Petit, Rock J. et al.

Patent Trials and Appeals Board

Jan 22, 2020

15136437 - (D) (P.T.A.B. Jan. 22, 2020)

UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE
United States Patent and Trademark Office
Address: COMMISSIONER FOR PATENTS
P.O. Box 1450
Alexandria, Virginia 22313-1450
www.uspto.gov
APPLICATION NO. FILING DATE FIRST NAMED INVENTOR ATTORNEY DOCKET NO. CONFIRMATION NO.
15/136,437 04/22/2016 Rock J. Petit CMD 245 9375
22222 7590 01/22/2020
GEORGE R CORRIGAN
CORRIGAN LAW OFFICE
2168 COLLADAY POINT DRIVE
STOUGHTON, WI 53589
EXAMINER
STCLAIR, ANDREW D
ART UNIT PAPER NUMBER
3753
NOTIFICATION DATE DELIVERY MODE
01/22/2020 ELECTRONIC
Please find below and/or attached an Office communication concerning this application or proceeding.
The time period for reply, if any, is set in the attached communication.
Notice of the Office communication was sent electronically on above-indicated "Notification Date" to the
following e-mail address(es):
gcorrigan@new.rr.com
george.corrigan@corrigan.pro
kari.brekke@corrigan.pro
PTOL-90A (Rev. 04/07)
UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
____________

BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD
____________

Ex parte ROCK J. PETIT, MITCHELL J. HEIN,
and PAUL A. SELLE
____________

Appeal 2019-005103
Application 15/136,437
Technology Center 3700
____________

Before NATHAN A. ENGELS, ERIC C. JESCHKE, and
RICHARD H. MARSCHALL, Administrative Patent Judges.

JESCHKE, Administrative Patent Judge.

DECISION ON APPEAL

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Appellant1 seeks review, under 35 U.S.C. § 134(a), of the Examiner’s
decision, as set forth in the Final Office Action dated September 26, 2018,
and as further explained in the Advisory Action dated April 8, 2019,
rejecting claims 1–11, 20–23, and 30–33. Claims 12–19, 24–29, and 34
have been withdrawn. We have jurisdiction under 35 U.S.C. § 6(b).
We affirm in part.

