Perry MacNeille et al.

Patent Trials and Appeals Board

May 20, 2020

13185975 - (D) (P.T.A.B. May. 20, 2020)

UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE
United States Patent and Trademark Office
Address: COMMISSIONER FOR PATENTS
P.O. Box 1450
Alexandria, Virginia 22313-1450
www.uspto.gov
APPLICATION NO. FILING DATE FIRST NAMED INVENTOR ATTORNEY DOCKET NO. CONFIRMATION NO.
13/185,975 07/19/2011 Perry Robinson MacNeille 83190201 3383
28395 7590 05/20/2020
BROOKS KUSHMAN P.C./FGTL
1000 TOWN CENTER
22ND FLOOR
SOUTHFIELD, MI 48075-1238
EXAMINER
NGUYEN, THUY N
ART UNIT PAPER NUMBER
3681
NOTIFICATION DATE DELIVERY MODE
05/20/2020 ELECTRONIC
Please find below and/or attached an Office communication concerning this application or proceeding.
The time period for reply, if any, is set in the attached communication.
Notice of the Office communication was sent electronically on above-indicated "Notification Date" to the
following e-mail address(es):
docketing@brookskushman.com
PTOL-90A (Rev. 04/07)
UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
____________

BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD
____________

Ex parte PERRY ROBINSON MACNEILLE,
OLEG YURIEVITCH GUSIKHIN,
GARY STEVEN STRUMOLO, and BASAVARAJ TONSHAL
____________

Appeal 2019-006088
Application 13/185,975
Technology Center 3600
____________

Before SHEILA F. MCSHANE, AMEE A. SHAH, and
MATTHEW S. MEYERS, Administrative Patent Judges.

MEYERS, Administrative Patent Judge.

DECISION ON APPEAL

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Appellant1 appeals under 35 U.S.C. § 134(a) from the Examiner’s
Final Rejection of claims 1–6 and 16–20, which constitute all the claims
pending in this application. Claims 7–15 have been cancelled. We have
jurisdiction under 35 U.S.C. § 6(b).

1 We use the term “Appellant” to refer to “applicant” as defined in 37 C.F.R.
§ 1.42. Our decision references Appellant’s Appeal Brief (“Appeal Br.,”
filed March 5, 2019) and Reply Brief (“Reply Br.,” filed August 12, 2019),
and the Examiner’s Answer (“Ans.,” mailed June 11, 2019) and Final Office
Action (“Final Act.,” mailed January 10, 2019). Appellant identifies the real
party in interest as “Ford Global Technologies, LLC” (Appeal Br. 1).
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We AFFIRM.
CLAIMED INVENTION
Appellant’s claims relate generally to methods “for managing a
content stream.” Spec. ¶ 1.
Claims 1 and 16 are the independent claims on appeal Claim 1,
reproduced below with minor formatting changes and added bracketed
notations, is illustrative of the claimed subject matter:
1. A computer-implemented method comprising:
[a] aggregating user, environmental or vehicle data
element values responsive to a vehicle media request;
[b] requesting a media plan based on the aggregated data
element values, from each of a plurality of media content
providers;
[c] selecting a plan from plans received from the media
content providers responsive to the media-plan request, based on
a determination that the plan includes content having a highest
correlation to historically observed user content preferences
when historical data element values corresponding to the
aggregated data element values were present; and
[d] sending the selected plan to the vehicle.

REJECTION
Claims 1–6 and 16–20 are rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 101 as directed
to a judicial exception without significantly more.

