Proto Plastics Co.

National Labor Relations Board - Board Decisions

Aug 5, 1985

275 N.L.R.B. 1379 (N.L.R.B. 1985)

PROTO PLASTICS CO 1379
Proto Plastics Co. and Oil,. Chemical and Atomic
Workers Union . Case 10-CA-20433
5 August 1985
DECISION AND ORDER
BY CHAIRMAN DOTSON AND MEMBERS
HUNTER AND DENNIS
On 28 February 1985 Administrative Law Judge
William N. Cates issued the attached decision in
this proceeding. Thereafter, the Charging Party
filed exceptions.
The National Labor Relations Board has delegat-
ed its authority in this proceeding to a three-
member panel. -
The Board has considered the decision and the
record in light of the exceptions and has decided to
affirm the judge's rulings, findings,' and conclu-
sions2 and to-adopt the recommended Order.
ORDER
The National Labor Relations Board adopts the
recommended Order of the administrative law
judge and orders that the Respondent, Proto Plas-
tics Company, Johnson City,. Tennessee, its offi-
cers, agents, successors, and assigns, shall take the
action set forth in the Order.
I The Charging Party has excepted to some of the judge's credibility
findings The Board's established policy is not to overrule an administra-
tive law judge's credibility resolutions unless the clear preponderance of
all the relevant evidence convinces us that they are incorrect Standard
Dry Wall Products, 91 NLRB 544 (1950), enfd 188 F 2d 362 (3d Cir
1951) We have carefully examined the record and find no basis for re-
versing the findings
The Charging Party also asserts that the judge was biased and preju-
diced against it This contention is based on the judge 's assistance at the
hearing to the Respondent, who was unrepresented by counsel We reject
the Charging Party's assertion that the judge was biased and prejudiced
as unsupported by the record
2 We adopt the judge's conclusion that the Respondent did not violate
Sec 8(a)(3) and (1) of the Act by discharging employee Jenkins In so
doing, we find that even assuming arguendo that the General Counsel es-
tablished a prima facie case, the Respondent has demonstrated that it
would have discharged Jenkins even absent her union activity
Finally, in the absence of exceptions, we adopt, pro forma, the judge's
conclusion that the Respondent violated Sec 8(a)(1) of the Act based on
the statement of the Respondent's vice president to employee Burleson
Member Dennis does not "assum[e] arguendo" that the General Coun-
sel established a prima facie case, but accepts the judge's finding of a
prima facie case Member Dennis also finds unnecessary her colleagues'
"pro forma" reference to the 8(a)(1) violation A "pro forma" adoption
of a judge's unfair labor practice decision has traditionally implied that
the Board has doubts about the judge's decision
16, 1985.1 The charge was filed by Oil, Chemical and
Atomic Workers Union (Union) on September 4, and
amended on October 19. A complaint and notice of hear-
ing issued on November _8, on behalf of the General
Counsel of the National Labor Relations Board (Board)
by the Regional Director of the Board for Region 10,. al-
leging that Proto-Plastics Company (Respondent) has en-
gaged and is engaging in unfair labor practices within
the meaning of Section 8(a)(1) and (3) of the National
Labor Relations Act (Act)" Specifically, the complaint
alleges that Respondent about September 24 solicited its
employees in violation of Section 8(a)(1) of the Act to
engage in direct bargaining with Respondent in circum-
vention of the Union, the employees' duly designated
collective-bargaining representative It is also alleged
that about August 27 Respondent discharged and there-
after failed and refused 'to reinstate its employee Faye
Jenkins because of her membership in and activities on
behalf of the Union and because she engaged in concert-
ed activities with other employees for the purposes of
collective bargaining and other mutual aid and protec-
iion.. About November 19, Respondent wrote the Re-
gional Director for Region 10 a letter which was consid-
ered to constitute an answer to the complaint.2 Respond-
ent by stipulations at trial amended its letter answer to
admit certain allegations of the complaint but denied it
had committed any, unfair labor practices within the
meaning of the Act.
