QuikTrip West, Inc.v.Weigel Stores, Inc.

Trademark Trial and Appeal Board

Oct 24, 2019

91235273 (T.T.A.B. Oct. 24, 2019)

This Opinion is Not a
Precedent of the TTAB

Mailed: October 24, 2019
UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
_____
Trademark Trial and Appeal Board
_____
QuikTrip West, Inc.
v.
Weigel Stores, Inc.
_____

Opposition No. 91235273

_____

Rachel Blue and Jessica L. John Bowman of McAfee & Taft for
QuikTrip West, Inc.

Robert E. Pitts, Paul A. Forsyth, and Jacob G. Horton of Pitts and Lake, P.C. for
Weigel Stores, Inc.
_____
Before Taylor, Wolfson and Lynch,
Administrative Trademark Judges.

Opinion by Lynch, Administrative Trademark Judge:

I. Background and Evidentiary Record
Weigel Stores, Inc. (“Applicant”) seeks registration on the Principal Register of the
mark , with a disclaimer of KITCHEN and
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a disclaimer of NOW OPEN as to the services in International Class 43,1 for
“Processed, ready to eat foods, namely, sandwiches, wrap sandwiches, pizza and
pastries” in International Class 30 and “Restaurant services” in International Class
43.
QuikTrip West, Inc. (“Opposer”) opposes registration of Applicant’s marks based
on alleged likelihood of confusion under Section 2(d) of the Trademark Act, 15 U.S.C.
§ 1052(d), with the registered mark for “Garden,
vegetable, meat, cheese and fruit salads” in International Class 29 and “Processed,
ready to eat foods, namely, sandwiches, wraps, pastries and pasta salads” in
International Class 30.2 Opposer submitted under Notice of Reliance a TSDR printout
for this registration, showing that the registration is subsisting and owned by
Opposer.3

