Phillips Petroleum Co.

National Labor Relations Board - Board Decisions

Jan 16, 1951

92 N.L.R.B. 1344 (N.L.R.B. 1951)

In the Matter of PHILLIPS PETROLEUM COMPANY and LOCAL 351, INTER-
NATIONAL UNION OF OPERATING ENGINEERS, AFL
Case No. 16-CA-218.-Decided January 16, 1951
DECISION AND ORDER
Upon the charge duly filed December 8, 1949, by Local 351, Inter-
national Union of Operating Engineers, AFL, herein called the Union,
the General Counsel of the National Labor Relations Board, herein
called the General Counsel, by the Regional Director for the Sixteenth
Region (Fort Worth, Texas), issued a complaint dated June 12, 1950,
against Phillips Petroleum Company, herein called the Respondent,
alleging that the Respondent interfered with, restrained, and coerced
and is interfering with, restraining, and coercing its employees in the
exercise of the rights guaranteed in Section 7 of the Act, and thereby
engaged in and is engaging in an unfair labor practice within the
meaning of Section 8 (a) (1) of the Act. Copies of the complaint,
the charge, and notice of hearing were duly served upon the Respond-
ent and the Union on or about June 12, 1950.
With respect to the unfair labor practice, the complaint alleges,
in substance, that in or about November 1949, and at all times there-
after, the Respondent refused to permit the Union the use of the only
available meeting place at the Sher-Han Plant. The Sher-Han Plant
is located in Hansford County, Texas, and is 1 of 15 gasoline plants
operated by the Respondent in the Panhandle District of Texas. This
plant is approximately 16 miles from the nearest village, Guymon,
Oklahoma, and is approximately 4 miles from the nearest rural school
building.
On or about June 22,1950, the Respondent filed an answer admitting,
among other allegations, the allegation that it owned a community
building near the Sher-Han Plant, which building had been and is
being used by Respondent's employees for social gatherings, safety
meetings, and church services, and that Respondent had, from in or
about November 1949 to date, refused to permit the Union the use of
said community building; but denying, among other allegations, the
allegation that the Respondent had engaged in, and was engaging in,
unfair labor practices within the meaning of Section 8 (a) (1) of the
Act.
92 NLRB No. 193.
1344
PHILLIPS PETROLEUM COMPANY 1345
Thereafter all parties entered into a stipulation which set forth an
agreed statement of facts. The stipulation provides that the parties,
thereby waive their rights to a hearing and to the taking of testimony
before a Trial Examiner of the National Labor Relations Board.
The stipulation further provides that, upon such stipulation and the
record as therein provided, the Board may make findings of fact, con-
clusions of law, and may issue its Decision and Order as if the same
facts had been adduced in open hearing before a duly authorized Trial
Examiner of the Board.
The aforesaid stipulation is hereby approved and accepted and made
a. part of the record in this case. In accordance with Section 203.45
of National Labor Relations Board Rules and Regulations, this pro-
ceeding was duly transferred to and continued before the Board.
Upon the basis of the aforesaid stipulation, and the entire record.
in this case, the Board, having duly considered the briefs filed by, the
Respondent and the Union, makes the following :
FINDINGS OF FACT
I. THE BUSINESS OF THE RESPONDENT
The Respondent is a Delaware corporation, having its principal
office and place of business in Bartlesville, Oklahoma, and operating
in 47 States of the United States. The Respondent is engaged in the
collecting, processing, refining, and sale of petroleum products. At
the Sher-Han Plant, which is involved in this proceeding, the Re-
spondent annually purchases petroleum products valued in excess of
$1,000,000, of which approximately 66 percent is shipped in interstate
commerce. During the past year the sales of petroleum' products
from this plant were valued in excess of $1,000,000, of which approxi-
mately 75 percent was shipped in interstate commerce. The Sher-Han
Plant is located in Hansford County, Texas, and is 1 of 15 gasoline
plants operated by the Respondent in the Panhandle District of the
State of Texas.
