Polymark Corp.

National Labor Relations Board - Board Decisions

Sep 1, 1999

329 N.L.R.B. 9 (N.L.R.B. 1999)

POLYMARK CORP. 9
Polymark Corporation and International Union of
Electronic, Electrical, Salaried Machine and
Furniture Workers, AFL–CIO, and its Local
795 and Robert J. Mohat. Cases 9–CA–28091,
9–CB–7783–1, and 9–CB–7783–2
September 1, 1999
DECISION AND ORDER
BY CHAIRMAN TRUESDALE AND MEMBERS FOX,
LIEBMAN, HURTGEN, AND BRAME
On September 30, 1992, Administrative Law Judge
Karl H. Buschmann issued the attached decision. The
Respondents and the Charging Party each filed excep-
tions and a supporting brief. The General Counsel filed
limited exceptions and a supporting brief. The Respon-
dent Union filed an answering brief in response to the
Charging Party’s exceptions and to the General Coun-
sel’s limited exceptions. The Charging Party filed an
answering brief to the Respondents’ exceptions and a
brief in reply to the Respondent Union’s answering brief.
The Board has considered the decision and the record
in light of the exceptions and briefs1 and has decided to
affirm the judge’s rulings, findings,2 and conclusions
only to the extent consistent with this Decision, and to
adopt the recommended Order as modified and set forth
in full below.
This case presents several issues concerning the en-
forcement of a union-security clause in the collective-
bargaining agreement between the Respondent Interna-
tional Union of Electronic, Electrical, Salaried Machine
and Furniture Workers, AFL–CIO (IUE), and its Local
795 (jointly referred to as the Union) and the Respondent
Polymark Corporation (the Employer). Specifically, we
must review the judge’s conclusions that the union-
security provision was not unlawful on its face; that the
Respondent Union violated Section 8(b)(1)(A) and (2) of
the Act by failing to honor Charging Party Robert Mo-
hat’s request for an immediate dues reduction after he
resigned from the Union, and by failing to advise unit
employees about their rights under the union-security
clause; and that the Respondent Employer violated Sec-
tion 8(a)(1), (2), and (3) of the Act by failing to honor
Mohat’s revocation of his dues-checkoff authorization
after he resigned from the Union.
Since 1981, the Employer and the Union have been
parties to successive collective-bargaining agreements
containing union-security and dues-checkoff clauses.
The relevant provision of the 1990–1993 agreement re-
quired as a condition of employment that nonmember
unit employees “become and remain members in good
standing of the Union.” The article also provided that,
upon the receipt of a duly executed authorization-
assignment, the Employer would “deduct . . . all estab-
lished monthly dues, initiation fees, and uniformly levied
assessments of the Union . . . and remit such deductions
to the Union.”

1 The Charging Party has requested oral argument. The request is
denied as the record and briefs adequately present the issues and posi-
tions of the parties.
2 The Charging Party has excepted to some of the judge’s credibility
findings. The Board’s established policy is not to overrule an adminis-
trative law judge’s credibility resolutions unless the clear preponder-
ance of all the relevant evidence convinces us that they are incorrect.
Standard Dry Wall Products, 91 NLRB 544 (1950), enfd. 188 F.2d 362
(3d Cir. 1951). We have carefully examined the record and find no
basis for reversing the findings.
Charging Party Mohat has worked for the Employer
since November 4, 1986. He joined the Union as a full
member and executed a checkoff authorization that
stated:
AUTHORIZATION & ASSIGNMENT
You are hereby authorized and directed to deduct
from my wages my membership dues and initiation
fees which shall be remitted by you to International
Union of Electrical, Radio and Machine Workers
AFL–CIO–CLC, Local 795 in accordance with the
applicable collective bargaining agreement.
This authorization shall be irrevocable until a
date one year from the effective date hereof or until
the date on which the current collective bargaining
agreement between my employer and IUE–AFL–
CIO–CLC and /or its Local is terminated, whichever
is earlier. I agree and direct that this Authorization
and Direction shall be automatically renewed, and
shall be irrevocable for successive period of one (1)
year each from the effective date hereof, or for the
period of each succeeding applicable collective bar-
gaining agreement between my employer and IUE–
AFL–CIO–CLC and/or its local, postmarked not
more than twenty (20) days and less than (10) days
prior to the expiration date of each one-year period,
or the termination date of each applicable collective
bargaining agreement between my employer and
IUE–AFL–CIO–CLC and/or its Local, whichever
date is earlier.

In August 1990, Mohat read a newspaper account of
Communications Workers v. Beck, 487 U.S. 735 (1988),
concerning the right of nonmember employees subject to
a union-security provision to object to a union’s expendi-
ture of their dues for nonrepresentational activities.
Thereafter, while still a union member, Mohat made sev-
eral attempts to gain information about how the Union
was spending his dues. A September 9 letter from Mohat
to the International Union’s treasurer requested a rebate
of all previously paid dues not specifically used to cover
collective-bargaining costs and a written statement of the
exact percentage of union dues needed for collective-
bargaining costs.
By letter dated October 17, the Union denied Mohat’s
request for a refund. The letter informed him that Beck
did not apply to union members. It further stated that the
329 NLRB No. 7
DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD 10
Union has an established procedure whereby a nonmem-
ber could, in April of each year, request a reduction in
the amount of fees paid to the Union. Finally, the letter
noted that the procedure for filing a dues objection had
been published annually in the March edition of the
“I.U.E. News.” Mohat testified that he had never re-
ceived copies of this newsletter.
Mohat sent another letter to the Union on November 9.
In this letter, he resigned his membership, alleged the
illegality of the parties’ union-security clause, and stated
his intent to file unfair labor practice charges. Expressly
referring to Beck, he also objected to the payment of
money to the Union for nonrepresentational purposes.
A November 19 letter from the Union advised Mohat
that he was still obligated under the union-security clause
to pay “a sum equal to union dues.” It also reminded
Mohat about established procedures for a nonmember to
raise a Beck objection during the April window period.
The letter did not describe the procedures, but it noted
that they would be published in the “IUE News” before
April 1991.
Mohat also mailed a letter to the Employer on Novem-
ber 9. He sought immediate revocation of his dues-
checkoff authorization. Shortly thereafter, the Em-
ployer’s accountant advised Mohat that the Company
would continue to withhold dues, but the money would
be put into an escrow account until the controversy con-
cerning the amount owed was settled.
1. The complaint alleged that the union-security clause
applicable to Mohat and fellow unit employees was
unlawful on its face because it required membership in
good standing and failed to state expressly their rights,
principally defined in NLRB v. General Motors Corp.,
373 U.S. 734 (1963), and in Beck, to be other than full
union members and to pay less than full union dues and
fees. The judge recommended dismissal of this allega-
tion.
We agree with the judge’s recommendation. The un-
ion-security clause tracks the provisions of Section
8(a)(3) of the Act authorizing unions and employers to
negotiate agreements that require “membership” as a
condition of employment for all unit employees. In its
recent decision in Marquez v. Screen Actors Guild, 525
U.S. 33 (1998), the Supreme Court unanimously held
that a union does not violate its duty of fair representa-
tion merely by negotiating agreements that track the lan-
guage of Section 8(a)(3), without fully explaining, in
such agreements, General Motors and Beck rights. The
Court explained that, by tracking the statutory language,
a union-security clause incorporates all of the legal rights
and refinements that have become associated with that
language under General Motors and Beck. In light of the
Supreme Court’s decision in Marquez, we affirm the
judge’s finding that the union-security clause at issue in
this case is not facially invalid.3
2. The judge seems to have found that the Union un-
lawfully failed to give sufficient separate notice of Beck
rights to Mohat and, perhaps, to other unit employees.
The complaint itself does not allege a notice violation in
the implementation of the union-security provision. It
alleges only that the Respondent Union violated the Act
by maintaining a facially unlawful union-security clause
and by failing to honor Mohat’s request for a reduction in
dues at the time of his resignation from union member-
ship. Although such allegations would in certain
circumstances be sufficient to warrant the finding of no-
tice violations without regard to the precise language of a
union-security clause,4 if fully litigated, the course of
proceedings in this case preclude such a finding. At the
hearing, the General Counsel expressly limited the Beck
issues to the facial validity of the contract and the “Re-
spondent Union’s failure to accord. Mohat his Beck
rights immediately upon request after his resignation
from membership.”
Furthermore, the General Counsel does not challenge
the general adequacy of the Union’s annual Beck notice
in its newsletter. Although the judge found that Mohat
never received copies of this newsletter, there is no evi-
dence that his failure to receive notice of Beck rights
through this medium was the result of arbitrary, bad
faith, or discriminatory conduct by the Union.5 Accord-
ingly, we shall reverse the judge’s finding that the Union
violated Section 8(b)(1)(A) and (2) by failing to advise
Mohat that the only condition of employment was the
payment of dues and fees relating to representational
purposes.
3. The judge held that the Respondent Employer vio-
lated Section 8(a)(1), (2), and (3) of the Act by failing to
honor Mohat’s revocation of his dues-checkoff authoriza-
tion. Relying on Electrical Workers IBEW Local 2088
(Lockheed Space Operations), 302 NLRB 322 (1991), the
judge found that Mohat’s authorization encompassed only
the period during which he was a union member.
Lockheed, however, did not involve an employee sub-
ject to a valid union-security clause. In fact, the Board
there expressly left open the question whether a union
could lawfully insist upon continued checkoff of dues as
to an employee who resigned union membership and

3 Accord: Assn. for Retarded Citizens (Opportunities Unlimited of
Niagara), 327 NLRB 463, 465 (1999); Paperworkers Local 987 (Sun
Chemical Corp. of Michigan), 327 NLRB 1011, 1012 (1999).
4 See generally California Saw & Knife Works, 320 NLRB 224,
251–252 (1995), enfd. sub nom. Machinists v. NLRB, 133 F.3d 1012
(7th Cir. 1998), cert. denied sub nom. Strang v. NLRB, 525 U.S. 813
(1998).
5 Cf. California Saw & Knife Works, 320 NLRB at 251–252 (resolu-
tion of notice issue remanded to administrative law judge turns on
reasonableness of unions’ dissemination efforts, not on evidence of
whether all employees actually received newsletter or read the notice of
Beck rights in it).
POLYMARK CORP. 11
attempted to rescind his checkoff authorization outside
the window period, but who continued to owe some
amount of union dues pursuant to a union-security
clause.6 Subsequent to the judge’s decision here, the
Board answered this open question in Auto Workers Lo-
cal 1752 (Schweizer Aircraft), 320 NLRB 528 (1995),
affd. sub nom. Williams v. NLRB, 105 F.2d 787 (2d Cir.
1996). The Board held that “resignation of membership
by an employee who is obligated to pay dues under a
lawful union-security clause does not privilege the em-
ployee to make an untimely revocation of his checkoff
authorization, and therefore a union’s efforts aimed at
continued enforcement of that checkoff after the em-
ployee’s resignation do not violate the Act.” 320 NLRB
528, supra at 531.
Schweizer Aircraft is controlling here with respect to
the legality of the Respondent Employer’s failure to
honor Mohat’s untimely postresignation attempt to re-
voke his dues-checkoff authorization.7 In accord with
the analysis set forth in Schweizer Aircraft, the Employer
did not violate the Act as alleged in the complaint.
Our dissenting colleague, in disagreement with
Schweizer, argues that the word “membership” in a
checkoff authorization must refer to full union member-
ship, as opposed to the more restricted meaning of union
“membership” as that term is used in the proviso to Sec-
tion 8(a)(3) of the Act and in contractual union security
clauses. In Marquez v. Screen Actors Guild, supra, the
Supreme Court held that, in the proviso and in union-
security clauses tracking its language, the word “mem-
bership” incorporates the glosses of case law, restricting
it to the obligation to pay dues and fees “for representa-
tional activities.” In a unit covered by a valid union se-
curity clause, an employee’s resignation from the union
and filing of a Beck objection would not relieve him of
that obligation. We see no reasonable basis for our dis-
senting colleague’s contention that, in using the term
“membership dues” in Section 302(c)(4) of the Labor
Management Relations Act, Congress intended some-
thing different from what was intended in Section 8(a)(3)
of the NLRA. “Membership dues” refers to whatever
may lawfully be charged as dues. In the case of both the

