Quadrillion Publishing Ltd.

Trademark Trial and Appeal Board

Aug 9, 2000

No. 75217892 (T.T.A.B. Aug. 9, 2000)

Paper No. 15
DEB
8/9/00
UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
________
Trademark Trial and Appeal Board
________
In re Quadrillion Publishing Limited
________
Serial No. 75/217,892
_______
Jane F. Collen of Collen Law Associates for Quadrillion
Publishing Limited.
Wanda Kay Price, Trademark Examining Attorney, Law Office 111
(Craig Taylor, Managing Attorney).
_______
Before Seeherman, Hairston and Bucher, Administrative Trademark
Judges.
Opinion by Bucher, Administrative Trademark Judge:
An intent-to-use application has been filed by Quadrillion
Publishing Limited to register the mark “BRAMLEY” for a wide
variety of books, magazines and stationery items in
International Class 16.1

1 Application Serial No. 75/217,892, filed December 2, 1996, based
upon a bona fide intention to use the mark in commerce under Section
1(b), 15 U.S.C. §1051(b). Although the prosecution of this
application also involved repeated disputes over the identification of
goods, these issues were all resolved to the satisfaction of the
Trademark Examining Attorney with an amendment submitted as part of
applicant’s appeal brief.
THIS DISPOSITION
IS NOT CITABLE AS PRECEDENT
OF THE T.T.A.B.
Serial No. 75/217,892
2
The Trademark Examining Attorney has refused registration
under Section 2(e)(4) of the Trademark Act, 15 U.S.C.
§1052(e)(4), on the ground that applicant's mark is primarily
merely a surname.
When the refusal to register was made final, applicant
appealed. Applicant and the Examining Attorney have filed
briefs. An oral hearing was not requested.
We affirm the refusal to register.
In support of her surname refusal, the Trademark Examining
Attorney has made of record the results of her search of a
database containing eighty million names, finding 433 “BRAMLEY”
surname listings from PHONEDISC POWERFINDER USA ONE 1997 (3rd
ed.), as well as an excerpt from Webster’s Unabridged Third New
International Dictionary, 1986, showing that there is no listing
of the term “Bramley” in that dictionary.
Applicant argues that the Trademark Examining Attorney has
failed to establish a prima facie surname case. Applicant
challenges the Trademark Examining Attorney’s PHONEDISC evidence
on the ground that the quantum of evidence submitted by the
Examining Attorney is indeterminate of the primary significance
of the term to purchasers. Applicant asserts that “Bramley” is
also the name of a small village in England. In support of its
position, applicant has submitted a map showing the village of
Bramley in the county of Surrey, as well as a picture post card
Serial No. 75/217,892
3
seeming to represent images of several buildings in the village
of Bramley. Finally, applicant has also provided a copy of the
Oxford English Dictionary where the term “Bramley” is defined as
“a large green variety of cooking apple.”
The test for determining whether a mark is primarily merely
a surname is the primary significance of the mark to the
purchasing public. See In re Hutchinson Technology Inc., 852
F.2d 552, 554, 7 UPQ2d 1490, 1492 (Fed. Cir. 1988), citing In re
Kahan & Weisz Jewelry Mfg. Corp., 508 F.2d 831, 184 USPQ 421
(CCPA 1975) and In re Harris-Intertype Corp., 518 F.2d 629, 186
USPQ 238 (CCPA 1975). The initial burden is on the Trademark
Examining Attorney to establish a prima facie case that a mark
is primarily merely a surname. See In re Etablissements Darty
et Fils, 759 F.2d 15, 16, 225 USPQ 652, 653 (Fed. Cir. 1985).
After the Trademark Examining Attorney establishes a prima facie
case, the burden shifts to the applicant to rebut this finding.
The Board, in the past, has considered several different
factors in making a surname determination under Section 2(e)(4):
(i) the degree of surname rareness; (ii) whether anyone
connected with applicant has the surname; (iii) whether the term
has any recognized meaning other than that of a surname; and
(iv) the structure and pronunciation or “look and sound” of the
surname. In re Benthin Management GmbH, 37 USPQ2d 1332 (TTAB
1995).
Serial No. 75/217,892
4
There is no doubt that the Trademark Examining Attorney has
met her initial burden of establishing that “BRAMLEY” would be
perceived by consumers as primarily merely a surname. In
particular, the Trademark Examining Attorney has presented over
four hundred “BRAMLEY” surname references from the PHONEDISC
database, along with proof that the word “Bramley” does not
appear in an unabridged, English-language dictionary. The Court
of Appeals for the Federal Circuit has held that this type of
evidence is sufficient to establish a prima facie surname case.
See Hutchinson Technology, 852 F.2d at 554, 7 USPQ2d at 1492;
Darty, 759 F.2d at 16, 225 USPQ at 653; see also 2 J. Thomas
McCarthy, MCCARTHY ON TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR COMPETITION, §13.30, p. 13-50
(4th ed. 1999).
The Trademark Examining Attorney’s PHONEDISC evidence is
collected from telephone directories and address books across
the country. There is no magic number of directory listings
required to establish a prima facie surname case. In re Cazes,
21 USPQ2d 1796, 1797 (TTAB 1991); In re Industrie Pirelli
Societa per Azioni, 9 USPQ2d 1564, 1566 (TTAB 1988), aff’d
unpublished decision, No. 89-1231 (Fed. Cir. 1989). It is
reasonable to conclude from these submissions that “BRAMLEY,”
while obviously not as common as some other surnames, has had
Serial No. 75/217,892
5
measurable public exposure.2 Even if “BRAMLEY” is an uncommon
surname, it is by no means a decidedly rare surname.3 From more
than four hundred “BRAMLEY” surname references in the PHONEDISC
database, we conclude that “BRAMLEY” is a surname even if there
are relatively few people in the United States having this name.
Applicant dismisses the hundreds of listings from the
PHONEDISC database as representing “1/10,000 of 1%,” or an
“imperceptible sliver of the American population.” However, we
find this “percentage-of-the-entire-population” argument to be a
hollow reed. The rich diversity of surnames in this country is
amply reflected in the PHONEDISC computer database evidence. If
one were to take a statistical measurement of this database for
common names like “Smith” or “Jones,” each would constitute a
relatively small fraction of the total database content.
As to the second Benthin factor, we recognize that no one
connected to applicant’s organization has been shown to have the