The Respondent admits and we find that it is engaged in commerce
within the meaning of Section 2 (6) and (7) of the Act.
H. THE ORGANIZATION INVOLVED
Local 351, International Union of Operating Engineers, AFL, is a
labor organization as defined in Section 2 (5) of the Act.
1346 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
III. THE UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICE
A. The setting in which the relevant events occurred
The Sher-Han Plant is composed of 2 plants : The Hansford Plant
which was placed in operation in 1944, and the Sherman Plant which
was placed in operation in 1949. Both plants are located on the same
:site, in the northern part of Hansford County, Texas , about one-half
.mile south of the Oklahoma State line. Natural gas is obtained at
both plants through a field gathering system from wells in the outlying
. area and is then processed for the extraction of natural gasoline.
North of the Sher-Han Plant is located a group of houses owned by
the Respondent and referred to as the Hansford Camp. At this camp
most of the 70 employees of the plant reside with their families under
:individual unit rental contracts with the Respondent . There is no
grocery store , bank, movie, church , post office , or school in the camp.
There is one community building owned and maintained by the
Respondent , which charges no fees for its use or for janitor services.
The community building consists of a small auditorium with a stage
and piano . It is used for social gatherings , safety meetings , church
services, Boy Scout meetings, and other community activities spon-
sored and entered into by employees of Respondent at the plant and
their guests . The children from the Hansford Camp attend school
in Guymon, Oklahoma, which is a town of 5,000 persons about 16 miles
north of the Sher-Han Plant. Employees make their purchases of
groceries and other supplies at Guymon or at Gruver , Texas ( popula-
tion about 1,500 ), located 16 to 20 miles southeast from the Sher-Han
Plant or at Spearman, Texas ( population about 1,105 ), about 13
miles east of Gruver.
The road to Guymon is a graded gravel road over which the school-
'busses travel ; the road to Gruver is a graded caliche-topped road ; the
Toad from Gruver to Spearman is paved.
There are two schoolhouses in the vicinity of the Hansford Camp: ..
'(1) Prairie View, located about 4 miles north of the Sher-Han Plant
,on the road to Guymon , and (2 ) Oslo schoolbuilding , located at Oslo,
a community . about 5 ' miles southwest of the Sher -Han Plant. The
Prairie View schoolbuilding is not now used for school purposes, but
the building and equipment are intact. Prior to the construction of
the Respondent 's community building at the Hansford Camp, this
'schoolhouse was used by employees for meetings , and in 1949 such
building was used by residents in the surrounding area on at least
three occasions , once for an election , once for a reunion party, and
,once for a Christmas party . The schoolhouse is about 28 feet by 32
PHILLIPS PETROLEUM COMPANY 1347
feet. The Oslo school building is about 16 feet by 20 feet.and is
reached from the Sher-Han Plant by a graded road.
The employees at the Sher-Han Plant work on 3 shifts, 8 hours
per day and 40 hours per week. Operations are carried on 24 hours
per day and 7 days per week. Of the approximately 70 employees,
all but approximately 12 employees work the day shift.
B. The issue: The Respondent's refusal to permit the Union to use
the Community Hall
The sole issue in this case on the facts stipulated by the parties is
the action of the Respondent in denying the Union use of the com-
munity building in the Hansford Camp for organizational purposes.
The Union began its organizational drive at the Sher-Han Plant dur-
ing November 1949. On November 21, 1949, Joe W. Rigdon, business
agent of the Union, wrote to A. W. Paris, superintendent of the
Respondent's Panhandle gasoline district, requesting use of the com-
munity building for the purpose of holding union meetings. The
stipulated facts show that the Union's request was denied by Paris
on December 1, 1949, on the ground that such permission by the
Respondent "would be regarded as support of Local 351." Those
facts further reveal that Paris' letter, denying the Union use of the
building, was based upon a policy of the Respondent adopted in
November 1940, which is stated as follows: 1
Use of Community Buildings.