On the entire record made in this proceeding, includ-
ing my observation of each witness who testified herein,
and after due consideration of the General Counsel's
brief, I make the following
FINDINGS OF FACT
I. JURISDICTION
Respondent, a Tennessee corporation, with an office
acid place of business in Johnson City, Tennessee, is en-
gaged, in the production of plastic injection molding
products. During the year preceding the issuance of the
complaint herein, a representative period, Respondent, in
the course and conduct of its business, sold and shipped
from its Johnson City, Tennessee facility finished prod-
ucts valued in excess of $50,000 directly to customers lo-
cated outside the State of Tennessee. The complaint al-
leges, Respondent admits, and' I find Respondent is and
has been at all times material herein an employer en-
gaged in commerce within the meaning of Section 2(2),
(6), and (7) of the Act. '
11. LABOR ORGANIZATION
DECISION
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
WILLIAM N. CATES, Administrative Law Judge: This
matter was heard at Kingsport, Tennessee, on January
It is admitted and I find the Union is and at all times
material has been a labor organization within the mean-
ing of Section 2(5) of the Act.
I All dates hereinafter are 1984 unless otherwise indicated
2 Respondent did not serve a copy of its letter to the Regional Direc-
tor on the Union, however, the Union requested and the Regional Office
provided it with a copy of the letter
275 NLRB No. 188
1380 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
IiI. THE ALLEGED UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES ' "try to meet [their] demands and try to straighten every-
thing out with [them] " Burleson told Vice. President
Ellis she would do as he had asked. Burleson asserts she
relayed Vice President Ellis' offer to those present at the
union meeting and it was rejected Burleson stated that
on yet another occasion in April 1983 Vice President
Ellis called her and Jenkins into his office and told them
he would not meet nor negotiate with the Union, that
the employees did not need^,a third •.par:ty, to ,arbitrate
their differences. • Jenkins stated Vice President Ellis
wanted to know why-the employees were suing him and
indicated he would negotiate with the employees but not
with the Union.' . -
Jenkins testified Vice President Ellis,- spoke to her
while she was alone in the breakroom at the plant in
April 1983 and told her he would not negotiate with the
Union, that he did not need anyone else telling him how
to run his business.
Ellis did not deny making the statements -Burleson,
Baird, and Jenkins attribute to him. Ellis did testify he
had made an effort to separate beliefs of his that he con-
sidered personal from decisions he had to make on behalf
of Respondent It is undisputed that Vice President Ellis,
pursuant to the informal settlement agreement referred to
earlier in this decision, posted a notice at the plant which
stated Respondent would bargain with the Union. It' is
also undisputed that the-parties met for a number of bar-
gaining sessions. Additionally, Respondent allowed the
Union to audit its records regarding its' financial stand-
ing.
I find Vice President Ellis made the statements in 1983
that Burleson, Baird," and Jenkins attributed to him. Al-
though I, have expressed doubt elsewhere in this decision
about Jenkins' overall credibility, I nevertheless credit
her undenied and uncontradicted testimony regarding
her 1983 conversations with Vice• President Ellis. Jen-
kins' - testimony regarding Ellis' ' 1983 conversations is
supported by that of Burleson and Baird. The, fact that
Vice.'President Ellis did, at a later time, meet with the
Union and bargain does not make unbelievable the un-
denied testimony of Burleson, Baird, and Jenkins that he
made the 1983 comments which I find he made regard-
ing the Union and bargaining.
No violations of the Act may be based on the above
statements of Vice President Ellis because the statements
were made more than , 6 months before the original
charge in the instant case was filed and because the Gen-
eral Counsel -never at any point sought to have the previ-
ously mentioned informal settlement agreement'set'aside.
Although no violations bf the Act may be based on the
above factual findings, such facts' may nevertheless be
considered as background evidence and 'relied on to shed
light on timely' allegations contained` in 'the complaint.
