Pennsylvania Telephone Guild

National Labor Relations Board - Board Decisions

Nov 15, 1985

277 N.L.R.B. 501 (N.L.R.B. 1985)

PENNSYLVANIA TELEPHONE GUILD (BELL TELEPHONE)
Pennsylvania Telephone Guild and the Philadelphia
Division of the Pennsylvania Telephone Guild
and Bell Telephone Company of Pennsylvania.
Case 4-CB-4821
15 November 1985
DECISION AND ORDER
BY CHAIRMAN DOTSON AND MEMBERS
DENNIS AND JOHANSEN
On 14 September 1984 Administrative Law
Judge Stanley N. Ohlbaum issued the attached de-
cision. The General Counsel and the Charging
Party filed exceptions and supporting briefs and the
Respondent filed cross-exceptions and answering
briefs.
The National Labor Relations Board has delegat-
ed its authority in this proceeding to a three-
member panel.
The Board has considered the decision and the
record in light of the exceptions and briefs and has
decided to affirm the judge's rulings, findings, and
conclusions only to the extent consistent with this
Decision and Order.
The principal issue in this case is whether a
party may insist to impasse on tape-recording a
grievance meeting. The judge concluded that the
Board's decision in Bartlett-Collins Co.' was inap-
plicable to grievance meetings because he reasoned
that grievance meetings were distinguishable from
collective-bargaining negotiations in character,
thrust, and methodology. We disagree.
In Bartlett-Collins, we held that the presence of a
court reporter or the use of a recording device was
a permissive subject of bargaining which could not
be insisted upon to impasse. Thus, we found that an
employer violated its duty to bargain in good faith
by insisting to impasse on the presence of a court
reporter during collective-bargaining negotiations.
The duty to bargain in good faith not only ap-
plies to negotiations, but to any meeting where
questions arising under the collective-bargaining
agreement will be discussed. Section 8(d) of the
Act provides that "[the duty] to bargain collective-
ly is the performance of the mutual obligation of
the employer and the representative of the employ-
ees to meet at reasonable times and confer in good
faith with respect to wages, hours, and other terms
and conditions of employment or the negotiation of
an agreement or any question arising thereunder."
Typically, questions arising under collective-bar-
gaining agreements are initially addressed by the
parties by means of a grievance meeting. Grievance
meetings may sift out unmeritorious claims and fa-
' 237 NLRB 770 (1978), enfd 639 F.2d 652 (10th Car 1981), cert,
denied 452 U S 961 (1981)
501
cilitate the settlement of disputes before any formal
dispute resolution forum is utilized. Thus, griev-
ance meetings are integral parts of the collective-
bargaining process which are subject to the Act's
requirement of good-faith bargaining.
Moreover, our examination, contrary to that of
the judge, reveals that grievance meetings are simi-
lar to collective-bargaining negotiations in charac-
ter and methodology. Like contract negotiations, a
grievance meeting is an informal mechanism used
to address employee concerns where the ultimate
goal is to reach an agreement or settlement. Al-
though grievance meetings and negotiation sessions
may differ in the scope of matters to be discussed,
both proceedings involve the trading of items or
groups of items in order to obtain mutually accept-
able agreements. Informal dialog between the par-
ties regarding the means by which agreement can
be reached is an essential element of both proceed-
ings. Unlike adversary proceedings such as trials
and arbitrations, grievance meetings do not normal-
ly have a judge to make findings of fact or conclu-
sions of law or any provision for examination or
cross-examination of witnesses.
Further, the same adverse effects on the bargain-
ing process which might result from allowing a
party to insist to impasse on a verbatim transcript
of collective-bargaining negotiations would also be
found in grievance meetings. Bartlett-Collins, supra.
