People Care, Inc.

National Labor Relations Board - Board Decisions

Mar 9, 1999

327 N.L.R.B. 814 (N.L.R.B. 1999)

DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD 814
People Care, Incorporated and 1199 National Health
and Human Service Employees’ Union and Ei-
leen Francis. Cases 2–CA–27207, 2–CA–28509,
and 2–CA–27909
March 9, 1999
DECISION AND ORDER
BY CHAIRMAN TRUESDALE AND MEMBERS
LIEBMAN AND BRAME
On July 16, 1997, Administrative Law Judge Steven
Davis issued the attached decision. The Respondent
filed exceptions and a supporting brief. The General
Counsel and the Charging Party each filed an answering
brief, and the Respondent filed a reply brief in support of
its exceptions. The General Counsel and the Charging
Party each filed exceptions and a supporting brief. The
Respondent filed an answering brief to the exceptions of
the General Counsel and the Charging Party.
The National Labor Relations Board has delegated its
authority in this proceeding to a three-member panel.
The Board has considered the decision and the record
in light of the exceptions and briefs and has decided to
affirm the judge’s rulings, findings,1 and conclusions and
to adopt the recommended Order as modified.2
ORDER
The National Labor Relations Board adopts the rec-
ommended Order of the administrative law judge as
modified below and orders that the Respondent, People
Care, Incorporated, New York, New York, its officers,
agents, successors, and assigns, shall take the action set
forth in the Order as modified.
1. Substitute the following for paragraphs 2(b) and (e).
“(b) Provide the Union with all the information re-
quested by the Union in its letter of February 17, 1994,
excluding the names of clients, except such information
already provided to the Union through its response of
June 26, 1996.
“(e) Within 14 days after service by the Region, post at
its place of business in New York, New York, copies of
the attached notice marked “Appendix.”12 Copies of the
notice, on forms provided by the Regional Director for
Region 2, after being signed by the Respondent’s author-
ized representative, shall be posted by the Respondent
and maintained for 60 consecutive days in conspicuous
places including all places where notices to employees
are customarily posted. Reasonable steps shall be taken
by the Respondent to insure that the notices are not al-
tered, defaced, or covered by any other material. In the
event that, during the pendency of these proceedings, the
Respondent has gone out of business or closed the facil-
ity involved in these proceedings, the Respondent shall
duplicate and mail, at its own expense, a copy of the no-
tice to all current employees and former employees em-
ployed by the Respondent at any time since February 17,
1994.”

1 The Charging Party has excepted, inter alia, to the judge’s failure
to find that the Respondent violated Sec. 8(a)(5) and (1) of the Act by
insisting on bargaining at evening sessions only. Since we have
adopted the judge’s finding that the Respondent unlawfully failed to
meet with the Union at reasonable times for bargaining, it is unneces-
sary to decide the issue raised by the Charging Party. It would not
materially affect the remedy and Order in this proceeding.
2 We shall modify the judge’s recommended Order to comport with
our decision in Excel Container, 325 NLRB 17 (1997), and to clarify
that the Respondent is ordered to provide the Union, without any addi-
tional request by the Union, all the information requested by the Union
in its letter of February 17, 1994, excluding the names of clients, except
such information already provided to the Union by the Respondent
through its response of June 26, 1996. See I & F Corp., 322 NLRB
1037 fn. 1 (1997).
On the facts of this case, Chairman Truesdale would grant the ex-
traordinary remedies requested in the consolidated complaint.
2. Substitute the attached notice for that of the admin-
istrative law judge.

APPENDIX
NOTICE TO EMPLOYEES
POSTED BY ORDER OF THE
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
An Agency of the United States Government

The National Labor Relations Board has found that we vio-
lated the National Labor Relations Act and has ordered us to
post and abide by this notice.

Section 7 of the Act gives employees these rights.

To organize
To form, join, or assist any union
To bargain collectively through representatives
of their own choice
To act together for other mutual aid or protection
To choose not to engage in any of these protected
concerted activities.

WE WILL NOT fail or refuse to furnish or delay in
furnishing 1199 National Health and Human Service
Employees’ Union with the information requested by the
Union in its letter of February 17, 1994, excluding the
names of clients.
WE WILL NOT refuse to meet at reasonable times for
bargaining with the Union.
WE WILL NOT insist on the removal of union nego-
tiator Richard Levy as a condition for the continuation of
collective bargaining.
WE WILL NOT in any like or related manner interfere
with, restrain, or coerce you in the exercise of the rights
guaranteed you by Section 7 of the Act.
WE WILL, on request, bargain with the Union as the
exclusive representative of the employees in the follow-
ing appropriate unit concerning terms and conditions of
employment, as if the initial year of certification has
been extended for an additional 8 months from the com-
mencement of bargaining and, if an understanding is
reached, embody the understanding in a signed agree-
ment:

327 NLRB No. 144
PEOPLE CARE, INC. 815
All full-time and regular part-time home health care
workers employed by us, including certified home
health aides, personal care aides, quality compliance
technicians, junior aides and housekeepers employed
by us out of our facility located at 500 Eighth Avenue,
New York, New York, excluding all other employees,
including registered nurses, licensed practical nurses,
office clerical and professional employees, guards and
supervisors as defined in the Act.

WE WILL provide the Union with all the information
requested by the Union in its letter of February 17, 1994,
excluding the names of clients, except such information
already provided to the Union through our response of
June 26, 1996.
WE WILL, on request, provide the Union in a timely
and diligent fashion with bargaining dates.
WE WILL, on request, meet, deal with, and bargain
collectively with Richard Levy and any other duly desig-
nated representative of the Union.

PEOPLE CARE, INCORPORATED

Ian Penny, Esq., for the General Counsel.
David Lew and Eric Stuart, Esqs. (Peckar & Abramson, P.C.),
of River Edge, New Jersey, for the Respondent.
Gwynne Wilcox, Esq. (Levy, Ratner & Behroozi, P.C.), of New
York, New York, for the Union.
DECISION
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
STEVEN DAVIS, Administrative Law Judge. Based on a
charge and a first amended charge in Case 2–CA–27207 filed
on February 22 and April 4, 1994, respectively, by 1199 Na-
tional Health and Human Service Employees’ Union (the Un-
ion), an amended complaint was issued by Region 2 of the
Board on November 10, 1994, against People Care, Incorpo-
rated (the Respondent or Employer), and based on a charge in
Case 2–CA–27909 filed on October 24, 1994, by Eileen Fran-
cis, an individual (Francis), a complaint was issued on February
28, 1995, against the Respondent, and based on a charge in
Case 2–CA–28509 filed on June 14, 1995, by the Union, a
consolidated complaint was issued against the Respondent on
October 12, 1995.1
The complaint, as amended at the hearing, alleges that he
Respondent (a) refused to furnish certain information to the
Union, and alternatively, substantially delayed in furnishing
such information and (b) refused to bargain in good faith with
the Union by refusing to meet at reasonable times and for rea-
sonable durations insisting on the removal of a union negotiator
as a condition for the continuation of bargaining; presenting
certain bargaining demands designed to be rejected by the Un-
ion and to prevent the parties from reaching agreement; and
engaging in a pattern of bargaining without any good-faith

1 The Respondent’s answer denies the filing and service of the
charge in Case 2–CA–27207. My review of the original documents in
evidence, including an affidavit of service of the charge, and a signed
return receipt therefor, establishes that the charge was filed and served
as set forth in the complaint.
intention of reaching agreement with the Union. The complaint
sought a remedy pursuant to Mar-Jac Poultry, 136 NLRB 785
(1962).2
The Respondent’s answer denied the material allegations of
the complaint, and on December 18, 1995, and May 21, June 12
and 28, 1996, a hearing was held before me in New York City.
On my denial of the Respondent’s motion to admit certain evi-
dence of negotiations which took place subsequent to the al-
leged violations of the Act, the Respondent filed a request for
special permission to appeal my ruling. On July 18, the Board
directed me to reopen the hearing to permit the parties to intro-
duce such evidence and to consider that evidence with respect
to both the merits of the complaint allegations and the remedies
requested by the General Counsel. On October 24, 1996, a re-
opened hearing was held before me, and such evidence was
received.
On the evidence presented in this proceeding, and my obser-
vation of the demeanor of the witnesses, and after consideration
of the briefs filed by all parties, I make the following3

FINDINGS OF FACT
I. JURISDICTION
The Respondent, a New York corporation, having its princi-
pal place of business at 500 Eighth Avenue, New York City,
has been engaged in the business of providing housekeeping
services to disabled and elderly individuals. Annually, in the
course and conduct of its business operations, the Respondent
derives gross revenues in excess of $500,000, and purchases
and receives at its facility products, goods, and materials valued
in excess of $25,000 directly from points located outside New
York State. The Respondent admits, and I find, that it is an
employer engaged in commerce within the meaning of Section
2(2), (6), and (7) of the Act, and that the Union is a labor or-
ganization within the meaning of Section 2(5) of the Act.
II. THE ALLEGED UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES
The Facts
The Respondent, a for-profit company which supplies home
health care aides to aged and ill people in their homes, employs
between 700 and 900 such workers.
1. Events leading up to the negotiations
On September 24, 1992, the Union filed a petition to repre-
sent the Respondent’s employees. A representation hearing was
held in October and November 1992, at which the Respondent
supplied certain personnel documents pursuant to a union sub-
poena.
On January 12, 1993, a Decision and Direction of Election
was issued. On May 10, the Respondent submitted an Excelsior
list which set forth the names and addresses of employees who
were eligible to vote in the election. On June 11 and 12, an
election was conducted, and on September 24, 1993, the Union
was certified as the exclusive collective-bargaining representa-
tive in the following appropriate unit:

2 At the opening of the hearing, the General Counsel moved to dis-
miss all allegations of the complaint concerning Francis. I granted the
motion.
3 The Respondent’s unopposed motion to correct the hearing tran-
script in certain respects is granted.
DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD 816
All full-time and regular part-time home health care workers
employed by the Employer, including certified home health
aides, personal care aides, quality compliance technicians,
junior aides and housekeepers employed by the Employer out
of its facility located at 500 Eighth Avenue, New York, New
York, excluding all other employees, including registered
nurses, licensed practical nurses, office clerical and profes-
sional employees, guards and supervisors as defined in the
Act.

