Pennsylvania Transformer

National Labor Relations Board - Board Decisions

Aug 25, 2000

331 N.L.R.B. 1147 (N.L.R.B. 2000)

PENNSYLVANIA TRANSFORMER TECHNOLOGY 1147
Pennsylvania Transformer Technology, Inc. and
United Steelworkers of America, AFL–CIO,
CLC. Case 6–CA–29448
August 25, 2000
DECISION AND ORDER
BY MEMBERS FOX, LIEBMAN, AND HURTGEN
On September 30, 1998, Administrative Law Judge
Karl H. Buschmann issued the attached decision. The
Respondent filed exceptions, a supporting brief, a Mo-
tion to Reopen the Record, and a reply to the General
Counsel’s opposition to its motion. The General Counsel
filed limited cross exceptions, an answering brief to the
Respondent’s exceptions, and an opposition to the Re-
spondent’s motion to reopen the record. Finally, the
Charging Party filed a brief in answer to the Respon-
dent’s exceptions and in support of the judge’s decision.
The National Labor Relations Board has delegated its
authority in this proceeding to a three-member panel.
The Board has considered the decision and the record
in light of the exceptions and briefs and has decided to
affirm the judge’s rulings, findings, and conclusions1 as
modified below and to adopt the recommended Order as
modified.2
We affirm the judge’s finding that Respondent Penn-
sylvania Transformer is a successor to Cooper Power
Systems, and that it violated Section 8(a)(5) and (1) by
failing to recognize the Charging Party Union as the col-
lective-bargaining representative of its production and
maintenance employees pursuant to a recognition request
made on March 30, 1998. The General Counsel has ex-
cepted to the judge’s failure to find specifically that, as
of April 1998, the Respondent had hired a substantial and
representative complement of employees. We find merit
in the General Counsel’s exception, and reject the Re-
spondent’s contention that the Union’s demand for rec-
ognition in April 1998 was premature.
As articulated by the Supreme Court in Fall River
Dyeing Corp. v. NLRB, 482 U.S. 27 (1987), in deciding
whether a “substantial and representative complement”
existed at a particular time which triggers the successor’s
bargaining obligation, the Board examines a number of
factors, including
1 “In the circumstances of this case, Member Hurtgen agrees with
the judge that there was substantial continuity between the predeces-
sor’s operation and the successor’s operation. In Tree-Free Fiber Co.,
328 NLRB 389 (1999), Bronx Health Plan, 326 NLRB 810 (1998), and
Simon DeBartelo Group, 325 NLRB 1154 (1998), Member Hurtgen, in
dissent, found no substantial continuity. In those cases, in Member
Hurtgen’s view, the changes between the predecessor operation and the
successor operation were far more substantial then those involved
herein. In Tree-Free, the predecessor produced a myriad of paper
products, and it sold these to other manufacturers. The alleged succes-
sor produced only jumbo rolls and sold them to retailers. In Bronx
Health Plan, the predecessor was a large multifaceted hospital, and the
alleged successor provided medical insurance services. In M.S. Man-
agement, the predecessor was a maintenance contractor which em-
ployed a variety of maintenance employees. The alleged successor was
a shopping mall which employed only the maintenance employees who
performed HVAC work.
2 The judge’s recommended Order is modified to conform to Excel
Container, 325 NLRB 17 (1997).
“whether the job classifications designated for the
operation were filled or substantially filled and
whether the operation was in normal or substantially
normal production.” In addition, [the Board] takes
into consideration “the size of the complement on
that date and the time expected to elapse before a
substantially larger complement would be at work
. . . as well as the relative certainty of the employers
expected expansion.” Id. at 48 [citations omitted].
Here, the record shows that in August 1996 the Re-
spondent purchased all of Cooper’s facilities and assets
used in the manufacture of electrical transformers. The
Respondent began operations in January 1997, building
core transformers, one of two types of transformers that
had been manufactured by Cooper.3 The Respondent
occupies approximately one-half the space that Cooper
utilized.
Regarding the Respondent’s level of production, the
judge determined that the Respondent “[had] filled a