The presence of a recording device may have a
tendency to inhibit free and open discussions. This
may be especially true when sensitive or confiden-
tial matters will be discussed. The spontaneity and
flexibility which are commonly manifested during
bargaining may be lost.2 Moreover, the important
element of open and honest dialog may be replaced
by a formalistic monologue of posturing and
speechmaking. The informal nature of the griev-
ance meeting would therefore be converted into a
formalistic one where parties speak more for the
record in anticipation of litigation rather than even-
tual settlement. While we are mindful that some
grievances may proceed to arbitration and a verba-
tim record of grievance discussions may be helpful,
the primary goal of grievance meetings is to adjust
the grievance. This goal will more likely be accom-
plished when there is no chilling effect on the ex-
pression of views. Finally, disagreement over the
threshold issue of whether a recording device can
be used, which is preliminary and subordinate to
substantive matters, may stiffle bargaining from its
inception.3 Therefore, we conclude that the need
2 Bartlett-Collins, supra at 773 fn. 9.
2 We disagree with the judge's conclusion that the Employer suffers
no damage when the grievance procedure is frustrated by the Union's
Continued
277 NLRB No. 55
502 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
for an objective means of replicating facts is out-
weighed by the adverse effects on the bargaining
process.
Because it is our statutory obligation to foster
and encourage meaningful collective bargaining
and the resolution of industrial disputes, we con-
clude that our ruling in Bartlett-Collins relating to
collective-bargaining negotiations should be equally
applicable to grievance meetings. Accordingly, we
hold that a party fails to bargain in good faith by
insisting to impasse on the use of a recording
device during a grievance meeting.
Applying these principles to the facts of this
case, the undisputed evidence reveals that the Re-
spondent's division president John Zawackis car-
ried a tape recorder to the 3 and 5 April 1984
grievance meetings to record the discussions relat-
ed to the grievances filed by the special order typ-
ists and the Respondent's division officers. Despite
the Employer's objections to the use of the record-
ing device, the Union's position remained un-
changed. When the parties were unable to reach an
agreement on this issue, the meetings ended with-
out any discussion regarding the merits of the
grievances. We therefore concluded that the
Union's insistence to impasse on tape-recording the
3 and 5 April 1984 grievance meetings constituted
unlawful insistence on a nonmandatory subject of
bargaining in violation of Section 8(b)(3) of the
Act.4
For remedial purposes, we must now address the
issue of whether Pennsylvania Telephone Guild
and/or The Philadelphia Division of the Pennsyl-
vania Telephone Guild is the responsible party in
this proceeding.5
Pennsylvania Telephone Guild is divided into
four geographical divisions for jurisdictional pur-
poses in representing the membership, handling
failure to process grievances. Because the grievance procedure is the em-
ployee's channel of communication to management, the breakdown of
this process may result in the Employer's inability to discover and cor-
rect problem areas in plant operations. See Elkoun and Elkouri, How Ar-
bitration Works 111-112 (3d ed 1973). Thus, production and efficiency
may suffer or work stoppages may result.
4 In reaching this determination, we do not rely on the Board's deci-
sion in Chemical Workers Local 29 (Morton-Norwich Products), 228 NLRB
1101 (1977), in which the Board found an 8(b)(3) violation based on the
respondents' attempt to change the implied terms of a collective-bargain-
ing agreement by insisting on tape-recording grievance discussions where
no such practice existed. Although the judge found that a practice of
tape-recording grievance meetings existed between the parties, we are not
satisfied that the record supports his conclusion. In any event, we find
that whether a practice existed is irrelevant where insistence concerns a
nonmandatory subject of bargaining.
s During the hearing, Pennsylvania Telephone Guild contended that it
was not responsible for the acts of the Division with respect to grievance
handling of disciplinary cases, as they are separate entities The judge
stated that if it were necessary to decide this issue, he would find that the
Guild shared responsibility for the actions of the Division. No party to
this proceeding excepted to the judge's finding However, in view of the
violation found herein , we are obligated to sua sponte determine for re-
medial purposes the responsible party.
grievances, and conducting membership meetings.
The 4000 members of the organization are mem-
bers of the Guild, not the divisions themselves.
Membership dues are the only source of revenue
for the Guild. These dues are received by an exec-
utive officer of the Guild who, in turn, funnels a
portion of these dues to the divisions. There is only
one constitution for the Guild and its divisions.