On November 9, Aida Garcia, the Union’s executive vice
president and director of its home care division, sent a letter to
the Respondent requesting bargaining. On November 16, the
Respondent’s attorney, David Lew, responded that the Union’s
“representational status” was pending before the Board. Subse-
quently, the Board denied the the Respondent’s request for
review, and on November 30, Garcia again requested bargain-
ing and asked Lew for dates which were available to him for
negotiations. When no dates for bargaining were forthcoming,
Garcia informed the Union’s attorneys.
On January 3, 1994, Richard Levy, the Union’s general
counsel, wrote to Lew, proposing eight dates for bargaining,
between January 10 and 21, seven of the dates being “p.m.
only,” meaning sessions beginning at noon or 1 p.m. Levy
suggested that Lew choose “two or more dates now,” and ad-
vise him promptly. Levy testified that he requested multiple
bargaining dates since he anticipated that negotiations for this
first contract would be difficult, requiring much time.
Lew responded by letter of January 12, stating that none of
the requested dates was available “on such short notice,” and
that he would be “meeting with my client, hopefully in the near
future, to discuss the issue, including all of the NLRB’s actions
to date.” Lew concluded by saying that he would be in contact
with Levy when he and his client met.
Not having heard from Lew, Levy phoned him apparently
without success, and then wrote to him on February 15, re-
questing dates for bargaining.
On February 17, 1994, Levy sent a letter to Lew requesting
that Lew contact him “as quickly as possible regarding bargain-
ing dates.” The letter also requested the following information,
which he asserted the Union needed to prepare for negotiations:

1. The name and address of each current employee and
his/her title and current assignment, date of first employ-
ment, number of years with the agency and date of birth.
The latter information is particularly important to pension
coverage questions.
2. The wages being paid to each of the present em-
ployees.
3. A description of all benefits provided to employees,
including but not limited to pension, health insurance, life
insurance, vacations, holidays, sick leave, other leave poli-
cies and copies of any benefit plans, summary plan de-
scriptions or other documents describing such benefits.
4. Any employee manuals or memoranda describing
work requirements or personnel practices affecting em-
ployees in the bargaining unit.
5. A description of the procedure by which employees
are selected for assignment to particular cases (clients) and
a listing of all such assignments made within the last six
months showing the name of the employee assigned, the
name of the client and the date of the assignment and the
reason for her selection for that assignment.4

Levy testified that from February 17 through June 8, he did
not receive any response to his letter of February 17. Levy’s
letter of June 8, in response to Lew’s questions to the Board
agent who was investigating an unfair labor practice charge,
explained why the requested information was relevant.
On June 14, Lew wrote to Levy, in which he essentially
claimed that the information requested was either supplied to
the Union in the representation proceeding, or was burdensome
and confidential. Lew noted that he had called Levy, and ap-
parently Levy returned the calls, but the two men could not
thereafter make contact.
Lew testified that the information requested in Levy’s Feb-
ruary 17 letter was not requested for the purposes of collective-
bargaining, as set forth in the letter. Rather, according to Lew,
at that time Levy knew there was no collective bargaining on-
going, and that the Respondent was testing the Union’s certifi-
cation, adding that Levy was simply “posturing” in the letter.
However, Lew admitted that his June 14 letter did not advise
Levy that he would not supply the information because he
sought review of the certification, which was pending at that
time.
Levy replied in a letter sent the same day, stating that Lew’s
objections to the information requests were “frivolous.” Levy
again asked for bargaining dates, but none were forthcoming.
On June 22, a complaint was issued in Case 2–CA–27207,
alleging that the Respondent failed and refused to meet and
bargain with the Union, and refused to furnish the information
set forth above. On July 25, the General Counsel filed a petition
for summary judgment, and on September 16, the Board issued
its decision, finding that the Respondent refused to bargain in
order to contest the Union’s certification, granting the petition
in that respect, and ordering it to bargain. However, the Board
remanded the matter concerning the refusal to provide informa-
tion for further action. People Care, Inc., 314 NLRB 1188
(1994).
On September 26, Levy wrote to Lew asking him to call to
arrange bargaining dates. Lew testified that at that time, the
Respondent had decided not to appeal the Board’s decision to
the court of appeals, and that the Respondent would be in a
very strong economic position in negotiations, and therefore
decided to comply with the Board’s Order. Accordingly, on
October 18, Lew wrote to Levy, advising that the Respondent
would bargain, and asked Levy to have the union negotiator
call him.
In late October, Levy spoke to Lew. Levy asked for dates in
late October and early November. Lew was not available in
early November. According to Levy, Lew suggested two dates,
November 18 and 29. According to Lew, he agreed to meet on
November 18, but said that he would have to check his client’s
availability to meet on November 29 or 30.
On October 26, Levy wrote to Lew agreeing to Lew’s “sug-
gested dates” of November 18 and 29. Lew immediately wrote
back, saying that he had not agreed to November 29, and that in
fact his client was not available on that day, noting that when
they met on November 18 he was certain that they would be
able to agree on the next date for bargaining.5

4 The Union later withdrew its request for the names of the clients.
5 The General Counsel argued in his brief that Lew was being disin-
genuous about saying that he had to check with his client Donald Ja-
PEOPLE CARE, INC. 817
On November 4, Levy wrote to Lew confirming the Novem-
ber 18 session, and asking whether Lew still had available No-
vember 30, which was referred to as a possible date for meet-
ing. Levy asked Lew to contact him about November 30 and
other dates in December. Lew did not respond since he believed
that further dates would be discussed at negotiations.
2. The November 18 bargaining session
Prior to this session, Levy met with union representatives
and assembled a complete proposed collective-bargaining
agreement.
At the session, which began at 11 a.m., about 25 persons
were present for the Union, including Levy, Garcia, and other
representatives and employees.6 Lew and Jacobson represented
the Respondent. The Union presented the the Respondent with
its proposed contract, and Levy spoke about each clause. Fol-
lowing his presentation, Levy asked Lew if he had any ques-
tions or responses, and Lew replied that he had none at that
time. Levy asked Lew to call him if anything could be worked
out or clarified before the next session.
Levy also renewed his request for the materials he had asked
for, and Lew gave no response to that request.
At the end of the meeting, Levy said that he was concerned
that so much time had elapsed since the Union’s certification,
and that he wanted to set a number of bargaining dates quickly,
since this was a first contract, and he expected that negotiations
would be extensive. Levy proposed dates in late November and
early December, which were rejected by Lew, who said that his
first available date for bargaining was December 15.
Levy responded that that was too far away, but if that was
the earliest date they could meet, then they should agree on
some dates immediately after December 15, such as in Decem-
ber and early January. Lew replied that he could not do that,
and would only be able to supply additional dates when they
met on December 15.
Lew further replied that he would no longer meet to bargain
during the day, since such daytime bargaining meant that em-
ployees would not be working. He said that one employee who
was present called the Respondent and said she could not work
that day. Levy responded that they should meet during the day,
and offered to have employees present who were not working
that day.
Lew testified that 1 or 2 days prior to this session, the Re-
spondent received a list of 20 employees who would be present
at negotiations, thereby leaving their cases. Lew refused to
meet during the day since most of the employees are employed
during the day, leaving work at about 5 p.m. He told Levy that
The Respondent would only meet in the evening, beginning at
6:45 p.m. Levy replied that such a late start to bargaining was
not productive and would limit the amount of time to bargain,
unless the parties bargained late into the night, which Lew said
he would not do. Levy also remarked that many of the employ-
ees who were members of the negotiating committee were
working mothers and single heads of households who needed to
be home in the evenings with their children, and that their
travel home in the evening presented a safety issue. Neverthe-