She, e.g., Trrt-City Electric Co:, 264 NLRB 1407, 1408
(1982); and Riley-Begird, Inc.,''271 NLRB 155 fn. 1
(1984). Accordingly, I shall, as, I have indicated 'else"-
where in this decision, consider Vice President Ellis'
1983 comments in evaluating, timely allegations in the
complaint.
A. Background
The Union conducted an organizational campaign at
Respondent in the'springof 1983. The campaign culmi-
nated in a Board-conducted election. The Union was cer-
tified in Case 10-RC-12764 as the collective-bargaining
representative for the production and maintenance em-
ployees of Respondent: '
Certain employees testified, they had conversations
with Respondent's vice president-James R Ellis' (Vice
President Ellis) during the Union's 1983 campaign. Fran-
cis Burleson (Burleson), who after the Union was certi-
fied became its Local president, testified she and certain
other employees who did not support the Union were
not laid off 3 Burleson testified that after.she returned to
work from layoff she had various conversations in the
spring of 1983 with Vice President Ellis about the Union.
Burleson stated that one of the conversations took place'
in Vice, President Ellis' office in April 1983. According
to Burleson, when she arrived at Ellis' office he told her
he had a speech he wanted to make to her Burleson told
Vice President Ellis she thought she ought to tell him
she was a' member `of the Union. Vice President Ellis
then told Burleson he could not make the speech he had
planned to. Vice President Ellis told Burleson he would
not negotiate with the Union nor would he have any
part of it because'the Union was communistic and it was
against his religion' to have anything to do with unions.
Vice President Ellis handled Burleson what she ' de-
scribed as a _"religious book" and asked her to read it.
Burleson stated Vice President Ellis told her one of the
passages in the book stated that if a union came into his
place of business he was to-close his doors and have no
part of it
Burleson also testified that during the spring -of 1983
Vice President Ellis 'spoke with her and, fellow employ-
ees'Carolyn Baird (Baird) and Faye Jenkins (Jenkins) in
the breakroom 'about the Union: In' the conversation,
Vice President Ellis told the, three of them he would not
negotiate with the Union and wanted' no part of it be-
cause the Union was evil and- communistic.' Burleson
testified Vice President Ellis told' her in mid-April. 1983
that he had heard there was-going to be a union meeting
in `the parking lot at Respondent's facility. Burleson told
Vice President Ellis she would not' lie to him, that they
were going to have a union meeting but. it was not going
'to.be in.Respondent's parking. lot. According to Burle-
son, Vice, President Ellis then asked if she "would go to
the. girls and tell them that, if [they] would drop the
Union . he would sit down . . and- negotiate with
[them]." Vice President Ellis . toldy Burleson he would
9 Pursuant to an informal settlement agreement approved by Region 10
of Board, the employees who were laid off and recalled in March 1983
were made whole for any losses they suffered as a result of their having
been laid off Additionally, the settlement agreement covered various
other alleged violations of the-Act ' ' , %
4 Baird corroborated Burleson's testimony-as outlined above Addition-
ally, Baird testified about various other conversations she had with Ellis
in the spring of 1983 In the additional conversations that Baird testified
about, she asserts Vice President Ellis said he could not allow a union at
Respondent, and that he would have to take his family and go to the
mountains if the employees joined a union . I I '
PROTO PLASTICS CO 1381
B. Alleged Solicitation to Engage in Direct Bargaining
It is alleged at complaint paragraph 7 that Vice Presi-
dent Ellis about September 24, in the vicinity of the
plant, solicited employees to engage in direct bargaining
with Respondent in circumvention of the Union, the em-
ployees' duly designated collective-bargaining represent-
ative.
Burleson testified she went to the plant in September
to-obtain'her paycheck and -while - there Vice President
Ellis spoke with her. Burleson asserts Vice President
Ellis said.
