Quick Find Co.

National Labor Relations Board - Board Decisions

Jun 21, 1982

262 N.L.R.B. 341 (N.L.R.B. 1982)

QUICK FIND CO.
Quick Find Co. and Teamsters Local Union No.
688, affiliated with International Brotherhood of
Teamsters, Chauffeurs, Warehousemen and
Helpers of America. Case 14-CA-15028
June 21, 1982
DECISION AND ORDER
BY MEMBERS JENKINS, ZIMMERMAN, AND
HUNTER
On March 4, 1982, Administrative Law Judge
Claude R. Wolfe issued the attached Decision in
this proceeding. Thereafter, Respondent filed ex-
ceptions and a supporting brief.
Pursuant to the provisions of Section 3(b) of the
National Labor Relations Act, as amended, the Na-
tional Labor Relations Board has delegated its au-
thority in this proceeding to a three-member panel.
The Board has considered the record and the at-
tached Decision in light of the exceptions and brief
and has decided to affirm the rulings, findings, and
conclusions of the Administrative Law Judge only
to the extent consistent herewith.
The Administrative Law Judge found that Re-
spondent withheld vacation pay from Joseph
Emily, Michael Rangel, and Charles Hoffman in
violation of Section 8(a)(3) and (1). Respondent as-
serts that these three employees were not unlawful-
ly denied vacation pay, but rather they failed to
meet its attendance requirement entitling them to
this benefit. We find merit in Respondent's posi-
tion.
The facts, as more fully set forth in the Adminis-
trative Law Judge's Decision, are undisputed. Re-
spondent had long-established rules governing eli-
gibility for vacation and vacation pay. These rules
required that an employee must have been em-
ployed for at least I year and have been in attend-
ance on the job for at least 93 percent of the work
year in order to qualify for a week's paid vacation.
In 1981, in order to allay production disruptions
created by staggered vacation schedules, Respond-
ent lawfully promulgated a new policy requiring
that vacations be taken during a designated week in
June. In accordance with this policy, Respondent
decided that the relevant work year for determin-
ing eligibility for a June 1981 vacationi was from
June 1980 through May 1981. Respondent contend-
ed that Emily, Rangel, and Hoffman failed to quali-
fy for the June 1981 vacation pay because their at-
tendance records for the relevant work year fell
below the 93-percent requisite. However, the larg-
est portion of their absences was attributable to a 7-
week layoff during November and December 1980,
which was the subject of an earlier unfair labor
practice proceeding and was pending final determi-
262 NLRB No. 46
nation by the Board at the time of the hearing in
the instant case. Prior to the issuance of the Ad-
ministrative Law Judge's Decision herein, the
Board decided that the November-December 1980
layoff violated Section 8(aX3) and (1).1 Relying
upon this finding, the Administrative Law Judge
determined that Respondent could not rely on its
earlier unfair labor practice to disqualify these oth-
erwise entitled employees from their vacation pay.
Accordingly, he concluded that Respondent's
denial of vacation pay to these individuals corsti-
tuted a separate violation of Section 8(a)(3) and (1).
In its exceptions Respondent argued that even if
the additional hours lost through the unlawful
layoff-280 hours-were fully credited toward
these three employees' attendance records, none of
them would have met the 93-percent requirement.
We find support for Respondent's contention in the
record evidence.
Examination of Respondent's attendance records
for the time period here involved indicates that the
number of hours Emily worked, adjusted for the
unlawful layoff, comprised only 92.5 percent of the
work year. Similarly, Rangel's adjusted attendance
record shows a rate of only 89.3 percent and Hoff-
man's attendance totaled just 92.8 percent of the
work year. Clearly, these employees would not
have qualified for vacation pay irrespective of Re-
spondent's discriminatory layoff. See Elm Hill
Meats of Owensboro, Inc., Elmn Hill Meats, Inc.,
Baltz Brothers Packing Company, 213 NLRB 874
(1974).
There is no evidence that Respondent did not
apply its vacation policy uniformly or that employ-
ees were unaware of this widely known rule. Re-
spondent was under no obligation to provide vaca-
tion pay to employees who did not meet the quali-
fications for such benefits. Accordingly, we reverse
the Administrative Law Judge's determination that
Respondent violated Section 8(a)( 3 ) and (1) by
withholding vacation pay from these employees
and we dismiss the complaint in its entirety.
