0120090598
08-10-2011
Phillip E. Nelson, Complainant, v. John M. McHugh, Secretary, Department of the Army, Agency.
Phillip E. Nelson,
Complainant,
v.
John M. McHugh,
Secretary,
Department of the Army,
Agency.
Appeal No. 0120090598
Agency No. ARCEVICK07SEP04024
DECISION
On December 1, 2008, Complainant timely filed an appeal from the
Agency’s October 31, 2008, final decision concerning his equal
employment opportunity (EEO) complaint alleging employment discrimination
in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (Title VII), as
amended, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq. The Commission accepts the appeal
pursuant to 29 C.F.R. § 1614.405(a). For the following reasons,
the Commission MODIFIES the Agency’s final decision.
ISSUES PRESENTED
The issues presented are whether Complainant properly requested a final
agency decision and whether Complainant was subjected to unlawful
discrimination when the agency issued him a letter of warning and
written reprimand.
BACKGROUND
At the time of events giving rise to this complaint, Complainant
worked for the Agency as an Electrical Helper at the Agency’s Enid,
Mississippi facility. On November 20, 2007, Complainant filed an EEO
complaint alleging that the Agency discriminated against him and subjected
him to a hostile work environment in reprisal for prior protected EEO
activity under Title VII n when:
1. On September 20, 2007, Complainant received a Letter of Warning from
the Agency; and
2. On October 29, 2007, Complainant received a Written Reprimand from
the Agency.
Regarding the Letter of Warning, Complainant testified in an
investigative interview that on September 20, 2007, he confronted a
government contractor (W1) and said “People who live in glass houses
shouldn’t throw rocks.”1 Fact-Finding Conference, May 20, 2008,
p. 18. Complainant also testified that he told W1 that he was going to
speak to W1’s boss. Id. at 19. Complainant testified that profanity
was commonplace, including by his immediate manager, at his workplace.
Id. at 17. Complainant further stated, “My inappropriate language
was ‘chicken shit.’ That was the cleanest talk these people used.
They don’t know how to do without profanity.” Id. at 22-23.
When asked if his manager (M1) knew of his EEO activity prior to the
Letter of Warning, Complainant said he could not speak for M1 on this
matter, but M1 acted surprised to find out about Complainant’s EEO
activity when they met for a counseling session over the Letter of
Warning on September 20, 2007. Id. at 13-14.
M1 testified that he issued Complainant a Letter of Warning for not
following the chain of command, taking a situation into his own hands,
and abusive and degrading language toward W1. Id. at 61. M1 testified
that he based the Letter of Warning on information that he received
from his boss, who had met with W1’s supervisor and provided written
statements of what happened. Id. at 61. M1 testified that he did not
know of anyone who witnessed Complainant’s actions that led to the
Letter of Warning. Id. at 62. M1 also testified that he first became
aware of Complainant’s EEO activity when he presented Complainant
with the Letter of Warning. Id. at 60. M1 further testified that he
frequently worked at another work site away from Complainant. Id. at
67. M1 testified that he had verbally warned Complainant about similar
behavior prior to issuing the Letter of Warning. Id. at 65. M1 testified
that he felt Complainant’s language toward W1 was inappropriate not
because of cursing, but for “cursing at someone.” Id. at 65.
Regarding the Written Reprimand, Complainant testified that he went to
an Agency Park Ranger (R1) “as a friend,” and confronted him about
inappropriately speaking to another employee whom Complainant represented
in an EEO Complaint (C1). Id. at 26. Complainant testified that he told
R1 that he had requested whistleblower protection because of “what
had gone on at the Agency of buying college credits for employees
in management, and that was part of my complaint.”2 Id. at 27.
Complainant testified that he told R1 that R1 was part of a “good ole
boy system.” Id. Complainant testified he was unaware of the issuance
of the Letter of Warning when he confronted R1. Id. at 26.
Complainant also testified that he approached another Ranger (R2),
and R2 jokingly said to a member of the public, “Oh, here he comes.
He’s trying to get me fired.” Id. at 28. Complainant testified
that he responded that he was not trying to get anyone terminated, and
everyone laughed. Id. Complainant later testified that he had previously
spoken to R2 on two occasions about misusing a government vehicle, told
R2 that he was going to report the matter, and said that people can be
terminated for the things that they were doing. Id. at 43-44.
R1 testified that on September 20, 2007, Complainant came into his office
and spoke to him about the nature of R1’s work with C1. Id. at 120.
