Photo and Video Sync, Cloud Storage, and Picture Editing, Inc.Download PDFTrademark Trial and Appeal BoardMar 9, 2018No. 86789886 (T.T.A.B. Mar. 9, 2018) Copy Citation This Opinion is Not a Precedent of the TTAB Mailed: March 9, 2018 UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE _____ Trademark Trial and Appeal Board _____ In re Photo and Video Sync, Cloud Storage, and Picture Editing, Inc. _____ Serial No. 86789886 _____ Heather A. Sapp of LegalForce RAPC Worldwide, P.C. for Photo and Video Sync, Cloud Storage, and Picture Editing, Inc. Scott Kumis, Trademark Examining Attorney, Law Office 125, Mark Pilaro, Managing Attorney. _____ Before Ritchie, Masiello, and Lynch, Administrative Trademark Judges. Opinion by Lynch, Administrative Trademark Judge: I. Background and Evidentiary Objections Photo and Video Sync, Cloud Storage, and Picture Editing, Inc. (“Applicant”) seeks registration on the Principal Register of the mark PHOTO KEEPER in standard characters, with PHOTO disclaimed, for the following goods and services: Downloadable computer software applications for mobile phones and handheld tablet computer devices, namely, software for viewing, Serial No. 86789886 - 2 - organizing, managing, sharing and sending images via the Internet; Downloadable computer software for viewing, organizing, managing, and sending images via the Internet in International Class 9; and Electronic storage of electronic media, namely, images, text and audio data; Electronic storage of images; Providing temporary use of online- only, non-downloadable Software as a Service (SaaS) services featuring software for viewing, organizing, managing, sharing and sending images to others via the Internet; Providing a website featuring on-line non-downloadable software tools for viewing, organizing, managing, sharing and sending images via the Internet; Providing a web site featuring technology that enables internet users to share images in International Class 42.1 The Examining Attorney has finally refused registration under Section 2(d) of the Trademark Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1052(d), based on a likelihood of confusion with the following two registered marks: • PICTURE KEEPER in standard characters, with a claim of acquired distinctiveness, for “Computer software and hardware for locating and storing electronic media, namely, digital images, text, audio and video” in International Class 9.2 • for “Remote electronic storage of electronic photographs, electronic video recordings and electronic sound recordings all stored with geographic location information, date and time identifiers” in International Class 42.3 After the final Office Action, Applicant requested reconsideration. The Examining Attorney denied the request. Applicant then appealed the refusal to register. 1 Application Serial No. 86789886 was filed October 16, 2015, based on a declared intent to use the mark in commerce under Section 1(b) of the Trademark Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1051(b). 2 Registration No. 4316668 issued April 9, 2013. 3 Registration No. 4994220 issued July 5, 2016. Serial No. 86789886 - 3 - Applicant’s Brief includes a list of third-party registrations in support of Applicant’s argument that KEEPER constitutes a weak term. The Examining Attorney objects to six of the listed registrations on the ground that Applicant never submitted them during prosecution, and notes that under Trademark Rule 2.142(d), 37 C.F.R. § 2.142(d), it is too late to introduce them. That rule provides: The record in the application should be complete prior to the filing of an appeal. Evidence should not be filed with the Board after the filing of a notice of appeal. If the appellant or the examining attorney desires to introduce additional evidence after an appeal is filed, the appellant or the examining attorney should submit a request to the Board to suspend the appeal and to remand the application for further examination. Although Applicant listed these six registrations, among others, in its February 8, 2017 Response to Office Action, it never submitted the requisite copies of the registrations, despite the Examining Attorney’s explicit instructions that the mere submission of a list of registrations does not make such registrations part of the record,4 and despite later supplying copies of other registrations.5 To make third party registrations part of the record, an applicant must submit copies of the registrations, or the electronic equivalent from the USPTO’s automated systems, prior to appeal. See In re Compania de Licores Internacionales S.A., 102 USPQ2d 1841, 1843 (TTAB 2012) (mere listing of third-party registrations insufficient); see also TBMP § 1208.02 (June 2017) (“Mere listings of registrations ... are not sufficient 4 TSDR March 1, 2017 Office Action at 1 (citations omitted). 