1 We use the word “Appellant” to refer to “applicant” as defined in
37 C.F.R. § 1.42. CMD Corporation (“Appellant”) is the applicant under
37 C.F.R. § 1.46 and is identified as the real party in interest. Appeal Br. 3.
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BACKGROUND
The disclosed subject matter “relates generally to the art of dispensing
gaseous fuels to vehicles.” Spec. ¶ 1. Claims 1, 10, and 20 are independent.
Claim 1 is reproduced below, with emphasis added:
1. A gaseous fuel station for filling vehicle tanks with fuel,
comprising:
a plurality of storage vessels, including a first storage
vessel at a first pressure, and a second storage vessel at a
second pressure, wherein the first pressure is less than or equal
to the second pressure;
a plurality of dispensing sub-stations, each dispensing
sub-station comprising a dispensing hose, and a control valve;
wherein the plurality of dispensing sub-stations includes
a first dispensing sub-station that is in controllable fluid
communication with each of the first and second storage vessels
such that fluid can flow in a first fluid path from each of the
first and second storage vessels through the first dispensing
sub-station to a vehicle tank, and wherein the dispensing hose,
and the control valve of the first dispensing sub-station are in
the first fluid path;
wherein the plurality of dispensing sub-stations further
includes a second dispensing sub-station that is in controllable
fluid communication with each of the first and second storage
vessels such that fluid can flow in a second fluid path from each
of the first and second storage vessels through the second
dispensing sub-station to a vehicle tank, and wherein the
dispensing hose, and the control valve of the second dispensing
sub-station are in the second fluid path; and
a controller, connected to receive feedback indicative of a
pressure from each of the first and second dispensing sub-
stations and to provide control signals to the control valves of
the first and second dispensing sub-station to implement a
desired fill scheme, wherein the controller includes an output
on which usage data is communicated to at least one of a station
manager and an offsite location.
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REFERENCES
Name Reference Date
O’Connor US 5,400,253 Mar. 21, 1995
Cohen US 7,028,724 B2 Apr. 18, 2006
Tiberghien US 8,616,524 B2 Dec. 31, 2013
Mutter US 2002/0053365 A1 May 9, 2002
Graham US 2003/0164202 A1 Sept. 4, 2003
Allidieres US 2009/0151812 A1 June 18, 2009
Uemura US 2010/0307636 A1 Dec. 9, 2010
Mori US 2012/0125482 A1 May 24, 2012
Takata US 2012/0216915 A1 Aug. 30, 2012
Thiessen US 2015/0083273 A1 Mar. 26, 2015
Sasaki Japanese Publication No. 2003-
172497A (and machine translation)
June 20, 2003
REJECTIONS
1. Claim 4 stands rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 112(a) as failing to
comply with the written description requirement.
2. Claim 4 stands rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 112(b) as failing to
particularly point out and distinctly claim the subject matter regarded as the
invention.
3. Claims 1, 3, 5, 6, and 9 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103 as
unpatentable over Allidieres, Mutter, and O’Connor.
4. Claims 2 and 4 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103 as
unpatentable over Allidieres, Mutter, O’Connor, and Thiessen.
5. Claim 7 stands rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103 as unpatentable
over Allidieres, Mutter, O’Connor, and Takata.
6. Claim 8 stands rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103 as unpatentable
over Allidieres, Mutter, O’Connor, and Tiberghien.
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7. Claim 10 stands rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103 as unpatentable
over Allidieres and Cohen.
8. Claim 11 stands rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103 as unpatentable
over Allidieres, Cohen, and Uemura.
9. Claims 20 and 23 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103 as
unpatentable over Sasaki, Mori, and O’Connor.
10. Claims 21 and 22 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103 as
unpatentable over Sasaki, Mori, O’Connor, and Thiessen.
11. Claims 1, 32, and 33 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103 as
unpatentable over Allidieres, Mori, and O’Connor.
12. Claims 30 and 31 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103 as
unpatentable over Allidieres, Mori, O’Connor, and Graham.
DISCUSSION
Rejections 1 and 2 – The rejections of claim 4 under
35 U.S.C. §§ 112(a) and 112(b)
The Examiner rejected dependent claim 4, finding that its claim
language (1) lacks adequate written description support (see Final Act. 2–3)
and (2) is indefinite (see id. at 3–4). In an amendment filed February 26,
2019 (i.e., after the Final Office Action on appeal), Appellant proposed
revisions to certain language in claim 4 highlighted by the Examiner in these
Rejections. Compare Amendment, at 3 (dated Feb. 26, 2019), with Final
Act. 2–4. As acknowledged by Appellant in its Appeal Brief, however, the
Examiner did not enter the amendment. See Appeal Br. 6 (“Claim 4 was
amended after the Final Action, and that amendment was not entered.”);
Adv. Act. 2.
Appellant does not list these Rejections in the “GROUNDS OF
REJECTION TO BE REVIEWED ON APPEAL” and does not present any
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arguments addressing these Rejections. See Appeal Br. 10–13; see generally
Reply Br. Under these circumstances, we deem Appellant to have waived
any arguments as to these Rejections. See Hyatt v. Dudas, 551 F.3d 1307,
1314 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (“When the appellant fails to contest a ground of
rejection to the Board, . . . the Board may treat any argument with respect to
that ground of rejection as waived”); see also 37 C.F.R. § 41.37(c)(1)(iv)
(2018) (“The arguments shall explain why the examiner erred as to each
ground of rejection contested by appellant. Except as provided for in
§§ 41.41, 41.47 and 41.52, any arguments or authorities not included in the
appeal brief will be refused consideration by the Board for purposes of the
present appeal.”).
To the extent Appellant requests the Patent Trial and Appeal Board to
direct the Examiner to enter the amendment, we cannot grant the requested
relief. The refusal by an examiner to enter an amendment filed after a final
rejection is a petitionable matter, not one for appeal. See In re Berger, 279
F.3d 975, 984 (Fed. Cir. 2002) (citing In re Mindick, 371 F.2d 892, 894
(CCPA 1967) (stating that the predecessor to the PTAB “does not consider
the issue of whether the examiner’s refusal to enter the proposed amendment
after final rejection constituted an abuse of discretion”)); see also 37 C.F.R.
§ 1.127 (“From the refusal of the primary examiner to admit an amendment,
in whole or in part, a petition will lie to the Director under § 1.181.”). For
these reasons, we summarily sustain these Rejections.