It is the policy of the Company to permit the use of community
halls for community activities and by various organizations such
as safety, civil, social, Boy Scouts, charity benefits, dances, etc.
These groups should obtain permission from the appropriate
supervisor to use the community buildings for their meetings.
These buildings were planned and constructed primarily for the
use of employees of Phillips Petroleum Company and its sub-
sidiaries. Their use by employee groups maybe continued. How-
ever, the Company is prohibited by the Wagner Act from con-
tributing financial or other support to any labor organization,
and therefore the use of community buildings for meeting places
for labor organizations cannot be allowed. This policy must be
strictly complied with.
When permission is secured from. the supervisor in charge and
dates arranged for the use of the buildings, the organization
" The Union has, since on or about March 1, 1950, made it known to the Respondent
that the Union was willing to pay the Respondent for the use of the community building
at the Hansford Camp.
1348 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
sponsoring the meetings should exercise care in the use' of the
building and equipment contained .therein. The Company as-
sumes no liability for personal injury or loss sustained by any
organization using the building.
C. Conclusions as to the refusal
This case is not one of first impression. In the Stowe Spinning case
we had occasion to consider and to decide, with the subsequent ap-
proval of the Supreme Court,' that it was a violation of Section 8 (1)
of the Wagner Act for an employer to discriminate against a union by
refusing it permission to use a company-owned meeting hall in an
isolated company town, where such a building was the only available
meeting place in the immediate vicinity.
The Respondent contends, however, that the instant case is dis-
tinguishable from the Stowe Spinning case on the ground that there.
the employer's bias against the union was the cause of its refusal to
grant the union permission to' use the meeting hall. In its brief to,
the Board the Respondent disclaims any intention of hindering or
discouraging the organization of its employees. Rather, it takes the,
position that the motivating cause for its 10-year policy resulting in
the disparity of treatment accorded union meetings, as distinguished
from other community gatherings, is the requirement of Section 8 (a)
(2) of the Act that an employer must refrain from giving financial
or other support to a labor organization. The Respondent asserts that.
it would be in violation of that section of the Act if it acceded to the•
Union's request for use of the community building. However, we have
found this contention to, be without merit in the very Stowe Spinning
case upon which the Respondent otherwise relies. Our finding there
that the mere granting of a meeting place to a union by an employer
under circumstances closely analagous to those present here would not
constitute unlawful assistance to that union was affirmed by the
Supreme Court.
The Respondent refers to several previous decisions of the Board
in which we found that the Respondent had violated Section 8 (2)
of the Wagner Act by various forms of assistance to organizations of
its employees, including, among others, the use of company facilities
and property for meetings.4 An examination of those cases reveals
2 Stowe Spinning Company, 70 NLRB 614.
3 N. L. if. B. v. Stowe Spinning Company, et at., 336 U. S. 226.
4 23 NLRB 741 ; 24 NLRB 325 ., The record in these cases contained substantial evidence
that a plan for employee representation , known as the "Phillips Plan for employee Repre-
sentation," was sponsored , organized , and promoted by the Respondent, and that the
Respondent thereafter dominated, controlled , and supported its administration . Against
this background of company unionism both before and after passage of the Wagner Act,
the Board found subsequent allegedly independent organizations of Respondent's em-
ployees to be similarly dominated.
PHILLIPS PETROLEUM COMPANY 1349
that this finding of the Board was based upon overwhelming evidence
of employer assistance to and domination of the several labor organi-
zations involved. In no case was the use of a company meeting hall
under the circumstances here present the sole criterion of unlawful
assistance.
Were we to assume that the Respondent is, as it vigorously asserts,
unbiased toward the Union, there would appear to be no reason,
other than Respondent's erroneous interpretation of Section 8 (a)
(2) of the Act, for continuous enforcement of a discriminatory policy
which denies only the Union the use of the community building at
the Hansford Camp. Moreover, tli-ere is no evidence in the record
before us to indicate that the Respondent would be inconvenienced
in any way by granting the Union's request for a meeting place.
