POWERTRON GLOBAL, LLC

Patent Trials and Appeals Board

Dec 23, 2020

2019002840 (P.T.A.B. Dec. 23, 2020)

UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE
United States Patent and Trademark Office
Address: COMMISSIONER FOR PATENTS
P.O. Box 1450
Alexandria, Virginia 22313-1450
www.uspto.gov
APPLICATION NO. FILING DATE FIRST NAMED INVENTOR ATTORNEY DOCKET NO. CONFIRMATION NO.
13/745,568 01/18/2013 Peter Nathan Albee 3754.001US1 8060
21186 7590 12/23/2020
SCHWEGMAN LUNDBERG & WOESSNER, P.A.
P.O. BOX 2938
MINNEAPOLIS, MN 55402
EXAMINER
GOLDBERG, IVAN R
ART UNIT PAPER NUMBER
3619
NOTIFICATION DATE DELIVERY MODE
12/23/2020 ELECTRONIC
Please find below and/or attached an Office communication concerning this application or proceeding.
The time period for reply, if any, is set in the attached communication.
Notice of the Office communication was sent electronically on above-indicated "Notification Date" to the
following e-mail address(es):
SLW@blackhillsip.com
uspto@slwip.com
PTOL-90A (Rev. 04/07)
UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
____________

BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD
____________

Ex parte PETER NATHAN ALBEE and KEVIN CARRIERE
____________

Appeal 2019-002840
Application 13/745,568
Technology Center 3600
____________

Before KALYAN K. DESHPANDE, CHARLES J. BOUDREAU,
and SHARON FENICK, Administrative Patent Judges.

FENICK, Administrative Patent Judge.

DECISION ON APPEAL
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Pursuant to 35 U.S.C. § 134(a), Appellant1 appeals from the
Examiner’s decision to reject claims 1–26. We have jurisdiction under
35 U.S.C. § 6(b)(1).
We affirm-in-part.

1 We use the word “Appellant” to refer to “applicant” as defined in
37 C.F.R. § 1.42. Appellant identifies Powertron Global, LLC as the real
party in interest. Appeal Br. 3.
Appeal 2019-002840
Application 13/745,568
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CLAIMED SUBJECT MATTER
Appellant’s Specification describes climate control systems providing
heating, ventilation, air conditioning, and refrigeration within buildings.
Spec. 1:4–5, 1:10–14, 3:13–20. Treatments incorporated into such systems
may increase or restore capacity or performance in order to minimize the
cost of operation. Id. at 1:18–21. Appellant’s invention relates to
determining cost savings in a climate control system resulting from such
treatments. Spec. 2:26–29, 3:13–14, 3:21–25, 4:18–5:5.
Claims 1, 15, and 26 are independent. Claim 1, reproduced below, is
illustrative of the subject matter on appeal:
1. A method of determining savings in a climate control system,
comprising:
determining, by one or more modules of a treatment
savings system, a pretreatment capacity of an evaporator coil in
an evaporator coil chamber of the climate control system, the
determining based on a pretreatment enthalpy difference;
calculating, by the one or more modules of the treatment
savings system, a pretreatment efficacy of the system;
introducing a chemical additive into the evaporator coil to
prevent the pretreatment capacity of the evaporator coil from
decreasing or restore a previously lost capacity of the evaporator
coil;
determining, by the one or more modules of the treatment
savings system, a post-treatment capacity of the evaporator coil
in the evaporator coil chamber of the climate control system, the
determining based on a post-treatment enthalpy difference;
calculating, by the one or more modules of the treatment
savings system, a post-treatment efficacy of the climate control
system;
determining by the one or more modules of the treatment
savings system, a pretreatment energy cost per usage time period;
and
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Application 13/745,568
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determining, by the one or more modules of the treatment
savings system, a revised pretreatment energy cost per usage
time period based at least in part on the post-treatment capacity.
Appeal Br. 21 (Claims App.).
REJECTIONS
The Examiner rejects claims 1 and 15 under pre-AIA 35 U.S.C.
§ 103(a) as being unpatentable over Sgarbi2 in view of Barclay.3 Final
Act. 2–17.
The Examiner rejects claims 2 and 6 under pre-AIA 35 U.S.C.
§ 103(a) as being unpatentable over Sgarbi in view of Barclay, Mowris,4 and
Zhou.5 Final Act. 17–21.
The Examiner rejects claims 3, 10, 11, and 21 under pre-AIA
35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as being unpatentable over Sgarbi in view of Barclay and
Kates.6 Final Act. 21–25.
The Examiner rejects claims 4, 5, 8, 16, and 18 under pre-AIA
35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as being unpatentable over Sgarbi in view of Barclay and
Seippel.7 Final Act. 26–30.