5 TSDR March 15, 2017 Request for Reconsideration at 2-30. Serial No. 86789886 - 4 - to make the registrations of record”). Accordingly, because these six third-party registrations are not in the record, we give them no consideration. The Examining Attorney also objects to Applicant’s reliance on third-party Registration Nos. 3830879 and 3115994 on the grounds that they now have been cancelled. We take judicial notice of this updated information that both these registrations are now cancelled. See Royal Hawaiian Perfumes, Ltd. v. Diamond Head Products of Hawaii, Inc., 204 USPQ 144, 146-47 (TTAB 1979). II. Likelihood of Confusion The determination under Section 2(d) involves an analysis of all of the probative evidence of record bearing on a likelihood of confusion. In re E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 476 F.2d 1357, 177 USPQ 563, 567 (CCPA 1973) (setting forth factors to be considered, hereinafter referred to as “du Pont factors”); see also In re Majestic Distilling Co., 315 F.3d 1311, 65 USPQ2d 1201, 1203 (Fed. Cir. 2003). In any likelihood of confusion analysis, two key considerations are the similarities between the marks and the relatedness of the goods and services. See In re Chatam Int’l Inc., 380 F.3d 1340, 71 USPQ2d 1944 (Fed. Cir. 2004); Federated Foods, Inc. v. Fort Howard Paper Co., 544 F.2d 1098, 192 USPQ 24, 29 (CCPA 1976) (“The fundamental inquiry mandated by § 2(d) goes to the cumulative effect of differences in the essential characteristics of the goods and differences in the marks.”). We discuss below these and other relevant factors. See M2 Software, Inc. v. M2 Commc’ns, Inc., 450 F.3d 1378, 78 USPQ2d 1944 (Fed. Cir. 2006) (only du Pont factors that are “relevant and of record” need be considered). Serial No. 86789886 - 5 - We focus our analysis on the cited registration for PICTURE KEEPER (hereinafter, the Registration) because the degree of relatedness of its goods to Applicant’s is reasonably comparable to the degree of relatedness of the services in the other cited registration, and if we find no likelihood of confusion with PICTURE KEEPER, then it follows there would be no likelihood of confusion with the registered mark , which bears less similarity to Applicant’s mark. See In re Max Capital Group Ltd., 93 USPQ2d 1243, 1245 (TTAB 2010). A. The Goods and Services Initially, we note that Applicant’s brief contains no argument on the du Pont factor of the similarity or dissimilarity and nature of the goods and services at issue. Nonetheless, we must determine whether their degree of relatedness rises to such a level that consumers would mistakenly believe the respective goods and services emanate from the same source. In making this analysis, we look to the identifications in the application and cited Registration. See Stone Lion Capital Partners, LP v. Lion Capital LLP, 746 F.3d 1317, 110 USPQ2d 1157, 1162 (Fed. Cir. 2014); Octocom Sys., Inc. v. Houston Computers Servs. Inc., 918 F.2d 937, 16 USPQ2d 1783, 1787 (Fed. Cir. 1990). Also, “it is sufficient for finding a likelihood of confusion if relatedness is established for any item encompassed by the identification of goods [and services] within a particular class in the application.” In re Aquamar, Inc., 115 USPQ2d 1122, 1126, n.5 (TTAB 2015); see also Tuxedo Monopoly, Inc. v. General Mills Fun Group, 648 F.2d 1335, 209 USPQ 986, 988 (CCPA 1981). Serial No. 86789886 - 6 - Applicant’s services include electronic storage of images, as well as providing Software as a Service (SaaS) for organizing, managing, and sharing images via the Internet. Applicant’s goods include downloadable computer software for organizing, managing, and sending images via the Internet. The Registration’s identification includes computer software for locating and storing digital images. The Examining Attorney maintains that Applicant’s software for organizing and managing images encompasses software such as Registrant’s for storing digital images. See In re Hughes Furniture Indus., Inc., 114 USPQ2d 1134, 1137 (TTAB 2015) (“Applicant’s broadly worded identification of ‘furniture’ necessarily encompasses Registrant’s narrowly identified ‘residential and commercial furniture.’”). While we do not agree that organizing and managing images necessarily includes storing them, we find Applicant’s software and software as a service that allow for organizing, managing, and sharing images related to the Registration’s identified software for storing digital images. The record includes sufficient evidence that goods and services of this type emanate from the same source under the same mark. For example: • The Samsung website promotes under the same mark the ability to “backup and sync your data,” which refers to storing and managing, and points to the ability to “[s]eamlessly view photos across all devices”;6 • The Verizon Cloud webpage promotes under that mark the option to “[b]ack up and sync your contacts, photos, videos and more. Transfer 6 TSDR August 29, 2016 Office Action at 12 (samsung.com). Serial No. 86789886 - 7 - content, share photos or print your favorites stored securely in Verizon Cloud.” Also, the webpage describes features of Verizon Cloud such as “organizes your best photos” and “share select media”;7 • A webpage offering the Microsoft Lumia 735 notes that it “comes preloaded with the Lumia Selfie app, so you can easily capture, edit and share stunning self-portraits anytime”;8 • The webpage for Apple’s iCloud promotes the ability to “keep all your photos … stored securely,” and includes a feature that “lets you easily share … photos, and more with everyone in your family”;9 • The Amazon Drive website describes a photo storage feature “to auto- save your photos to Amazon Drive” as well as “[a] sleek timeline layout in the free mobile app [that] makes it easy to find the photos you’re looking for”; 10 • The webpage for Google Photos promotes “Free unlimited storage for photos and videos,” advertises that “[a]utomatically organized and searchable, you can find photos fast and bring them to life,” and “[p]rivately sharing all the photos you took … has never been easier”.11 7 Id. at 15-17 (verizonwireless.com). 