Indeed, here, as in the Stowe Spinning case, the Union has offered
to pay for the use of the hall.
In this context, while continuing to stress the absence of antiunion
motivation, the Respondent relies upon its property rights trader
the Fifth Amendment to support its disparate treatment of the Union.
It has an absolute right, the Respondent argues, to use its property
as it pleases and to grant or deny the Union, or any other organiza-
tion, access to its premises. This view of the Fifth Amendment
has been expressly rejected by the Board and the courts. "It is not
every interference with property rights that is within the Fifth
Amendment . . . Inconvenience or even some dislocation of prop-
erty rights may be necessary in order to safeguard the right of col-
lective bargaining." 5
The right of Respondent's employees to join and assist labor or-
ganizations and thereby engage in collective bargaining would be
seriously impeded by the inability of the Union to secure the use
of the Hansford Community Hall for organizational purposes. As
the Supreme Court noted in the Stowe Spinning case, a common
meeting place in a company town is clearly a part of the company's
business. It fulfills the need of the employees for a place to meet
and to discuss their common problems in the immediate vicinity of
their homes and employment. While it is true that the Respondent
may not be under an obligation to provide such a meeting place,
once having provided it, the Respondent cannot thereafter arbitrar-
ily and for no valid reason select the Union for special treatment by
denying its use. Discrimination of this nature is here admitted.
' N. L. R. B. v. Cities Service Oil Company, et al., 122 F. 2d 149 (C. A. 2, 1941). Cited
as authority by the Board in Le Tourneau Company of Georgia, 54 NLRB at 1259- 60, and
in other cases cited therein. Cited with approval by the Supreme Court in Republic Avia-
tion Corporation v. N. L. R. B.,; N. L. R. B. v. Le Tourneau Company of Georgia, 324
U. S. 793, at 802, and in N. L. R. B. V. Stowe Spinning Co., supra.
1350 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
Under these circumstances, particularly the failure of the Respond-
entent to offer a good and sufficient reason, such as business neces-
sity, unwarranted expense, or serious inconvenience, for the promul-
gation and enforcement of its discriminatory policy with regard to
the use by labor organizations of the Hansford community building,
we view dubiously its bare contention that that very policy was not
motivated by a desire to hamper the organization of its employees-
However, regardless of Respondent's motive,e the necessary effect of
its unjustified and discriminatory treatment of the Union in refusing
it permission to use the only available meeting place in a company
town is to place an unreasonable impediment on its employees' free-
dom of communication and assembly and to interfere with, restrain,
and coerce them in the exercise of the rights guaranteed in Section 7
of the Act. We find that the Respondent has thereby violated Sec-
tion 8 (a) (1) of the Act, as alleged in the complaint.'
IV. THE EFFECT OF THE UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICE UPON COMMERCE
The activities of the Respondent set forth in Section III, above,
occurring in connection with its operations as described in Section
I, above, have a close, intimate, and substantial relation to trade,
traffic, and commerce among the several States and tend to lead to
labor disputes burdening and obstructing commerce and the free flow
of commerce.
V. THE REMEDY
Normally, in cases in which an employer has interfered with, re-
strained, and coerced its employees in violation of Section 8 (a) (1)^
of the Act, we order the employer to cease and desist from in any
manner infringing upon the rights guaranteed in Section 7 of the
Act. However, in view of the absence of any evidence on the facts
stipulated in this case that danger of other unfair labor practices
is to be anticipated from Respondent's conduct, we shall not enjoin
the Respondent from the commission of any and all unfair labor
9 Antiunion motivation is not necessarily an element of conduct violative of Section 8
(a) (1) of the Act. Unreasonable rules denying employees access to the employer 's premises
for purpose of self-organization constitute interference , restraint , and coercion where,
as here, the denial results in a serious hindrance to such organizational activity and does
not appear otherwise to be justified . Republic Aviation Corporation v. N. L. R. B.;
