Quik-Pik Food Stores, Inc.

National Labor Relations Board - Board Decisions

Sep 29, 1980

252 N.L.R.B. 506 (N.L.R.B. 1980)

DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
Quik-Pik Food Stores, Inc. and Olga Vincent. Case
7-CA- 16744
September 29, 1980
DECISION AND ORDER
BY CHIAIRMAN FANNING AND ME:MBERS
JENKINS AND PlNE.I.O
On June 16, 1980, Administrative Law Judge
Joel A. Harmatz issued the attached Decision in
this proceeding. Thereafter, the Respondent filed
exceptions and a supporting brief.
Pursuant to the provisions of Section 3(b) of the
National Labor Relations Act, as amended, the Na-
tional Labor Relations Board has delegated its au-
thority in this proceeding to a three-member panel.
The Board has considered the record and the at-
tached Decision in light of the exceptions and brief
and has decided to affirm the rulings, findings, and
conclusions of the Administrative Law Judge and
to adopt his recommended Order.'
ORDER
Pursuant to Section 10(c) of the National Labor
Relations Act, as amended, the National Labor Re-
lations Board adopts as its Order the recommended
Order of the Administrative Law Judge and
hereby orders that the Respondent, Quik-Pik Food
Stores, Inc., Warren, Michigan, its officers, agents,
successors, and assigns, shall take the action set
forth in the said recommended Order, except that
the attached notice is substituted for that of the
Administrative Law Judge.
MclIlbc r JkillS .¢ulId ol pll tc Itlcrrest (,ri ithe backpa y III accord-
ancc with his partial di',cil in Ompic Medical Corportiun. 25(0 Ni.RIB
No. II ( IX))
\c hac mrodificd the AdmirliIr.itic I[.a' Judgc's Illicc Ito conlior
wvilh is rcconmcndcd O(rder
APPENDIX
NOTICI To EMPLOYIE.ES
POSTE) BY ORDER OF THE
NATIONAI. LABOR RE.ATIONS BOARDI)
An Agency of the United States Government
After a hearing at which all sides had an opportu-
nity to present evidence and state their positions,
the National Labor Relations Board found that we
have violated the National Labor Relations Act, as
amended, and has ordered us to post this notice.
The Act gives employees the following rights:
To engage in self-organization
To form, join, or assist any union
To bargain collectively through repre-
sentatives of their own choice
252 NLRB No. 76
To engage in activities together for the
purpose of collective bargaining or other
mutual aid or protection
To refrain from the exercise of any or all
such activities.
W: WIl.L NOT discharge or in any other
manner discriminate against our employees be-
cause they have joined others in communicat-
ing their complaints about conditions of work
to management.
Wt WILl. NOT in any like or related manner
interfere with, restrain, or coerce employees in
the exercise of the rights guaranteed them by
Section 7 of the Act.
WE wii.i. offer Olga Vincent immediate and
full reinstatement to her former position or, if
that job no longer exists, to a substantially
equivalent position, without prejudice to her
seniority or any other rights and privileges
previously enjoyed, and wtE wiI.l make her
whole for any loss of pay she may have suf-
fered by reason of our discrimination against
her, with interest.
QUIK-PIK FOOD STORES, INC.
DECISION
S I A\I M1ENI OF Hi. CASL
Joli A. HARMA'I'z, Administrative Law Judge: This
proceeding was heard in Detroit, Michigan, on April 16,
1980, upon an unfair labor practice charge filed on
August 27, 1979, and a complaint issued on October 10,
1979, alleging that Respondent violated Section 8(a)(1) of
the National abor Relations Act, as amended, by termi-
nating the Charging Party, Olga Vincent, on February
27, 1979, because she participated in employee efforts to
communicate job-related complaints to Respondent, and
because of Respondent's belief that she had participated
in a concerted work stoppage in support thereof. In its
duly filed answer, Respondent denied that any unfair
labor practices were committed. After close of the hear-
ing, a brief was filed on behalf of Respondent.
Upon the entire record in this proceeding, my personal
opportunity to observe directly the witnesses while testi-
fying and their demeanor, and consideration of the post-
hearing brief, it is hereby found as follows:
FINI)INGS OF FAC I
I. JURISDIC IoN
Respondent is a Michigan corporation engaged in the
operation of multiple retail facilities, including Store 53
located at 5273 East Ten Mile Road, Warren, Michigan,
the sole facility involved in this proceeding, from which
it is engaged in the retail sale of groceries and related
items. During the calendar year ending December 31,
1978, a representative period, Respondent realized rev-
506
QUIK-PIK FOOD STORES, INC
enues from such operations in excess of $5(X),(XX), and
purchased and caused to be transported and delivered di-
rectly to its Detroit, Michigan, area stores goods valued
in excess of $20,000 from points located outside the State
of Michigan.
The complaint alleges, the answer admits, and I find
that Respondent is now, and has been at all times materi-
al herein, an employer engaged in commerce within the
meant,., of Section 2(2), (6). and (7) of the Act.
11. [ti A 1 (tl) tUN FAIR AilABOR PRACTICIS
A. Background
This case is concerned with the limited question of
whether the termination of Olga Vincent was in repisal
for her involvement in concerted activity protected by
Section 7 and hence in violation of Section 8(a)(1) of the
Act. Respondent defends on grounds that Vincent was a
supervisor and therefore unprotected by the Act and
that, in any event, her termination was predicated upon
legitimate cause.