2 Sgarbi et al., US 6,286,323 B1 (pub. Sept. 11, 2001).
3 Barclay et al., US 2009/0187445 A1 (pub. July 23, 2009).
4 Mowris, US 2011/0082651 A1 (pub. Apr. 7, 2011).
5 Y.P. Zhou et al., Energy simulation in the variable refrigerant flow air-
conditioning system under cooling conditions, 39 Energy and Buildings 212
(2007).
6 Kates, US 2008/0016888 A1 (pub. Jan. 24, 2008).
7 Seippel, US 2010/0326470 A1 (pub. Dec. 30, 2010).
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The Examiner rejects claim 7 under pre-AIA 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as
being unpatentable over Sgarbi in view of Barclay, Mowris, Zhou, and
Kates.8 Final Act. 30–31.
The Examiner rejects claims 9 and 24 under pre-AIA 35 U.S.C.
§ 103(a) as being unpatentable over Sgarbi in view of Barclay and Mathur.9
Final Act. 32–34.
The Examiner rejects claim 12 under pre-AIA 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as
being unpatentable over Sgarbi in view of Barclay, Kates, and Seippel.
Final Act. 34–36.
The Examiner rejects claim 13 under pre-AIA 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as
being unpatentable over Sgarbi in view of Barclay, Kates, and Mathur. Final
Act. 36–38.
The Examiner rejects claim 14 under pre-AIA 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as
being unpatentable over Sgarbi in view of Barclay and Duncan.10 Final
Act. 38–39.
The Examiner rejects claims 17, 19, and 20 under pre-AIA 35 U.S.C.
§ 103(a) as being unpatentable over Sgarbi in view of Barclay, Seippel, and
Zugibe.11 Final Act. 39–43.
The Examiner rejects claims 22 and 23 under pre-AIA 35 U.S.C.
§ 103(a) as being unpatentable over Sgarbi in view of Barclay, Kates, and
Zugibe. Final Act. 43–48.

8 The heading of this rejection appears to contain a typographical error. The
rejection is presumed to be over this combination, as described in the body
of the rejection. Compare Final Act. 30, with id. at 31.
9 Mathur, US 4,768,346 (iss. Sept. 6, 1988).
10 Duncan, US 2011/0137468 A1 (pub. June 9, 2011).
11 Zugibe et al., US 7,533,536 B1 (iss. May 19, 2009).
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The Examiner rejects claim 25 under pre-AIA 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as
being unpatentable over Sgarbi in view of Barclay and Zugibe. Final
Act. 48–49.
The Examiner rejects claim 26 under pre-AIA 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as
being unpatentable over Sgarbi in view of Barclay and Johnson.12 Final
Act. 49–58.
OPINION
Claims 1–14
The Examiner relies upon Sgarbi for the limitations “determining . . .
a pretreatment capacity of an evaporator coil in an evaporator coil chamber
of the climate control system, the determining based on a pretreatment
enthalpy difference” and “determining . . . a post-treatment capacity of the
evaporator coil in the evaporator coil chamber of the climate control system,
the determining based on a post-treatment enthalpy difference,” as recited in
independent claim 1. Final Act. 3, 5 (citing Sgarbi 1:45–56, 7:1–17,
7:54–67; Spec. 16:7–2913). Specifically, the Examiner finds that the
“Specification discusses efficiency and capacity interchangeably” and cites
Sgarbi’s disclosure of a “method for improving energy efficiency of a
refrigeration system” and resulting “better heat transfer” in the evaporator
coil. Id. (emphasis omitted); see also Ans. 5–6 (Examiner interpreting
“enthalpy” to include “heat transfer”). According to the Examiner, “to

12 Johnson et al., US 2011/0112875 A1 (pub. May 12, 2011).
13 The Final Action cites “par. 0058–059 as published,” referring to the
paragraph numbering in the version of the subject patent application as
published, US 2014/0207501 A1. We have revised the citation to refer to
the page and line numbers of the Specification as originally filed.