2 To the extent applicant contends that BRAMLEY is an uncommon
surname, we would point out that even uncommon surnames may not be
registrable on the Principal Register. See Industrie Pirelli, 9
USPQ2d at 1566.
3 This evidence is far more significant than the number of listings
presented in other cases where the surname has been categorized as
“rare.” See e.g. Kahan & Weisz, 508 F.2d at 832, 184 USPQ at 422 (six
DUCHARME surname telephone directory listings); In re Sava Research
Corp., 32 USPQ2d 1380 (TTAB 1994)(one hundred SAVA surname telephone
directory listings); Benthin Management, 37 USPQ2d at 1333 (one
hundred BENTHIN surname telephone directory listings); In re Garan,
Inc., 3 USPQ2d 1537 (TTAB 1987)(six GARAN telephone directory listings
and one NEXIS listing). This is one of four factors. Hence, the
quantum of PHONEDISC evidence which may be persuasive for finding
surname significance in one case may be insufficient in another
Serial No. 75/217,892
6
“Bramley” surname. If a Bramley were associated in some way
with applicant, it could well indicate the public’s recognition
of the term as a surname. However, logic tells us that the
converse is not necessarily true, i.e., the mere fact that this
query comes up negative herein cannot compel the conclusion that
consumers will perceive the term as a non-surname.
In weighing the third Benthin factor, we have considered
applicant’s contention that “Bramley” has recognized meanings
other than that of a surname. However, both the Benthin
decision and our primary reviewing court clearly require that
the other meanings be “recognized” by a significant number of
people. See Harris-Intertype, supra; Benthin Management, supra.
We do not believe that a significant number of people would
recognize the other meanings proffered in this case because they
are remote or obscure. Thus, they do not rebut the Examining
Attorney’s prima facie surname case. The mere fact that the
word “Bramley” has two obscure or remote meanings is
insufficient to show that it will not be perceived as “primarily
merely a surname.” See Harris-Intertype, supra; In re Hamilton
Pharmaceuticals Ltd., 27 USPQ2d 1939, 1942 (TTAB 1993). Even
applicant concedes that “Bramley” is “ … the name of a very
small village outside Guildford, Surrey in England, which

because of differences in the surnames themselves and/or consideration
of the other relevant surname factors. Darty, supra.
Serial No. 75/217,892
7
consists of a few houses, a post office and a general store.”
See Harris-Intertype, 518 F.2d at 631 n.4, 186 USPQ at 239 n.4
(Harris, Missouri, population 174, and Harris, Minnesota,
population 559 held obscure). Applicant certainly has not
demonstrated that consumers in the United States would recognize
that “Bramley” is the name of a tiny, rural village in England.4
Similarly, as to its other alleged non-surname meaning
(i.e., a variety of apple), we note that according to
applicant’s own dictionary entry, the designation “Bramley’s
seedlings” comes from “M. Bramley, English butcher in whose
garden it [the apple variety] may have first grown.” Moreover,
an entry from the Oxford English Dictionary combined with the
absence of entries in several unabridged English language
dictionaries commonly used in the United States suggests to us
that this alleged non-surname significance is remote in the
United Kingdom, that this alternate meaning is directly derived
from an English surname, and that this particular non-surname
meaning is nonexistent in the United States.

4 Surnames are routinely used as key parts of the names of streets,
neighborhoods, towns, mountains and so forth, indicating the surnames
of the people for whom they are named. See Harris-Intertype, supra;
In re Champion International Corp., 229 USPQ 550, 551 (TTAB 1985).
Given that it is a common practice to name places after individuals,
it would be surprising if the village of “Bramley” in Surrey could not
also trace the historical origins of the village name to the surname
of an English family that once lived there.
Serial No. 75/217,892
8
Finally, as to the fourth Benthin factor, contrary to
applicant’s contention, it is the view of the Board that
“BRAMLEY” has the structure and pronunciation of a surname, not
of an arbitrary designation. See Garan, 3 USPQ2d at 1538;
Industrie Pirelli, 9 USPQ2d at 1566. In fact, judging this
matter simply by its look and feel, “BRAMLEY” seems to fit the
archetype of British surnames having an “-ley” suffix, such as
Bailey, Bradley, Buckley, Brantley or Barkley, and differs only
in a single vowel from American surnames, Bromley, Brumley and
Brimley.
Decision: The refusal to register the mark “BRAMLEY” under
Section 2(e)(4) is affirmed.
E. J. Seeherman
P. T. Hairston
D. E. Bucher
Administrative Trademark
Judges, Trademark Trial and
Appeal Board