Ponderosa Lumber SalesDownload PDFNational Labor Relations Board - Board DecisionsAug 20, 1957118 N.L.R.B. 1055 (N.L.R.B. 1957) Copy Citation PINE INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS COMMITTEE, INC. 1055 ber of employees will be entitled to vote under the Board's usual eligibility rules, we perceive no reason to depart therefrom 13 [The Board dismissed the petition in Case No. 12-RM-5 and granted the request to withdraw the petition in Case No. 12-RC-128 and granted with prejudice the filing of a new petition for a period of 6 months from the date of this Order, unless good cause is shown why the Board should entertain a new petition filed prior to the expiration of such period.] [The Board severed the petition in Case No . 12-RC-134.] [Text of Direction of Elections omitted from publication.] Is Cf. Cities Service Oil Co. of Pennsylvania, 80 NLRB 1512. Pine Industrial Relations Committee , Inc.; Brooks-Scanlon, Inc.; Ponderosa Mouldings, Inc., d/b/a Ponderosa Lumber Sales; Philip Dahl and Sam Johnson , Co-Partners, d/b/a Tite Knot Pine Mill; Philip Dahl and Harold D. Barclay , Co-Partners, d/b/a Harold Barclay Logging Company , and Red Blanket Lumber Company, Inc. and International Woodworkers of America, Local Unions 6-7 and 6-122, AFL-CIO. Cases N08.36- CA-486 and 36-CA-627. August 20,1957 DECISION AND ORDER On March 28, 1956, Trial Examiner Martin S. Bennett issued his Intermediate Report in the above-entitled proceeding, finding that the Respondents 1 had engaged in and were engaging in certain unfair labor practices, and recommending that they cease and desist there- from and take certain affirmative action, as set forth in the copy of the Intermediate Report attached hereto. The Trial Examiner also found that the Respondents had not engaged in certain other unfair labor practices as alleged in the complaint, and recommended that these particular allegations be dismissed. Thereafter, the Respond- ents, the Charging Unions,? and the General Counsel filed exceptions to the Intermediate Report, together with supporting briefs. The Board has reviewed the rulings made by the Trial Examiner at the hearing and finds that no prejudicial error was committed. The 1 The Respondents, namely, Pine Industrial Relations Committee, Inc. ; Brooks-Scanlon, Inc. ; Ponderosa Mouldings, Inc., d/b/a Ponderosa Lumber Sales ; Philip Dahl and Sam Johnson, Co-Partners, d/b/a Tite Knot Pine Mill ; Philip Dahl and Harold D. Ba: clay, Co-Partners, d/b/a Harold Barclay Logging Company ; and Red Blanket Lumber Company, Inc., are herein called PIRC, Brooks-Scanlon, Ponderosa, Tite Knot, Barclay, and Red Blanket, respectively. 0 The Charging Unions are Locals 6-7 and 6-122, International Woodworkers of America, AFL-CIO, herein called Local 6-7 and Local 6-122, respectively. 118 NLRB No. 142. 1056 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD rulings are hereby affirmed. The Board has considered the Inter- mediate Report, the exceptions filed by the Respondents, Charging Unions, and the General Counsel, and the entire record in the case, and hereby adopts the findings, conclusions, and recommendations of the Trial Examiner, with the following additions 3 and modification. 1. Late in 1953, Northwest Regional Negotiating Committee, herein called NRNC,4 sent a questionnaire, Form IWWWA-1, to approximately 600 employers with whom it customarily dealt. This form, in part, called for the following information : The name of each employee, his job classifications, his hourly rate of pay, his seniority standing, his paid holidays, the number of weeks of his vacation, the total annual hours he had worked, and his annual earnings. Information received from the questionnaire was to be used by Edward Kenney, director of the department of, education and research of the International Woodworkers, to compile certain statistics for bargaining with em- ployers in the Pacific Northwest lumber and plywood industries. Ac- cording to Kenney, such statistics, in addition to being used in actual bargaining negotiations, were intended to be used to assist in measur- ing demands to be made upon the Respondents, and to determine eco- nomic changes in the lumber and plywood industries with a view to reviewing negotiation procedure, and determining whether industry- wide bargaining or individual employer bargaining was the more feasible.- In addition, should one of the local unions need such infor- mation for bargaining on local issues, this information, as needed, could be supplied to the local. In December 1953, the NRNC, by its chairman, A. F. Hartung, notified each employer with which it bargained, including the Re- spondents herein, that it desired Form IWA-1 to be filled out and -'We agree with the Trial Examiner ' s finding that there I,;. no substantial evidence to refute Respondent Red Blanket 's contention that it permanently replaced its strikers prior to their termination . Indeed , there is substantial evidence in the record supporting its position . Thus, Willard Mattson, Red Blanket's assistant manager, testified that on .lime 28, 1956 , its mill 2 commenced operations with essentially a full crew . On that date, Red Blanket issued termination notices to those strikers who had been permanently replaced . Subsequently , as more replacements were hired for mill 2 and other opera- tions, the remaining strikers at mill 2 and other operations received termination notices. The termination notices were issued to strikers on various dates between June 28 and July 7, 1954 . This evidence is supported by the testimony of certain strikers. Arnold Winslow, a strike captain, testified that he was an edgerman at mill 2 prior to the strike, but that mill 2 commenced operations with a replacement edgerman on June 28, 1954. Winslow's termination notice was dated June 30, 1954. Critt Carroll , financial secretary of Local 6-122, testified that he worked at mill 1 on the green chain prior to the strike and when mill 1 resumed operations on June 24 , i 954, "They had some guys there" running the green chain. Furthermore , there is no evidence in the record showing that any of the "permanent" replacements were subsequently removed from their jobs. This is a committee composed of representatives of various Pacific Northwest local unions belonging to International Woodworkers of America . It negotiates provisions of collective-bargaining agreements in behalf of local unions which have authorized it to do so , and its efforts are concentrated on basic terms of employment which are generally applicable to employers in the lumber industry throughout the Pacific Northwest area. The two Charging Local Unions had authorized NRNC to negotiate on certain issues with Respondent Employers. PINE INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS COMMITTEE, INC. 1057 returned by January 30, 1954, "in order that our Union may formu- late, constructive proposals for intelligent collective bargaining." On January 14 and 22,1954, followup letters were sent to the Respondents urging submission of this information. The January 14 letter contains the following : The information requested on Form IWA-1 is absolutely essential for an intelligent and constructive approach to our collective bargaining process this year. And, as such, under NLRB and Court interpretation of the National Labor Relations Act you will be expected to comply within the time limit established. In January 1954 each of the Employer Respondents was notified by letter from the local union representing its employees, of the latter's desire to amend the existing agreement. Thus in each instance the Local Union stated that it was seeking a general wage increase, "the amount to be determined from an analysis of conditions within the industry and other pertinent factors, including information to be submitted on Form IWA-1"; 5 the correction of inequities in job rates with such corrections to be based on a job analysis program to be made jointly by the companies and the Union, and with the cost of such analysis to be borne by the companies; and 3 weeks' vacation after 5 years' seniority. In addition, the Respondents were notified that the Local Unions had authorized NRNC to represent them on the above-stated proposed amendments. The letters also contained the following directive : In order that our Union may proceed intelligently and con- structively in the 1954 negotiations, Forms IWA-1 mailed to you from the International Union's office on December 31, 1953, must be returned to the International office, as directed in the instructions not later than January 30, 1954. Commencing on February 11, 1954, and during the ensuing bar- gaining negotiations between Respondents and NRNC, frequent re- quests were made by spokesmen of the NRNC for the submission of the information. Each of the Respondents failed to furnish this information, either by refusing to submit it, as did Respondent Red Blanket, or by delaying a response to the request and thereafter not supplying it. The Trial Examiner found that the information sought pertaining to individual employees, namely, the name of each employee, his job classifications, his rate of pay, his seniority standing, his paid holi- days and vacation, the total hours he had worked, and his total annual earnings, was relevant to the collective-bargaining process; that the 0 5 As completed , in each instance the local unions requested of the Respondents an across-the-board general wage increase of 121/2 cents per hour. 450553-58--vol. 118-68 1058 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD 0 requests were made in good faith; and that the Respondents each violated Section 8 (a) (5) and (1) by failing to submit the requested information. The Trial Examiner also found that the Respondents, in refusing to supply this information, were not motivated by bad faith in an attempt to undermine the bargaining process, but rather believed that they were not required to submit such information. We agree with each of these findings. The Board and the courts have uniformly held that a collective- bargaining agent is entitled to employment information pertaining to individual employees which enables it properly to carry out its du- ties in the general course of bargaining. Thus, employers have been required to furnish to the bargaining agent such information as the names of employees in the bargaining unit and their respective job classifications,6 seniority standing,' number of hours employees have worked,' and employee rates of pay.' In the instant proceeding, the Local Unions sought similar specific items bearing on the Re- spondents' wage structures. The Respondents appear to agree that, under certain circumstances, collective-bargaining representatives are entitled to such wage data. However, they contend that such circumstances are not present in this case.10 Thus, they contend, in principal part, that (1) This in- formation was actually sought by the International Union, and not by the local unions which were the collective-bargaining representa- tives of the employees involved; (2) this information was not to be used solely by the Locals here involved in collective bargaining with the Respondents, but rather was to be used in compiling statistics for bargaining by other local unions with other employers ; and (3) the demand for this information was waived by the Locals in their efforts to settle the economic strikes which resulted when the parties subsequently reached stalemates in bargaining." As to the first and second contentions, the Local Unions had a definite interest in the procurement of the requested information. Indeed, these Locals had delegated certain collective-bargaining 6 See e. g., Whitin Machine Works, 108 NLRB 1537, enfd. 217 P. 2d 593 (C. A. 4): S. H. Kress & Co., 108 NLRB 1615; Boston-Herold Traveler Corporation, 110 NLRB 2097, enfd. 223 F. 2d 58 (C. A. 1) ; Hugh J. Baker of Company, et at., 112 NLRB 828. 1 Stein-Way Clothing Company, 106 NLRB 1314, enfd. 209 F. 2d 261 (C. A. 6) ; New Britain Machine Co., 105 NLRB 646, enfd. 210 F. 2d (C. A. 2). AF. W. Woolworth Co., 109 NLRB 196, enfd. 352 U. S. 938. 9 See e. g., Taylor Forge and Pipe Works, 113 NLRB 693; Dixie Corporation, 105 NLRB 390. 10 Respondent Brooks-Scanlon does not appear to except to the Trial Examiner's 8 (a) (5) findings on the wage data but directs its exceptions solely to the issue discussed infra, of whether or not the requested production and sales figures should be turned over to the Union. a We agree with the Trial Examiner that the strikes occurred after the parties arrived at an impasi;e in bargaining; that the strikes at the Respondents' operations were economic strikes at their inception ; and that the striking employees were economic strikers , and not unfair labor practice strikers as contended by the General Counsel and the Charging Locals. PINE INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS CODI\IITTEE, INC. 1059 functions to the NRNC, and the NRNC was to utilize such informa- tion in bargaining on behalf of the Locals concerning the three basic contract demands. In addition, such information would assist the Locals in measuring their bargaining demands, and would be used by them if necessary in bargaining with the respective Respond- ents on matters which they had not delegated to the NRNC for negotiati on." As to the Respondents' third contention, the record indicates, as the Respondents contend, that there was little mention made of the requests for information during the Local Unions' attempts to settle the strikes at the operations of the respective Respondents. How- ever, during such bargaining negotiations the record does not show a clear and unequivocal waiver of the information requested by the Local Unions." Moreover, on August 6, 1954, in separate bargaining meetings " with Respondents Ponderosa, Tite Knot, Barclay,14 and Brooks-Scanlon, the Local Unions again expressed the desire for the requested information. Clearly, then, at this late date the Unions had not waived the request for the information. Moreover, during the signing of the ultimate contracts negotiated with Brooks-Scanlon, Local Union 6-7 clearly stated that by signing the contracts, it was not to be considered as having waived the charges it had filed several months before, one of which had alleged 8 (a) (5) by refusing to supply information.15 In view of the foregoing , and on the basis , of the entire record, the Board .finds that each of the Respondents failed and refused, on and after February 11, 1954, to furnish requested information pertaining to its employees ' individual wage and employment data, and that each of the Respondents has thereby engaged in conduct violative of Sec- tion8 (a) (5) and8 (a) (1) of the Act. 2. In addition to the above-described information pertaining to in- dividual employees, the Respondents were also requested to furnish, on Form IWA-1, figures showing the annual board-foot production of their respective operations and related sales totals expressed in dollars. As in the former matters, the Respondents did not comply with the latter request. The Trial Examiner concluded that the re- quested production and sales figures were relevant and necessary for the purposes of collective bargaining," and that the Respondents, by i3 Oregon Coast Operators Association., 113 NLRB 1333. 13 Cf . International News Service Division of the Hearst Corporation, 113 NLRB 1067. ' We agree with the Trial Examiner's finding that Philip Dahl participated in bargain- ing negotiations on behalf of both Tite Knot and Barclay. i^ The charges in these proceedings relating to all Respondents were filed on July 1 and 13, 1954. "The Trial Examiner based his finding on relevance and necessity on the testimony of Kenney, the International's director of education and research, to the effect that the pro- duction and sales figures would he helpful to the Unions in the course of collective bargaining and, more specifically, would enable the Unions to evaluate accurately employer claims with respect to labor costs. In the latter connection, it should be noted, 1060 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD failing to supply these figures as requested, violated the Act." For the reasons stated below we do not agree. It is clear from the testimony of Kenney, the International's director of education and research, that the Unions asked for the production and sales figures in order to determine what size wage demands they should make upon the Respondents in relation to the latter's ability to pay. It is also clear from Kenney's testimony that once the Unions had determined how much of a wage increase the Respondents could afford to pay, the Unions intended to use the production and sales figures to refute any possible argument that the Respondents might raise during negotiations based upon their ability to meet the Unions' demands, as well as to disprove any claim that certain segments of a particular Respondent's operations were losing money. In any event, apart from the Unions' purpose, the information sought related to the financial status of the Respondents and necessarily went to the question of their ability to pay, and we so find. The Respondents, how= ever, at no time preliminary to or in the course of the bargaining negotiations claimed inability to pay as a defense to the Unions' wage demands." Indeed, when queried by Dicey, the Unions'. spokesman, at the March 12 bargaining session, the Respondents through their spokesman, Irving, unequivocally denied that they were pleading inability to pay as their reason for refusing to acceed to the Unions' Wage demands." Turning now to the applicable law, we note that, while in wage data cases it is sufficient that the information sought by the union is relevant and no specific need as to a particular issue must be.showti-n,1; however, that so far as the record shows the Respondents at no time made any claim with respect to labor costs other than labor costs would increase if wages were increased. ]l The Respondents take exception to the Trial Examiner ' s conclusions . They, contend, in principal part, that they do not have to divulge "confidential internal business records and data" when they had not pleaded an inability to meet the Unions' contract demands. Thus, they claim that if an employer is required to divulge such information to."strangers to his business family," the request for the information becomes a club to force bargaining concessions which the employer would not ordinarily yield. In this connection, the Respondents point out that the information requested was to be used by the Unions in bargaining with the competitors of each Respondent , and that , if such information were to be revealed to a competitor , the Respondents would be seriously handicapped in bidding for Government timber. 1During the negotiations the Unions sought a general wage increase of 12Y,, cents per hour. 70 Instead, Irving gave , as the Respondents ' reason, "inadvisability" in view of the market and economic trends within the lumber industry as a whole , and cited some general data by way of substantiating this position . While there may be some color under certain circumstances to the contention that "inadvisability" means " inability ," we do not believe that Irving' s use of the term "inadvisability ," when considered in context , was intended to or did convey the meaning that the Respondents were pleading inability to pay. Significantly , the Unions at the time did not challenge Irving's statement as constituting a plea of inability to pay. Rather , Dicey specifically interpreted the Respondents ' position as not pleading inability to pay for in a statement made toward the close of negotiations to one of the Respondents he charged that the Respondents "do not plead inability to pay. On the contrary, they are well able to give a wage increase but refuse to do so." 21 Whitin Machine Works, 108 NLRB 1537, enfd . 217 F. 2d 593 (C. A. 4), cert, denied 349 U. S. 905; Glen Raven Knitting lfills, Inc., 115 NLRB 422 (reversed on other grounds), 235 F. 2d 413 (C. A. 4). In the latter case Member Rodgers would have re- PINE INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS COMMITTEE, INC. 1061 the same is not true where, as here, the union is seeking information relating to the employer's ability to grant a wage increase. In the latter cases the Board and the courts have, in effect, held that the employer's ability to pay must be brought into issue before a refusal to furnish information relating thereto can be found to be violative of the Act.21 Since, as previously found, the Respondents never claimed inability to pay as a.defense to the " ions' pay demands, it follows that their failui°e to slippll: Elie. pro,- ion and sales informa- tion sought by the Unions did not constitute a refusal to bargain in goocUaitl>, w:ithill, the meaning of-trie Act. In deciding this case we have not been unaware of the consideration that possession at the outset of bargaining of the facts about the em- ployer's economic position may be helpful to the union in tailoring its wage demands to what the employer can reasonably pay and thereby make bargaining, perhaps, more realistic and successful. But our duty under the Act is here to determine whether the obligation of good-faith bargaining has been met rather than to establish ideal bargaining conditions. In the recent Truitt case, supra, the Supreme Court ruled that the Act does not require that "in every case where economic inability is raised as an argument against increased wages it automatically follows that the employees are entitled to substantiating evidence. Each case must turn upon its particular facts." Conse- quently, if we were to hold that it is bad-faith bargaining for an em- ployer to withhold from a union at the outset facts about its economic position, whether or not a claim of inability to pay has been made, the result would be that in every wage case the employer would auto- matically have to disclose his financial status in whole or in part upon request. We would thus be doing by indirection what, under the Truitt decision, we may not do by direction. That we are not willing to do.22 quired, upon the authority of the prior Oregon Coast Operators Association case (113 NLRB 1338), necessity as well as relevance in wage data cases, but he now considers himself bound by the majority holding. "McLean-Arkansas Lumber Company, Inc., 109 NLRB 1022, 1037, where the Board declared : "It is clear from the cases that when it is asserted that a company is not financially able to grant a wage increase or other economic demand, a refusal to furnish any information as to its financial condition is not a fulfillment of the requirement of good-faith bargaining" (emphasis supplied) ; Southern Saddlery Company. 