vacuum in a market left by Cooper and [was] in the
process of expanding rapidly in the manufacture and sale
of the same products.” The record shows that the Re-
spondent typically made transformers which were
smaller than those produced by Cooper, but that the pro-
duction process and the employee skills necessary to
perform this work were essentially identical.
The judge found that as of April 1998, at the time of
the demand for recognition, the Respondent had hired 68
production employees, 54 of whom or nearly 80 percent
had formerly worked for Cooper. Further, as of the time
of the hearing in July 1998 the Respondent had hired
approximately 100 production and maintenance employ-
ees, a majority of whom were former Cooper employ-
ees.4 The record shows that the bulk of the Respondent’s
hiring came early in its startup phase and that, by the
time of the hearing, its hiring had dramatically slowed
down.5
3 Cooper had also manufactured another type of transformer called a
shell transformer, which the Respondent has plans to manufacture at
some indefinite time in the future.
4 It appears that there were a total of about 157 employees employed
as of the date of the hearing, and that there was authorization to hire 24
additional employees.
5 While asserting that it plans to expand into the manufacturing of
shell transformers in the near future, the Respondent nevertheless con-
tends that any bargaining obligation is premature because it will not
reach its full employee complement of approximately 400 for 2 or more
years. This projection is speculative and dependent upon the Respon-
dent increasing its manufacture and sales of both types of transformers.
The Court in Fall River Dyeing, supra, and the Board have dismissed
this type of argument premised on a “full” employee complement. See
also, Clement-Blythe Co., 182 NLRB 502 (1970), enfd. 415 F.2d 78 (4th
Cir. 1971), where the Board held that “it would unduly frustrate exist-
ing employees’ choice to delay selection of a bargaining representative
for months or years until the very last employee is on board.” We note
331 NLRB No. 151
DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD 1148
The Respondent’s employees are divided into two
classifications—transformer technician and apprentice—
and both of these classifications were filled as of the date
of the recognition demand. Further, the record shows
that, although the Respondent eliminated certain classifi-
cations utilized by Cooper, these employees are perform-
ing the same work that they did for Cooper including
winding, electrical testing, and storeroom attending, and
they are utilizing the same knowledge and skills, and, in
some instances, are supervised by the same supervisors.
Based on the totality of the circumstances, we find that
the Respondent’s operation was in a normal production
phase with transformers being regularly and consistently
built and sold, and that as of the date of the demand for
recognition, the Respondent had hired a substantial and
representative complement of employees. Therefore, we
affirm the judge’s finding of successorship as of April 1,
1998,6 with a corresponding obligation to bargain with
the Union as of that date.7
ORDER
The National Labor Relations Board adopts the rec-
ommended Order of the administrative law judge as
modified and orders that the Respondent, Pennsylvania
Transformer Technology, Inc, Canonsburg, Pennsyl-
vania, its officers, agents, successors, and assigns, shall
take the action set forth in the Order as modified.
1. Substitute the following for paragraph 2(b):
“2. (b) Within 14 days after service by the Region,
post at its facility in Canonsburg, Pennsylvania, copies of
the attached notice marked “Appendix.”2 Copies of the
notice, on forms provided by the Regional Director for
Region 6, after being signed by the Respondent’s author-
ized representative, shall be posted by the Respondent
and maintained for 60 consecutive days in conspicuous
places including all places where notices to employees
are customarily posted. Reasonable steps shall be taken
by Respondent to ensure that the notices are not altered,
defaced, or covered by any other material. In the event
that, during the pendency of these proceedings, the Re-
spondent has gone out of business or closed the facility
involved in these proceedings, the Respondent shall du-