Respondent operates some 59 "convenience" stores in
the metropolitan area of Detroit, Michigan. The instant
issues concern Store 53 in Warren. Michigan. Olga Vin-
cent was hired on September 15, 1975, and at the time of
her discharge was the most senior employee assigned to
that location. At one time Vincent served as store man-
ager, but in October 1978, about 4 months prior to her
termination on February 27, 1979,. she was demoted for
cause to the position of assistant manager. Mike Loven
replaced Vincent as manager of Store 53 upon her demo-
tion.
The store was operated from 7 a.m. to midnight on a
7-day-per-week basis. At times material the work sched-
ule of Vinent was 4 p.m. to midnight on Monday, Tues-
day, and Wednesday, and 7 a.m. to 4 p.m. on Saturday
and Sunday. Her regular days off were Thursday and
Friday. 2
Vincent last worked for Respondent on Wednesday,
February 14. Her next scheduled workday was Saturday,
February 17. Because she was ill, Vincent arranged with
Alfreda Kapzynski, a cashier, to replace her on Saturday
and Sunday. February 17 and 18, respectively.
B. The Meeting of Febhruari 19 and the Discharge
The complaint, considered in the light of the evidence
adduced in support thereof, appears to be based on the
theory that the discharge was motivated by Vincent's
participation with other employees in a meeting with
certain of Respondent's officials on Monday, February
19, at company headquarters. As for the developments
leading to her involvement therein. Vincent testified that
on February 17 Kapzynski telephoned her from the store
at the outset of the latter's Saturday morning shift.' Kap-
zynski had apparently discovered an overage of $70 in
All dates refer il 1979 unless otherwise indicated
The store manager as scheduled regularli to ork Monday
through Friday. 7 a m I 4 pm lie ustrked unaided Ihe night shift
normally was mailined by a cress of three the asls lIl ln manager. a cash-
ier, and t s k prs- n
:1 Kapisnski uilt S1ll iempo! ed hb Respoilldenlt it Ihe tinlte If the hear-
ing She .ts not clled is .i s Itnes
the opening receipts, and sought Vincent's advice as to
how this should be handled. Vincent advised Kapzynski
to deposit the 70, but list that amount as an overage.
However, later that same afternoon, according to Vin-
cent, she received a second phone call from Kapzynski,
who reported that Store Manager Loven arrived at the
store during the shift. She reportedly also asked Loven
what to do about the $70 overage, but, somewhat con-
trary to the advice given by Vincent, was told by Loven
not to check out her drawer at the end of the day, as he
would come in and check over the funds and prepare the
necessary paperwork. The next day, Sunday, February
18, according to Vincent, she received a third telephone
call from Kapzynski, who reported that she followed
Loven's instructions, but that at or about 10 p.m. on Feb-
ruary 17 Loven called her at home, advising that she
was not $70 over but $30 short. Kapzynski also told Vin-
cent that she found a cash bag, which should have been
deposited in the drop chute the night before, under a
counter in the store. Later that day Kapzynski again
called Vincent advising her that certain employees were
going to headquarters to clear up the matter of shortages
and overages. She invited Vincent to accompany them.4
On February 19, Vincent was scheduled to work the 4
p.m. to midnight shift. That morning she joined Harry
Ardman, also a cashier, and Kapzynski at or about 10
a.m., and they continued on to the Company's headquar-
ters. Upon their arrival, Ardman told the receptionist
that the employees wished to speak with Donald Coch-
ran, Respondent's district manager, to whom Area Su-
perivisor Lennox reports." The employees were told that
Cochran was not available, but Stanley Wilson, Re-
spondent's director of vendors, came out of his office,
greeted the employees, and asked if he could be of help.
Ardman said "yes," indicating that there were matters
the employees wished to discuss. The three employees
were invited into Wilson's office. 6 Wilson requested the
presence of Harold Mercer, Respondent's administrative
assistant to the vice president, who, unlike Wilson, did
have responsibilities which included the overseeing of
personnel problems in the stores. The session was opened
with Kapzynski stating that she wished to "clear herself'
concerning the check out of the previous Saturday
morning and the $70 overage. In this connection, Kap-
zynski reported Loven's instructions to her and the fact
that she was later told by Loven that she was $30 short
and not $70 over. Wilson observed that this made it $100
short. Ardman then discussed certain conditions in the
store; namely, work that had not been done on the previ-
ous shift such as failure to eliminate unsanitary condi-
4 According to the testimony of Vincent. prior to February 17 short-
ages uere a continuing prohlem in the store and had been discussed regu-
larly ilh hboth Store Manager Loven and Maureen .ennox, the area u-
per i,or Iennox,. though riot squarel) contradicting Vincenl on this
point, did testify that she could only recall a single cash shortage at Store
53 Len uas not called.
I Based on the credited. uncontradicted testimony of Ardman and Vin-
centt The latter admittedly as aware that it as unlikely that Cochran
would be present at the time. Lennox was n acation and Vincenrt knewr
that Cochran sould havse to assume her responsibility fr collecting re-
cords fromn each of Llennox's eight tores that morning
'; 'ilson is rl nil called as a ilness The foregoing is based upon a
Crntispeonl of the credited tesllmron) of Ardman and Vincent
507
DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
tions, cash shortages, and erasures and changes appearing
in his nightly cash receipt tally. Vincent joined in ex-
pressing her concern that the preceding shifts had not
fulfilled their responsibility to leave the store in a clean,
stocked, and presentable state and about cash and inven-
tory shortages.7 Wilson assured the employees that
someone from management would look into conditions at
the store that very afternoon. Vincent, before leaving,
mentioned that she had been ill, and that, while she had
left home to come to the meeting, she would not be able
to work her scheduled shift that afternoon because she
had to see her doctor. 8
That same afternoon, Mercer, Wilson, and Cochran
visited Store 53 apparently to look into the complaints
registered by the employees.9 Cochran and Mercer testi-
fied that they found no evidence substantiating the objec-
tions of Ardman and Vincent concerning conditions in
the store.
