Peerless Products, Inc.

National Labor Relations Board - Board Decisions

May 15, 1958

120 N.L.R.B. 1008 (N.L.R.B. 1958)

1008 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
arrangement would be determined in the future by the business conditions of the
company.
May we especially emphasize the friendly attitude that members of the committee
and the representatives of management showed one another in an earnest desire
to discuss and solve problems . As you have already been told, the membership
of this committee will change each week , so that before a whole year is over,
everyone working for the company will have served on the committee and will have
had the experience and the satisfaction of having been brought into close contact
with management , learning to understand its problems , and being able intelligently
to help make decisions that will benefit everyone.
The fine beginning thus far made gives promise of bringing about a full and
complete understanding among us all. And the wonderful part of this lies in the
fact that no outsiders , bosses or dictators can interfere with you and us in insuring
the future success of Pacemaker and its employees.
Sincerely,
PACEMAKER TRAILER COMPANY,
(Signed ) T. R. Neher,
TED NEHER, Vice President.
Peerless Products, Inc. and Mary Britt and Mary Benson. Cases
Nos. 13-CA-W5 and 13-CA-3488. May 15, 1958
DECISION AND ORDER
On November 6, 1957, Trial Examiner Lloyd Buchanan issued his
Intermediate Report in the above-entitled proceeding, finding that
Respondent had engaged in and was engaging in certain unfair labor
practices and recommending that it cease and desist therefrom and
take certain affirmative action, as set forth in the copy of the Inter-
mediate Report attached hereto. Thereafter, Respondent filed excep-
tions to the Intermediate Report and a supporting brief.
Pursuant to the provisions of Section 3 (b) of the Act, the Board
has delegated its powers in connection with this case to a three-member
panel [Chairman Leedom and Members Bean and Fanning].
The Board has reviewed the rulings made by the Trial Examiner
at the hearing and finds that no prejudicial error was committed. The
rulings are hereby affirmed.' The Board has considered the Inter-
mediate Report, Respondent's exceptions and brief, and the entire
record in the case,' and hereby adopts the findings, conclusions, and
recommendations of the Trial Examiner to the extent consistent
herewith.'
' As no findings of violation are based on Dortch 's activity , we consider it unnecessary
to decide whether the rulings of the Trial Examiner denying Respondent 's motions to
amend its answer to deny Dortch's supervisory status were proper.
2 Respondent 's request for oral argument is hereby denied as the record and brief ade-
quately set forth the facts and positions of the parties.
3In our opinion , Britt did not quit, but was discharged In retaliation for her union
activity, including attendance at the Board's representation hearing. We do not believe
that Britt 's conduct following the demand for repayment of $15, or thereafter , was the
motivating factor in the discharge or In Respondent 's refusal to rehire her.
Neither the charges nor the consolidated complaint In this matter alleges violation
of Section 8 (a) (4) of the Act. However , at the conclusion of the second day of the
hearing, and after Respondent had already , in effect, admitted violation of Sec-
tion 8 (a) (4), the General Counsel moved to amend the complaint to allege such a vio-
lation. The Trial Examiner granted the motion. As a finding of violation of See-
120 NLRB . No. 136.
PEERLESS PRODUCTS, INC.
ORDER
1009
Upon the entire record in the case, and pursuant to Section 10 (c)
of the National Labor Relations Act, as amended, the National Labor
Relations Board hereby orders that Respondent, Peerless Products,
Inc., Chicago, Illinois, its officers, agents, successors, and assigns,
shall :
1. Cease and desist from :
(a) Discouraging membership in Allied Crafts Division, United
'Textile Workers of America, AFL-CIO, or in any other labor organi-
zation of its employees by discharging or refusing to reinstate its
employees or discriminating in any other manner in respect to their
hire and tenure of employment, or any term or condition of
employment.