R1 testified that Complainant told him that C1 was filing an EEO
complaint and Complainant was going to change the work environment
by being a whistleblower. Id. When asked if Complainant also made
statements about R1 being part of a “good ole boy system” and that
Complainant would be watching R1 along with other employees, R1 answered
affirmatively and added that Complainant told him that anything R1 said
or did could be used against him. Id.
R2 testified that he was speaking to a member of the public when
Complainant approached him. Id. at 139. R2 testified that Complainant
said to the member of the public, “I’m going to see if I can get him
fired,” and then laughed and walked off while talking to the member of
the public. Id. at 140. R2 testified that he informed management about
what Complainant had said because Complainant was “always intimidating
me[,] always asking me questions; what I do at work, that type stuff.”
Id. at 144.
M1 testified that he issued Complainant the Written Reprimand because of
Complainant’s actions toward R1 and R2. Id. at 61. M1 testified that
Complainant went to confront R1 immediately after a counseling session
between M1 and Complainant regarding the Letter of Warning. Id. at 71.
M1 stated that Complainant had several verbal altercations with numerous
employees, that management had spoken to Complainant about changing his
behavior, and that “it was time for it to stop.” Id. at 69.
Complainant’s second-level supervisor (S1) also testified that
Complainant confronted R1 after receiving counseling for the Letter
of Warning. Id. at 92. S1 testified that because Complainant continued
to engage in the type of behavior for which Complainant had been issued
the Letter of Warning and counseled, he felt the Written Reprimand
was appropriate. Id.
In the Written Reprimand, management gave the following explanation for
reprimanding Complainant, in pertinent part:
On 20 Sep 07, you entered the office of [R1] and confronted him concerning
a conversation that he had with [C1]. You stated to [R1] that he had
talked to [C1] in a demeaning tone and had told her that she was breaking
up the family by filing an EEO complaint. You stated to [R1] that he was
part of the “good ole boy” system and that you were going to stop it.
You also stated that you were watching him and that if he said anything,
that you would use it against him. You went on to make accusations
about other employees and your [i]ntent to “get” them as well.
You also commented that you were a “whistleblower” and that you were
taking this all the way to the top. Just minutes prior to your actions
you had received a written letter of warning for a verbal altercation
you had with a [government contractor] employee. During your counseling
session you were [i]nstructed not to take personnel matters into your own
hands and to report them to your supervisor. You were told that you are
expected to treat co-workers with respect and to follow the supervisory
chain of command to report any personnel concerns that you may have.
Exhibit F-4, p. 1.
Complainant also alleged that the Agency subjected him to a hostile work
environment in reprisal for his EEO activity. Id. at 15. Complainant
alleged that he was called “Papa Smurf” and “Yankee,” Id.
Complainant also alleged that he was watched by management. Id.
M1 testified that he heard people call Complainant “Papa Smurf” and
“Yankee.” Id. at 84. M1 testified that several employees were
called by nicknames, such as “Big Daddy” and “Sunshine,” and
that if someone complained about a nickname, everybody was asked not
to call that person that name anymore. Id. at 85. M1 testified that
Complainant never complained to him about being called any names. Id.
At the conclusion of the investigation, the Agency provided Complainant
with a copy of the report of investigation and notice of his right to
request a hearing before an EEOC Administrative Judge (AJ). In accordance
with Complainant’s request, the Agency issued a final decision pursuant
to 29 C.F.R. § 1614.110(b). The decision concluded that Complainant
failed to prove that the Agency subjected him to discrimination as
alleged.
CONTENTIONS ON APPEAL
On appeal, Complainant reiterates his claims and contends that he wanted
to present witnesses to support his case, but never had the opportunity.
Complainant further contends that documents were sent to his designated
representative, and consequently, Complainant was never aware of some of
the proceedings. Complainant contends that “[a]t no time did I or my
Representative ever request that the EEOC render a ‘Final Judgment’
and I have been expecting paperwork of the next step in the proceedings
that would allow me the opportunity to get to present what is the real
truth of these actions.” Complainant’s Brief in Support of Appeal
(Complainant’s Brief), p. 2. The Agency did reply to Complainant’s
appeal statement.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
As this is an appeal from a decision issued without a hearing, pursuant
to 29 C.F.R. § 1614.110(b), the Agency's decision is subject to de
novo review by the Commission. 29 C.F.R. § 1614.405(a). See Equal
Employment Opportunity Management Directive for 29 C.F.R. Part 1614 (EEO
MD-110), at Chap. 9, § VI.A. (Nov. 9, 1999) (explaining that the de novo
standard of review “requires that the Commission examine the record
without regard to the factual and legal determinations of the previous
decision maker,” and that EEOC “review the documents, statements,
and testimony of record, including any timely and relevant submissions
of the parties, and . . . issue its decision based on the Commission’s
own assessment of the record and its interpretation of the law”).