that the Charging Party Union made the pertinent demand for recogni-
tion over 1 year after production had commenced, during which time
the Respondent significantly increased the size of its workforce.
6 See Cencom of Missouri, 282 NLRB 253, 259 (1986).
7 We deny the Respondent’s motion to reopen the hearing. The Re-
spondent contends that it now employs 130 production and mainte-
nance employees and that a majority of those employees were not em-
ployed by Cooper. Since we find, in agreement with the judge, that the
Respondent’s duty to recognize and bargain with the Union began on
April 1, 1998, the changes mentioned in the Respondent’s motion,
having occurred after the relevant date, do not affect our conclusion
that the Respondent is a successor employer to Cooper. See Cencom of
Missouri, supra at fn. 2; Hudson River Aggregates, Inc., 246 NLRB 192
fn. 2 (1979). Accordingly, since the Respondent seeks to present evi-
dence that if adduced and credited would not require a different result,
we deny the Respondent’s motion. See Sec. 102.48(d) of the Board’s
Rules and Regulations.
plicate and mail, at its own expense, a copy of the notice
to all current employees and former employees employed
by the Respondent at any time since April 1, 1998.”

Clifford E. Spungen, Esq., for the General Counsel.
Walter G. Bleil, Esq. (Deopken Keevican & Weiss), of Pitts-
burgh, Pennsylvania, for the Respondent.
David R. Jury, Esq., of Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania, for the Charg-
ing Party.
DECISION
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
KARL H. BUSCHMANN, Administrative Law Judge. This
case was tried in Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania, on July 7, 1998,
upon a complaint issued on May 18, 1998. The underlying
charges were filed by the United Steelworkers of America,
AFL–CIO, CLC (the Union) on December 22, 1997.
The complaint alleges that the Respondent, Pennsylvania
Transformer Technology, Inc. (The Respondent or PTTI), vio-
lated Section 8(a)(1) and (5) of the National Labor Relations
Act (the Act) by failing and refusing since April 1, 1998, to
recognize and bargain with the Union as the collective-
bargaining representative of PTTI’s production and mainte-
nance and tester employees.
The Respondent’s answer to the complaint admitted the ju-
risdictional allegations in the complaint, the supervisory status
of Ravindra Nalh Rahangdale, the status of the Union as a labor
organization, as well as its refusal to recognize and bargain
with the Union. The Union made a written request by letter of
March 30, 1998. The Respondent’s answer admitted that it has
failed and refused to recognize and bargain with the Union as
the exclusive collective-bargaining representative of the em-
ployees in the following two units:

All production and maintenance employees of the Com-
pany’s Canonsburg Transformer Plant, except for salaried
employees, nurses, transformer testers, office clerical and
technical employees, watchmen, guards, inspectors, and
all supervisory employees.
. . . .
All testers (at the Greater Canonsburg Works) except for
supervisors as defined in the National Labor Relations Act
as amended and all other employees.