90 NLRB 1205, 1207, where, speaking of ability-to-pay information, the Board said : "The employer is obliged to furnish the Union with sufficient information to enable the latter to under- stand and discuss intelligently the issues raised by the [employer] in opposition to the Unions' demands" (emphasis supplied). See also to the same effect, B. L. Montague Company, 116 NLRB 554; N. L. R. B. v. Jacobs Mannafacturing Company, 196 F. 2d 680, -683-684 (C. A. 2) ; and N. L. R. B. v. Truitt Mfg. Co., 351 U. S. 149. The requirement that ability to pay must first be in issue before an employer is obliged to furnish informa- tion relating thereto reflects the rule, recently affirmed in Glen Raven Knitting, supra, that as to information other than wage data the test is both relevance and necessity and a specific need as to the particular issue involved must be shown. For until ability to pay becomes an issue, "specific need" for information as to it cannot be shown, nor can such information be said to be necessary as well as relevant. a Our dissenting colleague asserts that our decision conflicts with Board and court decisions . It is to be noted, however, that he views the facts of this case substantially 1062 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD We are administratively informed that Local 6-122, although in continuous compliance during this proceeding from the filing of the charge until after the date of the hearing, has since permitted its com- pliance to lapse. We shall therefore condition our order requiring the Respondent Red Blanket to bargain with Local 6-122, upon the Union's renewal of compliance, with the requirements of Section 9 (f), (g), and (h) of the Act, within 30 days from the date of our Order herein .21 ORDER Upon the entire record in the case, and pursuant to Section 10 (c) of the National Labor Relations Act, the National Labor Relations Board hereby orders that each of the Respondents herein, namely, Pine Industrial Relations Committee, Inc.; Brooks-Scanlon, Inc. ; Ponderosa .Mouldings, Inc., d/b/a Ponderosa Lumber Sales; Philip Dahl and Sam Johnson, Co-Partners, d/b/a Tite Knot Pine Mill; Philip Dahl and Harold D. Barclay, Co-Partners, d/b/a Harold Barclay Logging Company ; and Red Blanket Lumber Company, Inc., its officers, agents, successors and assigns shall: 1. Cease and desist from : (a) Refusing to bargain collectively with International Woodwork- ers of America, AFL-CIO, Local 6-7 or Local 6-122, as the case may be, as the exclusive representative of its employees in the appropriate unit, by failing and refusing to furnish said labor organization, on request, information concerning the name of each employee in such appropriate unit, hisjob classifications, his rate of pay, his.:.seniority standing, his paid holidays, his vacations, total hours he has worked, and his annual earnings, provided, however, with respect to Respond- ent Red Blanket, that within 30 days from this decision, Local 6-122 shall have complied with Section 9 (f), (g), and (h) of the Act. (b) In any like or related manner interfering with the efforts of the respective bargaining representatives to bargain collectively. 2. Take the following affirmative action which the Board finds will effectuate the policies of the Act : (a) Upon request, furnish International Woodworkers of America, AFL-CIO, Local 6-7 or Local 6-122, as the case may be, in writing, different than do we. Consequently, his assertion that we are disregarding earlier deci- sions cannot have any possible bearing on this case for the reason that the applicability of precedent necessarily depends on one's view of the facts. iVe are satisfied that tinder our view of the facts our decision is consistent with and in furtherance of prior Board and court decisions. Furthermore, since this Board is a tribunal of law, we do not deem it proper, in determining whether the Respondent has violated the law, to take into account what our dissenting colleague refers to as "the Administration's policy on inflation." m Member Bean, rather than issue the conditional order described above, would issue an order to show cause why the complaint should not be dismissed as to Local 6-122 unless within 30 days from the service of such order Local 6-122 achieves compliance with Section 9 (f),.(g), and (h) of the Act. If this procedure were followed, the Board's order, when issued in this proceeding, would be a final order, enforceable under Section 10 (e) and reviewable under Section 10 (f) of the Act. PINE INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS COMMITTEE, INC. 1063 the name of each employee in the appropriate unit of its employees, his job classifications, his rate of pay, his seniority standing, his paid holidays, his vacations, the total hours he has worked, and his annual earnings, provided, however, with respect to Respondent Red Blanket, that within 30 days from this decision, Local 6-122 shall have complied with Section 9 (f), (g), and (h) of the Act. (b) Post at its installations, and in the case of PIRC at its office, in the State of Oregon, copies of the notices attached hereto and marked "Appendix A" in the case of Red Blanket and "Appendix B" in the case of the other Respondents?' Copies of said notices to be furnished by the Regional Director for the Nineteenth Region shall, after being respectively signed by Respondents' representatives, be posted by the respective Respondents immediately upon receipt thereof and main- tained by them for a period of sixty (60) consecutive days thereafter in conspicuous places, including all places where notices to employees are customarily posted. Reasonable steps shall be taken by each Re- spondent to insure that said notices are not altered, defaced, or covered by any other material. (c) Notify the Regional Director for the Nineteenth Region in writing within ten (10) days from the date of this Order, what steps it has taken to comply herewith. IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the complaint herein, insofar as it alleges that the Respondents have violated the Act by conduct other than that found to be violative herein, be, and it hereby is, dismissed. MEMBER MURDOCH, dissenting in part : I dissent from the majority opinion to the extent that it reverses the Trial Examiner and holds that the Respondents, in the particular circumstances present, were not obligated to furnish the Unions herein the requested data as to the 1953 board-foot production and sales totals, broken down according to nature of operations. The Trial Examiner found that such data was demonstrated as directly relevant and neces- sary in connection with current collective-bargaining issues; that the data was requested by the Unions in good faith; that it was reasonably available; and that there was no showing that furnishing it would place an undue burden on the Respondents, financially or otherwise. The majority's failure. to find the alleged violation on this issue, in my opinion, disregards the settled collective-bargaining principles under- lying the requirement for furnishing of data, and conflicts with a long and:.unbroken line of Board and court decisions, two recently handed down in the United States Supreme Court.2s 211n the event that this Order is enforced by a decree of a United States Court of Appeals, there shall be substituted for the words "Pursuant to a Decision and Order" the words "Pursuant to a Decree of the United States Court of Appeals, Enforcing an Order." s N. L. R. B. v. F. W. Woolworth Co., 352 U. S. 933 ; N. L. B. B. v. Truitt Mfg. Co., 351 U. S. 149. 1064 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD It is well at the outset to review the applicable principles, which have been stated in the courts as follows : "An employer is obligated to furnish the union [upon request] with data relevant to issues about which the parties are obligated to bargain." 26 [Emphasis supplied.] The "union as bargaining agent of the employees [is] entitled to infor- mation [from the employer] which would enable it properly and under- standingly to perform its duties as such in the general course of bar- gaining.. . ." 27 In a per curiam opinion of the Second Circuit, the heart of the problem was put thusly- The rule governing disclosure of data of this kind is not unlike that prevailing in discovery procedures under modern codes. For the information must be disclosed unless it plainly appears ir- relevant. Any less lenient rule in labor disputes would greatly hamper the bargaining process, for it is virtually impossible to tell in advance whether the requested data will be relevant except in those infrequent instances in which the inquiry is patently out- side the bargaining issue.28 The rule derives directly from the Act's requirement and the overriding Federal policy that, as a means of avoiding strikes and industrial strife, union and management compose their differences by the process of good-faith collective bargaining. The furnishing of relevant infor- mation,29 upon request, as between the parties is a necessary concomitant of good faith bargaining.3o A major purpose of the request for the data specified in the ques- tionnaire 31-annual board-feet production and sales figures-was to enable the Unions accurately to measure the productivity of the em- ployees 32 upon which the Unions would base the size of a proposed 24 Taylor Forge & Pipe Works v. N. L. R . B., 234 F . 2d 227 , 231 (C . A. 7) (June 1956). 3 N. L. R. B. Y. Whitin Maclaine Works, 217 F. 2d 593 (C. A. 4), cert. denied 349 U. S. 905. %N. L. R . B. v. Yawman. & Erbe Mfg . Co., 187 F . 2d 947 , 948 (C. A. 2). 20 There is no case of the many in the 22-year history of the Act In which requested data having been found relevant was not required to be furnished as necessary for collective -bargaining purposes. "I Good faith in bargaining "contemplates an exchange of information, ideas and theories in open discussion and an honest attempt to arrive at an agreement ." N. L. R. B. v. Aluminum Ore Co., 131 F. 2d 485, 487 (C. A. 7). "As discussed in the majority opinion and the Intermediate Report, the questionnaire IWA-1 was sent by the Unions in advance of pending contract negotiations to some 600 employers in the industry , including Respondents , requesting data concerning their re- spective operations as to employee name, job classification , rate of pay , seniority, paid holidays , vacations , total hours worked , annual earnings , and the Company's 1953 produc- tloh and sales figures. Respondents , on advice of the employer association, Pine Industrial Relations Committee ( PIRC ), consistently refused to furnish any of the data, essentially on the ground that they were under no legal obligation to do so. My colleagues found , and in this I concur , that Respondents were guilty of an unlawful refusal to bargain in failing to supply the Unions with the specific items of information sought , excepting the production and sales figures. My position here is that the Unions were equally entitled to the production and sales figures. "In finding that the production and sales data was relevant and necessary , the Trial Examiner referred to the testimony in the present record of Kenney , the Unions ' spokes- PINE INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS COMMITTEE, INC. 1065 wage increase.33 (This purpose of the data sought, i. e., to ascertain productivity factors, though unmistakably evident throughout the record and the Intermediate Report, is not mentioned at all in the majority opinion.) Thus, the record shows that in the previous year, 1953, during the bargaining negotiations between these same parties, the Unions attempted to make use of production statistics secured from releases of employer trade associations in the industry and published national statistics to support their claims. But the Respondents re- jected these statistics because they were not directly related to the actual operations and the employers involved in the negotiations. In principal part, to meet this very objection of Respondents, the Unions prepared and submitted to employers in advance of the 1954 negoti- ations the questionnaire IWA-1, which included the request for the production and sales figures. Respondents themselves undertook to have comparable questionnaires filled out by employers in the in- dustry, 34 and compiled statistics for their own use, which was avail- able immediately prior to the 1954 negotiations. Such evidence itself establishes the relevance of the data in question in advance of the 1954 negotiations. Moreover, viewing the actual negotiations which took place, it is an undeniable matter of record that the issue of pro- ductivity was argued by either or both the Unions and Respondents, e. g., at the meetings on February 11, March 12, April 2, May 17 (Red Blanket), June 4, August 6 (Redmond), and in the negotiations of the Brooks-Scanlon contracts on September 14. The Unions stated in substance that "in the absence of the information requested on Form IWA-1," they based their demand for a 121/2-cents-per- hour increase "on the probable increase in productivity," pointing out in detail how the data in question would shed light on their demands. They claimed, man in the negotiations , "who clearly elucidated how these production and sales figures would be helpful to the union in the course of collective bargaining ." A specific reference of the Trial Examiner was to Kenney ' s testimony that the Unions by getting such data "would be in a position to accurately evaluate employer claims wtih respect to labor costs ." The majority , with the statement that the Respondents at no time made any claim with respect to labor costs . summarily discards the Trial Examiner 's all important finding that the data was relevant and necessary . This is patent error . ( 1) The specific data sought was plainly shown to be relevant and necessary without any such claim having to be made by the Respondents . ( 2) The Trial Examiner clearly relied on the whole record , not alone on this item of testimony adverted to by the majority. In any event , the record is open and speaks for itself . That the issue of productivity, with claims relating thereto being made on both sides, was a major one in the negotiations cannot thus be submerged or ignored . ( 3) Kenney's reference to "labor costs " is by no manner of inference drawing to be deemed a request for data as to the employer's financial position in anticipation of a plea of inability to pay. Indeed, Kenney's mention of "labor costs" fits well into the whole picture of the productivity issue, for it is elementary economics that employee productivity must always be gauged in relation to labor costs. 33 The formal contract proposals of the Unions in addition to the wage increase were (a) correction of inequities in job rates to be predicated upon a job evaluation study, and (b ) vacation improvements . For purposes of bargaining with respect to these de- mands as well , the Unions ' need for the data requested was well established in the record. 34 In the covering letter to these employers , PIRC stated that "the availability of such information is necessary in union negotiations." [Emphasis supplied.] 1066 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD inter alia, that "productivity, shipments and orders for 1954 in the in- dustry were running higher than in 1952, the date of the last wage in- crease" and stressed the need for job evaluation, one of the expressed purposes behind their request for the data. (No raise in wages re- sulted from the 1953 negotiations, and throughout the 1954 negotiations in question Respondents' insistent offer was no more than a renewal of the 1952 contract.) The Respondents in turn questioned the source of the Unions' figures on increased productivity, and cited statistics of two lumber associations in arguing that, on a national basis, "wages amply reflected increased productivity." That factors of improved employee productivity in measuring, pro- posals for a wage raise or other cost benefits are highly relevant in collective bargaining is not denied by my colleagues. Indeed, they cannot but be aware of the vital economic significance with which the element of employee productivity is regarded in union-manage- ment bargaining, and particularly in the light of the Administration's policy on inflation. In his State of the Union message to Congress on January 10, 1957, the President said : . .. I call on leaders in business and in labor to think well on their responsibility to the American people. With all elements of our society, they owe the Nation a vigilant guard against the inflationary tendencies that are always at work in a dynamic economy operating at today's high levels. They can powerfully help counteract or accentuate such tendencies by their wage and price policies. If our economy is to remain healthy, increases in wages and other labor benefits, negotiated by labor and management must be reasonably related to improvements in productivity. Such increases are beneficial, for they provide wage earners with greater purchasing power. Except where necessary to correct obvious injustices, wage increases that outrun productivity, however, are an inflationary factor.35 [Emphasis supplied.] I have read with some surprise the majority's footnote statement that, as the Board is a tribunal of law, it is improper to give any considera- tion to the administration's policy on inflation just quoted. I would note first that the suggestion that I have referred to this policy to establish a violation which would not otherwise exist is incorrect. I have referred. to it simply to underline not only the relevance but the 0 m, House Document No. 1, 85th Cong ., 1st Sess., 3 ; 103 Cong. Rec. 387 . Again on January 23 , 1957 , in the "Economic Report of the President " to Congress , the reference was made to " the responsibility of leaders of business and labor to reach agreement on wages and other labor benefits that are consistent with productivity prospects . . [emphasis supplied] . House Document No. 29 ; 103 Cong . Rec. 818. PINE INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS COMMITTEE, INC. 1067 crucial importance of productivity data to collective bargaining at the present time. But even if the President's statement were used to establish such relevance, such material would properly be considered by an administrative agency on such a question. If the national interest in avoiding inflation requires that wage increases be limited to those which reflect increased productivity, it is a cruel paradox for this Board to deny to the Unions the produc- tivity information peculiarly in the Respondents' possession which is the sole method by which the Unions can relate their request for a wage increase to the productivity factor and attempt to justify such .an increase in the course of collective bargaining. Moreover, it is a paradox. which is not required by law, but one which stems from the majority's misinterpretation in the context of this case of the nature of the data sought. Totally ignoring the fact that data as to annual board-feet production and sales is undeniably productivity informa- tion, the majority opinion labels it "information relating to the em- ployer's ability to grant a wage increase." The majority then says that "in effect" the Board and courts have held that an employer must plead inability to pay before an obligation to furnish "information relating thereto" arises; that this employer did not plead inability to pay,36 therefore there was no obligation to provide the data in question. I do not believe that the majority can successfully use such a transparent device as label switching in order to avoid the employer's obligation to furnish data relevant to wages. Assuming that data which would show a decline in production and in sales could properly be utilized in part by an employer who refused a wage increase on the ground of inability to pay-to justify his position it does not fol- low that production and sales data must exclusively bear the label "Data related to financial inability to pay-to be used for this purpose only." It is nonetheless "productivity" information without which in- creases or declines in labor productivity cannot be ascertained. The productivity factor is always pertinent and relevant to wages and par- ticularly-indeed, one might say indispensably-so at the present time in view of the President's State of the Union message. I would further note that there is nothing about the production and sales figures which is privileged, certainly nothing which would justify its withholding from the collective-bargaining process. The Respondents' arguments at the hearing that they would be "seriously '° Notwithstanding the Respondents' self-serving protestations during the negotiations and at the hearing that they did not plead inability to pay, there appears sufficient basis to find, were it necessary, that they did so plead in effect. They refused the Union's demands on grounds, among others, that "business conditions did not warrant and could not support the increase in costs," but carefully characterized this position as "in- advisability" rather than "inability" to pay. In similar circumstances, it has been held that the substance of such a position is a plea of inability to pay. E. g., Truitt Mfg. Co., 110 NLRB 856, enfd. 351 U. S. 149. 1068 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD handicapped" if such information became known to their respective competitors is the same contention which has been frequently advanced and rejected in other similar cases.37 And it is immaterial whether or not the Respondents "believed" that they were legally obligated to furnish the data .18 Numerous decisions on the books have required the employer to furnish requested data like that here in issue.38 Accordingly, I would require the Respondents to produce the pro- duction and sales data along with the other specified data in ques- tionnaire IWA-1 as to which there is no dispute that they have with- held unlawfully. MEMBER JENKINS took no part in the consideration of the above Decision and Order. 87 E. g ., Boston-Herald Traveler, Corp., 102 NLRB 627, enfd. 210 F. 2d 134 (C. A. 1) The Item Co., 108 NLRB 1634, enfd . 220 F. 2d 956 (C. A. 5).