ANALYSIS AND FINDINGS
As an initial matter, Complainant contends on appeal that he did not
request that the Agency issue a final decision. Complainant’s Brief,
p. 2. The record contains a Notice of Request for a Final Agency
Decision signed by Complainant’s designated representative. Thus,
we find that the Agency properly issued a final decision. See Minarchin
v. U.S. Postal Serv., Appeal No. 01972531 (Jan. 12, 2000).
Claim 1: Letter of Warning
In the absence of direct evidence of discrimination, the allocation of
burdens and order of presentation of proof in a Title VII case alleging
discrimination is a three-step process. McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green,
411 U.S. 792, 802-03 (1973). Initially, Complainant must establish
a prima facie case of discrimination by presenting facts that, if
unexplained, reasonably give rise to an inference of discrimination; i.e.,
that a prohibited consideration was a factor in the adverse employment
action. McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 802. Complainant may establish
a prima facie case of reprisal by showing that: (1) he engaged in a
protected activity; (2) the agency was aware of the protected activity;
(3) subsequently, he was subjected to adverse treatment by the agency;
and (4) a nexus exists between the protected activity and the adverse
treatment. Whitmire v. Dep't of the Air Force, EEOC Appeal No. 01A00340
(Sept. 25, 2000). Next, the Agency must articulate a legitimate,
nondiscriminatory reason(s) for its actions. Texas Dep't of Community
Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 253 (1981). Finally, if the Agency
is successful, then Complainant must prove, by preponderant evidence,
that the legitimate reason(s) proffered by the agency was a pretext for
discrimination. Id. at 256.
Regarding the Letter of Warning, we find that Complainant has not
established that he was subjected to unlawful discrimination. Complainant
stated that he engaged in the conduct alleged in the Letter of Warning.
We find that Complainant’s conduct toward W1 was not protected EEO
activity. Further, based on the testimony of both Complainant and M1, we
find that M1 did not know of Complainant’s EEO activity before he issued
Complainant the Letter of Warning. Thus, we find that Complainant has
not established a prima facie case of reprisal. Further, the Commission
finds that the Agency presented legitimate, nondiscriminatory reasons for
its actions. Specifically, the Agency stated that Complainant was issued
the Letter of Warning because he used abusive language and took personnel
matters into his own hands during a verbal altercation with W1. We find
that Complainant failed to prove that the Agency’s nondiscriminatory
reason is a pretext for unlawful discrimination. Consequently, we find
that the Agency properly found no reprisal for Claim 1.
Claim 2: Written Reprimand
Direct evidence of discriminatory motive may be any written or verbal
policy or statement made by a respondent or respondent official that on
its face demonstrates a bias against a protected group and is linked to
the complained of adverse action. See Enforcement Guidance on Recent
Developments in Disparate Treatment Theory, § III(A) (rev. July 14,
1992) (Enforcement Guidance). A link between the evidence of bias and
the challenged employment action can be shown if the biased statements
were made by the decision maker or one who was involved in the decision,
at or around the time the decision was made, even if the biased remarks
were not specifically related to the particular employment decision at
issue. See id., fn. 8. The United States Supreme Court has held that
where the complainant presents direct evidence of discrimination,
use of the McDonnell Douglas test is inappropriate. See McDonnell
Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973); Trans World Air Lines,
Inc. v. Thurston, 469 U.S. 111, 121 (1985). Unless the agency can impeach
the evidence or can establish an affirmative defense, liability will be
established. Enforcement Guidance, at § III(B)(1).
Further, Title VII prohibits retaliation by an employer because an
individual has engaged in protected activity. EEOC Compliance Manual
Section 8 on Retaliation, EEOC Notice No. 915.003, 8-1 n.5 (May 20,
1998) (“Compliance Manual”); see also Payne v. Dep’t. of Veterans
Affairs, Appeal No. 0720080053 (Oct. 27, 2008). Protected activity
includes opposition to any practice made unlawful under the employment
discrimination statutes. Compliance Manual, 8-1, 8-3.