ANALYSIS
Patent-Ineligible Subject Matter
Appellant argues claims 1–6 and 16–20 as a group. Appeal Br. 4–5;
Reply Br. 2–4. We select independent claim 1 as representative. The
remaining claims stand or fall with claim 1. See 37 C.F.R. § 41.37(c)(1)(iv).
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A. Section 101
An invention is patent-eligible if it claims a “new and useful process,
machine, manufacture, or composition of matter.” 35 U.S.C. § 101.
However, the U.S. Supreme Court has long interpreted 35 U.S.C. § 101 to
include implicit exceptions: “[l]aws of nature, natural phenomena, and
abstract ideas” are not patentable. E.g., Alice Corp. v. CLS Bank Int’l, 573
U.S. 208, 216 (2014).
In determining whether a claim falls within an excluded category, we
are guided by the Court’s two-part framework, described in Mayo and Alice.
Id. at 217–18 (citing Mayo Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus Labs., Inc.,
566 U.S. 66, 75–77 (2012)). In accordance with that framework, we first
determine what concept the claim is “directed to.” See Alice, 573 U.S. at
219 (“On their face, the claims before us are drawn to the concept of
intermediated settlement, i.e., the use of a third party to mitigate settlement
risk.”); see also Bilski v. Kappos, 561 U.S. 593, 611 (2010) (“Claims 1 and 4
in petitioners’ application explain the basic concept of hedging, or protecting
against risk.”).
Concepts determined to be abstract ideas, and thus patent ineligible,
include certain methods of organizing human activity, such as fundamental
economic practices (Alice, 573 U.S. at 219–20; Bilski, 561 U.S. at 611);
mathematical formulas (Parker v. Flook, 437 U.S. 584, 594–95 (1978)); and
mental processes (Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63, 67 (1972)). Concepts
determined to be patent eligible include physical and chemical processes,
such as “molding rubber products” (Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175, 191
(1981)); “tanning, dyeing, making waterproof cloth, vulcanizing India
rubber, smelting ores” (id. at 182 n.7 (quoting Corning v. Burden, 56 U.S.
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252, 267–68 (1854))); and manufacturing flour (Benson, 409 U.S. at 69
(citing Cochrane v. Deener, 94 U.S. 780, 785 (1876))).
In Diehr, the claim at issue recited a mathematical formula, but the
Court held that “a claim drawn to subject matter otherwise statutory does not
become nonstatutory simply because it uses a mathematical formula.”
Diehr, 450 U.S. at 187; see also id. at 191 (“We view respondents’ claims as
nothing more than a process for molding rubber products and not as an
attempt to patent a mathematical formula.”). Having said that, the Court
also indicated that a claim “seeking patent protection for that formula in the
abstract . . . is not accorded the protection of our patent laws, and this
principle cannot be circumvented by attempting to limit the use of the
formula to a particular technological environment.” Id. (citation omitted)
(citing Benson and Flook); see, e.g., id. at 187 (“It is now commonplace that
an application of a law of nature or mathematical formula to a known
structure or process may well be deserving of patent protection.”).
If the claim is “directed to” an abstract idea, we turn to the second
step of the Alice and Mayo framework, where “we must examine the
elements of the claim to determine whether it contains an ‘inventive
concept’ sufficient to ‘transform’ the claimed abstract idea into a patent-
eligible application.” Alice, 573 U.S. at 221 (quotation marks omitted).
“A claim that recites an abstract idea must include ‘additional features’ to
ensure ‘that the [claim] is more than a drafting effort designed to
monopolize the [abstract idea].’” Id. (alterations in original) (quoting Mayo,
566 U.S. at 77). “[M]erely requir[ing] generic computer implementation[]
fail[s] to transform that abstract idea into a patent-eligible invention.” Id.
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B. USPTO Section 101 Guidance
In January 2019, the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO)
published revised guidance on the application of § 101. 2019 Revised Patent
Subject Matter Eligibility Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. 50 (Jan. 7, 2019)
(“2019 Revised Guidance”).2 “All USPTO personnel are, as a matter of
internal agency management, expected to follow the guidance.” Id. at 51;
see also October 2019 Update at 1.
Under the 2019 Revised Guidance and the October 2019 Update, we
first look to whether the claim recites:
(1) any judicial exceptions, including certain groupings of abstract
ideas (i.e., mathematical concepts, certain methods of organizing
human activity such as a fundamental economic practice, or mental
processes) (“Step 2A, Prong One”); and
(2) additional elements that integrate the judicial exception into a
practical application (see MPEP § 2106.05(a)–(c), (e)–(h) (9th ed.
Rev. 08.2017, Jan. 2018)) (“Step 2A, Prong Two”).3
2019 Revised Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. at 52–55.

