herein
called the Respondent or Company, violated Section
8(a)(1), (3), and (5) of the National Labor Relations Act, as
amended, by unlawfully terminating two of its employees
and, further, by refusing to bargain in good faith with the
Charging Party. Respondent filed an answer denying the
commission of unfair labor practices and pleading affirma-
tively that the Charging Party should be denied, in any
event, the benefit of a bargaining order by reason of its
alleged practice discrimination on the basis of race and sex.
Issues
Whether the Respondent is a successor to an employer
who had a collective-bargaining agreement with the
Charging Party.
Whether Respondent illegally terminated two of its
employees because of their membership in and activities in
behalf of the Charging Party.
Assuming the Respondent has unlawfully refused to
bargain in good faith, whether a bargaining order should
be denied because of alleged racial and sexual discrimina-
tion by the Union.
All parties were given full opportunity to participate, to
introduce relevant evidence, to examine and cross-examine
witnesses, to argue orally, and to file briefs. Briefs, which
I Par. 7 of the complaint, admitted by the Respondent, alleges the
effective date as January I. 1970. There is also a discrepancy as to the date
in the agreement itself, as the first page refers to 1971 and the last page to
have been carefully considered, were submitted by all of
the parties.
Upon the entire record of the case, and from my
observation of the witnesses and their demeanor, I make
the following:
FINDINGS OF FACT
I. THE BUSINESS OF THE COMPANY
Respondent is an Alabama corporation which owns and
operates motion picture theatres in several States including
the State of Florida. In Florida it owns and operates,
among others, the Pine Hills Twin Theatres and the
Semoran Twin Theatres located, respectively, in Orlando
and Winter Park. During the past year Respondent
received gross revenues in excess of $500,000 from its
theatre operations and rented films which were delivered to
Florida from outside that State at a rental cost in excess of
$50,000. Respondent admits and I find that the Company
is an employer engaged in commerce within the meaning of
Section 2(6) and (7) of the Act.
11. THE LABOR ORGANIZATION INVOLVED
Local 631, International Alliance of Theatrical Stage
Employees and Moving Picture Machine Operators of the
United States and Canada, herein called the Union or
Charging Party, is a labor organization within the meaning
of Section 2(5) of the Act.
111. THE ALLEGED UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES
A. Background
Respondent operates 55 motion picture theatres in the
southeastern part of the United States. At the end of 1970,
it commenced operation of the Pine Hills Twin Theatres at
Orlando and the Semoran Twin Theatres at Winter Park,
Florida. From the outset, Respondent employed moving
picture machine operators (projectionists) who were mem-
bers of the Union. Respondent and the Union executed a
collective-bargaining agreement covering employees at the
two locations effective January 1, 1971, to December 31,
1973.1 The agreement provided for a weekly wage rate with
a 40-hour guarantee. Hourly rates were set at $4 in 1971,
$4.25 in 1972, and $4.50 in 1973. Each theatre had two
auditoriums (twin) which were serviced by one booth and
therefore one projectionist at each location. While the
contract does not provide for a hiring hall, it is undisputed
that the projectionists were always furnished by the Union.
The projectionist at each location could, if he wished, work
7 days a week. But the Union sent a replacement whenever
the regular employee desired a day off, a vacation, or was
absent for any reason. Until their termination by Respon-
dent on March 2, 1974, Joe R. Bracciale was employed at
1970. However, the briefs of both General Counsel and Respondent allude
to 1971 which I shall accept as the correct date. In any event, the exact date
of the inception of this relationship is of no consequence in this case
101
DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
the Pine Hills Twin since the fall of 1972 and Ofa H.
Osborne at the Semoran Twin since its opening in 1970.2
As indicated, both had been referred to these jobs by the
Union.
On April 24, 1973, Respondent subleased both twin
theatre locations to Windsor Theatres, Inc., which there-
upon undertook their operation, paying to the Respondent
rentals and rentals and a percentage of gross revenues from
concessions. Windsor met with the Union and signed an
agreement effective May 4, 1973, to December 31, 1977.
This contract continued the wage rate of $4.50 per hour
then in effect under the Cobb agreement. However, it
further provided for increases to $5 in 1974, $5.50 in 1975,
and $6 in 1976 and 1977. It also contained provisions not
present in the Cobb agreement such as a 3-hour minimum
for RCA service call;3 a fraction of an hour was to be
considered I full hour; and makeup time to be 2 hours per
feature minimum.4 Windsor encountered financial difficul-
ties and closed the theatres on October 20, 1973.
The Respondent then subleased the theatres to Venus
Theatres, Inc., which reopened them on November 8, 1973.
Apparently Venus did not sign a new contract but rather
adopted the Windsor agreement except for a modification
of vacation benefits and changing makeup time to 2 hours
minimum from 2 hours per feature minimum. Venus
operated the theatres, instituting the wage increase on
January I as provided in the Windsor contract, until
January 11, 1974.
On that date, Cobb once more took over the operation of
the theatres. Thereafter Cobb terminated the two projec-
tionists on March 2, reinstating them on May 13, 1974.