1 Application Serial No. 87324199 was filed on February 3, 2017 based on alleged first use
and first use of the mark in commerce as of October 20, 2016 under Section 1(a) of the
Trademark Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1051(a). According to the description, “[t]he mark consists of a
white ‘W’ justified to the right and inside of a red circle. To the right of the ‘W’ in the circle is
‘Weigel’s’ above ‘Kitchen’ in large black font. To the right of the ‘Weigel’s’ and ‘Kitchen’ is
‘Now’ above ‘Open’ in diagonal, stylized, black font.” The colors red, white and black are
claimed as a feature of the mark.
2 Registration No. 4118738 issued March 27, 2012; Sections 8 and 15 combined declaration
accepted and acknowledged. According to the description, “[t]he mark consists of the letters
‘QT’ in white on a red square background; the word ‘KITCHENS’ in black and underlined in
black; and a chef-style hat outlined in black located at the top left corner of the red square.”
The colors red, white and black are claimed as a feature of the mark.
3 14 TTABVUE 17-18. Citations refer to TTABVUE, the Board’s online docketing system.
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In its Answer, Applicant denies the salient allegations in the Notice of Opposition.
The opposition is fully briefed.
The parties raise no evidentiary objections. The record includes the pleadings and
pursuant to Trademark Rule 2.122(b), 37 C.F.R. § 2.122(b), the file of the opposed
application. The record also includes documents filed under notices of reliance by each
party, as well as affidavit testimony. The record includes materials designated as
confidential by the parties, which are discussed only in general terms.
II. Standing
Opposer must prove standing by showing a real interest in the outcome of the
proceeding and a reasonable basis for believing that it will suffer damage if the mark
is registered. See 15 U.S.C. § 1063; Empresa Cubana Del Tabaco v. Gen. Cigar Co.,
753 F.3d 1270, 111 USPQ2d 1058, 1062 (Fed. Cir. 2014). Applicant has not contested
Opposer’s standing. Opposer’s pleaded registration, for which Opposer has proven
status and title, establishes its standing. See Coach Servs. v. Triumph Learning LLC,
668 F.3d 1356, 101 USPQ2d 1713, 1727-28 (Fed. Cir. 2012); Cunningham v. Laser
Golf Corp., 222 F.3d 943, 55 USPQ2d 1842, 1844 (Fed. Cir. 2000).
III. Priority
Because Opposer has made its registration of record, which Applicant has not
counterclaimed to cancel, priority is not an issue as to the mark and goods covered by
the registration. See Top Tobacco LP v. N. Atl. Op. Co., 101 USPQ2d 1163, 1169
(TTAB 2011) (citing King Candy, Co. v. Eunice King’s Kitchen, Inc., 496 F.2d 1400,
82 USPQ 108 (CCPA 1974)); see also Massey Junior Coll., Inc. v. Fashion Inst. of
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Tech., 492 F.2d 1399, 181 USPQ 272, 275 n.6 (CCPA 1974) (“prior use need not be
shown by a plaintiff relying on a registered mark unless the defendant counterclaims
for cancellation”); Itel Corp. v. Ainslie, 8 USPQ2d 1168, 1169 (TTAB 1988) (“because
of the existence of opposer’s valid and subsisting registration, it need not prove prior
use as to the services recited therein”).
IV. Likelihood of Confusion
The determination under Section 2(d) involves an analysis of all of the probative
evidence of record bearing on a likelihood of confusion. In re E.I. DuPont de Nemours
& Co., 476 F.2d 1357, 177 USPQ 563, 567 (CCPA 1973) (setting forth factors to be
considered, hereinafter referred to as “DuPont factors”); see also In re Majestic
Distilling Co., 315 F.3d 1311, 65 USPQ2d 1201, 1203 (Fed. Cir. 2003). A likelihood of
confusion analysis often focuses on the similarities between the marks and the
similarities between the goods and/or services. See Federated Foods, Inc. v. Fort
Howard Paper Co., 544 F.2d 1098, 192 USPQ 24, 29 (CCPA 1976) (“The fundamental
inquiry mandated by § 2(d) goes to the cumulative effect of differences in the essential
characteristics of the goods and differences in the marks.”). Opposer bears the burden
of proving its claim of likelihood of confusion by a preponderance of the evidence.
Cunningham, 55 USPQ2d at 1848. Opposer may establish likelihood of confusion as
to either class of goods or services in Applicant’s application by showing the
relatedness of its goods to any item within that class of goods or services in the
opposed application. Tuxedo Monopoly, Inc. v. Gen. Mills Fun Grp., 648 F.2d 1335,
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209 USPQ 986, 988 (CCPA 1981); Apple Comput. v. TVNET.Net, Inc., 90 USPQ2d
1393, 1398 (TTAB 2007).
The Goods and Services
“[L]ikelihood of confusion can be found ‘if the respective goods [or services] are
related in some manner and/or if the circumstances surrounding their marketing are
such that they could give rise to the mistaken belief that they emanate from the same
source.’” Coach Servs., 101 USPQ2d at 1722 (internal citations omitted). In fact,
relatedness may be found if consumers would believe that Opposer’s goods and
Applicant’s goods or services are “in some way associated with the same producer” or
that there is an association between the sources of the goods and services. Hilson
Research, Inc. v. Society for Human Resource Management, 27 USPQ2d 1423, 1432
(TTAB 1993). We “focus on the application and registration[] rather than on real
world conditions, because ‘the question of registrability of an Applicant’s mark must
be decided on the basis of the identification of goods [and services] set forth in the
application.’” Stone Lion Capital, 110 USPQ2d at 1162.
Opposer’s and Applicant’s goods overlap in part, as to sandwiches, pastries, and
wraps/wrap sandwiches. Applicant points out that the goods in International Class
30 do not overlap entirely, and contends that “the weight of this factor should be
diminished appropriately.”4 However, as noted above, where the relatedness – or in
this case identical nature – is established as to at least one item in a class of the