8 Id. at 21-22 (verizonwireless.com). 9 Id. at 39 (apple.com). 10 Id. at 42-45 (amazon.com). 11 Id. at 48-50 (google.com). Serial No. 86789886 - 8 - The record also contains other similar evidence.12 This marketplace evidence shows that consumers commonly encounter under one mark software that facilitates storing and organizing images, or storing and sharing images. Thus, we find the relevant goods and services in the application highly related to the goods in the Registration. The du Pont factor of the similarity of the goods and services clearly favors a finding of likelihood of confusion as to each class in the application. See Tuxedo Monopoly, 209 USPQ at 988 (likelihood of confusion must be found if there is likely to be confusion with respect to any item that comes within the identification of goods in the application). B. Trade Channels and Classes of Consumers Turning to the trade channels and classes of consumers, we must assume that the identified goods and services move through all normal and usual channels of trade and methods of distribution for such goods and services. In re i.am.symbolic llc, 866 USPQ2d 1315, 123 USPQ2d 1744, 1751 (Fed. Cir. 2017); Squirtco v. Tomy Corp., 697 F.2d 1038, 216 USPQ 937, 940 (Fed. Cir. 1983). The Examining Attorney’s evidence, including the evidence set out above, shows that software and SaaS for the functions performed by the goods and services of both Applicant and Registrant are offered together through the same websites. Thus, the record reflects that Applicant’s goods and services travel in the same channels of trade to the same classes of consumers as the registrant’s goods. 12 See February 9, 2016 Office Action at 21-48. Serial No. 86789886 - 9 - C. The Number and Nature of Similar Marks for Similar Services Applicant asserts under the sixth du Pont factor that the mark in the cited registration deserves only a narrow scope of protection in view of third-party registered marks that include the term KEEPER, covering various goods and services. Evidence of third-party use and registration of a term in the relevant industry is considered in the likelihood of confusion analysis. Juice Generation, Inc. v. GS Enterprises LLC, 794 F.3d 1334, 115 USPQ2d 1671, 1675 (Fed. Cir. 2015); Jack Wolfskin Ausrustung Fur Draussen GmbH v. New Millennium Sports, S.L.U., 797 F.3d 1363, 116 USPQ2d 1129, 1136 (Fed. Cir. 2015). In the case before us, however, Applicant points to no evidence of actual third-party use, and instead relies on third- party registrations of marks that include KEEPER. Applicant’s record thus does not demonstrate commercial weakness from third-party use, and fails to show that consumers actually are conditioned to distinguish among marks that include KEEPER. However, even where the record lacks proof of actual third-party use, third-party registration evidence may show conceptual weakness, in that a term carries a highly suggestive or descriptive connotation in the relevant industry. However, most of the third-party registrations on which Applicant relies cover goods or services that differ from those at issue, and Applicant submitted no evidence of their relatedness. Many of the third-party registrations identify various types of software that do not involve the subject matter identified in the Registration. For example, they include, in relevant part, “software for livestock records and livestock operations management,” Serial No. 86789886 - 10 - software “for mutual fund subaccounting and sub-transfer agency functions,” “software for online construction management,” and “software for the use in tracking, managing and reporting on workflow processes.” Not all types of software are related. As explained in TMEP § 1402.03(d), “[a]ny identification of goods for computer programs must be sufficiently specific to permit determinations with respect to likelihood of confusion. The purpose of requiring specificity in identifying computer programs is to avoid the issuance of unnecessary refusals of registration under 15 U.S.C. §1052(d) where the actual goods of the parties are not related and there is no conflict in the marketplace.” Other registrations involve similarly unrelated goods, such as “[p]rotective covers, cases and sleeves for tablet computers.”13 Thus, unlike Juice Generation and Jack Wolfskin, where the third-party evidence involved the very same goods and services at issue, here Applicant’s third-party registration evidence relates to different goods and services. It therefore lacks probative value as to alleged weakness of the term KEEPER in relation to Registrant’s goods. See i.am.symbolic, 123 USPQ2d at 1751 (disregarding third-party registrations for goods in other classes where the proffering party “has neither introduced evidence, nor provided adequate explanation to