6 302 NLRB at 329 fn. 26.
7 Chairman Truesdale and Members Fox, Liebman, and Hurtgen
agree that Schweizer Aircraft is controlling in the situation of an un-
timely postresignation attempt to revoke a dues checkoff. For the rea-
sons set forth in their partial dissent, Members Fox and Liebman would
also find no violation here because they would find that Mohat’s objec-
tion attempt was itself untimely and therefore ineffective.
In Schweizer Aircraft, Chairman Truesdale noted that he would con-
strue the charging party’s premature notice of revocation in that case as
an ongoing request to be held in abeyance until such time as it may
have been submitted in accordance with the limitations set forth in the
authorization. 320 NLRB at 532 fn. 14. Consistent with this position,
he would likewise construe Mohat’s untimely revocation as an ongoing
request. However, he notes that Polymark’s failure to honor Mohat’s
premature revocation at the nearest period for revocability was not
alleged or litigated as a separate violation of the Act.
checkoff and the dues obligation imposed by the union-
security clause, an employee’s resignation places him in
a position, under Beck, to claim the right to pay dues
only for the support of the union’s “representation activi-
ties.” But, just as his resignation does not nullify his
dues obligation in toto, so his resignation should not nul-
lify his checkoff authorization.
We emphasize that we are not holding that an em-
ployee must remain on checkoff for full union dues until
the next open period. After an employee has perfected
an objection under Beck to the payment of nonrepresen-
tational expenses, a union may lawfully seek enforce-
ment of the checkoff only for an amount equivalent to an
employee’s share of representational expenses. It is the
union, however, not the employer, that bears the onus for
responding initially to the objection. Accordingly, an
employer does not violate the Act by continuing to de-
duct an amount equivalent to full union dues after an
employee has perfected a Beck objection until such time
as the union informs the employer of the reduced amount
owed for representational expenses.8
4. The judge found that Mohat’s resignation from the
Union and his Beck objection obligated the Union to
honor his objection within a reasonable time. Citing Pat-
tern Makers v. NLRB, 473 U.S. 95 (1985), the judge fur-
ther found that the Union’s failure to honor Mohat’s No-
vember objection because it occurred outside of the April
window period conflicted with the right to be free to re-
sign from union membership.
The judge’s conclusion accords with the Board’s sub-
sequent disposition of the same issue in California Saw
& Knife. The Board there held that a window period for
filing Beck objections, as applied to individuals who re-
sign their union membership after the expiration of an
annual window period, operates as an arbitrary restriction
on the right to be free to resign from union membership
because employees are effectively compelled to pay the
equivalent of full dues and fees even though they are no
longer union members. 320 NLRB at 236. The Board
concluded that, in light of the fundamental labor policy
of “voluntary unionism” emphasized by the Court in Pat-
tern Makers, a window period for filing objections, as
applied to employees who resigned their union member-
ship after its expiration, constitutes arbitrary conduct
violative of the duty of fair representation.9
8 Members Fox and Liebman subscribe to everything in the forego-
ing paragraph except that, for the reasons stated in their dissent, they
would find that no reduction in either dues or the amount of checkoff
would be required until the next window period for filing Beck objec-
tions.
We note that the Employer here placed Mohat’s dues in escrow after
receiving notice from him of his resignation and Beck objection. No
issue is raised and we do not pass on the question of whether the Em-
ployer was required or permitted to follow this procedure.
9 Although the Seventh Circuit held in favor of a union with respect
to the enforceability of a similar window period in Nielsen v. Machin-
ists Local 2569, 94 F.3d 1107, 1116–1117 (1996), the Board was not a
DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD 12
Under California Saw’s analysis of the window period
issue, the Respondent Union’s imposition of a window
period limitation on the filing of Beck objections by em-
ployees who have recently resigned is violative of the
duty of fair representation because it operates as an arbi-
trary restriction on the right to resign from union mem-
bership.10 Accordingly, the Respondent Union in this
case unlawfully refused to honor Mohat’s attempt to file
a Beck objection, and it thereby violated Section
8(b)(1)(A) of the Act.11
AMENDED REMEDY
Having found that the Respondent Union violated Sec-
tion 8(b)(1)(A) of the Act by restricting the submission
of dues objections of recently resigned union members to
the annual April window period, we shall order the Re-
spondent Union not to enforce the policy restriction as
currently written against dues objections of union mem-
ber resignees. Further, we shall order the Respondent
Union to amend their policy to make it clear that em-
ployees who resign from the Union may file objections
to the collection of fees for nonrepresentational expenses
for a reasonable time after their resignation of not less
than 30 days. We shall further order the Respondent
Union to accept from employee Robert Mohat the re-
duced dues and fees for the period he was or should have
been a perfected objector.
ORDER
The National Labor Relations Board orders that the
Respondent, International Union of Electronic, Electri-
cal, Salaried Machine and Furniture Workers, AFL–CIO,
and its Local 795, their officers, agents, and representa-
tives, shall
1. Cease and desist from
(a) Preventing employees in the Polymark Corporation
collective-bargaining unit who have resigned from the
Union from filing objections to the payment of fees for
expenditures of the Union not germane to the collective-
bargaining process for a reasonable time after their resig-
nations.

party to that proceeding. The Seventh Circuit subsequently deferred to
the Board’s administrative expertise and specifically enforced as a
reasonable statutory interpretation the finding of a window period vio-
lation in California Saw. 133 F.3d at 1019–1020.
10 Although Members Fox and Liebman would overrule California
Saw on this issue, and Member Brame would find a violation on differ-
ent grounds, California Saw remains controlling precedent in the ab-
sence of a single-majority supported rule to replace it.
We do not agree with our colleague that an “overcharge” to a Beck
objector is a “fine or penalty.” These terms generally connote internal
union discipline. The moneys involved herein are union-security dues.
They are privileged by the union-security provisos to Sec. 8(a)(3) and
Sec. 8(b)(2), except to the extent that they are used for nonrepresenta-
tional purposes.
11 We shall reverse the judge and dismiss the 8(b)(2) allegation
against the Union, however, in the absence of evidence that the Union
sought to “cause or attempt to cause [Polymark] to discriminate against
an employee in violation of subsection 8(a)(3)” with respect to any
employee.
(b) Collecting or attempting to collect fees from ob-
jecting nonmembers which are attributable to nonrepre-
sentational expenditures.
(c) In any like or related manner restraining or coerc-
ing employees in the exercise of the rights guaranteed
them by Section 7 of the Act.
2. Take the following affirmative action necessary to
effectuate the policies of the Act.
(a) Recognize employee Robert Mohat as an objecting
nonmember as of the effective date of his resignation.
(b) Accept from Mohat the reduced dues and fees for
the period he was or should have been a perfected objec-
tor.
(c) Amend its policy to make it clear that employees
who resign from the Union may file objections to the
collection of fees for nonrepresentational expenses for a
reasonable time after their resignation.
(d) Within 14 days after service by the Region, post at
its business offices and local meeting halls copies of the
attached notice marked “Appendix.”12 Copies of the
notice, on forms provided by the Regional Director for
Region 9, after being signed by the Respondent Unions’
authorized representatives, shall be posted by the Re-
spondent Unions and maintained for 60 consecutive days
in conspicuous places including all places where notices
to employees and members are customarily posted. Rea-
sonable steps shall be taken to ensure that the notices are
not altered, defaced, or covered by any other material.
(e) Within 21 days after service by the Region, file
with the Regional Director a sworn certification of a re-
sponsible official on a form provided by the Region at-
testing to the steps the Respondent Unions have taken to
comply.

MEMBERS FOX and LIEBMAN, dissenting in part.
We join all parts of the majority’s decision but one.
Unlike our colleagues, we would not find that the Re-
spondent Union violated its duty of fair representation by
refusing to honor Charging Party Robert Mohat’s No-
vember 1990 Beck1 objection because it was not filed
during April pursuant to the Union’s established proce-
dures.
In California Saw & Knife Works,2 the Board held that
a union that has a “window period” for filing Beck objec-
tions violates its duty of fair representation by applying
the window period to employees who resign their union
membership after the window period expires. The Board
reasoned that requiring such employees to continue to
12 If this Order is enforced by a judgment of a United States court of
appeals, the words in the notice reading “Posted by Order of the Na-
tional Labor Relations Board” shall read “Posted Pursuant to a Judg-
ment of the United States Court of Appeals Enforcing an Order of the
National Labor Relations Board.”
1 Communications Workers v. Beck, 487 U.S. 735 (1988).
2 320 NLRB 224 (1995), enfd. sub nom. Machinists v. NLRB, 133
F.3d 1012 (7th Cir. 1998), cert. denied sub nom. Strang v. NLRB, 525
U.S. 813 (1998).
POLYMARK CORP. 13
pay full dues and fees until the next window period oper-
ates as an arbitrary restriction on their right to resign
from union membership.3 Our colleagues adhere to that
view in finding the violation here.
Contrary to the majority, we find no reasoned support
for the Board’s ruling on this issue in California Saw.
To begin with, notwithstanding the Board’s ipse dixit
pronouncement in that case, it is simply not true that re-
quiring employees to object during an annual window
period restricts their right to resign. Under the Board’s
decision in Pattern Makers,4 employees may resign their
union membership at any time, for any reason. The exis-
tence of a window period in which employees who are
not members of the union may file a Beck objection in no
way limits that right. The fact that an employee may
have to wait some period of time after resigning from the
union to obtain a reduction in the fees she is charged as a
nonmember may make resignation less attractive to the
employee at that particular time, but that hardly means
that the employee is in any sense being compelled to
remain a member of the union against her will.
Second, the majority’s rule is inconsistent with the
duty of fair representation as it has been consistently
interpreted. As the Board recognized in California Saw,
in construing the duty of fair representation, the Board
and the courts must allow a union a “wide range of rea-
sonableness . . . in serving the unit it represents, subject
always to complete good faith and honesty of purpose in
the exercise of its discretion.”5 Accordingly, any as-
sessment of the validity of a window period requirement
must take into account unions’ legitimate interests in
administrative efficiency and simplicity.
The Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals in Nielsen v.
Machinists6 did just that, and found that a union’s use of
a window period in circumstances similar to those pre-
sented here did not violate its duty of fair representation.
The court agreed with the union in that case that the use
of a window period was “a reasonable administrative
device that helps the union to process its dues objector
claims and to keep its annual budget straight.”7 The
court noted that requiring unions to handle objections
“on a rolling basis throughout the year” would raise ad-
ministrative costs and complicate unions’ efforts to de-
vise annual budgets for their nonrepresentational activi-
ties.8 It held that “[n]othing in the NLRA or in Beck con-
fers a right to instantaneous action, regardless of the ad-
ministrative burden the union might bear in implement-

3 320 NLRB at 236, citing Pattern Makers League v. NLRB, 473
U.S. 95 (1985).
4 Pattern Makers League, 265 NLRB 1332 (1982), enfd. 724 F.2d 57
(7th Cir. 1983), affd. 473 U.S. 95 (1985).
5 320 NLRB at 229, quoting Ford Motor Co. v. Huffman, 345 U.S.
330, 338 (1953).
6 94 F.3d 1107 (1996).
7 Id. at 1116.
8 Id.
ing these requests.”9 Other circuit courts of appeals have
considered window periods and have come to the same
conclusion. See discussion in Nielsen.
Our colleagues, however, give no weight to these im-
portant considerations. Instead, they focus entirely on
the employee’s desire to object at any time he pleases,
and their only apparent reason for doing so lies in the
mistaken belief that to do otherwise would impair the
employee’s right to resign from union membership. As
the Seventh Circuit in Nielsen held, “Such exacting scru-
tiny is inconsistent with Vaca10 and O’Neill,11 which re-
quire us to uphold the union’s actions as long as they fall
within a generous range of reasonableness.”12 We agree
with the court that

It is not unreasonable for a union to require exist-
ing members or full fee nonmembers to voice their
objections in a timely fashion, and to be aware that
the price of not doing so will be to wait at most ten
or eleven months before implementing their new
status. Life is full of deadlines, and we see nothing
particularly onerous about this one. When people
miss the deadline for filing an appeal to this Court
[or exceptions to the Board], their rights can be lost
forever, not just for eleven months, but that does not
make time limits for filing an appeal in violation of
the law.13

In our view, then, window periods serve legitimate un-
ion administrative purposes. They do not unreasonably
restrict employees’ rights to file Beck objections, and do
not in any sense impair their right to resign from union
membership. We would, therefore, overrule California
Saw insofar as it holds that a union may not lawfully
refuse to honor Beck objections filed by employees who
resign after the expiration of an annual window period,
and we would dismiss the complaint altogether.