4 21 TTABVUE 32 (Applicant’s Brief).
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application, this suffices to establish it for likelihood of confusion purposes as to the
entire class. Tuxedo Monopoly, 209 USPQ at 988.
Turning to Applicant’s restaurant services in International Class 43, Opposer
argues that they are related to Opposer’s goods because Applicant’s restaurants serve
the type of food items identified in Opposer’s registration. Applicant’s Brief mentions
the restaurant services in passing, but makes no argument addressing them, instead
limiting its arguments on relatedness to the lack of complete overlap as to the goods
identified in International Class 30.5 We follow our primary reviewing court’s holding
that “the fact that restaurants serve food and beverages is not enough to render food
and beverages related to restaurant services for purposes of determining the
likelihood of confusion. Instead, . . . ‘to establish likelihood of confusion a party must
show something more than that similar or even identical marks are used for food
products and for restaurant services.’” In re Coors Brewing Co., 343 F.3d 1340, 68
USPQ2d 1059, 1063 (Fed. Cir. 2003) (citation omitted). The Coors Brewing decision
makes clear that the relatedness of restaurant services and food items is not to be
assumed and that evidence sufficient to meet the “something more” standard is
necessary. Id. at 1063-64.
Applicant’s restaurant services are unlimited in nature, and therefore include
restaurants located in convenience stores attached to gasoline fueling stations.
Applicant acknowledges that both Applicant and Opposer are engaged in the business

5 21 TTABVUE 31-32.
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of operating convenience stores attached to gasoline fueling stations.6 In its Brief,
Applicant describes its restaurant services as “offering made-to-order, freshly
prepared food in specially designated and designed kitchen areas of some of its
convenience stores.”7 Website evidence in the record shows that convenience store
restaurants often also offer ready-to-eat foods, such as sandwiches, wraps, and
pastries, under the same mark, suggesting that consumers are accustomed to
encountering such goods and services under the same mark. See In re Detroit Athletic
Co., 903 F.3d 1297, 128 USPQ2d 1047, 1051 (Fed. Cir. 2018) (evidence of third parties
offering both types of goods under the same mark demonstrates relatedness of the
goods). For example:
• Family Express Convenience Stores’ website shows its Cravin’s To Order and
design mark used in connection with restaurant services “[l]ocated inside of
select Family Express locations,” and promotes under the same Cravin’s To
Order and design mark $3 Breakfast Combos that include a breakfast
sandwich 8
• The Sheetz website features photos of sandwiches and pastries and describes
its quick-serve restaurant services offered “at a convenience store.”9

6 21 TTABVUE 9 (Applicant’s Brief).
7 21 TTABVUE 12.
8 17 TTABVUE 80-81.
9 17 TTABVUE 83-86.
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• The Thorntons website promotes sandwiches and wraps available in its deli
case, sells beverages labeled “Thorntons,” and advertises that “[s]elect stores
have real kitchens, with real cooks, handcrafting real food.”10
An article Applicant submitted from the Convenience Store News website notes that
the convenience store retailer FriendShip operates an in-store restaurant under that
mark and also provides “FriendShip Pizza or FriendShip Famous Chicken … in a
FriendShip store.”11 The evidence suggests that in contexts such as convenience
stores and quick-serve restaurants, the same marks are used in connection with the
restaurant services as are also used for food items such as sandwiches, wraps, and
pastries. This is “something more” than merely that the restaurants serve these
foods, and we find it sufficient to establish the relatedness of Applicant’s restaurant
services and the food items in Opposer’s registration. See Tao Licensing, LLC v.
Bender Consulting Ltd., 125 USPQ2d 1043, 1060 (TTAB 2017) (use of the mark to
promote alcoholic drinks as well as the night clubs contributed to a showing of
“something more”).
This factor weighs in favor of a likelihood of confusion.
Trade Channels and Classes of Consumers
Because Applicant’s goods in International Class 30 are in-part identical to
Opposer’s, we presume that they travel in the same channels of trade to the same
classes of consumers. Notably, Applicant admits that its goods and services, and

