Pepsi-Cola Bottling Co. of Los Angeles

National Labor Relations Board - Board Decisions

Jun 24, 1974

211 N.L.R.B. 870 (N.L.R.B. 1974)

870 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
Pepsi-Cola Bottling Co. of Los Angeles and Chauf-
feurs, Salesdrivers & Helpers Local 572, Interna-
tional Brotherhood of Teamsters, Chauffeurs,
Warehousemen & Helpers of America. Case
31-CA-3580
June 24, 1974
DECISION AND ORDER
BY CHAIRMAN MILLER AND MEMBERS JENKINS
AND KENNEDY
On July 9, 1973, Administrative Law Judge Henry
S. Salim issued the attached Decision in this
proceeding. Thereafter, the General Counsel filed
exceptions and a supporting brief.
Pursuant to the provisions of Section 3(b) of the
National Labor Relations Act, as amended, the
National Labor Relations Board has delegated its
authority in this proceeding to a three-member panel.
The Board has considered the record and the
attached Decision in light of the exceptions and brief
and has decided to affirm the rulings, findings, and
conclusions of the Administrative Law Judge and to
adopt his recommended Order only to the extent
consistent herewith.
At all times material herein, Respondent has
maintained on its plant bulletin boards the following
rule which provides for discharge or disciplinary
action if it is violated:
Solicitation of any employees, distributing
literature illustrated, written, or printed matter of
any description on company premises during
working hours, without the consent of the
Company.
The Administrative Law Judge found the rule to be
"patently valid." We disagree.
In his analysis, the Administrative Law Judge has
equated the foregoing rule, which prohibits solicita-
tion and distribution of literature during "working
hours," with more restrictive rules in other cases
which prohibit solicitation and distribution of litera-
ture only during "working time." In our view, there is
a clear distinction to be drawn between the terms
"working hours" and "working time."
For the reasons fully set forth in Essex Internation-
al, Inc., 211 NLRB No. 112, we hold that the rule in
this case is invalid because the use of the term
"working hours" unduly restricts employees' rights
under Section 7 of the Act to engage in union
solicitation during their nonworking time; i.e., when
they are not engaged in the actual performance of
their job duties. The rule is also invalid because it
prohibits distribution of literature "on company
premises" and, therefore, further restricts employees'
rights to distribute union literature during their
nonworking time in nonworking areas of the plant
premises. We find, therefore, that the maintenance of
the no-solicitation and no-distribution rule in this
case violates Section 8(a)(1) of the Act.'
AMENDED CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1. The Respondent is engaged in commerce
within the meaning of Section 2(6) and (7) of the Act.
2. The Union is a labor organization as defined in
Section 2(5) of the Act.
3. By its preelection conduct of improving vaca-
tion benefits, Respondent violated Section 8(a)(1) of
the Act.
4. By its maintenance of an invalid no-solicitation
and no-distribution rule, Respondent violated Sec-
tion 8(a)(1) of the Act.
5. The aforesaid unfair labor practices affect
commerce within the meaning of Section 2(6) and (7)
of the Act.
6. Respondent did not engage in unfair labor
practices in violation of Section 8(a)(1) of the Act by
interrogating employee Robert Nutt and by promis-
ing its employees improved terms and conditions of
employment.
AMENDED REMEDY
We shall order Respondent to cease and desist
from maintaining any rule which prohibits employ-
ees from engaging in union solicitation during their
nonworking time, or from distributing union litera-
ture during their nonworking time in nonworking
areas of the plant premises.
ORDER
Pursuant to Section 10(c) of the National Labor
Relations Act, as amended, the National Labor
Relations Board adopts as its Order the recommend-
ed Order of the Administrative Law Judge, as
modified herein, and hereby orders that the Respon-
dent, Pepsi-Cola Bottling Co . of Los Angeles,
California, its officers, agents , successors , and as-
signs , shall take the action set forth in the said
recommended Order, as so modified:
1. Change paragraph 1(b) to 1(c) and insert the
following as 1(b):
"(b) Maintaining any rule which prohibits employ-
ees from engaging in union solicitation during their
nonworking time or which prohibits employees from
distributing union literature during their nonworking
time in nonworking areas of the plant premises."
I Stoddard-Quirk Manufacturing Co, 138 NLRB 615.
211 NLRB No. 132
PEPSI-COLA BOTTLING CO.
2. Substitute the attached notice for that of the
Administrative Law Judge.