Moreover, the parties to the collective-bargaining
agreement are the Employer and the Guild. While
division representatives handle grievance matters
during steps 1, 2, and 3 of the grievance procedure,
the Guild determines whether grievances will pro-
ceed to arbitration. In view of the above, we
concur with Guild Executive President Gales
Dreves' assessment that "there is only one Union
and that is the Pennsylvania Telephone Guild."
Thus, it is clear that the Division is only an agent
of the Guild. Accordingly, our remedial order will
be directed to Pennsylvania Telephone Guild as
the Respondent.
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1. Bell Telephone Company of Pennsylvania is
an employer engaged in commerce within the
meaning of Section 2(6) and (7) of the Act.
2. Pennsylvania Telephone Guild and the Phila-
delphia Division of the Pennsylvania Telephone
Guild are labor organizations within the meaning
of Section 2(5) of the Act.
3. At all times material herein, Pennsylvania
Telephone Guild and The Philadelphia Division of
the Pennsylvania Telephone Guild have been the
exclusive representative of all the employees in the
appropriate unit, set forth in article 2 of the collec-
tive-bargaining agreement, for purposes of collec-
tive bargaining with respect to wages, rates of pay,
hours of employment, and other terms and condi-
tions of employment within the meaning of Section
9(a) of the Act.
4. Since about 3 and 5 April 1984, the Respond-
ent, by insisting to impasse on the use of a record-
ing device during grievance meetings, has engaged
in and is engaging in unfair labor practices within
the meaning of Section 8(b)(3) of the Act.
5. The aforesaid unfair labor practices affect
commerce within the meaning of Section 2(6) and
(7) of the Act.
REMEDY
Having found that the Respondent, Pennsylvania
Telephone Guild, has engaged in unfair labor prac-
tices in violation of Section 8(b)(3) of the Act by
insisting to impasse on the use of a recording
device during grievance meetings, we shall order
the Respondent to cease and desist from engaging
PENNSYLVANIA TELEPHONE GUILD (BELL TELEPHONE)
in such conduct and from any like or related unfair
labor practices , and to take certain affirmative
action that we deem necessary to effectuate the
policies of the Act.
ORDER
The National Labor Relations Board orders that
the Respondent, Pennsylvania Telephone Guild,
Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, its officers, agents, and
representatives, shall
1. Cease and desist from
(a) Refusing to bargain in good faith with the
Bell 't'elephone Company of Pennsylvania by insist-
ing to impasse on the use of a recording device
during grievance meetings.
(b) In any like or related manner refusing to bar-
gain in good faith with the Employer over the
processing and adjustment of grievances.
2. Take the following affirmative action neces-
sary to effectuate the policies of the Act.
(a) On request, as the exclusive representative of
the employees in the appropriate unit described in
article 2 of the collective-bargaining agreement,
bargain in good faith with the Employer over
grievances filed pursuant to the collective-bargain-
ing agreement.
(b) Post at its facility in Philadelphia, Pennsylva-
nia, copies of the attached notice marked "Appen-
dix.`3 Copies of the notice, on forms provided by
the Regional Director for Region 4, after being
signed by the Respondent's authorized representa-
tive, shall be posted by the Respondent immediate-
ly upon receipt and maintained for 60 consecutive
days in conspicuous places including all places
where notices to members are customarily posted.
Reasonable steps shall be taken by the Respondent
to ensure that the notices are not altered, defaced,
or covered by any other material.
(c) Notify the Regional Director in writing
within 20 days from the date of this Order what
steps the Respondent has taken to comply.
B If this Order is enforced by a judgment of a United States court of
appeals, the words in the notice reading "Posted by Order of the Nation-
al Labor Relations Board" shall read "Posted Pursuant to a Judgment of
the United States Court of Appeals Enforcing-an Order of the National
Labor Relations Board "
APPENDIX
NOTICE To MEMBERS
POSTED BY ORDER OP THE
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
An Agency of the United States Government
503
The National Labor Relations Board has found
that we violated the National Labor Relations Act
and has ordered us to post and abide by this notice.
WE WILL NOT refuse to bargain in good faith
with Bell Telephone Company of Pennsylvania by
insisting to impasse on the use of a recording
device during grievance meetings.