Rejection 3 – The rejection of claims 1, 3, 5, 6,
and 9 under 35 U.S.C. § 103
For this Rejection, Appellant argues the patentability of independent
claim 1 and does not provide separate arguments for claims 3, 5, 6, and 9,
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which depend from claim 1. Appeal Br. 12–13; Reply Br. 2–3. Thus, we
address claim 1, with claims 3, 5, 6, and 9 standing or falling with claim 1.
See 37 C.F.R. § 41.37(c)(1)(iv). For claim 1, the Examiner relied on a
combination of Allidieres, Mutter, and O’Connor for the recited limitations,
and the Examiner provided reasons to modify Allidieres based on Mutter
and based on O’Connor. See Final Act. 4–7.
First, Appellant states that claim 1 requires “that the controller
‘receive feedback indicative of a pressure from each of the first and second
dispensing sub-stations’” (as recited in the claim language shown with
emphasis above), and argues that “[t]his is not found in the prior art.”
Appeal Br. 12. Appellant contends that “[t]he Examiner relied on [Mutter]
for this claimed feature,” but, according to Appellant, Mutter instead
“teaches to sense the pressure in the tank of the vehicle being filled, not in
the dispensing substation.” Id. In support, Appellant quotes a passage from
Mutter describing sensors 32, 33 as “arranged in the vehicle fuel tank 31.”
Mutter ¶ 36, quoted at Appeal Br. 12; see also Mutter, Fig. 1 (showing
sensors 32, 33 inside tank 31).
With this argument, Appellant does not address the rejection as
articulated. As clarified in the Answer, the Examiner relied on Allidieres—
not Mutter—to satisfy the recited “feedback indicative of a pressure from
each of the first and second dispensing sub-stations” in the context of the
proposed modified device. Ans. 3. Specifically, in the Final Office Action,
the Examiner found that Allidieres teaches that “each sub-station monitors
pressure (via pressure sensors 133, 1[43]; figure 1 and paragraph 0035).”
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Final Act. 52; Ans. 3 (stating that Allidieres “accounts for a pressure sensor
(133, 1[43]) in each sub-station”). As to this claim language, the Examiner
clarifies that “[t]he first substation (13) of Allidieres has a first pressure
sensor (133), and the second substation (14) of Allidieres has a second
pressure sensor (143).” Ans. 3 (discussing Allidieres, Fig. 1).
Second, highlighting a statement in the Final Office Action, Appellant
argues that “[t]he Examiner was correct - Allidieres . . . does not teach a
controller using pressure sensed from a dispensing sub-station to implement
a desired control scheme.” Reply Br. 2 (discussing Final Act. 5). According
to Appellant, “[w]hile one prior art publication teaches sensing pressure and
another teaches controlling a valve[,] nothing teaches a controller that
implements a desired fill scheme and receives pressure feedback from the
dispensing substations.” Id.
Nonobviousness cannot be established by attacking prior art
references individually when the rejection is based on the teachings of a
combination of references. See In re Merck & Co., 800 F.2d 1091, 1097
(Fed. Cir. 1986). Here, as clarified in the Answer, the Examiner generally
relies on Mutter “for the teaching of a controller that controls a valve” and
generally relies on Allidieres “for a pressure sensor (133, 1[43]) in each sub-
station.” Ans. 3. The Examiner states that “[p]roviding a controller to the
system of Allidieres for controlling each substation (13, 14), based on the

