Plumbers and Pipefitters Local Union 142, AFL-CIO

National Labor Relations Board - Board Decisions

Sep 22, 1961

133 N.L.R.B. 307 (N.L.R.B. 1961)

PLUMBERS AND PIPEFITTERS LOCAL UNION 142, AFL-CIO 307
the craft, it is unlawful for an employer to contract to hire only journeymen to fill
vacancies in the craft. Such a holding would make it illegal to agree to hire only
plumbers to do plumbing work if pipefitters were capable of doing any of it; stone
masons if bricklayers can lay stone ; diemakers if machinists run lathes; roofers where
carpenters can lay shingles . Some of the work of some crafts can be performed
by the traditional handyman. The General Counsel's contention is rejected. In my
view, so long as the arrangement is not for the purpose of preferring men on the
basis of their union membership rather than on the basis of their probable skill, an
agreement to hire only journeymen in the craft is not illegal . Journeyman status is
an acceptable indicium of likely competence at the trade . Indeed, its very purpose is
to serve as such evidence . Recognition of that fact is not inconsistent with the
statute . In any event, in the instant case, the employers were free to hire non-
journeymen after the 30-day period. Hence they were not completely restricted to
the employment of journeymen.
It is now found that article 7, and its successor article 9 , do not establish closed-
shop or preferential hiring conditions in the plants of Institute members, and are
therefore not illegal . In accordance with the concession of the General Counsel,
under such circumstances the Union was entitled to insist in the negotiations upon such
an article as a condition of agreement . Whether it in fact did so need not , there-
fore, be determined. In view of these findings other contentions of the General
Counsel do not require consideration.
It is found that the evidence does not establish any of the allegations of unfair
labor practices alleged in the complaint . It will consequently be recommended that
the complaint be dismissed in its entirety.
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1. Glass Container Manufacturers Institute and its employer members are engaged
in commerce within the meaning of Section 2 (6) and ( 7) of the Act.
2. The Respondent, American Flint Glass Workers ' Union of North America,
AFL-CIO, is a labor organization within the meaning of Section 2 (5) of the Act.
3. The Respondent has not engaged in any of the unfair labor practices alleged in
the complaint.
[Recommendations omitted from publication.]
Plumbers and Pipefitters Local Union No. 142 , AFL-CIO and
William Matera
Plumbers and Pipefitters Local Union No. 142, AFL-CIO and
Shop-Rite Foods, Inc., d/b/a Piggly Wiggly. Cases Nos.
23-CC-72 and 23-CC-73. September 22,1961
DECISION AND ORDER
On October 25, 1960, Trial Examiner Fannie M. Boyls issued her
Intermediate Report in the above-entitled proceeding, finding that the
Respondent had engaged in and was engaging in certain unfair labor
practices and' recommending that it cease and desist therefrom and
take certain affirmative action, as set forth in the Intermediate Report
attached hereto. The Trial Examiner also found that the Respondent
did not engage in certain other unfair labor practices and recom-
mended that the complaint be dismissed with respect thereto. There-
after, the Respondent, the General Counsel, and the Charging Party,
Shop-Rite Foods, Inc., d/b/a Piggly Wiggly, hereafter called Piggly
133 NLRB No. 33.
308 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
Wiggly, filed exceptions to the Intermediate Report and supporting
briefs.'
The Board 2 has reviewed the rulings made by the Trial Examiner
at the hearing and finds that no prejudicial error was committed.
The rulings are hereby affirmed. The Board has considered the Inter-
mediate Report, the exceptions and briefs, and the entire record in
the case, and hereby adopts the findings, conclusions, and recom-
mendations of the Trial Examiner, with the modifications herein.
1. We agree with the Trial Examiner that the Respondent violated
Section 8(b) (4) (i) (B) of the Act by inducing and encouraging em-
ployees of neutral employers Dillard and Johnson, and other persons,
to engage in a work stoppage with an object of forcing or requiring
Piggly Wiggly to cease doing business with San Antonio Refrigera-
tion Company, hereafter called Refrigeration, the only firm involved
herein with whom the Respondent was engaged in a primary dispute.
Since the picketing conducted by the Respondent on April 26, 1960,
did not, contrary to the Respondent's contention, meet the applicable
standards for common situs picketing as established by the Board in
the Moore Dry Dock case, 3 we find it unnecessary and therefore do not
pass on the Trial Examiner's conclusion contained in footnote 5 of the
Intermediate Report.
We also agree with the Trial Examiner that the Respondent violated
Section 8(b) (4) (ii) (B) by its aforementioned conduct and by its
threat of physical violence if Piggly Wiggly continued to do business
with Refrigeration.
2. For the reasons explicated in our recent opinion in Lohman Sales
Company,4 we adopt the Trial Examiner's conclusions that the Re-
spondent's handbilling of Piggly Wiggly stores was protected by the
publicity proviso to Section 8 (b) (4).
ORDER
Upon the entire record in this case, and pursuant to Section 10(c)
of the National Labor Relations Act, as amended, the National Labor
Relations Board hereby orders that the Respondent, Plumbers and
Pipefitters Local Union No. 142, AFL-CIO, its officers, representa-
tives, agents, successors, and assigns, shall :
1. Cease and desist from :
1 The Respondent has requested oral argument. This request is hereby denied because
the record , the exceptions , and the briefs adequately present the issues and positions of
the parties.
2 Pursuant to the provisions of Section 3 (b) of the National Labor Relations Act, as
amended, the Board has delegated its powers in connection with this case to a three-
member panel [ Members Leedom , Fanning, and Brown].
8 Sailors' Union of the Pacific, AFL (Moore Dry Dock Company ), 92 NLRB 547.
'International Brotherhood of Teamsters , Chauffeurs , Warehousemen and Helpers of
America, Milk Drivers and Dairy Employees Local 537 (Jack M. Lohman, d/b/a Lohman
Sales Company ), 132 NLRB 901.
PLUMBERS AND PIPEFITTERS LOCAL UNION 142, AFL-CIO 309
(a) Threatening, coercing, or restraining Shop-Rite Foods, Inc.,
d/b/a Piggly Wiggly, where an object thereof is forcing or requiring
Piggly Wiggly to cease doing business with San Antonio Refrigera-
tion Company.
(b) Engaging in, or inducing or encouraging any individual em-
ployed by Shop-Rite Foods, Inc., d/b/a Piggly Wiggly, or by any
other person in the San Antonio area, engaged in commerce or in an
industry affecting commerce, operating at a common situs with Piggly
Wiggly, except San Antonio Refrigeration Company, to engage in a
strike or a refusal in the course of his employment to perform any
services, where an object thereof is to force or require Piggly Wiggly
to cease doing business with San Antonio Refrigeration Company.