WE WILL NOT in any like or related manner
refuse to bargain in good faith with the Employer
over the processing and adjustment of grievances.
WE WILL, on request, as the exclusive represent-
ative of the employees in the appropriate unit de-
scribed in article 2 of the collective-bargaining
agreement, meet, process, and discuss with the Em-
ployer grievances filed pursuant to the terms of the
collective-bargaining agreement in effect between
ourselves and the Employer.
PENNSYLVANIA TELEPHONE GUILD
Michael P. Berger and Joseph C. Kelly, Esqs., for the
Acting General Counsel.
Paul M. Levinson, Esq. (Messrs. Mayer, Weiner & Levin-
son, Attorneys), of New York, New York, for the Re-
spondents.
Herbert Thurschwell, Esq., of Philadelphia, Pennsylvania,
for the Charging Party.
DECISION
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Preliminary Statement; Issue
STANLEY N. OHLBAUM, Administrative Law Judge.
This proceeding' under the National Labor Relations
Act, 29 U.S.C. § 151 et seq. (Act), was litigated before
me in Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, on August 10, 1984,
with all parties participating throughout by counsel af-
forded full opportunity to present evidence and conten-
tions, as well as to propose findings and conclusions, and
to file posttrial briefs received on September 10, 1984.
All have been carefully considered.
The basic issue presented and resolved is whether a
party to a grievance proceeding under a collective labor
agreement has the right, over objection of the other
party, to tape-record that proceeding; specifically,
whether Respondent Unions violated Section 8(b)(3) of
the Act by so insisting.
1 Based on May 25 complaint arising out of April 4 charge as amended
on April 26 and further amended on May 18, 1984
504 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
On the entire record and my observation of the testi-
monial demeanor of the witnesses, I make the following
FINDINGS AND CONCLUSIONS
1. JURISDICTION
At all material times, Respondents Pennsylvania Tele-
phone Guild (Pennsylvania Guild) and its geographical
subsidiary, Philadelphia Division of Pennsylvania Tele-
phone Guild (Philadelphia Division) (the Union), have
each been a labor organization as defined by Section 2(5)
of the Act.
During the year immediately preceding issuance of the
complaint, Bell Telephone Company of Pennsylvania
(Pennsylvania Bell; Company), a Pennsylvania public
utility corporation operating a communications system
throughout Pennsylvania, received gross revenues ex-
ceeding $500,000 and also purchased and received, in
Pennsylvania directly from places outside Pennsylvania,
materials worth over $50,000. I find that at all material
times Pennsylvania Bell has been and is an employer en-
gaged in commerce as defined by Section 2(2), (6), and
(7) of the Act.
II. ALLEGED UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES
A. Facts as Found
The essential facts are substantially undisputed.
The parties have since at least 1944 maintained a col-
lective-bargaining relationship, memorialized in collec-
tive agreements, calling for, among other things, a
grievance/arbitration procedure for resolution of certain
disputes including disciplinary personnel actions by the
Company' against members of the Union (Jt. Exh. 2, arts.
11, 15, 12.03, 13.02, and 14.01).
On March 26, 1984, following an alleged work inter-
ruption or stoppage, Charging Party Company convoked
an "investigatory" (so denominated by the Company)
meeting, resulting in the 5-day suspension of Philadelphia
Division President Zawackis and the 3-day suspensions
of four other union officers, all unit members. The entire
meeting was tape-recorded by Zawackis, with the
knowledge but over the "objection" of the Company,
which nevertheless continued to participate. Numerous
other "investigatory" meetings were held between the
parties on the same date, all tape-recorded by the Union.
As an outgrowth of the disciplines meted out at the
foregoing meetings, on April 3, 1984, a third-step griev-
ance meeting was held by the parties concerning the
Company's suspension of five special or service order
typists, unit employees, resulting from the alleged work
interruption or stoppage. On April 5, 1984, a further
grievance session was held, this time concerning the
Company's suspension of the foregoing four union offi-
cers for allegedly being instrumental in bringing about
the alleged work interruption or stoppage resulting in the
April 3 grievance meeting. The April 3 and 5 grievance
meetings thus involved the same underlying circum-
stances and all arose out of the March 26 meetings and
disciplinary actions.