. . ' [H]e had heard a rumor that there was none of
the Union left but dust me, and . . . stated . . . if it
is dust you and I, let's sit down together and -pull-
this plant out of the hole, and put the Union aside,
and we will pull together, and pull this plant out of
the hole it is in. -
Burleson stated no one else was present when Vice
President Ellis spoke with her. Burleson made no re-
sponse to Ellis' comment
I credit the above undenied testimony of Burleson.
Burleson 's testimony had a ring of truth to it. The com-
ments Vice President Ellis made to his employees in the
spring of 1983 demonstrate his displeasure with and per-
sonal dislike for the Union, and such lends credence to
Burleson 's undenied testimony. At first glance, it might
appear that since Burleson was president of the Local
Union, Ellis was not attempting to bypass the Union
when he spoke with her However, I am persuaded Ellis
was not attempting to meet with Burleson in her official
capacity as president of the Local Union because he
asked her to "put,the Union aside " I am convinced Vice
President Ellis attempted to bargain directly with Burle-
son as an employee and not as president of the Local
Union. Accordingly, I find that Vice President Ellis by
his actions outlined above attempted to engage in direct
bargaining with one of Respondent's employees in cir-'
cumvention of the Union, the employees'-duly designat-
ed collective-bargaining representative. Such conduct on
the part of Ellis constitutes a violation of Section 8(a)(1)
of the Act. See K & K Transportation Corp., 254 NLRB
722, 735 (1981); and Scotto's I.G.A., 249 NLRB 909, 914
(1980).
C: The Discharge of Faye Jenkins
It is alleged at.complaint'paragraphs 8, 9, and 10 that
Respondent in violation of Section 8(a)(3) and (1) of the
Act discharged employee Faye Jenkins about August 27,
and thereafter failed and refused to-reinstate her because
of her membership in and activities on behalf of the
Union and because she engaged in concerted activities
with other employees for the purposes of collective bar-
gaining and other mutual aid and, protection.. ,_
Jenkins commenced work for Respondent in, 1978 and
throughout her employment worked as a press operator.
Jenkins was the most senior employee at Respondent.
Jenkins participated in the Union's 1983 organizational
campaign She signed a union card, wore a union button,
and attended union meetings . After the Union was certi-
fied as the collective-bargaining representative for Re-
spondent's production and maintenance employees, Jen-
kins served its local as vice chairman. Jenkins was one of
a number of employees who were laid off for a brief
period of time in the spring' of 1983. Jenkins, like' the
others, was made whole-for any losses she suffered as a
result'of her having been laid off. Additionally, as noted
in .the section of this decision entitled "Background,"
Vice President Ellis told Jenkins and others that he
would not negotiate with the Union
Some of the operative facts related 'to Jenkins' employ-
ment immediately prior•to her departure from Respond-
ent are in conflict: I have set forth the events as I am
persuaded they happened, and in doing so I have dis-
credited the testimony of Jenkins where her testimony
conflicted with that of Respondent's witnesses, 'particu-
larly where it conflicted with the testimony of Vice
President Ellis and Plant Manager John A. Patterson Jr
(Patterson).' Ellis impressed me as being unreservedly
honest He was forthright and candid and although at
times he may not have been the most sophisticated wit-
ness, I am nevertheless persuaded he told the truth. Pat-
terson impressed me 'as being honest and other record
evidence tended to support his testimony. in contrast to
Ellis and Patterson, Jenkins appeared to be somewhat
nervous, ill at ease, and hostile while testifying, and as
such I am persuaded her testimony cannot be regarded
as wholly trustworthy, accurate, or reliable.
It, is undisputed that Jenkins suffered an on-the-job
injury in 1984 which resulted in her being away from
work for a number of days. Jenkins first injured her arm
on April 6.5 Prior to her arm injury, Jenkins had not had
a significant problem with being absent from work.