Upon review of Claim 2, we find that Complainant engaged in protected EEO
activity when he confronted R1 over R1’s discussion with C1 regarding
C1’s filing of an EEO complaint. See Payne, Appeal No. 0720080053.
In addition, we find that there is direct evidence of reprisal for EEO
Activity because the Written Reprimand was given to Complainant, in part,
for protesting what he felt was unlawful activity by R1. The letter
of reprimand stated that Complainant was reprimanded in part because
he entered R1’s office and confronted him for speaking to C1 in a
demeaning tone and telling her she was “breaking up the family” by
filing an EEO complaint. This portion of the letter reflects that the
Agency unlawfully considered Complainant’s EEO activity as a motivating
factor in issuing him a Written Reprimand. See Holmes v. Dep’t. of
Agriculture, Appeal No. 0120091986 (Apr. 23, 2010); see also Armas
v. Dep’t. of the Treasury, Appeal No. 0720060085 (Jul. 26, 2007).
However, we further find that the Agency also reprimanded Complainant for
other reasons that were not related to his EEO activity. Specifically,
the evidence demonstrates that during the confrontation with R1,
Complainant said several things to R1 that were not related to EEO
activity, including accusing R1 of being part of a “good ole boy
system.” Further, we find that Complainant’s conduct toward R2 was
not protected EEO Activity.
Considering the testimony of M1 and S1, along with the fact that
Complainant had just been given a Letter of Warning and a counseling
session over similar behavior two days earlier, we conclude that the
Agency would have reprimanded Complainant for his confrontation with
R2 alone. As M1’s testimony explained, M1 had decided that it was
“time for [such behavior] to stop” and “it was time to draw a
line in the sand.” Id. at 63, 69. Thus, we conclude that the Agency
would have reprimanded Complainant even if it had not considered his
EEO activity with R1 as a basis for the reprimand.
In cases such as this, where there is evidence that discrimination was
one of multiple motivating factors for an employment action, i.e., in
which the agency acted on the bases of both lawful and unlawful reasons,
are known as “mixed motive” cases. See Enforcement Guidance.
Prior to the Civil Rights Act of 1991 (CRA), an employer could avoid
liability in mixed motive cases if it could show that it would have
made the same decision even absent the unlawful factor. See Price
Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228 (1989). However, the CRA effectively
overruled the part of Price Waterhouse that allowed an employer to avoid
liability in this way. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e- 2(m); EEOC Compliance Manual,
at 8-II(E)(1). A complainant is not required to present direct evidence
of discrimination to prove discrimination was a motivating factor for
the employment practices at issue in mixed motive cases. Desert Palace,
Inc. v. Costa, 539 U.S. 90, 101 (2003). Once a complainant demonstrates
that discrimination was a motivating factor in the agency’s action,
it is the agency’s burden to demonstrate by clear and convincing
evidence that it would have taken the same action even if it had not
considered the discriminatory factor. If the agency is able to make this
demonstration, the complainant is not entitled to personal relief, i.e.,
damages, reinstatement, hiring, promotion, back pay, but may be entitled
to declaratory relief, injunctive relief, attorneys’ fees or costs. See
Walker v. Soc. Sec. Admin., EEOC Request No. 05980504 (Apr. 8, 1999).
Accordingly, in this case, we find that Complainant is not entitled to
personal relief because the Agency would have reprimanded Complainant
even if it had not considered his EEO activity.
Hostile Work Environment
Harassment of an employee that would not occur but for the employee's
race, color, sex, national origin, age, disability, religion or
prior EEO activity is unlawful, if it is sufficiently patterned or
pervasive. Wibstad v. U.S. Postal Serv., EEOC Appeal No. 01972699
(Aug. 14, 1998) (citing McKinney v. Dole, 765 F.2d 1129, 1138-39
(D.C. Cir. 1985)); EEOC Enforcement Guidance on Harris v. Forklift
Systems, Inc. at 3, 9 (Mar. 8, 1994) (Harris Enforcement Guidance). In
determining that a working environment is hostile, factors to consider are
the frequency of the alleged discriminatory conduct, its severity, whether
it is physically threatening or humiliating, and if it unreasonably
interferes with an employee's work performance. See Harris v. Forklift
Systems, Inc., 510 U.S. 17, 21 (1993); Harris Enforcement Guidance at
6. The Supreme Court has stated that “Conduct that is not severe or
pervasive enough to create an objectively hostile work environment -
an environment that a reasonable person would find hostile or abusive -
is beyond Title VII's purview.” Harris, 510 U.S. at 22.
