Petitioner, )

Equal Employment Opportunity CommissionJan 7, 2000
03990081 (E.E.O.C. Jan. 7, 2000)

03990081

01-07-2000

Petitioner, )


Brenda Jones v. Department of Defense

03990081

January 7, 2000

Brenda Jones, )

Petitioner, )

) Appeal No. 03990081

v. ) MSPB No. DC0753980473

)

William S. Cohen, )

Secretary, )

Department of Defense )

Agency. )

)

DECISION

INTRODUCTION

On April 30, 1999, petitioner timely filed a petition with the Equal

Employment Opportunity Commission for review of the final decision of

the Merit Systems Protection Board dated March 30, 1999, concerning an

allegation of discrimination in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights

Act of 1964, as amended, 42 U.S.C. � 2000e et seq. The MSPB found that

the Department of Defense had not engaged in discrimination as alleged

by petitioner. For the following reasons, the Commission CONCURS with

the decision of the MSPB.

ISSUE PRESENTED

The issue presented is whether the Board's determination that petitioner

failed to prove that the agency discriminated against her on the basis

of reprisal constitutes a correct interpretation of the applicable laws,

rules, regulations, and policy directives, and is supported by the record

as a whole.

BACKGROUND

A review of the record indicates that petitioner, formerly employed by

the agency as a Sales Store Checker, GS-3, was terminated, effective

March 23, 1998, for exhibiting disrespectful conduct toward customers.

One customer, for example, testified that petitioner snapped at her.

When the customer informed petitioner that she was being rude,

petitioner did not apologize or offer an explanation. The agency

produced a written statement from another customer which indicated

that petitioner's agitation and yelling caused that customer to leave

the store without paying. On another occasion, when engaged in a

disagreement with a customer regarding pricing, petitioner failed to

follow store procedures. In determining whether to terminate petitioner,

the agency considered her past disciplinary record which consisted of

three suspensions during the preceding 18 months. The petitioner denies

having engaged in disrespectful conduct. Instead, she alleges, among

other things, that she was terminated in retaliation for her previous

engagement in the EEO process (i.e., the filing of a formal complaint).

ANALYSIS AND FINDINGS

The Commission must determine whether the decision of the Board with

respect to the allegation of discrimination based on reprisal constitutes

a corrective interpretation of any applicable law, rule, regulation or

policy directive and is supported by evidence in the record as a whole.

29 C.F.R. �1614.305(c).

After carefully considering the facts of this case, we find that the

Board was correct in concluding that petitioner has not proven that she

was discriminated against on the basis of reprisal. In the absence

of direct evidence, a claim of discrimination is examined under the

three-part analysis originally enunciated in McDonnell Douglas Corporation

v. Green. 411 U.S. 792 (1973). For petitioner to prevail, she must

first establish a prima facie case of discrimination by presenting

facts that, if unexplained, reasonably give rise to an inference of

discrimination, i.e., that a prohibited consideration was a factor

in the adverse employment action. Id. at 802; Furnco Construction

Corp. v. Waters, 438 U.S. 567 (1978). The burden then shifts to the

agency to articulate a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for its

action. Texas Department of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248,

253 (1981). Once the agency has met its burden, the petitioner bears the

ultimate responsibility to persuade the fact finder by a preponderance of

the evidence that the agency acted on the basis of a prohibited reason.

St. Mary's Honor Center v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502 (1993).

In order to establish a prima facie case of discrimination for an

allegation of reprisal, petitioner must prove the existence of four

elements: (1) that she engaged in protected activity, e.g., participated

in a Title VII proceeding; (2) that the alleged discriminating official

was aware of the protected activity; (3) that she was disadvantaged

by an action of the agency contemporaneously with or subsequent to

such participation; and (4) that there is a causal connection between

the protected activity and the adverse employment action. Hochstadt

v. Worcester Found. for Experimental Biology, Inc., 425 F. Supp. 318,

324 (D. Mass), aff'd, 545 F.2d 222 (1st Cir. 1976); see also Mitchell

v. Baldridge, 759 F.2d 80, 86 (D.C. Cir. 1985); Burris v. United Telephone

Co. of Kansas, Inc., 683 F.2d 339, 343 (10th Cir. 1982), cert. denied,

459 U.S. 1071 (1982).

Although the initial inquiry in a discrimination case usually focuses

on whether the petitioner has established a prima facie case, following

this order of analysis is unnecessary when the agency has articulated a

legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for its actions. See Washington

v. Department of the Navy, EEOC Petition No. 03900056 (May 31, 1990).