However, after her arm injury she missed work often in
April and May. On May 9, Jenkins was granted a leave
of absence from work because Respondent had no light
duty for her to perform 6 At the conclusion of her.leave
of absence which was in the latter part of May, Jenkins
asked for and was granted a week's vacation. Thereafter,
Jenkins returned. to work 'but was again away from work
during the last. 2 weeks in July -because' of her arm
injury Jenkins worked on August 1, but left work com-
plaining 'her arm was' hurting. Jenkins did not return to
the plant' until August 17. On 'that day she went by 'the
plant and spoke with-Vice President Ellis. Leonard Ellis
(Vice President Ellis' son) 'was present at the conversa-
tion between Jenkins and Vice President Ellis During
Jenkins' conversation' with Ellis, she was offered a layoff
slip. Jenkins wore a sling type support on her arm at the
meeting: -According to' Leonard Ellis, whose testimony I
credit,- Jenkins told Vice President Ellis she would have
to 'wear the arm sling at work even when operating her
machine. Vice President Ellis told Jenkins that work-'
men's compensation 7 'would not cover that type of situa-
5 On direct examination , Jenkins stated she injured her arm on July 13,
however, on cross-examination she acknowledged she first inured her
arm (pulled a ligament) in April .
6 Jenkins received compensation for the time she was on leave of ab-
sence -
Respondent was dropped from-coverage by one workmen's compen-
sation carrier on August 8, but was picked up as an assigned risk policy
holder by a different carrier on August 15
1382 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR, RELATIONS BOARD
tion . He also told Jenkins she would not be able to get
her arm, with the sling on it, into the machine to operate
the machine properly..
Jenkins telephoned,.Vice President Ellis the following
Monday, August 20„and informed him she had been ad-
vised by counsel to reject his offer of a layoff slip be-
cause she would lose her seniority if she, accepted one.
On August i 22, Vice President Ellis attempted two or
three times to telephone Jenkins before he left the ,plant
at 4 p.m. on that date. Ellis' left instructions at the plant
that if Jenkins called he wanted her to be told she was to
meet with him in his office at the plant at 3 p.m. on
August 24 Vice President Ellis stated he had obtained
some less strenuous work for Jenkins to perform that
would take her away from her.regularly assigned ma-
chine - and he wanted to "give her- her work assign=
ments," and "tell her what [he] had laid out for her [to
do]." Jenkins telephoned the plant at approximately 4:30
p.m. on August 22. Patterson took the call. Jenkins asked
for Vice President Ellis and was told he was not there.
Jenkins asked if Ellis was "supposed to get back in touch
with [her] about something." Patterson told Jenkins he
,had no idea what it would lie about Jenkins thanked
Patterson and ended the conversation. -
Francis Ellis _(Vice President' Ellis' wife) was working
in the plant office at the time Jenkins spoke with Patter-
son: Francis Ellis overheard-Patterson's part of the con-
versation and attempted but was unable to get his atten-
tion while he spoke with'Jenkins -on the phone. As soon
as Patterson finished 'speaking with Jenkins,. Francis Ellis
told him' she had been trying to get in touch with Jen-
kins to tell her that-Vice President Ellis wanted'to meet
with-her at 3 p.m. on August 24. Francis Ellis told Pat-
terson to telephone Jenkins back and tell her of Vice
President Ellis' desire to meet with ,her at 3 p.m. on
August-24.8 .
Plant Manager -Patterson followed Francis Ellis' in-
struction and immediately telephoned Jenkins.9 Patterson
informed Jenkins of the date,, time, and place of the
meeting and even repeated the information to her ' be-
cause -Jenkins hesitated , "as if she , was writing it
down." to '
Vice President Ellis .was present at the,.-plant on
August 24 and remained there until . approximately 5
p m.; however, Jenkins -never showed for the meeting,
nor called to.explain,her absence.'[, Vice President Ellis
stated he did not discharge Jenkins,.that after she-did not
show for the meeting or call to explain her absence, he
simply considered she had quit her employment. Vice
President Ellis told Francis Ellis later,, that, same -day
8,Francis Ellis also showed Patterson Vice;Presiden t Ellis' desk calen-
dar which reflected a notation of the meeting.., .1 1. -
8 Francis Ellis corroborated Patterson 's testimony that he immediately
telephoned Jenkins and informed her'of the scheduled meeting with Vice
President Ellis E '
10 Although Jenkins acknowledges Patterson called her a second time
on August 22 and told her on Friday, August 24, she denied Patterson
mentioned any meeting in the conversation or that he told her to be at
the plant at 3 p m on August 24 1 specifically discredit Jenkins' testimo-
ny that Patterson did not mention a meeting for August 24 at 3 p in in
his conversation with her
Vice President Ellis testified he expedited a business , trip he had
made to Alabama in order to be present for the meeting
(August 24) he guessed Jenkins had quit her employment
with Respondent.