cobson, since he was aware, through the 1992 representation hearing,
that Jacobson had not been actively involved in the Company since
1990. I do not agree with the General Counsel. In fact, Jacobson at-
tended the November 18 bargaining session.
6 Lew stated that 9 union committee members and 28 other employ-
ees were present.
less, Lew insisted on meeting in the evening, when the employ-
ees had completed their work.7
Lew testified, as to the setting of new dates, that he had
heavy workdays on nearly every day from November 18 to
December 15, and that he had to make sure that Jacobson was
available. Lew added that Levy had a “knack for continually
asking for earlier and earlier dates,” and “pushed” and
“bugged” him for earlier dates. They agreed to meet on De-
cember 15 at 6:45 p.m.
That day, November 18, Levy sent a letter to Lew, confirm-
ing the December 15 session, and asking that he inform Levy if
a date earlier than December 15 became available. Levy also
asked Lew to reconsider his insistence on evening bargaining
sessions, noting that the Union was only asking that five peo-
ple be released from work. Lew testified that no bargaining
dates prior to December 15 were available because of his busy
schedule, nor at the end of December due to the holiday season.
Lew claimed that Levy was “posturing” and preparing for liti-
gation at the November 18 session, by asking for other dates.
On December 6, Levy wrote to Lew again requesting the in-
formation set forth in his February 17 letter. That information
was not forthcoming. Lew testified that Levy was simply “pos-
turing” by his request since the information request was the
subject of the instant case, and Levy had not responded to his
June 14 letter that the Union was in possession of all the infor-
mation.
3. The December 15 bargaining session
The meeting was scheduled to begin at 6:45 p.m. Levy stated
that Lew arrived at 7:20 p.m., whereas Lew said that he arrived
before 7 p.m., due to heavy traffic. About 20 to 30 people were
present for the Union. The meeting ended at about 9:30 p.m.
The Respondent was also represented by Jerry Lewkowitz, its
president and chairman.
Levy renewed his request for the information he demanded
in his February 17 letter, but none was forthcoming. Lew told
Levy that the parties were in litigation on that issue, and he
would take it “under advisement.” Levy said that he expected a
response to the Union’s proposed contract at this meeting.
No formal response was given to the proposed contract.
Rather, during this and the next session, Lew went through the
proposed contract in detail.
Levy testified the during this meeting, Lew questioned Levy
extensively about every item in the proposed contract, includ-
ing details which were, according to Levy, clear on their face.
According to Levy, the questions asked were “superfluous”
concerning matters that were “obvious or unnecessary in an
attempt to waste time.” Thus, Levy stated that Lew questioned
him about an opening paragraph of the contract which stated
that it was the intent of the parties that the contract promote and
improve the interests of the clients of the Employer. In relation
to that paragraph, Lew asked how the contract would advance
the Employer’s interests. Levy stated that Lew went through
each line of the contract, asking the meaning of words and the
clauses “in great and lengthy detail.” Levy added that he had
never seen any management attorney ask the kinds of questions
that Lew asked concerning provisions familiar to any experi-
enced labor attorney.
At the session, Levy asked Lew how many employees were
employed by the Respondent, and Lew replied that he did not
know, but believed that the number was between 700 and 900.
7 Virtually all the employees work during the day.
DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD 818
Lew admitted going through the proposals page by page in
order to have a “full understanding” of them. He noted that
many provisions in the contract related to voluntary agencies
funded by governmental agencies, which had no application to
the Respondent’s operation, and he questioned the Union con-
cerning that. Lew also mentioned the Union’s omission of
amounts requested for contributions to the health and pension
funds. Lew asked why a definition of “employee” was needed
since the Board’s certification defined who was in the unit.
They discussed the on-call provision, Lew disputed the worka-
bility of the seniority provision, telling Levy that the Respon-
dent covers a case on demand from the hospital or discharging
institution.
The Union has no collective-bargaining agreements with any
other for profit home health care agencies. Lew refused to agree
to the union-security clause, stating that in this competitive
industry, the Respondent should not be the only employer to
undertake another accounting function in checking off dues.
Levy replied that by agreeing to union security, the Respondent
would enjoy a good relationship with the Union. Lew also
questioned certain language in that clause pursuant to which the
Union agreed to hold the Respondent harmless in the event of
any claim or proceeding by any government agency or any
group arising from certain deductions made by the Respondent
to the Union’s political action fund and credit union.
Lew also discussed the no-discrimination clause, stating that
although the provision prohibited discrimination against em-
ployees with disabilities, he said that the language should en-
compass the Americans with Disabilities Act, and a discussion
concerning such language took place.
Lew inquired as to the proposed contract’s provision that the
Respondent and Union sponsor a conference on abuse of home
care workers in the work place. Levy said that no conferences
are being held now, and that it is in the planning stage. Lew
then asked why the clause was needed. Levy replied that the
matter was very important to the Union.
Lew stated that the parties spent nearly 1 hour discussing the
seniority clause, which applied in cases of vacation scheduling,
layoff, and recall, and that job assignments shall take into con-
sideration certain factors including client requests and the lan-
guage spoken by the client. Lew noted that a seniority provision
was unworkable because assignments for the next day are made
by coordinators who cover separate boroughs with separate lists
of employees. Lew stated that they don’t have time to check
personnel files and seniority lists to determine who was laid off
from work, and who must be recalled next.
Lew also noted that some employees leave the Respondent’s
employ for 1 month and then return, and under such circum-
stances it would be impossible to assign cases by seniority to
those who are entitled to recall. Lew remarked that time is of
the essence in making assignments, and that the coordinator
assigns to the case the first qualified person she can find, and
that if an assignment is not made immediately, the case might
be lost to a competitor of the Company. Levy replied that sen-
iority is the basis on which assignments are made in the Un-
ion’s contracts with New York city, and he insisted on a senior-
ity clause here.
Lew also questioned the clause which provided that 1 union
delegate for each 200 client cases shall be released from work
for up to 8 paid hours per month for union business provided
that another employee was available to cover the delegate’s
case. Levy noted that such a clause was in the Union’s contract
with the New York City, and Lew answered that the Respon-
dent was not a city agency. Lew also noted that the Respon-
dent’s clients insisted on continuous coverage by the same aide,
and a substitute would be unacceptable. Lew also said that
whatever a delegate was required to do, she could do on the
phone since the Respondent had no central office to which
employees report.
The contract contained a clause which stated that the Re-
spondent agreed to consider qualified applicants who were
referred from the 1199 Employment Service. Lew asked how
many applicants are registered by the service. Levy said that the
service is not yet in existence but it is being worked on. Lew
then asked why it was in the proposed contract.
The proposed contract also provided for a probationary pe-
riod of 90 days for all employees. Lew questioned that, noting
that the Respondent had employees who work full time, and
others who work occasionally. They discussed the issue of an
appropriate probationary period.
With respect to the contract clause providing for “adequate
sleeping arrangements” for employees assigned to a 24-hour
case, Lew asked for a definition of “adequate.”
Levy testified that the Respondent caucused at 8:05 p.m. and
returned at 8:30 p.m., after which the discussion continued until
9:10 p.m. when Lew said he had to leave. Levy objected, said
the parties made very little progress, no positions had been
taken, no counterproposals had been made, and no information
had been provided. Levy said he asked the Respondent to con-
tinue bargaining, but it refused.
According to Lew, the meeting ended at 9:15 or 9:30 p.m..
He denied that Levy asked him to bargain later. He testified
that he told Levy that he expected to finish his examination and
questioning of the Union’s proposals at the next session, and
then he would present the Respondent’s counterproposals.
Levy testified that he asked that the next bargaining date be
in December, and begin during the daytime. Lew rejected those
suggestions. Lew said that this was holiday time, and in any
event, was busy every day and evening in December.
Lew suggested January 4 as the next meeting date, but Levy
was not available. The parties agreed to meet again on January
9, and Levy asked Lew to call him before that date if he any
other questions concerning the contract or its meaning. Levy
also asked Lew to advise him if any bargaining dates became
available before January 9. Lew did not make such a call. Levy
also asked for additional dates in January, after January 9. Lew
refused to agree to any additional dates beyond January 9.
4. The January 9, 1995 bargaining session
Levy stated that Lew arrived at 7:10 p.m. for the meeting
which was scheduled for 6:45 p.m. Lew testified that he arrived
on time.
The discussion began with the Union’s wage proposal, which
was made without the Union’s having received definite infor-
mation concerning the wages of the employees. Such informa-
tion had been requested in February. Levy asked if there was a
wage policy or whether wages were tied to years of service. No
answer was forthcoming, according to Levy. Lew testified that
the proposed contract’s wage rates were based on New York
city contracts which had no relation to the Respondent’s opera-
tion. Lew stated that he believed that the Respondent has a
separate payroll for home health aides, with checks being
mailed to bargaining unit employees weekly.
Lew asked questions concerning the wage proposal’s lan-
guage concerning single client and mutual client rates, and for
PEOPLE CARE, INC. 819
an explanation of the provision that provided a certain wage
rate if the employee worked for two or more clients in the same
home at the same time and has completed less than 2100
hours.8 He questioned the wage rate, and was told that the
wage listed was that for voluntary, nonprofit agencies. Lew
reiterated that the Respondent is a for profit organization. The
proposal mentioned a weekend wage differential. Lew asked
how “weekend” was defined—what days and hours were in-
cluded. Levy pointed out that weekend was defined in the con-
tract as being from Saturday at 8 a.m. to Monday at 8 a.m.
Levy asked whether the Respondent had a policy permitting
employees time off on weekends if they were employed 24
hours per day, 7 days per week. The Union sought a provision
permitting weekend time off. According to Levy, Lew said that
he did not know if the Respondent had such a policy but would
find out. However, Lew testified that he told Levy that the Re-
spondent’s operation runs around the clock, and makes no dis
tinction for weekends, and that it does not give its employees
weekends off.
Levy also asked what the Respondent’s vacation policy was.
Lew replied that he did not know and would have to let the
Union know.
The parties discussed the holiday provision. Lew raised a
question about the holiday rate, stating that the contract con-
tained inconsistent provisions (art. X, par. 7—time and one half
for holidays worked; and art. XIII, par. 2—regular time for
holidays worked). Levy clarified the Union’s position on the
issue. Levy asked what holidays the Respondent provided, and
for its holiday policy. Lew replied that he was not certain as to
what the holiday policy was, although he believed that Christ-
mas and New Years Day were holidays, and that the employees
might receive a small bonus for working those days. Lew said
that he would supply such information. Lew admitted that since
the February 17 request for information, the Respondent did not
give the Union information concerning its holiday policy.
In addition, Lew said that he would consider certain changes
to language in the proposed contract concerning holidays which
fall on weekends. Lew objected to the provision requiring an
employee who was scheduled to work on a holiday to notify the
Employer in advance if she wanted to take the day off. Lew
explained that the Respondent had a strict policy requiring each
employee to work each day.
The Union’s annual leave proposal was also discussed. One
matter in contention was the Union’s proposal that an em-
ployee’s annual leave request “shall be granted unless an emer-
gency situation exists.” The Respondent noted that “emergency
situation” was not defined, and explained to the Union that the
Employer and its clients expected continuous service on the
particular case from the employee. The Union’s proposal for
unpaid leave was also discussed, particularly the clause provid-
ing that certain unpaid leave requests shall be reasonably
granted given the needs of the employee and Employer. An
example was given where an employee had to care for a sick
relative in another State. Lew had earlier stressed the impor-
tance of employees remaining on the job in continuance service
for their clients.
The parties discussed the Union’s proposal that employees
receive 4 paid days off for the death of a family member. They