Desiring to assure total accuracy of certain key mat-
ters at the point in the April 3 meeting where the suspen-
sion of the five service order typists was about to be dis-
cussed and also at the April 5 grievance meeting involv-
ing the related suspension of the four union officials,
Philadelphia Division President Zawackis turned on a
tape recorder, reassuring Company Lead Representative
Robinson, without demur by the latter, that he
(Zawackis) would turn it off if the Company wished to
go "off the record," as at previous taped meetings. The
Company, however, this time refused to participate fur-
ther in either of these meetings unless the Union with-
drew or turned off its tape recorder. The Company sub-
sequently filed the charge resulting in the complaint
here,2 that the Union's insistence on the aforedescribed
tape-recording constituted "bad faith bargaining" in vio-
lation of Section 8(b)(3), while conceding in its charge
that there was precedent for such tape-recording under
undescribed "special circumstances" (G.C. Exhs. 1[a],
[c], and [e].
According to uncontroverted testimony of Union
Philadelphia Division President Zawackis, there have
been previous instances since the mid-1970s of tape-re-
cording grievance meetings, in whole or in part, by
either or both of the parties. It is, additionally, stipulated
that since the 1944 inception of the parties' collective-
bargaining relationship, the parties have at substantially
each grievance meeting taken longhand notes, without
objection by either side, while going "off the record" at
request, and that both sides' notes have been introduced
into evidence in ensuing arbitration proceedings (Jt. Exh.
1, par. 7). The subject of utilization of a tape recorder at
grievance meetings is not reflected in, nor was it bar-
gained about during the parties' negotiations eventuating
in, their current collective agreement (id. par. 5; R. Exh.
2).
B. Discussion and Resolution
Since 1978, the Board has held that a party (in that
case an employer) may not, even in good faith, condition
collective bargaining upon a stenographic transcript or a
recording device. See Bartlett-Collins Co., 237 NLRB 770
(1978), enfd. 639 F.2d 652 (10th Cir. 1981), cert. denied
452 U.S. 961 (1981); see also Latrobe Steel Co. Y. NLRB,
630 F.2d 171 (3d Cir. 1980), enfg. in part 244 NLRB 528
(1979), cert. denied 454 U.S. 821 (1981).3 These cases,
however, involved the propriety of utilization of such
devices at collective bargaining sessions, whereas the in-
stant case involves their use in grievance meetings. Unless
the principle is to be the same in both types of situations,
those precedents are not dispositive of the question pre-
sented here.
Grievance meetings would appear to differ substantial-
ly in character, thrust, and methodology from collective-
bargaining sessions. Thus, typically collective-bargaining
sessions are broad in scope, characteristically involving
the trading off of an item or group of items against an-
other or others; whereas grievance meetings are typically
2 This testimony by Zawackis is wholly uncontradicted.
2 For an earlier , different view, see Reed & Prince Mfg. Co, 96 NLRB
850 (1951) (involving a finding of bad faith on the employer 's part in in-
sisting upon a verbatim transcript), enfd on other grounds 205 F.2d 131
(1st Cir. 1953), cert denied 346 U S 887 (1953)
PENNSYLVANIA TELEPHONE GUILD (BELL TELEPHONE)
narrow in focus, frequently if not usually concerned, as
here, with specific discipline meted out to an employee
or employees in relation to certain specific alleged facts
which are contested. Unlike collective negotiations,
grievance meetings are adversarial in nature like a trial
or its preliminaries. Further, unlike typical collective bar-
gaining,4 unresolved grievances typically result in arbi-
tration which, notwithstanding its euphemistic rubric and
despite its stylistic contrast at times to the formalism of
judicial trial, is nonetheless an adversarial dispute-resolu-
tion process. It is characteristic, indeed a basic aim, of
dispute-resolution processes to arrive at truth based upon
an inquisition into facts-still further unlike the bargain-
ing process , in which each side aims for advantage
through tradeoffs if necessary. The need for, or desirabil-
ity of, objective means for replicating facts, to remove
them from the arena of dispute, such as through mechan-
ical tape-recording in contrast to the recognized fallacies
of personal recollection and the obvious shortcomings of
manual note-taking, is apparent in conjunction with ad-
versarial dispute-resolution, unlike in the loose give-and-
take donnybrook of collective bargaining. Cf., e.g.,
ATLRB v. Bartlett-Collins Co., supra, 639 F.2d at 657
(10th Cir. 1981), cert. denied 452 U.S. 961 (1981).