2. Take the following affirmative action which the Board finds will
effectuate the policies of the Act :
(a) Post at its offices and meeting halls, copies of the notice at-
tached hereto marked "Appendix." 5 Copies of said notice, to be
furnished by the Regional Director for the Twenty-third Region,
shall, after being duly signed by the Respondent, be posted by Re-
spondent's authorized representative immediately upon receipt there-
of, and be maintained by it for a period of 60 consecutive days there-
after, in conspicuous places, including all places where notices to
members are customarily posted. Reasonable steps shall be taken to
insure that said notices are not altered, defaced, or covered by any
other material.
(b) Notify the Regional Director for the Twenty-third Region, in
writing, within 10 days from the date of this Order, what steps Re-
spondent has taken to comply herewith.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the complaint be, and it hereby is, dis-
missed insofar as it alleges that the Respondent violated Section
8(b) (4) (ii) (B) of the Act by distributing handbills at or near
Piggly Wiggly stores.
5 In the event 'that this Order is enforced by a decree of a United States Court of
Appeals, there shall be substituted for the words "Pursuant to a Decision and Order" the
words "Pursuant to a Decree of the United States Court of Appeals , Enforcing an Order."
APPENDIX
NOTICE TO ALL EMPLOYEES
Pursuant to a Decision and Order of the National Labor Relations
Board, and in order to effectuate the policies of the Act, we hereby
notify you that :
WE WILL NOT threaten, coerce, or restrain Shop-Rite Foods,
Inc., d/b/a Piggly Wiggly, where an object thereof is forcing
or requiring the latter to cease doing business with San An-
tonio Refrigeration Company.
310 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
WE WILL NOT engage in or induce or encourage any individual
employed by Shop-Rite Foods, Inc., d/b/a Piggly Wiggly, or by
any other person in the San Antonio area, engaged in commerce
or in an industry affecting commerce, operating at a common
situs with Piggly Wiggly, except San Antonio Refrigeration
Company, to engage in a strike or a refusal in the course of his
employment to perform any services where an object thereof is
forcing or requiring Piggly Wiggly to cease doing business with
San Antonio Refrigeration Company.
PLUMBERS AND PIPEFITTERS LOCAL
UNION No. 142 , AFL-CIO,
Labor Organization.
Dated---------------- By-------------------------------------
(Representative ) ( Title)
This notice must remain posted for 60 days from the date hereof,
and must not be altered , defaced, or covered by any other material.
INTERMEDIATE REPORT
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
This proceeding, with all parties represented, was heard before the duly designated
Trial Examiner in San Antonio, Texas, on July 20 and 21, 1960, on complaint of the
General Counsel and answer of Plumbers and Pipefitters Local Union No. 142,
AFL-CIO, herein called Respondent. The issues litigated were whether Respondent
violated Section 8(b)(4) (i) and (ii) (B) of the National Labor Relations Act, as
amended. On or before August 8, 1960, all parties submitted briefs which I have
duly considered.
Upon the entire record, and from my observation of the witnesses, I make the
following:
FINDINGS OF FACT
1. THE BUSINESSES OF THE EMPLOYERS INVOLVED
(a) William Matera is a general contractor engaged in the construction of build-
ings in San Antonio, Texas. During the 12 months preceding the hearing, in the
course and conduct of his business, he purchased, transferred, and delivered to his
construction sites in San Antonio building materials and other goods valued in excess
of $2,000,000, more than $1,000,000 worth of which came from outside the State
of Texas.
(b) Shop-Rite Foods, Inc., d/b/a Piggly Wiggly, herein called Piggly Wiggly, is
a corporation engaged in the retail grocery business in Texas and New Mexico and
has a number of retail stores and warehouses in San Antonio, Texas. In the con-
duct of its business in San Antonio during the year 1959 it sold and distributed
groceries valued in excess of $5,000,000.
(c) Dale Johnson, an individual proprietor doing business under the trade name
and style of D. E. Johnson Plumbing and Heating Company, herein called Johnson,
is a plumbing, heating, and air-conditioning contractor. During the 12-month
period prior to the hearing, in the course and conduct of its business, it purchased,
transferred, and delivered to its facilities in the State of Texas plumbing, heating,
and air-conditioning equipment, supplies, and other goods and materials valued in
excess of $170,000, more than $50,000 worth of which originated outside the State
of Texas.
(d) G. H. Dillard, an individual proprietor doing business under the trade name
and style of G. H. Dillard Company, herein called Dillard, is an air-conditioning
contractor. - During the 12-month period prior to the hearing, in the course and
conduct of its business , it purchased, transferred, and delivered to its facilities in
Texas, heating and air-conditioning equipment and other goods and materials valued
in excess of $200,000, over $50,000 worth of which were transported from points
outside the State of Texas.
PLUMBERS AND PIPEFITTERS LOCAL UNION 142, AFL-CIO 311
(e) L. D. Gillespie, W. A. Moore, and Taylor Saathoff are copartners doing
business under the trade name and style of San Antonio Refrigeration Company,
herein called Refrigeration. They are engaged at San Antonio, Texas, in the business
of installing and servicing commercial refrigeration.
I find that each of the businesses mentioned above, excluding Refrigeration, affect
commerce within the meaning of the Act and that it will effectuate the policies of the
Act to assert jurisdiction.
II. THE LABOR ORGANIZATION INVOLVED
Plumbers and Pipefitters Local Union No. 142, AFL-CIO, is a labor organization
within the meaning of Section 2(5) of the Act.
III. THE UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES
A. The issues
During the period here pertinent Matera, the general contractor, was engaged in
construction the superstructure of the Northwest Shopping Center and had subcon-
tracted the air-conditioning and plumbing work for the various buildings to Johnson
and Dillard, each of whom were operating under a contract with Respondent. As
the superstructure of each store building was completed, Matera turned the building
over to the owner or lessee for completion, that is, for the installation of fixtures,
refrigeration, etc. About March 1, 1960, Matera turned over-to one of the lessees,
Piggly Wiggly, the building in which the latter planned to operate its grocery business.
Piggly Wiggly, under its present and past ownership, had for many years been using
the services of Refrigeration, a nonunion firm, for the installation and servicing of
its refrigeration, and it contracted with Refrigeration to do this work at its new
store in the Northwest Center.