MEMBER HURTGEN, concurring.
I agree that the union-security clause is not unlawful
on its face. However, contrary to the majority, I note that
the clause does not track the statute. Rather, it reads in
terms of “member in good standing” rather than “mem-
ber.” However, in the instant case, I note that there is no
evidence of any Respondent constitution or bylaw, which
defines “member in good-standing.” If there were, and if
the terms were defined in ways that go beyond the pay-
ment of dues and fees, I would consider whether the lan-
guage of the union-security clause in that context was
unlawful.
I agree that the forced collection of union dues for
nonrepresentational purposes, after a nonmember has
objected thereto, is a violation of the employee’s Section
9 Id.
10 Vaca v. Sipes, 386 U.S. 171 (1967).
11 Air Line Pilots v. O’Neill, 499 U.S. 65 (1991).
12 94 F.3d at 1117.
13 Id. at 1116.
DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD 14
7 rights to refrain from supporting the union. I note,
however, that the Supreme Court in Beck held that such
conduct was a breach of the duty of fair representation.
Accordingly, I conclude that such conduct is both a di-
rect infringement of a Section 7 right and a breach of the
duty of fair representation.

MEMBER BRAME, concurring in part and dissenting in part.
This case presents a situation in which a union-
represented employee, Robert Mohat, wished to take
control of his relationship with his bargaining representa-
tive1 within the limits of the law. First, he wanted to end
his unwilling financial support, pursuant to the collec-
tive-bargaining agreement’s union-security clause, of
union activities unrelated to collective bargaining. Mo-
hat found that to do so he would have to resign from un-
ion membership, so he did. But Mohat had also learned
that the financial burden of continuing to support activi-
ties that, under the law, could not be required of him
would not end for about another 10 months. This restric-
tion stemmed from a union rule designating a limited
annual period, in this case a 1-month “window period,”
during which his union would accept his objection to
paying dues in an amount exceeding that required for
representational purposes. Further, Mohat wished to
exercise control over the manner in which he remitted his
dues, by voiding a dues-checkoff authorization2 with his
employer that, by its terms, was no longer enforceable
after he had resigned from the Union. His employer,
Polymark, refused to honor his revocation, and continued
to withhold the full dues for a union of which Mohat was
no longer a member. The allegations in the complaint
before us, then, arose because, acting on his own, Mohat
was unable promptly to effect his rights under the Act in
either matter. The complaint alleges that the Union vio-
lated Sections 8(b)(1)(A) and (2) of the National Labor
Relations Act3 by refusing to reduce Mohat’s financial

1 Named in the complaint are the “International Union of Electronic,
Electrical, Salaried Machine and Furniture Workers, AFL–CIO, and its
Local 795.” For convenience, these entities will be referred to
throughout as “the Union.”
2 A dues-checkoff system is a procedure under which an employer
deducts union dues directly from the wages of a bargaining unit em-
ployee and remits them to the union. The Act permits such an agree-
ment between an employee and his employer if certain conditions are
met. See fn. 3, infra.
3 29 U.S.C.§ 151, Below are the provisions of the Act referred to in
full or in relevant part:
Section 7 (after Congress amended it in 1947 to embrace the
right of employees to refrain from concerted activity, the provi-
sion reads):

RIGHTS OF EMPLOYEES
Employees shall have the right to self-organization, to form,
join, or assist labor organizations, to bargain collectively through
representatives of their own choosing, and to engage in other con-
certed activities for the purpose of collective bargaining or other
mutual aid or protection, and shall also have the right to refrain
from any or all such activities except to the extent that such right
may be affected by an agreement requiring membership in a labor
obligation after he resigned from union membership.4
The complaint further alleges that Polymark violated

organization as a condition of employment as authorized in sec-
tion 8(a)(3).

Sec. 8(a)(2) provides in relevant part:

It shall be an unfair labor practice for an employer—
(2) to dominate or interfere with the formation or administra-
tion of any labor organization or contribute financial or other sup-
port to it.

. . . .

Sec. 8(a)(3) provides in relevant part:

It shall be an unfair labor practice for an employer—
(3) by discrimination in regard to hire or tenure of employ-
ment or any term or condition of employment to encourage or
discourage membership in any labor organization: Provided, That
nothing in this Act . . .shall preclude an employer from making an
agreement with a labor organization . . . to require as a condition
of employment membership therein on or after the thirtieth day
following the beginning of such employment or the effective date
of such agreement, whichever is the later, (i) if such labor organi-
zation is the representative of the employees as provided in sec-
tion 9(a), in the appropriate collective-bargaining unit covered by
such agreement when made . . . Provided further, That no em-
ployer shall justify any discrimination against an employee for
nonmembership in a labor organization (A) if he has reasonable
grounds for believing that such membership was not available to
the employee on the same terms and conditions generally applica-
ble to other members, or (B) if he has reasonable grounds for be-
lieving that membership was denied or terminated for reasons
other than the failure of the employee to tender the periodic dues
and the initiation fees uniformly required as a condition of acquir-
ing or retaining membership.

Sec. 8(b) reads, in pertinent part:

It shall be an unfair labor practice for a labor organization or
its agents

(1) to restrain or coerce (A) employees in the exercise of the
rights guaranteed in Section 7: Provided, That this paragraph shall
not impair the right of a labor organization to prescribe its own
rules with respect to the acquisition or retention of membership
therein

. . . .

(2) to cause or attempt to cause an employer to discriminate
against an employee in violation of subsection (a)(3).

Sec. 302(a)(4), which enables unions and employers to negotiate
dues-checkoff authorization provisions in collective-bargaining agree-
ments, provides as follows:
It shall be unlawful for any employer . . . to pay, lend, or de-
liver . . . any money or other thing of value—to any labor organi-
zation . . . [except] with respect to money deducted from the
wages of employees in payment of membership dues in a labor
organization: Provided, That the employer has received from
each employee, on whose account such deductions are made, a
written assignment which shall not be irrevocable for a period of
more than one year, or beyond the termination date of the appli-
cable collective agreement, whichever occurs sooner.
4 The complaint also alleged that the Union violated Sec. 8(b)(1)(A)
and (2) and the Employer violated Sec. 8(a)(3) and (1) by maintaining a
collective-bargaining agreement with a union-security clause requiring
employees to be members of the Union in good standing. Like my
colleagues, I would dismiss this allegation under Marquez v. Screen
Actors Guild, 525 U.S. 33 (1998), wherein the Supreme Court upheld
the facial validity of a similar clause.
POLYMARK CORP. 15
Sections 8(a)(1), (2), and (3) of the Act by refusing to
honor Mohat’s revocation of his dues-checkoff authori-
zation. In my view, both the Employer and the Union
violated the Act, to the extent discussed below, in their
treatment of Mohat’s claims.
Mohat’s rights with respect to his union-security obli-
gations arise from the most fundamental precepts of la-
bor law, as interpreted by Supreme Court decisions de-
fining the relationship between a union and an employee
under the Act. In NLRB v. General Motors Corp.,5 the
Supreme Court recognized Mohat’s right to resign for-
mal union membership, even though the Union and Po-
lymark had negotiated a union-security clause requiring
“membership in good standing.” The Court further lim-
ited Mohat’s financial obligation to the Union to a ser-
vice fee that did not include funds used to support activi-
ties not related to the Union’s role as collective-
bargaining agent under Communications Workers v.
Beck.6 In that case, the Supreme Court held that al-
though Section 8(a)(3) of the Act permits a union and an
employer to agree that all unit employees shall pay dues
and fees regardless of formal membership, a union’s ex-
penditure of such funds collected from objecting non-
members on activities unrelated to collective bargaining
violates the union’s duty of fair representation.7

5 373 U.S. 734 (1963). General Motors described the “membership
obligation” a bargaining unit employee owed his bargaining representa-
tive as membership “whittled down to its financial core.” Id. at 742.
6 487 U.S. 735 (1988).
7 The Court reasoned that its decision in Machinists v. Street, 367
U.S. 740 (1961), which made essentially the same holding under the
Railway Labor Act ((RLA), 45 U.S.C. § 151, et seq.), is controlling for
cases arising under the NLRA. The Court found that Sec. 2, Eleventh
of the RLA and Sec. 8(a)(3) are identical in all material respects. The
Court observed that “only the most compelling evidence could per-
suade us that Congress intended the nearly identical language of these
two provisions to have different meanings.” 487 U.S. at 754.
The duty of fair representation is a court-devised legal principle,
originally arising in cases under the RLA, which affords employees
direct access to the federal courts for claims against their union. See,
e.g., Steele v. Louisville & Nashville Railway Co., 323 U.S. 192 (1944).
As succinctly formulated by the Supreme Court, the duty of fair repre-
sentation states that the union, as the exclusive representative of all
employees in a unit, owes each employee a duty to exercise honesty of
purpose and good faith in statutory dealings. A union breaches its duty
of fair representation through conduct that is “arbitrary, discriminatory,
or in bad faith.” Vaca v. Sipes, 386 U.S. 171, 190 (1967). Vaca v.
Sipes arose under Sec. 301 of the Labor Management Relations Act,
which accords federal courts jurisdiction over suits by and against labor
organizations, including some by employees. A Sec. 301 suit does not
involve a finding that the union has violated the Act and does not con-
sider whether a union has “restrained or coerced” an employee within
the meaning of Sec. 8(b)(1)(A).
The Board concluded that the duty of fair representation could be
enforced through an unfair labor practice proceeding alleging a viola-
tion of Sec. 8(b)(1)(A) of the Act in Miranda Fuel Co., 140 NLRB 181,
185 (1962), enf. denied on other grounds 326 F.2d 172 (2d Cir. 1963).
The Board derived the right from the Sec. 7 right to “bargain collec-
tively through representatives of one’s own choosing” and concluded
that Sec. 8(b)(1)(A) “prohibits labor organizations, when acting in a
statutory representative capacity, from taking action against any em-
ployee upon considerations or classifications which are irrelevant,
I.
The Union represents a unit of production and mainte-
nance employees at Polymark, a Cincinnati, Ohio manu-
facturer of silk-screen emblems. The Union and Poly-
mark had negotiated a collective-bargaining agreement
with a union-security clause and dues-checkoff authori-
zation.8 Mohat went to work in the bargaining unit at
Polymark in 1986. At the time he was hired, Polymark’s
president, Dale Vollmer, told Mohat that he was to join
the Union and to authorize dues checkoff. Mohat did so.
In August 1990,9 he learned, through a newspaper article,
of represented employees’ rights under CWA v. Beck.
Mohat sought to exercise those rights immediately, first
by asking Sheila Madden, his shop steward, about how
his dues broke down between representational and non-
representational matters. Madden was unable to help
him. In late August or September, Mohat next called the
Union, seeking without success the same information.
Mohat then wrote to the Union on September 9, request-
ing a breakdown of his dues between representational
and nonrepresentational activities as well as a refund of
dues not used for collective bargaining. By letter dated
October 17, Edward Fire, the International Union’s
treasurer, denied the refund request, because Beck rights
do not apply to members. Fire informed Mohat, how-
ever, that in April 1991, six months hence, nonmembers
could request a dues reduction, to run from “the succeed-
ing June through May of the following year.” Thus, the
earliest time that Mohat could realize his dues objection
was approximately 10 months after he began his efforts

invidious, or unfair.” “Although there is no explicit statutory require-
ment of ‘fair representation,’ the Board and the courts have declared a
violation of the duty to be a violation of Sec. 8(b)(1)(A).” NLRB v.
Teamsters Local 5, 778 F.2d 207, 213 (5th Cir. 1985), and cases cited
therein.
8 The text of the union-security clause and the dues-checkoff au-
thorization in the relevant collective-bargaining agreement between
Polymark and the Union are as follows:
Section 1. It shall be a condition of employment that all em-
ployees of the Company covered by this Agreement who are
members of the Union in good standing on the effective date of
this Agreement shall, [sic] remain members in good standing and
those who are not members on the effective date of this Agree-
ment, shall, on the sixty-first day following the effective date of
this agreement, become and remain members in good standing of
the Union. It shall also be a condition of employment that all em-
ployees covered by this Agreement and hired after its effective
date shall, on the sixty-first calendar day following the beginning
of such employment, become and remain members in good stand-
ing in the Union.

. . . .