(b) Interrogating employees concerning union activities and affili-
ation,in a manner constituting interference, restraint, or coercion in
violation of Section 8 (a) (1) of the Act and threatening reprisal and
withdrawing economic benefits from employees because of their con-
certed activities.
(c) In any other like manner interfering with, restraining, or co-
ercing its employees in the exercise of the right to self-organization,
to form labor organizations, to join or assist Allied Crafts Division,
United Textile Workers of America, AFL-CIO, or any other labor
organization, to bargain collectively, through representatives of their
,own choosing, and to engage in other concerted activities for the
purposes of collective bargaining or other mutual aid or protection,
or to refrain from any or all of such activities, except to the extent
that such right may be affected by an agreement requiring member-
ship in a labor organization as a condition of employment as au-
thorized in Section 8 (a) (3) of the Act.
2. Take the following affirmative action, which the Board finds will
effectuate the policies of the Act :
(a) Offer to Mary Britt immediate and full reinstatement to her
former or substantially equivalent position, without prejudice to her
seniority or other rights and privileges, in the manner set forth in the
section of the Intermediate Report entitled "The Remedy."
(b) Make whole the said Mary Britt, Mary Benson, and Verbie
Lee Nichols for loss of pay suffered by reason of the discrimination
against them, in the manner set forth in the section of the Intermediate
Report entitled "The Remedy." 4
tion 8 (a) (4) would not substantially affect the remedy herein, it is unnecessary to
decide whether the allegation of violation of Section 8 (a) (4) is properly before the
Board Accordingly , we do not adopt the Trial Examiner 's findings and conclusions
concerning Section 8 (a) (4) of the Act
. The amount of back pay due Benson and Nichols shall be determined in the coin-
phance proceedings without regard to the observations of the Trial Examiner in the
Intermediate Repoi t
483142--59-vol. 120-65
1010 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
(c) Post at its plant in Chicago, Illinois, copies of the notice at-
tached to the Intermediate Report marked "Appendix." 5 Copies
of said notice, to be furnished by the Regional Director for the Thir-
teenth Region, -shall, after being duly signed by the Company's rep-
resentative, be posted by the Company immediately 'upon receipt
thereof, and be maintained by it for sixty (60) consecutive days
thereafter, in conspicuous places, including all places where notices
to its employees are customarily posted. Reasonable steps shall be
taken by the Company to insure that said notices are not altered, de-
faced, or covered by any other material.
(d) Notify the Regional Director for the Thirteenth Region in
writing, within ten (10) days from the date of this Order, what steps
have been taken to comply herewith.
5 This notice is amended by substituting for the words "The Recommendations of a
Trial Examiner" the words "A Decision and Order ." In the event that this Order is
enforced by a decree of a United States Court of Appeals, there shall be substituted for
the words "Pursuant to a Decision and Order"4he words "Pursuant to a Decree of the
United States Court of Appeals , Enforcing an Order."
INTERMEDIATE REPORT AND RECOMMENDED ORDER
The consolidated complaint herein , as amended , alleges that the Company has
violated Section 8 (a) (3) of the National Labor Relations Act, as amended, 61
Stat . 136, by discharging and refusing to reinstate Mary Britt , and refusing to rein-
state Mary Benson and Verbie Lee Nichols on their unconditional offer to return to
work after a strike, all because of their concerted activities ; Section 8 (a) (4) with
respect to Benson and Nichols by refusing , because they had filed charges with the
Board , to reinstate them ; and Section 8 (a) (1) of the Act by said alleged acts and by
interrogating employees concerning union activities and affiliations , warning of
surveillance of such activities , and threatening employees with discharge and other
reprisals and withdrawing economic benefits because they sympathized with the
Union or engaged in concerted activities The answer, as amended , alleges that
Britt was discharged for good and sufficient cause and , denying that Benson and
Nichols were refused reinstatement because of their union activities or because they
filed charges , alleges that they discontinued their employment ; the answer also denies
the alleged independent violations of Section 8 (a) (1).