8 Levy defined mutual client as the situation where the employee
cared for a husband and wife in the same residence. The employee was
entitled to more pay. Lew stated that he was not familiar with that term.
discussed the definition of family member, with Levy noting
that that term could include a life partner. Other relationships
were discussed, including common law spouses and stepchil-
dren.
The Union’s proposal requiring the Employer to pay for
training and carfare between two client’s homes visited in the
same day was discussed. The Employer said that it did not pay
those items now, except for limited carfare, but that Lew would
consider it.
Lew refused to accept the Union’s management-rights
clause, as being too restrictive. The parties discussed for nearly
one half hour the Union’s discharge and penalties clause. The
Union’s proposal required notification to the Union of a dis-
charge within 48 hours following the firing, with a right to
submit the matter to the grievance and arbitration procedure of
the contract. The Union demanded due process in connection
with giving the Employer the right to discharge for cause. Lew
claimed that the Employer had no control over discharges,
since if it is told to remove an aide from a home by a visiting
nurse, it does so without any formalities. He stated that if the
employee committed a serious offense, such as abuse of a cli-
ent, the employee would no longer be employed by the Re-
spondent, without any review. Levy argued that there should be
a review of the decision not to reemploy the aide.
The Union’s four-step grievance and arbitration procedure
was discussed. Lew said that he wanted a simpler grievance
procedure, and would propose one, and that the Employer
might consider a named arbitrator, as opposed to going through
an arbitration agency.
Levy testified that the Employer, which took a caucus of 20
minutes, did not make any proposals to the Union, refused to
take any positions on any of the contract’s provisions, but said
that it would perhaps agree to a named arbitrator.
Lew noted several references in the contract to action taken
by the New York City with respect to the assignment or with-
drawal of cases. Lew remarked that such a practice is not
known in the for profit home care industry. Levy answered that
those provisions were in the contracts with the voluntary agen-
cies.
Levy provided the amounts sought for contributions to the
Union’s benefit fund, but not for the pension fund. Levy said he
would provide those amounts. The proposed contract contained
a provision for contributions to the training fund. Levy ex-
plained that such a training program is not yet in effect, but was
“sort of a wish list.”
Levy testified that the meeting ended at about 9 p.m. with
Lew announcing that he had to leave. Levy attempted to have
Lew stay and continue to negotiate, but he refused. Levy asked
Lew for several dates for bargaining, and requested that bar-
gaining begin earlier in the day. Lew rejected both proposals.
Lew said that his first available date was on February 2. Levy
asked Lew to call prior to that date if he had any questions or
positions to take, and also asked him to provide the information
which had been previously requested, and to advise if earlier
dates for bargaining became available. Lew denied being asked
to remain to bargain further.
With respect to the information requested by the Union, Lew
stated that although he did not personally review the transcript
in the representation hearing, he believed that “virtually” all the
information requested was supplied to the Union in that pro-
ceeding.
DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD 820
5. The February 2 bargaining session
Levy stated that The Respondent arrived at 7:13 p.m. at the
session which was scheduled for 6:45 p.m. About 35 employ-
ees were present. Lew stated that he was present on time, but
Lewkowitz arrived at about 7:10 p.m.
The Respondent presented its written counterproposals. In
addition to the terms discussed below, the contract also con-
tained a provision (which is the Employer’s current policy)
giving employees who work on Thanksgiving Day, Christmas
Day, or New Year’s Day shall receive $1.10-per-hour addi-
tional pay, and that in the fifth year of the contract, $1.20 per
hour. The proposal also provided for a 6-month unpaid leave of
absence for illness, disability, or maternity; an agreement that
the Employer would supply the Union on a semiannual basis
with a list of unit employees and their addresses; a provision
that the Employer would reimburse employees for carfare if
they were assigned to two or more clients in 1 day; a no-strike,
no-lockout clause; a management-rights clause; a union recog-
nition clause; a union visitation clause; and provision for a
union bulletin board.
The parties discussed the wage proposal, which consisted of
a raise of one half of 1 percent every other year. Levy again
requested information concerning the employees’ current
wages. It was not supplied. He asked for the amounts of the
highest and lowest wages paid to employees, and Lew re-
sponded that he was not certain, but the lowest wage might be
$4.25 or $5.50 per hour. Lew refused to agree to a $5.50 mini-
mum rate.
Levy expressed incredulity at the 10-year duration of the
contract, and at the wage proposal, noting that a person earning
$5 per hour would receive a 2.5- to 3-cent-per-hour raise every
other year. Lew agreed with Levy’s figures, but Lew noted that
the wage clause also includes a provision that the Employer
may grant merit wage increases at any time during the contract
term. Lew testified that a long contract was necessary because
the Employer had, in recent years, been the object of three or-
ganizational campaigns.
The Employer’s vacation proposal provided that regular em-
ployees were entitled to 1 week’s vacation pay if they worked
42 or more weeks during the year. Levy remarked that it would
be difficult for an employee to meet that standard because this
was an industry marked by a high rate of turnover and a lack of
continuous employment. Levy explained that in between cases,
because of the death or move of a client, there could be delays
before the employee is assigned another case. The proposal
further provided that employees who have worked more than
10 years would receive an additional 2 days of vacation pay in
the 8th year of the contract. At the representation hearing, the
Respondent’s official testified that a “small number of people
who, if they work an extensive amount of time, will get some
small vacation benefit . . . only a few . . . actually qualify.”
Levy also noted his disagreement with the Employer’s pro-
posal that employees would be on probation for the first 1040
hours of employment during which time they could be dis-
missed without cause. He noted that because of a lack of con-
tinuous employment in the industry, an employee would be on
probation for a long time.
Levy noted that the Employer’s proposal did not provide for
health or pension coverage. Lew’s explanation was that since
the Respondent was a for profit provider, competing with simi-
lar companies, it saw no need to provide such coverage for its
employees.
The Employer’s discipline and discharge proposal provided
that in cases of abuse of patients, dishonesty, intoxication, in-
subordination, assault, failure to provide for the health and
welfare of patients, chronic lateness, and chronic absenteeism,
the employee was subject to summary dismissal with no right
to grieve such action. The proposal also contained a grievance
and arbitration procedure. Lew testified that at that session he
was prepared to modify his proposal and make concessions
regarding this matter.
A caucus was then held by the Union, during which the em-
ployees expressed their anger and disappointment at the Em-
ployer’s proposals, which they believed were “outrageous and
unfair, particularly at the low wage increases, and the failure of
the Employer to propose any health and welfare coverage.”
Employees expressed their belief that inasmuch as they were
loyal, hard working long-term employees they deserved a fairer
proposal.
Levy suggested that the employees should express their
views to the Employer when the session resumed. When the
parties reconvened, Levy told the Employer that the employees
wanted to address them. Lew protested, saying that Levy was
the Union’s spokesman, but then agreed to hear from the work-
ers.
One employee stated that she worked hard, and believed that
the wage proposal was inadequate. Another worker said that
she could not live on the amount of money she was being paid.
She had spoken about 30 seconds when Lew turned to Lewko-
witz, and they began to speak together. According to Levy, they
were “visibly and ostentatiously ignoring the speaker.”
Levy testified that at that point he raised his voice to Lew,
“chastising” him, and telling him to stop talking while he was
being addressed by his employee, accusing him of being “in-
credibly rude” and that his refusal to listen to a poorly paid
employee who has been working very hard for many years
constitutes “terrible behavior.”
Lew raised his voice, saying that he had a right to talk to his
client. Levy testified that there was a “heated exchange” be-
tween him and Lew as to whether he was speaking to his client
or being “obnoxious and rude” to the employee. Levy told him
he was acting very badly, and was rude and discourteous. Lew
responded that Levy’s comments were improper. Lewkowitz
wrote in his notes that a “screaming match” ensued.
At that time, other employees began to raise their voices and
point their fingers at Lew and Lewkowitz, saying that they
could not treat the employees the way they had, and that they
were rude to the speaker. Other employees said they were very
offended.
Levy stated that one or two employees stood, while another
one or two walked forward toward the table where the negotia-
tors were sitting, while other employees were “yelling and get-
ting angry” at the Employer.
Levy further stated that Lew announced that he did not have
to stay and listen to people yelling at him, and that he was leav-
ing. Employees responded by saying that Lew should listen to
them, and that his behavior was very bad and “disgusting” and
asked how they could be treated this way after years of dedi-
cated service.
Lew and Lewkowitz then packed their papers, and started to
make their way to the door. According to Levy, several em-
ployees “came forward to express their outrage at [their] con-
duct and he asked them to clear back.” Levy accompanied Lew
PEOPLE CARE, INC. 821
and Lewkowitz out the door, and he asked employees who were
standing there to move back.
Levy stated that at the elevator he asked Lew why he was
“carrying on,” and accused him of “inciting” the employees’
reaction by his behavior. According to Levy, Lew replied
“that’s all right, that’s fine that this happened. Thank you very
much. This will be very helpful. Thank you. This is outrageous.
You caused these people to yell at me.”
Lew testified that during Levy’s questioning of him concern-
ing the Employer’s proposals, before the Union’s caucus, Levy
termed the offer “horrendous, ridiculous, disrespectful, an in-
sult to the employees” and that he should not be treating the
employees this way. Lewkowitz quoted Levy as calling the
proposals worthless, a sham, and irresponsible. While making
these allegedly inflammatory comments, Levy sat “sidesaddle”
in his chair, as much addressing the audience of employees as
the Employer. Lew characterized Levy’s conduct as “playing
up to the employees, and trying to get them agitated.” Lew
replied that this proposal was only his first offer, and that if
there was movement by the Union, there would be movement
by the Employer.
Lew further testified that when the second employee began
speaking, he bent to Lewkowitz and asked who she was.
Lewkowitz said that he did not know. This exchange took 5
seconds, and at which Levy “went bananas, screaming uncon-
trollably at the top of his longs, his face totally red, his veins
bulging. According to Lew, Levy “lost everything, like a raving
lunatic almost.” According to Lew, Levy yelled, “[W]ho the
hell do you think you people are, treating them like this? This is
still America.” He demanded that Lew listen to the employees.
Levy yelled for 3 to 4 minutes, and Lew conceded that he
“screamed back” for 1 minute.
Lew stated that employees got out of their chairs and began
to move forward. Lew and Lewkowitz packed their materials
and said they were leaving. At that point, all the employees
were standing and yelling that “you can’t treat us this way,
we’re not dirt,” repeating everything that Levy was yelling.
Lew, who weighs 220 pounds, stated that a female employee
grabbed both his suit jacket lapels and nearly lifted him off the
ground. He heard other employees yelling: “You aint’ going
anywhere Mr. Lewkowitz. We want what’s due us.” Lew stated
that Levy continued to yell throughout this time. Lew saw
Lewkowitz blocked from leaving the room, and he saw one or
two male nursing assistants punch at Lewkowitz, while others
pushed him, one employee tried to pick him up, and others
blocked his way to the door.
Lewkowitz testified that he was “rushed” by 10 to 15 people
who “pounded and beat” him on his head, neck and arms, for 5
to 8 seconds.
Lew said to Levy, “look what the hell you did here. Let us
out of this goddamned room.” According to Lew, Levy did
nothing to intervene, but continued to scream. Lew said that he
and Lewkowitz could not leave because the door was blocked
by about 15 to 20 people. Finally, two union representatives
yelled at the others to let them out, and they did so.
Lew stated that at the elevator, Levy told him that what had
occurred was his (Lew’s) fault, that he was disrespectful to the
people. Lew accused Levy of “orchestrating” the incident, and
said that he had not “heard the end of this.” Lew denied telling
Levy that he was happy that this occurred, or that this incident
would be very helpful.
The next day, Lew wrote to Levy, accusing him of “inciting
a riot,” and “being involved in an assault” on him and Lewko-
witz. Lew testified, however, that Levy did not threaten him or
touch him. Levy responded, conceding that there were “raised
voices on both sides.” Levy wrote, and testified that he did not
see anyone touch either Lew or Lewkowitz, and generally ac-
cused Lew of not bargaining in good faith.
6. The attempts to resume negotiations
One month later, on March 2, Levy wrote to Lew suggesting
nine additional bargaining dates in March. On March 8, Lew
wrote to Levy stating that because of Levy’s “despicable activi-
ties that you orchestrated and engaged in” at the February 2
bargaining session “I am unable to deal with you in the future
regarding this matter or any other matter.” Lew asked that the
negotiations be assigned to another attorney at Levy’s firm, and
that person should contact him. Lew agreed to deal with the
person taking over the negotiations, and offered to speak with
that person concerning ensuring that appropriate negotiations
take place, and the safety of himself and his client are assured.
On April 27, union official Garcia wrote to Lewkowitz ask-
ing him for three or four proposed dates for bargaining. On
May 5, Lewkowitz replied, stating that if Garcia should contact
Lew, he will need a letter authorizing such contact by the Un-
ion’s lawyers. On May 8, Levy wrote Lew, authorizing him to
deal directly with Garcia in order to arrange a date for contin-
ued negotiations.
On May 12, Lew wrote to Garcia requesting that the name of
the new attorney handling the negotiations be supplied. On
May 16, Garcia replied, stating that she was authorized to deal
with him to set up dates for negotiations, and that she was
awaiting such dates. On May 19, Lew responded that he wanted
to know whether Levy would be present at the resumed nego-
tiations. On May 25, Garcia wrote to Lew, advising that she
would be the Union’s chief spokesperson at the negotiations.
On June 7, Lew wrote to Garcia, again asking whether Levy
would be present at future negotiations, adding that in the event
that he was advised that Levy would not be present at negotia-
tions, he (Lew) would then agree to resume negotiations “with
appropriate safeguards for my client and myself.”
On June 29, Mitra Behroozi, an attorney in Levy’s office,
wrote to Lew, advising that she would be substituting for Levy,
and asked for dates for negotiations. On July 5, Lew wrote to
her, suggesting that the number of union participants be limited
to 12.
On July 24, Behroozi advised Lew that the Union would
have 17 people on its negotiating committee and 2 officers, the
organizer and herself, a total of 21 persons. She noted that lim-
iting the number of persons in attendance were conditions im-
posed by the Respondent to which the Union agreed only to
obtain a fair and early contract. On August 4, Lew objected to
that number of union participants, and on August 15, Behroozi
agreed to have 14 people present, which was acceptable to the
Respondent.
On September 5, Lew proposed a bargaining date of Sep-
tember 27, which was unacceptable to the Union. The parties
agreed to meet on October 5 at 6:45 p.m.
7. Subsequent negotiations
On October 5, 1995, the parties discussed their original pro-
posals. On October 12, the instant consolidated complaint was
issued, alleging that the Respondent failed to bargain in good
faith with the Union. They continued to discuss their original
DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD 822
proposals on October 23, 1995. On November 12, the Regional
Director advised the Respondent that he would recommend to
the Board that it enforce its decision in Case 2–CA–27207,
requiring that it bargain in good faith. On January 2, 1996, the
parties met and again discussed their original proposals.
At each of those three sessions, the parties omitted from the
discussion, at the Union’s request, economic issues such as
wages, health and pension funds, and vacation and sick pay.
The following sessions consisted of the parties each present-
ing its counteroffer at alternate sessions. During the 2- to 2-1/2-
hour sessions, the counteroffer was discussed, the parties cau-
cused, and a response was given.
Thus, sessions were held on January 25, 1996, at which the
Union presented a counteroffer, and on February 26, the Em-
ployer presented its counteroffer which reduced the probation-
ary period from 1040 hours to 90 working days of continuous
employment, and deleted insubordination, chronic lateness, and
absenteeism as nongrievable grounds for discharge.
On March 19, the Second Circuit Court of Appeals enforced
the Board’s bargaining order in Case 2–CA–27207. Thereafter
a bargaining session was held on March 27, at which the Union
made a counteroffer which included economic issues.