APPENDIX
NOTICE To EMPLOYEES
POSTED BY ORDER OF THE
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
An Agency of the United States Government
After a full trial in which both sides had the
opportunity to present their evidence, the National
Labor Relations Board has found that we, Pepsi-
Cola Bottling Co. of Los Angeles, violated the
National Labor Relations Act, and ordered us to
post this notice. We will carry out the order of the
Board or the judgment of any court enforcing the
same , and we will comply with the following:
The Act gives all employees these rights:
To organize themselves
To form, join, or help unions
To act together for collective bargaining
or other mutual aid or protection
To refuse to do any or all these things.
WE WILL NOT do anything to interfere with you
in the exercise of the aforementioned rights, and
all our employees are free to become or remain a
member of Chauffeurs, Salesdrivers & Helpers
Local 572, International Brotherhood of Team-
sters, Chauffeurs, Warehousemen & Helpers of
America, or not become or remain a member of
that or any other union.
WE WILL NOT maintain any rule which prohib-
its our employees from engaging in union
solicitation during their nonworking time or
which prohibits our employees from distributing
union literature during their nonworking time in
nonworking areas of our plant premises.
WE WILL NOT promise or grant our employees
benefits and other improved working conditions
in order to influence how they vote in any
elections conducted by the National Labor
Relations Board.
WE WILL NOT in any like or related manner
interfere with, restrain, or coerce any employee in
the exercise of his right to join or assist a labor
union or to engage in other concerted activity for
mutual aid or protection.
PEPSI-COLA BOTTLING
CO. OF Los ANGELES
(Employer)
Dated By
(Representative) (Title)
This is an official notice and must not be defaced
by anyone.
871
This notice must remain posted for 60 consecutive
days from the date of posting and must not be
altered, defaced, or covered by any other material.
Any questions concerning this notice or compli-
ance with its provisions may be directed to the
Board's Office, Federal Building, Room 12100, 11000
Wilshire Boulevard, Los Angeles, California 90024,
Telephone 213-824-7351.
DECISION
HENRY S . SAKI, Administrative Law Judge: Upon
charges filed by the aforementioned Union, a complaint
issued by the General Counsel on March 29, 1973, and an
answer filed by Respondent,) a hearing was held on April
24 and 25.
Upon the entire record in this case, including observa-
tion of the demeanor of witnesses and upon consideration
of briefs filed June 6, 1973, there are made the following:
FINDINGS OF FACT
1. THE BUSINESS OF THE RESPONDENT AND THE
LABOR ORGANIZATION INVOLVED
Respondent is a California corporation with its principal
office and place of business in Torrance, California, where
it is engaged in the manufacture and sale of soft drink
beverages. Respondent admits and it is found that it is
engaged in commerce within Section 2(6) and (7) of the
Act.
Chauffeurs, Salesdrivers & Helpers Local 572, Interna-
tional Brotherhood of Teamsters, Chauffeurs, Warehouse-
men & Helpers of America, herein called the Union, is a
labor organization within the meaning of Section 2(5) of
the Act.
II. THE ALLEGED UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES 2
A. Introduction
In July, the Union began an organizational campaign
among Respondent's advance salesmen. Of the 19 advance
salesmen, approximately 15 or 16 signed union authoriza-
tion cards. By letter dated August 31, the Union notified
the Respondent Company that it represented a majority of
its advance salesmen employed at its Torrance plant and
requested recognition and a meeting with the Company for
the purpose of negotiating a collective-bargaining agree-
ment. A Board-conducted election was held on October 27,
which the Union lost.
B. Interrogation
The testimony reveals that Thomas Grubb, a supervisor
within the meaning of Section 2(11) of the Act, had a
discussion with Robert Nutt, an employee, which the
General Counsel' alleges was unlawful interrogation in
I Respondent amended its answer to allege that there has never been
enforcement of its no-solicitation rule with respect to union solicitation and
distribution of union literature on company premises.
2 All dates are 1972 unless otherwise indicated.
872 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
violation of Section 8(a)(l) of the Act. Nutt testified that 2
weeks before the election , when he and Grubb were away
from the plant, they talked for over an hour, while riding in
an automobile . Nutt testified that Grubb "asked me what
my sentiments were on it [the Union] and I told him that
without a union we had nothing . Because any day these
people could let any one of us go for any reason at all."