After the February 19 meeting Vincent, due to illness
supported by a Doctor's excuse, did not again report for
work until 4 p.m. Monday, February 26. Upon reporting
for work, she showed Loven a medical excuse dated
February 19, which indicated that she was not to return
to work until February 26.10 Loven allegedly glanced at
the excuse, and informed Vincent that her shift was cov-
ered that day and she was not needed, while directing
her to contact Cochran because he wanted to talk to her.
Vincent did so, arranging to meet with Cochran at the
store at 10 a.m. on February 27.
Pursuant thereto, Vincent met with Supervisor Lennox
and District Manager Cochran on February 27. At that
7 It was the sense of Mercer's testimony that at the meeting Vincent
spoke more than the other employees This impression might well have
been held by Wilson as well, for, according to Vincent's uncontradicted,
credible testimony, Wilson, at an unemployment insurance hearing in-
volving her claim, informed the "hearing officer" that on February 19,
Vincent entered his office "quite brasingly" and that she appeared to be
the "principal ring leader . the instigator of the meeting."
8 Mercer testified that at the February 19 meeting Ardman and Vin-
ceint stated that they would nt return to work until the conditions at
Store 53 were corrected Mercer claims to have told Vincent, in re-
sponse, that she should report to the store manager. This testimony was
not believed and is rejected. As Wilson did not appear, Mercer was the
only witness presented by Respondent who was in a position to afford
direct primary evidence as to what transpired during that confrontation
He did not impress me as possessed of a capacity for clear recollection
and certain aspects of his testimony were considered unreliable In any
event, Mercer did acknowledge on cross-examination that at the meeting
"Olga said something about going to the doctor." My disbelief that an)
form of walkout was threatened is furthered by the testimony of Coch-
ran, who averred that he was in the company of Mercer for a substantial
segment of that afternoon, and who added that his primary concern at
the time vwas assuring that the store was properly staffed. It seems only
likely in the circumstances that, had Ardman and Vincent indicated that
they would protest their grievances by refusing to work, this fact would
have been relayed by Mercer to Cochran. Although Mercer claims that
he did so, Cochran denied ever receiving any such report. I also find it
unlikely that Mercer would have told Vincent to report to the store man-
ager if she had expressed a desire to participate in a work stoppage.
9 Cochran testified that this occurred at his suggestion after he was in-
formed of the complaints registered by the employees. He indicates that
he had been in the store that morning and had seen no evidence of the
problems mentioned by the employees, and, accordingly, he suggested
that Mercer and Wilson join him in visiting the premises. That said isit
was prompted by Cochran was not expressly corroborated by Mercer
"' See G.C Exh 5 I credit Vincent's testimony that after her medical
appointment she telephoned Loven on February 19 reporting her Doc-
tor's recommendation and the content of the written excuse.
time, Cochran stated that he had " been very unhappy
with . . . [Vincent's] . . . performances in the past few
weeks, and for this reason I have to issue you this cita-
tion." Three separate grounds were described orally and
in writing as the basis for the discharge. Those grounds
were also memorialized on a payroll clearance form
which was retained in company files, and which set forth
as follows:
Exact reason for separation: Three written warnings
in a period of 90 days.
1. Spreading malicious gossip.
2. Failure to call store by noon concerning ab-
sence from second shift 2/20/79.
3. Ignoring chain of command.
The document was signed by Lennox and Cochran. "
It is noted that published company personnel policy
sets forth the Procedure through which employees are
subject to discipline. That policy recites as follows:
An employee will be fired for any infraction of our
rules for personnel according to the following pro-
cedure. Infractions followed by a "D" indicate
those infractions punishable by immediate dismissal.
Infractions followed by "W" are written repri-
mands. An employee accumulating a total of three
"W's" for any infraction or combination of infrac-
tions in any 90-day period will be immediately dis-
missed.
Also contained therein is a definition of the offenses
which may lead to immediate dismissal and those lesser
grounds which would warrant mere formal reprimand. 2
A fair construction of that document leads to the conclu-
sion that none of the grounds assigned for the discharge
of Vincent would individually warrant "immediate" dis-
charge under the established policy. Therefore, since
Vincent, prior to the events of February 1979, had re-
ceived one formal warning which was issued in October
1978, well before the 90-day warning period set forth in
Respondent's established policy, Lennox and Cochran in
perfecting the discharge of Vincent sought to conform
thereto by simultaneously consolidating three separate
warnings in a single document.
C. Concluding Findings
1. The supervisory issue
Respondent claims that as assistant store manager Vin-
cent possessed authority exempting her from the protec-
tion of the Act.
The facts show that the 7-day operation at the Warren
store is maintained essentially by a pool of six to seven
employees who regularly work at that location. Under
the scheduling arrangement, Vincent and Store Manager
Loven worked separate shifts with Loven covering day-
light hours Monday through Friday with no weekend
schedule and Vincent working evenings on Monday,
" See Ci C Exh 2
12 See i C Exh 4.
508
QUIK-PIK FOOD STORES, INC
Tuesday, and Wednesday and the day shift on weekends.