The complaint alleges that Respondent, in violation of Section 8(b) (4) (i) and
(ii) (B) of the Act, picketed the Northwest Center construction site on April 26,
1960, inducing and encouraging employees of Dillard and Johnson and other persons
to refuse to perform services for their respective employers, an object being to force
or require Piggly Wiggly and other persons to cease doing business with Refrigera-
tion ; and that Respondent, also in violation of Section 8(b)(4)(i) and (ii)(B) of
the Act, on or about March 1, orally communicated threats of violence to a super-
visory employee of Piggly Wiggly, if the latter failed to use members of Respondent
for its refrigeration work. The complaint also alleges that on April 25 and there-
after, Respondent threatened, coerced, and restrained Piggly Wiggly and other per-
sons by distributing handbills at or near the premises of a number of Piggly Wiggly
stores in San Antonio, an object of Respondent's conduct being to force or require
Piggly Wiggly and other persons to cease doing business with Refrigeration.
The issues are whether a preponderance of the evidence supports the factual alle-
gations and whether those facts are legally sufficient to establish the violation alleged.
An issue of particular importance is whether the handbilling, because it refers to one
furnishing services, rather than products, to Piggly Wiggly, comes within the pro-
scription of Section 8(b) (4) (-ii) (B) and the publicity proviso to Section 8(b) (4)
of the Act.
B. Events preceding the April26 picketing and the handbilling
Shortly after General Contractor Matera, on March 1, turned over to Piggly
Wiggly the store building which it had leased, Respondent's business agent, Hank
Brown, obtained from Matera a list of the tenants for the Northwest Center buildings
and on March 14 mailed to each of the tenants a letter, to which was attached a
list of pumbing and pipefitting contractors who employed members of Respondent,
requesting that any plumbing, heating, air-conditioning, refrigeration, or pipefitting
work be awarded to one of the listed firms, who paid the prevailing wage rate. In
the letter each tenant was warned that "in an effort to maintain the prevailing rate
of wages as established in this area, our local union shall establish legal pickets
on any job or installation where substandard wages are being paid by any firm in the
plumbing and pipefitting industry."
Also early in March, Brown called upon Edward W. Keeling, division manager of
Piggly Wiggly's 15 San Antonio stores, gave Keeling a list of plumbing and pipefitting
contractors who employed Respondent's members and asked him, if he had not
already decided upon the firm which was to do the refrigeration installation on the
new Piggly Wiggly store, to consider awarding the work to one of the firms on
Respondent's list.
312 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
About April 1, however, Keeling awarded the work to Refrigeration, the nonunion
firm with which Piggly Wiggly had been doing business for many years. Thereafter
Respondent's financial secretary, Elton Schroeder, upon several occasions talked
separately to Saatoff and Moore, two of the three partners operating the Refrigera-
tion firm, in an attempt to persuade them to use two union members on the Piggly
Wiggly job and, in response to an inquiry by one of the partners, informed him of
the union wage rate which would have to be paid the union workmen.
Schroeder, on or about April 13, also .talked to Piggly Wiggly's division manager,
Keeling, in an attempt to persuade Keeling to see that unionmen were used for in-
stalling the refrigeration equipment. Keeling informed Schroeder that he had been
using the services of Refrigeration for a number of years, was satisfied with that firm,
and did not wish to make a change. When Schroeder sought his assistance in getting
Refrigeration to use unionmen, Keeling told Schroeder that if the latter wanted to
organize Refrigeration, that was his business, but that Keeling would not interfere.
Schroeder warned him, however, that if he did not change, "it would cause 'a lot of
trouble, a lot of worry, a lot of headaches, save a lot of money. There might be some
knots in some heads."
Shortly thereafter Respondent's business manager, Brown, sought an interview with
Matera, the general contractor at the Northwest Center, and, upon learning that
Matera was not in his office, asked the latter's secretary to tell Matera "that it looked
like he was going to have to put pickets on the job because Piggly Wiggly was using
non-union men" and that it should be emphasized to Matera that the picketing would
not be directed against him but against Piggly Wiggly.' In addition to Refrigeration
men, carpenters and electricians were also working at the Piggly Wiggly site but it
is not contended that any of them were nonunion. Pickets were in fact placed at
and near the two driveways leading into Northwest Center at 7:30 a.m. on April 26
and on the same day handbills were distributed at six or seven of Piggly Wiggly's
operating retail stores in San Antonio. No attempt was made by Respondent to
picket Refrigeration's place of business or to pass out handbills there.
C. The picketing
On April 26, when the picketing occurred, none of the stores at the Northwest
Shopping Center were ready for occupancy or operation and a number of no-
trespassing signs were posted around the project to keep the public out. The two
driveways into the project site were located near one corner of the project where
Piggly Wiggly had its store. Workmen wishing to drive into the site had to enter
at one or the other of the two driveways being picketed but they could, and some
did, park on the streets and walk over the curbs to their jobs without using the drive-
ways. The picket walking near, and across, one driveway carried a sign reading:
This is for
information only
SAN ANTONIO
REFRIGERATION CO.
pays sub-standard wages
The picket walking near, and across, the other driveway carried a sign reading:
This is for
information only
PIGGLY WIGGLY
pays construction workers
sub-standard wages
The eight employees of Dillard, one of the plumbing subcontractors, refused to
cross the picket line and did not work on the project at all that day. All the em-
ployees of Johnson, the other plumbing subcontractor, at first refused to work but,
upon being told by Johnson that they would be fired if they did not report for work
by 11 a.m., all but five went to work by the alloted time? In the meantime, Re-
spondent's financial secretary, Schroeder, in response to a telephone call from
1 This finding is based upon the credited testimony of Matera's secretary, Norma Lister.
Brown testified that although it was likely he left a message for Matera to call him, he
did not recall leaving the message attributed to him by Lister.
E These work stoppages occurred despite the fact, as testified by Brown, that several
weeks before the picketing commenced, in response to an inquiry of a union steward of
either Johnson or Dillard as to what the men should do in the event of a picket line,
Brown told the steward that the men should continue working.
PLUMBERS AND PIPEFITTERS LOCAL UNION 142, AFL-CIO 313
Johnson, had appeared at the jobsite. Johnson asked Schroeder to tell the men to
go to work or go home but Schroeder declined to do so. Johnson, who was himself
a member of Respondent Union and familiar with its bylaws, then asked Schroeder
whether, pursuant to a provision in the Union's bylaws for penalizing members who
crossed a picket line, the men would be fined if they reported for work. Schroeder
refused to commit himself on that matter.
Johnson also talked to Respondent's business manager, Brown, about getting the
men back to work or obtaining replacements for them. Brown took the position
that because of a provision in Respondent's contract with Johnson, the latter could
not lawfully discharge his men for refusing to cross the picket line. It was finally
agreed that Respondent would discontinue the picketing, that Johnson would take
back the five discharged men, with pay for the 5 hours of working time on April 26
subsequent to their discharge, and that Brown would not file any charges with Re-
spondent against any of the men who had worked that day. In agreeing to dis-
continue the picketing, Brown stated that his purpose-to inform the public that
Piggly Wiggly allowed subcontractors to pay substandard wages-would be served
by continuing the distribution of handbills at other Piggly Wiggly stores. He specu-
lated that if he could in that manner get 5,000 people to stop buying from Piggly
Wiggly, the latter `would feel it in their pocketbook, or their cash registers." He told
Johnson that he had been trying to secure Piggly Wiggly's refrigeration work for
several years and eventually he would get it.