10 17 TTABVUE 88-89.
11 16 TTABVUE 449-52 (confidential).
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Opposer’s goods, “are sold in convenience stores that are located in or near gasoline
service stations.”12 This admission is consistent with the third-party website evidence
discussed above showing that convenience stores sell goods such as Opposer’s and
offer restaurant services such as Applicant’s. We therefore also find that Applicant’s
services in International Class 43 move in at least some of the same channels of trade
as Opposer’s goods, and to the same classes of consumers.
This factor weighs in favor of a finding of a likelihood of confusion.
The Strength of KITCHEN(S)
Before we turn to the similarity of the marks, we consider Applicant’s assertion
that in the context of the relevant goods and services, the word KITCHEN(S) is
descriptive or generic, as that will affect the comparison of the marks. The strength
of a mark under the fifth DuPont factor rests on the extent to which “a significant
portion of the relevant consuming public . . . recognizes the mark as a source
indicator.” Joseph Phelps Vineyards, LLC v. Fairmont Holdings, LLC, 857 F.3d 1323,
122 USPQ2d 1733, 1734 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (citing Palm Bay Imps., 73 USPQ2d at 1694).
This factor involves assessing the mark “‘along a spectrum from very strong to very
weak.’” Id. (internal citations omitted). Under the sixth DuPont factor, proof of recent
consumer exposure to third-party use of similar components of a mark in connection
with similar goods or services may show commercial weakness of the term, in that
consumers generally distinguish among marks consisting of or containing such

12 14 TTABVUE 30 (answers to request for admission; see also 21 TTABVUE 12 (“At the
present time, goods and services are offered under Applicant’s Mark in twelve of Weigel’s 66
fuel station convenience stores.”).
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similar component (here, “kitchen”) based on minor distinctions. See Juice
Generation, Inc. v. GS Enters. LLC, 794 F.3d 1334, 115 USPQ2d 1671, 1674 (Fed. Cir.
2015). Third-party registrations also may be considered “powerful” evidence of
conceptual weakness of a term.13 Id. Here, we are particularly focused on the
KITCHEN(S) portion of the marks, a term which they share in common, but which
Applicant contends is descriptive and should be given “little weight in reaching a
conclusion on likelihood of confusion.”14
Dictionary entries of record make clear that a “kitchen” is “a room where food is
prepared and cooked,”15 or “a room or place or the equipment for the preparation and
cooking of food.”16 In declaration testimony, Applicant’s founder and Chairman Bill
Weigel stated that he has encountered numerous third-party uses in the industry
(and “closely related fields”) of marks incorporating KITCHEN(S), and he attached
supporting documentary evidence to his declaration.17 Examples include:

13 To the extent Applicant attempts to rely on a TESS printout of marks containing
KITCHEN, 16 TTABVUE 252-95, we do not find the evidence persuasive. A mere number of
live marks that include some variant of “kitchen” without showing the goods or services and
other relevant information, “has no probative value.” See Nat’l Fidelity Life Ins. v. Nat’l Ins.
Trust, 199 USPQ 691, 694 n.5 (TTAB 1978); In re Peace Love World Live, LLC, 127 USPQ2d
1400, 1405 n.17 (TTAB 2018) (“[T]he list does not include enough information to be probative.
The list includes only the serial number, registration number, mark, and status (live or dead)
of the applications or registrations. Because the goods are not listed, we do not know whether
the listed registrations are relevant.”); cf. Nat’l Cable Television Ass’n, Inc. v. Am. Cinema
Editors, Inc., 937 F.2d 1572, 19 USPQ2d 1424, 1430 (Fed. Cir. 1991) (“None of the third party
marks and uses of ACE made of record are nearly as closely related to the activities of the
parties as the virtually identical uses of the parties are to each other”).
14 21 TTABVUE 30 (quoting Cunningham, 55 USPQ2d at 1846).
15 16 TTABVUE 433-34 (Cambridge English Dictionary).
16 Id. at 443 (Collins English Dictionary, American).
17 15 TTABVUE 17-19, 107-54.
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• MCLANE KITCHEN FRESH PRODUCE, a “nationally distributed produce
solution for convenience stores.”18
• PARKER’S KITCHEN, a convenience store chain with 53 locations offering
made-to-order food.19
• Photographs of restaurants named FOOD NETWORK KITCHEN,20
RICKER’S KITCHEN,21 FRESH KITCHEN,22 and ET’S KITCHEN.23
• Articles profiling ZOЁ’S KITCHEN, a fast-casual restaurant (Retail &
Restaurant Facility Business),24 THORNTON’S REAL KITCHEN, REAL
FOOD foodservice program (Convenience Store News),25 and FRIENDSHIP
KITCHEN, a foodservice platform within FriendShip Food Stores
(Convenience Store Decisions).26
Applicant also introduced third-party use-based registrations of marks that
include the term KITCHEN(S) for some of the same goods and services at issue in
this case, and they include disclaimers of KITCHEN or a claim of acquired
distinctiveness that encompasses KITCHEN. For example:

18 15 TTABVUE 108.
19 15 TTABVUE 110-121.
20 15 TTABVUE 144.
21 15 TTABVUE 127.
22 15 TTABVUE 138-40.
23 15 TTABVUE 146.
24 15 TTABVUE 125
25 15 TTABVUE 129-31.
26 15 TTABVUE 142. See also 17 TTABVUE 105-07.
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• (KITCHEN disclaimed) for goods including pastries,
sandwiches, and sandwich wraps.27

• TEXAS KITCHEN in standard characters (Section 2(f) claim) for goods
including chicken salad, potato salad, tuna salad, ham salad, fruit salad, and
pasta salad.28
• CRAVIN’S KITCHEN in standard characters (KITCHEN disclaimed) for goods
including pizza and sandwiches.29
Applicant also submitted excerpts from Retail & Restaurant Facility Business
magazine showing:
• A cover from November 2017 featuring a photo of ZOЁ’S KITCHEN restaurant,
describing it as a “Mediterranean fast casual concept.”30
• An article from June 2017 titled, “Do Smarter Kitchens Mean Better Bottom
Lines,” describing automation trends in restaurant operations and using
KITCHENS in the restaurant context, such as “a data-driven approach to

27 16 TTABVUE 404-08.
28 16 TTABVUE 409-13.
29 16 TTABVUE 414-17. A December 2017 article from Convenience Store Decisions
magazine states that the Family Express convenience store chain “debuted a new made-to-
order hot foodservice offering, labeled Cravin’s Kitchen.” 15 TTABVUE 123.
30 16 TTABVUE 430.
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kitchen operations” and “smarter kitchens can make your restaurant more
efficient.”31
Applicant also introduced an article from the Convenience Store News website on
“The Transformation of FriendShip Food Stores” that describes the opening of a large
new convenience store and “the unveiling of its proprietary FriendShip Kitchen
restaurant.”32
Opposer disputes the descriptiveness of KITCHEN(S), arguing that KITCHEN is
not defined in reference to the goods or services at issue. Regardless, Opposer
maintains that this element of the marks must not be disregarded in the comparison
of marks.
We find that the record as a whole demonstrates that in the context of Applicant’s
and Opposer’s goods and services, KITCHEN(S) is rather weak, because it is at least
highly suggestive, if not descriptive of the relevant goods and services. The dictionary
definitions make clear that a kitchen is where food items (such as the identified goods)
are prepared, and the definitions and evidence show that a kitchen is where a
restaurant prepares the food it serves. Articles reflect descriptive and suggestive use
of the wording in connection with offering the same types of relevant goods and
services. Third-party use in the industry and third-party registrations, as well as the
disclaimers and 2(f) claim therein, also suggest that restaurants and food retailers
view KITCHEN(S) as descriptive or highly suggestive. The use evidence further