During the day, the store was operated by a single indi-
vidual. Thus, the store manager worked without assist-
ance, leaving written or verbal instructions as to the
work to be performed on the evening shift. Since in the
evening the store 'was usually manned by three employ-
ees and no less than two, Vincent would be responsible
for direction of others. The assistant store manager,
while on duty, would have immediate responsibility for
store operations, which routinely would consist of sell-
ing, stocking, cleaning, and the completion of paperwork
at the end of the shift. As for Vincent in particular,
during the week it would be her responsibility to pass on
any instructions received from Store Manager Loven to
other workers on her shift, and to, with the others, see to
the proper maintenance of the store. However, since the
store manager did not work evenings and Vincent only
worked three evening shifts, it is only logical that discre-
tion equal to that held by Vincent would be exercised by
the one or more cashiers responsible for operation of the
store on the other four evening shifts.' :
Vincent unquestionably was a higher rated employee
than the cashiers, was paid more, and possessed keys to
the store. She also was in charge of closing the books at
the end of the week. However, she had no authority to
hire and fire, and it is not shown convincingly that she
had authority effectively to recommend such action.' 4
With respect to discipline, Lennox testified that Vincent
had no authority to issue formal reprimands, but that she
could send a cashier or stock person home if they were
not doing their job. '5
As for scheduling, it does not appear that the assistant
manager has any input or responsibility with respect to
the initial preparation thereof. However, in emergency
situations, when someone indicates that they will not
show up for an assigned shift, the assistant manager will
seek a replacement among the pool of employees as-
signed to the store, and, if unsuccessful, will contact the
supervisor. 6
Respondent also asserts further that the assistant man-
ager has the authority to pledge Respondent's credit in
dealings with vendors. In considering this contention, it
was my impression that any authority of the assistant
store manager in this respect was narrowly circum-
scribed and irregularly exercised. Thus, the identity of
authorized vendors and the products which may be sold
to the various stores are limited by higher management
13 Payroll records indicate that prior to February t6, 1979. the evening
shifts on Wednesday through Sunday, inclusive, were covered primarily
on a rotating basis by cashiers Harry Ardman, Jan Carreyn, and Alfreda
Kapzynski. See Resp Exh. I On a regular basis, from week-to-week, one
of these individuals would necessarily be responsible for store operations
during such shifts.
'4 Supervisor Lennox estified that she "believed" that Vincent had
recommended the hire of stock person Steele. I was not my impression
that this testimony was based upon direct knowledge While the fiorego-
ing is regarded as unreliable, it is also noted that there is no showing as
to how any such recommendation would differ from mere suggestion by
any rank-and-file employee that an acquaintance friend, or relative in
need of work be hired
' Lennox could not recall an instance in which any such authority
was exercised by Vincent
i' There is nothing in the record to suggest that an unscheduled em-
ployee could be compelled by the assistant manager to replace an absent
employee
directives. Furthermore, on the question of quantity the
convenience stores in question being small, covering
some 2,500 square feet only, are conducive to competi-
tion among vendors for shelf space. 7 Thus, it would
seem that, with the exception of products inventoried on
a storage basis, quantity would be controlled by the
amount of shelf space allocated to a particular vendor.
Finally, Vincent's opportunity to deal with vendors was
limited to two occasions on which she substituted for
Store Manager Loven,' 8 together with her dealings with
the milk and bread supplier who operated on Saturday
mornings during her shift. ' 9 With respect to the former,
Vincent on those occasions dealt with a wine vendor.
Thus, William Tesch, a salesman for a "Gallo" wine dis-
tributor, testified that he regularly calls on Store 53 on
Mondays during the day shift. Respondent's payroll re-
cords confirm that Vincent substituted for Loven on
Monday, November 27, and Monday, December 18.
Tesch testified that his procedure on entering the store
was to check the reserved stock, fill the shelves from it,
then take an inventory of what the store was low on and
report to Vincent or Loven what was needed. 20 Taking
full account of Tesch's own description of how orders
were filled, as well as the fact that quantities would be
dictated by storage capacity and shelving allocation, I
am not convinced that significant authority to affect em-
ployer expenditure was exercised on these occasions by
the store manager or the assistant store manager acting
in his place.
On balance, it is my view that Vincent functioned
simply as an experienced employee with "lead" authori-
ty. Her clerical responsibilities as well as her direction of
others impressed me as being routine and derived from
skill and experience gained as a relatively long-term em-
ployee at the store. Beyond that, from the totality of the
credible evidence, it was my impression that the mission
' Mercer conceded that the allocation thereof would be discussed be-
tween the merchandising manager and the endors
]Y Though there was some reference in Mercer's testimony to venders
of carbonated soda and related products. I am not convinced from his
testimony that such deliveries were made during shifts worked by Vin-
cent
i9 Mercer conceded that at least with respect to the bread vendor the
general practice on reordering is for the salesman to examine the area in
which his products are stored, then fill out the order form himself, return
to his vehicle, load up his cart, and bring the new products in the store
At that point, the invoice is shown to the assistant store manager who
checks the merchandise physically. Any variance in the order decided
upon by the store manager or the assistant store manager would occur at
that point Whether, as a matter of practice, such variations occur on a
more than occasional basis is not disclosed In any event, the endors of
bread and dairy products guarantee sale and retrieve old merchandise al-
lowing the Company a credit therefore. Thus, the vendors having regular
contact with Vincent would have an interest in assuring against overor-
dering. minimizing the risk entailed in any discretion exercised by the as-
sistant store manager in this regard.