D. The handbilling
It is undisputed that handbills were distributed at or near the premises of six or
seven Piggly Wiggly stores in San Antonio on April 26 and 27 and that beginning
on June 10 and thereafter until about July 1, these stores were handbilled every
Wednesday and Friday except in rainy weather. The handbills stated:
PIGGLY
WIGGLY
of San Antonio
Allows Sub-Contractors to Pay Their
Employees Substandard Wages*
We PROTEST the Payment of
SUBSTANDARD WAGES
Please DO NOT Patronize
PIGGLY WIGGLY
Distributed by
PLUMBERS ANIY PIPEFITTERS
LOCAL UNION NO. 142
*Wages below prevailing minimum wages for this area as determined by the
Secretary of Labor of the United States.
Persons distributing the handbills strictly obeyed instructions of Respondent' s Busi-
ness Manager Brown that they were to stand on public property near the customer
entrances, not block the entry or exit of any person, and leave immediately if any
difficulty arose. Pursuant to these instructions, one distributor did leave when a
Piggly Wiggly store manager requested him to do so. No work stoppage resulted
from the handbilling; nor was there any refusal by employees to handle products or
to perform services.
E. Analysis and conclusions
1. The April 26 picketing as a violation of Section 8(b) (4) (i) (B) of the Act
It is clear from the record that Respondent was engaged in a labor dispute with
Refrigeration occasioned either by the latter's performing work at substandard wage
rates for Piggly Wiggly 3 or by its refusal to use Respondent's members on the
Piggly Wiggly job. In furtherance of this dispute with Refrigeration, Respondent
placed two pickets at and near the entrances to the Northwest Shopping Center, one
of the signs directed at Refrgieration and the other at Piggly Wiggly. This picketing
induced and encouraged employees at the Northwest Center building site to cease
work. None of Dillard's employees worked while the picketing was in progress and
a number of Johnson's employees refused to work even in the face of a discharge
ultimatum if they did not work.
8 Saatoff , one of the partners , testified that Refrigeration charged some of its customers
$4 an hour but that it gave Piggly Wiggly a discount, charging only $3.50 an hour-which
was less than the union rate.
314 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
The picketing,, moreover, plainly had as an object the forcing and requiring of
Piggly Wiggly to cease doing business with Refrigeration. This is disclosed in state.
ments made by union agents prior to the picketing-such as Business Manager
Brown's comment to Matera that Piggly Wiggly was using Refrigeration, a nonunion
concern, his later statement to Lister that it looked like he was going to have to put
pickets on the job because Piggly Wiggly was using nonunion men, and Financial
Secretary Schroeder's warning to Piggly Wiggly's Division Manager Keeling that
Piggly Wiggly's insistence on using Refrigeration instead of union men to do its
refrigeration installation would cause a lot of trouble, worry, headaches, and per-
haps "knots in some heads." Respondent's object is further revealed by Schroeder's
refusal, at the request of subcontractor Johnson, to tell the latter's employees to go
to work on April 21; and by the handbills distributed at Piggly Wiggly retail stores
which, on their face, disclosed an intent to force Piggly Wiggly to cease doing busi-
ness with subcontractors paying substandard wages-a clear reference to Refrigera-
tion workmen.
Section 8(b) (4) (i) (B) of the Act as amended in 1959 prohibits, inter alia, the
same type of union conduct as that prohibited by the prior Section 8(b) (4) (A).
Since Respondent's conduct outlined above induced and encouraged employees of
Dillard and Johnson and other persons 4 to engage in a work stoppage, an object
being to force or require Piggly Wiggly to cease doing business with Refrigeration,
it was accordingly in violation of Section 8(b) (4) (i) (B).5 International Brother-
hood of Electrical Workers et al. (Samuel Langer) v. N.L.R.B., 341 U.S. 694; Sales
Drivers, etc. Local 859 (Campbell Coal Company), 116 NLRB 1020, enfd. sub nom.
Truck Drivers and Helpers Local Union 728, etc. v. N.L.R.B., 249 F. 2d 512
(C.A.D.C.), cert. denied 335 U.S. 958.
2. The threats and picketing as a violation of Section 8(b)(4)(ii)(B)
The complaint alleges that the picketing was, in addition, a violation of Section
8(b) (4) (ii) (B) of the amended Act-as was also the threat made by Respondent's
financial secretary, Schroeder, to Piggly Wiggly. That section, insofar as here rele-
vant, makes it an unfair labor practice for a union:
(ii) to threaten, coerce, or restrain any person . . . where . an object
thereof is . . . (B) forcing or requiring any person .. . to cease doing busi-
ness with any other person.
The legislative history relating to this provision shows that it was intended to out-
law threats, coercion, and restraint of neutral employers-conduct which had not
been made unlawful by the 1947 amendments-and that a strike or other economic
retaliation or a threat of economic retaliation made directly against an employer to
force him to cease doing business with a primary employer with whom the Union
has a dispute comes within the purview of the new provision .6 It follows, therefore,
that since an object of the picketing was to force Piggly Wiggly to cease doing
business with Refrigeration, with whom Respondent had a labor dispute, that conduct
was in violation of Section 8(b) (4) (ii) (B).
It seems equally clear, and I find, that Schroeder' s warning to Piggly Wiggly that
the latter's continued use of Refrigeration for its refrigeration installation work
would cause a lot of trouble, worry and headaches and that there might be "knots
in some heads," constituted a threat of economic retaliation, including possible
violence, against Piggly Wiggly if the latter did not cease doing business with Re-
frigeration and that such threat was in contravention of Section 8(b)(4)(ii)(B)?
4 The fact that employees in addition to those of Dillard and Johnson, such as con-
struction workers or the laborer employed at the Piggly Wiggly building site, may not
actually have ceased work because of the picketing does not mean that they were not also
induced and encouraged, for where, as here, a union's conduct is reasonably intended to
cause a work stoppage, it is not of controlling significance that the inducement and
encouragement was not successful. N.L.R.B. v. Association Musicians, et al. (Gotham
Broadcasting Corp. (Station 'WINS)), 226 F. 2d 900, 904-905 (CA. 2), cert. denied,
351 U.S 962.
s In view of Respondent's demonstrated objective of forcing or requiring Piggly Wiggly
to cease doing business with Refrigeration, Respondent's argument that the standards
established by the Board in Moore Dry Dock Company, 92 NLRB 547, for common situs
picketing were met is misplaced
6 This legislative history is set forth in International Hod Carriers, etc, Local No. 1140
(Gilmore Construction Company), 127 NLRB 541, footnote 6.