B. The Successorship Issue
There is essentially no dispute as to the facts on this
question. Respondent, the principal lessor of the theatre
properties, and the original operator, returned to operation
after successive subleases to Windsor and Venus which
endured less than I year in total. The employees (only the
two projectionists are involved) remained the same
throughout and Respondent accepted them on January 11,
1974, when it resumed operations. Indeed, Respondent's
district manager testified that he told them "everything was
going to be the same as it was when it was Cobb theatres in
the beginning." However, Respondent did not revert to the
conditions provided in its original agreement, but contin-
ued the increased wage rate mandated by the Windsor and
Venus contract as of January 1, 1974, as well as the
minimums for makeup time and service calls. Obviously,
the business entity and function, that of operating the film
theatres, remained the same throughout and there is no
evidence that the two employees involved no longer wished
to be represented by the Union. Thus the important factors
of continuity of business, equipment, employees, working
conditions, and continued membership in the Union are
present and I find, therefore, that Respondent is a
2 Respondent reemployed Bracciale and Osborne on May 13, 1974.
:' RCA periodically serviced the equipment and the operator was
required to be present.
4 Makeup time refers to the time required to prepare a show for viewing.
It is necessary for each new feature to be wound on larger reels, inspecting
the film for breaks, etc., at the same time. At the conclusion of a run, the
successor to Venus in the operation of the Pine Hills and
Semoran Twin Theatres.5
C. The Alleged Violation of Section 8(a)(3)
At the conclusion of the last shift on March 2, 1974,
Division Manager John Zampi visited the Pine Hills
Theatre and personally delivered the following letter to
Bracciale, with a copy for the business agent of the Union.
March 2, 1974
Mr. Richard Gabel
Mr. Joseph R. Bracciale
Mr. Ofa H. Osborne
Local No. 631
I.A.T.S.E.
Orlando, Florida
Gentlemen:
The contract between Cobb Theatres for its Semoran
and Pine Hills Theatres, Orlando, Florida and Local
No. 631 -I.A.T.S.E. expired on December 31, 1973.
As you are aware, these theatres have been losing
money steadily, and after careful review, we have
determined that we can no longer afford to continue
this agreement.
Accordingly, your representative operators in the booth
have been paid in full for the payroll period through
March 2, 1974 and additionally, the primary operators
have received two weeks' salary in lieu of two weeks'
notice.
Thank you for your cooperation.
Kindest personal regards.
Sincerely,
Irv Richland
Special Assistant to the
Executive Vice President and
Director of Florida Operations
IR: fmk
CC: Mr. R. C. Cobb
Mr. Joe Moore
Mr. Norm Levinson
Mr. John Zampi
Simultaneously, another representative of Respondent
delivered a copy of the letter to Osborne at the Semoran
Theatre. The following day (Sunday), the theatres were
opened and continued to operate with new employees. No
prior notice of the termination had been given to the Union
or the employees. Thereafter on March 30, Business Agent
show is then torn down and the film is rewound on the original reels. This
process of making up and tearing down occurs only when a show is
changed. As will be seen, the time required for the operation was a source of
conflict between Respondent and the employees and their Union.
I N.L.R.B. v. Burns International Security Services, Inc., 406 U.S. 272
(1972).
102
R. C. COBB, INC.
Sullivan called Zampi who refused to discuss the discharg-
es and said they had no contract with the Local.
Norman Levinson is executive vice president of the
Respondent in charge of its theatre operation. Levinson
testified that sometime in February, as a result of
discussion with his assistants concerning their belief that
Bracciale and Osborne charged the Company for excessive
amounts of makeup time, he decided to terminate these
employees. He thereupon personally instructed Zampi to
"locate nonunion." Zampi looked, found nonunion people,
and hired them well before dismissing Bracciale and
Osborne. The replacements began to work the following
day at respective rates of $2.50 and $2.75 per hour as
compared to the $5 per hour union rate.
Bracciale testified that at the time he was terminated
Zampi told him that the Company could not afford to keep
the Union. Zampi denies making this statement but in this
regard I credit Bracciale who seemed more straightforward
in his testimony while Zampi was elusive and had to be led.
Moreover, the statement is consistent with the letter of
termination which is really written to the Union and states
that "we can no longer afford this agreement." 6
Respondent's defense to the allegation that the employ-
ees were illegally terminated is based mainly on its
contention that they were unreasonable in the time they
charged the Company. In short, it is alleged that they
padded the payrolls and, in support of this argument, a
great deal of testimony was elicited concerning the makeup
time. In 1972, Respondent wrote to an International
representative of the Union complaining about this
problem. As a result a meeting was held in October
attended by company and union representatives as well as
Bracciale and Osborne. Nothing concrete came forth at the
meeting. Accepting the version of Respondent's witnesses,
the Union's International representative told the employ-
ees to be careful about the hours charged and the
Company agreed to install a new additional rewind
machine in each booth to speed the makeup process. In all
of the testimony there is no clear statement of what is a
reasonable time for makeup. At one point Levinson
testified that three-quarters of an hour is reasonable; at
another, his assistant, Richland, stated 15 minutes in some
cases is reasonable. These estimates are contested by the
employees who state that makeup time varies and is
dependent upon many factors such as the length of a film
and whether it contains defects. The Windsor and Venus
contracts provided for minimums, not maximums, and
while the expired contract with Respondent did not
contain any specific provision, the employees charged for
the time they spent making up and tearing down.