The issue presented is whether PTTI is a successor employer
to Cooper Power Systems Division, Cooper Industries, Inc.,
and is obligated to recognize and bargain with the Union.
I. JURISDICTION
The Respondent, a Delaware corporation, with its office and
place of business in Canonsburg, Pennsylvania, is engaged in
the manufacture and distribution of power and specialty trans-
formers.
With purchases and receipts of goods valued in excess of
$50,000 from its Canonsburg facility to points outside the
Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, the Respondent is admittedly
an employer within the meaning of Section 2((2), (6), and (7) of
the Act.
The Union, United Steelworkers of America, AFL–CIO,
CLC, is admittedly a labor organization within the meaning of
Section 2(5) of the Act.
PENNSYLVANIA TRANSFORMER TECHNOLOGY 1149
II. FACTS
PTTI’s facility in Canonsburg was owned and operated by
Cooper Power Systems Division, Cooper Industries, Inc., since
1985. Owners prior to Cooper Industries, Inc., were McGraw
Edison. Cooper had from 750 to 880 employees prior to its
closure in 1994. At that time, the employees were represented
by three units of the Steelworkers Union. Local 3968 repre-
sented the production and maintenance employees, Local 4561
represented the “testers,” and Local 6449 represented the office
and technical employees. The latter unit is not at issue in this
case.
In April 1994, Cooper announced to the Union that it had to
close the facility unless a purchaser could be found by the end
of 1994. The Union and its three locals established a committee
to find a buyer. However, the effort was unsuccessful. Cooper
and the Union entered into a closing agreement which pro-
vided, inter alla, for recognition rights in the event the Com-
pany were to reopen within a period of 2 years (GC Exh. 23).
On November 22, 1994, the plant closed. The Union continued
its efforts to search for a buyer. Another committee was estab-
lished, known as the Canonsburg industrial development com-
mittee which included several former union presidents and
State and local officials, as well as members from the local
Chamber of Commerce. This committee tried to find a buyer
and took action when the plant was rumored to be moved to
China. In addition, the Union established a program for dislo-
cated workers who needed assistance as a result of the closing
of the plant. The committee also involved itself in sale of the
facility to Ravindra Nalh (R.N.) Rahangdale, the present owner.
The Canonsburg industrial development committee issued a
press release about the sale of the facility to an investment
group headed by Rahangdale (GC Exh. 26).
Rahangdale began to negotiate for the acquisition of the fa-
cility in 1995. On August 9, 1996, he acquired all the assets of
Cooper’s Canonsburg plant which he combined with his other
company, Fayetteville Transformer Company in Raeford, North
Carolina. The record contains the purchase and sales agreement
between Cooper Power Systems, Inc. and Fayetteville Trans-
former Company (GC Exh. 2), as well as a list of purchase
assets (GC Exh. 3). The new Company known as Pennsylvania
Transformer Technology, Inc. (PTTI), began operations on
August 11, 1996, in the same facility formerly owned and oper-
ated by Cooper, using the same equipment and hiring former
Cooper employees. The production of transformers began on
January 1996 with sales to former customers of Cooper.
The new Company initially obtained its employees from
Bedway Temporary Services which had also been instrumental
in assisting Cooper when it closed the facility. Applicants for
employment were interviewed by PTTI personnel and hired by
Bedford. They worked under the supervision of PTTI manage-
ment and were considered probationary employees. Following
a probationary period of 6 months, they were eligible to be-
come PTTI employees. The initial complement of employees
were virtually all former Cooper employees (GC Exh. 8). More
specifically, as of April 1998, 54 of the 68 production employ-
ees or nearly 80 percent of the PTTI work force had worked for
Cooper. Considering also the employees who were on Bed-
way’s payroll, 58 out of 82 production workers or 72 percent
had been Cooper employees (R. Exh.10). At the time of the
trial, the Respondent conceded that a majority of the production
and maintenance employees were former Cooper employees.
The record similarly shows that three of the four workers who
are classified as testers were former Cooper employees (GC
Exh. 11).
Several supervisors working for the PTTI had worked for
Cooper, including John Sworchek and Spencer Burnside (R.
Exh. 8). Richard L. Pacilla, general manager of PTTI was also a
former Cooper employee.
The product of PTTI, like its predecessor, is the manufacture
of electric transformers ranging from 10 to 60 megavolts
(MVA). Cooper’s definition of “intermediate” was an MVA
range of 10 to 20 and anything above 24 MVA was considered
a large transformer. The Respondent’s definition was that a
capacity of up to 50 MVA was considered intermediate and
anything above that was a large transformer. Cooper also pro-
duced shell form transformers which have the same function as