Section 2. Upon receipt of a duly executed authorization-
assignment, the company agrees to deduct from the pay all [sic]
employees covered by this agreement all established monthly
dues, initiation fees, and uniformly levied assessments of the Un-
ion. It is further agreed that the Company shall remit such deduc-
tions to the Union prior to the end of the month for which the de-
duction is made. All authorizations shall be voluntarily signed by
the employees.
9 Unless otherwise noted, all subsequent dates shall be in 1990.
DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD 16
to secure his Beck rights. Fire also informed him that the
Union had published this information in its newsletter.10
Mohat resigned from the Union by letter dated No-
vember 9, and instructed the Union to put his Beck rights
into effect immediately. On the same day, Mohat sent
Polymark a copy of this letter, with a cover letter revok-
ing his checkoff authorization, noting that the authoriza-
tion form “only allows you to deduct monies from my
pay for ‘membership dues and initiation fee.’ As I am no
longer a member of the Union, I owe the Union no
‘membership dues.’”
On the day Polymark received Mohat’s letter, Jim
Henson, Polymark’s accountant, orally acknowledged his
letters and informed him that the Company would con-
tinue withholding full dues, as the Union had not author-
ized it to reduce that amount, and that it would place the
money in escrow pending resolution of the dispute. Ac-
cording to Mohat’s testimony, Henson indicated that
Polymark preferred legal difficulties with him to any
with the Union.
By letter dated November 19, Fire then told Mohat that
although he had resigned, he was still responsible for
paying an amount equal to normal dues and fees and re-
minded him of the objection procedures outlined in its
previous letter.
In December, with both bargaining representative and
employer ranged against him, a frustrated Mohat filed an
unfair labor practice charge and the Union filed a griev-
ance with Polymark for failing to pay Mohat’s dues.
Polymark denied the grievance, and the instant proceed-
ing resulted from the charge.
II.
The judge found that the Union’s failure to reduce his
financial obligation to his fair share of such expenses
violated Section 8(b)(1)(A) and (2) of the Act.11 With
respect to Polymark, the judge found that its failure to
give effect to Mohat’s checkoff revocation violated Sec-
tions 8(a)(1), (2),12 and (3) and ordered Polymark to

10 Mohat testified that he had never received the newsletter. In its
brief, the Union concedes the veracity of Mohat’s statement that he had
never received the newsletter.
Mohat also unsuccessfully sought similar information from Poly-
mark. The Supreme Court, however, has never found that an employer
has any obligation to provide employees with information regarding
their rights under union-security clauses.
11 The judge also found that the Union’s failure to inform Mohat that
the sole condition of employment is the payment of fees for representa-
tional expenses violated Sec. 8(b)(1)(A). I agree with my colleagues’
dismissal of this finding, solely on the basis that it was not alleged in
the complaint or litigated at the hearing.
I also agree with my colleagues’ dismissal of the 8(b)(2) allegation
against the Union in the absence of evidence that the Union sought to
“cause or attempt to cause [Polymark] to discriminate against an em-
ployee in violation of subsection (a)(3)” with respect to any employee.
12 The Employer argues in pertinent part that it did not violate Sec.
8(a)(2) because it placed any dues of Mohat’s that could be disputed
into an escrow account pending the resolution of a disagreement
involving parties and issues other than those over which it had control.
Thus, Polymark contends, it did not “contribute financial aid or other
honor the checkoff revocation and to refund dues and
fees collected thereafter.
My colleagues have found that the Union unlawfully
refused to accord Mohat his Beck rights immediately
upon his assertion of them, but solely on the grounds that
he effectively resigned from the Union notwithstanding
the window period. They rely on the Board’s previous
decision California Saw & Knife Works.13 They order
the Union to recognize Mohat as an objecting nonmem-
ber as of the date of his objection, accept from him the
reduced dues and fees of an objector, and amend its pol-
icy to clarify that employees who resign union member-
ship may file Beck objections for a reasonable time after
resignation.
My colleagues have also reversed the judge and dis-
missed the allegation against the Employer under the rule
announced in Auto Workers Local 1752 (Schweizer Air-
craft),14 in which the Board, with former Member Cohen
dissenting, held that a dues-checkoff authorization sur-
vives resignation when an employee is covered by a
valid union-security clause.
III.
While I agree that the Union violated the Act in failing
to follow Mohat’s instructions respecting his dues objec-
tion promptly, I base my view on a very different reading
of the law from that of my colleagues. Once an em-
ployee has resigned from the union, the union may not
collect funds in amounts greater than those allowed un-
der Beck. Therefore, the collection of such amounts,
whether for 1 month or for 11 months because of a
“window period,” is prohibited by the Act, as violations
of Section 8(b)(1)(A)’s prohibition against “restrain[t] or
coerc[ion][of] employees in the rights guaranteed in Sec-
tion 7.” Well-settled legal precedent supports this view,
as does simple logic. On the one hand, if such compelled
overcharges are viewed as equivalent of the dues and
fees paid by members, then regardless of the reasons a
union may give for the imposition of a window period,
the union collecting the overcharge violates the em-
ployee’s fundamental Section 7 right to refrain from “as-
sist[ing]” a labor organization. On the other hand, if
overcharges15 are viewed as something other than lawful
dues, they constitute a fine or discipline that coerces and

support” to a labor organization in violation of Sec. 8(a)(2). I find
merit in Polymark’s exception, and I would dismiss the 8(a)(2) allega-
tion in light of Polymark’s having placed the dues in escrow.
13 320 NLRB 224 (1995), enfd. sub nom. Machinists v. NLRB, 133
F.3d 1012 (7th Cir. 1998), cert. denied sub nom. Strang v. NLRB, 525
U.S. 813 (1998). California Saw & Knife was the Board’s first elucida-
tion of its view that violating the rights accorded an employee under
Beck was a breach of the union’s duty of fair representation and a viola-
tion of Sec. 8(b)(1)(A). See fuller discussion, infra.
14 320 NLRB 528 (1995), affd. sub nom. Williams v. NLRB, 105
F.3d 787 (2d Cir. 1996).
15 The term “overcharge” will be used herein to denote the amount of
money in excess of the appropriate Beck service fee for objecting non-
members that a union continues to exact after resignation and objection.
POLYMARK CORP. 17
restrains the objecting nonmember under Scofield v.
NLRB.16
Thus, because cases dealing with the lawfulness of a
union’s window period for dues objections under Beck
involve the statutory prohibition against “restraint or
coercion,” I would hold that a union must accept and
give immediate effect to all dues objections from any
nonmember, at the election of the nonmember rather than
at the convenience of the union.17 In addition, I would
require an employer to honor a nonmember’s revocation
of dues-checkoff authorization and a union to recognize
this obligation on the part of an employer.
A careful reading of the Act and the case law indicates
clearly that no clause of Section 7 can be stretched to
endow a union or an employer with the right to require
that the employee continue to pay fees the union may no
longer legally demand or to bind a nonmember to one
method of remitting dues. I find only one outcome in
keeping with the Act’s principles of employee freedom
of choice. The discretion to join a union, to remain a
member or to resign, to support every activity the union
deems desirable or to limit support to the bargaining
agent’s statutory activities, remains vested always and
entirely in the employee, not in the bargaining representa-
tive nor in the employer. Just as a union cannot restrict a
member’s right to resign,18 no private restriction may be
placed on a nonmember’s right to control his relationship
to his bargaining representative. Further, no party can
hold an employee to a private contract, such as a dues-
checkoff authorization, when the condition underlying
that contract no longer exists. My reasons for these posi-
tions follow.
A.
First, a limit on a nonmember’s right to assert Beck
rights violates the bedrock principles of voluntary union-
ism and the concomitant right to refrain from union ac-
tivity. As noted above, the majority finds that the Union
in this case violated Section 8(b)(1)(A) based on the
precedent set by the Board in California Saw & Knife. In
that case, the Board faced the limited allegation that

the window period is violative of Section 8(b)(1)(A) of
the Act solely as applied to employees who resign their
membership following the expiration of the January
window period. The General Counsel reasons that a
union member who resigns after the January window
period has passed is compelled to wait until the follow-
ing January to register a Beck objection. The General
Counsel accordingly asserts that the window period
impermissibly burdens the resignation rights of those

16 394 U.S. 423 (1969).
17 In this regard, we need not decide whether a union, which, for ex-
ample, accepts new members only on the first of each month, may
delay the effectuation of a requested reduction of dues similarly to the
first of the month that next follows the request.
18 Pattern Makers v. NLRB, 473 U.S. 95 (1985).
individuals who resign their union membership follow-
ing the window period.19

The Board agreed with the General Counsel and the
judge, and found, in light of its duty to uphold the fun-
damental labor policy of voluntary unionism, that with
respect to this small class of employee, the window pe-
riod

effectively operates as an arbitrary restriction on the
right to be free to resign from union membership. [Ci-
tations omitted]. A unit employee may exercise Beck
rights only when he or she is not a member of the un-
ion. An employee who resigns union membership out-
side the window period is thereafter effectively com-
pelled to continue to pay full dues even though no
longer a union member, and the window period in this
circumstance operates as an arbitrary restriction on the
right to refrain from union membership and from sup-
porting nonrepresentational expenditures.20

The California Saw Board rightly relied on Pattern
Makers v. NLRB.21 The Supreme Court held there that
Section 8(b)(1)(A) precluded a union from fining em-
ployees who resigned during a strike, despite a union
bylaw prohibiting such resignations. The Court based its
holding on the conclusion that reasonable limits on res-
ignation were incompatible with Section 7’s recognition
of the right of employees to refrain from union activities,
and fining an employee for resigning during a strike was
thus a coercive act violative of Section 8(b)(1)(A). In
California Saw & Knife, however, the Board merely
stated, without explication, the principle that imposing a
window period on newly resigned employees impeded
their right to resign freely, but then found, with respect to
that group of employees, that the imposition of a window
period was arbitrary conduct that violated the union’s
duty of fair representation. In this last respect, the Board
unquestionably strayed. Where statutory language
clearly covers conduct in question, it is unnecessary to
look to the duty of fair representation, a judicially de-
rived doctrine. Thus, in Pattern Makers, the Supreme
Court analyzed the union conduct at issue in terms of its
propensity to restrain or coerce employees, not in terms
of whether the union’s conduct ran afoul of the duty of
fair representation doctrine, which the Board had, in
Miranda Fuel Co., supra, recognized as a distinct viola-
tion of Section 8(b)(1)(A).22
This analysis arises from an important theme of labor
history emerging since 1935: the transition from the
closed shop and compulsory unionism under the Wagner
Act to voluntary unionism after the 1947 Taft-Hartley
amendments. This movement has been, for our pur-
19 320 NLRB at 236.
20 Id.
21 473 U.S. 95 (1985).
22 See fn. 7, supra.
DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD 18
poses, primarily expressed in Taft-Hartley’s amendments
to Section 7 and to what is now Section 8(a)(3) and its
addition of Section 8(b)(1)(A) to the Act, as well as in
several Supreme Court cases applying these sections.
Taft-Hartley amended Section 7, in relevant part, to add
language recognizing employees’ right to “refrain from
any or all [concerted] activities”; and, as the Supreme
Court commented in Pattern Makers, “[t]his general
right is implemented by Section 8(b)(1)(A).”23 Taft-
Hartley’s amendments to Section 8(a)(3) eliminated
compulsory unionism by permitting only union-security
agreements that did no more than require unit employees
to pay dues or an equivalent service fee and removed
union power under a closed shop to force a worker to
abide by union rules or policies or lose his job. As the
Court in Pattern Makers noted, “[f]ull union membership
thus no longer can be a requirement of employment. If a
new employee refuses formally to join a union and sub-
ject himself to its discipline, he cannot be fired. More-
over, no employee can be discharged if he initially joins
a union, and subsequently resigns.”24
In Pattern Makers, the Court linked its construction of
Section 8(a)(3) permitting resignation at will to these
developments in individual labor freedoms, and recog-
nized that Section 8(b)(1)(A) was the practical tool that
effectuated that freedom. As noted above, the Court held
that Section 8(b)(1)(A) precluded a union from fining
employees who violated a union bylaw by resigning dur-
ing a strike. The Court saw that, although the bylaw
called for fining employees, not discharging them, it was
nonetheless coercive. “[A] union has not left a ‘worker’s
employment rights inviolate when it exacts [his entire]
paycheck in satisfaction of a fine imposed for working.’ .
. . Congress in 1947 sought to eliminate completely any
requirement that the employee maintain full union mem-
bership.”25
Significantly for our purposes, in Pattern Makers the
Court recognized that a unit employee’s views about
membership in his union could change over time: “We
think it noteworthy that Section 8(a)(3) protects the em-
ployment rights of the dissatisfied member as well as
those of the worker who never assumed full membership.
By allowing employees to resign from a union at any
time, Section 8(a)(3) protects the employee whose views
come to diverge from those of his union.”26
Although Pattern Makers represents a landmark in the
elucidation of employee rights under the Act, Section 7
rights do not end at the freedom to join, refuse to join, or
resign from a union. These rights explicitly include the
right to refrain from assisting a labor organization. Even
when an employee has exercised his right to join a union,
the right to choose whether to participate in or refrain

23 Pattern Makers, 473 U.S. at 100–101.
24 Id. at 106.
25 Id. at 107 (citation omitted).
26 Id. at 106.
from union activities includes the right to resign, as the
Supreme Court recognized in Pattern Makers. More-
over, as the Court further recognized, Section 8(b)(1)(A)
forbids unions from restraining or coercing an employee
in the exercise of that right.27 After Communications
Workers v. Beck, supra, however, the right to refrain
from assisting a labor union includes the right, for a
nonmember subject to the requirements of a valid union-
security clause, to decline to support union activities that
are not germane to collective bargaining, contract ad-
ministration, and grievance adjustment:

Taken as a whole, Section 8(a)(3) permits an em-
ployer and a union to enter into an agreement requir-
ing all employees to become union members as a
condition of continued employment, but the “mem-
bership” that may be so required has been “whittled
down to its financial core.” NLRB v. General Mo-
tors Corp., 373 U.S. 734, 742 (1963). The statutory
question presented in this case, then, is whether this
“financial core” includes the obligation to support
union activities beyond those germane to collective
bargaining, contract administration, and grievance
adjustment. We think it does not.28

When the Court concluded in Beck that Section 8(a)(3)
“authorizes the exaction of only those fees and dues nec-
essary to ‘performing the duties of an exclusive represen-
tative of the employees in dealing with the employer on
labor-management issues,’”29 unions lost any authority to
require from nonmembers payments beyond their fair
share of the expenses described above. Thus, after
Beck’s holding that a union’s expenditure of such funds
exceeded its statutory authority and constituted a breach
of the duty of fair representation, no statutory basis for
the involuntary collection of such funds from a nonmem-
ber who had registered an objection could exist.30 Once
27 Subject to the proviso to Sec. 8(b)(1)(A): “Provided, That this
paragraph shall not impair the right of a labor organization to prescribe
its own rules with respect to the acquisition or retention of membership
therein.”
28 487 U.S 735, 745 (1988).
29 Id. at 762–763.
30 In Beck, the respondents’ pleading presented the Supreme Court
with the allegation that a union’s expenditures of objectors’ dues on
nonrepresentational activities violated their constitutional rights, ran
contrary to Sec. 8(a)(3), and breached the duty of fair representation.
There was no allegation, nor could there have been in this context, that
Sec. 8(b)(1)(A) had been violated; thus, the Court did not and could not
consider the issues of restraint or coercion in the exercise of Sec. 7
rights. Indeed, as a statutory construction of the Act, the Court scarcely
mentions Sec. 8(b)(1)(A); instead, the Court construed Sec. 8(a)(3), the
provision called into question by the pleadings, and its proviso. It
remained for the Board to find that union exaction of nonrepresenta-
tional monies from objecting nonmembers was a union unfair labor
practice. See California Saw & Knife, supra.
Thus, I disagree with our dissenting colleagues that a union’s use of
a window period is compatible with Sec. 8(b)(1)(A). What is more, I
find inapplicable their use of the duty of fair representation as the basis
for their analysis of the window period issue, as applied to newly re-
signed employees or to any other class of employee. This is the same
POLYMARK CORP. 19
a nonmember has informed his bargaining representative
of his objection to paying dues to support nonrepresenta-
tional expenditures, the only lawful course open to the
union is to recognize the objection and to give it effect as
soon as it is received.31
Just as in Pattern Makers, in which the Court found
that a union restrained and coerced employees in viola-
tion of Section 8(b)(1)(A) when it did not permit them to
resign at any time without penalty, so a union’s failure to
recognize and give immediate effect to objections also
violates Section 8(b)(1)(A). Neither the Act nor any Su-
preme Court cases justify permitting a union to postpone
the effectuation of any nonmember’s objection—for to
do so is to permit a union to extract funds from a non-
member to which it is not entitled and to continue to
deny to the employee his Section 7 right to refrain from
assisting a labor organization by forcing the nonmember
to pay for nonrepresentational activities over the non-
member’s objection—or otherwise to penalize the non-
member.32

error, discussed above, that the Board in California Saw & Knife made when it conflated a Pattern Makers and a duty of fair representation
analysis to strike down the window period at issue there.
Pattern Makers and the right to resign apply to Beck rights because
where the financial obligations forcibly survive the end of formal
membership where the employee has filed a Beck objection, the right to
resign from, and not assist, a labor organization, is impeded because the
employee is forced to continue to pay an overcharge—the equivalent of
full union membership dues—or face the possible loss of employment.
This, under Sec. 8(b)(1)(A) and Pattern Makers, is union coercion.
This conduct, which amounts to forcing the objecting nonmember to
assist the union, falls outside the bounds of Sec. 8(a)(3) and Sec.
8(b)(1)(A). It is erroneous to judge the conduct at issue here according
to standards that the courts devised to evaluate whether a union’s per-
formance of its statutory obligations met a minimum standard. Rather,
this conduct violates the statute’s prohibitions, and it is properly evalu-
ated in terms of an 8(b)(1)(A) “restrain or coerce” standard.
31 As the Supreme Court stated in Machinists v. Street, 367 U.S. at
774:
“Any remedies, however, would properly be granted only to
employees who have made known to the union officials that they
do not desire their funds to be used for political causes to which
they object. The safeguards of [the RLA] . . . were added for the
protection of dissenters” interest, but dissent is not to be pre-
sumed—it must affirmatively be made known to the union by the
dissenting employee. . . . Thus we think that only those who have
identified themselves as opposed to political uses of their funds
are entitled to relief.
32 Until the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals reconsidered the issue
of a window period, 133 F.3d at 1017–1019, in affirming California
Saw & Knife, no circuit court had issued an opinion on the lawfulness
of a window period under the Act.
In Nielsen v. Machinists Local 2569, 94 F.3d 1107 (7th Cir. 1996), a
case arising under Sec. 301, the court found “not unreasonable” the
union’s requirement that employees register objections in a month-long
period each year. The court agreed with the union that a window pe-
riod facilitates administrative and budgeting, and found that handling
objections throughout the year would increase costs and difficulties.
The court noted that “[l]ife is full of deadlines, and we see nothing
particularly onerous in this one,” and compared the window period to
judicial filings: “When people miss the deadline for filing an appeal to
this court, their rights can be lost forever, not just for eleven months,
but that does not make time limits for filing appeals in violation of the
law.” Id. at 1116. With all due respect, I do not find this analogy per-
B.
My second basis for finding that a window period is
coercive under Section 8(b)(1)(A) is that any overcharge
after a nonmember has notified the union of his objection
constitutes an unlawfully levied penalty, fine, or other
exaction.33 As discussed above, such charges are not part
of the objector’s membership obligation, as they exceed
the financial core obligation as defined in Beck. There-
fore, these overcharges, since they take money away
from employees against their will and at the union’s dis-
cretion, must then constitute a “fine or penalty” levied by
the union under circumstances not permitted by the Act.
A union violates Section 8(b)(1)(A), then, by collecting
post-objection overcharges because Section 8(b)(1)(A)
precludes unions from fining or disciplining employees
who are not members and have not consented to the un-
ion’s authority.
In Pattern Makers, the Supreme Court noted that “if
[Section 8(b)(1)(A)’s] terms ‘refrain’ and ‘restrain or
coerce’ are interpreted literally, fining employees to en-
force compliance with any union rule would violate the

suasive. Courts are empowered by law to impose judicial filing dead-
lines, and they serve important public policy functions. There is no
explicit enabling statute that empowers unions to establish window
periods, and even if the court views them as private goods for the un-
ion, they play no role in the furtherance of public policy.
Likewise, in Abrams v. Communications Workers, 59 F.3d 1373,
1381–1382 (1995), arising under Sec. 301, the D.C. Circuit approved
the union’s use of a window period and its refusal to recognize continu-
ing objections, finding that neither procedure is unduly burdensome to
dues objectors. Regarding the window period, the court noted that
“[t]he union, as well as the employees, have an interest in the prompt
resolution of obligations and disputes. The . . . window period facili-
tates prompt resolution and leaves no doubt as to the timing of the
requirement for making an objection.” It is difficult to see how a win-
dow period would aid in the resolution of disputes over “obligations,”
which would appear to arise out of whether an objection had been filed,
the proportion of chargeable to nonchargeable expenses, the adequacy
of union notice to employees of their rights, or the quality of the infor-
mation the union supplied. In fact, the notion that the window period
would lessen the likelihood of disputes is premised on the assumption
that the union’s determination of whether an objection had been filed
properly would always prevail.
In Shea v. Machinists, 154 F.3d 508 (1998), another RLA case,
however, the Fifth Circuit, deciding a case arising under the RLA,
rejected the union’s defense of its annual renewal requirement and
refusal to accept continuing objections, but distinguished the facts
before it from those arising under the Act. The court held that under
the RLA, “procedures [that limit an employee’s Constitutional rights,
such as the payment of dues under a union-security clause], be carefully
tailored to minimize the infringement” on those rights. Id. at 504 (cita-
tion omitted). The court distinguished Nielsen and California Saw &
Knife on the basis that those cases arise under the NLRA rather than the
RLA.
Thus, neither Nielsen, Abrams, nor Shea did, or could, consider the
theories set forth here based as it is on a violation of Sec. 8(b)(1)(A) of
the Act, wholly apart from the duty of fair representation. “[A]s a
general matter, neither state nor federal courts possess jurisdiction over
claims based on activity that is ‘arguably’ subject to Section 7 or 8 of
the NLRA.” Breininger v. Sheet Metal Workers Local, 493 U.S. 67, 74
(1989).
33 This analysis applies in cases in which an employee is bound by a
valid union-security clause.
DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD 20
Act”34—but commented that it had held that Section
8(b)(1)(A) does not prohibit a union from disciplining
members. See NLRB v. Allis-Chalmers Mfg. Co.,35
NLRB v. Granite State Joint Board,36 and Scofield v.
NLRB.37 The evolution of the Court’s application of Sec-
tion 8(b)(1)(A) and Section 8(a)(3), from Allis-Chalmers
through Beck, shows that, while union internal autonomy
remained important to labor policy, the Court curbed the
absolute nature of union autonomy to accommodate em-
ployee freedom and self-determination as the Court fur-
ther expounded the implications of Section 7.
In Allis-Chalmers, the Court held that a union had not
violated Section 8(b)(1)(A) by fining members who had
crossed the union’s picket line and returned to work dur-
ing a strike, and suing to collect the fines.38 The Court
noted that unions’ almost legislative power over the af-
fairs of represented employees and authority to regulate
their internal affairs were significant elements in national
labor policy after enactment of the Taft-Hartley Act.39
The Court saw the intent of the Taft-Hartley Act as leav-
ing with unions the authority to discipline members who
quit a strike. It did not attribute to Congress an intent to
limit “unions in the powers necessary to the discharge of
their role as exclusive statutory bargaining agents by
impairing the usefulness of labor’s cherished strike
weapon.”40 This reasoning, however, required the Court
to balance Congress’ equally prominent intent that Taft-
Hartley safeguard represented employees against union
autonomy.41 To do so, the Court characterized the disci-
pline of a member as an internal matter, and an attempt
to affect an employee’s employment as external.42
Thus, Allis-Chalmers and Pattern Makers represent
two strands in modern NLRA law: the first, union inter-
nal autonomy, and the second, voluntary unionism,
where employees are free to set their own relationship
with their union, without compulsory membership or fear
of job loss.
The Court began to reconcile these two strains in Sco-
field v. NLRB and NLRB v. Granite State Joint Board,
both cases involving Section 8(b). Scofield involved the

34 473 U.S. at 101.
35 388 U.S. 175 (1967).
36 409 U.S. 213 (1972).
37 394 U.S. 423 (1969).
38 388 U.S. at 175.
39 Id. at 179–183.
40 Id. at 183.
41 Id. at 184.
42 The Court noted that “[f]ull union membership is not compelled
by the [union-security] clauses: an employee is required only to become
and remain a member of the Union . . . to the extent of paying his
monthly dues.” Id. at 196. While the court below relied on the nature
of the union-security obligation to hold that unions could not fine
members and seek enforcement in court, the Supreme Court, in revers-
ing, assumed that the individuals at issue were full members and cau-
tioned that “[w]hether [the Taft-Hartley] prohibitions would apply if
the locals had imposed fines on members whose membership was in
fact limited to the obligation of paying monthly dues is a question not
before us and upon which we intimate no view.” Id. at 197.
fining of union members who broke a union rule by ex-
ceeding a union-imposed production ceiling. The mem-
bers filed charges with the Board, arguing that the un-
ion’s attempt to collect the fines restrained and coerced
them under the Act. In delineating the circumstances
under which unions were privileged to discipline mem-
bers, the Court interpreted Allis-Chalmers as “distin-
guish[ing] between internal and external enforcement of
union rules and [holding] that ‘Congress did not propose
any limitations with respect to the internal affairs of un-
ions, aside from barring enforcement of a union’s inter-
nal regulations to affect a member’s employment
status.’”43 However, citing cases involving a union’s
rule that employees exhaust internal remedies before
filing charges with the Board, the Court recognized that
“it has become clear that if the rule invades or frustrates
an overriding policy of the labor laws the rule may not be
enforced, even by fine or expulsion, without violating
Section 8(b)(1).”44 The Court then held that “Section
8(b)(1) leaves a union free to enforce a properly adopted
rule which reflects a legitimate union interest, impairs no
policy Congress has imbedded in the labor laws, and is
reasonably enforced against union members who are free
to leave the union and escape the rule.”45
In Scofield, the Court found that the rule at issue satis-
fied each requirement. With respect to freedom to leave
the union and escape the rule, the Court commented:

If a member chooses not to engage in this concerted ac-
tivity [the limit on production] and is unable to prevail
on the other members to change the rule, then he may
leave the union and obtain whatever benefits in job ad-
vancement and extra pay may result from extra work,
at the same time enjoying the protection from competi-
tion, the high piece rate, and the job security which
compliance with the union rule by union members
tends to promote.46

Thus, an essential element in a union’s authority to
lawfully impose a penalty or fine on a represented em-
ployee is that the employee be a member, so that no em-
ployee is subject to union rules unwillingly. In NLRB v.
Granite State Joint Board, the Court interpreted Scofield
as

indicat[ing] that the power of the union over the mem-
ber is certainly no greater than the union-member con-
tract. Where a member lawfully resigns from a union
and thereafter engages in conduct, which the union rule
proscribes, the union commits an unfair labor practice
43 Scofield v. NLRB, 394 U.S. at 428.
44 Id. at 429. One of the cases, NLRB v. Shipbuilders, 391 U.S. 418
(1968), was decided by the Court, which agreed with the Board that
employees must be free from coercion in making complaints to the
Board. Id.
45 Id. at 430.
46 Id. at 435.
POLYMARK CORP. 21
when it seeks enforcement of fines for that conduct.
That is to say, when there is a lawful dissolution of a
union-member relation, the union has no more control
over the former member than it has over the man in the
street.47

In Granite State Joint Board, the Court struck down
the union’s attempt to enforce its rule against returning to
work during a strike against employees who resigned and
returned to work, where the union constitution contained
no restrictions on resignation: “[W]e conclude that the
vitality of Section 7 requires that the member be free to
refrain in November from the action he endorsed in May
and that his Section 7 rights are not lost by a union’s plea
for solidarity or by its pressures for conformity and sub-
mission to its regime.”48
A union window period, as a unilateral restriction on
behavior imposed by the union, is a union rule. Leaving
aside whether the window period reflects a legitimate
union interest, Scofield first inquires whether the window
period—the rule that permits a union to continue to col-
lect money for nonrepresentational purposes after a
nonmember has objected—impairs any policy Congress
has imbedded in the labor laws. It does, because the Su-
preme Court has interpreted Section 8(a)(3) as denying a
union the right to expend such funds. Scofield then in-
quires whether the window period is reasonably enforced
against union members free to resign from the union and
escape the rule. Clearly it is not, as the very individuals
against whom it is enforced are those who have already
resigned and thus cannot escape the rule in any way.
Under Scofield, then, a union cannot enforce a window
period without violating Section 8(b)(1)(A).
Thus, Supreme Court interpretations of congressional
intent in balancing union control over internal affairs
against the right of employees to be free of coercion or
restraint absolutely prohibit delay in the effectuation of
Beck rights and the continued exaction of monies for
nonrepresentational expenditures from nonmembers who
have objected. To continue to do so is to “restrain or
coerce” employees within the meaning of Section
8(b)(1)(A).49

47 409 U.S. at 217.
48 Id. at 217–218.
49 Further, I find no practical justification for a “window period.” In
California Saw & Knife, the union argued that to force it to accept
objections throughout the year would cause serious accounting prob-
lems, as various sets of books would require changes. In this case, the
union argues simply that a window period is orderly. It is notable that
the union involved in California Saw & Knife accepted new members
and their dues and initiation fees throughout the year, with no deleteri-
ous effect on its accounting system, despite the arguments of the union
there that rolling acceptance of dues objections would be an accounting
nightmare. Thus, as the same records that would need alteration for a
nonmember’s objection must also be changed for a new member’s fees
and dues, a genuine accounting need could not have motivated the
window period in California Saw & Knife. In the case at hand, the
Union does not argue that any negative consequences will follow the
prompt processing of nonmembers’ Beck objections; it only contends,
IV.
I would also find that the majority errs in dismissing
the allegations against the Respondent Employer for fail-
ing to accept the Charging Party’s revocation of his dues-
checkoff authorization. In this case, the Charging Party
sent a copy of his resignation letter to his employer, ac-
companied by a cover letter revoking his dues-checkoff
authorization. The Employer, Polymark, continued to
deduct dues from Mohat’s paycheck, but it stopped re-
mitting them to the union, instead placing the dues in
escrow. The majority reverses the judge and dismisses
the allegation that the Employer violated Section 8(a)(1),
(2), and (3) of the Act by refusing to accept Mohat’s
revocation. Based on the same principle of voluntary
unionism expressed in both Pattern Makers and Beck, I
would hold that, once an employee has resigned from the
union, his agreement with the employer to deduct his
union dues, unless his dues-checkoff authorization
clearly states otherwise, is void.50 While Section
302(c)(4) of the Act permits the negotiation of dues-
checkoff agreements between employees and employers
under certain circumstances, I would find that, in order to

in a perfunctory manner, that a neat and orderly system for processing
objections is every bit as important as the need for accounting stability
(which the judge had found would be the only justification for delaying
processing objections). If the purpose of a window period is to satisfy a
genuine accounting or administrative need, it would appear that the
only union that could plausibly assert a window period for objections
would be the union that limited the acceptance of new memberships to
the same window of time. In that way, a union truly could count on a
year that would be free of changes in various sets of books or difficulty
in devising budgets (not alleged as issues in this case). Such a union
would also avoid a charge that it discriminated against nonmembers by,
as in the case of many unions that impose window periods, forcing
them to wait for an open period to object and to renew their objections
yearly, in favor of members, who need make their status known only
once. But any union that is willing to put up with the uncertainty in the
amount of income that it will receive through new initiation fees and
membership dues cannot credibly assert that it cannot cope with the
very small changes in income that a rolling acceptance of objections
would entail.
50 Mohat’s dues-checkoff authorization reads in pertinent part:

AUTHORIZATION AND ASSIGNMENT
You are hereby authorized and directed to deduct from my
wages my membership dues and initiation fee which shall be re-
mitted by you to [the Union] in accordance with the applicable
collective-bargaining agreement.
This authorization shall be irrevocable until a date one year
from the effective date hereof or until the date on which the cur-
rent collective-bargaining agreement between my employer and
[the Union] is terminated, whichever is earlier. I agree and direct
that this Authorization and Direction shall be automatically re-
newed and shall be irrevocable for successive periods of one (1)
year each from the effective date hereof, or for the period of each
succeeding applicable collective-bargaining agreement . . . unless
written notice of revocation by individual registered mail is given
by me to my employer and [the Union], postmarked not more
than twenty (20) days and less than ten (10) days prior to the expi-
ration date of each one-year period, or the termination date of
each applicable collective-bargaining agreement between my em-
ployer and [the Union ], whichever is earlier.
DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD 22
survive resignation from the union, a dues-checkoff au-
thorization must clearly waive the employee’s right to
refrain from assisting the union. Moreover, such au-
thorization must not have been either obtained or main-
tained by fraud, manipulation, or coercion. Further, I
would overrule Schweizer Aircraft, supra, to the extent it
is inconsistent.51
In Schweizer Aircraft, which involved facts essentially
on all fours with those in this case, the Board held that

when an employee working under a contract with a un-
ion-security clause signs a checkoff authorization, the
employee agrees to a particular method for paying
whatever dues and fees can be lawfully required of him
pursuant to the union-security clause. Under the terms
of that clause, the employee remains obligated to make
payments even after a resignation of membership and
attempted checkoff authorization revocation. Under
the terms of a checkoff authorization, the employee
may be precluded from revoking his agreement to that
method of payment, so long as the revocability restric-
tions are consistent with Section 302(c)(4).52

Former Member Cohen dissented, arguing that “mem-
bership” has a specialized meaning in a union-security
clause, which it does not necessarily have in dues-
checkoff authorization. He noted that union-security
clauses and dues-checkoff authorizations are independ-
ent; that one could exist without the other; and that they
involved agreements with different sets of parties: the
union-security clause is an agreement between an em-
ployer and a union; and dues-checkoff authorization is an
agreement between an employee and an employer.53
I agree with former Member Cohen. It is absolutely
clear that, especially since Marquez v. Screen Actors’
Guild, supra, which held in part that the word “member-
ship” in Section 8(a)(3), carries with it the full gloss of
Supreme Court interpretation, that “membership” in un-
ion-security clauses using that term has a limited and
artful meaning. The same cannot be said for a dues-
checkoff authorization, which is not mentioned in Sec-
tion 7, in Section 8(a)(3), or in Marquez. Thus, I would
read “membership” in a dues-checkoff authorization to
mean full membership in a union. When Mohat in-
formed his employer that he had resigned from the Union
and that he no longer wished Polymark to withhold “my
membership dues,” Polymark’s authorization to withhold
them ended. While Mohat still may have had a financial
obligation to the Union after his resignation, that obliga-
tion was not to pay “membership dues,” and nothing in
the statute or in the collective-bargaining agreement
bound him to a particular method of satisfying that obli-

51 The Board in Schweizer did not face the issue of the effect of Beck
objections on dues checkoff. See 320 NLRB 528 at fn. 6.
52 Id. at 532.
53 Id. at 532–533.
gation or authorized the employer to enforce the union-
security clause by collecting service fees through contin-
ued dues deductions.
In Lockheed Corp.,54 the Board held that in the ab-
sence of a valid union-security clause, the language of a
dues-checkoff authorization must show a clear and un-
mistakable waiver of the right to refrain from assisting a
labor organization:

We merely hold that the policy of “voluntary un-
ionism” that informs the Supreme Court’s decision
in Pattern Makers with regard to remaining, or de-
clining to remain, a union member also logically re-
lates to other forms of union activity. . . . .If the em-
ployee did not agree, when he signed the authoriza-
tion, to have “regular membership dues” deducted
even when he is no longer a union member, then the
employee’s continued financial support of the union
is not clearly “voluntary” after he has resigned.55

As noted above, then, I would apply the Lockheed Board’s
clear statement of the principles at issue in dues checkoff to
all employees, including those covered by a valid union-
security clause.
Thus, for the reasons stated above, I would find that
the Union violated Section 8(b)(1)(A) by coercing Mohat
in the exercise of his Section 7 rights, and that Polymark
violated Section 8(a)(3) and (1) by refusing to accept
Mohat’s dues-checkoff authorization revocation.

APPENDIX
NOTICE TO EMPLOYEES
POSTED BY ORDER OF THE
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
An Agency of the United States Government

The National Labor Relations Board has found that we vio-
lated the National Labor Relations Act and has ordered us to
post and abide by this notice.

Section 7 of the Act gives employees these rights.
To organize
To form, join, or assist any union
To bargain collectively through representatives
of their own choice
To act together for other mutual aid or protection
To choose not to engage in any of these protected
concerted activities.

WE WILL NOT prevent employees in the Polymark Cor-
poration collective-bargaining unit we represent who
have resigned from the Union from filing objections to
the payment of fees for expenditures of the Union not
germane to the collective-bargaining process for a rea-
sonable time after their resignations.
54 302 NLRB 322 (1991).
55 Id. at 328.
POLYMARK CORP. 23
WE WILL NOT collect or attempt to collect fees from ob-
jecting nonmembers which are attributable to nonrepre-
sentational expenses.
WE WILL NOT in any like or related manner restrain or
coerce employees in the exercise of the rights guaranteed
them by Section 7 of the Act.
WE WILL recognize employee Robert Mohat as an ob-
jecting nonmember as of the effective date of his resigna-
tion.
WE WILL accept from Mohat the reduced dues and fees
for the period he was or should have been a perfected
objector.
WE WILL amend our policy to make it clear that em-
ployees who resign from the Union may file objections
to the collection of fees for nonrepresentational expenses
for a reasonable time after their resignation.

