Quaker City Life Insurance Co.

National Labor Relations Board - Board Decisions

Dec 5, 1961

134 N.L.R.B. 960 (N.L.R.B. 1961)

960 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
Quaker City Life Insurance Company and Insurance Workers
International Union , AFL-CIO, Petitioner . Case No. 5-RU-
3344. December 5, 1961
DECISION AND DIRECTION OF ELECTION
Upon a petition duly filed under Section 9 (c) of the National Labor
Relations Act, a hearing was held before Robert W. Knadler, hearing
officer. The hearing officer's rulings made at the hearing are free from
prejudicial error and are hereby affirmed.
Upon the entire 'record in this case, the Board finds :
1. The Employer is engaged in commerce within the meaning of
the Act.
2. The labor organization involved claims to represent certain em-
ployees of the Employer.
3. A question affecting commerce exists concerning the representa-
tion of employees of the Employer within the meaning of Section
9(c) (1) and Section 2(6) and (7) of the Act.
4. The appropriate unit :
The Petitioner seeks a unit of all the employees in the Employer's
Alexandria, Virginia, district office. This office consists of five debit
agents, one district manager, and one office clerical employee.
The Employer argues that the unit petitioned for is inappropriate
since it includes an office clerical employee, and moreover that this is
basically a district office unit of insurance agents which is not appro-
priate in any event.
The Employer's operations encompass 16 States and there are 6 dis-
trict offices in Virginia with the closest one at Richmond, some 100
miles distant. All of the employees in the Alexandria district office
are under the exclusive supervision of the district manager who re-
ports directly to the home office in Philadelphia.'
The duties of the office clerical include accepting and banking premi-
ums collected by the agents, paying the agents, reporting claims, and
making personnel reports to the home office, and whenever necessary,
acting as secretary to the district manager. When so acting, she some-
times handles correspondence to the home office regarding personnel
matters. Like the insurance agents, she is bonded and licensed by the
State of Virginia to sell insurance although it appears that she has
never done so. Moreover, she is expected to be sufficiently conversant
with the Employer's business to supply information to individuals
seeking it. The office clerical and the insurance agents enjoy the same
retirement plan, but their vacation and insurance plans differ to some
extent.
1 Since the record indicates that the district manager exercises supervisory authority in
the management of the district office and since no one objects to his exclusion , he shall
be excluded
134 NLRB No. 114.
QUAKER CITY LIFE INSURANCE COMPANY 961
The Employer argues that the office clerical should be excluded from
the unit either as a confidential employee or as an office clerical em-
ployee without a sufficient similarity of interest to warrant her inclu-
sion in the unit of insurance agents.
Although the record indicates that she handles personnel corre-
spondence to the home office, the record nowhere indicates that she
comes within the Board's definition 'of a confidential employee since
she does not determine, formulate, nor effectuate management policy
in the field of labor relations or assist anyone who does 2
Normally the Board will exclude office clericals from plant produc-
tion and maintenance units. However, in other circumstances, similar
to those in the instant case, for example, where storewide units of
selling and nonselling employees are sought, the Board has found the
overall storewide unit appropriate.3 The office clerical in the instant
case is similarly situated, and moreover, as noted, above, she has a
close association with the agents in the conduct of the Employer's
district office operation, and general similarities of employment condi-
tions and qualifications. Accordingly, we find that she may properly
be included in the overall unit sought herein.
2. The Employer further contends that, in any event, the unit
sought is basically a district office unit of insurance agents which is
inappropriate as a matter of Board policy.
Since 1944, when the Board decided Metropolitan Life Insurance
Company, 56 NLRB 1635, it has been the policy of the Board to deny
units of insurance agents less than statewide or companywide in scope 4
The reasons for this policy are stated in the Metropolitan Life de-
cision where the Board said :
Thus, the rapid growth of'union organization among insurance
agents makes it clearly appear that provisional units less than
State-wide in scope are, under ordinary circumstances, unneces-
sary to make collective bargaining reasonably possible for them
if they desire it. Accordingly, we are of the opinion that, in the
absences of unusual circumstances, the practice of setting up units
for insurance agents smaller that [sic] State-wide in scope should
be avoided. In the instant case, since the Federation, the Inde-
pendent, and the CIO are all actively engaged in a broad organi-
zational program in Ohio, and since it may reasonably be antici-
pated that one of these organizations may in the near future
extend its membership to State-wide proportions, we are of the
2 Spencer Press , Incorporated , 121 NLRB 784
3 John Brenner Co, 129 NLRB 394.
4 However, this position has not been adopted by every succeeding Board Member.
Member Fanning expressly rejected this Metropolitan Life rule in The Life Insurance
Company of Virginia , 123 NLRB 610.
630849-62-vol 134-62
962 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
opinion that it will not effectuate the policies of the Act to set up
city-wide units for employees of the Company in Ohio at this
time. [Emphasis supplied.] 5
Clearly this language of the Metropolitan Life case indicates that
the rule was adopted solely in anticipation of broader organization on
a companywide or statewide basis, which at that time appeared im-
minent. As a practical matter, however, such statewide or company-
wide organization has not materialized, and the result of the rule has
been to arrest the organizational development of insurance agents to an
extent certainly never contemplated by the Act, or for that matter, by
the Board that decided the Metropolitan Life case. There is no longer
any rational basis for applying different rules of organization to the
insurance industry than are applied to other industries. The rule was
adopted for the purpose of permitting organization on a statewide or
employerwide basis, which did not develop as anticipated. Contrary
to our dissenting colleagues, we regard this as a valid reason for chang-
ing the rule. Obviously, when the purpose for which a rule has been
established fails, the rule should also fail. This is especially so with
respect to a rule which unfairly prejudices the collective-bargaining
rights of employees. Accordingly, in the future, the Board's policy
will be not to preclude the organization of insurance agents into units
of less than employerwide or statewide scope, and we shall apply our
normal unit principles to the cases as they arise. In the instant case,
upon the record as a whole, and especially in view of the autonomous
day-to-day operation of the district office here, the overall immediate
supervision by the district manager , the lack of contact or interchange
among employees of the various district offices, and the absence of any
administrative subdivision between the home office and the district
office, we find the district office unit to be appropriate.'
On the basis of the foregoing, we find that the following employees
of the Employer's Alexandria, Virginia, office, constitute a unit ap-
propriate for collective bargaining purposes : All employees, including
debit agents and office clerical employees; but excluding the office
manager , guards, and supervisors as defined in the Act.
[Text of Direction of Election omitted from publication.]
MEMBERS RODGERS and LEEDOM dissenting :
We see no valid reason for departing from the Metropolitan Life
rule which the Board adopted in 1944. Consequently, we would dis-
miss the instant petition.
Metropolitan Life Insurance Company , 56 NLRB 1635, 1640.
In view of the unit findings in this case , we shall and hereby do deny the Employer's
motion to dismiss the petition.