support a determination that the existence of I AM marks for goods in other classes … support[s] a finding that registrants’ marks are weak with respect to the goods identified in their registrations”). The following two third-party registrations have services similar to the function of the Registrant’s software: 13 TSDR March 15, 2017 Request for Reconsideration at 27. Serial No. 86789886 - 11 - • PODKEEPER for “Computer services, namely, creating online virtual communities via communication networks to registered users … for uploading, downloading, streaming, linking, sharing or otherwise providing electronic media or information, for transmitting and sharing personal and business profiles, audio, video, photographic images….”14 • LIST KEEPER for “Providing an interactive website featuring technology that allows users to store, organize, and share personal list information”15 However, we find that the use of KEEPER in the latter registration creates a different impression than in the cited mark because of the common expression “keep a list.” Overall, given the nature and quantity of the third-party registration evidence, we find it insufficient to diminish the scope of protection to be afforded the KEEPER portion of the mark in the Registration. Cf. Juice Generation, 115 USPQ2d at 1675 (weakness shown by at least 26 third-party uses and registrations containing the same phrase for the same services); Jack Wolfskin, 116 USPQ2d at 1136 (third-party weakness evidence characterized as “voluminous”). D. Similarity of the Marks Next, we turn to the du Pont factor comparing the applied-for and cited marks, which we consider “in their entireties as to appearance, sound, connotation and commercial impression.” Palm Bay Imports Inc. v. Veuve Clicquot Ponsardin Maison Fondee En 1772, 396 F.3d 1369, 73 USPQ2d 1689, 1691 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (quoting du Pont, 177 USPQ at 567). The test assesses not whether the marks can be 14 TSDR March 15, 2017 Request for Reconsideration at 16-17. 15 Id. at 18-20. Serial No. 86789886 - 12 - distinguished in a side-by-side comparison, but rather whether their overall commercial impressions are so similar that confusion as to the source of the goods offered under the respective marks is likely to result. Coach Servs., 101 USPQ2d at 1721; see also Edom Labs., Inc. v. Glenn Lichter, 102 USPQ2d 1546, 1551 (TTAB 2012). “[I]n articulating reasons for reaching a conclusion on the issue of confusion, there is nothing improper in stating that, for rational reasons, more or less weight has been given to a particular feature of a mark, provided the ultimate conclusion rests on consideration of the marks in their entireties.” In re Nat’l Data Corp., 753 F.2d 1056, 1058, 224 USPQ 749, 750-51 (Fed. Cir. 1985); see also Stone Lion Capital 110 USPQ2d at 1161. We find that PHOTO KEEPER and PICTURE KEEPER look and sound similar, and create the same meaning and commercial impression. The marks share the same dominant term, KEEPER, and the other words in each mark have important similarities. We find that KEEPER dominates Applicant’s mark because it is the more distinctive term. The descriptive nature of PHOTO in Applicant’s mark diminishes its significance in the comparison because consumers would be unlikely to focus on it to distinguish source. See In re Dixie Rests., Inc., 105 F.3d 1405, 41 USPQ2d 1531, 1533-34 (Fed. Cir. 1997) (affirming TTAB’s finding that the dominant portion of the mark THE DELTA CAFE was DELTA, not the disclaimed generic term CAFE); Nat’l Data Corp., 224 USPQ at 752. While, as Applicant notes, the technicality of its disclaimer of PHOTO may not be important in the likelihood of confusion analysis, the reason for the disclaimer matters. A “photo,” or “photograph,” Serial No. 86789886 - 13 - is “[a] picture made using a camera…,”16 and Applicant’s goods and services focus on images. Therefore, consumers will place more emphasis on the KEEPER portion of the mark to indicate source. Regardless, the other words in each mark are two-syllable synonymous words that begin with the same letter. In the cited mark, the word PICTURE can be defined as “[a] photograph,”17 such that PHOTO and PICTURE can have the same meaning. While Applicant points out that PICTURE can have other meanings, such as referring to a painting, both the Registration’s identification and Applicant’s evidence regarding its commercial context show that PICTURE refers to photos.18 Although we of course recognize that PHOTO and PICTURE create some visual and phonetic difference between the marks, combining either word with KEEPER creates a term with the same connotation and commercial impression, contributing to the similarity of the marks as a whole. We find that this factor weighs in favor of likely confusion. III. Conclusion The overall similarity of the marks for related goods and services that move in the same channels of trade to the same classes of customers renders confusion likely. Decision: The refusal to register Applicant’s mark is affirmed for the goods in International Class 9 and the services in International Class 42. 16 TSDR August 29, 2016 Office Action at 7-8 (oxforddictionaries.com). 17 Id. at 10. 18 See id. at 17. Copy with citationCopy as parenthetical citation