To establish a claim of hostile environment harassment, complainant
must show that: (1) he belongs to a statutorily protected class; (2) he
was subjected to harassment in the form of unwelcome verbal or physical
conduct involving the protected class; (3) the harassment complained of
was based on his statutorily protected class; (4) the harassment affected
a term or condition of employment and/or had the purpose or effect of
unreasonably interfering with the work environment and/or creating an
intimidating, hostile, or offensive work environment; and (5) there is a
basis for imputing liability. See Harris v. Federal Deposit Insurance
Corp., Appeal No. 0120110234 (Mar. 24, 2011); see also Henson v. City
of Dundee, 682 F.2d 897 (11th Cir. 1982). The harasser's conduct should
be evaluated from the objective viewpoint of a reasonable person in the
victim's circumstances. Harris Enforcement Guidance at 6.
In this case, Complainant alleged that he was subjected to a hostile work
environment when he received the Letter of Warning, Written Reprimand,
was monitored by management, and was called names such as “Yankee” and
“Papa Smurf” by coworkers. Assuming that Complainant’s allegations
are true, we nevertheless find that the alleged incidents were not
sufficiently severe or pervasive to create a hostile work environment.
Consequently, we find that Complainant was not subjected to unlawful
harassment.
CONCLUSION
Based on a thorough review of the record and the contentions on appeal,
including those not specifically addressed herein, we AFFIRM the
Agency’s final decision with regard to Claim 1 (the Letter of Warning)
and REVERSE with regard to Claim 2 (the Written Reprimand).
ORDER
The Agency is ordered to take the following remedial action:
1. Within thirty (30) calendar days of the date this decision becomes
final, Complainant shall submit to the Agency a statement of costs
to which he is entitled, including such items as photocopying and
travel. Within ninety (90) calendar days of the date this decision
becomes final, the Agency shall pay Complainant all costs to which he
may be entitled under Federal law in connection with this complaint. 29
C.F.R. § 1614.501.
2. The Agency should provide training to the RMO regarding his obligations
not to restrain, interfere, coerce, or retaliate against any individual
who exercises his or her right to oppose practices made unlawful by,
or who participates in proceedings under the Federal equal employment
opportunity laws. The Commission does not consider training to be a
disciplinary action.
3. The Agency shall consider taking disciplinary action against the
RMO. The Agency shall report its decision. If the Agency decides to
take disciplinary action, it shall identify the action taken. If the
Agency decides not to take disciplinary action, it shall set forth the
reason(s) for its decision not to impose discipline. If the RMO is no
longer employed by the Agency, the Agency shall furnish proof of the
date f separation.
The Agency is further directed to submit a report of compliance, as
provided in the statement entitled “Implementation of the Commission's
Decision.” The report shall include supporting documentation verifying
that the corrective action has been implemented.
POSTING ORDER (G0900)
The Agency is ordered to post at its Enid, Mississippi facility copies
of the attached notice. Copies of the notice, after being signed by the
Agency's duly authorized representative, shall be posted by the Agency
within thirty (30) calendar days of the date this decision becomes final,
and shall remain posted for sixty (60) consecutive days, in conspicuous
places, including all places where notices to employees are customarily
posted. The Agency shall take reasonable steps to ensure that said notices
are not altered, defaced, or covered by any other material. The original
signed notice is to be submitted to the Compliance Officer at the address
cited in the paragraph entitled “Implementation of the Commission's
Decision,” within ten (10) calendar days of the expiration of the
posting period.
IMPLEMENTATION OF THE COMMISSION’S DECISION (K0610)
Compliance with the Commission’s corrective action is mandatory.
The Agency shall submit its compliance report within thirty (30) calendar
days of the completion of all ordered corrective action. The report shall
be submitted to the Compliance Officer, Office of Federal Operations,
Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, P.O. Box 77960, Washington,
DC 20013. The Agency’s report must contain supporting documentation,
and the Agency must send a copy of all submissions to the Complainant.
If the Agency does not comply with the Commission’s order, the
Complainant may petition the Commission for enforcement of the order.
29 C.F.R. § 1614.503(a). The Complainant also has the right to file
a civil action to enforce compliance with the Commission’s order
prior to or following an administrative petition for enforcement.