2 In response to received public comments, the Office issued further
guidance on October 17, 2019, clarifying the 2019 Revised Guidance.
USPTO, October 2019 Update: Subject Matter Eligibility (the “October
2019 Update”) (available at
https://www.uspto.gov/sites/default/files/documents/peg_oct_2019_update.p
df).
3 This evaluation is performed by (a) identifying whether there are any
additional elements recited in the claim beyond the judicial exception, and
(b) evaluating those additional elements individually and in combination to
determine whether the claim as a whole integrates the exception into a
practical application. See 2019 Revised Guidance — Section III(A)(2), 84
Fed. Reg. 54–55.
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Only if a claim (1) recites a judicial exception and (2) does not
integrate that exception into a practical application, do we then look, under
Step 2B, to whether the claim:
(3) adds a specific limitation beyond the judicial exception that is not
“well-understood, routine, conventional” in the field (see MPEP
§ 2106.05(d)); or
(4) simply appends well-understood, routine, conventional activities
previously known to the industry, specified at a high level of
generality, to the judicial exception.
2019 Revised Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. at 52–56.
Step One of the Mayo/Alice Framework
With regard to the first step of the Mayo/Alice framework and
Step 2A, Prong One of the 2019 Revised Guidelines, 84 Fed. Reg. at 54,
the Examiner determines that exemplary independent claim 1 recites an
abstract idea that falls under the categories of “[c]ertain methods of
organizing human activity” and “mental processes.” Ans. 9; see also Final
Act. 2 (“Independent claim 1 (Step 2A): is directed to multiple abstract
ideas including ‘organizing human activity’” (emphases omitted).). More
particularly, the Examiner states that independent claim 1 is directed to an
abstract idea because it
describe[s] the concept of collecting information (e.g., use media
plan request, aggregated user, environmental or vehicle data
element values, user content preference data, media plans) and
comparing/analyzing known information (e.g.,
comparing/analyzing use media plan request along with user
aggregated user, environmental or vehicle data element values,
user content preference data against media plans) in order to
select a plan that includes content having a highest correlation
with the user historical preferences corresponding to the
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aggregated data element values present); then sending/displaying
the selected plan to the user.
Final Act. 3 (emphasis omitted).
Appellant does not contest the Examiner’s determination that the
claims are directed to an abstract idea. Appeal Br. 4; see generally Reply
Br. 2–4. Instead, Appellant argues that independent claim 1 is
“distinguish[able] from a broader, generic concept of collecting and
comparing known information” and “represent[s] a practical implementation
of the ideas recited therein” under Step 2A, Prong Two of the 2019 Revised
Guidelines. Appeal Br. 4; Reply Br. 2–4.
We are not persuaded that the Examiner erred in determining that
independent claim 1 is directed to an abstract idea. The Federal Circuit has
explained that “the ‘directed to’ inquiry applies a stage-one filter to claims,
considered in light of the specification, based on whether ‘their character as
a whole is directed to excluded subject matter.’” Enfish, LLC v. Microsoft
Corp., 822 F.3d 1327, 1335 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (quoting Internet Patents Corp.
v. Active Network, Inc., 790 F.3d 1343, 1346 (Fed. Cir. 2015)). It asks
whether the focus of the claims is on a specific improvement in relevant
technology or on a process that itself qualifies as an “abstract idea” for
which computers are invoked merely as a tool. See id. at 1335–36. Here, it
is clear from the Specification (including the claim language) that the claims
focus on an abstract idea, and not on any improvement to technology and/or
a technical field.
The Specification is entitled “METHODS AND APPARATUS FOR
MANAGING A CONTENT STREAM,” and states that the present
invention relates to methods “for managing a content stream.” Spec. ¶ 1.
According to the Specification, “[n]umerous sources of ‘infotainment’ are
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available in a streaming and/or on-demand fashion” (id. ¶ 2; see also id. ¶35
(“[I]nfotainment presentation devices exist in a multitude of forms in