31 16 TTABVUE 432.
32 16 TTABVUE 449-50.
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demonstrates that consumers frequently are exposed to KITCHEN(S) in connection
with the relevant goods and services, making the consumers less likely to rely on such
wording to distinguish source. See In re Dixie Rests., Inc., 105 F.3d 1405, 1407, 41
USPQ2d 1531, 1533-34 (Fed. Cir. 1997); In re Nat’l Data Corp., 753 F.2d 1056, 1060,
224 USPQ 749, 752 (Fed. Cir. 1985). Overall, the evidence convinces us that
KITCHEN(S) should be considered a relatively weaker component in Opposer’s and
Applicant’s marks.
Similarity of the Marks
Turning to the first DuPont factor, we must compare the marks “in their entireties
as to appearance, sound, connotation and commercial impression.” Palm Bay, 73
USPQ2d at 1691 (quoting DuPont, 177 USPQ at 567). The test assesses not whether
the marks can be distinguished in a side-by-side comparison, but rather whether
their overall commercial impressions are so similar that confusion as to the source of
the goods offered under the respective marks is likely to result. Coach Servs., 101
USPQ2d at 1721; see also Edom Labs. v. Lichter, 102 USPQ2d 1546, 1551 (TTAB
2012).
Some findings about each mark provide a useful background for the comparison.
The first element in Applicant’s mark is a large W appearing in a red circle, next to
the stacked words WEIGEL’S KITCHEN, next to the relatively smaller cursive
wording NOW OPEN. In the context of the mark as a whole, the W points to and
reinforces WEIGEL’S, and we find that these two elements dominate Applicant’s
mark. The size, color and prominence of the encircled W, along with its placement as
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the first literal element in the mark, contribute to its dominance. See Presto Prods.,
Inc. v. Nice-Pak Prods., Inc., 9 USPQ2d 1895, 1897 (TTAB 1988) (first part of a mark
“is most likely to be impressed upon the mind of a purchaser and remembered.”); see
also Palm Bay Imps., 73 USPQ2d at 1692. As previously discussed, KITCHEN is
descriptive or highly suggestive in this context, and Applicant has disclaimed it,
pursuant to an apparent requirement by the Examining Attorney, complied with and
entered by the Examiner’s Amendment dated March 3, 2017. Given the weakness of
this term, it occupies a less significant role in the source-indicating function of the
mark. NOW OPEN also has been disclaimed as to the restaurant services, and
Opposer maintains that in the context of Applicant’s mark, NOW OPEN is a
“functional element”33 that “primarily [] inform[s] customers that the kitchen was
‘now open.’”34 While we assess the mark as a whole and therefore do not, as Opposer
suggests, consider the element “likely to be omitted,”35 we agree that the wording
NOW OPEN gives the impression that the restaurant services or the kitchen
preparing the identified food is now open for business, and consumers would not
likely rely on it for source indication.
Overall, we find that as to , consumers
will focus and rely most for source-indication on the encircled W and the possessive

33 19 TTABVUE 34.
34 19 TTABVUE 19 (Opposer’s Brief).
35 19 TTABVUE 37 (Opposer’s Brief).
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surname WEIGEL’S. The possessive surname, WEIGEL’S, which precedes and
modifies KITCHEN, also contributes to an emphasis on WEIGEL’S as the focus of
source-indication.
In Opposer’s , the large letters QT appearing
in a red square shape, with a chef’s hat perched on top, stand out as the dominant
portion of the mark. Because this unique design element precedes the word
KITCHENS and is more prominent in terms of size and color, and because
KITCHENS, despite being stylized, is weak and highly suggestive of the goods,
consumers likely would rely more on the QT and design component of the mark for
source indication.
Comparing the marks visually, we them quite different. With the exception of
KITCHEN(S), the literal elements of the marks share no similarities. Even the
common word KITCHEN(S) appears in a very different font in each mark –
unremarkable block letters in Applicant’s mark, and stylized cursive in Opposer’s
mark. Although the left side of each mark contains one or two large letters appearing
on a red background, the letters are not similar – Applicant has the single letter W,
while Opposer has two letters, Q and T. While both are red, the background carriers
for the letters are in different shapes, a circle in Applicant’s mark versus a square in
Opposer’s. And this portion of Opposer’s mark is further differentiated by a
prominent design element at the upper left, showing a chef’s hat tilted to one side, as
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though worn by the QT square. Applicant’s mark includes no such additional design
element. Given their overall compositions and content, the fact that both marks
contain red geometric shapes and include the relatively weak word KITCHEN(S) is
not enough to render them visually similar.
We also find the marks phonetically different. The literal elements, W WEIGEL’S
KITCHEN NOW OPEN, simply do not sound similar to QT KITCHENS, regardless
of the nearly identical shared wording KITCHEN(S). The letters do not rhyme or
otherwise sound close to one another, and the component WEIGEL’S adds an entirely
different sound to Applicant’s mark, for which there is no counterpart in Opposer’s
mark. Similarly, the NOW OPEN wording in Applicant’s mark adds more to its
sound. We decline Opposer’s invitation to find that consumers “would drop some or
all of the opening elements when referring to Applicant’s services.”36 If any
shortening were to occur, we consider it more likely that the opening elements would
be retained while the more descriptive or informational wording at the end would be
dropped. Overall, the marks are far from “similar, and nearly identical” in sound, as
Opposer asserts.37
The connotation and commercial impression of Applicant’s mark centers on
WEIGEL’S, which term likely would be perceived as the possessive form of a surname
(presumably that of Applicant’s founder, Bill Weigel),38 and is reinforced by the