core transformers but have the appearance of stacked discs.
PTTI has not yet produced shell transformers but has the inten-
tion to manufacture these types in the future. While the size of
the transformer units produced by PTTI has tended to be
smaller than those produced by Cooper or the level of produc-
tion by PTTI has been lower than that of Cooper, there is no
question that the products as such are admittedly identical,
requiring the same skills and expertise of its employees.
The Respondent’s plant is the same as Cooper’s former facil-
ity, except that PTTI has occupied a smaller portion of Coo-
per’s former area. PTTI estimated that it currently uses about
half of Cooper’s former production area. Portion of the former
Cooper plant have been leased. However, as the Company
grows, it is expected to make increasing use of Cooper’s former
plant.
PTTI uses Cooper’s equipment. While the Respondent has
sold or moved some of the original equipment, in continued use
are the furniture, machinery, spare parts, maintenance inven-
tory, and intellectual property for the design of the transform-
ers. The only equipment which the Respondent added were a
new computer, printers, and copiers.
Cooper’s former customers have provided the base for
PTTI’s customers. More than half of its sales are being made to
former customers of Cooper. Several witnesses recited custom-
ers of Cooper who are also customers of PTTI, such as Detroit
Edison, Florida Power and Light, Western States Electric, Inc.,
Babcock and Wilcox, Consumers Energy, Smith Central
Power, Georgia Power, AEP, Alabama Power, Penn Power and
Light, TVA, Allegheny Power, and Entergy (GC Exh. 14).
III. ANALYSIS
The parties are in agreement that the resolution of the issue
of successorship is controlled by Fall River Dyeing & Corp. v.
NLRB, 482 U.S. 27 (1987). The General Counsel and the
Charging Party submit that PTTI, although smaller in size than
its predecessor, is without a doubt the successor to Cooper
Power Systems, and, accordingly, obligated to recognize and
bargain with the Union.
According to the Respondent, the Fall River criteria have not
been satisfied because PTTI has designated certain job
classifications for its employees which are different than
Cooper’s job classifications. PTTI is not operating anywhere
near the optimum capacity and far short of that achieved by
Cooper, and the size of its complement of employees is
substantially smaller, although it is expected to increase
substantially. For those reasons, the Respondent suggests that a
finding of successorship is premature. The diminished scope of
its operations, as compared to Cooper’s facility, different
supervisors, customers and products, as well as the long hiatus
DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD 1150
ucts, as well as the long hiatus between operations, all militate
against a conclusion of successorship, according to the Respon-
dent.
The Court in Fall River initially emphasized the presumption
of majority status of the union during a successorship situation.
“[D]uring this unsettling transition period, the union needs the
presumptions of majority status to which it is entitled to safe-
guard its members’ rights and to develop a relationship with the
successor.” Id. at 39. According to the Court, the obligations of
successorship and the duty to bargain depend upon whether
there is “substantial continuity” between the enterprises. The
Court stated that this question “is primarily factual in nature
and is based upon the totality of the circumstances of a given
situation.” The Board must examine a number of factors:
“whether the business of both employers is essentially the
same; whether the employees of the new company are doing
the same jobs in the same working conditions under the same
supervisors; and whether the new entity has the same produc-
tion process, produces the same products, and basically has the
same body of customers.” Id. at 43.
The record shows that the new company is essentially a con-
tinuation of the old, albeit after a 2-year hiatus, and on a
smaller scale. Cooper closed its doors on November 22, 1994,
and PTTI reopened in August 1996. However, during the hia-
tus, a skeleton crew made the necessary repairs and supplied
parts to former customers. The Union continued its efforts to
locate a new owner and continually kept the former Cooper
employees informed about the developments and was continu-
ally involved in the fate of the old company and its employees.
A lengthy hiatus between ownerships has not been a successful
defense to a finding of a successorship. Straight Creek Mining,
323 NLRB 759 (1997).
The Respondent showed that the transformers it produces are
smaller than those of its predecessor. Yet the record shows that
it has produced and intends to produce identical products, using
the same machinery in the same plant with a majority of the
same employees. Cooper produced intermediate and large core
transformers, as well as shell form transformers. PTTI has ad-
mittedly produced intermediate size transformers, admittedly
intends to build shell transformers, and admittedly has the ca-
pacity and expertise to build large transformers. Rahangdale
testified as follows (Tr. 103).