The only case cited by the parties involving the ques-
tion of the propriety of insistence upon utilizing a tape
recorder at a grievance meeting is Chemical Workers
Local 29 (Morton-Norwich Products), 228 NLRB 1101
(1977), in which the Board determined that, under the
circumstances there shown, a union violated Section
8(b)(3) by insisting on tape-recording a grievance meet-
ing. In that case, however, unlike at bar, the parties had
never during their 10-year grievance-processing relation-
ship made any verbatim transcript by tape recorder or
other means, nor had either party ever so requested. The
Board accordingly bottomed its decision upon the par-
ties' long-established unbroken practice of never making
a verbatim transcript, which the Board regarded as re-
sulting in an "implied term[s] of the collective-bargaining
agreement" (id.) which the union had attempted unilater-
ally to change. In the instant case, however, the par-
ties--either or both of them-had tape-recorded griev-
ance sessions in the past; indeed, according to the uncon-
troverted testimony of Union Philadelphia Division
President Zawackis, precedents for so doing had existed
since the mid-1970s. Upon this basis alone, the instant
case differs and is readily distinguishable from the above-
cited case,5 in which, it is additionally to be noted, the
Board gave no indication that it regarded its prohibition
4 "Interest arbitration" is atypical in collective negotiations
s Unlike the instant case, Chicago Cartage Co. v. Teamsters Local 710,
659 F 2d 825 (7th Cir. 1981), involved court review of a district court
decree enforcing an arbitration award . The Seventh Circuit , in an opinion
by Circuit Judge Pell not addressing the question of distinction between
collective-bargaining negotiations and grievance hearings, affirmed the
district court, holding that refusal by a party (union) to permit tape- re-
cording did not constitute "misconduct " vitiating the arbitral award. Cf
Rosario P. Ladies Garment Workers Local 10, 605 F.2d 1228, 1240-42 (2d
Cir 1979), cert denied 446 U S 919 (1980), Feltmgton v Stage Employees
1ATSE Local 306, 605 F 2d 1251, 1256 (2d Cir 1979), cert denied 446
U S 943 (1980)
505
against tape -recording of negotiating sessions (Bartlett-
Collins, supra) to be applicable to grievance meetings. 6
Section 8(b)(3) of the Act, which Respondent Unions
are alleged to have violated here, declares it to be an
unfair labor practice for a representative labor organiza-
tion "to refuse to bargain collectively with an employ-
er." The record fails to establish that the Unions here
"refuse [d] to bargain," no bargaining session being in-
volved and there also being no agreement or established
practice barring the use of tape recorders at grievance
meetings. Respondent Unions merely insisted on tape-re-
cording part of one and all of another grievance meeting,
as had occurred in the past, rather than to take notes by
hand, subject to the right of the Charging Party employ-
er to "go off the record" on request.
Since, as indicated above, grievance meetings differ in
character and essence from collective-bargaining negotia-
tions, and since the parties7 here, unlike as in Chemical
Workers Local 29 (Morton-Norwich Products), supra, nei-
ther expressly nor impliedly agreed to ban the tape-re-
cording of their grievance meetings, 8 but, on the con-
trary, merely adhered to their past practices in so doing,
it is determined and concluded that it has not been estab-
lished that Respondents, or either of them, violated the
Act by their described action in seeking to tape-record
the grievance meetings in question.9
6 Alternatively, if Respondent 's insistence on tape-recording here be
viewed as a unilateral change, in that event , since it involved a nonman-
datory subject of bargaining unreflected in the parties' subsisting collec-
tive agreement, it was nonviolative of the Act. Chemical Workers Local v.