7 The complaint alleged that Schroeder's threatening statement occurred "on or about
March 1, 1960." In its brief, Respondent contends that since the evidence shows that
PLUMBERS AND PIPEFITTERS LOCAL UNION 142, AFL-CIO 315
International Hod Carriers, etc. Local No . 1140 ( Gilmore Construction Company),
127 NLRB 541; Alpert v. Excavating and Building Material etc., Union (Consalvo
Trucking, Inc.), 184 F. Supp . 558 (D .C. Mass.).
3. The handbilling
The distribution by Respondent of handbills at Piggly Wiggly's retail stores, ap-
pealing to customers not to buy from Piggly Wiggly because the latter allowed
subcontractors to pay substandard wages was not, as Respondent contends, in fur-
therance of a primary dispute with Piggly Wiggly. The handbilling cannot be
divorced from the other events in this case. Like the picketing, it was in furtherance
of Respondent's quarrel with Refrigeration for refusing to hire union members, or
pay the prevailing wage rate, for refrigeration installation work at Piggly Wiggly's
new store and had as an object forcing or requiring Piggly Wiggly to cease doing
business with Refrigeration at least with respect to refrigeration installation work.
Indeed, the handbills themselves disclosed that the fundamental dispute was with
subcontractors paying substandard wages-an obvious reference to Refrigeration
workmen, the only subcontractors 8 shown by the record to have worked for less
than the union wage scale .9 The primary dispute was, therefore, with Refrigeration
rather than with Piggly Wiggly. See N.L.R.B. v. Denver Building and Construction
Trades Council, et al., 341 U.S. 675, 688.
The more difficult question is whether Respondent's peaceful distribution of the
handbills in the circumstances of this case threatened, coerced, or restrained Piggly
Wiggly within the meaning of Section 8(b) (4) (ii) (B) of the amended Act, as
alleged in the complaint.10 The relevant portions of this section, including the
publicity proviso to Section 8(b)(4), make it an unfair labor practice for a labor
organization:
(ii) to threaten, coerce, or restrain any person . . . where . . . an object
thereof is: . . . (B) forcing or requiring any person to cease . . . doing busi-
ness with any other person . . . Provided . . . That for the purpose of this
paragraph (4) only, nothing contained in such paragraph shall be construed
to prohibit publicity, other than picketing, for the purpose of truthfully advising
the public, including consumers and members of a labor organization, that a
product or products are produced by an employer with whom the labor organi-
zation has a primary dispute and are distributed by another employer , as long
as such publicity does not have an effect of inducing any individual employed
the statement in question was made "on or about April 26, 1960," it is not within the
scope of the complaint Respondent , however, made no such objection at the time the testi-
mony was offered and I am satisfied that it was not surprised or otherwise prejudiced by
the variance in the allegations and proof in this respect. I accordingly reject Respond-
ent's argument based on this ground
Respondent also argues in its brief that Schroeder 's statement with respect to "knots
in some heads" should not be interpreted as a threat of violence, as alleged in the com-
plaint , for Keeling, on cross-examination , conceded that he had no misgivings or any
feeling that something was going to happen to him Since, however , Schroeder 's state-
ment, in its very nature, was threatening , restraining , and coercive , I reject Respond-
ent's contention that the statement does not fall within the proscription of Section
8(b) (4) (ii ) ( B). Schroeder 's testimony with respect to his reaction is not controlling
for a feeling by a person that he is "under no sense of constraint . . . Is a subtle thing,
and recognition of constraint may call for a high degree of introspective perception "
Bethlehem Shipbuilding Corporation , Ltd. v. N.L.R.B., 114 F. 2d 930, 937 (C.A. 1),
quoted with approval in N.L.R.B. v Donnelly Garment Company, 330 U.S 219, 231.
s In using the term "subcontractor" herein , I am adopting the interpretation given to
it by Respondent 's business agent, Brown , who testified that in the building and con-
struction industry that term does not necessarily mean one who works under a contract
with another contractor ; it also has reference to one who does specialty work at a con-
struction site as distinguished from one having the general contract for the whole construc-
tion project.
0 Respondent learned by interrogating Piggly Wiggly's division manager , Keeling, at the
hearing that Piggly Wiggly had in its employ at the new store a man who did janitorial
or general cleanup work , to whom it paid less than the common laborers ' union rate ;
but the labor dispute in this case clearly did not concern him.
30 Although the complaint on its face may be construed as alleging the handbilling as
also a violation of Section 8(b) (4) (1 ) (B), the General Counsel at the hearing made it
clear that he meant to allege it as a violation solely of the ( ii) portion of that section.
316 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
by any person other than the primary employer in the course of his employ-
ment to refuse to pick up, deliver, or transport any goods, or not to perform
any services, at the establishment of the employer engaged in such distribution;
The General Counsel contends that the handbilling threatened, coerced, or re-
strained Piggly Wiggly with an object of forcing the latter to cease doing business
with Refrigeration and that such conduct was not protected by the proviso because
the installation work done by Refrigeration was not a product produced by it and
distributed by Piggly Wiggly." Respondent contends, on the other hand, that its
peaceful distribution of the handbills did not "threaten, coerce, or restrain" within
the contemplation of Section 8(b) (4)'(ii) (B) but that even if considered coercive,
the handbilling comes within the intent of the publicity proviso and was therefore
not unlawful.
The statute does not define the words, "threaten, coerce, or restrain" as used in
the (ii) provision of Section 8(b) (4) and, like the similar words "restrain or coerce"
appearing in Section 8(b) (1) (A), must be interpreted in the light of other provisions
of the statute and the legislative history showing congressional intent.12
The (ii) provision first appears in the administration bill (S. 748 and H.R. 3540)
introduced in the Senate by Senator Goldwater and others on January 28, 1959
(I Leg. Hist. (1959) 84, 142) and in the House by Congressmen Kearns and
Hiestand on January 29, 1959 (II Leg. Hist. (1959) 1461).13 Accompanying the
administration bill was an explanatory statement prepared by the Department of
Labor, pointing out certain loopholes in the Taft-Hartley Act which the new bill
was designed to close (105 Daily Congressional Record 1153, 1161, 1163; II Leg.
