Quertle LLC

Patent Trials and Appeals Board

May 4, 2021

2020000546 (P.T.A.B. May. 4, 2021)

UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE
United States Patent and Trademark Office
Address: COMMISSIONER FOR PATENTS
P.O. Box 1450
Alexandria, Virginia 22313-1450
www.uspto.gov
APPLICATION NO. FILING DATE FIRST NAMED INVENTOR ATTORNEY DOCKET NO. CONFIRMATION NO.
14/484,130 09/11/2014 Jeffrey D. Saffer QTL-9-0001 5291
102472 7590 05/04/2021
Lightbulb IP, LLC
11035 Lavender Hill Drive
Suite 160-205
Las Vegas, NV 89135
EXAMINER
NGUYEN, LOAN T
ART UNIT PAPER NUMBER
2158
MAIL DATE DELIVERY MODE
05/04/2021 PAPER
Please find below and/or attached an Office communication concerning this application or proceeding.
The time period for reply, if any, is set in the attached communication.
PTOL-90A (Rev. 04/07)
UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
____________

BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD
____________

Ex parte JEFFREY D. SAFFER and VICKI L. BURNETT
____________

Appeal 2020-000546
Application 14/484,130
Technology Center 2100
____________

Before KARA L. SZPONDOWSKI, SCOTT B. HOWARD, and
STEVEN M. AMUNDSON, Administrative Patent Judges.

SZPONDOWSKI, Administrative Patent Judge.

DECISION ON APPEAL
Appellant1 appeals under 35 U.S.C. § 134(a) from the Examiner’s
Final Rejection of claims 1, 2, and 7–20, which constitute all of the claims
pending in this application. We have jurisdiction under 35 U.S.C. § 6(b).
We AFFIRM.

1 We use the word “Appellant” to refer to “applicant” as defined in
37 C.F.R. § 1.42. Appellant identifies the real party in interest as Quertle
LLC. Appeal Br. 3.
Appeal 2020-000546
Application 14/484,130

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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Appellant’s invention generally “relates to indexing, searching, and
data mining information and in particular to systems and methods for the
same that are capable of handling term variants.” Spec. ¶ 1. Claim 1,
reproduced below, is representative of the claimed subject matter:
1. A term variant discernment system comprising:
one or more processors;
one or more memory devices comprising instructions
which, when executed by the one or more processors, cause the
one or more processors to:
identify a term and a variant of the term in some content,
wherein the term and the variant may differ in capitalization,
alphabet, or representation;
determine a meaning of the term and the variant by
executing a plurality of case-sensitive discernment processes on
the term and the variant; and
assign distinct identifiers to the term and the variant
when the term and the variant differ only in capitalization of
one or more characters and a preponderance of the plurality of
case-sensitive discernment processes indicate the term and the
variant have distinct meanings, or assign a single identifier to
both the term and the variant;
one or more storage devices storing the term and the
variant and the term’s and the variant’s assigned identifiers; and
one or more communication interfaces that receive one or
more queries from a user, wherein the one or more processors
also execute instructions to:
identify one or more query terms in the one or more
queries;
determine a meaning of the one or more query terms;
assign a new identifier to the one or more query terms if
the one or more query terms’ meaning differs from that of the
term and the variant; and
assign an existing identifier to the one or more query
terms if the one or more query terms’ meaning is the same as
that of the term or the variant.
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Application 14/484,130

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REJECTIONS2
Claims 1, 2, and 7–20 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 112(a) as
failing to comply with the written-description requirement. Final Act. 6.
Claims 1, 2, and 7–20 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 112(b) as
being indefinite for failing to particularly point out and distinctly claim the
subject matter regarded as the invention. Final Act. 7.3
Claims 1, 2, and 7–20 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103 as
unpatentable over the combination Saitoh et al. (US 2007/0162281 A1;
published July 12, 2007) (“Saitoh”), Stuhec (US 2007/0283252 A1;
published Dec. 6, 2007), Abdelali (US 2017/0147679 A1; published May
25, 2017), and Bates et al. (US 2007/0271089 A1; published Nov. 22, 2007)
(“Bates”). Final Act. 9.