20 Tesch testified that, during the period when Vincent was store man-
ager as well as assistant store manager, she would at times cut the order
if she thought it was too much, or add to it if she thought it was not
enough Tesch. who had called on Store 53 regularly for a period of
about 5 months while Vincent was store manager, and only on 2 days
while she was assistant store manager. did not impress me as having a
sufficient capacity for recollection to enable him to accurately isolate
what transpired during these diverse timeframes I regarded his testimony
as unreliable to the extent that he implied that Viicent actually varied his
recommended order on November 27 and December 18
509
DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR REI.ATIONS BOARD
of each of Respondent's stores is implemented through
the development of guidelines designed by high level
managers to facilitate absentee control by relegating the
opportunity for independent judgment on the part of
store personnel to the insignificant and sporadic. In sum.
I am not persuaded that the record substantiates Re-
spondent's contention that Vincent was a supervisor
within the meaning of Section 2(11) of the Act.
2. The reasons assigned for the discharge
a. Preliminary statement
Under Respondent's established procedure the three
infractions attributed to Vincent could not separately
have justified her discharge. Independent assessment
thereof, upon resolution of credibility conflicts, points to
the fact that one was pretextual and two were inspired
directly through Vincent's role in the meeting at head-
quarters on February 19. The analysis of each of the sep-
arate grounds is set forth below.
b. Spreading malicious gossip
This charge derives from conduct on the part of Vin-
cent which took place in December 1978. Thus, William
A. Tesch, the "Gallo" wine salesman, testified that fol-
lowing Vincent's demotion she expressed to him that she
felt that supervision was out to get her and that inven-
tory and cash shortages were being "palmed off' on her.
Tesch credibly testified that she also accused Lennox of
carrying on an affair and sleeping with Store Manager
Loven.
Subsequently, Tesch mentioned the foregoing to an-
other store manager, whereupon he received a call from
Wilson, Respondent's merchandising manager. Tesch re-
ported to Wilson that Vincent told him that Lennox was
sleeping with Loven. However, Tesch placed the report
to Wilson as occurring between the Christmas and New
Year holidays in 1978.
Until February 27 Vincent had received no discipline
as a result of this matter. However, during the period
contemporaneous with the February 19 meeting, accord-
ing to Tesch he was contacted by Wilson a second time.
Wilson in their conversation requested a "refresher" of
what Tesch had previously reported, and Tesch simply
reiterated what Vincent had told him.
Although Cochran testified that he learned of the
gossip no earlier than Tuesday, February 20, it is a fact
that at least one high level company official, namely,
Wilson, after verifying that the story had been circulat-
ed, let the matter lie dormant until the period corre-
sponding to the meeting of February 19.
21
Although the conduct of Vincent in this regard is not
condoned, Respondent's renewed interest in what had
occurred some months earlier following Vincent's par-
ticipation in the meeting of February 19 supports an in-
ference that Vincent's involvement in the latter was the
2a Wilson did not testify and Cochran failed to disclose the source of
his information.
sole cause for Respondent's apparent revitalization of
such misconduct as a basis for discipline. "22
c. Failure to report absence
General Counsel's Exhibit 2 indicates that the second
ground for the termination of Vincent was her failure to
call the store by noon concerning the absence from her
scheduled shift on February 20. However, Cochran,
though having signed that document, testified that he
himself excused Vincent's absence that day, while shift-
ing the date of the offense to February 19. This discrep-
ancy provides the framework for a highly material cre-
diblity clash as to developments during the interim be-
tween February 19 and the discharge of Vincent on Feb-
ruary 27.
Thus, Vincent's testimony that at the meeting on Feb-
ruary 19 she mentioned that she had been home ill and
that she would not be able to work that evening because
she had a medical appointment was believed. However,
Vincent went on to testify that on the same afternoon,
enroute to her doctor, she stopped by the store to pick
up her check, where she was confronted by Cochran,
who engaged her in conversation as to why she had
gone to headquarters before communicating with him.
Vincent reiterated her concerns again to Cochran. Ac-
cording to Vincent, another meeting was arranged for 10
o'clock the following morning. She then went to the
doctor, where, according to her testimony and a docu-
ment in evidence, she received a medical excuse dated
February 19, stating as follows: "Mrs. Vincent is under
treatment and advised to remain at home until 2/26/70."
The signature of R. W. Harkaway, M.D. appears there-
on.23 Vincent related that, after receiving the same, she
telephoned Loven indicating that pursuant to her physi-
cian's advice she would not return to work until Febru-
ary 26.