INTERNATIONAL UNION OF ELECTRONIC,
ELECTRICAL, SALARIED MACHINE AND
FURNITURE WORKERS, AFL–CIO

LOCAL 795 OF THE INTERNATIONAL UNION OF
ELECTRONIC, ELECTRICAL, SALARIED MACHINE
AND FURNITURE WORKERS, AFL–CIO

Carol L. Shore, Esq., for the General Counsel.
Bruce A. Hoffman, Esq. (Graydon, Head & Ritchey), of Cin-
cinnati, Ohio, for Respondent Employer.
Robert Freidman, Esq., of Washington, D.C., for Respondent
Union.
W. James Young, Esq., of Springfield, Virginia, for the Charg-
ing Party.
DECISION
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
KARL H. BUSCHMANN, Administrative Law Judge. These
cases were tried at Cincinnati, Ohio, on December 11, 1991.
The charges were filed on December 4, 1990, against Polymark
Corporation and International Union of Electronic, Electrical,
Salaried, Machine and Furniture Workers, AFL–CIO and its
Local 795 (the Unions) by Robert J. Mohat, an individual. The
complaint in Case 9–CA–28091 charges the Company with
violations of Section 8(a)(1), (2), and (3) of the National Labor
Relations Act (the Act) and the complaint in Case 9–CB–7783–
1,–2, charges the Union with violations of Section 8(b)(1)(A)
and (2) of the Act, for being parties to a collective-bargaining
agreement that contains a union-security clause requiring em-
ployees to be members of the Union in good standing and for
failing to reduce the financial obligation of Robert Mohat fol-
lowing his resignation from the union membership. The Re-
spondents filed answers in which the jurisdictional allegations
of the respective complaints were admitted and in which the
substantive allegations of violations of the Act were denied.
On the entire record, including my observation of the de-
meanor of the witnesses, and after consideration of the briefs by
the General Counsel, the Charging Party, the Company, and the
Unions, I make the following
FINDINGS OF FACT
I. JURISDICTION
Respondent Company, Polymark Corporation, located in
Cincinnati, Ohio, is engaged in the manufacture of heat seal
transfers or silk screened emblems for the garment industry (Tr.
110). With sales of goods and products valued in excess of
$50,000 directly to points outside the State of Ohio, Respon-
dent Company is admittedly an employer engaged in commerce
within the meaning of Section 2(2), (6), and (7) of the Act.
Respondent Union, International Union of Electronic, Elec-
trical, Salaried, Machine and Furniture Workers, AFL–CIO,
and its Local 795 (sometimes referred to as the Union) are ad-
mittedly labor organizations within the meaning of Section 2(5)
of the Act.
Since at least March 9, 1981, the Union has been the exclu-
sive collective-bargaining representative of Polymark’s em-
ployees in the following unit:

All production and maintenance employees, including inspec-
tion department, ink department, printing department, cutting
department, art department, camera department, shipping and
receiving department, maintenance department, stencil de-
partment and quality control department employees, em-
ployed by the Employer at its facility at Cincinnati, Ohio, but
at no other geographical location, but excluding all office
clerical and all professional employees, guards and supervi-
sors as defined in the Act.
II. FACTS
The parties have been signatories to at least three collective-
bargaining agreements, the most recent of which is effective
from May 26, 1990, through May 25, 1993 (Tr. 111, G.C. Exh.
3). The first agreement in 1981 and all successive agreements
have contained a union-security clause and a dues-checkoff
provision providing as follows (G.C. Exh. 3, p. 39):

Section 1. It shall be a condition of employment that
all employees of the Company covered by this Agreement
who are members of the Union in good standing on the ef-
fective date of this Agreement shall remain members in
good standing and those who are not members on the ef-
fective date of this Agreement shall remain members in
good standing and those who are not members on the ef-
fective date of this Agreement shall, on the sixty-first day
following the effective date of this Agreement, become
and remain members in good standing of the Union. It
shall also be a condition of employment that all employees
covered by this Agreement and hired on or after its effec-
tive date shall, on the sixty-first calendar day following the
beginning of such employment, become and remain mem-
bers in good standing in the Union. This provision is not
applicable to part time or co-op employees.
Section 2. Upon receipt of a duly executed authoriza-
tion-assignment, the Company agrees to deduct from the
pay all employees covered by this agreement all estab-
lished monthly dues, initiation fees, and uniformly levied
assessments of the Union. It is further agreed that the
Company shall remit such deductions to the Union prior to
the end of the month for which such deduction is made.
All authorizations shall be voluntarily signed by the em-
ployees.

DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD 24
Robert Mohat, the Charging Party, was hired on November
4, 1986. During the interview with Dale Vollmer, the Com-
pany’s president, Mohat was informed that he would have to
join the Union after a probationary period of 60 days and that
he would be expected to sign a dues-checkoff card (Tr. 31–32).
Mohat eventually signed the checkoff authorization and has
been a member of the Union since 1986 (Tr. 33, G.C. Exh. 9).
Prior to his resignation from the Union on November 9,
1990, Mohat attempted to obtain information about the Union’s
allocation of dues. In August 1990, a newspaper article about
the Supreme Court’s Beck decision1 alerted Mohat to the prac-
tice of some unions, which use a percentage of their funds for
political purposes (Tr. 37). He initially asked Sheila Madden,
the union steward, for a breakdown of the union dues. Within a
few days she provided him with the respective amounts going
to the International and to the Local, but she was unable to
obtain the figures apportioned according to their purposes (Tr.
37–38). In late August or early September, Mohat telephoned
Edward Fire, the International’s treasurer, with the same re-
quest. Fire was reluctant to disclose the information and sug-
gested that Mohat submit a written request. In a letter of Sep-
tember 9, 1990, Mohat, referring to the Beck case, renewed his
request as follows (G.C. Exh. 11, Tr. 40):

Therefore, at this time I am making a formal request
for a return of all dues not specifically used to cover the
collective bargaining cost over the last 3 years 10 months.
I also request that I be told immediately and in writting
[sic] exactly what percentage of my union dues is needed
and used exclusively to support the collective bargaining
cost for my local 795.
In conclusion as of this date Polymark Corporation has
been informed that they are to withhold, from my pay
check, only that percentage of my union dues nessary [sic]
to support collective bargaining cost.

Fire denied the request for a refund of certain dues in a writ-
ten reply of October 17, 1990, stating that the Beck case did not
apply to a union member and that the Union “has an established
procedure whereby a nonmember or agency fee payer may,
during the month of April, request a reduction of the amounts
he or she pays to the union for the period commencing the suc-
ceeding June through May of the following year” (G.C. Exh.
12, Tr. 41). Although the letter also indicated that this informa-
tion had been publicized in the “I.U.E. News,” Mohat testified
that he had never received any issues of the Union’s news (Tr.
33–35).
On October 22, 1990, Mohat approached Jim Henson, the
Company’s accountant, to inquire about the type of union
membership an employee had to be to remain employed.
Henson suggested that he talk to the company president. Ac-
cording to Mohat, Vollmer stated as follows (Tr. 44):

He told me he had a closed shop, that the company—it
was a Union shop and that you had to be a Union member
to work there, but he had never been asked that question
before about what a Union member meant.
That he would have to direct that question to the com-
pany attorney and that he would get back with me on what
that definition was.

1 Communications Workers v. Beck, 487 U.S. 735 (1988).
Vollmer testified that he made no reference in his conversa-
tion to a closed shop and that he stated to Mohat that he “didn’t
know . . . nor was [he] familiar with the Beck Case. . . . [H]e
would get back to him after [he] conferred with” his attorney
(Tr. 112–113).
Mohat’s testimony was consistent with that of Vollmer to the
extent that the latter had expressed his unfamiliarity with the
issue and that he needed to consult his attorney. However,
contrary to Mohat’s testimony, I find that Vollmer did not refer
to his Company as a closed shop.2
In a letter to the Union dated November 9, 1990, Mohat de-
clared his resignation as a member and informed the Union as
follows (G.C. Exh. 13):

Given that your contract with my employer states that
you have unlawfully negotiated a “closed shop “ provision
with my employer, Article XXII of the collective bargain-
ing agreement, I have serious reservations that you have a
lawful agency shop agreement, and have this date ordered
my attorney to file charges with the National Labor Rela-
tions Board to have your per se void and invalid “mem-
bers only” clause stricken from the contract. You should
receive these charges shortly.
The United States Supreme Court’s affirmance of the
decision in Communications Workers v. Beck, 108 S.Ct.
2641 (1988), prompts me to object to the use of the money
that I may be forced to pay to you for any purposes other
than my pro rata share of the costs of collective bargain-
ing, contract administration, and grievance adjustment for
the unit of employees in which I am employed.
Please see to it that might [sic] rights under Beck are
put into effect immediately.

On the same day, Mohat sent a copy of the letter to his Em-
ployer stating as follows (G.C. Exh 15):

Consistent with this resignation, I hereby revoke my
dues-checkoff authorization. As you will note, this au-
thorization only allows you to deduct monies from my pay
for “membership dues and initiation fee.” As I am no
longer a member of the Union, I owe the Union no “mem-
bership dues.”
As you will note in my letter to the union’s president, I
have authorized my attorney to file a charge against the
union for its negotiation and attempts to enforce an illegal
“members only” clause. Should you attempt to discharge
me for the exercise of my rights under § 7 of the National
Labor Relations Act, I will have little choice by [sic] to
authorize my attorney to do the same.

The Union responded by letter of November 19, 1990, which
reminded Mohat that in spite of his resignation from the Union,
he was “still obligated, under the union-security clause of the
collective-bargaining agreement covering him, to continue to
pay a sum equal to union dues.” (G.C. Exh. 14.) With regard
to any reduction in dues, the letter continued as follows:

As I previously notified you in my letter of October
17, 1990, with respect to any Beck issue, there are estab-
lished procedures whereby a non-member or agency fee
payer may object, during the month of April, to the use of
that portion of the amount you pay to the union which is
2 Mohat appeared uncertain whether Vollmer said union shop or
closed shop. I base my findings on Vollmer’s unequivocal denial.
POLYMARK CORP. 25
not attributable to the union’s representational activities,
and request a reduction prospectively of the amounts paid
to the union. The procedures will be publicized in the is-
sue of the IUE News before April 1991 so that you may
then timely raise you objection.

Mohat’s testified as follows about the Company’s response
to his letter (Tr. 48–49):

On that date, Jim Henson came to my press. I was al-
ready working and he mentioned receiving both letters of
November 9th and that the company was going to continue
to withhold Union dues from my paycheck because they
had not received any authorization from the Union to re-
duce that amount by any percentage. . . . He also men-
tioned that this money would be put in an escrow account
until the matter between me and the Union were settled
and he also stated that probably—they thought they’d
rather be sued by me than by the Union for a breach of
contract that they had with the Union.

. . . .

On December 4, 1990, Mohat filed the unfair labor
practice charge and, on December 12, 1990, the Union
filed a grievance with Polymark protesting its failure to
pay Mohat’s union dues (R. Exh. 1, G.C. Exh. L (a)). The
Company denied the grievance on December 11, 1990.
Analysis
Section 8(a)(3) of the Act provides in part:

That nothing in this Act, or in any other statute of the United
States, shall preclude an employer from making an agreement
with a labor organization . . . to require as a condition of em-
ployment membership therein on or after the thirtieth day fol-
lowing the beginning of such employment or the effective
date of such agreement.