When Nutt was asked what Grubb then said, he answered:
"I don 't remember exactly what he said ." Then when Nutt
was asked again if Grubb said anything about the Union,
Nutt replied: "Tom [Grubb] naturally didn't agree with
me, but he thought with what we had we were doing all
right . If there were things wrong , they would talk them
over and try to get them straightened out."
The question then is whether Grubb coercively interro-
gated Nutt within the meaning of Section 8(axl) based
upon the above testimony of Nutt which is uncontradicted.
Interrogation of employees by a supervisor about union
matters is not per se a violation of the Act . It appears that
Nutt and Grubb were on a first-name basis with one
another and that the conversation , quoted above , does not
have the coercive characteristics proscribed by Section
8(a)(1) of the Act .3 Nor does it seem that Grubb was
seeking information on which to base taking action against
Nutt. This was a casual , informal conversation in an
amicable atmosphere, while both of them were riding in an
automobile . What Grubb said to Nutt obviously was not
threatening. An inquiry by Grubb as to Nutt's "senti-
ments" about the Union has not been shown by the
General Counsel to have any relationship to the coercion
or restraint of Nutt in his organizational rights as
delineated in Section 7 of the Act. This isolated and
innocuous inquiry by Grubb of Nutt, the only advance
salesman questioned out of a unit of approximately 19
advance salesmen, standing alone , does not constitute
interference, restraint, or coercion within the meaning of
Section 8(a)(1). Accordingly, it is found, based upon the
above facts , that Section 8(a)(1) of the Act was not
violated .4
C. Promises of Improved Working Conditions
The complaint alleges that Glenn Graeber, who is a
supervisor within the meaning of Section 2(11) of the Act,
promised the advance salesmen at an employees' meeting
improved terms and conditions of employment . The only
evidence with respect to this alleged violation of Section
8(a)(1) is the following testimony of Nutt:
Q. What did he [Graeber] say at that meeting?
A. He told us that he didn't know what the men
were so upset with the way the working conditions
were, the way they were, and that if everybody felt-if
it was that way, there would be changes made for the
better, but he couldn ' t make any promises.
He also stated he couldn ' t make any promises , because
he was ruled by law as to what he could say and
couldn 't say, something to that effect.
9 United Fireworks Company v. N.LR B., 252 F.2d 428, 430 (C.A. 6,
1958); Welch Scientific Co. v. N.LR.B., 340 F.2d 199 , 204 (C.A. 2, 1965).
4 American Federation of Musicians, Local 76, AFL-CIO (The Jimmy
Graeber denied that he promised the advance salesmen
any benefits.
The General Counsel argues that in the light of
Respondent's other conduct , it is consistent with Respon-
dent's efforts to thwart the Union 's organizational drive,
and that the testimony of Nutt quoted above "strongly
supports the probability that Graeber did in fact tell the
salesmen [at the meeting ] that there would be improved
post-election changes in terms and conditions of employ-
ment ." The evidence does not support this contention as
evidenced by Nutt's own testimony that Graeber specifi-
cally told them "he couldn't make any promises."
The burden is on the General Counsel to make out a
prima facie case that Graeber promised the advance
salesmen improved working conditions. Graeber denied
this and employee Nutt testified that Graeber , in speaking
to the advance salesmen at a meeting about their
complaints, twice qualified what he had to say by
emphasizing that he had no authority to promise them
anything. Consequently , it is found that the General
Counsel has not sustained his burden of proof. According-
ly, paragraph 7(b) of the complaint is dismissed.
D. Vacation Benefits
The complaint alleges that Respondent announced to its
advance salesmen and put into effect improved vacation
benefits for certain advance salesmen . The record reveals
that prior to 1972 advance salesmen, who were employed
by Respondent for 1 year, were entitled to 1 week of
vacation; 2 years' service entitled them to 2 weeks of
vacation; and those employed for 5 years received 3 weeks
of vacation . In computing the time when an employee
would be entitled to either 2 or 3 weeks of vacation, the
date originally used by the Company in fixing the
anniversary date was the date when the employee was
hired. Subsequently, the Company changed the hiring date
for employees to a common date of January 1.
Nutt testified that he learned for the first time that the
manner of computing the amount of vacation time was
changed from the hiring date to the common date of
January 1, when the employees' vacation times were posted
on the bulletin board sometime around April 1972.5 At
that time, he was listed on the bulletin board announce-
ment as being entitled to only 2 weeks' vacation instead of
3 weeks, which he believed he had coming to him. He
complained to Al Johnson, his supervisor, that the notice
posted on the bulletin board stated his vacation time was
only 2 weeks , whereas he was employed by the Company 5
years as of April 1972. It was not until 2 weeks before the
October 27 election, testified Nutt, that he was notified by
Johnson that he was entitled to an additional week of
vacation.