ORDER
Pursuant to Section 10(c) of the National Labor
Relations Act, as amended, the National Labor Re-
lations Board hereby orders that the complaint
herein be, and it hereby is, dismissed in its entirety.
See Quick Find Co., 259 NLRB 1051 (1982).
DECISION
CLAUDE R. WOLFE, Administrative law Judge: This
case was heard before me in St. Louis, Missouri, pursu-
ant to charges filed on June 2, 1981. and an amended
341
DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
complaint issued August 21, 1981. The complaint alleges
violations of Section 8(a)(3) and (1) of the Act consisting
of the denial of vacation pay to Joseph Emily, Charles
Hoffman, Bob Moore, Michael Rangel, and Brian
Wadlow; a refusal to timely recall Eugene and Joseph
Emily from layoff; the assignment of Eugene Emily to
more onerous duties; and the discharge and refusal to re-
instate Joseph Emily. Respondent denies the commission
of unfair labor practices.
The parties filed post-hearing briefs which have been
considered.
Upon the entire record' and my observation of the de-
meanor of the witnesses as they testified before me I
make the following:
FINDINGS AND CONCLUSIONS
I. JURISDICTION
Respondent is engaged in the manufacture and sale of
steel cabinets and related products. The complaint al-
leges, Respondent admits, and I find that Respondent
meets the Board's jurisdictional standards and is an em-
ployer engaged in commerce within the meaning of
Section 2(2), (6), and (7) of the Act.
11. LABOR ORGANIZATION
The Union is a labor organization within the meaning
of Section 2(5) of the Act.
III. THE ALLEGED UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES
A. Background
The Board issued a Decision on January 13, 1982,2
finding that Respondent laid off Michael Rangel, Joseph
Emily, Charles Hoffman, Robert Moore, and Donald
Dilschneider on November 6, 1980, in violation of
Section 8(a)(3) and (1) of the Act, and committed several
other violations of Section 8(a)(1) of the Act. The Board
also adopted Administrative Law Judge Ries' finding
that Eugene Emily was a statutory supervisory.
B. Further Facts and Allegations
Respondent laid off all its employees on May 28, 1981,
including Eugene Emily, Joseph Emily, Charles Hoff-
man, Robert Moore, Michael Rangel, and Brian
Wadlow. This layoff was neither alleged nor litigated as
an unfair labor practice.
When then General Manager Nathan Fogel called the
men together and advised them of the layoff, Eugene
Emily,3 a statutory supervisor, asked if the employees
were going to receive vacation pay. Fogel, apparently
after checking with owner Dwight Gold, told them va-
cation was supposed to start in June and there would
therefore be no vacation until then. This was consistent
with a notice to employees posted about May I notifying
that all qualifying employees would get their vacation in
June, but the laid-off employees did not in fact get their
I Errors in the transcript have been noted and corrected.
' Quick Find. Ca, 259 NLRB 1051 (1982).
· I credit Emily's version of this conversation.
vacation in June or even by the date of the hearing
before me.
The record fairly establishes that to qualify for a paid
vacation an employee must be employed for 1 year and
must have been present 93 percent of the scheduled
workdays in the 12 months preceding the vacation.
Hoffman, Rangel, Wadlow, and Moore were recalled
on July 10. Hoffman did not return. Eugene and Joseph
Emily were recalled on July 15. On both July 10 and 15,
new General Manager David Schuman explained that
the payment of vacation pay depended on the outcome
of the pending unfair labor practice case, which would
result in them receiving vacation pay if the decision was
in their favor or not receiving it if the decision was in
favor of Respondent.
Of the five employees allegedly denied vacation pay
for unlawful reasons, Brian Wadlow and Robert Moore
had not been employed the requisite year in May 1981.
Moore was subsequently discharged in July, prior to the
completion of a year of employment. Wadlow would not
have completed his first year until January 1982, after
the hearing before me. Obviously, neither of them was
entitled to any vacation in May or June 1981, and there-
fore they were denied nothing in the way of vacation
pay.