ANALYSIS
Section 112(a) Rejection
The Examiner finds that the claimed “determining the meaning of the
term and the variant by executing a plurality of case-sensitive discernment
processes on the term and the variant” is not supported by the original
disclosure. Final Act. 6. Specifically, the Examiner finds that the

2 The Examiner initially rejected claims 1, 2, and 7–20 under 35 U.S.C.
§ 101 as “directed to a judicial exception (i.e., a law of nature, a natural
phenomenon, or an abstract idea) without significantly more.” Final Act. 7
(emphasis omitted). In the Answer, the Examiner withdrew the rejection.
Ans. 3.
3 Although the heading of the rejection does not identify claims 19 and 20,
the Examiner sets forth a rejection in the body. See Final Act. 7 (setting
forth that the “dependent claims are . . . rejected along the same rationale as”
described for the independent claims 1, 8, and 15). We treat the exclusion
from the heading as a typographical error.
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Specification describing “Contextual Analysis” only “shows that the
capitalized term is preferentially used in specific contexts,” but does not
show the “process possess[es] the nature of being case-sensitive.” Ans. 4.
The Examiner also finds that the claimed assigning distinct identifiers
to the term and variant when they “differ only in capitalization of one or
more characters and a preponderance of the plurality of case-sensitive
discernment processes indicate the term and the variant have distinct
meaning” is not supported by the original disclosure. Final Act. 6.
Specifically, the Examiner finds that the Specification describes “the term
and variant differ only in capitalization,” but not “any indication that the
term and variant have distinct meanings.” Ans. 5–6.
Appellant argues that the Specification provides support for case-
sensitive discernment processes, such as those disclosed by the “Dictionary”
and “Contextual Analysis.” Appeal Br. 7 (citing Spec. ¶¶ 57–60, Fig. 2); see
Reply Br. 3–4 (citing Fig. 2). According to Appellant, a “showing that a
capitalized term is preferentially used in specific contexts is a case-sensitive
process at least for the reason that it accounts for and is sensitive to
capitalization.” Reply Br. 4.
Appellant also argues that the Specification provides support for terms
being assigned distinct identifiers when the case form differs and when
“three of four discernment processes” indicate the term and variant have
different meanings. Appeal Br. 8 (citing Spec. ¶¶ 60, 28–43). According to
Appellant, the Specification is “replete with disclosure connecting the
determining meaning with each of the named discernment processes.”
Reply Br. 5 (citing Spec. ¶¶ 46–52, 57–60, Figs. 1–4).
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We agree with Appellant. Whether a Specification complies with the
written-description requirement of 35 U.S.C. § 112(a) is a question of fact
and is assessed on a case-by-case basis. See, e.g., Purdue Pharma L.P. v.
Faulding, Inc., 230 F.3d 1320, 1323 (Fed. Cir. 2000) (citing Vas-Cath Inc. v.
Mahurkar, 935 F.2d 1555, 1561 (Fed. Cir. 1991)). The disclosure, as
originally filed, does not need to literally describe the claimed subject matter
(i.e., using the same terms or in haec verba) in order to satisfy the written-
description requirement, but the Specification must convey with reasonable
clarity to those skilled in the art that, as of the filing date, Appellant was in
possession of the claimed invention. See id.
Here, the Specification discloses term variants and methods of
discerning their meanings that a person of ordinary skill in the art would
understand indicates the inventors had possession of the claimed subject
matter. For example, Appellant’s Specification describes that “Term
Variants may be due to capitalization.” Spec. ¶ 28; see also id. ¶¶ 29–31.
The Specification further discloses methods for discerning the meanings of
“different types of term[s] . . . to determine if they are different or the same.”
Id. ¶ 46; see also id. ¶¶ 47–51, ¶¶ 57–61. The Specification provides an
example for the term “no” with “two variants of ‘no’, one lowercase and one
uppercase.” Id. ¶ 57, Fig. 2. “Each term is run through one or more
discernment processes” to “provide[] information that the two forms should”
or “should not be identified as the same.” Id. ¶ 57; see also id. ¶ 58 (“in this
example, there is information from the discernment processes that there is
likely a difference in meaning between ‘no’ and “NO’”).
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Accordingly, we are persuaded the Examiner erred. We, therefore, do
not sustain the Examiner’s 35 U.S.C. § 112(a) rejection of claims 1, 2, and
7–20.
Section 112(b) Rejection
Appellant does not address the rejection under 35 U.S.C. § 112(b).
See generally Appeal Br.; Reply Br.; Final Act. 7. Accordingly, we
summarily sustain the Examiner’s rejection of claims 1, 2, and 7–20 under
35 U.S.C. § 112(b) as indefinite. See Manual of Patent Examining