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Application 13/745,568
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determine the efficiency improvement, there is an initial efficiency, i.e. a
pretreatment determination; and a final efficiency, i.e. a post[-]treatment
determination.” Final Act. 3, 5.
Appellant argues that Sgarbi fails to teach determining a pretreatment
or post-treatment capacity of the evaporator coil based on an enthalpy
difference. Appeal Br. 14. According to Appellant, Sgarbi discloses
measuring improvement in terms of a reduction in kWh usage, but not
calculating an enthalpy difference. Id. at 13–14 (citing Sgarbi 7:1–17);
Reply Br. 6.
We agree with Appellant. Sgarbi discloses improved energy
efficiency and better heat transfer resulting from a lubricant additive
treatment, but this disclosure does not teach or suggest that the capacity of
the evaporator coil, pretreatment or post-treatment, is determined based on
an enthalpy difference. See Sgarbi 1:45–56, 6:56–7:17. For example,
nothing in the cited portions of Sgarbi indicates that an initial enthalpy
difference associated with the heat transfer is measured or used to determine
the capacity of the evaporator coil or efficiency improvement.
The Examiner finds Sgarbi does not explicitly disclose revising a
pretreatment cost based on post-treatment capacity, and relies upon Barclay
for this aspect of the claimed invention. Final Act. 6–9 (citing Barclay
¶¶ 49, 60–62, 88); Ans. 8–14. Specifically, the Examiner cites Barclay’s
disclosure of “baseline facility condition data,” “actual facility condition
data represent[ing] facility conditions during a second time interval, after the
energy-conserving or energy efficiency-enhancing measures have been
implemented,” and “performing pre-processing on the data” in a method of
determining energy cost savings. Final Act. 7–8; Barclay ¶¶ 49, 61–62. The
Examiner finds that Barclay’s “‘pre-processed’ values result[] in an
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adjustment, i.e. scaling a value.” Ans. 12. According to the Examiner, “the
treatment applied in Sgarbi is the post-treatment capacity” and “the baseline
value (i.e. the pretreatment energy cost per usage time period) in Barclay is
based on the implementation of the efficiency-measure (input of post-
treatment capacity).” Id. at 10–11 (citing Spec. 3:26–4:11) (emphasis
omitted).
Appellant argues that Barclay “fails to teach or suggest revising a
pretreatment energy cost per usage time period based on at least the post-
treatment capacity.” Appeal Br. 16. According to Appellant, Barclay
determines savings by comparing an estimated amount of energy that would
have been consumed but for the implementation of energy efficiency or
conservation measures, with actual usage after the measures have been
taken. Id. at 14–16 (citing Barclay Abstr., Figs. 13–14); Reply Br. 7–8.
Appellant further argues that “any adjustment [in Barclay] is to correct the
baseline measurements and has nothing to do with . . . post-treatment
capacity.” Appeal Br. 16.
We agree with Appellant that Barclay, alone or in combination with
Sgarbi, fails to teach or suggest determining a revised pretreatment energy
cost per usage time period based at least in part on the post-treatment
capacity. While the Examiner finds that Barclay’s “baseline value . . . is
based on the implementation of the efficiency-measure (input of post-
treatment capacity)” and corresponds to the claimed “revised pretreatment
energy cost per usage time period” (Ans. 11) (emphasis omitted), Barclay
describes “baseline facility condition data” to include weather conditions,
occupancy data, and production data (Barclay ¶ 45). Furthermore, while the
Examiner cites Barclay’s “pre-processing” of the baseline facility condition
data (Final Act. 7–8; Ans. 12), Barclay describes such “pre-processing” as
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creating “additional weather-based statistical variables” or “summing all
hourly and daily data and converting them to average monthly values”
(Barclay ¶ 49). We find no teaching or suggestion in the cited portions of
Barclay of determining a revised pretreatment energy cost per usage time
period, or basing that determination at least in part on the post-treatment
capacity.
For the foregoing reasons, we do not sustain the Examiner’s rejection
of claim 1 as obvious over Sgarbi and Barclay. For the same reasons, we do
not sustain the Examiner’s rejections of claims 2–14, which depend directly
or indirectly from claim 1.
Claims 15–25
In addition to other differences from claim 1, independent claim 15
recites “determining . . . a revised pretreatment energy cost per usage time
period based at least in part on the post-treatment efficacy,” where claim 1
recites a determination based at least in part on post-treatment capacity. The
Examiner relies upon Barclay for this limitation in a similar manner as
applied to independent claim 1. Compare Final Act. 14–16, with id. at 6–8.
Appellant disputes the Examiner’s finding that Barclay teaches or suggests
the limitation. Appeal Br. 13, 16–17; see also Reply Br. 7–9.
For the same reasons discussed above with respect to claim 1, we find
no teaching or suggestion in the cited portions of Barclay of determining a
revised pretreatment energy cost per usage time period, or basing that
determination at least in part on the post-treatment efficacy.
Accordingly, we do not sustain the Examiner’s rejection of claim 15
as obvious over Sgarbi and Barclay. For the same reasons, we do not sustain
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the Examiner’s rejections of claims 16–25, which depend directly or
indirectly from claim 15.
Claim 26
The Examiner rejects independent claim 26 as obvious over Sgarbi,
Barclay, and Johnson. Final Act. 49–58.
Appellant argues that “Sgarbi, Barclay, and Johnson, alone or in
combination, do not appear to teach or suggest each and every element as
recited in Appellant’s independent claim[] . . . 26.” Appeal Br. 12. While
Appellant argues that “Johnson fails to cure the deficiencies of Sgarbi and
Bar[cl]ay,” Appellant does not identify the alleged deficiencies of Sgarbi
and Barclay with respect to claim 26. Id. at 17. To the extent that Appellant
relies upon the same arguments as those made against the rejection of claims
1 and 15 (see id. at 13–17), those arguments address limitations that are not
recited in claim 26.
Thus, we are not persuaded of error in the Examiner’s rejection of
claim 26. Accordingly, we sustain the Examiner’s rejection of claim 26 as
obvious over Sgarbi, Barclay, and Johnson.
CONCLUSION
The Examiner’s rejections of claims 1–25 under 35 U.S.C. § 103 are
reversed.
The Examiner’s rejection of claim 26 under 35 U.S.C. § 103 is
affirmed.