Warren Davis , an advance salesman, testified that the
change in computing the date when an employee 's right to
another week's vacation was reached was adopted by
Respondent, whereby the hiring date was reestablished and
the common date discarded without notifying the sales-
men, that he did not learn about it until late September or
Wakely Show), 202 NLRB 620.
5 This estimate is based on Nutt 's original employment date of April
1967, which would mean his 5-year anniversary date was April 1972.
PEPSI-COLA BOTTLING CO. 873
early October 1972 , when Johnson announced it at a
meeting of the employees.
Wayne Lemons director ' of industrial relations for
Respondent, testified that 13 advance salesmen were
affected when the basis for computing the date when the
employees' right to an additional week's vacation was
reached was changed by the Company.
Ronald Schoors , an advance salesman since March 1967,
who testified on behalf of Respondent , stated that he
learned in the "last part of July" that he was entitled to 3
weeks of vacation . On cross-examination , he appeared
confused as to when he learned for the first time that he
was entitled to 3 weeks of vacation . He testified he learned
this when he spoke to Johnson "in the latter part of August
... around Labor Day," and then in speaking to a fellow
employee he heard of it around August 31 , and finally, he
stated, he did not remember the date when he first learned
he was entitled to a third week of vacation , except that it
was at a "sales meeting" of the employees , which he places
as being I week after August 316 Cogently significant is
Schoors' recital of a conversation he had with Lemon,
Respondent 's industrial relations director, in January or
February, when Duane Murray (who is unidentified) had
suggested he see Lemon in regard to how many weeks of
vacation he was entitled. Lemon told him, according to
Schoors, that : ". . . we had reverted to a common
anniversary date for salaried employees which I was not
aware of. I was using my hire date as an anniversary date."
As mentioned above, 13 employees were adversely
affected by the Company's change in computing the date
when their respective dates for I more week of vacation
matured . It is clear that after the change instituted by
Respondent , whereby the employee's hiring date was
abolished and a common anniversary date of January 1
adopted , that he was required to wait a greater length of
time before he could qualify for additional vacation time.
For example , Nutt and Davis, whose hiring dates were in
April, were adversely affected as their anniversary dates to
qualify for 3 weeks of vacation , under the newly instituted
common date of January 1, was postponed from their
hiring dates in April until the following January.
It is found that the union organizational campaign was
initiated in July and that 15 or 16 advance salesmen signed
union authorization cards. In late September or early
October the employees were notified for the first time by
Respondent that the present basis of a common date for
computing the date when they were entitled to an increase
in their number of weeks of vacation was rescinded and the
former method of their respective hiring dates reinstituted.
It is believed there was more than a temporal coincidence
between the time the employees were so notified and the
date of the Board election. The advance salesmen received
notice of this change about 3 or 4 weeks before the
election . Moreover, it is found that the Respondent was
aware of the salesmen 's interest in and activity on behalf of
the Union when it announced it was reverting to its
original method of computing the time when an employee
was entitled to an additional week of vacation. The
absence of direct knowledge of employees ' union activity is
not a material failure of proof , and does not preclude a
finding that the employer knew of such activity where the
circumstances are such , as here, that Respondent 's knowl-
edge may be properly inferred.?
It is clear that the Company , by reverting to its former
method of computation was granting a substantial benefit
to those 13 employees whose dates of entitlement to 3
weeks' vacation were accelerated, particularly so in the
context of the approaching election which was approxi-
mately a month away. Moreover, it is not believed that the
Respondent Company was motivated by a legitimate
business purpose, but rather to influence the manner in
which the advance salesmen would vote in the impending
Board election . Such motivation , it is not too unreasonable
to assume, conceivably would discourage their voting for
the Union, and the evidence warrants an inference that the
conferring of this benefit was causally connected or
motivated for the purpose of influencing the employees in
their choice of bargaining representatives in the coming
election . The timing of the announcement to the salesmen
of the change in the Company 's method of computing as to
when they qualified for an additional week of vacation,
which in this case accelerated the time , convinces me that it
constitutes a substantial basis for an unfair labor practice
finding of an 8(a)(1) violation of the Act, in that it had a
tendency to interfere with the employees ' free choice when
they voted in the representation election.