Respondent asserts that Joseph Emily and Michael
Rangel's ineligibility for vacation pay arose from the No-
vember 19804 layoff which caused their attendance to
fall below the 93 percent required. Inasmuch as the
Board has found the November to December 1980 layoff
of Joseph Emily and Rangel to have been an unfair labor
practice. it is patent that Respondent may not rely on it
as a vacation pay tolling device. Accordingly, I find
both were entitled to vacation pay in 1981 because they
had met the qualifying requirements on May 28, 1981.
Charles Hoffman, who was also unlawfully laid off in
November and December 1980, was not paid vacation
pay, according to Schuman, because of this layoff but
otherwise satisfied the 93-percent requirement. He was
therefore eligible for vacation pay in June 1981 for the
same reasons Joseph Emily and Rangel were. That Hoff-
man did not respond to a recall of July 10 does not, as
Respondent's post-hearing brief suggests, obliterate his
previously established entitlement to June vacation pay.
Summing up, Fogel was correct when he advised em-
ployees that vacation was not scheduled until June, but
the real motivation for withholding vacation pay was set
forth by Schuman. Hearing had been held on February 5
and 6, 1981, and the eligibility of Joseph Emily, Michael
Rangel, and Charles Hoffman for vacation pay would
only be established if the decision in that case found the
November 1980 layoff to be unlawful. Respondent clear-
ly had a right to litigate its liability for any wages lost as
a result of the layoff and any consequential losses such as
vacation pay, but Respondent must also bear the risks of
such litigation. The Board has found the November 1980
layoff to be unlawful. It necessarily follows that Re-
spondent was in fact wrong when it withheld the vaca-
tion pay of Joseph Emily, Rangel, and Hoffman. The
· Respondent's post-heanng brief inadvertently places the layoff in No-
vember 1981.
342
QUICK FIND CO.
withholding was a consequence of its prior unfair labor
practice and therefore also an unfair labor practice re-
quiring a remedy. Accordingly, I find that the withhold-
ing of vacation pay to these three men violated Section
8(aX3) and (1) of the Act and must be remedied.
1. The assignment of Eugene Emily
When Eugene Emily returned to work on July 15 he
was advised that he had been demoted from foreman to
production employee. He was assigned to work on the
mig welder. Brian Wadlow, who had been doing that
work, was transferred to spray painting to replace Hoff-
man. Wadlow and Eugene Emily were the most qualified
employees at mig welding. Eugene Emily had in the past
trained employees on this work. Eugene Emily considers
mig welding to be the worst job in the shop. Joseph
Emily, Eugene's brother, gave an opinion that it was the
best job in the shop, noting the high pay for that work.
Joseph Emily also ranked spray painting and mig weld-
ing as about the same in degree of difficulty and unpleas-
antness. Michael Rangel expressed an aversion to either
mig welding or spray painting. Mig welding does in-
volve the wearing of somewhat cumbersome protective
clothing, and is a hot, smelly job because of the heat and
unpleasant gaseous fumes generated by the welding. The
assignment took place in the middle of summer and the
temperature in the welding area reached as high as 100
degress Fahrenheit.
Prior to his demotion, Eugene Emily had spent about
70 percent of his working time operating a punch press. I
am persuaded that this job and his set up and supervisory
duties were probably more pleasant and would indeed
appear to a reasonable man to be less taxing than mig
welding. These former duties of Eugene Emily were
split up among the other employees returning from
layoff. The work force had dwindled from eight to six
after the July recalls, and Rangel credibly testified the
punch press work is now less than 8 hours every day.
The complaint alleges that Emily was assigned more
onerous working duties on or about July 15, 1981, to dis-
courage union activities. The General Counsel's argu-
ment reflects that this refers to Eugene Emily's assign-
ment to mig welding other than some other production
job.
The demotion of Eugene Emily was not alleged as un-
lawful, and Respondent was free to discharge him from
his supervisory position. That it did not discharge him,
as it had a right to do when it became dissatisfied with
his supervisory performance5 or even his union activity
if that were the case, but retained him as the highest paid
hourly employee, militates against a finding that it was
determined to punish him because of his unprotected
union activities. He was not laid off in November 1980
and was given a raise after his demotion, hardly indica-
tors of any disposition to retaliate against him because he
supported a union.