2 Although the Rejection refers to “pressure sensors 133, 134,” in the
Answer, the Examiner clearly references sensors 133 and 143 in Allidieres.
See Ans. 3 (“The first substation (13) of Allidieres has a first pressure sensor
(133), and the second substation (14) of Allidieres has a second pressure
sensor (143).”).
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teaching of Mutter, accounts for the system of claim 1.” Id. Thus, the
Examiner relies on the combination of Allidieres and Mutter to address the
limitation argued by Appellant. By arguing that neither Allidieres nor
Mutter alone teaches all aspects of the limitation at issue, Appellant does not
address the rejection as articulated, in which the Examiner relies on certain
combined teachings of the prior art. See In re Keller, 642 F.2d 413, 425
(CCPA 1981) (“[T]he test [for obviousness] is what the combined
teachings of the references would have suggested to those of ordinary skill
in the art.” (emphasis added)).
Third, Appellant argues that “there is no suggestion in the prior art to
have a controller that implements a desired fill scheme and receives pressure
feedback from the dispensing substations.” Reply Br. 3. According to
Appellant, Allidieres “suggests two reasons for sensing pressure: 1) to
pressurize the storage tanks (¶34); and 2) safety venting (¶35)” and Mutter
“does not teach pressure sensing at all.” Id. at 2–3.
To the extent this argument is distinct from the prior argument,
Appellant contends that the prior art lacks an express “suggestion” to
combine the aspects of Allidieres and Mutter relied on by the Examiner. An
express teaching, suggestion, or motivation, however, is not a requirement
for an obviousness determination. See KSR Int’l Co. v. Teleflex Inc., 550
U.S. 398, 418–19 (2007) (holding that when the teaching-suggestion-
motivation test is applied as a rigid formula, it is incompatible with Supreme
Court precedent). Here, Appellant has not addressed or shown error in the
reasoning articulated to modify Allidieres based on Mutter. See Final Act. 6.
Moreover, to the extent Appellant asserts error in that the disclosed
reasons to sense pressure in Allidieres may not align with the Examiner’s
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stated reasoning, we note that “[u]nder the correct analysis, any need or
problem known in the field of endeavor at the time of invention and
addressed by the patent can provide a reason for combining the elements in
the manner claimed.” KSR, 550 U.S. at 420. For these reasons, we sustain
the rejection of claim 1 under 35 U.S.C. § 103 as unpatentable over
Allidieres, Mutter, and O’Connor. Claims 3, 5, 6, and 9 fall with claim 1.

Rejections 4 through 6 – The rejection of claims
2, 4, 7, and 8 under 35 U.S.C. § 103
Claims 2, 4, 7, and 8 depend from claim 1. See Appeal Br. 15–16
(Claims App.). Appellant argues that claims 2, 4, 7, and 8 are allowable
based on their dependence from claim 1. See id. at 12 (arguing that “[c]laim
1 (and thus dependent claims 2–9” are allowable (emphasis added)).
Appellant does not provide additional arguments for claims 2, 4, 7, and 8.
For the reasons above, we are not apprised of error in the rejection of
claim 1 under 35 U.S.C. § 103 as unpatentable over Allidieres, Mutter, and
O’Connor. See supra Rejection 3. As such, we sustain the rejection of
claims 2, 4, 7, and 8 under 35 U.S.C. § 103 as unpatentable over Allidieres,
Mutter, O’Connor, and either Thiessen (Rejection 4), Takata (Rejection 5),
or Tiberghien (Rejection 6).