Nevertheless, the General Counsel and the Charging Party ar-
gue that the union-security clause, requiring as “a condition of
employment that all employees of the Company covered by this
Agreement . . . become and remain members in good standing
in the Union,” is unlawful. Vollmer’s response to Mohat’s
inquiry that employees had to belong to the Union is also al-
leged to have violated the Act, as is the Company’s continued
compliance with the checkoff provision in the contract and the
Union’s failure to reduce Mohat’s dues to collective-bargaining
costs following his resignation from the Union.
The primary support for this allegation is the recent decision
in Communications Workers v. Beck, 487 U.S. 735 (1988), in
which the Court held “that § 8(a)(3) . . . authorizes the exaction
of only those fees and dues necessary to ‘performing the duties
of an exclusive representative of the employees on dealing with
the employer in labor management issues.’” Id. at 739. The
Court thereby clarified its prior holding in NLRB v. General
Motors Corp., 373 U.S. 734, 742 (1963), which had decided
that an “agency shop’’ was a lawful alternative to a “union
shop” or union security under Section 8(a)(3), and that union
“‘membership’ as a condition of employment is whittled down
to its financial core.” Id. at 742. Accordingly, in spite of a
union-security clause fashioned in accordance with the lan-
guage in Section 8(a)(3), membership in a union may not be
made a condition of remaining employed, although the em-
ployee can be required to pay union dues and fees. According
to Beck, an employee cannot be required to pay full union dues
or fees if a portion is expended by a union on “activities beyond
those germane to collective bargaining, contract administration
and grievance adjustment.” This interpretation assures on the
one hand that compulsory union membership is eliminated and,
on the other, that employees sharing the benefits of the union’s
efforts pay their fair share and do not become “free riders.”
Applied to the instant situation, it is clear that Mohat was
within his rights to resign from the Union in spite of the union-
security clause, and that he was also justified in requesting that
his union dues and fees be reduced insofar as they reflect ex-
penditures in excess of representational costs. However, the
issues are more complicated.
The union-security clause in this case does not reflect the
precise language of Section 8(a)(3), nor does it explain the
rights of employees to resign their membership under a union-
security clause as explained above. Instead, the clause requires
employees to become and remain members “in good standing.”
The parties agree that the Board deemed this language to be in
conformity with the requirements of the Act in Keystone Coat
Supply Co., 121 NLRB 880, 885 (1958). But the General
Counsel submits that the Board erred in Keystone because the
words “in good standing” are not found in the statute and be-
cause that decision conflicts with the holding in Paragon Prod-
ucts Corp., 134 NLRB 662 (1961). The Board held in Paragon
that a “clearly unlawful union security provision . . . is one
which by its own express terms clearly and unequivocally goes
beyond the limited form of security permitted by Section
8(a)(3) of the Act . . . which expressly require[s] as a condition
of continued employment the payment of sums of money other
than ‘periodic dues and initiation fees uniformly required.”’ Id.
at 666. That decision does not conflict with Keystone, unless
the term “in good standing” is interpreted as going beyond the
requirements to pay periodic dues and fees uniformly required.
As discussed by the General Counsel, that phrase has been
interpreted as an indication that the employees had “no arrears
in their dues obligation.” Hotel & Restaurant Employees Local
54 (Atlantis Casino), 291 NLRB 989 (1988), enfd. 887 F.2d 28
(3d Cir. 1989). There, neither the Board nor the Third Circuit
found the union-security clause requiring employees to “be-
come and remain members in good standing” to be unlawful
even though the case contained a discussion of financial core
members under the General Motors case. In other cases, which
arose subsequent to the General Motors case, the Board has
upheld union-security clauses requiring membership in good
standing. California Blowpipe & Steel Co., 218 NLRB 736
(1975); Hayes Coal Co., 197 NLRB 1102 (1972). It is accord-
ingly clear that the Board, having initially approved the union-
security clause of the type at issue here in Keystone, has never
invalidated such a provision following the General Motors
decision in 1963, nor did the Court in that case invalidate the
union-security clause provision, in spite of the holding that the
clause does not exactly mean what it states—so long as em-
ployees pay the core dues and fees, they do not have to be un-
ion members.
Turning now to the more recent decision in Beck, it is ini-
tially clear that the case did not overrule any prior holdings, nor
did it outlaw union-security agreements. To the contrary, the
Court stated that, taken “as a whole, § 8(a)(3) permits an em-
ployer and a union to enter into an agreement requiring all em-
ployees to become union members as a condition of employ-
ment,” but it explained “membership” and defined the mini-
mum or “financial core” obligation of an employee under such
DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD 26
a proviso as only those dues or fees “germane to collective
bargaining, contract administration, and grievance adjustment.”
Does that holding, finding “union membership” lawful, invali-
date on its face a security clause requiring membership “in
good standing?” It has long been established that “the assess-
ments that may be lawfully imposed [under a union-shop provi-
sion] do not include ‘fines and penalties.’” Railway Employees
Dept. v. Hanson, 351 U.S. 225, 235 (1956). So long as the
phrase “in good standing” is interpreted to exclude an em-
ployee’s responsibility for fines or penalties under internal
union rules, the union-security proviso appears to be lawful.
Indeed, the phrase may have a salutary purpose by reminding
employees to make their payments for lawful dues and fees
promptly and periodically, because a delay or a lapse of such
payments could subject them to discharge. Larkins v. NLRB,
596 F.2d 240 (7th Cir. 1979). As pointed out by the General
Counsel, the Board recently construed that language to require
prompt payment of personal dues. Hotel & Restaurant Em-
ployees Local 54 (Atlantis Casino), supra. The Board may, of
course, revisit the issue at its discretion but, considering the
prior interpretations of the phrase, it is my view that the Beck
decision does not mandate a different result. The misleading or
deceptive nature, if any is the word “membership” and to a
lesser extent the term “in good standing.” The decision in Beck
does not resolve that issue more precisely than General Motors.
Even though the union-security clause cannot be enforced as
written, I find that it is not unlawful on its face, but that it must
be interpreted in accordance with applicable law. I would
therefore dismiss the allegations that the Union and the Com-
pany violated the Act by maintaining the union-security clause.
The alleged threat. The allegation that Vollmer violated the
Act by threatening Mohat with loss of employment must be
dismissed. Vollmer stated that “Mohat had to be a union mem-
ber to work there,” but he also expressed his own uncertainty,
first by questioning “what a union member meant” and sec-
ondly by indicating that he would have to consult with this
attorney for a proper definition. Contrary to General Counsel’s
suggestion, Vollmer did not imply that Mohat had no choice
but to be a full union member. Vollmer essentially said that he
did not know the answer and even suggested that union mem-
bership may not necessarily mean what the security clause pro-
vides. Under these circumstances, I find that such comments
could not be interpreted to have a tendency to coerce or to in-
terfere with an employee’s Section 7 rights.
The Employer’s failure to honor the checkoff authorization.
The complaint’s allegation that Respondent Polymark Corpora-
tion refused to honor Mohat’s checkoff revocation is supported
by the record. Pursuant to the union-security and checkoff
provision in the collective-bargaining agreement, employees
execute a written checkoff authorization (G.C. Exhs. 3, 9). By
letter of November 9, 1990, Mohat informed the Company that
he had resigned his membership in the Union and stated,
“[C]onsistent with this resignation, I hereby revoke my dues
check off authorization.” (G.C. Exh. 15.) The Company orally
informed Mohat that it would continue to deduct union dues but
place the funds into an escrow account.
Mohat’s checkoff authorization does no contain any explicit
language setting forth an obligation to pay dues even in the
absence of union membership. Instead, the authorization shows
unequivocally that the funds are a quid pro quo for union mem-
bership. Under these circumstances, it is clear that Mohat’s
authorization permitting his employer to deduct union dues
must be construed to include only that period during which he
is a member. Electrical Workers IBEW Local 2088 (Lockheed
Space Operations), 302 NLRB 322 (1991). The Employer
should have honored Mohat’s revocation. Washington Gas
Light Co., 302 NLRB 425 (1991). I find that its failure to do so
violated Section 8(a)(1), (2), and (3) of the Act.
The Unions’ refusal to honor Mohat’s reduction of union
dues. The record shows that the Union did not reduce Mohat’s
dues following his notice of resignation, nor did the Union
advise Mohat that he was required for continued employment to
pay for only those dues and fees relating to representation pur-
poses. This conduct is alleged as a violation of Section
8(b)(1)(A) and (2) of the Act.
Mohat had repeated his verbal requests for a breakdown of
the dues structure, with a written request, dated September 9,
1990, and also demanded that all dues not related to collective
bargaining be returned. The Union responded stating that only
a nonmember could make such a request and referred to a pro-
cedure published in IUE News notifying employees that re-
quests for reduction in dues may only be made annually during
the month of April. On November 9, 1990, Mohat notified the
Union of his resignation and demanded his Beck rights. The
Union again referred to its established policy, stating that the
procedure would be published in the forthcoming issue of IUE
News.
The record contains page excerpts from the February 1989
and the March 1990 IUE News (G.C. Exh. 8(a)(b)). On pages
10 and 8, respectively, a boxed notice appears under the head-
ing “Notice to Agency Shop Fee Payers.” The notice explains
a procedure to those employees who desire a reduction in their
union obligations “based on union expenditures for non-
collective bargaining matters.” By stipulation, the record also
contains representative samples of letters designed for “agency
fee objectors” (Tr. 16–17, G.C. Exh. 7(a), (b), and (c)). These
letters contain a breakdown of the union dues and also explain a
procedure available to employees who want to challenge the
calculations used in the breakdown of the dues structure. The
Union’s practice in this regard should meet the criteria estab-
lished in Chicago Teachers v. Hudson, 475 U.S. 292 (1986),
and Crawford v. Airline Pilots, 870 F.2d 155, 160 (4th Cir.
1989).
The General Counsel did not challenge the adequacy of the
notices in the IUE News, nor the breakdown of the union dues,
nor the procedure to challenge the breakdown of the dues. The
record shows that Mohat never received this material. Accord-
ingly, the General Counsel submits that presented is “a question
of first impression as to when an employee who has resigned
his/her membership and raised a Beck objection must be ac-
corded a reduction in fees.”
The law is clear that a union must recognize the right of an
employee to resign his or her membership from the union.
Pattern Makers League v. NLRB, 473 U.S. 95 (1985). The only
aspect of union membership that may lawfully be required as a
condition of employment is the payment of dues, which, ac-
cording to Beck, are those germane to collective bargaining,
contract administration, and grievance adjustment. Mohat’s
resignation from the Union and the demand for his Beck rights,
obligated the Union to honor his request. While the Union
acknowledged his resignation, it failed to reduce his financial
obligation and, instead, referred him to a future time, namely,
the month of April when he could renew his request. In short,
the Union’s position is that a member’s request can only be
POLYMARK CORP. 27
made annually during the month of April. Such a policy con-
flicts with the rights of a union member to resign his member-
ship. Pattern Makers, supra; Machinist Local 1414 (Neufeld
Porsche-Audi), 270 NLRB 1330 (1984). The only argument
against a union’s prompt compliance with an employee’s Beck
rights would be the practicality of responding to numerous
requests or the complexity of accounting procedures if many
requests are received at different times. There is no such a
showing in the record. Accordingly, the obligation on the part
of the Union to notify employees within a reasonable time,
certainly on a monthly basis, would not be prohibitive. For
example, Mohat’s November resignation should have been
honored by a reduction of his December dues. I accordingly
find that the Union’s failure to advise Mohat within a reason-
able time of his rights and the failure to reduce his dues inter-
fered with his Section 7 rights in violation of Section
8(b)(1)(A) and (2) of the Act.
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1. Respondent Company, Polymark Corporation, is an em-
ployer engaged in commerce within the meaning of Section
2(2), (6), and (7) of the Act.
2. Respondent Unions, International Union of Electronic,
Electrical, Salaried, Machine and Furniture Workers, AFL–
CIO, and its Local 795, are labor organizations within the
meaning of Section 2(5) of the Act.
3. Respondent International and Respondent Local are agents
of each other within the meaning of Section 2(13) of the Act
and joint ventures in the conduct described herein.
4. Respondent Unions have been the collective-bargaining
representative of the employees of Polymark Corporation in the
following unit:

All production and maintenance employees, including inspec-
tion department, ink department, printing department, cutting
department, art department, camera department, shipping and
receiving department, maintenance department, stencil de-
partment and quality control department employees, em-
ployed by the Employer at its facility at Cincinnati, Ohio, but
at no other geographical location, but excluding all office
clerical employees and all professional employees, guards and
supervisors as defined in the Act.

5. Respondent Unions violated Section 8(b)(1)(A) and (2) of
the Act by failing and refusing to reduce an employee’s finan-
cial obligation under a union-security clause, after his resigna-
tion from the Union, to the pro rata share of the cost of collec-
tive bargaining, contract administration, grievance adjustment,
and other representational costs.
6. Respondent Unions violated Section 8(b)(1)(A) and (2) of
the Act by failing to advise an employee, who had inquired
about his rights under a union-security clause, that the only
condition of employment is the payment of dues and fees relat-
ing to representational purposes.
7. Respondent Polymark Corporation violated Section
8(a)(1), (2), and (3) of the Act by failing and refusing to honor
an employee’s checkoff revocation after the employee’s notice
of his resignation from the Union.
8. The unfair labor practices set forth above affect commerce
within the meaning of Section 2(6) and (7) of the Act.
REMEDY
Having found that Respondent Unions and Respondent Em-
ployer have engaged in unfair labor practices, I recommend that
they be ordered to cease and desist therefrom and to take cer-
tain affirmative actions necessary to effectuate the purposes of
the Act.
Respondent Unions will be required to honor requests for re-
ductions in dues pursuant to Communications Workers v. Beck,
487 U.S. 735 (1988), promptly and within a reasonable time not
to exceed 30 days from the date of resignation and to promptly
inform employees who make inquiries of their rights under the
union-security clause. The Union will accept from Mohat the
reduced dues and fees as of the effective date of Mohat’s resig-
nation as a union member.
Respondent Polymark Corporation will be ordered to honor
the employee’s written revocation of the checkoff authorization
and to refund with interest to the employee all dues and fees
collected after revocation of the checkoff authorization, ena-
bling Mohat to pay to the Union those dues and fees, past and
present, which represent the representational expenses as de-
fined by the Beck decision. The refunded amounts shall include
interest as computed in New Horizons for the Retarded, 283
NLRB 1173 (1987).
[Recommended Order omitted from publication.]