modern vehicles”) and identifies that “when using a ‘smart’ streaming
service such as PANDORA, a user will have a variety of preferences
associated with a user identity.” Id. ¶ 4. The Specification discloses that
“[b]ased on these preferences, and feedback gathered with respect to
delivered content, the delivery service will attempt to provide music that is
custom tailored to the audio preferences of the user.” Id. The Specification
observes that “[a] media provider may be able to inline advertisements with
content delivery, but this revenue is typically not shared with a vehicle
manufacturer.” Id. ¶ 35. The Specification further observes that
[t]he vehicle manufacturer, however, may have access to a much
greater store of knowledge with respect to a particular consumer,
and may be able to add value to selection of particular
advertisement delivery. Of course, a large portion of the
incentive to do so would come from the manufacturer’s ability to
subsequently share in the advertising revenues.
Id. ¶ 36.
To address this problem, the Specification identifies “a computer-
implemented method [that] includes receiving a request for media playback
sent from a vehicle computing system (VCS) and aggregating a plurality of
user, environmental and vehicle data elements for at least one known
consumer in a vehicle to receive media.” Id. ¶ 6. The Specification further
identifies “requesting media plans from a plurality of media provision
sources, the plan based at least in part on the aggregated user, environmental
and vehicle data elements” (id. ¶ 7) and “reviewing the media plans to select
a plan received responsive to the request that best corresponds to the user,
environmental and vehicle data elements.” Id. The Specification also
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identifies “receiving a request relating to an advertisement played in
conjunction with a media stream.” Id. ¶ 8.
Consistent with this disclosure, independent claim 1 recites a method
comprising steps for: (1) aggregating data element values in response to a
request, i.e., “aggregating user, environmental or vehicle data element values
responsive to a vehicle media request” (step [a]); (2) requesting data based
on the aggregated data element values, i.e., “requesting a media plan based
on the aggregated data element values, from each of a plurality of media
content providers” (step [b]); (3) selecting data based on a
determination/analysis, i.e., “selecting a plan from plans received from the
media content providers responsive to the media-plan request, based on a
determination that the plan includes content having a highest correlation to
historically observed user content preferences when historical data element
values corresponding to the aggregated data element values were present”
(step [c]); and (4) sending data, i.e., “sending the selected plan to the
vehicle” (step [d]).
Upon reviewing the Specification and independent claim 1, as
summarized above, we agree with the Examiner that independent claim 1
recites an abstract idea that falls under the categories of “[c]ertain methods
of organizing human activity” and “mental processes.” Ans. 9. Here,
independent claim 1 sends a “selected plan” (step [d]) based on the
collection and analysis of data (steps [a]–[c]). Thus, it is clear that
independent claim 1 recites a form of commercial interaction that, under the
2019 Revised Guidance, falls under the category of “[c]ertain methods of
organizing human activity” and more specifically “commercial or legal
interactions (including agreements in the form of . . . sales activities or
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behaviors; business relations)” (2019 Revised Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. at 52)
and “[m]ental processes—concepts performed in the human mind (including
an observation, evaluation, judgment, opinion).” Id.; see also October 2019
Update: Subject Matter Eligibility 7–8 (“October 2019 Update”)).
The Federal Circuit has consistently held that abstract ideas include
the concepts of collecting data, analyzing the data, and displaying the results
of the collection and analysis, including when limited to particular content.
See, e.g., Intellectual Ventures I LLC v. Capital One Fin. Corp., 850 F.3d
1332, 1340 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (identifying the abstract idea of collecting,
displaying, and manipulating data); Elec. Power Grp., LLC v. Alstom S.A.,
830 F.3d 1350, 1354 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (characterizing collecting information,