Hist. (1959) 976, 977, 979). Among those loopholes was one permitting "direct
coercion of secondary employers" to cease doing business with another with whom
a union had a labor dispute. It was pointed out by Goldwater and other sponsors
of the administration bill-or of other bills, including the Landrum-Griffith bill,
which adopted the identical (ii) language-that under the Taft-Hartley Act unions
could not exert pressure upon employees to engage in a work stoppage to force a
neutral employer to cease doing business with another employer but that they could
lawfully coerce the neutral employer himself by such means as threatening him with
a picket line or strike, insisting upon the execution of a hot cargo contract, or
threatening to refuse or actually refusing to supply the employer with needed crafts-
"Counsel for Piggly Wiggly argues, in addition, that even if the proviso is applicable
to the publicizing of a dispute with one furnishing a service rather than a product, it
would not protect Respondent because the handbills contained untruthful statements. It
contends , in the first place, that Refrigeration is not a subcontractor since Piggly Wiggly
contracts directly with Refrigeration. It may well be that Refrigeration, in its relation
to Piggly Wiggly, is not a subcontractor, but in the general sense used by Business Agent
Brown in this case, it was a subcontractor (see footnote 8, supra). In any event, an
inaccuracy with respect to such an immaterial matter would not, in my view, render un-
protected a statement which would otherwise be protected. Piggly Wiggly argues, also,
that the handbills must be considered untruthful because there was insufficient proof
that Refrigeration's single employee, characterized by Piggly Wiggly as a helper rather
than a journeyman, received substandard wages. There is credible evidence, however, not
only that the employee had been competently performing the work of a journeyman, but
that a wage rate below the union scale-which had been adopted by the city, the county
commissioners , and the United States Department of Labor for public contracts-was
charged to Piggly Wiggly for the work of both the employee and a member of the partner-
ship itself I conclude, therefore, that the handbills did truthfully advise the public of
the facts relating to the labor dispute
19 Cf. N L.R B v. Drivers, Chauffeurs and Helpers Local Union No 639, et al. (Curtis
Brothers ), 362 U.S 274, 285, in which the Supreme Court, after examining the legislative
history of Section 8(b)(1)(A) and other provisions of the statute, held that the prohibi-
tion against union restraint or coercion of employees contained in Section 8(b) (1) (A)
was meant to encompass "union coercion such as that brought about by threats of re-
prisal against employees and their families in the course of organizing campaigns; also
direct interference by mass picketing and other violence," not such coercion as might re-
sult from peaceful picketing to obtain recognition by the employer of a minority union
18 The Kennedy-Ervin bill ('S. 1555) which passed the Senate on April 25, 1959, made
no changes in the Section 8(b)(4) provisions of the Taft-Hartley Act (105 Daily Con-
gressional Record 6048, 6319-6320 ; II Leg. Hist. (1959) 1257 , 1262-1263). S. 1555 later
incorporated the provisions of the Landrum-Griffin bill (H R. 8342) and; as amended,
was enacted.
PLUMBERS AND PIPEFITTERS LOCAL UNION 142, AFL-CIO 317
men from a hiring hall list; and that the (ii ) provision of the new bill was designed
to prohibit this direct coercion of employers.14
Neither the Secretary of Labor nor the legislative sponsors of the administration
bill gave any indication that they meant the (ii) provision to outlaw such indirect
pressure upon neutral employers as the distribution of leaflets to customers or,
indeed, any other kind of indirect pressure upon such employers. However, late in
the debates on the Landrum-Griffin bill, which had adopted the ( ii) language of the
administration bill, Congressman Griffin, in response to a question, expressed his
opinion that the (ii) provision would prevent picketing at customer entrances of
neutral employers or of newspapers or radio stations running advertisements of the
primary employer if the purpose of the picketing was to coerce the neutrals to
cease doing business with the primary employer, but that the bill would be "limited
by the constitutional right of free speech" (105 Daily Congressional Record 14339,
Aug. 12, 1959; II Leg. Hist. (1959) 1615). On the other hand, opponents of the
provision in both the Senate and House had objected to the outlawing even of
customer picketing and had predicted, moreover, that the (ii) language might be
interpreted to reach not only picketing but the distribution of leaflets and advertise-
ments in the newspapers and over radios.115
The Landrum-Griffin bill, as passed by the House on August 14, 1959, did not
contain the publicity proviso. Thereafter, Congressman Thompson and Senator
Kennedy prepared an analysis of the bill's secondary boycott and hot cargo pro-
visions in which they criticized the (ii) provision on the ground that, as worded,
"The prohibition reaches not only picketing but leaflets, radio broadcasts and news-
paper advertisements, thereby interfering with free speech" (printed at Thompson's
request as an extension of remarks, 105 Daily Congressional Record 15222, Aug. 20,
1959; II Leg. Hist. (1959) 1708). They believed that "one of the apparent purposes
of the amendment is to prevent unions from appealing to the general public as
consumers for assistance in a labor dispute" and were unwilling to accept that
portion of the House bill (ibid.).
The publicity provisio was added by the Senate and House conferees. The
conference report filed on September 3 merely states that the proviso to Section
8(b)(4) was added and set forth its language (H.R. No. 1147 on S. 1555; I Leg.
Hist . ( 1959 ) 942). It is therefore of no more assistance than the words of the
statute itself in interpreting legislative intent. Some light, however, is shed on that
intent by action taken or statements made in the two houses of Congress immedi-
ately before and after the filing of the conference report.
Thus Senator Kennedy, on September 2, made an informal report to the Senate
on the results of the conference in which he reported , inter dlia (105 Daily Con-
gressional Record 16254-16255; II Leg. Hist. (1959) 1388-1389) :
. The House bill prohibited the union from carrying on any kind of
activity to disseminate informational material to secondary sites. They could
not say that there was a strike in a primary plant.
We quite obviously are opposed to their affecting liberties in a secondary strike
or affecting employees joining , but the House language prohibited not only
secondary picketing, but even the handing out of handbills or even taking out
an advertisement in a newspaper.
Under the language of the conference , we agreed there would not be picketing
at a secondary site . What was permitted was the giving out of handbills or
information through the radio , and so forth.
At the time of making this informal report, Kennedy announced that he expected
the language to be put in final form and included in a formal report on the
following day. On the next day, during debate on the formal report, Kennedy,
after pointing out that publicity regarding products made under sweatshop condi-
14 See, e g , Goldwater , 105 Daily 'Congressional Record 5764 , Apr. 21 , 1959 ( II Leg.
Hist. ( 1959 ) 1079 ) Curtis, 105 Daily Congressional Record 1176 , Jan. 28, 1959 (H Leg.