It will be recalled that Mercer, Wilson, and Cochran
visited Store 53 on the afternoon of February 19. Coch-
ran testified that he was primarily concerned at that time
with keeping the store open as he did not know whether
the second shift would report for work. 24 Cochran, with
: Evidently the decision to terminate Vincent involved a special case
Thus, according to Mercer the decision to discharge Vincent was based
on a "recommendation" from "subordinates" considered by no less than a
group including himself and the president of the Company. Lennox had
the authority herself, and without review from others, to effect a dis-
charge
23 See G C. Exh. 5
24 A curious conflict in Respondent's own testimony exists in this
regard Thus, Mercer testified that Ardman and Vincent reported at the
earlier meeting that they would not return to work until the problems
were resolved. Though Mercer and Wilson were in the store, Cochran
denied that he was either advised of any such threat or that at the meet-
ing Vincent had referred to her doctor's appointment that afternoon
Another consideration reflecting adversely upon Cochran's credulity
stems from the fact that Supervisor Lennox began a vacation on Fehru-
ary 26 Although it is apparent from her testimony that she was out of
town during the latter stages of her vacation, ennox and Cochran testi-
fied that they met on the morning of February 20. According to Lennox,
the meeting was requested by Cochran to discuss "what had taken place
at the office" the previous day Cochran, in downplaying his concern for
the employees' action at headquarters on February 19, testified that he
was primarily concerned with maintaining an adequate staff at the store
It is noted that Lennox, in describing her meeting with Cochran on Feb-
Continued
510
QUIK-PIK FOOD STORES. INC.
some support from Mercer, denied that he had any con-
tact with Vincent on February 19. He claims that he left
the store at or about 4:45 p.m. on February 19, and that
Vincent neither isited the store nor telephoned on that
date. 2
According to Cochran, his first contact with Vincent
was on February 20, when he telephoned to see if she
would work the second shift that evening. According to
Cochran, Vincent indicated that she was ill, that she was
going to see the doctor that afternoon, and that she
would contact him when she was capable of coming to
work. Nothing else was discussed and Vincent, accord-
ing to Cochran, failed to disclose that her doctor had
told her not to return to work until February 26.26
Cochran went on to testify that it was also on February
20 that Vincent, enroute to the doctor, came by to pick
up her check. Their conversation at that point, according
to Cochran, was very "minor" and limited to Cochran's
comments that it was nice that she could wait 4 days to
pick up her check and his expressions that she should get
well and be able to come back to work. 2 7 Contrary to
General Counsel Exhibit 2, Cochran testified that he,
personally, excused Vincent's absence on February 20.28
Cochran testified that to his knowledge after February
25 Vincent neither called the store nor contacted him
until Thursday, February 22. He claimed, however, that
Vincent on that date called him on his "beeper" number.
In the conversation Vincent indicated that "she felt
better," and a meeting was arranged for Friday morning,
February 23, because Cochran "wanted to talk to her
about her discussion at the office on Monday morning."
Cochran related that the alleged meeting did not take
place because Vincent was not available. Accordingly,
she was allegedly told to call him on Monday, February
26.29
ruary 20, failed to mention that employees had not shown up for work on
February 19 or that Cochran was confronted by any problem in that
regard. Quite obviously, Cochran's concern for the fact that the employ-
ees had gone to headquarters was of sufficient import to prompt him to
alert Supervisor Lennox of this fact by telephone on February 19 and to
meet with her on February 20, all during her vacation.
25 Mercer also testified that he remained in the store until after the
commencement of the evening shift and that. while present. Vincent did
not appear or to his knowledge call in.
26 Though Vincent's unexcused absence on February 19 was one of
the citations for her termination, Cochran admitted that in this first con-
versation with her he failed to express dissatisfaction in that regard
When questioned by me as to why, Cochran. in a somewhat argumenta-
tive vein, responded as follows: " believe I did . . the woman told me
she was sick, that she was ill I am not in the position to argue with
her at that point."
27 Here again the issue of the alleged unexcused absence on February
19 was not mentioned
:" As for the events of February 20). Vincent testified that she tele-
phoned Cochran at Store 53 on the morning of February 20 to advise
him that she was oo ill to leave home and could not meet with him that
morning, and that Cochran ads ised Vincent to report the illness to
Loven before noon that day. Vincent. pursuant thereo, avers that she at-
tempted for about an hour to reach the store before noon that day but
was unable to get through, checking with the operator to see if the phone
was out of order and then calling headquarters to report her abselce.
Vincent acknowledges that, later in the afternoon of February 20, she
had a telephone conversation with Cochran. However. she testified that
thereafter she had no communication with any of Respondents officials
until she reported for work on February 26.
29 Cochran acknowledged that he knew that Vincent would not work
her scheduled shifts on Saturday and Sunday The source of that infor-
To the extent in conflict, I credit Vincent over Mercer
and Cochran. The testimony of the latter lacked consist-
ency on a number of points and did not ring true when
considered on the total record. Probability favors Vin-
cent, who had been ill for several days prior to February
19, had mentioned a medical appointment at the Febru-
ary 19 meeting at headquarters, and before that date had
not picked up her check though apparently available at
the store at least since the previous Friday. Furthermore,
her account is substantiated by General Counsel's Exhibit
5.:t° On the other hand, particularly grave suspicion is
cast, upon testimony of Cochran that he had no commu-
nication with Vincent on February 19 when considered
against the fact that a company document prepared only
9 days later to memorialize the grounds for the discharge
signified that Vincent's unexcused absence was on Febru-
ary 20, rather than February 19. This discrepancy lends
added force to the credibility of Vincent.
Based upon the foregoing, I am convinced that Re-
spondent's assertion that during her illness Vincent vio-
lated her responsibility to notify the Company was con-
trived so as to enable a discharge in conformity with the
three warnings required under Respondent's disciplinary
policy.
d. The chain of command
The levels of authority within Respondent's operation
starting from the lowest are as follows: Stockboy, cash-
ier, assistant store manager, store manager, area supervi-
sor, district manager, and assistant to the president. The
employees, in going to headquarters and in first meeting
with Wilson on February 19, bypassed the store man-
ager, the area supervisor, and the district manager.