That is the reason why we are moving from small to
big, it is a progressive stage. Let’s say even if we made a
hundred MVA core form transformer, it takes longer time,
that means [that] industry inventory take[s] longer. We are
moving step by step. Every month we are making bigger
transformers. As we move further on the core form trans-
former, we have gotten few of what is now the shell form
transformers, which we plan to enter into the market.

PTTI, like Cooper, sold spare parts. In this regard, Rahang-
dale testified (Tr. 114): “As part of the purchase we acquired
the parts and the drawings to provide spare parts for those
transformers that either McGraw-Edison or Cooper Industries
has already sold and the circuit breakers that Cooper Industries
. . . had sold.” The PTTI 1998 marketing plan features, an ex-
perience work force, diverse engineering capabilities and “state
of the art” manufacturing, processing, and testing, as well as a
product base for medium and large transformers (GC Exh. 21).
The record contains documents showing in technical detail the
manufacturing goals and product descriptions relating to the
comparative nature of the two enterprises. The substance of the
documents is that PTTI has filled a vacuum in a market left by
Cooper and is in the process of expanding rapidly in the manu-
facture and sale of the same products.
The record also shows that a majority of the employees cur-
rently working for PTTI have formerly been employed by Coo-
per. That is one of the reasons which enabled the Respondent to
feature in its brochures an “experienced” work force. The em-
ployees have performed the same functions and have not been
trained differently under current ownership. Indeed, the Re-
spondent has not had a training program for its employees.
The Respondent stressed the adoption of new job classifica-
tions for the employees and the elimination of Cooper’s multis-
tructured job descriptions. In substance, PTTI has classified its
employees as either “transformer technicians” or “apprentices”
to reflect the owner’s management philosophy. Under that con-
cept, employees should be “empowered” and “flexible.” How-
ever, the elimination of job classifications and increased flexi-
bility do not reflect different job skills or changed work re-
quirement for the employees. The employees have performed
the same functions and have had the same skills as before.
While PTTI employees have enjoyed less supervision and have
had an increased responsibility for quality and a sense of flexi-
bility, they are still supervised in their work, perform the same
work to produce the same product as before. Such changes as
eliminating job classifications or combining job functions are
considered insignificant for purposes of finding a successor-
ship. Capitol Steel & Iron Co., 299 NLRB 484 (1990). The
Respondent admitted that the mechanics of assembling a trans-
former have not changed in a hundred years and require the
same job skills.
The record shows that PTTI has conducted its operation out
of the same physical facility with the same equipment. Except
for the acquisition of a new computer and printer, the Respon-
dent has used about 45 or 50 percent of the former plant and
equipment. While PTTI has used less space and inventory than
its predecessor, it is significant that PTTI has not occupied any
other space or different equipment, but conducts its operations,
albeit on a smaller scale, entirely within the confines of the
predecessor company. It is clear that the concept of a successor
employer is not affected by its comparative size.
Finally, the Respondent’s customer base reflects that 50 per-
cent have been former customers of Cooper. Although Cooper
sold its transformers primarily to large utilities, PTTI customers
include industrial concerns. The Respondent admits that Coo-
per may have had thousands of customers. That would certainly
include both, utility and industrial customers.· The record
plainly shows that PTTI sold its transformers to major utilities.
Indeed, the Respondent anticipates gaining additional utility
customers as other transformer manufactures have gone out of
business. The record shows that many of Cooper’s former cus-
tomers are also customers of PTTI.
Substantial continuity between the companies was firmly es-
tablished in this case. Illustrative of the concept of substantial
continuity is the testimony of Respondent’s human resource
manager, Deborah Baker:

I basically inherited Bedway when I arrived. From
what I have been told is when Cooper closed the plant,
there were about six ex-employees that they had kept as a
skeleton crew, and the other six employees that I believe
were hourly employees were hired through Bedway, and
whenever the plant was purchased by Ravi and company,
PENNSYLVANIA TRANSFORMER TECHNOLOGY 1151
they kept the Bedway employees on as Bedway, and then
when I got there, we all sat down and decided how we
were going to work this out since we were a startup com-
pany, and that we would keep Bedway, continue to use
Bedway for various business reasons.
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1. The Respondent, Pennsylvania Transformer Technology,
Inc., is an employer engaged in commerce within the meaning
of Section 2(2), (6), and (7) of the Act.
2. The Union, United Steelworkers of America, AFL–CIO,
CLC, is a labor organization within the meaning of Section 2(5)
of the Act.
3. The Union has been the exclusive collective-bargaining
representative of the following employees of Cooper, constitut-
ing units appropriate for the purposes of collective bargaining
within the meaning of Section 9(b) of the Act.

All production and maintenance employees of the Com-
pany’s Canonsburg Transformer Plant, except for salaried
employees, nurses, transformer testers, office clerical and
technical employees, watchmen, guards, inspectors, and
all supervisory employees.
. . . .
All testers (at the Greater Canonsburg Works) except for
supervisors as defined in the National Labor Relations Act
as amended and all other employees.

4. The Respondent is a successor to Cooper and is obligated
to recognize and bargain with the Union.
5. The Respondent has refused since April 1, 1998, to recog-
nize and bargain with the Union as the collective-bargaining
representative of its union employees.
REMEDY
Having found that the Respondent has violated Section
8(a)(5) and (1) of the Act by refusing to recognize and bargain
with the Union. I shall order it to cease and desist and take
certain affirmative action necessary to effectuate the policies of
the Act. I shall order that the Respondent recognize and, on
request, bargain with the Union as the collective-bargaining
representative of the unit employees and, if an understanding is
reached, embody that understanding in a signed agreement.
On these findings of fact and conclusions of law and with the
entire record, I issue the following recommended1
ORDER
The Respondent, Pennsylvania Transformer Technology,
Inc., Canonsburg, Pennsylvania, its officers, agents, successors,
and assigns shall
1. Cease and desist from
(a) Refusing to recognize and bargain collectively in good
faith with United Steelworkers of America, AFL–CIO, CLC as
the exclusive collective-bargaining representative for the unit
employees in the following appropriate units:

All production and maintenance employees of the Com-
pany’s Canonsburg Transformer Plant, except for salaried
employees, nurses, transformer testers, office clerical and

1 If no exceptions are filed as provided by Sec. 102.46 of the Board’s
Rules and Regulations, the findings, conclusions and recommended
Order shall, as provided in Sec. 102.48 of the Rules, be adopted by the
Board and all objections to them shall be deemed waived for all pur-
poses.
technical employees, watchmen, guards, inspectors, and
all supervisory employees.
. . . .
All testers (at the Greater Canonsburg Works) except for
supervisors as defined in the National Labor Relations Act
as amended and all other employees.

(b) In any like or related manner interfering with, restraining,
or coercing employees in the exercise of the rights guaranteed
them by Section 7 of the Act.
2. Take the following affirmative action necessary to effec-
tuate the policies of the Act.
(a) Recognize and, on request, bargain collectively and in
good faith with the Union as the exclusive representative of the
employees in the appropriate units concerning terms and condi-
tions of employment and, if an understanding is reached, em-
body it in a signed agreement.
(b) Within 14 days after service by the Region, post at its fa-
cility in Canonsburg, Pennsylvania, copies of the attached no-
tice marked “Appendix.”2 Copies of the notice, on forms pro-
vided by the Regional Director for Region 6, after being signed
by the Respondent’s authorized representative, shall be posted
by the Respondent and maintained for 60 consecutive days in
conspicuous places including all places where notices to em-
ployees are customarily posted. Reasonable steps shall be taken
by Respondent to ensure that the notices are not altered, de-
faced, or covered by any other material. In the event that, dur-
ing the pendency of these proceedings, the Respondent has
gone out of business or closed the facility involved in these
proceedings, the Respondent shall duplicate and mail, at its
own expense, a copy of the notice to all current employees and
former employees employed by the Respondent at any time
since December 22, 1997.
(c) Within 21 days after service by the Region, file with the
Regional Director a sworn certification of a responsible official
on a form provided by the Region attesting to the steps that the
Respondent has taken to comply.
APPENDIX
NOTICE TO EMPLOYEES
POSTED BY ORDER OF THE
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
An Agency of the United States Government

The National Labor Relations Board has found that we violated
the National Labor Relations Act and has ordered us to post and
abide by this notice.

Section 7 of the Act gives employees these rights.
To organize
To form, join, or assist any union
To bargain collectively through representatives of their
own choice
To act together for other mutual aid or protection
To choose not to engage in any of these protected con-
certed activities.

2 If this Order is enforced by a judgment of a United States court of
appeals, the words in the notice reading “Posted by Order of the Na-
tional Labor Relations Board” shall read “Posted Pursuant to a Judg-
ment of the United States Court of Appeals Enforcing an Order of the
National Labor Relations Board.”
DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD 1152
WE WILL NOT refuse to recognize and bargain collectively
in good faith with United Steelworkers of America, AFL–CIO,
CLC as the exclusive collective-bargaining representative for
the unit employees in the following appropriate units:

All production and maintenance employees of the Com-
pany’s Canonsburg Transformer Plant, except for salaried
employees, nurses, transformer testers, office clerical and
technical employees, watchmen, guards, inspectors, and
all supervisory employees.
. . . .
All testers (at the Greater Canonsburg Works) except for
supervisors as defined in the National Labor Relations Act
as amended and all other employees.

WE WILL NOT in any like or related manner interfere with,
restrain, or coerce employees in the exercise of the rights guar-
anteed them by Section 7 of the Act.
WE WILL recognize and, on request, bargain collectively
and in good faith with the Union as the exclusive representative
of the employees in the appropriate units concerning terms and
conditions of employment and, if an understanding is reached,
embody it in a signed agreement.

PENNSYLVANIA TRANSFORMER TECHNOLOGY, INC.