- as In a great many of the data cases in which a refusal to bargain was found, the employer took the same position that he "believed" he was not legally obligated to furnish the data. See, e. g., N. L. R. B. v. Truitt Mfg. Co., 351 U. S. 149, 150. See particularly court's discussion of this point and citation of cases in Taylor Forge & Pipe Works v. N. L. R. B., supra. X, E. g., Stein-Way Clothing Co., supra (studies made by the company concerning work- load grievances ) ; Hughes Toot Co., 100 NLRB 208 ( information concerning changes In production) ; N. L. R. B. v. Otis Elevator Co., 208 F. 2d 176 (C. A. 2) (time study data on which certain work standards were predicated which would disclose employer's basis for determining production standards involved in grievances). For cases showing the extreme type of data regarded as related to wages, or wage structure, see, e. g., Taylor Forge & Pipe Works v. N. L. If. B., supra (specific data revealing the basis of the em- ployer's complicated job evaluation system) ; Glen Raven Knitting Mills, supra (an accurate description of the company's various style constructions). In Oregon Coast Operators, 113 NLRB 1338, 1345 (where the failure to furnish production and opera- tional figures, among other data requested , was held violative of Section 8 (a) (5), the Board expressly reaffirmed, as it deliberately intended, all theretofore decided Board and court "data" cases, many of which it cited, referring to the whole question as involving "settled doctrine." Similarly, the Supreme Court in the Truitt case, supra, in referring to the consistent position of the Board on this aspect of the statute since " early in the Wagner Act" obviously indicated its agreement with the well -settled precedents. APPENDIX A NOTICE TO ALL EMPLOYEES Pursuant to a Decision and Order of the National Labor Relations Board, and in order to effectuate the policies of the National Labor Relations Act, we hereby notify our employees that : WE WILL NOT refuse to bargain collectively with International Woodworkers of America, AFL -CIO, Local 6-122, as the exclu- sive representative of our employees in the appropriate unit described below, by failing and refusing to furnish to said union information pertinent to collective bargaining namely, the name of each employee in the appropriate unit, his job classifications, his rate of pay, his seniority standing, his paid holidays, his PINE INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS COMMITTEE , INC. 1069 vacations, total hours he has worked, and his annual earnings, which information was requested by the union on or about December 21, 1953, provided, however, that within 30 days from this decision , Local 6-122 shall have complied with Section 9 ( f), (g), and (h) of the Act. WE WILL furnish the above -named union the above informa- tion requested in order that it may properly discharge its function as the statutory bargaining representative of the employees in said unit, provided, however, that within 30 days from this decision, Local 6-122 shall have complied with Section 9 (f), (g), and (h) of the Act. The bargaining unit is: All production, maintenance and transportation employees of Red Blanket Lumber Company, Inc., excluding office clerical, professional , and supervisory employees and guards. RED BLANKET LUMBER COMPANY, INC., Employer. Dated- --------------- By------------------------------------- (Representative ) ( Title) PINE INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS COMMITTEE, INC., Employer-Association. Dated---------------- By------------------------------------- (Representative) (Title) This notice must remain posted for 60 days from the date hereof, and must not be altered, defaced, or covered by, any other material. APPENDIX B NOTICE TO ALL E31PLOYEES Pursuant to a Decision and Order of the National Labor Relations Board , and in order to effectuate the policies of the National Labor Relations Act, we hereby notify our employees that: WE WILL NOT refuse to bargain collectively with International Woodworkers of America, AFL-CIO, Local 6-7, as the exclusive representative of our employees in the appropriate unit described below, by failing in refusing to furnish to said union information pertinent to collective bargaining namely, the name of each employee in the appropriate unit, his job classifications, his rate of pay, his seniority, his paid holidays, his vacations, total hours he has worked, and his annual earnings, which information was requested by the union on or about December 21, 1953. WE WILL furnish the above-named union the information re- quested in order that it may properly discharge its function as 1070 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD the statutory bargaining representative of the employees in said unit. The bargaining unit is : (The description of the respective bargaining units for each Respondent, shall be found in section III of the' Trial. Ex- aminer's Intermediate Report.) Employer. Dated---------------- By------------------------------------- (Representative) (Title) PINE INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS CoIIIIIITTEE, INC., Emnplo yer-Association. Dated---------------- By------------------------------------- (Representative) (Title) This notice must remain posted for 60 days from the date hereof, and must not be altered, defaced, or covered by any other material. INTERMEDIATE REPORT AND RECOMMENDED ORDER STATEMENT OF THE CASE This proceeding is brought under Section 10 (b) of the National Labor Rela- tions Act, 61 Stat. 136, herein called the Act, and is based upon charges duly filed by International Woodworkers of America, Locals 6-7 and 6-122, AFL-CIO,' against Respondents Pine Industrial Relations Committee, Inc., herein called PIRC; and against Brooks-Scanlon , Inc.; Ponderosa Mouldings, Inc. d/b/a Ponderosa Lumber Sales; Philip Dahl and Sam Johnson, Co-Partners, d/b/a Tile Knot Pine Mill; Philip Dahl and Harold D. Barclay, Co-Partners, d/b/a Harold Barclay Logging Company; 2 and Red Blanket Lumber Company, Inc., herein called Brooks-Scan- Ion, Ponderosa, Tile Knot, Barclay and Red Blanket, respectively, or Respondent Employers. Pursuant to said charges, the General Counsel of the National Labor Relations Board ordered the cases consolidated and issued a consolidated complaint on September 16, 1955, alleging that Respondents had engaged in unfair labor prac- tices within the meaning of Section 8 (a) (1), (3), and (5) of the Act. Copies of the charges, the order consolidating cases, the consolidated complaint, and no- tice of hearing thereon were duly served upon Respondents. In substance, the consolidated complaint alleged that: On and after January 30, 1954, Respondent Employers, through PIRC and otherwise, refused to supply the Charging Parties, and their international union as their agent, with certain specified payroll and production data directly related to the terms of then existing collective -bargaining agreements and to terms proposed for future collective- bargaining agreements; on and after February 11, 1954, in negotiations for new agree- ments, the Charging Parties sought 3 changes in a new collective-bargaining agree- ment and Respondent Employers, save Red Blanket, offered only to extend the previous agreement; on or about May 17, 1954, Red Blanket refused to agree to changes in terms of employment which would remove working conditions less advantageous than those found in agreements signed by the other Respondents for 1953 and 1954; Local 6-7 and Local 6-122 commenced an unfair labor practice strike against Respondent Employers on or about June 21, 1954, after their de- mands for improved working conditions and certain data were rejected; and dur- ing May and June 1954, prior to the strike, Red Blanket threatened to prolong any strike activity of its employees, threatened to shut down operations for 4 months if its employees struck, promised additional overtime if its employees abandoned membership in Local 6-122, discontinued overtime work on or about ' The AFL and CIO having merged, the identification of the Charging Parties is amended accordingly. 2 The pleadings were amended to reflect the correct name of this Respondent. PINE INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS COMMITTEE, INC. ].071 June 18, 1954 , because its employees had voted to strike , and, after the commence- ment of the strike on June 21 , withdrew recognition of Local 6-122. The complaint further alleged that: Red Blanket discharged certain named employees between June 24 and July 7, 1954; this action, together with the con- duct described above , prolonged the strike ; the strike was terminated on October 13, 1954; and Red Blanket thereafter refused to reinstate the strikers. The complaint further alleged - that: the strike was terminated with respect to Ponderosa , Tite Knot, and Barclay, on or about September 18, 1954, and with re- spect to Brooks-Scanlon on or about September 25; on or about September 20 certain named employees of Ponderosa and Tite Knot unconditionally offered to return to work and were denied reinstatement ; and on or about September 27, 1954 , certain named employees of Brooks-Scanlon unconditionally offered to re- turn to work , but were denied reinstatement to their former or substantially equiva- lent employment , and were offered or assigned to specified work of a different na- ture not substantially equivalent to their former employment . Answers were duly filed by all Respondents wherein the commission of unfair labor practices was denied. Pursuant to notice , a hearing , was held at Medford and Bend, Oregon, on various dates between October 24 and December 14, 1955, before the duly designated Trial Examiner . All parties participated in the hearing and were afforded full opportunity to be heard , to examine and cross -examine witnesses , and to introduce relevant evidence . During the course of the hearing , various motions were made by the Employer Respondents to sever the consolidated cases and were denied. At the close of the hearing, the parties were afforded an opportunity to argue orally, and to file briefs . Oral argument was waived and briefs have been received from all parties. Upon the entire record in the case, and from my observation of the witnesses, I make the following: FINDINGS OF FACT 1. THE BUSINESS OF RESPONDENTS A. The Association Pine Industrial Relations Committee , Inc., is a nonprofit corporation organized and existing under the laws of the State of Oregon, which maintains offices at Klamath Falls , Oregon. It represents its approximately 150 employer -members who are engaged in lumbering , logging, and allied woodworking industries , as stated in article II of the corporation 's Articles of Incorporation , "in connection with their relations with each other, with their employees and with the public." The same article states that another object of the corporation is to "use all lawful means to encourage the settlement of difficulties between its members, its members and their employees and its members and the public by agreements and arbitration; and to assist by all lawful means in the carrying out of such agreements and the pre- vention of the breach thereof; and to this end to represent and take the part of ag- grieved parties to such agreements." [Emphasis supplied.] Its operations are financed by dues levied upon the respective employer-members which are predicated upon the number of manhours of work performed for each employer member. All of the individual Employer Respondents named herein are members of PIRC. Although PIRC is ostensibly governed by its trustees who are selected from its membership according to geographical districts , day-to-day affairs were conducted and managed by C. L . Irving. Irving, now managing vice president of PIRC and its secretary -manager in 1954, claimed herein that PIRC did not deal with labor organizations, did not engage in labor negotiations in 1954, and that it is not its function to negotiate collective- bargaining agreements for its members . This contention will not withstand analysis for a consideration of the evidence discloses that PIRC, contrary to its claim, has been and is actively involved in the collective -bargaining picture of its members in a very direct sense. Thus, PIRC regularly contacts its members about bargaining negotiations both in their own pine area as well as in other areas . More particularly , and as Irving in fact testified , the operating technique is for a committee of employer -members of PIRC to be selected to meet with the labor organizations representing their em- ployees who are desirous of conducting negotiations . As Irving further testified, "The committee is chosen by my own notification to the people that I have known through the years who will be available for that work, who will have the time to do it, or who may be able to be available on a particular day on which the meeting is to be held." This was done in the present case in 1954. 1072 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD Indeed , Irving and other employees of PIRC arranged for and sat in at the meetings detailed below between the employer committee and the labor organiza- tions and counseled the employer members composing the committee as to how and when to meet with the union negotiating committee ; moreover, Irving, in his capacity with PIRC , and in no other, acted as spokesman for the employers on these occasions . While PIRC stresses the claim that it has no authority to bind its members to a collective-bargaining agreement, this is not dispositive of the ques- tion whether or not it serves as the agent of its employer -members in a direct sense in the field of labor relations . Nor is it of any import that the ultimate agree- ments signed by the employers represented by the employer committee are separate agreements rather than one multiemployer agreement. The only issue is whether or not PIRC serves as the agent of its members . The record amply discloses that it has and does. Similarly, while there was testimony by employer -members that they never authorized PIRC to act as its agent , the record amply demonstrates that PIRC, through its personnel , did precisely that with the consent of the particular employer- members, both in correspondence as well as at bargaining meetings held with the Charging Parties herein . The fact is that the committee of employers chosen by Irving was the creature of PIRC and had full authority to act for all the employers in negotiations with the Charging Parties, subject only to the reserved right of the Employer Respondents to.reject any settlement reached. As stated in Section 2 (2) of the Act, "The term ` employer' includes any person acting as an agent of an employer , directly or indirectly.. . I find , as Board decisions have consistently done, that an association such as this which appears for, counsels, and represents its members who are engaged in interstate commerce for the purpose of collective bargaining , as appears below , is itself an employer engaged in commerce within the meaning of the Act. See Oregon Coast Operators Association, et al., 113 NLRB 1338 ; Western Association of Engineers , et al., 101 NLRB 64; Mundet Cork Corporation , etc., 96 NLRB 1142; and Oertel Brewing Company, 93 NLRB 530 . See also N. L. R. B. v . International Brotherhood of Teamsters, Local 182, 228 F. 2d 83 (C. A. 2). B. The companies Brooks-Scanlon , Inc., is a Delaware corporation which is engaged in the manu- facture of lumber and lumber products at Bend , Oregon. During the course and conduct of its business , Brooks-Scanlon annually sells and ships products valued in excess of $100,000 to destinations outside the State of Oregon. Red Blanket Lumber Company , Inc., is an Oregon corporation which is engaged in the manufacture of lumber products at Prospect and Eagle Point , Oregon. It annually sells and ships lumber products valued in excess of $ 100,000 to destina- tions outside the State of Oregon. , Ponderosa Mouldings , Inc., d/b/a Ponderosa Lumber Sales 3 is an Oregon corpora- tion which is engaged in the manufacture of finished lumber and lumber products at Redmond , Oregon . During the course and conduct of its business, Ponderosa annually sells and ships products valued in excess of $ 100,000 to destinations out- side the State of Oregon. Philip Dahl and Sam Johnson are. copartners d/b/a Tire Knot Pine Mill and are engaged in the manufacture of rough lumber near Redmond , Oregon. Their annual product is valued in excess of $100,000 , and approximately 95 percent thereof, ac- cording to Dahl, is sold to Ponderosa which in turn converts the rough lumber to finished lumber . Ponderosa sells this finished lumber in the manner described above, deducts a portion of the proceeds for processing charges and commissions, and remits the remainder to Tite Knot. Stated otherwise, Ponderosa in effect performs a remanufacturing operation and provides a sales service for Tite Knot. Dahl con- ceded herein that Ponderosa annually sold lumber products valued in excess of $100,000 and remitted a sum in excess of $100,000 from such proceeds to Tite Knot. I find, in view of the foregoing business relationship between Tite Knot and Ponderosa , that the operations of Tite Knot meet the present jurisdictional stand- ards of the Board . See Whippany Motor Co., Inc., 115 NLRB 52, and Hoosier Fence Co., Inc., 115 NLRB 51.4 Philip Dahl and Harold D. Barclay are copartners doing business as Harold Barclay Logging Company and have been engaged , at least since 1944 , in logging ' It was stipulated herein that since February 28, 1955, Ponderosa has ceased doing business as Ponderosa Lumber Sales but has continued to do business solely as Ponderosa Mouldings, Inc. There is no evidence of any change in the form or nature of this business entity. S It is therefore not necessary to treat with evidence alleged to show that Tite Knot and Ponderosa, during one period at least, were one business entity. PINE INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS COMMITTEE, INC. 1073 operations in the vicinity of Sisters , Oregon . This business venture also conducts logging operations at Simnasho some 80 miles distant from Sisters; the latter operation is not involved herein and apparently is not organized. Barclay performs logging operations for Tite Knot and delivers logs to the latter which are valued in excess of $100,000 per annum . The General Counsel claims herein, as a basis for the assertion of jurisdiction , that the employees of Barclay, at the Sisters operation , have long been associated for the purposes of collective bargaining in what is in effect a single multiemployer unit comprised of Barclay and Tite Knot employees and therefore , in view of the assertion of jurisdiction over Tite knot, jurisdiction should be asserted over the operations of Barclay. I find merit in this claim which is substantially supported by the record . The testimony on this topic stems chiefly from Tim Sullivan , president of District No. 6 of Inter- national Woodworkers of America , a clear and impressive witness, whose recollec- tion on this topic was excellent. The testimony of Dahl and Harold Barclay on this topic was marked by vagueness , particularly that of the latter. Tite Knot has never employed logging crews but , in 1942 , as Dahl conceded, Tite Knot executed a contract with Local 6-7 which covered a bargaining unit of both mill and logging operations . Barclay was not in existence at that time and the contract applied to loggers employed by one Roche , who logged in the same Sisters area later logged by Barclay ; the record does not supply the precise connection, if any, between Roche and Barclay, although Harold Barclay testified that he was an employee of Roche at that time . According to Sullivan and Harold Barclay, Roche was performing logging operations for Tite Knot; thereafter, Sullivan entered the armed services and did not return to the area until 1946. In 1946, as Sullivan testified , he met with Dahl and Harold Barclay in the Tite Knot office in Redmond. He suggested that certain wartime regulations handed down by the West Coast Lumber Commission be embodied in the contract; Dahl agreed to do so. Sullivan then proposed that a separate contract with Barclay would be desirable , but Dahl declined , stating that the one contract would cover both concerns. Dahl testified that he did not recall making the statement attributed to him by Sullivan , and Harold Barclay was not questioned on this matter. I credit the testimony of Sullivan herein. On February 25, 1948, in Tite Knot Pine Mill, Case 36-UA-191, the Board held a consent election , as then required under the Act, on the proposition of authorizing Local 6-7 to negotiate a union-security agreement . The tally of ballots discloses that of 95 eligible voters the vote was 69 to 19 in favor of the proposition . What is sig- nificant about this figure is the fact that Tite Knot at that time , as Dahl conceded, had approximately 60 employees and the unit polled included both Tite Knot and Barclay personnel . Indeed , one Maurer , the office manager for Barclay , is listed on the tally as an observer for Tite Knot . Sullivan testified, and I find, that the voting was con- ducted initially in Redmond, the location of Tite Knot, and thereafter at Sisters, the location of Barclay . He further testified that the voters at Sisters were em- ployees of Barclay; as noted above, Tite Knot conducts no operations , logging or otherwise , at Sisters. On May 17, 1948, a contract was entered into between Local 6-7 and Tite Knot. In article I thereof , Local 6-7 was expressly recognized as the sole collective- bargaining representative of "all the employees in the Mill and Logging Operations of the Employer." According to Sullivan , some concern was expressed by newer employees of Barclay, hired since the 1946 negotiations when Dahl had stated that the Tite Knot contract would apply to Barclay , as to precisely where they stood in terms of contract coverage. As a result, they selected a negotiating committee to attend the 1948 negotiations which were also attended by Harold Barclay, Dahl, and Sullivan. The Barclay group of employees announced that they were there to nego- tiate a separate contract , but both Dahl and Barclay announced that it was not necessary to have a separate contract as the Tite Knot contract would still cover them. This was satisfactory to all and the contract was signed by Dahl and 7 employees , 4 of whom were employees of Barclay and 3 of Tite Knot. Again, in 1954 Dahl signed a contract with a committee of Local 6-7, later rejected by the full body thereof , which specifically dealt with woods employees. Here , as before, Tite Knot had no woods employees and this obviously applied to Barclay loggers. Sullivan further testified, and I find, that since 1946 the Tite Knot contract as amended has covered Barclay employees at Sisters . Dahl admitted that in the years prior to 1954 the benefits accorded to Tite Knot employees had been extended to all employees of Barclay . Harold Barclay, in his testimony , conceded that wages and working conditions of the employees of Barclay and Tite Knot are comparable and are usually changed together. 