Subsequent negotiations were held on April 29, at which the
Respondent again modified its proposals. Regarding wages, the
proposal provided that all employees who have not received a
wage increase for at least 1 year, shall receive a raise of 1 per-
cent above their wage, effective on the execution date of the
contract, and on each anniversary date. Regarding holidays, if
employees work on Thanksgiving Day, Christmas Day, or New
Year’s Day, they are entitled to $1.25-per-hour additional pay.
Regarding vacations, on the third anniversary of the contract,
employees employed more than 8 years were entitled to 2 addi-
tional days of vacation pay, thus receiving 7 days vacation. The
contract also provided that only abuse of patients and/or failure
to provide for the health and welfare of patients are non-
grievable items. The contract’s term was reduced to 4 years.
Further bargaining sessions were held on May 13, June 3
and 20, July 15, August 21, September 19, and October 10. On
alternate dates, the Respondent and the Union offered their
counterproposals which were discussed at the session in which
they were presented. At the next session, the other party pre-
sented its counterproposals. During such period of time, the
Respondent modified its proposals, at the various sessions, by
reducing the 90-day probationary period to 80 days; and then
65. The 1-percent wage raise was increased to 1.25 percent, and
then 1.5 percent and 1.75 percent.
A bargaining session was also set for the last date of the
hearing here, October 24. According to the last proposal pre-
sented, at the October 10 session, the Respondent’s wage raise
offer was 1-3/4 percent; recognized seniority for the purpose of
vacation scheduling; offered arbitration in the event of suspen-
sion or discharge for any cause except abuse or neglect of pa-
tients; offered an extra $1.50 per hour for time worked on the 3
holidays set forth above; proposed 1 week’s vacation pay for
employees employed more than 1 year, who have worked more
than 42 weeks during that year; and in addition, employees
employed for 7 or more years are entitled to up to 2 additional
vacation days, depending on their length of employment effec-
tive in the second year of the contract; 1 paid personal day per
year; and bereavement pay of 2 days for employees completing
1500 hours of employment within the past year.
8. The refusal to furnish information
The complaint alleges that on February 17 and June 8, 1994,
by letter, and on June 13, 1994, at a meeting, the Union re-
quested that the Respondent furnish it with certain information,
which is set forth in full above. The complaint further alleges
that such information was necessary for, and relevant to, the
Union’s performance of its duties as the exclusive collective-
bargaining representative of the employees, and that the Re-
spondent, since February 17, 1994, has failed and refused to
furnish it.
The Respondent’s answer denies all of the above allegations.
It argues that such information was not necessary to the per-
formance of the Union’s responsibilities as the collective-
bargaining representative of the unit, and in any event such
information either had been in the Union’s possession, or made
a matter of record in the October and November 1992 represen-
tation proceedings, or turned over to the Union pursuant to
subpoena in that matter.
Each item requested in the Union’s February 17 letter will be
discussed:

1. The name and address of each current employee and
his/her title and current assignment, date of first employ-
ment, number of years with the agency and date of birth.
The latter information is particularly important to pension
coverage questions.

In his reply dated June 14, 1994, Lew stated that the Union
should have a “relatively up to date list of names and address-
ees of unit employees which was furnished the Union in con-
nection with the NLRB representation case proceeding.” As set
forth above, the Excelsior list was provided to the Board on
May 10, 1993. Lew admitted that that was the last list provided
to the Union. Thus, Lew claimed that the Union should be satis-
fied with a list which was more than 1 year old.
In addition, at the representation hearing, the Respondent’s
president, Bruce Jacobson, testified that in 1992, the turnover
rate was 40 to 50 percent, and that within 6 months of training
new employees, the Employer retains less than half such work-
ers. Lew testified that in October and November 1995, he knew
that there was a “turnover rate” among the employees, but he
believed that it was declining. Union official Garcia testified
that generally there is a high turnover in the home health care
industry.

2. The wages being paid to each of the present em-
ployees.

Garcia testified that the Union did not have, and the Respon-
dent did not supply wage rate information. She said that she
had a “general idea” of the wage rates inasmuch as a majority
of the employees completed authorization cards during the
campaign and listed their wage.
In his letter of June 14, 1994, Lew stated that the Union had
that information, and in any event compiling that data was “ex-
ceptionally burdensome” because the wages varied from patient
case to patient case, and from client to client.
At the February 2, 1995 bargaining session, Lew provided
general information concerning the high and low ranges of
wages being paid. By letter dated March 15, 1996, Lew merely
provided a list containing two columns setting forth the num-
bers of employees earning certain wages, without their names.
Finally, in a letter dated June 26, 1996, to the Union’s attor-
ney, Lew provided a list of names and addresses of unit em-
PEOPLE CARE, INC. 823
ployees, their title, date of hire, hourly rate of pay, and date of
birth. That list was prepared by the Respondent’s controller in 1
week from computerized data available in The Respondent’s
offices, which Lew assumes was available in the same place in
1994. Lew also testified that the Respondent maintained a sepa-
rate payroll for unit employees, and mailed checks to them on a
weekly basis.

3. A description of all benefits provided to employees,
including but not limited to pension, health insurance, life
insurance, vacations, holidays, sick leave, other leave poli-
cies and copies of any benefit plans, summary plan de-
scriptions or other documents describing such benefits.
4. Any employee manuals or memoranda describing
work requirements or personnel practices affecting em-
ployees in the bargaining unit.
5. A description of the procedure by which employees
are selected for assignment to particular cases (clients) and
a listing of all such assignments made within the last six
months showing the name of the employee assigned, the
name of the client and the date of the assignment and the
reason for her selection for that assignment.