N. L. R. B. v. Le Tourneau Company of Georgia, supra.
7 As to the suggestion of our dissenting colleague that the Respondent should be "fore-
warned" before we find a violation here, we note that the conduct complained of occurred
after the Supreme Court 's decision in the Stowe Spinning case. The Respondent has had
ample warning by issuance of the complaint herein that the conduct might be found an
unfair labor practice . It apparently was quite prepared to test the issue. It seems to
us completely futile to dismiss this complaint and compel the Respondent to litigate this
Issue again in order to have an opportunity to test the General Counsel 's interpretation of
the Act, now sustained by the Board , in the courts.
PHILLIPS PETROLEUM COMPANY 1351
practices. Nevertheless, in order to effectuate the purposes of the.
Act, we shall order the Respondent to cease and desist from the un
fair labor practice found and from any like or related act or conduct
interfering with the exercise of the rights guaranteed in Section 7
of the Act. In addition, we shall order the Respondent to take cer-
tain affirmative action designed to effectuate the policies of the Act.
Upon the basis of the above findings of fact and upon the entire
record in this case, the Board makes the following:
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1. Local 351, International Union of Operating Engineers, AFL,.
is a labor organization as defined in Section 2 (5) of the Act.
2. By discriminating against Local 351, International Union of-
Operating Engineers, AFL, with regard to the use of the Hansford.
Community Hall for the purpose of self-organization or collective.
bargaining, and thereby interfering with, restraining, and coercing-
its employees in the exercise of the rights guaranteed in Section 7
of the Act, the Respondent, has engaged in and is engaging in an
unfair labor practice within the meaning. of Section 8 (a) (1) of-
the Act.
3. The aforesaid unfair labor practice is an unfair labor practice.
affecting commerce, within the meaning of Section 2 (6) and (7),
of the Act.
ORDER
Upon the entire record in this case, and pursuant to Section 10 (c)
of the National Labor Relations Act, the National Labor Relations,
Board hereby orders that the Respondent, Phillips Petroleum Com-
pany, Hansford County, Texas, and its officers, agents, successors,,
and assigns, shall:
1. Cease and desist from :
(a) Refusing to permit the use, subject to reasonable and non-
discriminatory terms and conditions, of the Hannsford Community-
Hall by its employees or by Local 351, International Union of Oper-
ating Engineers, AFL, or any other labor organization, as a meeting
place for the purpose of self-organization or collective bargaining,..
at times when the hall is not otherwise being used by the Respondent
for legitimate activity, so long as the hall remains the only suitable,..
available meeting place in the community; provided, that this pro-
vision shall in no way preclude Respondent from exercising its right
lawfully to dispose of its said property or use it for any other lawful
purpose ;
(b) Engaging in any like or related act or conduct interfering-
with, restraining, or coercing its employees in the exercise of the
1352 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
right to self-organization, to form labor organizations, to join or
assist Local 351, International Union of Operating Engineers, AFL,
or any other labor organization, to bargain collectively through repre-
sentatives of their own choosing, and to engage in concerted activities
for the purpose of collective bargaining or other mutual aid or pro-
tection, or to refrain. from any or all of such activities, except to the
extent that such right may be affected by an agreement requiring
membership in a labor organization as a condition of employment as
.authorized in Section 8 (a) (3) of the Act.