450553-58-vol. 118-69 1074 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD I find, in view of the foregoing, that there is a long established pattern of bar- gaining on a multiemployer basis by Tile Knot and Barclay, both concerns 50 percent owned by Dahl, with respect to Tite Knot employees at Redmond and Barclay em- ployees at Sisters, Oregon, and that these concerns constitute a single employer for jurisdictional purposes. In fact, these two employers, in the 1948 consent election, in effect conceded the appropriateness of such a bargaining unit and that they therefore constituted a single employer for the purposes of collective bargaining. The findings hereinabove made with respect to Tite Knot on the question of jurisdic- tion, bringing Tile Knot within the Board's jurisdictional standards, would therefore be applicable to Barclay. I further find, contrary to the contention of Respondents, that the authorization by Dahl of the employer committee chosen by PIRC to repre- sent Tite Knot in the 1954 negotiations was, consistent with the long bargaining history, also an authorization to represent Barclay, and that Dahl's participation was in behalf of both concerns. See Insulation Contractors of Southern California, Inc., 110 NLRB 638, and E. F. Shuck Construction Co., Inc., 114 NLRB 727. I find, in view of the foregoing, that all of the individually named employers herein are engaged in commerce within the meaning of the Act and that it would effectuate the policies of the Act to assert jurisdiction. II. THE LABOR ORGANIZATIONS INVOLVED International Woodworkers of America, Locals 6-7 and 6-122, AFL-CIO, are labor organizations admitting to membership the employees of Respondent Employers. III. THE UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES A. Background; the issues The unfair labor practices alleged in the instant complaint stem from negotiations in 1954 between the Charging Unions and Respondents concerning the provisions of collective-bargaining agreements, as well as the antecedent and concurrent attempts of the Charging Unions to obtain certain data from the respective Employer Respond- ents relating to individual job classifications and rates of pay, holidays, vacations, total hours worked, and annual earnings per employee, as well as production and sales totals of the respective employers. It may be noted that the record contains much matter not germane to a resolution of the issues. The Charging Parties have enjoyed a contractual relationship with the respective Employer Respondents for varying periods of time. The evidence discloses that Local 6-7 had entered into a contract with Tite Knot as early as 1942 and most recently in May 1948,5 with Ponderosa in July 1948, and with Brooks-Scanlon in 1951, the latter consisting of two separate contracts for woods and plant units signed in June and September 1951, respectively. Actually, Local 6-7 has been recognized by Brooks-Scanlon subsequent to a Board certification in 1940; Brooks-Scanlon, em- ploying approximately 600 employees, is by far the largest of the Employer Respond- ents, as the others employed less than 100 each at the time material herein. Local 6-122 in turn has enjoyed a contractual relationship with Red Blanket at least since June 1951. The agreements all provide, although in not identical language, for renewal or termination on April 1 of succeeding years. All have been renewed from year to year automatically, subject to some amendments. These contracts were in full force and effect at least up to April 1, 1954. I have previously set forth the general nature of PIRC and its role herein. On the other side of the bargaining table appears an organization known as Northwest Regional Negotiating Committee, herein called NRNC. This is a committee com- posed of representatives of various local unions belonging to International Wood- workers of America in the Pacific Northwest. It negotiates provisions of collective- bargaining agreements in behalf of local unions which have authorized it to do so with employer associations as well as individual employers. Its efforts are concentrated on basic terms of employment which are generally applicable to employers through- out the Northwest; other matters of local interest are reserved to the locals for sepa- rate negotiation. Thus, this system envisages separate collective bargaining by NRNC and the locals with the same employer on general and local terms of employment, respectively. As will appear, in the case of Red Blanket at least, this line of distinction is difficult s As heretofore found, Tite Knot and Barclay are allied; for the purposes of collective bargaining as one employer. Except as otherwise indicated, all references to Tite Knot, including its contractual relations with labor organizations, are intended to include Barclay operations at Sisters, Oregon. PINE INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS COMMITTEE, INC. 1075 to maintain. In 1954, NRNC was authorized by the 2 Charging Locals to negotiate with the Employer Respondents herein as well as other employers on 3 desired changes in the working agreements between the parties. These were the agreements due to expire on April 1, 1954. The practice of the local unions is to notify the respective employers that NRNC is authorized to represent them on certain broad demands. Late in 1953, the various local unions of International Woodworkers of America, after much preliminary exploratory work, fixed upon three demands for contract negotiations in the Pacific Northwest. These were (1) a general wage increase, the amount to be determined from industry conditions and other factors, including information to be submitted by employers in response to questionnaires sent out by NRNC; (2) correction of inequities in job rates, this to be predicated upon a job analysis jointly made by the employer and the local, but financed solely by the employer; and (3) a 3-week vacation after 5 continuous years of employment in lieu of the existing lesser benefit. Local 6-122 notified Red Blanket by mail of these three specific demands on January 21, and Local 6-7 similarly notified Brooks-Scanlon, Tite Knot, Barclay, and Ponderosa on January 23, 1954. This form letter stated that (1) the action was taken in accordance with the termination and revision provisions of the respective contracts; (2) NRNC had sole authority to represent the local in negotiations on these proposed amendments; (3) local matters were specifically excluded as the subject of these negotiations; (4) and the questionnaire, identified by the local, as well as herein, as IWA-1, should be returned to the International not later than January 30 so that the local could proceed intelligently and constructively in the negotiations. Two of the Employer Respondents gave notice during this period of contract changes they desired. Red Blanket wrote to Local 6-122 on January 21 and an- nounced its desire to amend the existing agreement in three respects, namely, elimination of the contractor and subcontractor clause, elimination of the provision providing for the checkoff of union dues, and amendment of the hours-of-labor clause determining the sixth and overtime day in a workweek. Brooks-Scanlon submitted revisions to Local 6-7 on January 29; the details of this proposal are not disclosed herein. Neither employer attempted in words to terminate the contract at this time. This questionnaire, IWA-1, and the failure to return it, constitutes one of the central issues herein. Late in 1953, NRNC concluded that it wished to avoid a difficulty experienced in the 1953 negotiations, namely, the reluctance of employers and employer associations generally to accept statistics put out by various national associations; it is not contended herein that PIRC took such a position in 1953. NRNC decided to provide its own statistics of a more specific nature for the lumber industry. Accordingly, a questionnaire, Form TWA-1, was devised and sent to approximately 600 employers in the States of Washington, Oregon, Idaho, Montana, and California, on or about December 21, 1953. Each employer, including the 5 Employer Re- spondents herein, received 1, together with a guide sheet and a covering letter asking that it be completed and returned not later than January 30, 1954. This letter stated, "In order that our Union may formulate constructive proposals for intelligent col- lective bargaining, we are enclosing Form IWA-1, requesting specific information as an aid to 1954 negotiations." The letter was signed by A. F. Hartung, chairman of NRNC and also president of the International. This form, as indicated, called for detailed information about seniority, job classification, rate of pay, annual hours, and annual wages paid each in- dividual employee by name; the location and type of operation involved; vacations and holidays granted each employee; and figures of 1953 production and sales. Followup form letters were sent on January 14 and 22, urging the submission of the material. Only Barclay, among the Respondents, pleaded ignorance of the receipt of these documents. I find that the knowledge of partner Dahl, admitted herein, is binding on Barclay. On various dates between January 26 and February 5, 1954, the Employer Re- spondents separately wrote to the respective Locals and acknowledged receipt of the form letters which served to open the contracts. These letters acknowledged the fact that the Locals had authorized NRNC to represent them in the negotiations; stated that the Locals and their representatives would be advised at a later date as to how the respective employers wished to be represented; and announced that a committee of employers was authorized to meet with union representatives at an initial meeting for the purpose of hearing an explanation of the union demands. The letters went on to state that arrangements for a meeting could be arranged 1076 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD through the PIRC office in Klamath Falls. They reflect almost verbatim a suggested draft letter sent to the employers by PIRC on or about January 25. On February 13, after an initial meeting on February 11 between NRNC and the employer committee, PIRC reported the results of the meeting to its membership and suggested a draft letter for transmission by the Employer Respondents to the respective Locals. Such letters were sent shortly thereafter. They informed the Locals, consistent with the draft submitted by PIRC, that an employer committee selected by Secretary-Manager Irving of PIRC, would represent the respective employers in the negotiations, although the right to reject any recommendation of the employer committee was reserved. Ponderosa's letter is not in evidence but it is clear from later correspondence on July 15 that it adopted this policy as well. A general outline of the ensuing sequence of events may prove helpful to an appreciation of the issues involved herein. As indicated, the negotiations for all the Employer Respondents were conducted jointly in their behalf, as well as for other employers, by the employer committee selected by PIRC and on the other hand, by NRNC for the Charging Parties. These meetings were held at Klamath Falls, Oregon, on February 11, March 12, April 2, April 23, and June 4, 1954. No agreement was reached between the negotiating committees. NRNC, during March and April, had taken a referendum strike ballot among the members of the locals involved, including Locals 6-7 and 6-122, and the resulting vote authorized a strike, if necessary, to enforce the economic demands it raised in the negotiations. The strike was originally scheduled for May but was postponed to June 21, 1954. It took place on or about that date, and was accompanied by picketing; there is evidence that it may have started as early as June 19 at Brooks-Scanlon. It may be noted that one meeting took place at the local level between a committee from Local 6-122 and Red Blanket late in May, on or about May 17. On this occasion, the union committee unsuccessfully offered to withdraw from NRNC and bargain individually, if a local agreement based upon certain stated economic demands could be reached. At this point, the Employer Respondents took steps to terminate their respective collective-bargaining agreements. On June 21, Brooks-Scanlon wrote to Local 6-7 and furnished 60 days' notice to cancel its 2 working agreements, for woods and plant employees respectively. I find that this was consistent with the provisions of the contracts. Tite Knot wrote a letter to the same effect to Local 6-7 on June 22; this too is found to have been consistent with the language of the contract. Ponderosa, on the other hand, posted a notice to its employees on June 22, announcing that under the terms of its agreement, specifically article XXI thereof, the agreement was no longer binding. This was done, apparently, on the theory that the contract expired on April 1, 1954, its renewal date, as a result of a notice to amend the contract filed by Local 6-7 in January. In any event, the General Counsel does not press this act as a violation herein. On July 7 Red Blanket notified its employees that it was no longer recognizing Local 6-122. This action was apparently taken on either of two theories, namely, (1) the contract which had been specifically extended to April 1, 1954, had expired on that date, or (2) the notice of Local 6-122 to amend the contract, duly filed in January, served to terminate the contract on April 1, 1954, and prevent its renewal. In July the Employer Respondents were advised by PIRC to withdraw their authority from the PIRC employer committee in view of the changed bargaining picture, namely, the fact that some employers originally represented by the employer committee had signed contracts and as a result the committee represented a smaller group than it originally had. This advice was followed, and the respective locals were duly notified that Respondents would conduct negotiations thereafter on an individual basis. Later attempts were made to negotiate with Tite Knot, Ponderosa, and Brooks- Scanlon . Meetings were held with Brooks-Scanlon from August through December 1954, and ultimately resulted in new contracts between Brooks-Scanlon and Local 6-7, covering plant and woods units; they were signed on November 6 and December 10, 1954, respectively, and run until April 1, 1956, and from year to year thereafter, absent notice to terminate by January 26. Meetings with Tite Knot and Ponderosa in August and September were inconclusive. Local 6-122 also met with Red Blanket on or about September 13. The strike against Ponderosa, Tite Knot and Barclay was terminated by vote at a meeting of Local 6-7 on September 18, effective September 20, and picketing was discontinued. Identical action was taken with respect to Brooks-Scanlon on Sep- tember 25 effective September 27. Local 6-122 notified Red Blanket of the termi- nation of the strike there on October 13. As indicated, all Respondents save Brooks- Scanlon had previously, during the course of the strike, notified the respective Locals PINE INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS COMMITTEE, INC. 1077 that they were no longer recognizing them. As will appear, this action stemmed from the replacement of strikers as well as the fact that numerous strikers had returned to work despite the presence of picket lines established by their unions. All struck Employer Respondents, save Brooks-Scanlon, opened behind the picket lines, operating with new hires and returned strikers. The General Counsel makes no contention herein that any economic strikers were discharged or denied reinstate- ment prior to permanent replacement and expressly bottoms his case on the theory that the strikers were unfair labor practice strikers. Brooks-Scanlon did resume op- erations, but only after the picket line was removed on September 25, 1954. Having previously determined that PIRC is an employer and that Barclay is en- gaged in commerce within the meaning of the Act, the remaining issues are raised by the pleadings: (1) Did Respondents engage in unfair labor practices within the meaning of Section 8 (a) (1) and (5) of the Act by refusing to provide the International or the Charging Parties with the data requested in the questionnaire, Form IWA-1? (2) Did Respondents engage in unfair labor practices within the meaning of Section 8 (a) (1) and (5) of the Act by refusing to accede to the demands of the Charging Parties for changes in the collective-bargaining agreements? 6 (3) Were the strikers unfair labor practice strikers? (4) Did Respondents Red Blanket, Brooks-Scanlon, Ponderosa, and Tite Knot discharge or discriminate against striking employees in violation of Section 8 (a) (1) and (3) of the Act? B. Joint negotiations 1. The February II meeting The first meeting between NRNC and the employer committee appointed by Secretary-Manager Irving of PIRC was held on February 11. Those present in- cluded J. E. Dicey, vice president of the International and spokesman for NRNC; Tim Sullivan, president of District No. 6 of the International, and various NRNC members as well as observers. District No. 6 is a Council of local unions in the pine area of Oregon and northern California. Present for the employer committee were Irving and his two assistants, Glos and Henry, and a group of employer-members including A. J. Glassow, then vice president and general manager of Brooks-Scanlon. Dicey and Irving did almost all of the talking. After certain preliminaries, Dicey read a 2-page statement outlining the union demands which were still 3 in number. They were (1) an across-the-board general wage increase of 121/2 cents per hour, which figure, Dicey pointed out, had been deter- mined by NRNC in the absence of the information requested on Form IWA-1, but without waiving the demand for this information; this amount Dicey stated, was based upon two factors, the increase in the cost of living since 1952 and the annual increase in productivity. It will be recalled that the Locals in their January letters to the employers had sought a wage increase in an unspecified amount. The other two demands were identical with those previously submitted to the individual em- ployers in January, namely, (2) an employer-financed job analysis of the industry in order to correct job-rate inequities, there allegedly being an excessive spread in the rates being paid men in different plants for the same work; and (3) a vacation benefit of 3 weeks after 5 years' seniority. Dicey elaborated somewhat on these demands, particularly on demand 2. On several occasions, Dicey made reference to the desire of the unions for the information on Form IWA-1. Irving raised the claim that the International, not being the bargaining agent, had no authority to obtain this information and that PIRC had so advised its membership, but it was pointed out in reply that the Locals, in their contract openings, had authorized this technique, as in fact they had. Dicey did indicate the need of the information not only with respect to wage demands but also with respect to holiday provisions of the contract, in order to determine whether members were receiving the full benefit of the contract. It was made clear by Irving that this was an exploratory meeting to hear the union demands so that the employers could decide how they would bargain, that is, in a group or individually. Neither at this nor any other meetings prior to the strike did the parties discuss the contract changes proposed by Red Blanket and Brooks-Scanlon. U The gravamen of the complaint, in this respect, and the evidence thereunder Is directed to the meetings held in the period prior to the strike in June. In fact, the complaint does not appear to attack the subsequent withdrawals of recognition. Similarly, the complaint does not attack the establishment of the employer committee without authority to bind the individual employers. 1078 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD There is a conflict as to whether Irving, at the close of the meeting, stated that the employers would decide whether to furnish the information sought by IWA-1 only after they determined how to bargain, as contended by Dicey, or whether, as Irving claimed, he stated only that he had advised the employers not to refuse to supply the information, but to keep the request pending, withhold the informa- tion, and permit the course of the bargaining to determine what information was necessary. A resolution of this conflict is not necessary because it is clear, and I find, that Irving, on either version, did not provide the information or promise that the employers would provide it. On February 13 PIRC mailed to its members having contracts with IWA locals a summary of the meeting of February 11, and reported that the employers' com- mittee had met subsequently and determined that they should engage in group negotiations in committee form, as had been done in the past. A suggested draft letter to the respective locals was enclosed and a notification to this effect was sent to Locals 6-7 and 6-122 by the Employer Respondents. Thus, an employer com- mittee with authoriy to negotiate, subject to approval by each Employer Respondent, appeared in the picture prior to the March 12 meeting. 