It is clear that the amount of time Respondent paid for
makeup was based upon the record submitted by each
employee individually to the theatre manager. This matter
of payroll padding, if it existed, was an act of the individual
employees, not the Union. Thus, if the Company was
unhappy with the charges made by these employees, as it
might well be, it did not seek to replace them with other
'; The letter of March 2. 1974, notes at the outset that the contract
expired December 31. 1973, then states it cannot continue the agreement.
The tone of the letter implies that Respondent, up to this point at least.
accorded recognition to the Union.
7 I do not credit Zampi's testimony, denied by Bracciale and Osborne.
union employees. Indeed, it continued to pay them for the
time they charged long after the 1972 meeting and during
the period commencing January 11, 1974, when the
Company resumed operations, until their discharge.7
The letter of termination was written to the Union, not
the employees. The reference to the losing operation is
linked to the continuation of the agreement. There is
nothing regarding the conduct of the employees. If
anything, it was the overall wage rate that concerned the
Company which was manifested by its hire of two
replacements at half the rate.
On the basis of all the testimony, but particularly that of
Executive Vice President Levinson, I conclude that
Bracciale and Osborne were terminated because of their
membership in the Union. Levinson was incapable of
separating these employees from their Union. For example,
he said repeatedly that the operators and the Union were
"unfair"; "these two operators and the Union were taking
advantage of us"; and "I believe the two operators and the
Union they worked for was at fault." And, of course,
Levinson's first instruction, after deciding to dismiss the
two operators, was to seek nonunion employees.
I find no merit in Respondent's contention that its
contract (par. 2) gave it the right to discharge the
employees for any reason. That paragraph, in this case,
conflicts with paragraph 6 which states that the employer
agrees not to discharge employees because of their union
affiliation. Further, reliance on the contract is not consis-
tent with Levinson's testimony that he did not contact the
Union before discharging the operators because "we did
not have a contract."
Finally, upon reinstating these two employees in May,
they were specifically informed by Zampi that the
Company was not recognizing the Union. On this occasion,
Business Agent Sullivan accompanied Osborne to the
Semoran but was denied admission to the booth by Zampi.
Accordingly, I find that Respondent discharged Bracc-
iale and Osborne on March 2, 1974, because of their
membership in the Union and thereby violated Section
8(aX I) and (3) of the Act.
D. The Refusal To Bargain
Having found that Respondent is a successor employer,
certain bargaining obligations flow under the Burns
doctrine. The Supreme Court said that a successor
employer is ordinarily free to set initial terms on which it
will hire the employees of a predecessor. But the Court also
stated that "there will be instances in which it is perfectly
clear that the new employer plans to retain all of the
employees in the unit and in which it will be appropriate to
have him initially consult with the employees' bargaining
representative before he fixes terms."
that he spoke to them individually in 1974 about overcharging. However,
even if his statement is accepted, there was nothing conclusive about it, nor
did it even contain a warning.
. Burns, supra.
103
DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
In this case, Respondent retained all the employees in
the unit.9 Consequently, Respondent's duty to bargain
concerning initial terms of employment arose as soon as
Zampi told the employees on January II that Respondent
was taking over and they would remain.10 At that point, no
bargaining or request for bargaining occurred presumably
because Respondent continued in effect the wages and
other terms as set forth in the contract of its predecessor. In
any event, the initial terms had been established on
January II and Respondent was not free thereafter to
establish or change conditions for unit employees without
bargaining with the Union."1
As the Company did not change working conditions
when it took over in January, this right came into play,
then, in mid-February 1974 when Executive Vice President
Levinson decided not only to terminate Bracciale and
Osborne but to hire nonunion replacements. This decision
was made, as we have seen, without notification to or
consultation with the Union, as was its implementation
which was not effected until the replacements had been
hired. Needless to say such unilateral conduct was
calculated to destroy the bargaining unit.' 2 Nor can there
be any doubt that Levinson intended that result in view of
his testimony that the Union was "unfair"; that it was "at
fault"; and his instruction to locate and hire nonunion
people at rates of half the union scale. When Bracciale and
Osborne were reinstated in May, Division Manager Zampi
told Osborne in person, and Bracciale by phone, that they
were being hired, but not as union operators. Further, he
directed Union Business Agent Sullivan not to come to the
theaters. It is clear that the Company at no time after
January 11 recognized its obligation to bargain with the
Union.
Thus, the successorship relationship having been estab-
lished, I find that Respondent failed in its obligation to
refrain from unilateral changes in the terms and conditions
of employment. This was done in several ways: (a) The
failure to notify the Union of its decision to terminate all
bargaining unit employees; (b) the termination, without
notice, of all bargaining unit employees; (c) the employ-
ment of nonunion replacements at wages substantially
below the established rate; (d) and by refusing at the time
of Osborne's reinstatement to permit the Union's business
agent to visit the theaters and inspect the booth, contrary
to previous custom. By all of this conduct, Respondent
unilaterally changed the conditions of employment in
violation of Section 8(a)(1) and (5) of the Act.