Lew’s June 14, 1994 letter stated that the information re-
quested in items 3, 4, and 5 was given to the Union’s attorney
during the representation proceeding.
Lew testified that a certain document produced at the repre-
sentation hearing, entitled “Orientation for HHA/PCW” was
responsive to the Union’s request for information because it
contained “certain policies.” The document included proce-
dures to be followed by employees, for such matters as ab-
sences, merit wage raise policy, and vacation policy, which was
set forth as 1 week’s paid vacation after 1 year of employment
and 42 workweeks of employment in that year. It was noted
that six major holidays were celebrated by the Respondent, and
two others depending on the hospital involved. It was further
noted that no extra pay was paid for holiday work; the proce-
dure to be followed while in the patient’s home; a statement
that workers compensation, liability, and unemployment insur-
ance covers each employee when on a case; a list of responsi-
bilities; and certain medical procedures such as infection con-
trol.
However, at the representation hearing, the Respondent’s
president, Jacobson, testified that that document was once a
part of new employees’ orientation package, but it was, at that
time, about 6 months old, and certain items were out of date. In
addition, Jacobson did not know if it was being used at the time
of that hearing, but that he doubted it.
Regarding holiday policy, at the representation hearing, Ja-
cobson testified that the Respondent offers no paid holidays,
but employees receive extra pay for Christmas Day, New
Year’s Day, and one other which he could not remember. The
Union formally learned, for the first time, at the bargaining
session of February 2, 1995, that the Respondent’s holiday
policy was that it offered $1 additional pay for Thanksgiving
Day, Christmas Day, and New Year’s Day.
Regarding its vacation policy, at the representation hearing,
Jacobson testified that employees working 42 of 52 weeks are
entitled to “some small vacation benefit.” For the first time, at
the February 2, 1995 session, the Union learned that such em-
ployees receive 1 week of paid vacation.
The Respondent argues that all the information requested
was provided during the representation proceeding, through
testimony and exhibits. However, Jacobson only gave general,
limited testimony in that hearing concerning personnel prac-
tices, employee work hours, and assignment procedure.
III. ANALYSIS AND DISCUSSION
1. The duty to furnish information
Information sought concerning bargaining unit employees is
presumptively relevant for purposes of collective bargaining
and must be furnished on request. NLRB v. Acme Industrial
Co., 385 U.S. 432 (1967); and Halltown Paperboard Co., 323
NLRB 295 (1997). The specific items requested here, as set
forth above, are basic items needed by the Union in order to
form its negotiation strategy.9 The Respondent’s answer denies
the relevance of the items requested, but has not proven that
they are not relevant to the Union’s performance of its respon-
sibilities to the unit.
The Respondent’s letter of June 14, 1994, in response to the
Union’s request for information, claimed that the Union either
had the information or that it was too burdensome to compile. It
is the Respondent’s burden to establish the truth of those con-
tentions, which I find it has not done. Somerville Mills, 308
NLRB 425, 442 (1992).
As to the names and addresses of employees, I reject the Re-
spondent’s argument that the names and addresses provided in
the Excelsior list satisfied its obligation to the Union. That list
was more than 1 year old, and since the Respondent had ex-
perienced a substantial turnover of employees during that pe-
riod of time, the old list could not be relied on as being accu-
rate.
The wage data which was available to the Union from the
authorization cards completed by some of the employees was
stale, incomplete, and may not have been accurate. The limited
information provided to the Union at the February 2, 1995 bar-
gaining session, consisting of the lowest and highest rates of
pay, was not sufficient to satisfy the Union’s request for in-
formation concerning the wages being paid to each employee.
It is significant to note that the information which was ulti-
mately provided, on June 26, 1996, consisting of the names and
addresses of unit employees, their title, dates of hire and birth,
and hourly rate of pay, was compiled from information avail-
able at the Respondent’s offices, which presumably was avail-
able in February 1994, and took only 1 week to get together.
Accordingly, the Respondent’s claim that the material was
burdensome to compile, is without merit.
With respect to the request for employee benefits, employee
manuals concerning personnel practices, and case assignment
procedure, the Respondent’s claim that such information was
contained in the testimony and exhibits in the representation
hearing is similarly without merit. As set forth above, the lim-
ited information provided therein was, even according to the
Respondent official’s testimony, out-dated, incomplete, and
inaccurate. The testimony provided concerning employee bene-
fits was inconsistent. Thus, the testimony and exhibits concern-
ing holiday and vacation benefits were at odds with the Re-
spondent’s then current policy, and its personnel policy manual
was described by its official as out of date, and he did not know
if it was in use.
Accordingly, the Respondent’s claim that the Union could
obtain the information it requested by searching through the

9 The items requested by the Union have been found to be presump-
tively relevant. Maple View Manor, 320 NLRB 1149 (1996).
DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD 824
extensive record of the representation hearing is simply false.
Even assuming that the Union could locate the information, the
material provided therein was incomplete, misleading, inaccu-
rate, out of date, and may not have been in use. Furthermore,
the Respondent may not refuse to furnish relevant information
to the Union on the ground that the Union has an alternative
source or method of obtaining such information. The Union is
under no obligation to utilize a burdensome procedure in order
to obtain desired information where the employer may have
such information available in a more convenient form. Ortho-
dox Jewish Home for the Aged, 314 NLRB 1006, 1008 (1994);
and KCET-TV, 312 NLRB 15, 19 (1993).
It is also clear that the Respondent did provide information
concerning its holiday and vacation benefits at the February 2,
1995 bargaining session. However, that was the first time,
nearly 1 year after the Union’s request, that it gave the Union
accurate information concerning those benefits. Similarly, on
June 26, 1996, the Respondent gave the Union the names and
addresses of unit employees, their title, date of hire, and hourly
rates of pay, as requested in the Union’s February 1994 letter.
The Respondent had an obligation to furnish the information
without undue delay, and in a reasonable time. Barclay Cater-
ers, 308 NLRB 1025, 1037 (1992); and Sivalls, Inc., 307
NLRB 986, 1007 (1992). In evaluating the speed with which
the information is furnished, the Board considers the complex-
ity and extent of the information sought, its availability, and the
difficulty in retrieving the information. Samaritan Medical
Center, 319 NLRB 392, 398 (1995). Here, accurate information
concerning holiday and vacation benefits could have been pro-
vided immediately on request. Such information was readily at
the Respondent’s disposal. Similarly, inasmuch as the payroll
information, provided in June 1996, was compiled within only
1 week after Lew requested it, from information available in the
Respondent’s office, it is clear that there was no valid reason
for the extensive delay in its being furnished to the Union. Such
an extraordinary delay, as was present here, in providing only
certain of the information requested, was unwarranted, and
violated the Act.10
It must also be noted that other items requested, specifically
those set forth in request number 5, have not been furnished to
the Union at all.

2. The Respondent’s insistence on the removal of
the union negotiator
The complaint alleges, and the Respondent denies, that the
Respondent unlawfully insisted on the removal of Union Attor-
ney Richard Levy as a condition for the continuation of collec-
tive bargaining. Although the Respondent argues in its brief
that the Union “voluntarily” substituted another attorney for
Levy, it is clear that the Respondent insisted, as a condition of
continuing negotiations, that Levy be removed.
Thus, as set forth above, in answer to Levy’s letter of March
2, 1995, Lew responded on March 8 that he was “unable to deal
with Levy in the future regarding this matter,” and asked that
the negotiations be assigned to another attorney. Thereafter, in
a letter of June 7 to union official Garcia, Lew asked whether
Levy would be present at future bargaining sessions, and ad-

10 Kurz-Kasch, Inc., 286 NLRB 1343, 1353 (1987), cited by the Re-
spondent, is inapposite since in that case the Board found that the re-
spondent had timely furnished the requested information.
vised that when he was informed that Levy would not be pre-
sent, Lew would then agree to resume negotiations.

It is well established that each party to a collective-
bargaining relationship has both the right to select its rep-
resentative for bargaining and negotiations and the duty to
deal with the chosen representative of the other party.
However, where the presence of a particular representative
in negotiations makes collective bargaining impossible or
futile, a party’s right to choose its representative is limited,
and the other party is relieved of its duty to deal with that
particular representative. [Fitzsimons Mfg.Co., 251 NLRB
375, 379 (1980).]
The Board has stated that the test to determine whether a
party can refuse to deal with a particular representative is
“whether there is persuasive evidence that the presence of the
particular individual would create ill will and make good-faith
bargaining impossible.” KDEN Broadcasting, 225 NLRB 25
(1976).
However, the cases in which the Board has found such a re-
fusal permissible have involved egregious situations in which
(a) a union representative physically assaulted the company’s
personnel director in an unprovoked attack, Fitzsimons, supra,
and (b) an employee made unsubstantiated allegations to a bank
that the employer falsified loan applications, and that the em-
ployer’s owners were involved in prostitution and the use and
sale of cocaine. Sahara Datsun, 278 NLRB 1044 (1986).
However, in Long Island Jewish Medical Center, 296 NLRB
51, 71 (1989), a case involving the barring of a newly ap-
pointed union representative from the employer’s premises, the
representative lightly pushed the employer’s administrator,
cursed her, and blocked her from leaving her desk, cursed an-
other administrator and engaged in a shoving match with her,
the Board found that there was no persuasive evidence that the
representative’s presence at the facility would create ill-will
and make good-faith bargaining impossible.
It is quite apparent that the February 2, 1995 bargaining ses-
sion quickly deteriorated following Levy’s criticism of Lew’s
failure to listen to an employee as she addressed him and the
Respondent’s president.
The question is whether Levy’s conduct permitted the Re-
spondent to refuse to negotiate with the Union until it replaced
him. Admittedly, Levy did not assault or threaten to assault the
Respondent’s representative. Even assuming the Respondent’s
evidence, Levy’s conduct consisted of a strong, if not hostile
criticism of the Respondent’s counterproposals during the bar-
gaining session. The Respondent argues that Levy incited the
riot which ensued. However, the facts are clear that nothing
untoward occurred until Lew turned his attention away from the
employee speaker. That prompted Levy’s rebuke, which then
erupted into a shouting match between the attorneys, and then
involvement by the employees.
While it is true that the employees were upset and disap-
pointed at the Employer’s offer, they controlled their anger
until the confrontation between the representatives. It cannot be
said, however, that Levy incited them during the caucus at
which they expressed their frustration at the proposals. They
simply expressed their disbelief, apparently without prompting,
that they could be given such a proposal considering their long
and dedicated service. Their anger was held in check until the
argument between Levy and Lew.
I find credible the testimony of Lew and Lewkowitz that
they were touched, in a hostile way, by certain of the partici-
PEOPLE CARE, INC. 825
pants. Lew gave uncontradicted testimony that the woman who
manhandled him was discharged by the Respondent for that
reason. However, it certainly cannot be said that Levy caused
the participants to engage in that conduct. The most that the
Respondent could argue, as it does, is that Levy saw the bellig-
erent actions of the participants, did nothing to stop it, and he
continued to yell.
Inasmuch as the outburst cannot be attributed to Levy, but
rather was initially prompted by Lew’s inattention to the person
addressing him, it cannot be said that the incident was totally
unprovoked. The Union’s right to have the representative of its
choosing, in this case its general counsel, represent it in diffi-
cult, extended bargaining negotiations such as these involving a
large number of employees must prevail. Levy’s conduct at the
bargaining sessions was proper. No objection was raised to his
presence, and no difficulty arose until the incident of February
2. Under such circumstances, barring him from further repre-
sentation of the Union during these negotiations with the Re-
spondent would not be warranted.
It has not been shown that by persuasive evidence that the
presence of Richard Levy would make collective bargaining
impossible or futile, or cause such ill will that bargaining could
not take place.
I accordingly find and conclude that the Respondent violated
Section 8(a)(1) and (5) of the Act by refusing to negotiate with
the Union unless Levy was replaced.
3. The Respondent’s refusal to meet at reasonable times
and for reasonable durations
The complaint alleges that from November 18, 1994,
through February 2, 1995, the Respondent refused to meet at
reasonable times and for reasonable durations.