Pittsburgh Glass Co., 404 U.S. 157, 185 (1971), Champion Parts Rebuilders
v NLRB, 717 F 2d 845, 855 (3d Cir 1983)
' Since this is said to be a case of novel impression , it may not be amiss
to observe that socially as well as administratively desirable byproducts
of not absolutely proscribing accurate memorialization through tape-re-
cording , as distinguished from time -consuming cross-correspondence or
laborious and far less accurate manual note -taking ("atavistic[ally] . .
quill and scroll ritual"-Communications Workers Local 1051 (American
Telephone & Telegraph Co.), 644 F 2d 923, 924 (1st Cir. 1981), of adver-
sarial-type grievance sessions potentially destined for factfinding resolu-
tion (i.e., in the arbitral and/or judicial forum) would be ( 1) a reduced
level of governmental intrusion into the business life modes of private
parties, in an area where stringent intervention is of questionable necessi-
ty or propriety , and (2) potential reduction of the ever widening htiga-
tional vortex through narrowing the area of factfinding, and thereby en-
couraging utilization of better mechanisms for determining truth, by tend-
ing to eliminate issues of fact as to what really occurred or was said at
preliminary stages of the adversarial contest, These byproducts militate in
favor of casting the die in the direction here suggested , viz, absent nego-
tiated agreement to the contrary, holding the tape-recording of grievance
meetings , in whole or in part, by either party , to be nonviolative of the
Act
8 It may additionally be observed that the instant proceeding appears
to present a classical instance of damnum absque mjuria, since it was not
Charging Party Employer 's grievance that was stalled here, but the
grievances of Respondent Union Charging Party Employer has in no
way been damaged through Respondent Union's failure to proceed with
Respondent Union's grievances against Charging Party Employer ; instead,
it is Respondent Union which has arguably been injured and damaged by
Charging Party Employer's refusal to proceed with Respondent Union's
grievances . How has Charging Party Employer been damaged by Re-
spondent Union's failure to proceed with Respondent Union's grievance'?
This would seem to constitute additional reason for dismissing the com-
plaint
9 Another question tendered , but unnecessary to reach in view of the
dismissal of the complaint , is whether Respondent Pennsylvania Guild
should be included in any remedial order herein , or whether such order
should be limited to Respondent Philadelphia Division only In view of
Continued
506 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
On the foregoing findings and the entire record, I state
the following
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
A. Jurisdiction is properly asserted here.
B. It has not been established by preponderating credi-
ble evidence upon the record as a whole that Respond-
the testimony of Respondent Pennsylvania Guild Executive President
Dreves that "There is only one Union, and that is the Pennsylvania Tele-
phone Guild," the fact that there is no indication that Respondent Phila-
delphia Division is a juridical entity apart from Respondent Pennsylvania
Guild-the former being a mere geographical part of the latter, that
union membership of all persons in all divisions is in Pennsylvania Guild,
that Pennsylvania Guild derives no revenues except from its membership
dues, that Pennsylvania Guild is not only the parent of all divisions but is
also their active managerial directing authority and head, and that Penn-
sylvania Guild participates in and controls its individual members' griev-
ents or either of them have violated Section 8(b)(3) of
the Act as alleged in the complaint dated May 25, 1984.
C. The complaint should be dismissed.
[Recommended Order omitted from publication.]
ances at their end stages-including, indeed, whether they may be carried
forward to the arbitration level, and handling them there, I would, were
it necessary to reach the question , find and decide that for the foregoing
reasons Pennsylvania Guild shared responsibility for the actions here
complained of on the part of its geographical subsidiary and creature
Philadelphia Division, and that any remedial order here should extend to
Pennsylvania Guild as well as to Philadelphia Division. Cf. Mine Workers
(Garland Coal Co.), 258 NLRB 56, 59 (1981), enfd 727 F.2d 954, 956
(10th Cir. 1984) Respondents' reliance on Carbon Fuel Co. v Mine Work-
ers, 444 U S. 212 (1979), allegedly to the contrary, is misplaced, since that
case merely held that parent unions are not necessarily accountable for
wildcat strikes by their locals