Further, by the refusal of Respondent Division Manager
Zampi to discuss with Business Agent Sullivan, at the
latter's request in March 1974, the matter of the discharge
of the unit employees, and Zampi's rejection of the Union
at the time of the employees' reinstatement on May 13,
Respondent also violated Section 8(aXl) and (5) of the
Act. 13
9 it is stipulated and I find that all motion picture machine operators
employed at the Pine Hills Twin Theater and Semoran Twin Theater
constitute an appropriate unit.
i' Howard Johnson Company, 198 NLRB 763 (1973); Good Foods
Manufacturing & Processing Corporation, Chicago Lamb Packers, Inc., 200
NLRB 623 (1972).
, Ranch- Wa, Inc., 203 NLRB 911 (1973).
Before providing remedies for the 8(aX5) violations
found, it is necessary to inquire into and determine the
merit of Respondent's affirmative defense of racial and
sexual discrimination by the Union.14
E. The Mansion House Defense
Respondent, relying on Mansion House, contends that
"the Union is guilty of such discrimination against blacks
and females as to be denied the status of exclusive
representative of the employees of the Company."
The facts developed on this issue are in the main
uncontroverted. The parties stipulated as follows:
1. That from January 1, 1970, to date, R. C. Cobb,
Inc., when employing projectionists furnished by Local
631, IATSE, in projectionists classifications has not
employed persons who are either black or female.
2. That Local 631, IATSE, from January 1, 1964, to
date has had no black or female members.
3. The collective-bargaining agreement between
Respondent and the Union dated January 1, 1971, with
a duration from January 1, 1971, through December 31,
1973, provides in part for "pay to the men represented
by Union... ."
4. That the practice since January 1, 1964, of Local
631, IATSE, and the employers with whom it has had
collective bargaining agreements has been that the
employers seek their employees exclusively through
Local 631 and the Union furnishes projectionists. This
exclusive referral system only allows the employer to
seek employees independently of the Union where the
Union notifies the employer that no one is available.
5. That the Constitution and By-Laws of Local 631,
IATSE, from January 1, 1964, to date, are attached
hereto and made a part hereof and marked Exhibit 1 to
this Stipulation.
6. That Local 631, IATSE, since January 1, 1964,
has had no apprenticeship training program.
7. That although the facts stipulated to are limited
to events after the year January 1964, they are so
limited only by reason of the contention of the Union
and the General Counsel that facts before that date
would be irrelevant. No inference will be drawn from
the fact that the period of time covered in this
stipulation commences on January 1, 1964, other than
that was the effective date of the Civil Rights Act.
The Respondent called on a witness in addition to the
stipulation. Esther Wilder, a labor market analyst em-
ployed by the Florida State Employment Service, testified
to the authenticity of certain documents which were
received for the purpose of showing population statistics in
the counties over which the Union has jurisdiction.' 5
12 See Johnson's Industrial Caterers, Inc., 197 NLRB 352 (1972).
i3 Southwest Janitorial and Maintenance Corporation, 205 NLRB 1061
(1973).
14 N.LR. B. v. Mansion House Center Management Corporation, 473 F.2d
471 (C.A. 8, 1973).
1' The Union's jurisdiction extends to Orange, Seminole, and Brevard
Counties.
104
R. C. COBB, INC.
The relevant figures show that in Orange County (where
the theaters are located) in 1972, 14.6 percent of the total
population were black and 51.3 percent were female.' 6
These statistics, updated to 1973, indicate 14.1 percent
blacks and 49.9 percent female. In Orange County during
1971, 13.5 percent of the work force was black while blacks
comprised 17.8 percent of the total unemployed in the
county. The 1971 reports indicate both black and female
employment and unemployment by occupation but the job
of motion picture operator is not listed. The witness
testified that figures on unemployment are obtained from
employer and unemployment compensation reports. Wild-
er receives information concerning the job placement by
state agencies of many classifications of employees, but
could not say whether a projectionist had been placed nor
whether any black or female had ever applied for such a
position.
Union Business Agent Sullivan testified that the Local
has 50 members of whom only 24 are employed. No new
members entered in 1974, but there were five in 1973 and
two in 1972. The initiation fee is $500 and an applicant
must demonstrate that he is a projectionist. This is
accomplished by sending him to a theater with an
experienced member. Three members are required to
vouch for an applicant; the application is then forwarded
to New York for approval after which the Local votes upon
his admission. Sullivan said that, in his 4 years' experience,
two applicants were voted down. He has not heard of any
black or female applicants nor, indeed, of any black or
female projectionists, union or nonunion, in the Orlando
area. Ofa Osborne, a member since 1967, and a trustee and
executive board member, stated that, to his knowledge, no
black or female had ever applied for membership.
The Union filed an Equal Employment Opportunity
Local Union Report (EEO - 3), but the EEOC does not
require a local union with less than 100 members to
complete those portions of the form relating to minority
practices and hiring halls.