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Application 13/745,568
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DECISION SUMMARY
In summary:
Claims
Rejected 35 U.S.C. § Reference(s)/Basis Affirmed Reversed
1, 15 103 Sgarbi, Barclay 1, 15
2, 6 103 Sgarbi, Barclay,
Mowris, Zhou
2, 6
3, 10, 11, 21 103 Sgarbi, Barclay,
Kates
3, 10, 11, 21
4, 5, 8, 16, 18 103 Sgarbi, Barclay,
Seippel
4, 5, 8, 16, 18
7 103 Sgarbi, Barclay,
Mowris, Zhou, Kates
7
9, 24 103 Sgarbi, Barclay,
Mathur
9, 24
12 103 Sgarbi, Barclay,
Kates, Seippel
12
13 103 Sgarbi, Barclay,
Kates, Mathur
13
14 103 Sgarbi, Barclay,
Duncan
14
17, 19, 20 103 Sgarbi, Barclay,
Seippel, Zugibe
17, 19, 20
22, 23 103 Sgarbi, Barclay,
Kates, Zugibe
22, 23
25 103 Sgarbi, Barclay,
Zugibe
25
26 103 Sgarbi, Barclay,
Johnson
26
Overall
Outcome
26 1–25
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Application 13/745,568
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TIME PERIOD FOR RESPONSE
No time period for taking any subsequent action in connection with
this appeal may be extended under 37 C.F.R. § 1.136(a)(1)(iv).
AFFIRMED-IN-PART