Rejections 7 and 8 – The rejection of claims 10
and 11 under 35 U.S.C. § 103
Independent claim 10 requires, among other limitations, “a fitting
capable of connecting to the vehicle tank and capable of connecting to at
least two dispensing substations, whereby the flow into the tank is from at
least two dispensing sub stations.” Appeal Br. 17 (Claims App.). The
Examiner relies on Cohen for this limitation:
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Cohen teaches a fitting (20) capable of connecting to the
vehicle tank (column 6, lines 45-47) and capable of connecting
to at least two dispensing substations (at 204) (capable of
connecting at 204 to two dispensing substations, for example
sequentially, by detaching and reattaching at 204), whereby the
flow into the tank is from at least two dispensing sub stations
(capable of, see figure 4 and MPEP 2114; the system of Cohen
is capable of directing flow into the tank from two dispensing
sub stations for example sequentially).
Final Act. 12.
Appellant argues that the term “fitting” in the limitation at issue “is
explicitly defined in the specification as [‘]the hardware and/or controller
used to effectively combine two or more fluid flow paths to fill one vehicle
tank.’” Appeal Br. 13 (quoting Spec. ¶ 138). Appellant states that the
Examiner found that certain structure in Cohen “is capable of sequential
connection of first one substation and then a second substation,” but
Appellant argues, “this does not teach to combine to [sic – two] or more
fluid flow paths as required by the claimed fitting.” Id.
We agree with Appellant that the Specification here defines the term
“fitting” as “the hardware and/or controller used to effectively combine two
or more fluid flow paths to fill one vehicle tank.” Spec. ¶ 138. The
Examiner takes the position that “the portion of the specification referred to
by the Appellant[] is not sufficiently specific to put the public on notice of a
special definition.” Ans. 4 (citing MPEP § 2111.01). We disagree.
When an applicant acts as a lexicographer, definitions for terms must
be set out in a specification “with reasonable clarity, deliberateness, and
precision.” In re Paulsen, 30 F.3d 1475, 1480 (Fed. Cir. 1994). The
Specification here provides a “Glossary,” stating that the “following terms
used herein have the meaning set forth below.” Spec. ¶ 127. The next
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eighteen paragraphs are an alphabetical list of various terms and what each
term “refers to.” Spec. ¶¶ 128–145. The definition of “fitting” relied on by
Appellant is in that list. Although the Examiner is correct that “none of the
actual claim language uses the term ‘combine’” (Ans. 4), that misses the
point. As discussed above, the definition of “fitting” relied on includes the
word “combine.” Spec. ¶ 138. On this record, the definition of “fitting” is
set forth with sufficient “clarity, deliberateness, and precision” to provide
public notice. Paulsen, 30 F.3d at 1480.
The statements in paragraph 68 of the Specification, highlighted by
the Examiner (Ans. 4), do not undermine this finding. The Examiner does
not identify (nor are we independently aware of) any instance in which our
reviewing courts have allowed such generalized language to override a
specific, express definition of a term. For these reasons, we construe
“fitting” in claim 10 in line with the definition provided in paragraph 138 of
the Specification. See Reply Br. 3 (arguing that “the word ‘fitting’ must be
given the definition explicitly provided in the specification”) (citing MPEP
§ 2111.01 (IV)(A) (“Where an explicit definition is provided by the
applicant for a term, that definition will control interpretation of the term as
it is used in the claim.”)).
The Examiner has not explained how Cohen satisfies the limitation at
issue under the proper construction of “fitting” (discussed above). Instead,
the Examiner only asserts that Cohen satisfies the limitation at issue under
the Examiner’s own construction of “fitting,” which does not overlap with
the proper construction. See Final Act. 12 (first full paragraph); Ans. 4–5
(“The coupler shown in figure 3 of Cohen . . . is capable of being connected
to two different substations, such as sequentially. . . . Appellant’s
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arguments effectively contend that the claim must be interpreted to require a
two-into-one coupler which simultaneously dispenses fluid from two inlets
through a single outlet, but the claim language is not nearly so specific.”).
For these reasons, we do not sustain the rejection of claim 10, or the
rejection of claim 11 (which depends from claim 10) under 35 U.S.C. § 103.

Rejections 9 and 10 – The rejection of claims
20–23 under 35 U.S.C. § 103
The Examiner rejected claims 20 and 23 under 35 U.S.C. § 103 as
unpatentable over Sasaki, Mori, and O’Connor, and rejected claims 21 and
22 under 35 U.S.C. § 103 as unpatentable over Sasaki, Mori, O’Connor, and
Thiessen. Final Act. 13–17. Appellant does not list these Rejections in the
“GROUNDS OF REJECTION TO BE REVIEWED ON APPEAL” and
does not present any arguments addressing these Rejections. See Appeal Br.
10–13; see generally Reply Br. Appellant also does not list claims 20–23 as
“on appeal.” Appeal Br. 5. Under these circumstances, we deem Appellant
to have waived any arguments as to these Rejections. See Hyatt, 551 F.3d at
1314; 37 C.F.R. § 41.37(c)(1)(iv). For these reasons, we summarily sustain
these Rejections.