In essence, Respondent's affirmative defense rests on the
fact that the Union does not have any blacks or females
among its membership, that these groups comprise a
significant portion of the population," that the Union, in
practice, operates an exclusive hiring hall and does not
have an apprenticeship training program.
In Mansion House, the court, relying on Title VII cases,
held that statistical evidence of racial imbalance in the
union's membership creates a prima facie case of racial
discrimination which shifts the burden to the union to
rebut this inference. The Board had held that it was not
sufficient for the employer to demonstrate a racial
imbalance by the use of statistics alone.' 8 The court stated
that "the Board should inquire whether the Union has
taken the initiative to affirmatively undo its discriminatory
'6 In this case. I believe it suffices to show merely a significant
proportion of blacks or females since the Union admittedly has none among
its membership
17 Although the stipulation provided that it was in lieu of other testimony
on the affirmative defense, I received, over objection. the additional
statistical evidence offered by Respondent. It was clear during the
negotiation that the stipulation was a substitute for testimony in support of
the bill of particulars furnished by Respondent. Moreover, Respondent need
not be limited by the scope of the demand for a bill of particulars provided
the evidence proffered is relevant to the issues raised by the affirmative
defense.
practices," and denied enforcement of the 8(a)(5) viola-
tion, 19 remanding those issues to the Board for further
consideration.
Since the court decision in Mansion House, the Board has
had very few opportunities to consider this matter. In
Hawkins Construction Company, 210 NLRB 965, 971
(1974), Administrative Law Judge Jerrold H. Shapiro
found that the employer violated Section 8(a)(5) by
refusing to furnish information to the union. The employer
pleaded the Mansion House defense and, after carefully
weighing the evidence, the Administrative Law Judge
concluded that the "statistical disparity between the racial
composition of the Union's membership with that of the
general population was not demonstrated to have been
readily identifiable as substantial." In short, the primafacie
case of discrimination had not been proven.2 The Board
adopted his recommended order, agreeing that the evi-
dence does not establish a prima facie case of racial
discrimination by the union. It therefore did not find it
necessary to reach the issue of whether the Board would be
required as a matter of national and statutory policy to find
that the union is not the exclusive bargaining representa-
tive, should it find that the union was engaging in racial
discrimination. Chairman Miller specifically reserved
judgment on the issue of under what circumstances a Title
VII violation is sufficient to withhold a bargaining order
and also the question of weight to be accorded to statistical
evidence.
Again, in another case, the Board adopted an order
recommended by Administrative Law Judge Charles W.
Schneider finding violations of Section 8(a)(5) despite an
affirmative defense that the union engaged in racially
discriminatory practices. The Administrative Law Judge
found that the failure of the union to refer minority
employees to the employer was insufficient to establish that
the union engaged in racial discrimination. Of course the
evidence showed that the union had referred minority
persons to other employers, it had substantially increased
its minority membership in the past few years, and it had
participated in various programs for recruitment and
training of minority individuals. The Board agreed with the
Administrative Law Judge's disposition of the case on the
merits.21
Neither Hawkins nor Williams is dispositive of the
instant case as they were situations in which the statistics
themselves failed to establish any substantial imbalance.
Three recent Board decisions in representation matters
dealt with the Mansion House issue. In each of these cases,
an employer urged that a petitioning union be disqualified
to represent the employees on the ground that the union
discriminates on the basis of sex, national origin, or race, as
the case may be.
IN 190NLRB437(1971).
19 The court enforced violations of Sec. 8(aX3) found by the Board.
20 The population statistics revealed that 3.3 percent of the population in
the union's territorial junsdiction were minonty groups while 2.4 percent of
the union's membership were minority group persons. In a smaller area
involved, the population contained 7.4 percent minority and the union had a
membership of 5.9 percent.
21 Williams Enterprises Inc., 212 NLRB 880 (1974).
105
DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
In Bekins Moving & Storage Co. of Florida, Inc., 211
NLRB 138 (1974), a majority of the Board determined that
the question whether the Board should certify a union
which engaged in invidious discrimination of this type
raised constitutional issues and that the Board lacked the
power to confer a certificate on such a union. Procedurally
it was held that the issue of disqualification in a representa-
tion case could be raised by objection only after the
election had been won by the union.22 In Bekins, the Board
did not set forth specific parameters which would be
determinative of particular cases. However, it did say:
It will thus be our task, on a case-by-case basis, to
determine whether the nature and quantum of the proof
offered sufficiently shows a propensity for unfair
representation as to require us, in order that our own
action may conform to our constitutional duties, to
take the drastic step of declining to certify a labor
organization which has demonstrated in an election
that it is the choice of the majority of employees. It is
not our intention to take such a step lightly or
incautiously, nor to regard every possible alleged
violation of Title VII, for example, as grounds for
refusing to issue a certificate. There will doubtless be
cases in which we will conclude that correction of such
statutory violations is best left to the expertise of other
agencies or to remedial orders less draconian than the
total withholding of representative status. To reconcile
these views with a full awareness of our own constitu-
tional responsibilities will, we recognize, not always be
an easy task, but the difficulties involved do not entitle
us to shrug off our oath to uphold and defend the
Constitution of the United States.