E. No-Solicitation Rule
Respondent had promulgated by posting some time
between May and September 1970, on its plant bulletin
boards , the following no-solicitation rule which provides
for discharge or disciplinary action if it were violated by
the:
Solicitation of any employees, distributing literature
illustrated, written, or printed matter of any description
on company premises during working hours , without
the consent of the Company.
No employee was ever cited for violating this rule.
The General Counsel contends that the "mere mainte-
nance of such an overly-broad rule constitutes an interfer-
ence with the employees ' Section 7 rights in violation of
Section 8(a)(1) of the Act . Moreover," argues the General
Counsel, "even though no employee was disciplined, the
mere maintenance of the rule itself serves to inhibit the
employees' engaging in otherwise protected organizational
activity and that the finding of a violation is not precluded
by the absence of specific evidence that the rule was
invoked against any employee."
Decisional law establishes that the validity under the Act
of a no-solicitation rule is to be determined by striking a
balance "between the undisputed right of self-organization
6 Nutt and Davis testified that this meeting was held in the last part of
September or early October , which is found to be correct.
7 Allied Distributing Co., 130 NLRB 1348, 1350 ; Radio Officers' Union of
the Commercial Telegraphers Union v N LR B., 347 U.S. 17 (1954); Becker.
Durham, Inc., 130 NLRB 1356, 1357.
874 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
assured to employees ... and the equally undisputed right
of employers to maintain discipline in their establish-
ment."8 Neither right is unlimited . As further explained by
the Supreme Court: 9
This is not a problem of always open or always closed
doors for union organization on company property.
Organization rights are granted to workers by the same
authority, the National Government, that preserves
property rights. Accommodation between the two must
be obtained with as little destruction of the one as is
consistent with the maintenance of the other.
In accordance with this approach, the cases have made
clear that in the normal situation an employer may, in
furtherance of the interests of production and discipline,
make and enforce a rule forbidding his employees to
engage in union solicitation on plant property during
working time.'° On the other hand, it is equally well
established that an employer may not, at least in the
absence of special justifying circumstances, enforce a rule
which prohibits solicitation by its employees during
nonworking time and in nonworking areas of company
premises.ll
The no-solicitation rule in this proceeding is patently
valid. However, the General Counsel contends that the rule
was "overly-broad" and its mere "maintenance" a viola-
tion of Section 8(a)(l). Whether he claims that rule is
illegal per se is not clear. The no-solicitation rule, supra,
was posted at an unspecified time between May and
September 1970 and no organizational activity was in
progress at the time of its adoption. In this regard, what the
Supreme Court has said in N.LR.B. v. United Steelworkers
of America, AFL-CIO [Nutone, Inc.], 357 U.S. 357, 361
(1958), is pertinent here: "Employer rules prohibiting
organizational solicitation are not in and of themselves
violative of the Act, for they may duly serve production,
order and discipline." In the instant case, the uncontradict-
ed evidence of Wayne Lemon establishes that the purpose
for which the rule was posted was to prevent various types
of solicitation which occurred at Respondent's premises,
such as the sale by other employees of Girl Scout cookies,
tour packages, brochures, and sweepstake tickets. It would
appear, therefore, that the rule was posted in response to
interference with production. As was stated by the Trial
Examiner in McEwen Manufacturing Company:12
The Board in McEwen affirmed the Trial Examiner's
Decision and found that the no-solicitation rule was posted
only after the Respondent noticed the quality and quantity
of the employees' work had declined. The Board stated:
"In these circumstances, the fact that the rule was posted
soon after the Union's organizing efforts, began does not
warrant an inference that its purpose and intent was to
discourage union activities among the employees."
In Gooch Packin& Inc., 187 NLRB 351, the respondent
company maintained the following no-solicitation rule:
Solicitation: There shall be no solicitation or buying or
selling of any kind during working time unless prior
permission has been obtained from the Personnel
Manager. This includes, but is not limited to, any form
of solicitations, such as contributions to charities,
contributions to employee funds, selling of tickets or
membership in service clubs, membership in labor
organizations , collection of bills, collection of debts,
etc.
Although the no-solicitation rule quoted, supra, is
broader than the one in this case, the Board held the rule to
be valid. No evidence was introduced by the General
Counsel to show that the no-solicitation rule here inhibited
protected activity. Moreover, no employees had ever been
reprimanded by Respondent for engaging in union
organizational activities.