Rejection 11 – The rejection of claims 1, 32,
and 33 under 35 U.S.C. § 103
For this Rejection, Appellant argues the patentability of independent
claim 1 and does not provide separate arguments for claims 32 and 33,
which depend from claim 1. Appeal Br. 12–13; Reply Br. 2–3. We address
claim 1, with claims 32 and 33 standing or falling with claim 1. See
37 C.F.R. § 41.37(c)(1)(iv). For claim 1, the Examiner relied on a
combination of Allidieres, Mori, and O’Connor for the recited limitations,
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and the Examiner provided reasons to modify Allidieres based on Mori and
based on O’Connor. See Final Act. 17–20.
Appellant argues that the Examiner relied on Mori “as teaching the
claimed ‘feedback indicative of a pressure from each of the first and second
dispensing sub-stations,’” but, according to Appellant, “Mori teaches to
control using tank pressure, not dispensing substation pressure.” Appeal Br.
12–13 (discussing aspects of Mori ¶¶ 32, 61).
Like the first argument regarding Rejection 3 (discussed above), this
argument does not apprise us of error because Appellant does not address
the rejection as articulated. As clarified in the Answer, in the context of this
Rejection, the Examiner again relied on Allidieres—not Mori—to satisfy the
recited “feedback indicative of a pressure from each of the first and second
dispensing sub-stations” in the context of the proposed modified device.
Specifically, in the Final Office Action, the Examiner again found that
Allidieres teaches that “each sub-station monitors pressure (via pressure
sensors 133, 1[43]; figure 1 and paragraph 0035).” Final Act. 18; id. (stating
that Allidieres “accounts for a pressure sensor (133, 1[43]) in each sub-
station”). As to this claim language, the Examiner again clarifies that “[t]he
first substation (13) of Allidieres has a first pressure sensor (133), and the
second substation (14) of Allidieres has a second pressure sensor (143).”
Ans. 3 (discussing Allidieres, Fig. 1); see also id. at 4 (relying on the
remarks on page 3 to address Rejection 11).
Moreover, to the extent Appellant relies on the arguments in the Reply
Brief (characterized as the second and third arguments in the context of
Rejection 3) in the context of this Rejection, for reasons similar to those
discussed above, we are not apprised of error based on those arguments. For
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these reasons, we sustain the rejection of independent claim 1 under
35 U.S.C. § 103 as unpatentable over Allidieres, Mori, and O’Connor.
Claims 32 and 33 fall with claim 1.

Rejection 12 – The rejection of claims
30 and 31 under 35 U.S.C. § 103
The Examiner rejected claims 30 and 31 under 35 U.S.C. § 103 as
unpatentable over Allidieres, Mori, O’Connor, and Graham. Final Act. 20–
21. Appellant does not list this Rejection in the “GROUNDS OF
REJECTION TO BE REVIEWED ON APPEAL.” See Appeal Br. 10–13;
see generally Reply Br. Appellant does assert, however, that claims 30 and
31 are allowable based on their dependence from claim 1. See id. at 12
(arguing that “[c]laim 1 (and thus dependent claims . . . 30–33” are
allowable (emphasis added)). Appellant does not provide additional
arguments for claims 30 and 31. For the reasons above, we are not apprised
of error in the rejection of claim 1 under 35 U.S.C. § 103 as unpatentable
over Allidieres, Mori, and O’Connor. See supra Rejection 11. As such, we
sustain the rejection of claims 30 and 31 under 35 U.S.C. § 103 as
unpatentable over Allidieres, Mori, O’Connor, and Graham.

CONCLUSION
We affirm in part the Examiner’s rejection of claims 1–11, 20–23, and
30–33. More specifically, we (1) affirm the decision to reject claim 4 under
35 U.S.C. § 112(a), (2) affirm the decision to reject claim 4 under 35 U.S.C.
§ 112(b), (3) affirm the decision to reject claims 1–9, 20–23, and 30–33
under 35 U.S.C. § 103, and (4) reverse the decision to reject claims 10 and
11 under 35 U.S.C. § 103.
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DECISION SUMMARY
In summary:
Claims
Rejected
35 U.S.C. § References/Basis Affirmed Reversed
4 112(a) Written Description 4
4 112(b) Indefiniteness 4
1, 3, 5, 6, 9 103 Allidieres, Mutter,
O’Connor
1, 3, 5, 6,
9

2, 4 103 Allidieres, Mutter,
O’Connor, Thiessen
2, 4
7 103 Allidieres, Mutter,
O’Connor, Takata
7
8 103 Allidieres, Mutter,
O’Connor, Tiberghien
8
10 103 Allidieres, Cohen 10
11 103 Allidieres, Cohen,
Uemura
11
20, 23 103 Sasaki, Mori, O’Connor 20, 23
21, 22 103 Sasaki, Mori,
O’Connor, Thiessen
21, 22
1, 32, 33 103 Allidieres, Mori,
O’Connor
1, 32, 33
30, 31 103 Allidieres, Mori,
O’Connor, Graham
30, 31
Overall Outcome 1–9, 20–23, 30–33
10, 11

TIME PERIOD FOR RESPONSE
No time period for taking any subsequent action in connection with
this appeal may be extended under 37 C.F.R. § 1.136(a). See 37 C.F.R.
§ 1.136(a)(1)(iv).

AFFIRMED-IN-PART