A statistical situation close to that in the instant case
arose in Bell & Howell Company, 213 NLRB 407 (1974),
where the employer urged, in the representation proceed-
ing, that a motion for disqualification be granted based
upon the contention, inter alia, that the union controlled
the stationary engineering trade in the Chicago area
thereby necessitating membership in order to obtain
employment, and the absence of female engineers is the
effect of the union's discriminatory policies. It further
alleged that no females were members of the union.
Members Fanning and Penello, adhering to their dissent in
Bekins, do not believe that disqualification of a union
petitioner in a representation case "because it allegedly
discriminates on the basis of sex is neither required by the
Constitution nor permitted by the Act." They would "leave
such questions as they may raise, with respect to the
Petitioner's willingness or capacity to represent all employ-
ees in the bargaining unit, to be resolved in other
proceedings under the Act." Member Kennedy concurred
in this case, because the alleged discrimination was based
on sex and, as previously noted, he would confine
precertification representation proceedings to those allega-
22 Member Kennedy, concurring, would limit the postelection hearing to
allegations that the union excludes persons from membership on the basis of
race, alienage, or national origin. He would not inquire at that time
regarding a potential breach of the union's duty of fair representation which
he believes to be statutory. Nor does he regard discrimination on the basis
of sex to be constitutional since the Supreme Court has not found sex to be
tions determined by the Supreme Court to be inherently
suspect. He would view alleged sexual discrimination as a
possible breach of the statutory duty of fair representation.
Thus, a Board majority denied the employer's motion to
disqualify the union. Chairman Miller and Member
Jenkins, on the other hand, in accordance with their views
expressed in Bekins, find that the employer had submitted
prima facie evidence "which challenges the Petitioner's
ability to fairly represent employees," and they would
direct a hearing on the issues.
In Grants Furniture Plaza, Inc. of West Palm Beach, Fla.,
213 NLRB 410 (1974), decided the same day as Bell &
Howell, the Board overruled the employer's exceptions to
the report on objections and recommendations of the
Regional Director, and certified the union without a
hearing. The employer submitted statistical data which, it
contended, showed an imbalance with respect to female
and Spanish-surnamed members of the union. It alleged
that union membership was 12-1/2 percent Spanish and
12-1/2 percent female while the population in the area was
26.6 percent Spanish and Spanish-surnamed and the
percentage of available females in the work force was 49.2
percent. All Board members agreed to the certification of
the union in this case. Members Fanning and Penello
concurred for the reasons expressed in Bekins that they
would not consider these matters in pre-certification
proceedings. Chairman Miller and Member Jenkins stated
(with respect to the issue pertinent herein):
Nor do we find sufficient to warrant a hearing the
evidence offered in the form of statistics purporting to
show that the labor organization seeking certification
here has a membership in which certain minority
groups appear in numbers less than the population
ratio of such minorities to the total population in the
area in which this labor organization operates. No
evidence was proffered here to show that the Petitioner,
through a hiring hall or other means, exercises any
control whatsoever over the racial, sexual or ethnic
composition of those who enter the work force and,
thus, those who are or may become its members. In the
absence of such evidence we must assume that the
employers in the area exercise the true control over the
selection of the work forces, and that only after the
employer selection process has been effective do
employees normally either voluntarily seek member-
ship in the union or, in some instances, do so as
required under the terms of a valid union-security
agreement.
Without passing, therefore, in this case, upon the
appropriate weight to be given statistical data as to the
racial or ethnic composition of the Union's member-
ship in a setting wherein evidence is offered to show
either that the Union controls or substantially influenc-
es access to employment, or deliberately restricts access
to its own membership rolls, we conclude that it would
an inherently suspect classification. The latter may be raised as a breach of
the duty to fairly represent. The dissenting members believe that certifica-
tion is statutory and the certification confers obligations on the union to
fairly represent all the employees. Should it fail in this obligation, the unfair
labor practice procedures under Sec. 8 would be available, or the
certification would be subject to revocation.
106
R. C. COBB, INC.
be improper to draw any inferences of union propensity
for discrimination on the sole basis of such statistical
evidence in the instant setting. We therefore conclude
in agreement with the Regional Director that this
statistical evidence standing alone is insufficient to
warrant the holding of a hearing.
Member Kennedy, concurring, also indicates that statis-
tical imbalance is an unreliable factor. He said:
In summary, I would not regard statistics alone, such
as those presented here, as a reliable indication of
discrimination in union membership. It would be
untenable, in my view, to rely solely on statistical
imbalances as evidence of union discrimination. Such
imbalances may be nothing more than a reflection of
the total composition of bargaining units which the
union is obligated to represent.
I have discussed these representation cases at some
length because they have been the sole vehicles at this
point, to my knowledge, which have provided the Board
with an opportunity to speak to the question of statistical
imbalance in union membership as indicative of discrimi-
nation with respect to race, sex, or national origin.
Moreover a bargaining order bestows upon a union the
status of exclusive bargaining representative under Section
9(a), the same as achieved through the electoral processes
of Section 9(c)(1). And as there has been no allegation or
evidence adduced in the instant case that the Union has
failed to represent fairly or equally employees in this or any
other unit in violation of its statutory duty, the principles
set forth in the representation cases should have applica-
tion here.