2. The March 12 meeting This meeting was a lengthy one and was attended, among others, by Irving; his two assistants; the employer committee, including Philip Dahl of Tite Knot and Barclay and A. J. Glassow of Brooks-Scanlon; and, for NRNC, Dicey, Sullivan, and various union representatives. On this occasion, Dicey, in behalf of NRNC, gave a lengthy presentation of the union arguments in support of the three economic demands presented at the February 11 meeting. The Red Blanket and Brooks- Scanlon proposals were not discussed. There is no substantial dispute concerning the meeting save with respect to the subject of the questionnaire, Form IWA-1. While Glassow testified that this topic was not mentioned subsequent to the February 11 meeting, Glos, Dahl, and Irving each conceded, and I find, that the topic was brought up on March 12. Dicey's presentation consisted of reading from a prepared 15-page statement on which he from time to time elaborated. He also pointed out how the information sought by the questionnaire would be valuable in shedding light on the three demands. His demand for the 121/z cents wage increase was predicated on the increase in the cost of living plus recognition of the probable increase in productivity during the preceding several years. As for the second demand, the job evaluation program, he urged that there should be no wage differential between plants for similar work performed at plants in the same area, claiming that a preliminary study in the adjoining fir area disclosed excessive wage spreads for similar job classifications. In this respect as well, he contended that the information of the questionnaire as to individual classifications and wage rates would be helpful. Apparently little was said about the vacation benefits save that Dicey claimed there was a trend in the industry in the direction of a 3 weeks' vacation after 5 years of employment. Irving conceded herein that Dicey complained about the failure of the Employer Respondents to submit IWA-1. It is not deemed necessary to resolve the conflict whether, as Dicey claimed, Irving refused to submit the information, or, as Irving claimed, no response was called for when Dicey brought up the subject, for the fact is that, as at the previous meeting, the information was sought but not produced or promised. Irving, in turn, questioned Dicey as to the source of his figures on increased productivity and wage differentials. The employer committee caucused briefly at this point and returned to the meeting, whereupon Irving responded to the union demands from an outline he had prepared prior to the meeting. Irving asserted with respect to the requested increase in wage rates, that wages of the pine area had more than kept up with the cost of living and that, on a national basis, production figures reflected labor as receiving more than 50 percent of increased productivity despite a downward trend in profits of the lumber industry, citing the statistics of 2 lumber associations. He claimed that wages paid by members of PIRC were higher than the average rates of all lumber workers in California and Oregon, as computed by State agencies, and stated that they compared favorably with rates in other industries. He contended that the job evaluation program would not prove successful be- cause differentials traditionally had existed in the industry for valid reasons, and that an evaluation should be conducted on an intra-plant basis rather than on an industry or areawide basis. Irving claimed that he saw no trend to a 3 weeks' PINE INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS COMMITTEE, INC. 1079 vacation after 5 years' employment and that the existing benefit, 2 weeks after 3 years was in excess of the trend. It may be noted that the record does not disclose precisely what the vacation benefits were with respect to all Employer Respondents in 1954. Irving stated, in response to Dicey's query, that he was not pleading "inability," but rather "inadvisability," to recommend anything involving an increase of costs. He bottomed his position opposing the cost increases required by the three economic demands on downward trends in the industry, namely, the steadily falling price of lumber at that time, as reflected in figures published by West Coast Lumbermen's Association, a trade association, as well as a drop in production, unfilled orders, and shipments. Finally, Irving stated that the employer committee was unwilling to recommend any settlement involving a cost increase in view of market and economic trends, but was offering to recommend renewal of the existing contract for 1 year. The union representatives then caucused, returned, and rejected Irving's offer. Irving in turn said that he would submit the employer position to them in writing. One claim of the General Counsel and the Charging Parties may be initially considered at this point. While it appears, as counsel for the Charging Parties ably stresses in his brief, that the desire for the submission of Form IWA-1 was pressed at this meeting and, as he further contends, the witnesses for Respondents tended to underplay the references to Form IWA-1 in the negotiations, on the other hand, the record does not warrant the further conclusion he urges, namely, that Form IWA-1 was a very strong part of the union presentation. While it is true that the union wanted the information, it is readily apparent that they were primarily and basically interested in their three economic demands, and in fact had selected the wage increase figure of 121/2 cents per hour precisely because the IWA-1 form information had not been forthcoming. Stated otherwise, NRNC basically sought a new contract with three economic improvements which the employers refused to grant because they believed, and attempted to prove as much, that business conditions did not warrant and could not support the increases in costs. The IWA-1 information was at best a corollary to these basic economic demands. On or about March 17, PIRC wrote to NRNC and the local unions. This letter constituted, in substance, a restatement of the position taken by Irving at the March 12 meeting. He again offered to renew the old contract for 1 year. Irving stressed the claim that wage rates of PIRC members had kept pace with the increase in the cost of living, citing statistics in support of his claim, and comparing wage rates paid by PIRC members with California, Oregon, and national lumber industry averages, as well as with averages in other industries. He pointed out that the PIRC standing was well above the average and was exceeded only by a few named industries. Irving repeated his argument that wages amply reflected increased productivity and that the share of sales reflected in lumber industry profits from 1953 was down. He cited facts in support of his claim that production, orders, shipments, and unfilled orders were down and in significant contrast, that inventories were up 15 percent, with lumber prices declining. Irving challenged the union concept of a job analysis and evaluation on an industrywide basis as "colossal" and "almost impossible" and drew attention to the upward adjustments in rate ranges envisaged by the Charg- ing Parties. He disputed the union claim of a trend to a 3 weeks' vacation after 5 years' employment, pointing out that it boiled down to a week of lost production and therefore was an additional cost item. Irving expressed concern that an increase in wage costs to be paid from already narrowed profit margins might well result in unemployment, and drew attention to decreasing production. He again offered to recommend renewal of the existing contract. Prior to the next meeting, Local 6-7 wrote to Brooks-Scanlon on March 25 and sought information as to the average hourly wage rates of all Brooks-Scanlon employees. On April 1 Brooks-Scanlon replied and supplied the 1953 rate ranges by departments, these being five in number. 3. The April 2 meeting The next meeting was arranged by the Federal Mediation and Conciliation Service at the request of NRNC and was held on April 2 at Klamath Falls. Present were Commissioner Walker of FMCS, Irving, Henry, Glos, Dicey, Sullivan, Glassow, and other employer and union committee members. The commissioner opened the meeting and immediately turned the proceedings over to Dicey. Walker, who did not testify herein, did not participate actively thereafter, although he presumably was present for the duration of the meeting. Dicey restated his contract demands, unchanged from the prior meeting, and claimed that productivity, shipments, and 1080 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD orders for 1954 in the industry were running higher than in 1952, the date of the last wage increase.7 Dicey claimed that 1953 had been a good year for the employers profitwise. He read certain ranges for wages which were alleged to support the union contention that there was an excessive spread in the rate ranges. Dicey then turned to a docu- ment prepared in reply to the PIRC letter of March 17. This document claimed that: (1) PIRC was manipulating figures with respect to the cost of living in order to cloud the issue; (2) the comparison of wage rates in the western lumber industry with national, California, and Oregon averages for the lumber industry and with national averages in other industries was misleading, and that a better comparison would have been with the -higher wage rates in the adjoining Douglas Fir area; (3) employees of the lumber industry had in fact not received any benefits from increased productivity; (4) current production shipments and orders were running ahead of 1952 (but as indicated above, behind 1953); (5) the job analysis program was workable, pointing out, as he had previously, that three pilot surveys, each of a different size operation, would be feasible; (6) and vacation pay was not pay for time worked, but for time spent on a job. This, it may be noted, does not dispose of Respondents' claim that it was an increased cost item, as in fact it was. In conclusion, he challenged the good faith of PIRC in the negotiations. Irving told the commission that Respondents had nothing to add to their prior proposal. I find, as Irving conceded, that the request for the IWA-1 information was brought up by union representatives who commented on the failure of individual employers to supply the information. I further find that this constituted a renewal request for the information. It is significant that Irving testified there was no indica- tion at this meeting, as well as throughout the negotiations, that the information was not forthcoming, but that "throughout the entire negotiations, our position was that, should any of the information prove in our judgment essential to the conduct of negotiations, we would view it [the request for information] anew." I find that the request for information was renewed at this meeting and that Respondents failed to comply with the request. As at the prior meeting, the very nature of the evidence proffered by both sides discloses that the primary emphasis was on the economic demands of the union, and, more particularly, the attempt by NRNC to refute the claims of the employer com- mittee with respect to the economic demands presented by the unions. 4. The April 25 meeting The next meeting was held at Klamath Falls on April 25 under the auspices of the Federal Mediation and Conciliation Service and was attended by Commissioner Walker; Irving, Glos, and Henry for PIRC; Glassow, Dahl, and several others of the employer committee; and Bruce McDonald and several others for NRNC and the Locals. The only testimony in any detail as to this meeting was presented by Irving and is credited; it is corroborated as to one aspect of the meeting by that of Glos. The meeting was a short one with Bruce McDonald, whose precise title is not disclosed, as the spokesman for NRNC. McDonald immediately asked "Is there any change in the employer committee position?" Irving replied that there was none, whereupon McDonald turned to Commissioner Walker and stated that he had been sent to the meeting with instructions "to ascertain only one thing, . if there is any change in the employer committee position, and, since there isn't, this meeting might as well come to an end." Walker claimed that in the face of such a position, mediation was futile, and recessed the meeting subject to a call by himself or either side. Prior to doing so, Walker did inquire whether the settlement proposed by PIRC on or about March 17, namely to extend the old contract 1 year, was intended to close out all issues, or whether other matters were still reserved for local negotia- tion. Irving replied that the employer committee had been authorized to nego- tiate only on the three industry issues, as posed by NRNC on a broad basis, and was not authorized to make recommendations on matters reserved for local bar- gaining. This, of course, was consistent with the position of the Locals when they had commenced negotiations, namely, that local matters were reserved for bar- gaining at the local level. Both Irving and Glos testified, and I find, that no refer- According to statistics read at the meeting by Dicey . such was the case. However, the same statistics also support the contention of PIRC that 1.954 production , shipments, and orders were running behind 1953 . What actually happened , as revealed by these statistics , the source of which is not disclosed , was that the 1953 totals were well above those for 1952 and that the 1954 totals , in a smaller percentage , were less than the totals for 1953, the result being that the net change from 1952 to 1954 was on the plus side. As is apparent, these figures support both sides herein. PINE INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS COMMITTEE, INC. 1081 ence was made to Form IWA-1 as such. As is apparent, neither the employer com- mittee nor NRNC retreated from their previous positions. On May 12, in response to a telephonic request from Commissioner Walker, Irving mailed to NRNC a written proposal for settlement of the dispute; this pro- posal was the same proposal previously mailed on March 17, namely, to extend the previous contract for 1 year. There were no further joint meetings until June 4. An interim meeting had been requested by NRNC and agreed to by the em- ployer committee, but it was canceled by Commissioner Walker, who informed Irving that NRNC had so requested. 5. The meeting of June 4 The next meeting was held at Klamath Falls on June 4, under the auspices of Commissioner Walker. Present were Irving and his two assistants; Dicey, Sullivan, and other union representatives; and one employer representative. The testimony of Dicey and Irving is in substantial agreement as to this meeting. It may be noted that the strike ballot conducted by NRNC among its constituent locals had been completed prior to May 1 and a strike authorized for May 3, but the date was postponed. Dicey acted as spokesman and stated that he wished to give the PIRC employer committee the same consideration afforded other groups, namely an opportunity to come forward with a new proposal before the unions resorted to other action. He referred to settlements made in the pulp and paper industry; Irving responded that those settlements had no bearing on the pine situation. Dicey claimed that lumber prices were higher, and Irving replied that published statistics of the trade associations still disclosed a downward trend for prices in the pine area. He insisted that Dicey was referring to the fir situation, which was not applicable. Dicey stated that the employer offer to extend the old contract was not acceptable to NRNC and referred to increased productivity. Irving replied that the only in- crease in productivity figures he had seen related to fir and were not relevant to pine, stating further that while productivity varied from employer to employer, the averages would not reflect an increase in productivity. In support of his position, Dicey read from two documents which gave the history of pine prices, as well as the existing price picture for pine and fir. None of these figures served to refute the position of the PIRC employer committee that pine prices had fallen during 1953 as well as during the negotiations to date. The meeting ended with Dicey informing the employer committee that there was no need to continue the meeting unless the employer committee had a different kind of proposal. Irving did point out that he had been speaking only for the employers still left in negotiations, inasmuch as many of the original group had signed with their locals, according to Irving, on the basis of extending the old contract without change. There is a minor conflict as to whether Form IWA-1 was mentioned at this meeting. According to Glos, it was not mentioned and Irving did not recall any reference to it. According to Dicey, he referred to the desired information in his discussion of increased productivity.8 I deem it unnecessary to resolve this con- flict because it is readily apparent that if the demand for the information was brought up by Dicey it was brought up, as at prior meetings, solely in a secondary vein, and at that, on June 4, only in relation to figures on productivity. The fact is that at this last joint meeting NRNC primarily sought an offer from P•I•RC which, in terms of dollars and cents, was in excess of the contract renewal proposal previ- ously submitted by PIRC, and that NRNC had postponed the strike in the hope that such an offer might be forthcoming. ,It is readily apparent, independently of whether or not NRNC was entitled to this IWA-1 information for the bargaining process, as a matter of law, that the unions basically and primarily wanted a contract from Respondents which would give them additional benefits in three specified areas but which, in these same areas, would inevitably result in additional costs to the respective employers. C. Local developments at Red Blanket 1. The May 17 Meeting Shortly after the last joint meeting, NRNC met and recommended strike action. On June 19 , it sent wires to Locals 6-7 and 6-122 setting a strike deadline not 8I do not rely in this respect on the testimony of Keith Henry and Tim Sullivan, that their testimony concerning the meeting would be the same as that of Glos and Dicey, respectively. 1082 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD later than the first shift of Monday, June 21, and recommending that the Locals make their own decisions whether or not to join in the strike. Both locals had previously voted to stick with NRNC on the strike issue and the strike duly com- menced at the operations of the respective employers on June 21. As noted, the Employer Respondents took action to terminate their contracts. Brooks-Scanlon and Tite Knot notified Local 6-7 on June 21 and 22, respectively, of the cancella- tion of the contract in 60 days. Ponderosa, on June 22, notified its employees that the contract was no longer binding, and Red Blanket, on July 7, notified its em- ployees, as well as the Federal Mediation and Conciliation Service, that Local 6-122 was no longer recognized. Certain incidents and a meeting at Red Blanket, allegedly causing or prolonging the strike, are relied upon by the General Counsel in support of his contention that the strike at Red Blanket, as well as at the other employers, was an unfair labor practice strike. This involves one meeting held on May 17 and certain alleged con- duct on various dates by officials of Red Blanket. On May 17, Red Blanket, on request, met with Local 6-122 to discuss a new contract. A resume of what took place at this meeting discloses that it was actually an attempt to negotiate on a local basis in an area, in part at least, which the Local had delegated to NRNC, as in fact was pointed out at the meeting. As will appear below, this resort to bargaining at the local level by Local 6-122 was emulated by PIRC and the respective employers during July. It appears that there had been some concern among the membership of Local 6-122 about the impending strike. As a result, a committee was authorized to contact Red Blanket on a local basis, to make a local settlement if Red Blanket would bring its contract up to date, and to withdraw from the negotiations conducted by NRNC if results warranted. It fur- ther appears that previous negotiations in 1952 had been abortive at Red Blanket and as a result, the Red Blanket contract expiring in 1954 provided for 3 holidays, 2 weeks' vacation after 5 years' employment, and a 4-cent night-shift differential, as contrasted with 6 holidays, 2 weeks' vacation after 3 years, and a 6-cent night-shift differential found in other contracts in the area. Thus, a meeting was arranged for May 17 between a committee appearing for Local 6-122 and officials of Red Blanket. As is apparent, this took place after a number of meetings between NRNC and the PIRC employer committee had been held. Spokesman for the union committee was one Glen Yorton, vice president of the Local. Red Blanket was represented by a number of officials, including President W. C. Mattson and his son, Willard Mattson, assistant manager of the concern, with W. C. Mattson as spokesman. There is no substantial conflict in the testimony concerning this meeting. Yorton announced that the union committee had come for the purpose of negoti- ating an agreement. Mattson pointed out that both sides had turned over their authorities to bargain to NRNC and the PIRC employer committee, respectively, as was in fact the case. Yorton replied that Local 6-122 had not relinquished its rights to negotiate on a local basis, although it is obvious that in one area, that of vacations, it had done so. He pointed out that the membership of the Local would be content if the Red Blanket contract would be brought up to date with the others in the district by making the three changes specified above.9 Yorton argued in support of his 3 demands that production in the planing mill and in mill 2, 2 of the 3 Red Blanket installations, had increased. W. C. Mattson disputed this and claimed that Yorton was in error as to the production figures. Mattson further claimed that the company had lost money during the previous year and in addition, that his costs for vacations in 1953 had been $40,000. Hence, he claimed it was undesirable economically to increase any of his costs. His statement concerning losses in 1953 was not. challenged and in fact, it has not been challenged herein; nor for that matter, was Red Blanket ever asked to prove its position concerning its losses in 1953.10 Yorton urged Mattson to offer something in excess of the existing contract pro- visions to Local 6-122, saying that if Red Blanket made the three contract adjust- ments, the committee would recommend to the Local that they accept it and with- 9 Willard Mattson testified that the men sought the 3 additional holidays and did not recall any mention of the other 2 demands. His father's testimony was vague and substantially to the same effect. The foregoing findings are based upon the credited testimony of Yorton. 1O Mattson, in a statement to a Board field examiner, said that he informed Yorton that the company lost $50,000 in 1953. He testified herein that the company had in fact lost $60,000 or $70,000. I deem it immaterial whether or not the actual loss figure was mentioned. PINE INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS COMMITTEE, INC. 1083 draw from the negotiations being conducted by NRNC. Mattson offered only to re-sign the old contract, this being the same position currently taken by the PIRC employer committee. 