36 19 TTABVUE 38.
37 19 TTABVUE 38.
38 See also 16 TTABVUE 19 (Applicant’s registration for the standard-character mark
WEIGEL’S issued under Section 2(f), presumably requiring a claim of acquired
distinctiveness because it is a surname).
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prominent W initial. See, e.g., Azeka Building Corp. v. Bryan Kenji Azeka, 122
USPQ2d 1477, 1482 (TTAB 2017) (surname significance “reinforced by the use of the
possessive”). The mark likely would be perceived as referring to a kitchen, now open
for business, which is run by or belongs to someone with the surname Weigel. As
noted above, in terms of what consumers would rely on to distinguish source, the
KITCHEN and NOW OPEN components contribute less to the commercial
impression. By contrast, the connotation and commercial impression of Opposer’s
mark centers on QT, which may be perceived as initials. The mark as a whole likely
would be perceived as referring to multiple kitchens run by QT, and the chef’s hat
design adds a nuance that the food sold under the mark is created or prepared by a
chef, or at least is skillfully prepared. Overall, we do not find the connotations and
commercial impressions of the marks similar.
This factor weighs heavily against a likelihood of confusion.
Thirteenth DuPont Factor
Under the thirteenth “catchall” DuPont factor, Opposer argues that Applicant’s
awareness of Opposer’s marks in advance of Applicant’s adoption of the marks at
issue, as well as an alleged pattern of bad behavior with regard to Opposer’s
intellectual property, show “knowing and willful appropriation.”39 Opposer and
Applicant both presented evidence regarding the genesis of Applicant’s mark, earlier
versions to which Opposer objected, and their disputes over “marks and intellectual

39 19 TTABVUE 14-15.
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property”40 other than the marks at issue here. Applicant counters that the history
between the parties and Applicant’s prior modifications of its marks in response to
concerns expressed by Opposer reflect its good faith, rather than bad faith. Applicant
argues that the facts in this case are not analogous to cases of bad faith willful copying
both because Applicant has repeatedly changed its mark “to accentuate its differences
from Opposer’s Mark,”41 and more to the point, because Applicant’s mark is so
dissimilar to Opposer’s that it cannot be considered copying.
“[A]n inference of ‘bad faith’ requires something more than mere knowledge of a
prior similar mark.” Sweats Fashions, Inc. v. Pannill Knitting Co., Inc., 833 F.2d
1560, 4 USPQ2d 1793, 1798 (Fed. Cir. 1987). A finding of bad faith must be supported
by evidence of an intent to confuse, rather than mere knowledge of another’s mark or
even an intent to copy. See, e.g., Starbucks Corp. v. Wolfe’s Borough Coffee, Inc., 588
F.3d 97, 92 USPQ2d 1769, 1782 (2d Cir. 2009) (“[T]he ‘only relevant intent is intent
to confuse. There is a considerable difference between an intent to copy and an intent
to deceive.’” (quoting 4 J. Thomas McCarthy, MCCARTHY ON TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR
COMPETITION § 23:113)). This record does not show such an intent to confuse
consumers, and instead reflects Applicant’s willingness to take some steps – albeit
not all the steps Opposer wanted – to avoid confusion. We find no bad faith in
Applicant’s adoption of the proposed mark.