analyzing information by steps people go through in their minds, or by
mathematical algorithms, and presenting the results of collecting and
analyzing information, without more, as matters within the realm of abstract
ideas); see also SAP Am., Inc. v. InvestPic, LLC, 898 F.3d 1161, 1168
(Fed. Cir. 2018) (“As many cases make clear, even if a process of collecting
and analyzing information is ‘limited to particular content’ or a particular
‘source,’ that limitation does not make the collection and analysis other than
abstract.” (Quoting Elec. Power Grp., 830 F.3d at 1353, 1355 (citing
cases))). Cf. 2019 Revised Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. at 52–53.
We also note that the present claims are similar to certain
“unpatentable mental processes” that our reviewing courts have found patent
ineligible, such as “steps [that] can be performed in the human mind, or by a
human using a pen and paper” in CyberSource Corp. v. Retail Decisions,
Inc., 654 F.3d 1366, 1372–73 (Fed. Cir. 2011), and “using an electronic
device to obtain clinical trial data that would otherwise be collected by pen-
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and-paper diary, and analyzing the data to decide whether to prompt action”
in eResearchTechnology, Inc. v. CRF, Inc., 186 F. Supp. 3d 463, 473 (W.D.
Pa. 2016), aff’d, 681 F. App’x 964 (mem) (Fed. Cir. 2017) (citing OIP
Techs., Inc. v. Amazon.com, Inc., 788 F.3d 1359, 1361–62 (Fed. Cir. 2015));
Intellectual Ventures I LLC v. Symantec Corp., 838 F.3d 1307, 1318 (Fed.
Cir. 2016) (“[W]ith the exception of generic computer-implemented steps,
there is nothing in the claims themselves that foreclose them from being
performed by a human, mentally or with pen and paper.”); Mortg. Grader,
Inc. v. First Choice Loan Servs. Inc., 811 F.3d. 1314, 1324 (Fed. Cir. 2016)
(holding that computer-implemented method for “anonymous loan
shopping” was an abstract idea because it could be “performed by humans
without a computer”).
Having concluded that independent claim 1 recites a judicial
exception, i.e., an abstract idea, we turn to the Step 2A, Prong Two of the
2019 Revised Guidance and determine whether the claim integrates the
recited judicial exception into a practical application of the judicial
exception.
Here, the only additional elements that may be found in claim 1
beyond the abstract idea are a “computer” and “vehicle.” However, as the
Examiner points out, these elements
are recited at a high level of generality and/or [are] recited
as performing generic computer functions routinely used in
computer applications; thus they are not significantly more than
the identified abstract idea(s). First, there is only “a computer-
implemented” in the preamble [that] does not provide any
specific [limitation] about how the computer is used. And the
“sending . . . to a vehicle” step . . . is broad enough to encompass
any and every way of sending information to the vehicle.
Generic computer components recited as performing generic
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computer functions that are well-understood, routine and
convention[al] activities amount to no more than implementing
the abstract idea with a computerized system. The use of generic
computer to transmit/send/display/collect/receive information
through an unspecified generic computer does not impose any
meaningful limit on the computer implementation of the abstract
idea.
Final Act. 4. We agree with the Examiner.
In this regard, we find no indication in the Specification, nor does
Appellant direct us to any indication, that the steps recited in claim 1 invoke
any assertedly inventive programming, require any specialized computer
hardware or other inventive computer components, i.e., a particular machine,
or that the claimed invention is implemented using other than generic
computer components to perform generic computer functions. See DDR
Holdings, LLC v. Hotels.com, L.P., 773 F.3d 1245, 1256 (Fed. Cir. 2014)
(citation omitted) (“[A]fter Alice, there can remain no doubt: recitation of
generic computer limitations does not make an otherwise ineligible claim
patent-eligible.”).
We also find no indication in the Specification that the claimed
invention effects a transformation or reduction of a particular article to a
different state or thing. Nor do we find anything of record that attributes an
improvement in computer technology and/or functionality to the claimed
invention or that otherwise indicates that the claimed invention integrates the
abstract idea into a “practical application,” as that phrase is used in the
2019 Revised Guidance.4