In Daylin, Inc., 198 NLRB No. 40, a Board majority
stated that: "Only a substantial business justification, such
as a genuine interference with the progress of the work,
justifies any restriction on this right of solicitation. A no-
solicitation rule is presumptively, and only presumptively,
valid if it is limited to prohibiting solicitation during the
time an employer is expected to be working and not during
breaktime, lunchtime, or the like. Such a rule is valid
because it is presumed to be directed toward, and to have
the effect of preventing interference with production." See
Glassmaster Plastics Company, 203 NLRB No. 147.
In the circumstances , it is found that Respondent posted
the no-solicitation rule in furtherance of Respondent's
legitimate interests _ of serving production and discipline
and not to impede and thwart the Union's organizational
campaign. Applying these principles to the instant case, it
is found there was no violation of Section 8(a)(1).
Accordingly, it will be recommended that paragraph 6(b)
of the complaint be dismissed.
The validity of a rule promulgated and posted under
such circumstances is not impaired because a second-
ary effect might result in the impeding of union
organization , for such result to some degree must
always follow from any valid rule. The no-solicitation
rule being valid on its face could be lawfully posted
where union activities as here were interfering with
production. . . . Under such circumstances, secondary
effects resulting in the prevention of unrestrained union
activities are, in nature , damnum absque injuria.
e Republic Aviation Corp. v. N.LR.B., 324 U.S. 793, 797-798 (1945);
Stoddard-Quirk Mfg. Co., 138 NLRB 615.
Y N. L R.B. v. Babcock & Wilcox Co., 351 U.S. 105,112 (1956).
10 Peyton Packing Co., 49 NLRB 828, 843-844, cited with approval in
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
The Company by reinstituting its former policy and
announcing it before a scheduled election whereby the
time for its advance salesmen to qualify for longer
vacations was shortened, which resulted in improved
vacation benefits, thereby engaged in unfair labor practices
affecting commerce within the meaning of Section 8(a)(l)
and Section 2(6) and (7) of the Act.
The Company did not violate Section 8(a)(1) when it is
Republic Aviation v. N.LRB., 324 U.S. 793, 804.
11 Republic Aviation v. N.LR.B., supra . See also N.L.R.B. v. Babcock &
Wilcox, 351 U.S. 105, 113.
12 172 NLRB 990 at 1000.
PEPSI-COLA BOTTLING CO. 875
alleged it coercively interrogated an employee and prom-
ised its employees improved terms and conditions of
employment.
THE REMEDY
It shall be recommended that the Company cease and
desist from granting employees better conditions of
employment in order to influence their choice of bargain-
ing representative in a Board election.
Upon the foregoing findings of fact, conclusions of law,
and the entire record, and pursuant to Section 10(c) of the
Act, it is hereby recommended there issue the following:
ORDER 13
The Respondent, Pepsi-Cola Bottling Co. of Los Ange-
les, its officers , agents , successors , and assigns , shall:
1. Cease and desist from:
(a) Granting its employees benefits whereby their
13 In the event no exceptions are filed as provided by Sec. 102.46 of the
Rules and Regulations of the National Labor Relations Board , the findings,
conclusions, and recommended Order herein shall, as provided in Sec.
102.48 of the Rules and Regulations ; be adopted by the Board and become
its findings, conclusions, and Order , and all objections thereto shall be
deemed waived for all purposes.
conditions of employment are improved in order to
influence how they vote in a Board election.
(b) In any like or related manner interfering with,
restraining, or coercing employees in the exercise of their
rights under Section 7 of the Act:
2. Take the following affirmative action necessary to
effectuate the policies of the Act.
(a) Post at its plant at Torrance, California, copies of the
attached notice marked "Appendix." 14 Copies of said
notice on forms provided by the Regional Director for
Region 31, after being duly signed by the Respondent's
representative, shall be posted by Respondent immediately
upon receipt thereof, and be maintained by it for 60
consecutive days thereafter, in conspicuous places, includ-
ing all places where notices to employees are customarily
posted. Reasonable steps shall be taken by the Respondent
to insure that said notices are not altered, defaced, or
covered by any other material.
(b) Notify the Regional Director for Region 31, in
writing, within 20 days from the date of this Order, what
steps the Respondent has taken to comply herewith.
14 In the event that the Board 's Order is enforced by a Judgment of a
United States Court of Appeals, the words in the notice reading "Posted by
Order of the National Labor Relations Board " shall read "Posted Pursuant
to a Judgment of the United States Court of Appeals Enforcing an Order of
the National Labor Relations Board."