Francis Ellis prepared a Tennessee Department of Em-
ployment Security separation notice for Jenkins and
mailed it to her on August 27. The separation notice
stated "quit without notice to employer " Francis Ellis
credibly testified it was "a long , long, time" thereafter
before Jenkins telephoned to say she had not quit Vice
President Ellis stated it was "about two to two and a
half weeks" before Jenkins made Respondent. aware that
she did not consider that she had quit her employment. i 2
D. Analysis and Conclusions
In evaluating the evidence to determine if Respondent
violated the Act when it discharged Jenkins, I am guided
by the principles set forth in Wright Line, 251 NLRB
1083 (1981), enfd. 662 F.2d 899 (1st Cir. 1981), cert.
denied 455 U.S. 989 (1982), approved in NLRB v. Trans-
portation Management Corp., 462 U.S. 393 (1983). Under
Wright Line analysis, the General Counsel has the initial
burden of demonstrating a prima facie case that protect-
ed conduct was a "motivating factor" in Respondent's
decision to terminate the alleged discriminatee. Once the
General Counsel has made_ such.a showing, the burden
then shifts to Respondent to demonstrate that it would
have taken the same action it did absent the protected
conduct.
I am persuaded the General Counsel has met her initial
burden of establishing a prima facie case. One thing abso-
lutely clear on this record is that Vice President Ellis has
a strong dislike, for the Union. Standing alone, an ex-
pressed dislike for unions in general or a dislike for a
particular union does not violate the Act; however, in
Vice President Ellis' case, he went beyond merely ex-
pressing a dislike for unions in general and this Union in
particular in that on several occasions in 1983 he indicat-
ed he would not bargain with the Union and stated he
felt unions were evil and communistic . Although no vio-
lations of the Act can be based on Vice President Ellis'
1983 comments , such comments do illuminate his strong
animus against unions in general and this Union in par-
ticular It cannot be disputed that Jenkins was a support-
er of the Union and that Respondent-was aware of her
support inasmuch as she served as vice chairman of the
Local Union. Jenkins had a long work history with Re-
spondent and was in fact the most senior employee of
Respondent. The above confluence of factors persuades
me the General Counsel has established a prima facie
case:
As the General Counsel has established a prima facie
case of.- unlawful motivation in the discharging of Jen-
kins, the remaining question under the Wright Line analy-
sis is whether Respondent has demonstrated it would
have discharged Jenkins absent her protected activity. I
am fully persuaded Respondent met its burden of estab-
lishing it would have taken the same action it did absent
12 Jenkins was somewhat 'uncertain as to when she actually received
her separation notice She could not recall if it was within a day or two
of August'24 or if it was in September I specifically discredit Jenkins'
testimony that she telephoned the plant the day she got her separation
notice to inform Respondent she had not quit
PROTO PLASTICS CO. - 1383
any protected conduct by Jenkins. Jenkins was specifical-
ly directed to meet with Vice President Ellis at 3 p.m.
on August 24, For reasons not reflected in this record,
Jenkins not only did not show for the meeting, but did
not even bother to explain her absence to Respondent. In
fact, Jenkins did not even contact Respondent for ap-
proximately' 2 weeks after-she received notice that Re-
spondent considered, she had voluntarily quit her em-
ployment. Respondent- demonstrated it had discharged
` employees • irrithe'past for failing -to report for scheduled
work. Although the instant situation involving Jenkins
was a failure to report for a scheduled meeting, I do not
view that to be a material difference such as to remove it
from Respondent's established policy of discharging em-
ployees who fail to report for a scheduled event be it
work or a meeting with management I am ,fully persuad-
ed Jenkins' discharge about August 27 was brought
about by her failure to attend a scheduled 'meeting with
Vice President Ellis on August 24. Accordingly, I find
Respondent did not violate Section 8(a)(3) and (1) of the
Act when-it discharged Jenkins.