4 The 2019 Revised Guidance references MPEP § 2106.05(a)–(c) and (e) in
describing the considerations that are indicative that an additional element or
combination of elements integrates the judicial exception, e.g., the abstract
idea, into a practical application. 2019 Revised Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg.
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Appellant argues that independent claim 1 “delivers a media plan
selected based on correlation of past user preferences under context to
present context, which is a practical way to select and deliver a media plan.”
Appeal Br. 4; Reply Br. 2. However, Appellant’s argument is not persuasive
to establish that independent claim 1 integrates the recited judicial exception
into a practical application of the exception. Here, we look to see if, for
example, any additional elements of the claim (i) reflect an improvement in
the functioning of a computer or to another technological field, (ii)
implement the judicial exception with, or by use of, a particular machine,
(iii) effect a transformation or reduction of a particular article to a different
state or thing, or (iv) use the judicial exception in some other meaningful
way beyond generally linking the use of the judicial exception to a particular
technological environment. See 2019 Revised Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. at 55;
see also MPEP § 2106.05(a)–(c), (e)–(h). Appellant provides no evidence to
this effect.
Here, the focus of independent claim 1 is not on any technological
advancement, but rather on the implementation of the abstract idea, “for
which computers are invoked merely as a tool.” See Enfish, 822 F.3d at
1336. In this regard, the Specification merely discloses that
a processor 3 controls at least some portion of the operation of
the vehicle-based computing system. Provided within the
vehicle, the processor allows onboard processing of commands
and routines. Further, the processor is connected to both non-
persistent 5 and persistent storage 7. In this illustrative
embodiment, the non-persistent storage is random access