Indeed, Wilson was not even in the line of authority
which related to store personnel. At the same time, how-
ever, the complaints registered by employees on that oc-
casion in significant part reflected adversely upon the
honesty of their store manager and the area supervisor
was on vacation. As for the district manager, although
Ardman first asked to speak with him, Vincent conceded
that she knew at the time that Cochran would be un-
available.
In any event, it does not appear that Mercer or Wilson
expressed concern with a possible bypass in allowing the
employees to air their problems or that they even in-
quired as to whether the complaints had been brought to
the attention of lower management echelons. Indeed, on
this record, it appears that the discharge notice issued
Vincent on February 26 constituted the first formal noti-
fication to any employee that failure to adhere to the
chain of command could result in discipline. For it does
not appear that any employee had ever before received
any form of discipline on this ground.
Assuming for purposes of argument that the Act does
not impede employers from establishing reasonable pro-
cedures for the communication of grievances to manage-
ment, and from disciplining those who fail to comply, it
mation is not evident from h testimony He denied that he had ever
been showvn V'incent's medical .xcuse.
"' N convincing evidence was presented questioning ihe authenticity
of this document
51
DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
seems only reasonable that any such limitations be clear-
ly communicated to employees before their rights under
Section 7 might be compromised. Here, however, it does
not appear that employees were ever placed on notice
that a mandatory policy existed in this regard. The sole
communication to employees pertaining to "lines of au-
thority" appears in Respondent's procedure manual,: '
which recites as follows:
Lines of Authority
Any organization is strengthened when its people
communicate their problems or questions through
proper channels. Quik Pik is structured so that store
personnel should take their questions and sugges-
tions to their store manager who, when necessary,
should communicate matters that were brought up,
to his or her supervisor.
The supervisors serve as the key link between the
stores and the district managers and between the
stores and the office. Normally, communication
should flow from one level to the next. In this way
problem-solving falls naturally to the person who is
responsible at each level. A breakdown occurs, for
instance, if a store manager communicates an in-
quiry or a complaint to someone other than his su-
pervisor on a matter concerning the store operation
or personnel. In time certain relationships could be
damaged and further communciation breakdowns
would become more likely.
Smooth operations with good companywide
communication flow require the best effort on the
part of every employee to bring matters to the at-
tention of his or her immediate superior. By the
same token, this will insure that the downward flow
of information and instruction will follow the same
communication channels, and your instructions and
guidance will come from your immediate supervi-
sor.
On its face, said declaration is couched merely in lan-
guage appealing to the good sense of employees and sug-
gesting management's preference as to what they
"should" do in communicating inquiries or complaints. It
lacks the mandatory language usually found in an in-
struction, directive, or firmly viewed requirement. This
ambiguity is compounded by the fact that, under Re-
spondent's published disciplinary policy, violation of
lines of authority or chain of command is not listed as a
basis for reprimand or termination. 3 2
In these circumstances, the issuance of discipline on
this ground with respect to an employee engaged in a
concerted effort to advance work-related complaints to
management no more constitutes valid cause or a basis
for privileged discipline under the Act than would be
1 See Resp. Exh. 2. This reference is part of a 50-page volume articu-
lating various aspects of store policy. According to the testimony of
Mercer, a cop) of the policy manual is to be maintained in each store
with employees having access thereto. Although not necessarily material,
it is noted that there is no direct evidence that such a document was
available in Store 53 at times material to this proceeding
32 G.C Exh 4 lists some 41 different offenses subject to punishment
either in the form of immediate dismissal or written reprimand, hut makes
no reference to chain of command.
true of discipline under a rule banning union solicitation
applied to employees engaged in such activity on their
own time.
3. The violation
The intervention of statutory remedies in this case de-
pends in the first instance upon whether the February 19
action by the employees constituted activity protected by
Section 7 of the Act. It is well settled that employees
enjoy a protected statutory right under Section 7 of the
Act to engage in "concerted activities for the purpose of
. . other mutual aid or protection," and that such guar-
antees necessarily include the right to appeal to manage-
ment concerning problems related to conditions of work.
Here, employees Vincent, Ardman, and Kapzynski ap-
peared at Respondent's offices to address management
officials concerning practices relative to cash and inven-
tory shortages in the store and adverse conditions they
found in the store upon the commencement of their
shifts. Said protestations related exclusively to the
manner in which Store Manager Loven discharged his
responsibility, and, since they were not addressed to his
removal, did not constitute an attempt to interefere with
Respondent's prerogative as to the composition of its
management team.3 3 The conduct of Vincent, Ardman,
and Kapezynski was confined to their assertion of com-
plaints to management relative to their conditions of
work, and as such was protected by Section 7 of the
Act.
Finally, the evidence overwhelmingly points to the
fact that Vincent was discharged solely because of her
involvement in the February 19 "grievance" meeting.