Since Bekins has determined that the issue of whether a
union discriminates upon the basis of race, sex, or national
origin raises constitutional questions, consideration of
these issues is warranted prior to granting a bargaining
order. However, the Board cautioned that it would not take
lightly the step of declining to certify a union and that it
would not regard every alleged violation of Title VII as
grounds for refusal to certify. It declared these matters will
be considered on a case-by-case basis.
Although Grants Furniture Plaza establishes that a
majority of the Board does not believe that certification
should denied on the sole basis of statistical imbalance, it
did not pass upon the weight to be given statistical data
where there is evidence that the union controls access to
employment, such as a hiring hall, or deliberately restricts
access to its own membership rolls. That is almost precisely
the area of the instant case: the Union has no black or
female members and, by practice, operates an exclusive
referral system. Upon the basis of all the evidence, I
conclude that, in the circumstances of this case, Respon-
dent has not proved its affirmative defense of discrimina-
tion because of race or sex. Respondent's statistical
argument, I believe, falls short of the mark. The population
figures submitted show merely the numbers of blacks and
females in the area of the Union's jurisdiction and the
percentage of unemployment in those categories. There is
no evidence as to the numbers of blacks or females who are
qualified as projectionists or any evidence as to whether
any of them are seeking either employment or training in
that occupation.
It has been the policy of the courts in Title VII cases to
accord great weight to statistical evidence of racial
imbalance which has been held to establish a prima facie
case of discrimination. 23 The Board has already noted that
it does not intend to regard every possible violation of Title
VII as grounds for refusing to issue a certificate.24 Yet the
union membership is so small in this case (50) that it is not
required to report its practices regarding minority groups
to EEOC, the agency primarily interested in this area. Of
course, this does not license the Union to discriminate but
there is no allegation of specific acts of discrimination
against blacks or females. Nor does there appear to be any
value to a apprenticeship training program for a small local
having 26 of 50 members unemployed There is no
evidence that this rate of unemployment is temporary or
seasonal. Indeed, such a program would appear to have
little attraction in that kind of job market. These are factors
which make of this case a de minimis situation and worthy
of consideration in the application of the Board's sugges-
tion in Bekins of a case-by-case approach to the problem.
The principal difficulty in resolving this issue arises from
the practice of the parties in this case to rely on an
exclusive refusal procedure. In Grants Furniture Plaza, the
Board suggested, without passing on it, that statistical
imbalance coupled with evidence showing either "that the
Union controls or substantially influences access to
employment, or deliberately restricts access to its own
membership rolls," may create an inference of union
"propensity for discrimination." While there is no evidence
that the Union here deliberately restricts its membership,
there is no question that it substantially influences access
to employment by reason of the exclusive refusal practice.
The bottom line is then statistical imbalance plus exclusive
hiring hall. At this point a line should be drawn between a
case of initial representation and the unfair labor practice
situation in which the Board is charged with enforcement
of the national labor policy. I have heretofore noted the
Board's inclination to the case-by-case approach. Respon-
dent has been found to be a successor employer with an
obligation to bargain with the Union. Yet it is not even an
ordinary successor, as Respondent was also a predecessor
whose initial contract with the Union expired less than 2
weeks before it regained operation from its sublessee. To
put it another way, except for an interlude of subleasing the
operation for approximately 8 months, Respondent had a
collective-bargaining relationship with the Union since the
latter part of 1970, stemming first from the contract and
then as a successor employer. From at least the time that
Respondent decided to discharge all employees in the unit
it has refused to fulfill its obligation of recognition and
bargaining with the Union. In my opinion, enforcement of
the statutory policy in this regard requires a bargaining
order. In the circumstances the factor of the Union's
control over a rather minimal labor market should not
preclude such an order, particularly where there is no
23 See UL'. S. v. Ironworkers Local 86, et al., 443 F.2d 544 (C.A. 9, 1971).
107
21 Bekinsr. supra.
DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
evidence, over a period of some years, that the Union has
engaged in any discriminatory conduct in the exercise of its
statutory duty to represent all employees fairly. For all of
the above reasons, Respondent has not sustained its
affirmative defense.
IV. THE EFFECT OF THE UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES
UPON COMMERCE
The activities of Respondent set forth in section III,
above, occurring in connection with its operations de-
scribed in section 1, above, have a close, intimate, and
substantial relationship to trade, traffic, and commerce
among the several States and tend to lead to labor disputes
burdening and obstructing commerce and the free flow of
commerce.
V. THE REMEDY
Having found that Respondent has engaged in certain
unfair labor practices, I shall recommend that it be ordered
to cease and desist therefrom and to take certain affirma-
tive action designed to effectuate the policies of the Act.
It appears that Respondent has reinstated Joseph R.