at 55. If the recited judicial exception is integrated into a practical
application, as determined under one or more of these MPEP sections, the
claim is not “directed to” the judicial exception.
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memory (RAM) and the persistent storage is a hard disk drive
(HDD) or flash memory.
Spec. ¶ 21; see also id. ¶¶ 38–43. The Specification further discloses that
stored data may then be analyzed by the remote process to
determine defining characteristics that could help indicate
preferable future content 441. For example, without limitation,
the data could be compared to previous analysis to see if the
results from the present analysis are consistent with observed
behavior. The more commonly confluences appear, the easier it
will be to tailor a media and advertising package that should be
pleasing to the driver while at the same time maximizing
revenues from advertisement.
Id. ¶ 69.
Independent claim 1, unlike the claims found non-abstract in prior
cases, uses generic computer technology to send a selected plan to a vehicle,
and does not recite an improvement to a particular computer technology. Cf.
McRO, Inc. v. Bandai Namco Games Am. Inc., 837 F.3d 1299, 1314–15
(Fed. Cir. 2016) (finding claims non-abstract because they “focused on a
specific asserted improvement in computer animation”).
Based on the above, we conclude that independent claim 1 recites an
abstract idea that falls under the categories of “[c]ertain methods of
organizing human activity” and “mental processes,” and that the additional
elements recited in the claim are no more than generic components used as
tools to perform the recited abstract idea. As such, they do not integrate the
abstract idea into a practical application. See Alice Corp., 573 U.S. at
223–24 (“[W]holly generic computer implementation is not generally the
sort of ‘additional featur[e]’ that provides any ‘practical assurance that the
process is more than a drafting effort designed to monopolize the [abstract
idea] itself.’”) (Alterations in original) (quoting Mayo, 566 U.S. at 77).
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Thus, we agree with the Examiner that independent claim 1 is directed to an
abstract idea.
Having determined under step one of the Mayo/Alice framework that
claim 1 is directed to an abstract idea, we next consider under Step 2B of the
2019 Revised Guidance, the second step of the Mayo/Alice framework,
whether claim 1 includes additional elements or a combination of elements
that provides an “inventive concept,” i.e., whether the additional elements
amount to “significantly more” than the judicial exception itself.
2019 Revised Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. at 56.
Here, the Examiner determines, as discussed above, that the additional
limitations beyond the abstract idea of claim 1 include a “computer,” as it
appears in the preamble, and a “vehicle.” Final Act. 4. The Examiner
further determines that the additional elements are “recited as performing
generic computer functions that are well-understood, routine and
convention[al] activities [that] amount to no more than implementing the
abstract idea with a computerized system.” Id. More particularly, the
Examiner states that “[t]he use of generic computer to transmit/send/display/
collect/receive information through an unspecified generic computer does
not impose any meaningful limit on the computer implementation of the
abstract idea.” Id.
We agree with the Examiner that the steps performed by the
“computer” or the “vehicle,” which simply receives a “selected plan,” of
independent claim 1 are well-understood, routine, or conventional. As
discussed above, there is nothing in the Specification to indicate that the
steps recited in claim 1 require any specialized hardware or inventive
computer components or that the claimed invention is implemented using
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anything other than a generic computer to perform generic computer
functions, e.g., sending, receiving, aggregating, and analyzing data.
Viewed as a whole, independent claim 1 simply recites a series of
steps instructing how to send a “selected plan” (step [d]) based on the
collection and analysis of data (steps [a]–[c]). See Ultramercial, Inc. v.
Hulu, LLC, 772 F.3d 709, 716 (Fed. Cir. 2014) (“[T]he claimed sequence of
steps comprises only ‘conventional steps, specified at a high level of
generality,’ which is insufficient to supply an ‘inventive concept.’”) (Citing
Alice, 573 U.S. at 222). Here, independent claim 1 does not, for example,
purport to improve the functioning of the computer itself. Nor does it effect
an improvement in any other technology or technical field, as discussed
above with respect to Prong Two of Step 2A. Instead, independent claim 1
amounts to nothing significantly more than an instruction to apply the
abstract idea using a generic computer, which under our precedents, is not
enough to transform an abstract idea into a patent-eligible invention. See
Alice, 573 U.S. at 226.
We also are not persuaded by Appellant’s argument that the
limitations of independent claim 1 “do not merely request generic media
plans, they request specific types of plans that were derived based on
gathered data values.” Reply Br. 3. More particularly, Appellant argues that
independent claim 1 “impose meaningful limitation on the alleged abstract
idea” (id. (emphasis omitted)) because “the claims do not merely select a
media plan, generically, they select a plan that has the highest correlation to
historically observed user content preference when historical data element
values corresponding to the gathered element values were present.” Id.
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As discussed in greater detail above, however, there is no indication in
the record that the “computer” requires any specialized computer hardware
or that it requires any programming atypical from conventional
programming to “select a media plan” based on comparing data values.
Instead, the Specification simply discloses that
[t]he data gathered from the cloud can be compared to historic
occupant data to assemble a likely desired list of content or at
least a context on which content assembly can be based 308. The
data gathered from the cloud can be compared to historic
occupant data to assemble a likely desired list of content or at
least a context on which content assembly can be based 308. The
assembled and filtered request may then be sent to a plurality of
media sources in order to have playlists generated 310. In this
embodiment, the media sources return both a suggested playlist
and one or more advertisements to be included with the playlist.
These advertisements provide the revenue for both the vehicle
manufacturer and the media provider.
Spec. ¶ 48. See Bancorp Services, L.L.C. v. Sun Life Assurance Co. of Can.
(U.S.), 687 F.3d 1266, 1278, (Fed. Cir. 2012) (“The computer required by
some of Bancorp’s claims is employed only for its most basic function, the
performance of repetitive calculations, and as such does not impose
meaningful limits on the scope of those claims.”).
We are not persuaded, on the present record, that the Examiner erred
in rejecting independent claim 1 under 35 U.S.C. § 101. Therefore, we
sustain the Examiner’s rejection of independent claim 1, and claims 2–6 and
16–20, which fall with independent claim 1.
Appeal 2019-006088
Application 13/185,975

18
CONCLUSION
In summary:
Claims
Rejected
35 U.S.C. § Reference(s)/Basis Affirmed Reversed
1–6, 16–20 101 Eligibility 1–6, 16–20
No time period for taking any subsequent action in connection with
this appeal may be extended under 37 C.F.R. § 1.136(a). See 37 C.F.R.
§ 1.136(a)(1)(iv).

AFFIRMED