See 29 C.F.R. §§ 1614.407, 1614.408, and 29 C.F.R. § 1614.503(g).
Alternatively, the Complainant has the right to file a civil action on
the underlying complaint in accordance with the paragraph below entitled
“Right to File a Civil Action.” 29 C.F.R. §§ 1614.407 and 1614.408.
A civil action for enforcement or a civil action on the underlying
complaint is subject to the deadline stated in 42 U.S.C. 2000e-16(c)
(1994 & Supp. IV 1999). If the Complainant files a civil action, the
administrative processing of the complaint, including any petition for
enforcement, will be terminated. See 29 C.F.R. § 1614.409.
STATEMENT OF RIGHTS - ON APPEAL
RECONSIDERATION (M0610)
The Commission may, in its discretion, reconsider the decision in this
case if the Complainant or the Agency submits a written request containing
arguments or evidence which tend to establish that:
1. The appellate decision involved a clearly erroneous interpretation
of material fact or law; or
2. The appellate decision will have a substantial impact on the policies,
practices, or operations of the Agency.
Requests to reconsider, with supporting statement or brief, must be filed
with the Office of Federal Operations (OFO) within thirty (30) calendar
days of receipt of this decision or within twenty (20) calendar days of
receipt of another party’s timely request for reconsideration. See
29 C.F.R. § 1614.405; Equal Employment Opportunity Management
Directive for 29 C.F.R. Part 1614 (EEO MD-110), at 9-18 (Nov. 9, 1999).
All requests and arguments must be submitted to the Director, Office of
Federal Operations, Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, P.O. Box
77960, Washington, DC 20013. In the absence of a legible postmark, the
request to reconsider shall be deemed timely filed if it is received by
mail within five days of the expiration of the applicable filing period.
See 29 C.F.R. § 1614.604. The request or opposition must also include
proof of service on the other party.
Failure to file within the time period will result in dismissal of your
request for reconsideration as untimely, unless extenuating circumstances
prevented the timely filing of the request. Any supporting documentation
must be submitted with your request for reconsideration. The Commission
will consider requests for reconsideration filed after the deadline only
in very limited circumstances. See 29 C.F.R. § 1614.604(c).
COMPLAINANT’S RIGHT TO FILE A CIVIL ACTION (T0610)
This decision affirms the Agency’s final decision/action in part, but it
also requires the Agency to continue its administrative processing of a
portion of your complaint. You have the right to file a civil action in
an appropriate United States District Court within ninety (90) calendar
days from the date that you receive this decision on both that portion of
your complaint which the Commission has affirmed and that portion of the
complaint which has been remanded for continued administrative processing.
In the alternative, you may file a civil action after one hundred and
eighty (180) calendar days of the date you filed your complaint with the
Agency, or your appeal with the Commission, until such time as the Agency
issues its final decision on your complaint. If you file a civil action,
you must name as the defendant in the complaint the person who is the
official Agency head or department head, identifying that person by his
or her full name and official title. Failure to do so may result in
the dismissal of your case in court. “Agency” or “department”
means the national organization, and not the local office, facility
or department in which you work. If you file a request to reconsider
and also file a civil action, filing a civil action will terminate the
administrative processing of your complaint.
RIGHT TO REQUEST COUNSEL (Z0610)
If you decide to file a civil action, and if you do not have or cannot
afford the services of an attorney, you may request from the Court that
the Court appoint an attorney to represent you and that the Court also
permit you to file the action without payment of fees, costs, or other
security. See Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended,
42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq.; the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, as amended,
29 U.S.C. §§ 791, 794(c). The grant or denial of the request is within
the sole discretion of the Court. Filing a request for an attorney with
the Court does not extend your time in which to file a civil action.
Both the request and the civil action must be filed within the time limits
as stated in the paragraph above (“Right to File a Civil Action”).
FOR THE COMMISSION:
______________________________
Carlton M. Hadden, Director
Office of Federal Operations
August 10, 2011
Date
1 W1 testified to a similar account of what happened. W1 testified that
Complainant told him that “it’s people who live in glass houses [who]
shouldn’t throw stones” and if W1 was going to play that “chicken
shit game,” Complainant was, too. Id. at 153.
2 The context of this statement is unclear in the record.
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U.S. EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION
Office of Federal Operations
P.O. Box 77960
Washington, DC 20013
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