Hist. ( 1959 ) 989) Dirksen , 105 Daily Congressional Record 1567-1568, Feb. 4, 1959
(II Leg Hist . ( 1959 ) 993-994 ) ; Griffin , 105 Daily Congressional Record 13092, 14195,
July 27 and Aug . 11, 1959 ( II Leg. Hist . ( 1959 ) 1523, 1568 ) ; Rhodes, 105 Daily Con-
gressional Record 14208 , Aug. 11 , 1959 (II Leg. Hist. ( 1959 ) 1581 ) ; S. Rept. 187 on
S. 1555, p. 79 (I Leg. Hist . ( 1959) 475).
15 See, e.g., Humphrey , 105 Daily Congressional Record 5580, Apr . 17, 1959 (II Leg
Hist. (1959 ) 1037 ) and speech by Rayburn , Inserted in Record by Thompson , 105 Daily
Congressional Record 14203 , Aug. 11 , 1959 ( II Leg. Hist. (1959) 1576).
318 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
tions would be protected, went on to explain the proviso in more general terms. He
stated (105 Daily Congressional Record 16414, Sept. 3, 1959; II Leg. Hist. (1959)
1432):
We were not able to persuade the House conferees to permit picketing in front
of that secondary shop, but we were able to persuade them to agree that the
union shall be free to conduct informational activity short of picketing. In
other words the union can hand out handbills,at the shop, can place advertise-
ments in newspapers, can make announcements over the radio, and can carry
on all publicity short of having ambulatory picketing in front of a secondary
site.
In the House, prior to the filing of the formal conference report, Congressman
Griffin made a preliminary report on the agreement worked out in conference, to
which was attached a summary analysis of the conference agreement. This analysis
stated that the conference agreement adopted by the House provision which
"Close[d] loopholes which permitted secondary boycotts through coercion applied
directly against secondary employer (instead of his employees)." It also stated
that the House bill "Prohibits secondary customer picketing at retail store which
happens to sell product produced by manufacturer with whom union has dispute"
and that the conference agreement "adopts House provision with clarification that
other forms of publicity are not prohibited" (105 Daily Congressional Record
16539, Sept. 3, 1959; II Leg. Hist. (1959) 1712). On September 9, after the
conference report had been filed, Senator Goldwater caused to be inserted in the
Congressional Record a summary analysis of the conference agreement in language
identical to the analysis attached to Griffin's preliminary report (105 Daily Con-
gressional Record 17180-17181; II Leg. Hist. (1959) 1453-1454). There can be
no doubt that this analysis discloses a specific awareness of fears voiced by Kennedy
and others that the prohibition against threatening, coercing, or restraining employers
would interfere with the right of free speech in publicizing that a product distributed
by the neutral employer was made by an unfair employer; 16 but I am convinced
from other and more general language used that the object sought to be accomplished
was protection of truthful publicity other than by means of picketing and that the
reference to products was meant to illustrate a familiar example rather than to
exclude disputes involving services.
The Senate Committee Analysis, printed on September 10, made no distinction
between publicity aimed at products and that aimed at services. It explains that "A
proviso to Section 8(b)(4) permits `publicity other than picketing, for the purpose
of truthfully advising the public . . . ,' as long as such publicity does not have `an
effect of inducing any individual' not to perform services at the secondary employer's
place of business." (I Leg. Hist. (1959) 966. )
At no time during consideration of the conference report did anyone suggest that
the proviso was meant to prohibit any truthful publicity by means other than
picketing, provided, of course, that the publicity, as in this case, did not have the
effect of causing employees of the neutral employer to cease handling products or
performing services. Even those who criticized the (ii) provision and the Section
8(b)(4) proviso as unduly interfering with the right of free speech did so on the
ground that picketing should be given the same protection as other forms of
truthful publicity, or because they saw no reason for outlawing truthful publicity
merely because of the manner in which it might effect employees of the neutral
employer.17
On the basis of the legislative history outlined above, I am convinced that those
who drafted the administration bill, in which the ((ii) language first appears, meant
to prohibit only direct coercion of neutral employers, not indirect coercion such as
appeals to customers of the neutral employer; that it was during the course of the
debates on the legislation that sentiment developed for prohibiting secondary
customer picketing and also other forms of publicity which had the effect of causing
19 See example given in Thompson-Kennedy analysis (105 Daily Congressional Record
15222, Aug. 20, 1959; II Leg. Hist. (1959) 1708) and Kennedy's subsequent statement
(105 Daily Congressional Record 16414, Sept. 3, 1959; II Leg. Hist. (1959) 1432) ;
example given by Humphrey (105 Daily Congressional Record 5579-5580, Apr 17, 1959;
II Leg. Hist. (1959) 1036-1037) ; and statement by Morse (105 Daily Congressional
Record 16397-16398, Sept. 3, 1959; II Leg. Hist. (1959) 1426-1427). See also compila-
tion of legislative history in Intermediate Report of Reeves R. Hilton, in General Drivers,
etc. Local Union No. 968, at at. (Schepps Grocery Co.), 133 NLRB 1420
17 See, e.g, Morse, 105 Daily Congressional Record 16397-16398, Sept. 3, 1959 (II Leg.
Hist. (1959) 1426-1427) ; and Roosevelt, 105 Daily Congressional Record 16644, Sept. 4,
1959 (II Leg. Hist. (1959) 1729).
PLUMBERS AND PIPEFITTERS LOCAL UNION 142, AFL-CIO 319
employees of the neutral employer not to handle products or perform services;
and that it was the intent of Congress to prohibit those types of publicity but not
otherwise to outlaw truthful publicity. In other words, except for the proviso,
there would be no sound basis for holding that sponsors of the bill,18 intended to
outlaw the peaceful distribution of leaflets to customers of a neutral employer,
truthfully advertising the facts of a labor dispute involving one with whom the
neutral did business. The addition of a proviso to make certain that one type of
publicity, which critics of the bill feared might be outlawed, would be permitted
should not, in these circumstances, have the effect of ipso facto prohibiting all other
kinds of publicity not specifically mentioned in the proviso. If, as the General
Counsel contends, the statute should be construed as outlawing the distribution of
leaflets publicizing a labor dispute with an employer furnishing services to a neutral
person, merely because services are not mentioned in the proviso, then it could
as reasonably be argued that picketing for the same purpose would be lawful, for
the proviso expressly excepts picketing only to advertise a dispute involving
products of the primary employer distributed by the neutral. But the legislative
intent, in my view, was to prohibit picketing, whether a product or service be
involved, while permitting other forms of truthful publicity which do not cause
employees of the neutral to cease performing any work.
I am reinforced in this view by frequent references in the legislative history,
made by sponsors as well as critics of the bill, to preserving the constitutional right
of free speech.19 It was recognized that there is inherent in the act of picketing a
coercive influence which may be unrelated to the content of the legend on the
picket sign and that the act of picketing may therefore be lawfully enjoined in
situations in which the constitutional right of free speech would protect the
dissemination of information and appeals by other means 20 If, as it appears,
Congress meant by the proviso to insure to unions their exercise of the constitu-
tional right of free speech, I can see .no basis for its distinguishing between the
exercise of that right in publicizing a dispute involving products and one involving
services; and I do not believe that Congress intended to make such a distinction.