2. Take the following affirmative action, which the Board finds
will effectuate the policies of the Act :
(a) Upon request, and offer to comply with such reasonable and
nondiscriminatory terms and conditions as may be prescribed, grant
to its employees and to Local 351, International Union of Operating
Engineers, AFL, or any other labor organization, the use of the Hans-
ford Community Hall as a meeting place for the purpose of self-
-organization or collective bargaining, at times when the hall is not
otherwise being used by the Respondent for legitimate activity, so
long as the hall remains the only suitable, available. meeting place
in the community ; provided, that this provision shall in no way pre-
-elude Respondent from exercising its right lawfully to dispose of its
said property or use it for any other lawful purpose;
(b) Post at its Sher-Han Plant, Hansford County, Texas, copies
of the notice attached hereto, marked Appendix A." Copies of said
notice, to be furnished by the Regional Director for the Sixteenth
Region, shall, after being signed by the Respondent's representative,
be posted by the Respondent immediately upon receipt thereof, and
maintained by it for a period of sixty (60) consecutive days there-
after, in conspicuous places, including all places -where notices to
employees are customarily posted. Reasonable steps shall be taken
by the Respondent to insure that said notices are not altered, defaced,
or covered by any other material;
(c) Notify the Regional Director for the Sixteenth Region, in writ-
ing, within ten (10) days from the date of this Order what steps the
Respondent has taken to comply herewith.
MEMBER REYNOLDS, dissenting :
Upon the particular facts in this case, I cannot agree that the Re-
spondent should be found guilty of having violated Section 8 (a) (1)
of the Act. In several cases decided by the Board some years ago,9
8 In the event this Order is enforced by decree of a Circuit Court of Appeals , there shall
be inserted in the notice before the words, "A Decision and Order" the words, "A Decree
of the United States Court of Appeals Enforcing."
23 NLRB 741 (decided, May 13, 1940) ; 24 NLRB 317 (decided, June 3, 1940) ; 45
NLRB 1318 (decided, December 15, 1942) ; 48 NLRB 460 (decided, March 24, 1943).
PHILLIPS PETROLEUM COMPANY, 1353
the Respondent was found to have violated Section 8 (2) of-the Wag-,
ner Act 10 by offering various forms of assistance to organizations of
its employees.. Among the factors relied upon by the Board in reach-
ing its conclusions in the said cases was that the Respondent permitted
organizations of its employees to use company facilities and property,
for meetings. In its orders the Board directed the Respondent to cease.
and desist from such practices. Following these. cases, in November
1940, the Respondent promulgated its policy respecting the use of
company-owned. community buildings. In that regard the Company.
published a statement which, in part, reads as follows :
The Company is prohibited by the Wagner Act from contribut-
ing financial or other support to any labor organization, and
therefore the use of community buildings for meeting places for
labor organizations cannot be allowed. This policy. must be
strictly complied with.
The complaint in this case is that the Respondent has interfered
with the rights guaranteed its employees by Section 7 by refusing
the complainant Union the use of the company-owned community
building at Hansford. The Respondent contends that its action was
prompted by its desire to maintain strict neutrality towards the or-
ganizational activities of its employees and because it did not wish
to expose itself to any charge that it was assisting any labor organiza-
tion in violation of Section 8 (a) ' (2) of the Act.1' The honesty of
the Respondent's reasons is not disputed. There is no contention
that the Respondent has engaged in any antiunion activities or in any
other way has sought to interfere with the organizational activities
of its employees. Thus, unlike my colleagues, I find that the Respond-
ent had a cogent and understandable reason for refusing the use of
the Hansford community building by labor organizations.
My colleagues take the view that only an erroneous interpretation of
Section 8 (a) (2) would give the Respondent cause to believe that
permitting the use of its community buildings by labor organizations
is a violation of the Act. They believe that the Stowe Spinning case 12
clearly enunciates the principle that Section 8 (a) (1) is violated by an
10 Section 8 (2) of the Wagner Act has been incorporated in its entirety in Section
8 (a) (2) of the Taft-Hartley Act.
11 In reply to the Union 's request for the use of the community building the Respondent's
superintendent in his letter of refusal stated the reasons for his refusal in the following
language:
The granting of Local 351's request would be in violation of the Company 's policy,
which policy is based upon the sound conviction that the company would be subject to
criticism if it permitted its facilities to be used by the Union in accordance with your
request . In the event that any other labor organization has an interest in the matter,
it seems clear that our permitting you to use the community building at the Hansford
plant would be regarded as support of Local 351.