2. Incidents at Red Blanket These additional incidents are relied upon by the General Counsel in support of his claim that unfair labor practices by Red Blanket caused or prolonged the strike of June 21. According to the credited testimony of Arnold Winslow, then job steward at mill 2, John Scherer, then foreman of mill 2, spoke to a group of employees ap- proximately in mid-April and stated that, "if it wasn't for the union, we would be a thousand dollars a year better off due to the overtime which we would be receiving." Scherer did not testify herein. According to W. C. Mattson, Scherer left the employ of Red Blanket in midsummer of 1954, departed the State, and his present where- abouts are unknown. Mattson contended that Scherer was not authorized to make the statements attributed to him by Winslow. Although this contention by Mattson lacks merit, in view of Scherer's supervisory status, on the other hand, the statement is not deemed to have been coercive or intimidatory. There is no evidence that overtime was canceled or abandoned at that time, or of any change in policy with re- spect thereto, and I find that this statement did not constitute a threat of economic loss for continued union affiliation. In any event, in view of the disposition of the incidents below, it stands as an isolated statement. On June 15, according to Winslow, Scherer informed a group of employees that if they went on strike, the "old man," namely, W. C. Mattson, would close down the mill for 4 months, take a trip East, and that he, Scherer, was not concerned because he would be paid for the time. Inasmuch as a strike was impending, this statement is viewed as no more than a prediction that a strike would necessitate shutting down the mill, as well it might. It does not, therefore, constitute a threat of reprisal for engaging in a concerted activity. On June 17, according to Winslow, Scherer posted a notice which announced that mill 2 would work overtime on Saturday, June 19. The record discloses that when logs were available, there was a flexible practice of working every other Satur- day at mill 2, with all Saturday work constituting overtime work. On June 18, after a visit to the mill by W. C. Mattson, Scherer changed the notice to read that the mill would not work on Saturday, June 19. There had been a union meeting on June 17 at which Local 6-122 had voted to stick with NRNC in the strike action which had been authorized. Employee Tom Denninger, as he testified, asked Scherer after the latter changed the notice, if he had heard of the union meeting. Scherer replied, according to Denninger , "I guess so . The old man thinks you guys are making enough money." His testimony was corroborated by that of Winslow, who allegedly overheard Scherer's statement, and is credited. Mattson admitted that he knew of the imminent strike, but denied that he went to mill 2 that day or spoke with Scherer. He claimed that an order of the type attributed to him would be given by the mill superintendent, Sanderson. The parties stipulated herein that Sanderson would testify that with the strike impending, Sander- son was not in a position to move lumber out of the mill on Monday, June 21, and that lumber would deteriorate if left standing in the yard: It is apparent that this action on the part of Scherer is susceptible of the explanation that it was moti- vated as a retaliatory move against the impending strike. It is, however, at the very least, equally susceptible of the explanation that the action was taken to avoid a tieup of lumber if the mill were shut down by the strike. Hence, the evidence on this incident does not preponderate in favor of the position of the General Counsel. Passing into the strike period itself, Victor Conover testified that he was a picket on the first day of the strike. He claimed that W. C. Mattson passed by and informed him that if the men wished a strike they would get a "good long one." Mattson denied seeing Conover or making the statement attributed to him. I deem it unnecessory to resolve the conflict for even if the statement were made, in view of the fact that the strike had commenced and the mill was shut down, the state- ment was not coercive or intimidatory, but was more of an expression of bravado. Again, on June 25, Striker Herman Bost was asked by Mattson, according to the testimony of Bost, to return to work. Bost replied that he could not work behind a picket line. Mattson replied that the strike was illegal and that he had a telegram from President Hartung of the International to that effect; there was, in fact, no such wire. Mattson uncontrovertedly testified, however, that Henry Hertager, then president of the Local, and apparently a controversial figure therein, had informed him that he had received a wire from Hartung just prior to the strike that there would not be a strike. Not only does Mattson's conclusion, in the face of this advice from the Local president seem reasonable, but in any event I see nothing coercive in this conversation. Moreover, I fail to see how it caused or prolonged the strike. 1084 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD D. The strike and its cause As is apparent in the immediately preceding section, the meeting of May 17 was an attempt by Local 6-122 to compose its differences with Red Blanket. It is noteworthy that the submission of the IWA-1 form information was not con- sidered by the Local to be a key difference between the parties; in fact, it was not mentioned on that date. This serves only to buttress the findings heretofore made that the chief emphasis of NRNC in the joint negotiations was on economic matters, in terms of dollars and cents. With respect to the various incidents at Red Blanket set forth above, none of them has been found to be independently violative of the Act and it is further found that Red Blanket did not, thereby, attempt to undermine the bargaining represent- ative. More particularly, there is no substantial evidence that these incidents served in any way to cause or prolong the strike. I find that they did not. The fact is that here, as in the joint negotiations, the cause of the strike was the inability of NRNC and the Locals to achieve the economic benefits they desired, this resulting in a strike in support of the economic demands. Turning to the series of joint bargaining meetings, the key premise of the General Counsel herein and, in fact, the only one on which he expressly relies, aside from the Red Blanket aspect of the case, is that the strike was an unfair labor practice strike caused by the unfair labor practices of Respondents. The strike of June 21, 1954, had its genesis in a referendum vote taken by NRNC in March and April. The result was an authorization for NRNC to call a strike if necessary to obtain a satisfactory settlement of the points in negotiations. Both Locals involved herein had in June, subsequent to the joint meetings, reaffirmed their support of the strike. I am in agreement with counsel for the Charging Parties that the strike action was the- direct result of a breakdown in negotiations. However, as will appear, I do not agree with his claim that it was an unfair labor practice strike. I have previously indicated that the strike was caused, not by the failure to supply the IWA-1 information, but rather the failure of Respondents to make concessions to NRNC on their three economic demands. While IWA-1 was in the picture at the outset, it grew smaller anad smaller as the course of negotiations progressed, although the emphasis on the other three demands was substantially unchanged. It is a fair conclusion on this record as a whole, that the strike of June 21 took place after the parties came to an impasse with the resulting inability of NRNC and the Charging Locals to secure their three demands over the bargaining table. I find that this was the cause of the strike. The evidence -of local union meetings does not support the contentions made herein concerning IWA-1. Similarly, there is no evidence of picket signs or union resolutions in support of the claim that the strike resulted from the failure to obtain this information. It is to be noted that the General Counsel makes no claim that Respondents did not meet, on request, with the Charging Parties. There remains for decision whether or not the conduct of Respondents at the bargaining table relative to the three economic demands constituted a refusal to bargain, which rendered the resulting strike an unfair labor practice strike. Actually, the General Counsel has well formulated his position on the face of the record, at page 251. He stated that his burden was to prove that the employers, in the course of the bargaining, "were resorting to first, a distortion of the union's demand and, secondly, to making a fallacious argument and well knowing they were making it." I agree that evidence of this nature, namely, distortion of demand and replying with knowingly fallacious contentions, might well be indicative of bad-faith bargaining. However, the preponderance of the evidence dealing with the bargain- ing negotiations prior to the strike will not support the stated position of the General Counsel. The General Counsel has argued that Irving supplied figures in the meetings that did not support his position. Although some of the figures supplied may have been controversial, this is a far cry from supplying false figures. The most that can be said is that the figures did not support the position of Respondents to the extent that the General Counsel thought they should. But they did support the positions taken, and the record will not support a finding of deliberate misrepresentation by Re- spondents. There is no substantial evidence to cast doubt on the legitimacy of the figures. True, Respondents did not comply with the demands for the IWA-1 information, but this does not prove that the figures submitted were fallacious. Nor were Re- spondents in the position of withholding information within their knowledge because at least a substantial portion of the IWA-1 information had never been collected as such. Hence, they were not on this record playing fast and loose by withholding some information, but presenting other information which they knew to be false. PINE INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS COMMITTEE, INC. 1.085 Respondents, it may be noted, were never confronted with a demand to prove that they could not afford these cost items. In fact, Mattson, at the Red Blanket negotia- tions, expressly pleaded his losses of the prior year, and this statement was not challenged, at least at the local level. See N. L. R. B. v. Truitt Manufacturing Co., 224 F. 2d 869 (C. A. 4), cert. 350 U. S. 922. I find that the strike of June 21, 1954, followed upon a number of meetings at which, in the posture most favorable to the General Counsel, hard bargaining took place on both sides of the bargaining table with Respondents diligently trying to substantiate their position with respect to economic conditions in the industry, that the parties bargained to an impasse, and that the strike resulted from the failure of the Charging Parties to obtain their three economics demands. It is a fair statement on this record that had these demands of the Charging Parties been met substan- tially, the strike would not have followed, irrespective of Respondents' position on IWA-1, and that the failure to obtain the information was not the cause -of the strike. The record well warrants the finding that the Charging Parties, after requesting an unspecified wage increase, then selected the figure of 121/2 cents per hour as their wage demand in lieu of the prior unspecified wage demand to be predicated upon the IWA-1 data. I find therefore that the strike occurred after the parties arrived at an impasse, that it was an economic strike at its inception, and that the striking employees of the Employer Respondents were not unfair labor practice strikers. See Cranston Print Works Company, 115 NLRB 537. E. Events during the strike; meetings 1. At Red Blanket On June 21 all striking employees of Red Blanket were sent letters instructing them to return to work on June 24 at the customary starting hour. Some of the strikers returned and an undisclosed number of new employees were hired. Mill 1 was reopened on June 24, mill 2 on June 28, and the planing mill on July 2. Termination slips were mailed on June 28 and 30 to strikers who had not returned to work; several slips were not mailed until early in July. These slips assigned failure to report to work as the cause of the termination and were accompanied by final paychecks. Those living in company houses were notified to move out or else commence paying rent. Red Blanket contended that all men terminated had been permanently replaced prior to their termination. The General Counsel does not chal- lenge this claim, relying as he does on the contention that the strikers were unfair labor practice strikers who, as a matter of law, could not be replaced. There is no substantial evidence to refute this contention by Red Blanket, which is accepted herein. Tim Sullivan, president of District No. 6, apparently acting in behalf of Local 6-122, attempted early in July to arrange a meeting with Red Blanket through the Federal Mediation and Conciliation Service. President Mattson contacted PIRC for advice and, on July 7, notified FMCS that there was no purpose in meeting with the union, as Red Blanket no longer recognized it as the bargaining representative of its employees. On the same day, Mattson wrote PIRC a letter withdrawing the authority of the PIRC employer committee to represent Red Blanket in the negotiations. Between September 12 and 15, a committee appointed by Local 6-122 visited the Red Blanket office and requested President Mattson to accept a procedure for termi- nating the strike. This was a factfinding board set up by the Governors of Oregon and Washington to investigate the strikes in the fir area, which was agreed to by both CIO and A. F. of L. lumber workers' unions. Mattson responded that he was not a party to the agreement setting up the board, as was the case, and refused to agree to accept whatever recommendation was put out by that board. Picketing continued until October 13 at Red Blanket, at which time Local 6-122 notified Red Blanket that the strike was terminated and that all strikers would return to work on October 14. Mattson acknowledged the communication and said that all employment applications would be entertained, that preference would be given to applicants with prior experience with Red Blanket, and that Local 6-122 was no longer recognized as bargaining representative. Here, as before, I find nothing on the part of Red Blanket tending to prolong the strike or convert it into an unfair labor practice strike. 2. At the other employers As heretofore noted, all the Employer Respondents withdrew their authority for negotiations from the PIRC committee during July, Red Blanket on July 7, and the 1086 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD other. employers on or about July 15. One suggestion for this action came from Irv- ing at a meeting with Brooks-Scanlon, Ponderosa, and Tite Knot on July 12; this recommendation, according to Irving, was predicated upon the reduced number of employers remaining in joint bargaining. NRNC was duly notified on July 16. NRNC then proceeded to individually contact the employers in the Bend and Red- mond area, namely, Brooks-Scanlon, Tite Knot, and Ponderosa. They separately but uniformly advised NRNC that they were willing to meet, that their respective positions on costs remaining stable was unchanged, and that they were still willing to extend previous contracts for 1 year. Attention was directed to the impending expiration of the agreements under notices previously given, particularly so in the case of Brooks-Scanlon and Tite Knot. Ultimately, under the auspices of the Federal Mediation and Conciliation Service, meetings were arranged between NRNC and the employers in the Bend and Redmond area. 3. The August 6 meeting at Redmond Under the auspices of the Federal Mediation and Conciliation Service a meeting was held on August 6 at Redmond, Oregon, in the offices of Ponderosa. This was arranged as a concurrent meeting for separate negotiations with Ponderosa and Tite Knot. Among those present were President Madden and Treasurer Elliott, of Ponderosa; Philip Dahl of Tite Knot; Commissioner Walker; Irving for PIRC; Dicey and Sullivan for NRNC; and other union officers. Commissioner Walker opened the meeting and turned the floor over to Dicey, who promptly cited settlements made at some plants in the Northwest. According to Sulli- van, Elliott asked if these settlements had taken place in the pine area, to which Sullivan replied that it made no difference whether it was fir or pine. Elliott claimed that Ponderosa wages already averaged 20 cents per hour higher than others in the area. There was some other talk, basically incidental to a three-page statement read by Dicey which is summarized below. This statement initially accused Ponderosa and Tite Knot of six acts allegedly taken in concert with other employers and PIRC, namely, (1) refusing to submit in- formation, thereby impeding negotiations to the point where a strike resulted; (2) refusing to bargain in good faith by offering only to re-sign the previous contract de- spite "excellent business conditions"; (3) attempting to bypass NRNC by making overtures to local unions to return to work without any benefits; (4) declaring that meetings would be fruitless unless NRNC agreed to employer proposals; (5) refus- ing to grant a wage increase, although not pleading "inability to pay"; 11 and (6) re- jecting the union's proposals, but not advancing a constructive counterproposal. The statement went on to list the efforts made by NRNC to present reasonable demands, support them with factual data, cooperate toward a reasonable and peaceful settlement, and its repeated submission of demands for the IWA-1 infor- mation and the three economic benefits. It referred to excellent economic conditions in the Nation and the industry, citing inter alia a high demand for lumber, firm lumber prices, increasing productivity in the lumber industry, the fact that there had been no wage increases since 1952, and the need for the job evaluation. The statement pointed out that: (1) Existing procedures for meetings under the auspices of the Federal Mediation and Conciliation Service had been a failure not because of the men of the Service, but because of "an ineffective law" which put limitations on collective-bargaining procedures; (2) the existing Federal system was so set up and administered as to make a mockery of collective bargaining; (3) although the employers were, in the main, responsible for the existing strike, the Federal and State governments, because of their passive attitude, had to bear equal responsibility for the continuation of the strike; (4) the employers were determined to break the NRNC position short of granting a wage increase; and (5) the Federal Mediation and Conciliation Service procedures were ineffecive. In conclusion, the statement proposed that the parties agree to arbitrate the issues between them by (1) selecting a three-man board of arbitration; (2) agreeing that the arbitrators' decision would be binding; (3) agreeing that all workers would immediately return to work without prejudice while the arbitration board resolved the case; and (4) agreeing that the board would consider three issues, namely, (a) a 121h-cent wage increase retroactive to April 1, 1954; (b) the original job evaluation program, cost to be borne by the employers; and (c) the original vacation proposal, namely, 3 weeks' vacation after 5 years' seniority. As is apparent, the document, although referring to the refusals to submit the IWA-1 information, did not include this as one of the items proposed for arbitration. "It will be recalled that the PIRC employer committee had stressed the economic " inadvisability " of granting a wage increase. PINE INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS COMMITTEE, INC. 1087 Dahl and Elliott rejected the arbitration proposal, stating that they were unwilling to have wage rates or contract clauses be determined by a third party who had no interest in whether or not business operations of the employers were profitable. It is not clear whether Irving so advised them before they responded in this vein. There is some conflict as to whether Form IWA-1 was mentioned. Irving did not recall any reference to it except in the introductory part of Dicey's arbitration pro- posal. Dicey and Sullivan testified that it was mentioned as being necessary to the job-evaluation program. In another minor conflict, Sullivan and Dicey attributed to Irving a statement to Elliott, who had displayed some interest in a union proposal, that he, Irving, had previously advised both employers that if they intended to make settlements with a union, they should do so before a strike so as to avoid strengthening the "strong right arm" of the union. Irving's version was that he told Elliott at the meeting that he, Irving, had always advised Ponderosa, as well as other employers, to do anything to avoid a strike that they would do to settle it after one started. The Commissioner recessed the meeting while he spoke to the employer repre- sentatives separately. He then informed the union representatives that the employer recommendations were that the men should return to work and that the old agree- ments should be re-signed. This was unsatisfactory to NRNC, as it had been in the past. 4. The August 6 meeting at Bend On the afternoon of August 6, a meeting was held at the office of Brooks-Scanlon in Bend. Unlike the meeting held that morning, Commissioner Walker did not participate. Among those present were Irving, appearing in behalf of General Manager Glassow, and Dicey and Sullivan appearing for NRNC. Except for the topic of Form IWA-1, there is no substantial conflict as to the events at this meeting. It appears that this meeting was held at the request of NRNC. The meeting opened with Irving explaining that Glassow was absent because he had been upset by an incident that took place on the picket line that morning. Dicey then proceeded to read the same proposal for arbitration which he had made that morning to Ponderosa and Tite Knot. Irving, speaking in behalf of Brooks-Scanlon, rejected the proposal. He assigned the same reasons that had been assigned that morning, namely, that it was undesirable to have wage rates or contract clauses be determined by a third party who had no interest in whether or not the employer conducted a profitable operation. Both Dicey and Sullivan testified that Dicey made reference to the IWA-1 informa- tion as being desirable in connection with the job evaluation program. They claimed that Irving replied that the local unions already had much of this information and that individual employees could supply other portions of this information. Accord- ing to Irving, he tried to explain that there was a difference between a request from the International Union for information of this nature for the purpose of industry- wide bargaining, and on the other hand, a request by the local union which was the certified bargaining agent. All parties agree that Dicey stated that the unions were willing to let their case stand or fall on Board decisions dealing with the supplying of the information. 