Bracciale and Ofa H. Osborne to their former positions as
motion picture machine operators. I shall recommend that
Respondent make them whole for any losses they may have
sustained with backpay as provided in F. W. Woolworth
Co., 90 NLRB 289 (1950), and Isis Plumbing & Heating Co.,
138 NLRB 716 (1962).
Having found that Respondent, in violation of its duty
under Section 8(a)(5) of the Act, has made unilateral
changes in working conditions, has refused to bargain with
Union concerning the discharge of all employees in the
bargaining unit, and has withdrawn recognition from the
Union, I shall recommend that Respondent be ordered to
recognize and, upon request, bargain with Union, and
cease making unilateral changes in working conditions
before notification and bargaining, upon request, with the
Union.
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1. Respondent is an employer engaged in commerce
within the meaning of Section 2(6) and (7) of the Act.
2. The Union is a labor organization within the
meaning of Section 2(5) of the Act.
3. By discharging employees Joseph R. Bracciale and
Ofa H. Osborne because of their membership in the Union,
Respondent has engaged in unfair labor practices within
the meaning of Section 8(a)(3) and (1) of the Act.
4. All motion picture machine operators employed at
the Pine Hills Twin Theatres, Orlando, Florida, and the
Semoran Twin Theatres, Winter Park, Florida, excluding
all other employees, watchmen, guards, and supervisors as
defined in the Act, constitute a unit appropriate for the
purposes of collective bargaining within the meaning of
Section 9(b) of the Act.
25 In the event no exceptions are filed as provided by Sec. 102.46 of the
Rules and Regulations of the National Labor Relations Board, the findings,
conclusions, and recommended Order herein shall, as provided in Sec.
5. At all times material herein, the Union has been the
exclusive bargaining representative of the employees in the
aforesaid appropriate unit within the meaning of Section
9(a) of the Act.
6. By failing and refusing to bargain in good faith with
the Union as the exclusive bargaining representative of the
unit described above, Respondent has engaged in and is
engaging in unfair labor practices within the meaning of
Section 8(a)(5) and (1) of the Act.
7. The aforesaid unfair labor practices affect commerce
within the meaning of Section 2(6) and (7) of the Act.
Upon the foregoing findings of fact, conclusions of law,
and upon the entire record, and pursuant to Section 10(c)
of the Act, I hereby issue the following recommended:
ORDER25
The Respondent, R. C. Cobb, Inc., Orlando and Winter
Park, Florida, its officers, agents, successors, and assigns,
shall:
1. Cease and desist from:
(a) Discouraging membership in Local 631, International
Alliance of Theatrical Stage Employees and Moving
Picture Machine Operators of the United States and
Canada, or any other labor organization, by discharging or
otherwise discriminating against employees in respect to
their hire or tenure of employment or other condition of
employment.
(b) Refusing to recognize and bargain with Local 631,
International Alliance of Theatrical Stage Employees and
Moving Picture Machine Operators of the United States
and Canada, with respect to rates of pay, hours of
employment, and other terms and conditions of employ-
ment.
(c) Unilaterally changing the wages or other terms and
conditions of employment of employees in the appropriate
unit without prior consultation with Local 631, Interna-
tional Alliance of Theatrical Stage Employees and Moving
Picture Machine Operators of the United States and
Canada.
(d) In any like or related manner interfering with,
restraining, or coercing its employees in the exercise of
their rights guaranteed in Section 7 of the Act.
2. Take the following affirmative action necessary to
effectuate the policies of the Act:
(a) Make whole Joseph R. Bracciale and Ofa H. Osborne
for any loss of pay or other benefits they may have suffered
as a result of the discrimination found against them, in the
manner set forth in "The Remedy" section herein.
(b) Bargain collectively, upon request, with Local 631,
International Alliance of Theatrical Stage Employees and
Moving Picture Machine Operators of the United States
and Canada, for a succeeding agreement, and, if an
understanding is reached, embody such understanding in a
signed agreement.
(c) Preserve and, upon request, make available to the
Board or its agents, for examination and copying, all
payroll records, social security payment records, timecards,
personnel records and reports, and all other records
102.48 of the Rules and Regulations, be adopted by the Board and become
its findings, conclusions, and Order, and all objections thereto shall be
deemed waived for all purposes.
108
R. C. COBB, INC.
necessary to analyze the amount of backpay due under the
terms of this recommended Order.
(d) Post at the Pine Hills Twin Theatres, Orlando,
Florida, and the Semoran Twin Theatres, Winter Park,
Florida, copies of the attached notice marked "Appen-
dix." 26 Copies of said notice, on forms provided by the
Regional Director for Region 12, after being duly signed by
Respondent's representative, shall be posted by it immedi-
26 In the event that the Board's Order is enforced by a Judgment of a
United States Court of Appeals, the words in the notice reading "Posted by
Order of the National Labor Relations Board" shall read "Posted Pursuant
ately upon receipt thereof, and be maintained by it in
conspicuous places, including all places where notices to
employees are customarily posted. Reasonable steps shall
be taken by Respondent to insure that said notices are not
altered, defaced, or covered by any other material.
(e) Notify the Regional Director for Region 12, in
writing, within 20 days from the date of this Order, what
steps Respondent has taken to comply herewith.
to a Judgment of the United States Court of Appeals Enforcing an Order of
the National Labor Relations Board."
109