I accordingly find that Respondent, by distributing leaflets at Piggly Wiggly
stores truthfully advising the public that Piggly Wiggly allowed subcontractors to
pay substandard wages, did not threaten, coerce, or restrain Piggly Wiggly within
the meaning of Section 8(b) (4) (ii) (B) and the publicity proviso.21
IV. THE EFFECT OF THE UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES UPON COMMERCE
The activities of Respondent set forth above, occurring in connection with oper-
ations of the persons concerned as set forth in section I, above, have a close, intimate,
13 It is to the sponsors rather than the critics of a bill that one should look in determin-
ing legislative intent . Mastro Plastics Corp ., et at. v. N.L .R.B., 350 U . S. 270, 288,
footnote 22.
10 See, e.g., Griffin, 105 Daily Congressional Record 14339 , Aug. 12, 1959 ; II Leg. Hist.
( 1959 ) 1615; Humphrey , 105 Daily Congressional Record 5580, Apr. 17, 1959 ; II Leg.
Hist. ( 1959 ) 1037 ; Morse, 105 Daily Congressional Record 16398, Sept . 3, 1959 ; II Leg.
Hist. ( 1959 ) 1427 ; Rayburn , 105 Daily Congressional Record 14203 , Aug. 11, 1959;
II Leg. Hist . ( 1959 ) 1576; Thompson-Kennedy analysis , 105 Daily Congressional Record
15222 , Aug. 20 , 1959 ; II Leg. Hist . ( 1959 ) 1708; Udall , 105 Daily Congressional Record
16637 , Sept. 4, 1959 ; II Leg. Hist . ( 1959 ) 1722 ; Roosevelt , 105 Daily Congressional
Record 16644 , Sept. 4, 1959 ; 11 Leg. Hist . ( 1959 ) 1729; Douglas, 105 Daily Congressional
Record A8372, Sept. 24, 1959 ; II Leg. Hist . ( 1959) 1834.
20Citing Bakery Drivers Local v. Wohl, 315 U.S. 769, 776-777; U.S. v. Hutcheson,
312 U.S. 219 , 243; Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U.S. 88, 104-105; N L.R.B. v . International
Association of Machinists, Lodge 942, etc. (Alloy Mfg. Co .), 263 F . 2d 796 ( C A. 9).
21 The Board has not yet passed upon the issues presented in this type of case. One
Trial Examiner , Maurice M . Miller, in considering the legality of unfair listing of a con-
tractor dealing with a nonunion subcontractor , has reached the same result which I have
reached . Electrical Workers Union, Local 73 ( Northwest Construction, etc.), 134 NLRB
No. 46. On the other hand , another Trial Examiner, Louis Libbin , has construed "Do Not
Patronize" leaflets in a similar situation to fall within the proscription of Section
8(b) (4) (1i ) ( B). Local No. 662, Radio and Television Engineers, et al. ( Middle South
Broadcasting Co.), 133 NLRB 1698. And cf. the Intermediate Reports of Trial Examiner
Ramey Donovan in Local 1921, United Brotherhood of Carpenters and Joiners of America,
AFL-CIO (Spar Builders, at al.), 131 NLRB 1052, and of George A. Downing in
Lafayette Building and Construction Trades Council ( Southern Construction Corporation),
132 NLRB 673, in each of which it was indicated-although not necessary to decide-
that the proviso protects publicity involving one furnishing products but not one furnishing
services.
320 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
and substantial relation to trade, traffic, and commerce among the several States,
and tend to lead to labor disputes burdening and obstructing commerce and the
free flow of commerce.
V. THE REMEDY
Having found that Respondent has engaged in certain unfair labor practices, I
shall recommend that it cease and desist therefrom and take certain affirmative
action which I find will effectuate the policies of the Act.
The record does not indicate that Respondent's dispute with Refrigeration ex-
tended to all persons with whom Refrigeration did business. It appears merely
that Respondent was attempting to induce Refrigeration to employ its members---or
at least to pay union wages-for refrigeration installation work at Piggly Wiggly
stores in the San Antonio area where Refrigeration did business. The picketing of
the Piggly Wiggly store at the Northwest Shopping Center did, however, cause work
stoppages among employees of two other employers on that project and, in order
to prevent Respondent from causing similar interruptions of work in the future,
it will be necessary to require it to cease and desist from inducing or encouraging
persons employed by Piggly Wiggly or by any other persons in the San Antonio area
operating at a common situs with Piggly Wiggly, to engage in such a work stoppage,
where an object is to force or require Piggly Wiggly to cease doing business with
Refrigeration.
Upon the basis of the foregoing findings of fact, and upon the entire record in
the case, I make the following:
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1. Piggly Wiggly is a person engaged in commerce or in an industry affecting
commerce within the meaning of Section 8(b) (4) of the Act.
2. By threatening Piggly Wiggly that its failure to use Respondent's members
for refrigeration installation work might result in violence, Respondent threatened,
coerced, and restrained Piggly Wiggly within the meaning of Section 8(b) (4) (ii) (B)
of the Act.
3. By picketing the Northwest Shopping Center on April 26, 1960, Respondent
has induced and encouraged individuals employed by Dillard and Johnson and other
persons to engage in a strike or a refusal in the course of their employment to
perform any services, and has restrained and coerced Piggly Wiggly, in each case
with an object of forcing or requiring Piggly Wiggly to cease doing business with
Refrigeration, and has thereby violated Section 8(b)(4)(i) and (ii) (B) of the Act.
4. The aforesaid unfair labor practices are unfair labor practices affecting com-
merce within the meaning of Section 2(6) and (7) of the Act.
5. Respondent has not, by its distribution of handbills at Piggly Wiggly stores
on and after April 26, 1960, threatened, coerced, or restrained Piggly Wiggly within
the meaning of Section 8(b) (4) (ii) (B) of the Act.
[Recommendations omitted from publication.]
Standard Industries , Inc., Aggregate Division and International
Union of Operating Engineers , Local 627, AFL-CIO. Case
No. 16-CA-1336. September 22, 1961
DECISION AND ORDER
On August 22, 1960, Morton D. Friedman issued his Intermediate
Report in the above-entitled proceeding, finding that the Respondent
had engaged in and was engaging in certain unfair labor practices and
recommending that it cease and desist therefrom and take certain
affirmative action, as set forth in the Intermediate Report attached
hereto. Thereafter, the Respondent filed exceptions to the Intermedi-
ate Report and a brief in support thereof. In addition, Respondent
filed a "Motion to Supplement Record."
133 NLRB No. 40.