5. The August 9 contracts There is evidence in the record of two separate contracts which were signed on August 9 between Ponderosa and Tite Knot, respectively, as employers, with Local 6-7. The General Counsel and the Charging Parties challenge the standing of the five-man committee signing these agreements to bind Local 6-7. They do not dispute the facts concerning the signing, but rather the legal effect of the agreements, con- tending that they were unauthorized. While Respondents, on the other hand, challenge the General Counsel and the Charging Parties on this issue, the facts with respect thereto, as set forth below, render the conflict immaterial. The evidence as to the meeting on August 9 is sketchy and was contributed chiefly by Dahl and partly by Madden of Ponderosa, as well as Sullivan. Those present at this meeting included Dahl and Madden, but not Sullivan. Also present were Elliott of Ponderosa, Harold Barclay, and a committee of at least five employees from Tite Knot and Ponderosa. According to Dahl's uncontroverted and credited testimony, he received a telephone call late on the afternoon of August 9 from Elliott.12 Elliott informed him that a local committee wished to enter into an agreement. Dahl and Elliott agreed that both concerns would meet concurrently with the committee that evening in the 12Elliott did not testify herein, is no longer in the employ of Ponderosa, and has apparently left the area. 1088 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD Ponderosa office. As indicated, Harold Barclay was present. I find that he appeared as a representative of Harold Barclay Logging Company, consistent with the long established collective-bargaining practice of Tite Knot contracts covering Barclay operations. Initially, the employers were given assurance that the committee had authority to negotiate contracts in behalf of Local 6-7. In fact, identical letters to Tile Knot and Ponderosa respectively, were prepared, wherein the 5-man committee stated that the 5 signers of the documents had been elected and empowered to act for Local 6-7 in negotiating a new working agreement. Although the agreement was apparently disapproved by the Local on the following day, as will appear, there is no direct evidence that the five signers did not speak truthfully in the statements they prepared. The signed agreements were identical except that the Tile Knot contract had one additional provision requiring, in the event of a work stoppage, that "All logs that are down in the woods or in storage will be sawed or moved to storage to protect against depreciation." Inasmuch as Tile Knot had no woods employees and Barclay employees were found exclusively in that category, this again is further evidence that not only this contract, but all Tite Knot contracts were applicable to Barclay employees as well. The agreements provided that the existing contracts would be extended to April 1, 1955, with several modifications. These were that: (1) If a majority of the employees in the pine industry settled their current wage dispute for an increase in wages, the employer would agree to immediate negotiations on wages; (2) neither side would take disciplinary action against any employee because of actions taken by employees during the strike; (3) in the event of a work stoppage, all machinery and equipment would be stored, all lumber and lumber products would be stored, and that plant machinery, equipment, and property would be guarded against fire, theft, and sabotage; and (4) that the Union would not interfere with the activities of the employer in carrying on activities under item (3), above, and would cooperate in efforts to obtain sufficient employees; it was further agreed that if employees were not available, the employer might hire other persons who would not be considered as strikebreakers. Counsel for the Charging Parties stresses in his brief, as Sullivan contended at the August 11 meeting described below, that the signers of these agreements had no authority to sign them. Attention is directed to the fact that the majority of the signers had returned to work through picket lines, that one of them was a leader in a back-to-work movement, and that Ponderosa and Tite Knot knew this to be the case. On the other hand, Dahl uncontrovertedly testified that Tite Knot had made similar settlements with, a committee from Local 6-7 in 1952 and 1953, and moreover that one of the signers, Blakeway, had previously served on such a com- mittee as this. The testimony of Madden was to the same effect. On the face of this evidence, I am unable to find, as the General Counsel and the Charging Parties urge, that the committees were not duly authorized by their fellow members to enter into these contracts. I attribute no significance to the agreements being termed "rump" agreements; this would only be indicative of the existence of dissension in the Local. On the other hand, the agreements were not ratified on the following day by the Local itself, the circumstances of which are not disclosed herein. And, in any event, Tite Knot and Ponderosa in effect accepted the rejection because the parties did thereafter meet on August 11 for further negotiations. 6. Later meetings Approximately August 10, Dahl was advised that Local 6-7 had refused to approve the "rump" agreements. He then contacted Otto Richardson, vice president of the Redmond sublocal is and asked him to arrange a meeting with a group which could authoritatively speak for Local 6-7. A meeting was arranged for August 11 at the Tite Knot office at Redmond. Present were Dahl, his partner Johnson, Sullivan, and several union representatives. There is no substantial conflict as to what took place, although some vagueness was displayed as to dates. Sullivan was spokesman for Local 6-7 and both Dahl and Johnson spoke in behalf of Tite Knot. Sullivan informed Tile Knot that the "rump" agreement had not been ratified. He in essence made two proposals as a basis for arriving at an agreement, (1) that Tite Knot agree to arbitrate the dispute and (2) that Tite Knot agree to absorb the monthly cost for the health and welfare program, which theretofore had been deducted from the employees' paychecks. It may be 1a It appears that Local 6-7 had two divisions , one for members in Bend and another called the sublocal for members in the Redmond area. PINE INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS COMMITTEE, INC. 1089 noted that in 1950 a wage increase had been granted expressly for this purpose and that thereafter , the respective employers had deducted this amount to pay for the program . Dahl and Johnson agreed to consider both proposals. On the following day, Dahl telephoned Sullivan and stated that he could not agree to arbitration because the industry was opposed to it. In this respect see United Telephone Company, 112 NLRB 779. He said that he intended to check with an insurance company concerning the cost of a health and welfare program. On August 16 or 17 another meeting was held between the local union committee, headed by Sullivan, and Tite Knot and Ponderosa . Present were Elliott of Pon- derosa and Johnson and Dahl of Tite Knot. There is little conflict concerning the discussion at this meeting . Sullivan asked Dahl whether , pursuant to his investi- gation, he was willing to absorb the cost of the health and welfare program. Dahl replied that they could not afford to do so. According to Dahl, Sullivan pressed for a wage increase or some benefits that he could present to the union membership. Dahl refused , but indicated that he wanted to see first on what basis Brooks-Scanlon, the largest employer in the area, settled with the union. According to Sullivan , Johnson, as the meeting ended, asked what was wrong with the agreement signed on August 9. To this Sullivan replied that the committee had no authority from the Local to sign it , that the Local had rejected the agree- ment, and that particular objection had been expressed over the clause providing that there would be no discipline against strikebreakers . Sullivan elsewhere pointed out that the 1952 and 1953 agreements had been made by similar committees, but that they had been ratified by the Local ; he conceded that he did not know that the committee , in 1954, had represented itself as having authority to bind the Local. Through the auspices of the Federal Mediation and Conciliation Service, separate meetings were arranged for August 27 at Redmond and Bend. A commissioner met with Madden , Dahl, and Irving at Redmond . He asked if there was any change in the employers ' position concerning terms for a settlement . Dahl replied that there was none. The commissioner replied that he had been advised by the union that there was no sense in holding a meeting if the employers had not changed their position. Accordingly , no meeting was held.14 Another meeting was scheduled at Brooks -Scanlon the same day. According to Irving , this meeting started to develop in the same manner as the one at Redmond. The commissioner initially ascertained whether a new offer was forthcoming from the employers , and, there being none , he forthwith terminated the meeting. Dicey attended this meeting and testified that there was discussion of a revised working agreement previously submitted by Brooks -Scanlon. There is no evidence of such an agreement , and it may be that Dicey had in mind a proposal submitted thereafter by Brooks -Scanlon on September 11. Dicey claimed that some of the proposals in this agreement were not acceptable to the union and that they were rejected by the union which , nevertheless , was still willing to bargain on all issues at this August 27 meeting, these apparently being the three issues originally raised by NRNC in the negotiations. Tite Knot wrote to Local 6-7 on August 30 and advised that it no longer recognized that organization as bargaining agent; as noted , Tite Knot, on June 22, had given Local 6-7 sixty days ' notice to terminate the contract , pursuant to its provisions. Ponderosa also wrote to Local 6-7 on September 9, advising that it no longer recog- nized it as bargaining agent; Ponderosa as well had taken the position on June 22 that the contract was no longer in effect. Again, on September 11, Tite Knot affirmed its withdrawal of recognition of Local 6-7 . Vice President Otto Richardson of the sublocal of Local 6-7 at Redmond, telephoned Dahl on or about September 10 and asked him to participate in the two- State factfinding procedure set up by the respective governors and the unions , as here- tofore described . Dahl replied in a letter dated September 11 that Tite Knot had withdrawn recognition of Local 6-7 and that, as a result, it was not in a position to participate, or refuse to participate , in the factfinding procedure; that if Tite Knot were bargaining with a labor organization , it would still be opposed to that type of procedure ; and claimed that Local 6-7 had refused to approve the action of a majority of Tite Knot employees , apparently a reference to the rejection by Local 6-7 of the "rump" agreement of August 9. The record does not disclose "These findings are based upon the testimony of Dahl and Irving. Sullivan, who did not participate in the conversation, testified that the commissioner informed the union group, which was standing nearby, that the employers had taken the position the August 9 "rump" agreement was binding. In view of the direct evidence set forth above relative to the conversation , Sullivan 's hearsay testimony on this point is not relied on. 450553-58-vol. 113- 7 0 1090 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD whether or not a majority of Tite Knot employees did, in fact, approve of the "rump" agreement.15 7. The Brooks-Scanlon contracts Later that month bargaining meetings were held with Brooks-Scanlon on Septem- ber 14, 15, 16, and 20; present at all of these meetings were Glassow, Assistant Manager Schultz, and Irving, for Brooks-Scanlon, and Sullivan and the local com- mittee for Local 6-7. Dicey was also present on September 20. The meetings of September 14, 15, and 16 were devoted to a discussion, clause by clause, of the new contracts submitted by Brooks-Scanlon for the plant and woods installations respectively. These contracts differed from the contract proposals sub- mitted by Brooks-Scanlon in January. While counsel for the Charging Parties accurately points out in his brief that the contract proposals, unlike the previous ones, did not contain a union-shop clause, it must in turn be noted that, as in the case of the changes proposed by Red Blanket, the original Brooks-Scanlon proposals were never discussed, primarily because all ensuing meetings were devoted, at the behest of NRNC, to a discussion of the changes desired by NRNC in the then exist- ing contract. On September 14, Glassow and Schultz stressed the inefficiency of the Brooks- Scanlon operations, Schultz claiming that their production of 575 board-feet per man-hour compared very unfavorably with that of approximately 1,000 at other opera- tions. Sullivan proposed going over the old contract and determining its objection-' able features. Glassow replied that it was definitely out of the picture. As a result, Sullivan asked that the new Brooks-Scanlon proposals be gone over clause by clause, and that was done. Sullivan conceded herein that Brooks-Scanlon did make con- cessions and that it had agreed to a number of changes in the new proposals. According to Irving, Glassow informed Sullivan, at the September 15 meeting, relative to the union-shop issue, that many of his employees had approached him and expressed concern over the protracted strike, and that as a result, Glassow felt that he owed it to his employees not to force them into compulsory union mem- 'bership. On September 18, the new proposals, as amended, were submitted to a meeting of the Local and were overwhelmingly rejected. There is some conflict as to the September 20 meeting, with agreement, how- ever, on the basic aspects thereof. According to Irving, Sullivan proposed renewal of the old contract with 2 changes, namely, (1) addition of a grievance appeal clause and (2) review of the wage schedule in 90 days. Glassow replied (1) that he would not accept the old contract, (2) that he was undecided about the grievance appeal clause, and (3) that he believed something would have to be done about a review of wages in one manner or another. According to Sullivan, he asked Glassow, in conformity with Irving's testimony, to sign the old contract and abide by the de- cision of the governors' factfinding panel; this, Glassow rejected. Sullivan testified that he also brought up the question of employer payment of the health and welfare program as a basis of settlement. I find that the parties did further discuss the Brooks-Scanlon proposals and that Glassow rejected Sullivan's alternative proposals. As found, the strike was terminated at Tite Knot and Ponderosa on or about September 18 and at Brooks-Scanlon on or about September 25, effective September 20 and 27 respectively. These concerns were duly notified by Local 6-7 on those dates that the strike was terminated and that the men were applying for reinstatement. Other meetings were held in October, November, and December, with the ulti- mate result that Local 6-7 agreed to the new contracts submitted by Brooks-Scanlon, although a number of changes were mutually agreed upon at the various meetings which did, in some respects, change the Brooks-Scanlon proposals. The new agree- ments were signed on November 6 and December 10, 1954, for the plant and woods installations, respectively. As counsel for Brooks-Scanlon points out in his brief, these agreements did require Brooks-Scanlon to furnish a small portion of the IWA-1 information, namely, wage schedules and a seniority list on request, but not oftener than once every 6 months. He further stresses the fact that the agree- ments, as signed, reflect a number of concessions made by Brooks-Scanlon with re- spect to the September 11 proposals, particularly as to the woods agreement. According to Sullivan, he stated, in signing the agreements, that the Union was not waving its charges in the present cases. Glassow and Schultz testified that the subject was not brought up. However, the record contains 2 letters from the secretary-treasurer of Local 6-7, Chambers, to Brooks-Scanlon on November 9 and 15 Local 6-7 included among its membership employees of all the Employer Respondents in the Bend and Redmond areas. As noted, Brooks-Scanlon was by far the largest employer among them. PINE INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS COMMITTEE, INC. 1091 December 16, 1954, respectively, wherein Brooks-Scanlon was advised that the signing of the 2 contracts did not constitute a withdrawal of the charges. There is no evidence of any reply to these letters. In view of the followup letters sent by the Local, as well as the testimony of Sulli- van which, in this respect, impressed me as the more accurate, I credit Sullivan's testi- mony herein. In any event, in view of the findings hereinafter, I do not find that Local 6-7, by signing the agreement, waived receipt of the full IWA-1 information from Brooks-Scanlon. F. Termination of strikers As set forth, the strike was terminated and the picketing discontinued at Ponderosa and Tite Knot on September 18, at Brooks-Scanlon on September 25, and at Red Blanket on October 13. The record demonstrates, and I find, that unconditional application was made in behalf of all strikers still on strike. Although it appears that some of the strikers may not have personally reported for work, I deem the broad application made in their behalf by the Locals as sufficient to reflect an abandon- ment of the strike by all concerned. The General Counsel has contended herein that: 27 named employees of Red Blanket were discharged between June 24 and July 7 and denied reinstatement after October 13; 14 named striking employees of Ponderosa were denied reinstatement on September 20; 10 striking employees of Tite Knot were denied reinstatement on September 20; and 10 named strikers at Brooks-Scanlon were offered reinstatement on September 27 and thereafter, but only to positions not substantially equivalent to those enjoyed by them prior to the strike. However, the General Counsel has not seriously challenged herein Respondents' position that all strikers at Red Blanket, Ponderosa, and Tite Knot were permanently replaced prior to being discharged or denied reinstatement, as the case may have been, or that the strikers offered different positions at Brooks-Scanlon had been permanently replaced at their original positions prior to their applications for reinstatement. He has predicated his case on the legal theory that they were unfair labor prac- tice strikers who could not, as a matter of law, be discharged or replaced. In fact, his position is reflected on page 21 of his brief, wherein he states, "The essence of the case against all the employers, as set forth above, and as stated in the complaint and at the trial, is that at the outset of their concerted action, they had engaged in unfair labor practices which, in combination with economic factors, had caused the strike. . Obviously, the General Counsel has correctly stated the law with respect to the status of unfair labor practice strikers, and of course, one of the issues herein is whether the strikers were unfair labor practice or economic strikers. However, that issue has been resolved in favor of the latter conclusion. And, there is no dispute before me as to Respondents' contention that the strikers were permanently replaced before they were denied reinstatement or discharged, as the case may be; indeed, there is no substantial evidence to the contrary, and I find that they were so replaced. Accordingly, it is recommended that the allegations of the complaint with respect to discrimination against strikers be dismissed. G. The refusal to bargain on Form IWA-1 1. Majority representation in the appropriate units In treating with the question of majority representation in the respective ap- propriate units, I am restricting these findings to the period of the alleged refusal to bargain, viz, the period up to the date of the strike of June 21, 1954. I therefore do not pass on the question whether, subsequent to the replacement of the economic strikers during the course of the strike, the Charging Parties still enjoyed a majority representation in the respective appropriate units which would support an initial re- fusal to bargain, either on this aspect of the case or any other, on dates subsequent to the replacement of strikers. The complaint alleges that the production, maintenance, and transportation em- ployees of each Employer Respondent, excluding office, clerical, professional and supervisory employees, and guards, separately constitutes a unit of employees ap- propriate for the purposes of collective bargaining, except in the cases of Barclay and Tite Knot where it is alleged that the specified classifications of Tite Knot em- ployees and Barclay employees at the Sisters, Oregon, operation, constitute a single appropriate unit. The answer of Brooks-Scanlon alleges, the evidence establishes, and I find that there is a long history of bargaining of Brooks-Scanlon employees in the indicated classi- 1092 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD fications in 2 separate units , 1 for the plant or mill operations, and I for the woods or logging operations. I find that these two separate units at Brooks-Scanlon, of the indicated classifications, are separately appropriate for the purposes of collective bargaining within the meaning of Section 9 (b) of the Act. The answers of Ponderosa and Red Blanket admit the appropriateness of the units set forth in the complaint and they are found to be appropriate within the meaning of Section 9 (b). Barclay and Tite Knot admit in their respective answers the appropriateness of the described units, but only on the basis of separate units re- stricted to each of the two concerns. I have heretofore set forth in detail the evi- dence depicting the long history of collective bargaining by these two concerns on a single multiemployer basis. On the basis thereof, I find that a single unit of the employees of Tite Knot and of Barclay at its Sisters operation, in the indicated classi- fications, constitutes a unit appropriate for the purposes of collective bargaining within the meaning of Section 9 (b) of the Act. The answer of Brooks-Scanlon admits that at all times material herein, Local 6-7 was the bargaining representative of the employees in the appropriate units. The answers of the other Employer Respondents in effect deny majority representation by Local 6-122 of the employees of Red Blanket and by Local 6-7 of the employees of the other Employer Respondents in the indicated appropriate units. However, restricting these findings to the period prior to the strike of June 21, the record demonstrates that all the Employer Respondents represented by the PIRC em- ployer committee met with NRNC, the bargaining medium of the two locals, and at no time challenged their majority representation of the employees involved herein. Indeed, the subject was not raised, and it may reasonably be inferred that the Em- ployer Respondents conceded the majority representation of the locals during the negotiations prior to the strike. Moreover, the contractual relationship in all cases had been a long one with union-security clauses included in the Ponderosa, Tite Knot, Red Blanket and Brooks-Scanlon agreements, plus the fact that there were Board certifications at Red Blanket in 1951 and 1953. Some evidence was adduced to the effect that certain Barclay employees due to the alleged lack of strict enforcement of the union-security clause were not members of Local 6-7. Barclay had 70 employees, approximately 35 at Simnasho and ap- proximately 35 at Sisters, and, of the latter group, 24 or 25 had submitted dues deduction authorizations; the evidence discloses, however, that at the most, 3 of the 35 at Sisters were not members. In addition, according to Office Manager Andrews, an increasing number of employees withdrew their authorizations for the deduction of- dues from Barclay in 1954. 