To bargain collectively is the performance of the mutual obli-
gation of the employer and the [union] to meet at reasonable
times and confer in good faith with respect to wages, hours,
and other terms and conditions of employment. Section 8(d)
of the Act.

In J .H. Rutter-Rex Mfg. Co., 86 NLRB 470, 506 (1949), the
Board stated that the obligation to bargain “encompasses the
affirmative duty to make expeditious and prompt arrangements,
within reason, for meeting and conferring. Agreement is stifled
at its source if opportunity is not accorded for discussion or so
delayed as to invite or prolong unrest or suspicion. It is not
unreasonable to expect of a party to collective bargaining that
he display a degree of diligence and promptness in arranging
for collective-bargaining sessions when they are requested, and
in the elimination of obstacles thereto, comparable to that
which he would display in his other business affairs of impor-
tance.”
At the end of the November 18, 1994 negotiation session,
union negotiator Levy proposed dates to resume bargaining in
late November and early December. Lew rejected them but
agreed to meet on December 15. Levy agreed to that date but
asked Lew to agree upon further dates. At that time, and at later
sessions, Lew refused to agree to dates in advance, saying that
he could only agree on a date at the next session.
Following November 18, although he insisted on bargaining
only in the evenings, Lew maintained that he was unavailable
on any evening between the three dates that he had agreed upon
to negotiate, November 18, December 15, January 9, and Feb-
ruary 2. Further, he could not bargain during the day because of
his concern that employees should be at work rather than at-
tending bargaining sessions, and he could not bargain during
certain evenings because of tiring workdays.
With respect to his reason for bargaining only in the evening
because of the employees’ work schedules, the Union immedi-
ately offered to have only employees who were off duty attend
the sessions. Lew continued to insist on evening sessions.
If an employer is concerned about the loss of an employee’s
services because of the employee’s presence at negotiations, it
may properly insist on a “reasonable alternative” such as bar-
gaining during nonworktime such as during the evening. Mil-
white Co., 290 NLRB 1150, 1162 (1988); and Indiana &
Michigan Electric Co., 229 NLRB 576 (1977). Here, The Re-
spondent claimed at the first, daytime bargaining session that it
had just received a request for time off from one employee
seeking to be relieved of her case in order to attend the negotia-
tions during worktime. Accordingly, the Respondent had a
legitimate reason for insisting that bargaining take place during
on-work hours. It asserted without contradiction that its clients
and their families preferred that the employee caring for the
client remain on the case until concluded, without being re-
placed, and that such was the Respondent’s policy.
However, the Union offered to have only those employees
present at the sessions who were off duty. That offer was not
accepted by the Respondent, and apparently the Union did not
press that offer thereafter. Rather, the Union continued to object
to evening sessions on the ground that bargaining time was
limited, the employees were needed at home, and traveling late
at night was dangerous. I do not believe that such concerns
were sufficient to overcome the Respondent’s legitimate claim
that employees remain on the cases assigned, and not be re-
placed in order to attend bargaining sessions.
I accordingly find that the Respondent has not violated the
Act by insisting on bargaining at evening sessions only.
The Board has long held that “the busy schedule of [The Re-
spondent’s] attorney and chief negotiator . . . does not excuse
the Respondent’s obligation to bargain in good faith.” Law-
rence Textile Shrinking Co., 235 NLRB 1178, 1179 (1978). In
addition, the Board has found a violation in an employer’s re-
fusal to set times for future meetings and by delaying the
scheduling of future meetings. Lower Bucks Cooling & Heat-
ing, 316 NLRB 16, 22 (1995).
In both instances, I find that the Respondent’s refusals to set
times for future meetings in advance, and its claim that its ne-
gotiator, Lew, was too busy to bargain at times other than those
it agreed to, constituted violations of its obligation to bargain in
good faith with the Union. Nursing Center at Vineland, 318
NLRB 901, 905 (1995). Surely, the Respondent’s negotiator
could have, if he wished, become available more frequently
than once per month to meet with the Union. The Respondent’s
unreasonable refusal to set dates in advance, and its “refusal to
accede in any reasonable or rational fashion to the Union’s
constant requests for more frequent meetings” violates the Act.
Calex Corp., 322 NLRB 977 (1997). “Considerations of per-
sonal convenience, including geographic or professional con-
flicts, do not take precedence over the statutory demand that the
bargaining process take place with expedition and regularity.
An employer acts at its peril when it selects an agent incapaci-
tated by these or any other conflicts.” Calex, supra; and Caribe
Staple Co., 313 NLRB 877, 893 (1994).
I also note that the Respondent’s negotiators were late to at
least two meetings. I appreciate their reasons for their lateness,
DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD 826
due to traffic, etc., however, the Respondent had an obligation
to meet with the Union at the appointed time.
4. Unreasonable bargaining demands
The complaint alleges that the Respondent unlawfully pre-
sented bargaining demands designed to be reject by the Union
and to prevent the parties from reaching agreement.
In support of its argument, the General Counsel asserts that
the Respondent’s February 2 proposals were unreasonable, and
“artificially polarized the parties’ bargaining positions.”
As set forth above, Section 8(d) of the Act does not require
either party to “agree to a proposal or require the making of a
concession.’’ “Although the Board does not evaluate whether
particular proposals are acceptable or unacceptable, the Board
will examine proposals when appropriate and consider whether,
on the basis of objective factors, a demand is clearly designed
to frustrate agreement on a collective-bargaining contract.”
Reichold Chemicals, 288 NLRB 69 (1988).
Here, the General Counsel characterizes the Respondent’s
first proposal as “extreme,” arguing that the proposal must be
viewed in the context in which it was made—the employees
were waiting 18 months since the election in June 1993; the
Union’s post-Board Order request to bargain was more than 4
months old, and that The Respondent had delayed the start of
bargaining. In that context, according to the General Counsel,
the Respondent’s proposals were designed to frustrate agree-
ment.
The Respondent argues that its initial proposals were reason-
able, and that in any event it was prepared to modify them if the
Union showed some movement in its proposals. Based on the
above legal principles, I cannot find that the Respondent’s pro-
posals were designed to frustrate agreement. The Respondent’s
wage proposal provided for a minimal wage increase, not a
wage freeze or a reduction in wages. Pursuant to its current
policy, it offered the same vacation and holiday benefits, and
did not offer pension and health insurance coverage. There is
some evidence, however, that its current policy for grieving
disciplinary action was more liberal than the procedure it pro-
posed, and its proposed 10-year duration to the contract is quite
long.
First, it must be emphasized that these were initial proposals.
The Respondent said repeatedly at the negotiation on February
2 that it was prepared to alter those proposals if the Union
modified its first offer. The negotiations were clearly in a nas-
cent state at that point. It cannot be said, even given these pro-
posals, that they were “so consistently and predictably unpalat-
able to the other party that the proposer should know agreement
is impossible.” Palace Performing Arts Center, 312 NLRB 950,
958 (1993).
Moreover, when the Respondent’s initial proposal is consid-
ered in the context of further negotiations, it must be found that
its first proposal was not designed to frustrate agreement. Thus,
as set forth above, the Respondent substantially modified its
proposals in the 14 subsequent bargaining sessions.
In Captain’s Table, 289 NLRB 22, 24 (1988), the Board
found no violation where negotiations had ended prematurely,
and a charge was filed based on the early bargaining sessions.
The Board stated that the union had not “sufficiently tested the
Respondent’s proposals to permit us to assess the latter’s will-
ingness to bargain in good faith . . . . The Respondent’s first
specific counterproposal regarding wages . . . was a starting
point for future negations. The Respondent neither stated nor
suggested by its conduct that it intended its first wage offer to
be its last. To the contrary, it is uncontested that the The Re-
spondent’s wage offer was on the table, awaiting a response, at
the close of the parties’ fourth and final bargaining session.”
In Captain’s Table, as here, “the bargaining process . . . had
just begun when the Union, soon after the parties’ initial ex-
change of proposals, filed the instant unfair labor practice
charges.”
Although it is true that in that case the bargaining ended
through no fault of either party, and here I have found that the
bargaining ended as a result of the Respondent’s unlawful fail-
ure to continue to bargain with Levy present, nevertheless I
cannot find, given the great movement in the Respondent’s
positions when bargaining finally resumed, that the Respon-
dent’s initial proposals were intended to frustrate agreement, or
were evidence of bad-faith bargaining. Clearly, the Respondent
did not insist on its initial, February 2 proposal, and modified
its proposal in later bargaining sessions as it said it would at the
February 2 session.
5. The alleged bad-faith bargaining
The complaint alleges that by its overall conduct, the Re-
spondent engaged in bad-faith bargaining, specifically, the
Respondent’s (a) refusal to meet at reasonable times and for
reasonable durations, (b) insisting on the removal of the union
negotiator as a condition for the continuation of bargaining, (c)
presenting bargaining demands designed to be rejected by the
Union and to prevent the parties from reaching agreement, (d)
failing and refusing to furnish the Union with requested infor-
mation, and (e) engaging in a pattern of bargaining without any
good-faith intention of reaching agreement with the Union.
In deciding whether an employer has engaged in surface or
bad-faith bargaining, the Board examines the “totality of the
employer’s conduct, both at and away from the bargaining
table.” Overnite Transportation Co., 296 NLRB 669, 671
(1989). First, there is no evidence of any improper conduct
engaged in by the Respondent away from the bargaining table.
The General Counsel argues that the Respondent’s approach to
bargaining, including its line by line analysis of the Union’s
proposals at the first two sessions, constitutes evidence of bad-
faith bargaining. I do not agree. The General Counsel’s reliance
on United Technologies Corp., 296 NLRB 571 (1989), is mis-
placed. In that case, the employer consumed 12 bargaining
sessions, comprising 6 months, in going through an extended
discussion of the union’s proposals, questioning each one in
great detail, and refused to submit a counteroffer until it com-
pleted its review of the union’s proposals.
The facts here are far different. The Respondent legitimately
asked valid questions of the Union concerning its proposals,
and raised proper issues, as set forth above, concerning the
language, meaning and effect of the various clauses. Such dis-
cussion consumed only two sessions, and was vital to the Re-
spondent’s understanding of the Union’s proposals. Inasmuch
as the language contained in a final contract is of extreme im-
portance and must be negotiated with precision, the Respon-
dent’s relatively brief examination of the Union’s lengthy pro-
posals during two bargaining sessions does not support a find-
ing of overall bad-faith bargaining.
I have found, above, that the Respondent did violate the Act
by (a) refusing to meet at reasonable times, and by its negotia-
tor’s failing to make himself available to bargain at more fre-
quent times, (b) insisting on the removal of Union Counsel
Levy as a condition for the continuation of bargaining, and (c)
failing to furnish the Union with requested information.
PEOPLE CARE, INC. 827
I cannot find, however, that these violations are so pervasive
that, even taken together, they constitute evidence of bad-faith
bargaining. The Respondent did meet with the Union in four
bargaining sessions over 4 months. Although its representative
should have made himself more available for more frequent
meetings, nevertheless the Respondent did not refuse to meet
with the Union, and in fact met and bargained with it. The Re-
spondent’s refusal to bargain with the Union until Levy was
replaced was occasioned by an event that certainly was not
orchestrated by the Respondent. Rather, the incident was an
unfortunate escalation of tempers and emotions of those present
at the November 2 bargaining session. With respect to the re-
fusal-to-furnish information, the Union was nevertheless able to
prepare and present its proposals, and was informed of the high
and low ranges of employee salaries, as well as the general
nature of the holiday and vacation benefits.
I accordingly find that the Respondent’s actions which con-
stituted unfair labor practices did not frustrate or impede the
bargaining process to an extent to warrant a finding that the
Respondent did not desire to reach agreement with the Union.
In addition, these activities must be viewed in relation to the
“totality” of the Respondent’s conduct, and that necessarily
must include subsequent events. As set forth above, numerous
bargaining sessions occurred when negotiations resumed, and
during those sessions, as established by the proposals offered
by the Respondent, it made substantial concessions to the Un-
ion, made great movement in its proposals, and there has been
no claim that it has not bargained in good faith thereafter. Thus,
the Respondent “was willing to meet and confer with the Un-
ion, exchange proposals, and modify its positions in an attempt
to reach agreement with the Union. WPIX, Inc., 293 NLRB 10
fn. 2 (1989). The Respondent’s conduct “at the table seemed to
indicate that the Respondent was willing to compromise with
the Union in an effort to arrive at a collective-bargaining
agreement. O’Reilly Enterprises, 314 NLRB 378 (1994).
The General Counsel argues that, even assuming that the Re-
spondent bargained in good faith following the February 2 ses-
sion, its conduct was tainted inasmuch as it was bargaining
following the issuance of a complaint, and its good-faith nego-
tiations were simply a charade to avoid a further finding of
unfair labor practices. I disagree. I do not believe that the Re-
spondent would make the concessions that it has for the 700 to
900 person unit simply in order to avoid a finding that it had
not bargained in good faith. The readiness with which it has
bargained, and the extent of the concessions that it has made
evidence a real desire to reach agreement with the Union.
I accordingly find and conclude that the General Counsel has
not established that the Respondent has engaged in surface
bargaining, or that it has bargained in overall bad faith with the
Union.
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1. The Respondent, People Care, Incorporated, is an em-
ployer engaged in commerce within the meaning of Section
2(2), (6), and (7) of the Act.
2. 1199 National Health and Human Service Employees’ Un-
ion is a labor organization within the meaning of Section 2(5)
of the Act.
3. At all material times, the Union has been the designated
exclusive collective-bargaining representative of the Respon-
dent’s employees in the following appropriate unit within the
meaning of Section 9(a) of the Act:

All full-time and regular part-time home health care workers
employed by the Employer, including certified home health
aides, personal care aides, quality compliance technicians,
junior aides and housekeepers employed by the Employer out
of its facility located at 500 Eighth Avenue, New York, New
York, excluding all other employees, including registered
nurses, licensed practical nurses, office clerical and profes-
sional employees, guards and supervisors as defined in the
Act.

4. By failing and refusing and delaying in furnishing the Un-
ion with the information requested by it by its letter of February
17, 1994, except the names of clients, the Respondent violated
Section 8(a)(1) and (5) of the Act.
5. By refusing to meet at reasonable times for bargaining
with the Union, the Respondent violated Section 8(a)(1) and (5)
of the Act.
6. By insisting on the removal of union negotiator Richard
Levy as a condition for the continuation of collective bargain-
ing, the Respondent violated Section 8(a)(1) and (5) of the Act.
7. The aforesaid unfair labor practices affect commerce
within the meaning of Section 8(a)(1) and (5) of the Act.
REMEDY
Having found that the Respondent has engaged in certain un-
fair labor practice, I find that it must be ordered to cease and
desist therefrom and to take certain affirmative action designed
to effectuate the policies of the Act.
I shall recommend that the Respondent furnish the Union
with all the information requested by the Union in its letter of
February 17, 1994, except the names of clients, and except such
information already provided to the Union through its response
of June 26, 1996.
The General Counsel requested a remedy pursuant to Mar-
Jac Poultry, 136 NLRB 785 (1962). That case extended the
certification year for 1 additional year because of the em-
ployer’s refusal to bargain with the union. Although I have not
found that the Respondent was guilty of bad-faith bargaining,
nevertheless I believe that an extension of the certification year
is required because of the Respondent’s unlawful refusal to
bargain with the Union for the 8-month period from February 2
to October 5, 1995, unless it received assurances that Levy
would not be the Union’s negotiator. I believe therefore that an
8 month extension of the certification year would take into
account the effect of the Respondent’s disruption of negotia-
tions following the Union’s certification. Colfor, Inc., 282
NLRB 1173, 1175 (1987); and Caribe Staple Co., supra at 894.
I reject the General Counsel’s request for extraordinary re-
dress consisting of a requirement that the Respondent be or-
dered to (a) commence bargaining within 15 days of a Board
order, (b) bargain on request for a minimum of 15 hours per
week until an agreement or a lawful impasse is reached or until
the parties agree to a respite in bargaining, and (c) prepare writ-
ten bargaining progress reports every 15 days and submit them
to the Regional Director and serve a copy of such reports on the
Union and provide the Union with an opportunity to reply.
Such remedies are inappropriate here. Caribe Staple Co., supra
at 894.
On these findings of fact and conclusions of law and on the
entire record, I issue the following recommended11

11 If no exceptions are filed as provided by Sec. 102.46 of the Board’s
Rules and Regulations, the findings, conclusions, and recommended
DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD 828
ORDER
The Respondent, People Care, Incorporated, New York, New
York, its officers, agents, successors, and assigns, shall
1. Cease and desist from
(a) Failing and refusing and delaying in furnishing the Union
with the information requested by it by its letter of February 17,
1994, excluding the names of clients.
(b) Refusing to meet at reasonable times for bargaining with
the Union.
(c) Insisting on the removal of union negotiator Richard
Levy as a condition for the continuation of collective bargain-
ing.
(d) In any like or related manner interfering with, restraining,
or coercing employees in the exercise of the rights guaranteed
them by Section 7 of the Act.
2. Take the following affirmative action necessary to effec-
tuate the policies of the Act.
(a) On request, bargain with the Union as the exclusive rep-
resentative of the employees in the following appropriate unit
concerning terms and conditions of employment, as if the initial
year of certification has been extended for an additional 8
months from the commencement of bargaining and, if an un-
derstanding is reached, embody the understanding in a signed
agreement:

All full-time and regular part-time home health care workers
employed by the Employer, including certified home health
aides, personal care aides, quality compliance technicians,
junior aides and housekeepers employed by the Employer out
of its facility located at 500 Eighth Avenue, New York, New
York, excluding all other employees, including registered
nurses, licensed practical nurses, office clerical and profes-
sional employees, guards and supervisors as defined in the
Act.

Order shall, as provided in Sec. 102.48 of the Rules, be adopted by the
Board and all objections to them shall be deemed waived for all pur-
poses.
(b) On request, provide the Union with all the information
requested by the Union in its letter of February 17, 1994, ex-
cluding the names of cleints, except such information already
provided to the Union through its response of June 26, 1996.
(c) On request, provide the Union in a timely and diligent
fashion with bargaining dates.
(d) On request, meet, deal with, and bargain collectively with
Richard Levy and any other duly designated representative of
the Union.
(e) Within 14 days after service by the Region, post at its fa-
cility in New York, New York, copies of the attached notice
marked “Appendix.”12 Copies of the notice, on forms provided
by the Regional Director for Region 2, after being signed by the
Respondent’s authorized representative, shall be posted by the
Respondent immediately upon receipt and maintained for 60
consecutive days in conspicuous places including all places
where notices to employees are customarily posted. Reasonable
steps shall be taken by the Respondent to ensure that the notices
are not altered, defaced, or covered by any other material. In
the event that, during the pendency of these proceedings, the
Respondent has gone out of business or closed the facility in-
volved in these proceedings, the Respondent shall duplicate and
mail, at its own expense, a copy of the notice to all current em-
ployees and former employees employed by the Respondent at
any time since February 22, 1994.
(f) Within 21 days after service by the Region, file with the
Regional Director a sworn certification of a responsible official
on a form provided by the Region attesting to the steps that the
Respondent has taken to comply.

12 If this Order is enforced by a judgment of a United States court of
appeals, the words in the notice reading “Posted by Order of the Na-
tional Labor Relations Board” shall read “Posted Pursuant to a Judg-
ment of the United States Court of Appeals Enforcing an Order of the
National Labor Relations Board.”