1. Cease and desist from
(a) Soliciting its employees to engage-in direct bargain-
ing with it in circumvention of the Union, the employ-
ees' duly designated collective-bargaining representative.
(b) In any like or related manner interfering with, re-
straining , or coercing employees in the exercise of the
rights guaranteed them by Section 7 of the Act. •
2. Take the following affirmative action necessary to
effectuate the policies of the Act. -
(a) Mail to all its employees employed on September
24, copies of the attached notice marked "Appendix." 14
Copies of the notice mailed to employees shall be on
forms provided by the Regional Director for Region 10
and shall be signed by an authorized representative of
Respondent.
(b) Notify the Regional Director in writing within 20
days from the date of this Order what steps the Re-
spondent has taken to comply. -
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the complaint be, and it
is, dismissed insofar as it alleges violations of the act not
specifically found. -
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1. Respondent is an employer engaged in commerce
with the meaning of Section 2(2), (6), and (7) of the Act.
2. The Union is a labor organization within the mean-
ing of Section-2(5) of the Act.
3. By, about September 24, soliciting its employees to
engage in direct bargaining with it in circumvention of
the Union,-the employees' duly designated collective-bar-
gaining representative, Respondent violated Section
8(a)(1) of the act - • I •
4. Respondent did not violate Section 8(a)(3) -and '(1)
of the Act by discharging its employee Faye Jenkins- on
August 27.' - -
THE REMEDY ,
Having found that Respondent has engaged in certain
unfair labor practices, I find it necessary to order it. to
cease and desist and to take cetain affirmative action de-
signed to.effectuate the policies of the Act. Inasmuch as
it appears Respondent has :gone oui of business, I shall
recommend that it mail the attached notice to all em-
ployees who were employed by 'it-on' September 24.
On' these findings of fact and 'conclusions of law and
on the entire record, I issue the following recommend-
ed13
ORDER
The Respondent, Proto Plastics Company, Johnson
City, Tennessee, its officers, agents, successors, and as-
signs, shall . ,
13 If-no exceptions, are, filed as provided by Sec .102 46 of the Board's
Rules and. Regulations, the findings,, conclusions,., and recommended
Order shall, as provided in Sec 102 48 of the Rules, be adopted by the
Board and all objections to them shall be deemed waived for all. pur-
poses •
14 If this Order is enforced by a Judgment of a United States Court of
Appeals, the words in the notice reading "Posted by Order of the Na-
tional Labor Relations Board" shall read "Posted Pursuant to a Judgment
of the United States Court of Appeals Enforcing an Order of the Nation-
al Labor Relations Board "
APPENDIX •
NOTICE To EMPLOYEES •
POSTED BY ORDER OF THE
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
An Agency of the United States Government
The National Labor Relations Board has found that we
violated the National Labor Relations Act and has or-
dered us to post and abide by this notice. -
Section 7- of the Act gives employees these rights.
To organize •
To form, join, or assist any union
To bargain collectively through representatives
of their own choice
tion
To choose not to engage in any of these protect-
ed concerted activities:-, i•- - -
WE WILL NOT solicit you to engage in direct bargain-
ing with us in circumvention of the Oil, Chemical and
Atomic Workers Union, your duly designated collective-
bargaining representative.
'WE WILL NOT in any'like or related manner interfere
with, restrain, or coerce you in the exercise of the rights
-guaranteed you by Section 7 of the Act.-
PROTO PLASTICS COMPANY ,
To act together for other mutual aid or protec-