1 deem this as insufficient to refute the foregoing find- ings, particularly in view of the much larger complement of personnel at Tite Knot within the same bargaining unit. I find, under the foregoing circumstances, that there is a presumption of continued majority in the respective units, particularly so in the absence of any substantial evidentiary challenge thereof, and that Respondents in effect acknowledged such majority representation during the bargaining meetings. I further find, pursuant to the provisions of Section 9 (a) of the Act, that Local 6-122 was the representative of the employees of Red Blanket in the indicated appropriate unit, and that Local 6-7 was the representative of the employees of the other Employer Respondents in the indicated appropriate units. 2. The refusal to bargain The remaining issue is presented by the allegation of the complaint that Re- spondents refused to bargain by failing to submit to the Charging Parties the data called for on Form IWA-1. Specifically, this form called for the submission to the Charging Parties by the Employer Respondents of the name of each employee and the listing of the following information with respect to each, viz, (1) classification, (2) hourly rate of pay, (3) years of seniority, (4) number of paid holidays en- joyed, (5) weeks of vacation enjoyed, (6) total annual hours worked, and (7) total' annual earnings. Each employer was also asked to provide on the same form, (1) total production figures broken down according to the nature of its operations. and (2) sales totals. It will be recalled that this information was requested by NRNC in a letter- mailed on or about December 23, 1953, wherein it was suggested that the infor- mation be placed upon a specially prepared form designated as IWA-1. Two followup letters renewing the request were mailed in January. As set forth, men- tion was made of the continued desire for this information in the meetings com- mencing on February 11, 1954. All of Respondents except PIRC admit receipt of this questionnaire; however as the meetings developed, PIRC as an agent of the- Employer Respondents was well aware of the request and treated with this issue.. PINE INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS COMMITTEE, INC. 1093 And, while Barclay disputed having knowledge of some of this correspondence, it has been found that Dahl was an agent of both Barclay and Tite Knot, and he was on notice of the demands. While much argument on the merits has been presented in the briefs on this issue, the position of the General Counsel and the Charging Parties is by now so well established as to require little discussion herein. All of the Employer Re- spondents failed to furnish the sought information, either flatly or by delaying a response to the query and thereafter not supplying it. That the information was relevant to the collective-bargaining procedure is readily apparent from its very nature as well as from the testimony of E. W. Kenney, director of the department of education and research of the International. I find that the request for infor- mation was made in good faith by NRNC. I further find, however, on this record, that the position of Respondents was one of believing that they were not required to submit this information, or, stated otherwise, of questioning the legal require- ment that they submit it. The record does not warrant a finding that they were motivated by bad faith in an attempt to undermine the bargaining process but, rather demonstrates a case of them taking a position which as a matter of law is erroneous and contrary to established law. It is settled that a bargaining agent is entitled to information which would en- able it to properly and understandingly carry out its duties in the general course of bargaining and this information is not necessarily limited to data pertinent to a particular controversy. The bulk of the information sought herein related to the names of employees, their rates of pay, earnings, seniority, and holiday and vaca- tion benefits enjoyed The presumptive relevance of this information bearing on the wage structure and the right of the collective-bargaining representative to re- ceive it is by now well established. See Utica Observer-Dispatch Inc. v. N. L. R. B. 229 F. 2d 575 (C. A. 2); N. L. R. B. v. Boston Herald-Traveler Corp., 223 F. 2d 58 (C. A. 1); N L. R. B. v. Whitin Machine Works, 217 F. 2d 593 (C. A. 4) cert. denied 349 U. S. 905; N. L. R. B. v. Hekman Furniture Co., 207 F. 2d 561 (C. A. 6); N. L. R. B. v. Item Co., 220'F. 2d 956 (C. A. 5) cert. denied 350 U. S. 836; and N. L. R. B. v. New Britain Machine Co., 210 F. 2d 61 (C. A. 2). The Boston Herald-Traveler decision referred to the submission of wage data linked with names as being presumptively relevant to the collective-bargaining procedure even in the absence of proof that linked the requested data to actual bargaining. The Item Co. decision held that the employer was required to disclose all information, not only pertinent to a particular controversy, but also reasonably necessary to police or administer a contract. True, the questionnaire did seek further information with respect to production and sales totals, and this does present a much closer question. While the Charging Parties did adduce evidence disclosing that this information would be useful, if not vital, in the presentation of union demands and the evaluation of employer conten- tions, there is some question whether the existing decisions go so far as to encompass this type of information. Cf. N. L. R. B. v. Truitt Manufacturing Co., 224 F. 2d 869 (C. A. 4), cert. granted 350 U. S. 922. The Charging Parties did demonstrate at the bargaining sessions their needs for all the requested information as bearing on their three economic demands, namely a wage increase, an employer financed job-evaluation program, and a more liberal vacation program. As heretofore noted, they did settle on a 121/2-cent wage demand in lieu of the previously unspecified figure which they had expected to make a specific one after receipt of the IWA-1 information. In Oregon Coast Operators Association, et al., 113 NLRB 1338, the Board re- quired the employers to furnish information which was both relevant and necessary for the purposes of collective bargaining. In Glen Raven Knitting Mills Inc., 115 NLRB 422, the Board, in referring to wage data cases, held that it was suffi- cient that the information be related to the issues involved in collective bargaining, and that no specific need as to a particular issue need be shown. The Board went on to characterize the use of the word "necessary" in the Oregon Coast decision as reflecting perchance the fact that the case was not simply a wage data case but one that involved information and issues other than wages, as is the case in the instant proceeding. It does not at first blush appear that the production and sales figures requested in the instant case were necessary for the purposes of collective bargaining, and the Board in the Glen Raven decision noted that relevance and necessity for the in- formation had not been established in the Oregon Coast decision. However, in the present record, there is the testimony of Kenney who clearly elucidated how these production and sales figures would be helpful to the union in the course of collective bargaining. This, of course, was his testimony at the hearing and not statements made at the actual bargaining table. According to Kenney, NRNC, by getting the 1094 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD production figures, would be in a position to accurately evaluate employer claims with respect to labor costs; apparently the sales figures were desired for the same reason. Accordingly, I find that production and sales figures here were relevant and necessary for the purposes of collective bargaining. Respondents have raised a number of defenses in support of their failure to furnish the requested information. At the February 11 meeting the point was made that the information had been requested by the International, namely NRNC, and not by the Locals which were the actual bargaining representatives. The simple answer to this is that the Locals had previously, during January, expressly requested the Employer Respondents to supply the information to the International to be collected for the benefit of the Locals. In view of the fact that NRNC had previously acted in behalf of the Locals in collective bargaining, I find that Respondents were on notice of the delegation of this field to the International. Some testimony was adduced to the effect that the information was already in union hands. However, Respondents do not seriously contend that the detailed information sought by NRNC was available. The most that the Locals had was a seniority list and wage rates for a certain classification but there was no linking of employees by name with rates of pay. While testimony was adduced that the Locals could acquire this information by questioning their membership man by man, the cited decisions have in effect disposed of this point adversely to Respondents. Some testimony was adduced by Red Blanket and Brooks-Scanlon demonstrating that the preparation of this information would have been time consuming and costly. According to Paymaster Williams, of Brooks-Scanlon, a test check made by him shortly before the present hearings disclosed that it would have taken I man working 8 hours a day approximately 261/z days to prepare the information sought by NRNC, based upon the procedure he followed in his test check. The Charging Parties contend that even if this figure were accepted, it is a minor matter when contrasted with the loss of man-hours which would be caused by a breakdown in negotiations and a resulting strike. I am not aware that the Board has squarely passed upon this issue of a claimed unduly severe burden, financial or otherwise, imposed upon an employer by preparing such data.'6 This would appear to be a matter for collective bargaining and conceivably the Board might deem it advisable, on a proper showing, to allocate the cost of obtaining the data so as to avoid the imposition of an unfair burden on an employer. Brooks-Scanlon has contended that the contracts signed in November and De- cember 1954 constituted a waiver by Local 6-7 of its request for the information. It stresses the fact that the contracts require the employer to furnish the union only with seniority lists, not oftener than every 6 months, and further with wage schedules to be attached to the contract. While the inclusion in the contract of this matter might be indicative of a resolu- tion of the overall issue between the parties, such is not the case on this record. First, Sullivan informed Brooks-Scanlon that despite the execution of the contracts the charges herein were not being withdrawn and were not being waived. More- over, the record will not support a finding that there has been a clear unmistakable and unequivocal waiver of the right to this information. Cf. Hearst Corporation, 113 NLRB 1067; California-Portland Cement Co., 103 NLRB 1375; N. L. R. B. v. Hekman Furniture Co., supra; N. L. R. B. v. Item Co., supra; and Taylor Forge and Pipe Works, supra. Respondents have also drawn attention to the fact that the General Counsel, prior to the issuance of the present complaint, had refused to issue a complaint against some, if not all, of Respondents based upon at least part of the subject matter litigated herein. The simple answer to this is that administrative action of this nature by the General Counsel is entrusted to his sole discretion and is in no way an adjudication on the merits. See e. g. National Container Corp., 96 NLRB 1387. I find that Respondents, including each of the Employer Respondents and PIRC as their agent, failed and refused on and after February 11, 1954, the date of the first meeting with the Charging Parties, to furnish the latter with the information requested in Form IWA-1 and that Respondents have thereby engaged in conduct violative of Section 8 (a) (5) and 8 (a) (1) of the Act.17 16 In Taylor Forge and Pipe Works, 113 NLRB 693 , the Board found that the supplying of "reasonably available" information which was in existence was not unduly burdensome, and in Whitin Machine Works, 108 NLRB 1537 , the Board noted that there had been no showing that submission of the data would place an "unwarranted and undue burden" on the employer. 1" In view of the clear failure to supply the information at the first meeting held on February 11, I deem it unnecessary and cumulative to decide whether there was a viola- tion on an earlier date based upon PIRC correspondence. PINE INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS COMMITTEE, INC. IV. THE EFFECT OF THE UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES UPON COMMERCE 1095 The activities of Respondents, including PIRC, as set forth in section III, above, occurring in connection with their business operations described in section I, above, have a close, intimate, and substantial relation to trade, traffic, and commerce among the several States and tend to lead to labor disputes burdening and obstructing commerce and the free flow thereof. V. THE REMEDY Having found that Respondents, including PIRC, have engaged in certain unfair labor practices, it will be recommended that they cease and desist therefrom and that they take certain affirmative action designed to effectuate the policies of the Act. It has been found that Respondents refused to bargain collectively with the representatives of their employees by refusing, on request, to furnish said representa- tives with the information sought on Form IWA-1. I shall, therefore, recommend that Respondents be ordered to cease and desist from engaging in such conduct and that, upon request, they furnish such data to the Charging Parties. In this respect, it is to be noted that the General Counsel and counsel for the Charging Parties are in disagreement as to the scope of the recommended order.' The General Counsel seeks the order found in the Oregon Coast decision supra. In that case the Board found that it was unnecessary to determine whether all of the specific data sought in the questionnaire under consideration was in fact relevant and necessary and, as a result, ordered the Respondents in that decision to supply "information which is relevant and necessary for purposes of collective bargaining." Counsel for the Charging Parties aptly points out in his brief that this type of order would still leave the question of precisely what information had to be sub- mitted so indefinite as to make enforcement of the order difficult and urges that the recommended order call for the supplying of all the information sought on Form IWA-1. I believe there is merit in this position of the Charging Parties. The only questionable material, as indicated heretofore, is that calling for the annual production and sales totals and I have found that their production was dem- onstrated to be necessary and relevant for the purposes of collective bargaining. Accordingly, the recommended order should encompass this area.18 Upon the basis of the foregoing findings of fact, and upon the entire record in the case, I make the following: CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 1. Local 6-7 and Local 6-122, International Woodworkers of America, AFL-CIO, are labor organizations within the meaning of Section 2 (5) of the Act. 2. Pine Industrial Relations Committee, Inc.; Brooks-Scanlon, Inc.; Ponderosa Mouldings, Inc., d/b/a Ponderosa Lumber Sales; Philip Dahl and Sam Johnson, Co-Partners, d/b/a Tile Knot Pine Mill; Red Blanket Lumber Company, Inc.; and Philip Dahl and Harold D. Barclay, Co-Partners, d/b/a Harold Barclay Logging Company, are employers within the meaning of Section 2 (2) of the Act. 3. The production, maintenance, and transportation employees of each Employer Respondent, excluding office clerical, professional, and supervisory employees and guards, as more fully described in section III of this report, constitute units appro- priate for the purposes of collective bargaining within the meaning of Section 9 (b) of the Act. 19 4. Local 6-122 was on February 11, 1954, the exclusive representative of the employees of Red Blanket, and Local 6-7 was on February 11, 1954, the exclusive representative of the employees of the other Employer Respondents in the above- described appropriate units for the purposes of collective bargaining within the meaning of Section 9 (a) of the Act. 5. By refusing on February 11, 1954, and thereafter, to supply to the representatives of their employees certain information pertinent to collective bargaining, each of Respondents, including PIRC, has engaged in unfair labor practices within the meaning of Section 8 (a) (5) of the Act. 6. By the aforesaid refusals to bargain, Respondents have interfered with, restrained, and coerced employees in the exercise of the rights guaranteed by Section 7 of the Act and have thereby engaged in unfair labor practices within the meaning of Section 8 (a) (1) of the Act. 1A Of course the Board may well arrive at a different conclusion on these two aspects of the form, in which event the recommended order could readily be tailored accordingly to the type of order proposed by the General Counsel. 10 As found, 2 separate units at Brooks-Scanlon are appropriate and 1 unit of Tite Knot and Barclay employees is appropriate in the indicated classifications. 1096 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD 7. By acting as the representative of its member respondents in the commission of the above violations of Section 8 (a) (1) and (5) of the Act, Respondent Pine Industrial Relations Committee, Inc., has likewise engaged in unfair labor practices within the meaning of Section 8 (a) (1) and (5) of the Act. 8. The aforesaid unfair labor practices are unfair labor practices affecting com- merce within the meaning of Section 2 (6) and (7) of the Act. 9. Respondents have not engaged in unfair labor practices within the meaning of Section 8 (a) (1) and (5) of. the Act by failing to bargain in good faith concerning the provisions of a contract. 10. Respondents Red Blanket, Tite Knot, Ponderosa, and Brooks-Scanlon, have not discriminated with respect to the tenure of employment of employees and have not thereby engaged in unfair labor practices within the meaning of Section 8 (a) (3) and (1) of the Act. [Recommendations omitted from publication.] Robert Hall Clothes, Inc.' and Retail Clerks Union Local 1222-A, affiliated with Retail Clerks International Association, AFL- CIO, Petitioner Robert Hall Clothes, Inc. and Retail Clerks Union Local No. 137, affiliated with Retail Clerks International Association, AFL- CIO, Petitioner. Cases Nos. 21-RC-4684 and 21-RC-4738. August 20, 1957 DECISION AND ORDER Upon petitions duly filed under Section 9 (c) of the National Labor Relations Act, a consolidated hearing was held before Fred W. Davis, hearing officer. The hearing officer's rulings made at the hearing are free from prejudicial error and are hereby affirmed.2 Pursuant to the provisions of Section 3 (b) of the Act, the Board has delegated its powers in connection with these cases to a three- member panel [Chairman Leedom and Members Murdock and Jenkins]. Upon the entire record in these cases, the Board finds : 1. The employer is engaged in commerce within the meaning of the Act. 2. The labor organizations involved claim to represent certain employees of the Employer. 3. No question affecting commerce exists concerning the repre- sentation of employees of the Employer within the meaning of Sec- tion 9 (c) (1) and Section 2 (6) and (7) of the Act, for the following reasons: The Petitioner in Case No. 21-RC-4684 seeks to represent a unit of retail sales employees at the Employer's two stores in, San Diego, 1 The name of the Employer appears as amended at the hearing. The Petitioner excepted to the hearing officer's rejection of its offer of proof relating to the validity of the contract advanced by the Employer and the Intervenor as a bar here- in. However, we need not pass upon the hearing officer's ruling in this instance, relating to the contract-bar issue, in view of our dismissal of the petitions on other grounds, here- inafter discussed. 118 NLBB No. 147. Copy with citationCopy as parenthetical citation