Polymer Flip Chip Corp.

Trademark Trial and Appeal Board

Jul 2, 2002

No. 75909248 (T.T.A.B. Jul. 2, 2002)

7/2/02
Paper No. 10
TJQ

UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
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Trademark Trial and Appeal Board
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In re Polymer Flip Chip Corporation
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Serial No. 75/909,248
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John F. McKenna of Cesari and McKenna for applicant.

Jennifer Stiver Chicoski, Trademark Examining Attorney, Law
Office 115 (Tomas V. Vlcek, Managing Attorney).
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Before Quinn, Chapman and Holtzman, Administrative
Trademark Judges.

Opinion by Quinn, Administrative Trademark Judge:

An application has been filed by Polymer Flip Chip
Corporation to register the mark FLIP CARD for “radio
frequency identification (RFID) tags and cards.”1
The Trademark Examining Attorney has refused
registration under Section 2(e)(1) on the ground that
applicant’s mark, if applied to applicant’s goods, would be
merely descriptive of them.

1 Application Serial No. 75/909,248, filed February 3, 2000,
alleging a bona fide intention to use the mark in commerce.
THIS DECISION IS NOT
CITABLE AS PRECEDENT
OF THE TTAB
Serial No. 75/909,248
2
When the refusal was made final, applicant appealed.
Applicant and the Examining Attorney submitted briefs.2 An
oral hearing was not requested.
At the outset, it should be noted that the Board, in a
final decision dated April 25, 2002, affirmed a mere
descriptiveness refusal under Section 2(e)(1) in
applicant’s co-pending application (application Serial No.
75/819,459) to register the mark FLIP TAG for goods
identified as “radio frequency identification (RFID) tags
and smart cards embedded with a microchip.” It has come to
the Board’s attention that applicant filed, on March 22,
2002, a request to consolidate the appeals in its two
applications. Unfortunately, the request was not timely
associated with the co-pending application and the final
decision issued. We would add that we agree with applicant
that the appeals involve common issues of law and fact, and
that consolidation would have been properly granted in the
interest of judicial economy. Be that as it may, we now
turn to consider the merits of this appeal.

2 The Examining Attorney objected to the untimely submission of
exhibits attached to applicant’s appeal brief. The objection is
well taken, and the exhibits have not been considered in reaching
our conclusion. Trademark Rule 2.142(d). Even if considered,
however, the evidence is not persuasive of a different result.
Insofar as the dictionary definitions attached to applicant’s
reply brief are concerned, we take judicial notice thereof
pursuant to applicant’s request.
Serial No. 75/909,248
3
Applicant, while conceding that its RFID cards “happen
to incorporate a flip chip” (brief, p. 3), argues that the
mark sought to be registered is “FLIP CARD,” not “FLIP CHIP
CARD” (brief, p. 4). Applicant contends that the term
“flip” by itself is meaningless in the smart card and tag
trade, and that mental gymnastics are required to conclude
that applicant’s cards incorporate a flip chip. Applicant
maintains that “even as to those of applicant’s tags that
do contain a flip chip, that chip is only one component of
the RDIF tag and ‘flip’ is only descriptive as to that
component, not to the RDIF tag as a whole.” (Reply brief,
p. 2, emphasis in original). In support of its position,
applicant submitted dictionary definitions of certain
terms, including “flip chip.” Applicant offered other
remarks to illustrate the nature of its goods as follows
(brief, p. 3):
RFID cards have many uses. For
example, they can be programmed to open
locked doors; they can be attached to
articles (e.g. computers) to sound an
alarm when the articles pass a
transceiver located at the exitway of a
building to prevent a theft. When
attached to automobiles, the cards can
be interrogated when the cars pass a
toll plaza for toll collection
purposes.

The Examining Attorney maintains that flip chip
technology is used by applicant and others in the RFID tag
Serial No. 75/909,248
4
and smart card industry, and that purchasers in the trade
are likely to immediately recognize that the term FLIP CARD
refers to RFID cards incorporating flip chips. The
Examining Attorney asserts that there is nothing
incongruous about applicant’s mark. In support of the
refusal, the Examining Attorney submitted dictionary
definitions, excerpts from the websites of applicant and
others in the RDIF card trade, and excerpts retrieved from
printed publications showing uses of flip chip technology
by others in the trade.
It is well settled that a term is considered to be
merely descriptive of goods, within the meaning of Section
2(e)(1) of the Trademark Act, if it immediately describes
an ingredient, quality, characteristic or feature thereof
or if it directly conveys information regarding the nature,
function, purpose or use of the goods. In re Abcor
Development Corp., 588 F.2d 811, 200 USPQ 215, 217-18 (CCPA
1978). It is not necessary that a term describe all of the
properties or functions of the goods in order for it to be
considered to be merely descriptive thereof; rather, it is
sufficient if the term describes a significant attribute or
feature about them. Moreover, whether a term is merely
descriptive is determined not in the abstract but in
Serial No. 75/909,248
5
relation to the goods for which registration is sought. In
re Bright-Crest, Ltd., 204 USPQ 591, 593 (TTAB 1979).
The term “flip chip” is defined as follows: “a tiny
semiconductor die having terminations all on one side in
the form of solder pads or bump contacts; after the surface
of the chip has been passivated or otherwise treated, it is
flipped over for attaching to a matching substrate.”
McGraw-Hill Dictionary of Scientific and Technical Terms
(1974). The NEXIS evidence attests to the tremendous
growth in flip chip consumption for various reasons, among
them being the small size, efficiency, reliability and low
cost of manufacture of these chips. Solid State Technology
(June 1, 1999). This evidence, along with the printouts
from various websites of record, shows that others in the
trade have incorporated flip chip technology in their
products: “Products as diverse as Intel’s Pentium II
microprocessor with more than 2100 bumps and Philips’
Mifare RFID tag chip with two bumps went flip chip last
year.” Id.
Applicant concedes, and the evidence shows, that
applicant’s RFID cards incorporate flip chips. Although
the record does not include any uses of the term “flip” per
se, the term describes the type of chip in applicant’s
card. The type of chip is a significant feature of the
Serial No. 75/909,248
6
cards. The matter sought to be registered is merely a
shortened form of “flip chip card” which immediately
describes, without conjecture or speculation, a significant
feature of the goods, namely that the cards incorporate
flip chips or flip chip technology. Thus, no imagination
would be necessary for the relevant purchasers in the RFID
card trade to perceive precisely the merely descriptive
significance of the term FLIP CARD as it relates to an
important feature of the goods. See: In re Abcor
Development Corp., supra at 219 [Rich, J., concurring:
“The name [of the product] is ‘Gas Monitoring Badge.’ This
may be regarded as the full name. However, the users of
language have a universal habit of shortening full names--
from haste or laziness or just economy of words. Examples
are: automobile to auto, telephone to phone, necktie to
tie, gasoline service station to gas station. I regard it
as inevitable that a gas monitoring badge will be called a
gas badge as the name of the goods to the same extent as
gas monitoring badge is the name...”] (emphasis in
original).
The fact that applicant could be the first and/or only
entity to use the term FLIP CARD for RDIF cards
incorporating flip chip technology is not dispositive
where, as here, the term unquestionably conveys a merely
Serial No. 75/909,248
7
descriptive connotation. In re Polo International Inc., 51
USPQ2d 1061, 1063 (TTAB 1999). We find that others in the
trade would have a competitive need to use this term. See:
2 J.T. McCarthy, McCarthy on Trademarks and Unfair
Competition, § 11:18 (4th ed. 2001).
Decision: The refusal to register is affirmed.