Emily had no vested "right" to retain the punch press
work supplementary to his supervisory duties, or to a
· I note that the evidence before Judge Ries caused him to suspect that
Eugene Emily was refusing to perform supervisory functions which he
had previously done, for which dereliction he was warned of possible
discharge. Quick Find Co., supro at 1061.
choice between spray painting and mig welding. It is not
even clear that spray painting was a less onerous or more
desirable job than mig welding. There is a division of
opinion among the General Counsel's employee wit-
nesses on this subject which suggests to me that neither
ranks high in the eyes of the employees as a desirable po-
sition. The General Counsel has not shown that Re-
spondent's purpose was to assign Emily to a job so op-
pressive that he would have no choice but to quit, or
that mig welding was so onerous that anyone assigned to
it would be compelled to leave. Eugene Emily did not
quit and was still on the same job at time of hearing 4-
1/2 months later. There is no evidence that Wadlow or
anyone else assigned to mig welding before Eugene
Emily had found it overly burdensome or had even com-
plained about it, nor does it appear that the job was
made any more difficult when Emily was assigned to it.
Spray painting was the only full-time production job
other than mig welding to which Emily could have been
assigned.6 The credible evidence does not persuade me
one is more onerous than the other. This being the case,
the General Counsel cannot prevail and the question of
whether Eugene Emily was discriminated against be-
cause he had engaged in unprotected union activity as a
foreman does not arise.
2. Discharge of Joseph Emily
Joseph Emily was a most unbelievable witness whose
demeanor was one of casual flippancy and conscious
searching for testimony to bolster his cause. His testimo-
ny was liberally sprinkled with glaring internal inconsis-
tencies, insouciant evasion, and obvious inherently im-
probable assertions. I do not credit him except on those
occasions his testimony is otherwise corroborated, is
probable in the circumstances, or amounts to admissions
against his interest.
Joseph Emily injured his hand on the evening of July
21.7 He did not seek medical treatment until about 8 a.m.
on July 22 at the earliest, when he claims he set out on a
10-block 40- to 45-minute walk to the hospital. Putting
aside the obvious question as to why a vigorous young
man of 19 would take that long to walk 10 blocks, he did
not arrive at the hospital by his calculation until 10:30 or
11 a.m. I do not believe he started out as early as he
claims. The hospital treatment record shows he was seen
by a doctor at 12:25 p.m. He was released from the hos-
pital at 1:45 p.m. and concedes he was able to work.
Joseph Emily was admittedly aware of a company rule
requiring employees to call in if they were going to be
late or absent, and had called in on July 21, only the day
before, to notify of a late arrival. He made no effort to
call in or go to the plant on July 22. He explains that he
had no phone nor money to make a call and did not call
or go to work when discharged from the hospital be-
" Punch press was and continued to be less than full-time work.
7 He testified that a television set fell on his hand as he attempted to
turn it on at 5:30 a.m. on July 22, but the hospital treatment record shows
that he advised the hospital his injury occurred on the evening of July 21
when he dropped a heavy piece of furniture on his hand. He had no
reason to mislead the hospital, and I am inclined to believe the July 22
date was invented by Joseph Emily to support his story of unexpected
injury on that date.
343
DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
cause his shift had ended. His shift did not in fact end
until 2:30 p.m., 8 and I cannot believe it would have been
all that difficult for him to find a phone some time that
day, to borrow the few cents needed for a pay phone
from one or more of the assorted cousins he says he met
on his way to the hospital, or have someone else call for
him. A picture emerges of a young man with little con-
cern for either the truth or his job.
Schuman had to call in job applicant Jeff Smith to re-
place Joseph Emily on July 22. At the end of the day,
Schuman told Smith to return the next day because he
did not know if Joseph Emily would return.
When Joseph Emily came to work on July 22 he pre-
sented the hospital release to Schuman and stated he had
been at the hospital all day. Schuman noted the release
time on the hospital form, told Emily he had not been all
day at the hospital, and asked where he had been and
why he had not called. Emily repeated he had been at
the hospital all day and added he did not think about
calling. Schuman then told Joseph Emily that according
to company ru!es9 he had voluntarily resigned by not
calling in, there was no work for him, he should leave,
and if he were needed the next day Schunman would call
him. Joseph Emily left his brother's phone number as a
place he could be reached. It would seem from these ar-
rangements to call Emily and the advice to Smith to
return on July 23 as a guard against the continued ab-
sence of Emily that Schuman had not made a final deci-
sion to terminate Joseph Emily on July 22 or at the end
of their meeting on July 23.