12 70 NLRB 614, affirmed N. L. R. B . Y. Stowe Spinning Co., et at ., 336 U . S. 226.
929979-51-vol. 92-87
1354 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
employer who refuses a union permission to use a meeting hall in an
isolated company town where such building is the only available meet-
ing place in the vicinity and further that permitting such use is not a
violation of Section 8 (a) (2). However, this principle does not
emerge so clearly from the facts in the Stowe Spinning case. The
background of that case was one of employer bias and hostility towards
the union involved, upon which fact the Board found discriminatory
motive. This background of union animus on the part of the employer
Was particularly emphasized by the Supreme Court in its decision of
affirmance in the Stowe Spinning case. The Court, in its opinion,
stated :
In the background of discrimination found by the Board in this
case, we cannot say that its conclusion should be upset. As we
will point out below, the Board may weigh the employer's ex-
pressed motive in determining the effect on employees of manage-
ment's otherwise equivocal act.
To this extent, therefore, the Stowe Spinning case is distinguishable
from the instant case where the Respondent has demonstrated no union
animus.
I agree with my colleagues that in the circumstances of this case the
Respondent would not be guilty of a violation of Section 8 (a) (2) by
permitting the complainant Union the use of the Hansford community
building and that it is not a violation of the Fifth Amendment to the
Constitution to direct the Respondent to make such meeting place
available to labor organizations on a nondiscriminatory basis. Never-
theless, I am of the opinion that, because of the extenuating circum-
stances present here, the Respondent should not now be found guilty of
a violation of the Act by conduct prompted by earlier Board decisions
without being forewarned. Accordingly, I would dismiss the com-
plaint herein.
APPENDIX A
.NOTICE TO ALL EMPLOYEES
Pursuant to a Decision and Order of the National Labor Relations
Board, and in order to effectuate the policies of the National Labor
Relations Act, we hereby notify our employees that :
WE WILL NOT refuse to permit the use, subject to reasonable and
nondiscriminatory terms and conditions, of the Hansford Com-
munity Hall by our employees or by LOCAL 351, INTERNATIONAL
UNION OF OPERATING ENGINEERS, AFL, or any other labor organ-
ization, as a meeting place for the purpose of self-organization or
collective bargaining, at times when the hall is not otherwise being
PHILLIPS PETROLEUM COMPANY 1355
used for legitimate activity, so long as the hall remains the only
suitable, available meeting place in the community. Upon re-
quest, and offer to comply with such reasonable and nondiscrim-
inatory terms and conditions as may be prescribed, we will grant
to our employees and to LOCAL 351, INTERNATIONAL UNION OF
OPERATING ENGINEERS, AFL, or any other labor organization, the
use of the Hansford Community Hall as a meeting place for the
purpose of self-organization or collective bargaining, at times
when the hall is not otherwise being used for legitimate activity,
so long as the hall remains the only suitable, available meeting
place in the community; provided, that this provision shall in no
way preclude us from exercising our right lawfully to dispose of
our said property or use it for any other awful purpose.
WE WILL NOT engage in any like or related act or conduct inter-
fering with, restraining, or coercing our employees in the exercise
of their right to self-organization, to form labor organizations, to
join or assist the above-named or any other labor organization, to
bargain collectively through representatives of their own choos-
ing, and to engage in concerted activities for the purpose of collec-
tive bargaining or other mutual aid or protection, or to refraiii
from any or all such activities, except to the extent that such right
may be affected by an agreement requiring membership in a labor
organization as a condition of employment as authorized in Sec-
tion 8 (a) (3) of the Act.
PHILLIPS PETROLEUM COMPANY,
Employer.
Dated ---------------- By ------------------- ----------
. (Representative ) (Title)
This notice must remain posted for 60 days from the date hereof, and
must not be altered, defaced, or covered by any other material.