Procedure (MPEP) § 1205.02 (2018) (“If a ground of rejection stated by the
examiner is not addressed in the appellant’s brief, appellant has waived any
challenge to that ground of rejection and the Board may summarily sustain
it.”); Ex parte Frye, 94 USPQ2d 1072, 1075 (BPAI 2010) (precedential) (“If
an appellant fails to present arguments on a particular issue — or, more
broadly, on a particular rejection — the Board will not, as a general matter,
unilaterally review those uncontested aspects of the rejection.”).
Section 103 Rejection
Appellant contends that the combination of Saitoh, Stuhec, Abdelali,
and Bates does not teach “assign distinct identifiers to the term and the
variant when the term and the variant differ only in capitalization of one or
more characters and . . . the term and the variant have distinct meanings, or
assign a single identifier to both the term and the variant” and “assign a new
identifier to the one or more query terms if the one or more query terms’
meaning differs from that of the term and the variant,” as recited in claim 1
and commensurately recited in claims 8 and 15. Appeal Br. 22–24; Reply
Br. 8–10.
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The Examiner relies on Abdelali to teach “assign distinct identifiers to
the term and the variant when the term and the variant differ only in
capitalization of one or more characters and . . . the term and the variant
have distinct meanings, or assign a single identifier to both the term and the
variant” and on Stuhec to teach “assign a new identifier to the one or more
query terms if the one or more query terms’ meaning differs from that of the
term and the variant.” Final Act. 10–12.
The Examiner finds that Abdelali’s “determining the likely language
or language variant of the search query by providing related search terms
using semantic information associated with the language or language variant
of the search query” teaches “assign[ing] distinct identifiers to the term and
the variant when the term and the variant differ only in capitalization of one
or more characters . . . or assign a single identifier to both the term and the
variant.” Final Act. 12 (citing Abdelali ¶¶ 76, 77, 87, 89, 92). Specifically,
the Examiner finds that Abdelali teaches that “a single term used in a search
query . . . may have a different meaning in the information resources.” Ans.
6 (citing Abdelali ¶ 6).
Appellant argues that Abdelali teaches receiving “a search term to
‘output an expanded search query including the search terms and an
additional search term’” but not the claimed assigning “distinct identifiers
for each semantic meaning.” Appeal Br. 22. Appellant also argues that
Abdelali does not teach assigning identifiers to “both content and query
terms,” as claimed. Id. at 23.
We are persuaded by Appellant’s arguments. Abdelali generally
describes a query expansion system using language and language variants.
Abdelali ¶ 1, code (54). The cited sections of Abdelali disclose a
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classification module “determin[ing] a likely language or language variant
used in at least part of the search query.” Abdelali ¶ 77. Abdelali also
describes “options” including “a user selectable list of language and/or
language variants” for the “search query.” Id. ¶ 89. Abdelali strives to
“provide better search results . . . for a given search query” by “providing
related search terms using semantic information associated with the
language or language variant of the search query.” Id. ¶ 92. In other words,
Abdelali teaches identifying further search terms for a search query based on
language variants. The Examiner has not sufficiently explained how
Abdelali’s identifying additional search terms for a search query teaches or
suggests “assign[ing] distinct identifiers to the term and the variant when the
term and the variant differ only in capitalization of one or more characters
. . . or assign a single identifier to both the term and the variant.”
The Examiner finds that Stuhec’s determining whether the first and
second terms exist in the collection and providing a new tag to any term in
the tag name that does not exist teaches “assign[ing] a new identifier to the
one or more query terms if the one or more query terms’ meaning differs
from that of the term and the variant.” Final Act. 10–11 (citing Stuhec ¶¶ 4–
6, 36); Ans. 7. According to the Examiner, Stuhec’s “first term” teaches the
claimed “query term,” “second term” teaches the claimed “variant term,”
“existing tag” teaches the claimed “existing identifier,” and “new tag” name
teaches the claimed “new identifier.” Ans. 7 (citing Stuhec ¶¶ 4–6, 36);
Final Act. 10–11.
Appellant argues that Stuhec teaches that “various replacements for
the term are tested until one of the replacement terms is within the synonyms
database,” but not “assigning a new identifier to a previously undefined
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Application 14/484,130