After Emily's departure, Schuman checked with the
hospital and was told Emily had been admitted at 12:30
p.m. on July 22. On July 24, Schuman called Joseph
Emily and told him that the hospital advised he had been
admitted at 12:30 p.m. and he had been discharged at
1:40 p.m.10 Schuman then again asked why Emily could
not have called or had some one else call. Emily again
responded that he did not think of it and there was no
one else to call for him. Schuman credibly asserts he
called Emily because he was trying to get a better expla-
nation of why Emily had not called, and was not trying
to get rid of anyone. It is implicit in this testimony that
he was giving Emily another chance to retain his job.
Joseph Emily has not been recalled to work.
Although Schuman told Joseph Emily on July 23 that
he had voluntarily quit pursuant to company rule, I con-
clude that Emily's final chance for retention expired on
July 24 when he failed to give Schuman satisfactory ex-
planation.
Respondent has utilized the voluntary quit rule in a
discretionary manner. Other considerations determine
how the rule is applied. As examples of the use of the
rule, both Eugene Emily and Michael Rangel were late
to work after their return from layoff and were told they
s Joseph Emily testified that he thinks his shift ended at 3:30 p.m.,
which makes his story all the more incredible.
I The rule reads, "Any employee not reporting for work by eight
o'clock in morning, has voluntarily quit," but has been interpreted in
view of different starting times to require a call in within one-half hour of
the shift start. Another related rule reads, "No absence of work allowed
without notification by 8 a.m."
to At first glance the time on the hospital form looks like 1:40 p.m.
had voluntarily quit but would be kept because of their
good work record.
Schuman testified that he decided to terminate Joseph
Emily because he and Nathan Fogel had previously had
disciplinary problems with him, he was not a good
worker, and had not called in on July 22. Schuman spe-
cifically refers to an incident on July 16 when Joseph
Emily was called into Schuman's office, with Foreman
Fritz present, and told Fritz had reported Emily for not
staying by his job and getting his work done. Emily pro-
tested he was getting his work done and told Schuman
to "keep Fritz off my ass so I could get some work
done." Fritz spoke up and told Emily that next time he
would say nothing but would clock Emily out and he
would be fired. Schuman concurred. "That's right. One
more chance and next time you're gone." Emily con-
cedes this all happened and further concedes that he had
applied foul names to Nathan Fogel when talking to
other employees about Fogel.
The General Counsel contends that Respondent dis-
parately applied the rule to Joseph Emily to terminate
him because of his union activities. It is true that Joseph
Emily did sign a union authorization card, but he en-
gaged in no other significant union activity. His brother
Eugene was both very active and known to be so by Re-
spondent, but he was neither laid off in November 1980
nor have I found he was discriminated against in 1981.
This certainly does not indicate an implacable resolve to
root out and sever individual union adherents, notwith-
standing that the Board has found the November 1980
layoff unlawful and the finding of that and various other
unfair labor practices in the Board's decision heretofore
cited establishes Respondent's hostility to employee
union activities.
It is also true that Respondent has not enforced its rule
against good workers to the extent of separating them,
but I cannot on this record accord the status of "good"
to Joseph Emily. The confrontation on July 16 would in-
dicate his performance was less than that, and I have no
basis upon which to substitute my judgment of his rela-
tive worth as an employee for that of Respondent. There
is no showing that Respondent in any way conspired to
get rid of Joseph Emily, or that his termination would
have occurred but for his failure to call in during an
entire day absence which I find was willful, following
closely on the heels of his poor performance on July 16;
and his failure to convincingly explain why he had not
called in. Respondent adverts in its post-hearing brief to
the fact that Joseph Emily "lied" to Schuman about his
whereabouts on July 23, but Schuman does not specifi-
cally cite lies as a reason, although it could arguably be
encompassed in the genus of failure to explain. Schuman
obviously knew Emily was being untruthful on July 23
when he claimed a whole day at the hospital, but yet
gave him an opportunity to explain on September 24.