There was no suggestion that discipline against Vincent
was likely until the first occasion on which she became
available for work following her involvement in the pro-
tected grievance meeting. After her discharge, at an un-
employment insurance hearing on her claim, Wilson de-
scribed Vincent as the principal "ringleader" in that con-
nection.3 4 Consistent with these factors, Respondent's as-
signed grounds for the termination, rather than allaying,
actually serve to enforce the claim of proscribed discrim-
ination. In this latter respect, the charge that she by-
passed lower level management, while not within any
privilege cognizable under the Act, stemmed directly
from and was linked inextricably with Vincent's involve-
ment in protected activity. Similarly, the charge of "ma-
licious gossip," though previously condoned by Re-
spondent's managers, was assigned heightened impor-
tance only after her participation in the February 19
meeting. And with respect to the third ground, I have
' I have not overlooked Vincent's adverse reaction to her demotion
from the store manager position in October 1978, and I am also persuad-
ed that she held an interest in returning to that position throughout, com-
municating that desire to Mercer on February 19. Nonetheless Vincent
obviously did not attend that meeting for the purpose of convincing man-
agement to replace Loven, since at the time it had been established and
she knew that L.oven was scheduled for promotion to another position in
the Company. Cf Joanna Cotton Mills Co. v. NL.R.B, 176 F2d 749 (4th
Cir. 1949). Furthermore, from the credible evidence on this record even
if she was the most outspoken, rather than the instigator of the meeting,
Vincent was simply invited by the others to join them if she wished
"4 Based on Vincent's credited, uncontradicted testimony.
512
QUIK-PIK FOOD STORES, INC.
heretofore concluded that it was pretextual, having been
structured in its entirety upon unbelievable testimony. In
the circumstances, and based on the entire record, I find
that Respondent terminated Vincent in reprisal for her
role in the advancement of employee complaints under
circumstances protected by Section 7 of the Act, and
that Respondent thereby violated Section 8(a)(1) of the
Act.3 s
CONCLUSIONS OFt LAW'
1. Respondent is an employer within the meaning of
Section 2(2) of the Act and is engaged in commerce
within the meaning of Section 2(6) and (7) of the Act.
2. Respondent violated Section 8(a)(l) of the Act on
February 27, 1979, by discharging and thereafter refusing
to reinstate employee Olga Vincent in reprisal for her
joining other employees in communicating their job-re-
lated complaints to management.
3. The aforesaid unfair labor practices constitute unfair
labor practices affecting commerce within the meaning
of Section 2(6) and (7) of the Act.
Having found that Respondent has engaged in certain
unfair labor practices, it shall be recommended that it be
ordered to cease and desist therefrom and to take certain
affirmative action found necessary to effectuate the pur-
poses and policies of the Act.
Having found that Respondent discriminatorily dis-
charged Olga Vincent, it shall be recommended that Re-
spondent be ordered to offer her immediate and full rein-
statement to her former position or, if that position is not
available, to a substantially equivalent position, without
loss of seniority or other privileges and benefits. It shall
be further recommended that Respondent make her
whole for any loss of pay sustained by reason of the dis-
crimination against her from February 27, 1979, to the
date of a bona fide offer of reinstatement. Backpay shall
be reduced by interim earnings and computed on a quar-
terly basis as prescribed in F. W Woolworth Company, 90
NLRB 289 (1950), with interest as authorized by Florida
Steel Corporation, 231 NLRB 651 (1977).36
Upon the foregoing findings of fact, conclusions of
law, and the entire record in this proceeding, and pursu-
ant to Section 10(c) of the Act, I hereby issue the fol-
lowing recommended:
ORDER 3 7
The Respondent, Quik-Pik Food Stores, Inc., Detroit,
Michigan, its officers, agents, successors, and assigns,
shall:
3s Harry Ardman, who was discharged on February 20, did not im-
press me as a reliable witness. His testimony has been accepted only
where corroborated by other believable evidence
ae See, generally, Iit, Plumbing & fleating Co.. 138 NLRB 716 (1962)
37 In the event no exceptions are filed as provided hby Sec 102.46 of
the Rules and Regulations of the National Labor Relations Board, the
1. Cease and desist from:
(a) Discharging or in any other manner discriminating
against employees because they elect to communicate
job-related complaints to management.
(hb) In any like or related manner interfering with, re-
straining, or coercing employees in the exercise of the
rights guaranteed them by Section 7 of the Act.
2. Take the following affirmative action which is
deemed necessary to effectuate the policies of the Act:
(a) Offer to Olga Vincent immediate and full reinstate-
ment to her former position or, if such position no longer
exists, to a substantially equivalent position, without prej-
udice to her seniority or other rights and privileges, and
make her whole in the manner set forth in the section of
this Decision entitled "The Remedy."
(b) Preserve and, upon request, make available to the
Board or its agents, for examination and copying, all
payroll records, social security payment records, time-
cards. personnel records and reports, and all other re-
cords necessary or appropriate to analyze the amounts
due under the terms of this Order.
(c) Post at Store 53 in Warren, Michigan, copies of the
attached notice marked "Appendix." a3 Copies of said
notice, on forms provided by the Regional Director for
Region 7 after being duly signed by Respondent's au-
thorized representative, shall be posted by Respondent
immediately upon receipt thereof, and be maintained by
it for 60 consecutive days thereafter, in conspicuous
places, including all places where notices to employees
are customarily posted. Reasonable steps shall be taken
by Respondent to insure that said notices are not altered,
defaced, or covered by any other material.
(d)Notify the Regional Director for Region 7, in writ-
ing, within 20 days from the date of this Order, what
steps the Respondent has taken to comply herewith.
findings, conclusions, and recommended Order herein shall. as provided
in Sec 102.48 of the Rules and Regulations, be adopted by the Board and
become its findings, conclusions, and Order, and all objections thereto
shall be deemed waived for all purposes
:' In the event that this Order is enforced by a Judgment of a United
Stales Court of Appeals, the words n the notice reading "Posted by
Order of the National Labor Relations Board" shall read "Posted Pursu-
ant to a Judgment of the United States Court of Appeals Enforcing an
Order of the Nalional Labor Relations Board "
513