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term.” Appeal Br. 24 (emphasis added). According to Appellant, in Stuhec,
no “new identifier [is] assigned to a term that does not already have an
existing identifier,” in contrast to the claimed “existing or new identifiers are
assigned to query terms based on the meaning of the query terms relative to
the meaning of the term and the variant.” Reply Br. 9–10. Appellant also
argues that Stuhec does not teach providing “a new tag name,” and instead
teaches “receiving, in a computer system, a new tag name.” Id. at 8 (citing
Stuhec ¶ 5) (emphasis omitted).
We find the Examiner has not sufficiently explained how Stuhec
teaches or suggests the limitation. Stuhec is generally directed to “[a]dding
a new tag name to a collection of tag names.” Stuhec code (57). Stuhec
describes that adding a tag name to a collection “includes receiving, in a
computer system, a new tag name that is to be added to a collection of
existing tag names . . . , the new tag name including at least first and second
terms.” Id. ¶ 5 (emphasis added). Then, “it is determined whether the
collection already includes any of the first and second terms, wherein each
term included in the existing tag names is associated with one of several
unique identifiers.” Id. “[F]or any of the first and second terms that is
already included in the collection, a corresponding one of the several unique
identifiers associated therewith is selected.” Id. In other words, “the new
tag name is provided with a unique identifier code” and for “any term in the
tag name that already exists in the collection, the existing unique identifier is
used in the code.” Id. ¶ 4. If a term does not already exist in the collection,
Stuhec discloses use of a synonyms database to check for synonyms of the
term, and changing the unavailable term to the synonym. Id. ¶¶ 6, 38.
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Stuhec discloses “determining whether a code is available for the
received terms.” Stuhec ¶ 36. If the code is available for the received terms,
a “tag name management module may . . . concatenate . . . the available
identifiers . . . to complete the code” for the received tag name. Id. In other
words, Stuhec teaches receiving new tag names (which may consist of one
or more terms) and associating those terms with available identifiers to
complete a code. The Examiner has not sufficiently explained how this
disclosure teaches “assign[ing] a new identifier to the one or more query
terms if the one or more query terms’ meaning differs from that of the term
and the variant” as claimed (emphasis added). In particular, the Examiner
finds that Stuhec’s “new tag” corresponds to the claimed “new identifier”
(Ans. 7), but the “new tag” is received by the computer system, not
“assign[ed] . . . to the one or more query terms.” Indeed, the “new tag”
includes the “one or more query terms.” See Stuhec ¶ 5.
Therefore, on this record, the Examiner has not sufficiently explained
how the cited sections of Abdelali and Stuhec teach “assign[ing] distinct
identifiers to the term and the variant when the term and the variant differ
only in capitalization of one or more characters and a preponderance of the
plurality of case-sensitive discernment processes indicate the term and the
variant have distinct meanings” and “assign[ing] a new identifier to the one
or more query terms if the one or more query terms’ meaning differs from
that of the term and the variant” as claimed.
Accordingly, on this record, we do not sustain the Examiner’s § 103
rejection of independent claims 1, 8, and 15, and dependent claims 2, 7, 9–
14, and 16–20. See Appeal Br. 24.
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Application 14/484,130

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CONCLUSION
We reverse the Examiner’s rejection of claims 1, 2, and 7–20 under
35 U.S.C. § 112(a).
We affirm the Examiner’s rejection of claims 1, 2, and 7–20 under
35 U.S.C. § 112(b).
We reverse the Examiner’s rejection of claims 1, 2, and 7–20 under
35 U.S.C. § 103.
Because we affirm at least one ground of rejection with respect to
each claim on appeal, we affirm the Examiner’s decision to reject all of the
pending claims.
In summary:
Claim(s)
Rejected
35 U.S.C. § Reference(s)/Basis Affirmed Reversed
1, 2, 7–20 112 Written Description
1, 2, 7–
20
1, 2, 7–20 112 Indefiniteness 1, 2, 7–20
1, 2, 7–20 103 Saitoh, Stuhec, Abdelali, Bates
1, 2, 7–
20
Overall
Outcome 1, 2, 7–20

TIME PERIOD FOR RESPONSE
No time period for taking any subsequent action in connection with
this appeal may be extended under 37 C.F.R. § 1.136(a)(1)(iv). See
37 C.F.R. § 41.50(f) (2018).
AFFIRMED