In such cases, the inquiry shifts from whether the petitioner has

established a prima facie case to whether she has demonstrated by

a preponderance of the evidence that the agency's reasons for its

actions merely were a pretext for discrimination. Id.; see also United

States Postal Service Board of Governors v. Aikens, 460 U.S. 711,

714-717 (1983). We find that the agency has articulated legitimate,

nondiscriminatory reasons for its action. Specifically, the agency

contended that petitioner was removed from the agency for repeatedly

exhibiting disrespectful conduct towards customers.

Because the agency has proffered legitimate, nondiscriminatory reasons

for the alleged discriminatory event, petitioner now bears the burden

of establishing that the agency's stated reason is merely a pretext

for discrimination. Shapiro v. Social Security Administration, EEOC

Request No. 05960403 (December 6, 1996). Appellant can do this by showing

that the agency was motivated by a discriminatory reason. Id. (citing

St. Mary's Honor Center v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502 (1993)). In this case,

petitioner has failed to meet that burden. The only evidence that

petitioner offered to support her claim of reprisal is that she filed

an informal complaint of discrimination on February 27, 1998, which,

at the time of her removal, was pending informal counseling. While that

evidence is sufficient to support a prima facie case of discrimination,

it is not sufficient to prove that the agency's articulated reason

constitutes an effort to mask discriminatory animus.

CONCLUSION

Based upon a thorough review of the record and for the foregoing reasons,

it is the decision of the Commission to CONCUR with the Board's final

decision finding no discrimination. The Commission finds that the

Board's decision constitutes a correct interpretation of the laws, rules,

regulations, and policies governing this matter and is supported by the

evidence in the record as a whole.

STATEMENT OF RIGHTS - ON APPEAL

PETITIONER'S RIGHT TO FILE A CIVIL ACTION (W1199)

This decision of the Commission is final, and there is no further right of

administrative appeal from the Commission's decision. You have the right

to file a civil action in an appropriate United States District Court,

based on the decision of the Merit Systems Protection Board, WITHIN

THIRTY (30) CALENDAR DAYS of the date that you receive this decision.

If you file a civil action, YOU MUST NAME AS THE DEFENDANT IN THE

COMPLAINT THE PERSON WHO IS THE OFFICIAL AGENCY HEAD OR DEPARTMENT HEAD,

IDENTIFYING THAT PERSON BY HIS OR HER FULL NAME AND OFFICIAL TITLE.

Failure to do so may result in the dismissal of your case in court.

"Agency" or "department" means the national organization, and not the

local office, facility or department in which you work.

RIGHT TO REQUEST COUNSEL (Z1199)

If you decide to file a civil action, and if you do not have or cannot

afford the services of an attorney, you may request that the Court appoint

an attorney to represent you and that the Court permit you to file the

action without payment of fees, costs, or other security. See Title VII

of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended, 42 U.S.C. �2000e et seq.;

the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, as amended, 29 U.S.C. ��791, 794(c).

The grant or denial of the request is within the sole discretion of

the Court. Filing a request for an attorney does not extend your time

in which to file a civil action. Both the request and the civil action

must be filed within the time limits as stated in the paragraph above

("Right to File A Civil Action").

FOR THE COMMISSION:

Jan 7, 2000

DATE Carlton Hadden, Acting Director

Office of Federal Operations

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING

For timeliness purposes, the Commission will presume that this decision

was received within five (5) calendar days of mailing. I certify that

the decision was mailed to petitioner, petitioner's representative

(if applicable), and the agency on:

________________________ _______________________