Respondent's previous history of unfair labor practices
does raise a suspicion regarding Joseph Emily's sever-
ance, but suspicion is not enough. The reasons advanced
by Respondent are not inherently implausible or unsup-
ported, nor has it been proved the rule was invoked
344
QUICK FIND CO.
against Joseph Emily on the basis of unlawful consider-
ations. I I
For the foregoing reasons I find that the General
Counsel has not shown by a preponderance of the evi-
dence either that Joseph Emily was terminated because
of his union activities, or that Schuman's reasons for not
permitting him to return to work are false.
Recall of the Emilys
The only issue remaining is whether the failure to
recall Eugene and Joseph Emily on July 10, 1981, was
unlawfully motivated.
The General Counsel argues that the union activities
of the two, particularly Eugene, combined with Re-
spondent's demonstrated union animus and the pretextual
nature of the reasons advanced for not calling them until
July 15, establish a violation of the Act.
Respondent relies on the testimony of David Schuman
who testified he did not recall the Emilys on July 10 be-
cause he had appointed Fayron Fritz as a supervisor and
wanted him to have an opportunity to relate to the other
employees and show them the change in their jobs
which had been "shuffled around," and wanted to give
Fritz a chance to supervise without conflict with ex-Su-
pervisor Eugene Emily and his brother Joseph who had
demonstrated a poor attitude about management to other
employees. Schuman also testified that Joseph Emily was
a drawer welder, one of the final stages in production,
and the first few days were needed to cut parts before
going into production which meant there was no imme-
diate need for Joseph Emily's services.
Schuman's explanation is not, as the General Counsel
urges, patently unreasonable. Fritz had worked under
Eugene Emily's supervision prior to the layoff, and it is
understandable that some overt resentment from Eugene
Emily over his demotion and Fritz' elevation might rea-
sonably be predicted. This might well have caused Fritz
some problems both in supervising Eugene Emily and es-
tablishing his authority with the other employees. With
respect to Joseph Emily, the record establishes that he
indeed was not particularly respectful of supervision, and
was inclined to openly voice his antipathies, as witness
I' P. G. Berland Paint City. Inc., 199 NLRB 927, 928 (1972); and see
Stoutco, Inc., 218 NLRB 645, 650-651 (1975).
his hereinabove noted derogatory references to Fogel
and his subsequent insubordination toward Fritz on July
16. Schuman's assertion that there was no immediate
work for Joseph Emily is unrebutted and credited.
Schuman's explanation seems reasonable, and I would
also note that Respondent was under no obligation at all
to recall Eugene Emily, a statutory supervisory at the
time of the layoff. Inasmuch as Schuman's delay of the
recall of Joseph and Eugene for 3 working days appears
to be an exercise of managerial discretion, based on rea-
sonable rather than pretextual or union considerations, I
find and conclude that Respondent did not violate the
Act by failing to recall the Emilys until July 15, 1981.
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1. Respondent Quick Find Co. is an employer engaged
in commerce within the meaning of Section 2(2), (6), and
(7) of the Act.
2. The Union, Teamsters Local Union No. 688, affili-
ated with International Brotherhood of Teamsters,
Chauffeurs, Warehousemen and Helpers of America, is a
labor organization within the meaning of Section 2(5) of
the Act.
3. By withholding the vacation pay due Joseph Emily,
Michael Rangel, and Charles Hoffman in June 1981, Re-
spondent violated Section 8(a)(3) and (1) of the Act.
4. The aforesaid unfair labor practice affects commerce
within the meaning of Section 2(6) and (7) of the Act.
5. Except as set forth above, Respondent has not vio-
lated the Act in any other respect alleged in the com-
plaint.
THE REMEDY
In addition to the customary notice posting, I shall
recommend Respondent be ordered to make Joseph
Emily, Michael Rangel, and Charles Hoffman whole for
the loss of vacation pay in June 1981 by paying them
that vacation pay with interest thereon to be computed
in the manner prescribed in F. W. Woolworth Company,
90 NLRB 289 (1950), and Florida Steel Corporation, 231
NLRB 651 (1977).12
[Recommended Order omitted from publication.]
12 See, generally, Isis Plumbing & Heating Co, 138 NLRB 716 (1962).
345