40 19 TTABVUE 18; see also 15 TTABVUE 157-99; 13 TTABVUE 2-65.
41 21 TTABVUE 43.
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Also under this factor, Applicant points to its prior registrations of marks that
consist of or include some of the same elements in the opposed mark – the encircled
W and WEIGEL’S.42 We do not agree with Applicant that its marks are “substantially
the same” under In re Strategic Partners, Inc., 102 USPQ2d 1397, 1399 (TTAB 2012),
where there was “no meaningful difference between” the marks. However, Applicant’s
prior marks, particularly the red encircled W, corroborate the lack of bad faith in
incorporating that element into the mark at issue in this case.
Purchasing Conditions
The parties agree that the goods and services in question are relatively
inexpensive and may be subject to “impulse” purchasing under the fourth DuPont
factor.43 Applicant argues that the geographically distinct areas in which each party
operates and the fact that the respective goods and services are encountered only in
the parties’ respective convenience stores help avoid consumer confusion. As to the
geographic separation, “[g]iven that registrant’s registration[] encompass[es]
nationwide rights, and that [A]pplicant is seeking a geographically unrestricted
registration, [A]pplicant’s argument is unavailing.” In re Infinity Broadcasting Corp.
of Dallas, 60 USPQ2d 1214, 1218 (TTAB 2001). Similarly, because the identifications
of goods and services are not restricted as to the channels of trade, we do not rely on
their alleged availability exclusively in the parties’ convenience stores as a probative
consideration. See Bose Corp. v. QSC Audio Products, Inc., 293 F.3d 1367, 63 USPQ2d

42 15 TTABVUE 4-6, 160; 16 TTABVUE 16-26.
43 21 TTABVUE 33 (Applicant’s Brief); 22 TTABVUE 17 (Opposer’s Reply Brief).
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1303, 1310-1311 (Fed. Cir. 2002). Based on the parties’ agreement as to “impulse”
purchasing and the lack of countervailing evidence, this factor weighs somewhat in
favor of likely confusion.
Actual Confusion
Opposer has conceded it is not aware of any actual confusion,44 but argues that
since Applicant has only used its mark since late 2016,45 and the parties are not
actually in close proximity or overlapping geographic areas,46 the opportunity for
confusion has been too limited for its absence to be meaningful in this case. See
DuPont, 177 USPQ at 567 (identifying the seventh and eighth DuPont factors as “the
nature and extent of any actual confusion,” and “the length of time during and
conditions under which there has been concurrent use without evidence of actual
confusion”). The limited amount of time Applicant’s mark has been used creates “little
opportunity for confusion to have occurred.” See Bd. of Regents v. S. Illinois Miners,
LLC, 110 USPQ2d 1182, 1196 (TTAB 2014) (finding actual confusion factors neutral
where only two years of simultaneous use); Interstate Brands Corp. v. McKee Foods
Corp., 53 USPQ2d 1910, 1915 (TTAB 2000) (lack of actual confusion not significant
where “the time period in which both products have been on the market has been
relatively brief--a little more than two years at the time of applicant’s testimony”).
Accordingly, we find this factor neutral.

44 16 TTABVUE 129, 343, 371.
45 15 TTABVUE 21.
46 21 TTABVUE 32.
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Other Factors
Applicant makes brief arguments that the “restricted set of goods in constrained
settings (i.e. within [the parties’] respective convenience stores)” weighs against
likely confusion under the ninth DuPont factor, and that the lack of geographic
overlap or proximity in the parties’ markets minimizes the “extent of potential
confusion” under the twelfth DuPont factor. The same arguments have been raised
under other factors, and for the reasons previously discussed, we do not find them
persuasive. We consider these factors neutral.
V. Conclusion
Although the identical-in-part goods, and otherwise related goods and services,
and the overlapping channels of trade and classes of consumers who may engage in
impulse purchasing weigh in favor likely confusion, in this case, Applicant’s mark is
so dissimilar to Opposer’s pleaded mark, and the common element between them is
so weak that no likelihood of confusion exists. See Champagne Louis Roederer S.A. v.
Delicato Vineyards, 148 F.3d 1373, 47 USPQ2d 1459, 1460 (Fed. Cir. 1998) (“one
DuPont factor may be dispositive in a likelihood of confusion analysis, especially
when that single factor is the dissimilarity of the marks”); Omega SA v. Alpha Phi
Omega, 118 USPQ2d 1289, 1293 (TTAB 2016); see also Kellogg Co. v. Pack’em Ent.
Inc., 951 F.2d 330, 21 USPQ2d 1142 (Fed. Cir. 1991) (single DuPont factor of the
dissimilarity of the marks outweighed the other relevant factors, and was therefore
dispositive on the issue of likelihood of confusion)
Decision: The opposition is dismissed.