A hearing was held before me at Chicago, Illinois, on September 24, 25, and 30,
1957 . Pursuant to leave granted , briefs have been filed by the General Counsel and
the Company, the time to do so having been extended
Upon the entire record in the case and from my observation of the witnesses,
I make the following:
FINDINGS OF FACT ( WITH REASONS THEREFOR)
1. THE COMPANY'S BUSINESS AND THE LABOR ORGANIZATION INVOLVED
It was admitted and I find that the Company , an Illinois corporation with office
and plant in Chicago, Illinois, is engaged in the manufacture , sale, and distribution of
punchboards . During 1956 it sold and transported from Chicago, Illinois, to points
outside the State of Illinois , its finished products valued at more than $50,000. I find
that the Company is engaged in commerce within the meaning of the Act.
It was admitted and I find that Allied Crafts Division , United Textile Workers of
America, AFL-CIO, is a labor organization within the meaning of the Act.
II. THE UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES
A. The alleged violations of Section 8 (a) (3) and (4)
1. Britt
The Union 's organizational activities among the Company's employees com-
menced early in February 1957, and an organizing committee was named , consisting
PEERLESS PRODUCTS, INC. 1011
of Britt, as chairman, and Nichols, and Morgan, another employee. Some con-
sideration was given to possible demands on the Company, and it was agreed as
early as February that all would walk out if any employee were discharged or laid off.
By the early part of March, Britt had asked all of the girls, some 15 in all, whether
they wanted to join the Union. On March 19, a Board hearing was held in connec-
tion with the representation proceeding then pending; this was attended by most of
the employees and by Benjamin Maltz, the Company's general supervisor and
guiding hand.
Both Benjamin Maltz and his son, Marshall, who is president of the Company,
made loans to employees from time to time through the years, repayment being
made in installments. Britt had borrowed as much as $50 at one time. The latest
loan was made to her about the middle of February, when she bought a watch from
Marshall Maltz, and agreed to pay $21. Her down payment was $3, and Marshall
warned that she not let this loan drag like the $5 which she had owed for 3 years.
The next week, she paid $3 again, leaving a balance of $15. There does not appear
to have been further payment or a request for payment until Friday, March 22, the
first payday after the Board hearing. At the end of that day, Benjamin Maltz called
Britt into his office and wanted to take the $15 out of her pay. Britt replied that he
would have to garnishee her wages, and with that she ran out of his office.
There is no sufficient basis for finding that Britt thereby quit her job. Her use of
the word "garnishee" indicates only that she was more familiar with the term than
with its meaning and the suggestion that she was or would have to be employed
elsewhere. Maltz himself connected her paychecks from the Company with possible
garnishee proceedings by it. Maltz testified further that he pulled Britt's card after
she left on the 22d. On Monday morning, March 25, when Britt returned to work,
her card was not in the rack. She made this known to the other employees, and
most of them thereupon, with Britt, did not commence to work. When Benjamin
and Marshall Maltz came into the plant and saw this, the former called Britt into his
office and there said to her, "Here's your check. Forget you owe me fifteen dollars.
Just take the money direct and go because under the circumstances, I don't think you
should work here any more." (This generous gesture contradicts the explanation
later given by Marshall Maltz, whatever its sufficiency as a matter of law, that he
feared that the employees might walk out and he would lose the money. Benjamin
Maltz later similarly testified that the organizational activity triggered his fear of a
walkout or strike, and prompted his demands for repayment on March 22.) Britt
did not "take the money and go," and there is no basis for argument that she in that
manner agreed to a proposal that she quit. She returned to the plant 3 weeks later
and received the wages due her less the $15, which were at that time deducted.
Absent discriminatory motivation, Maltz would perhaps be within his rights in
calling for payment, and in discharging Britt if she had not in fact quit. (He
testified that he "took" it that she had quit on March 22. But he admittedly dis-
charged her on March 25.) Even under such circumstances it would be necessary
to review the original terms, express or implied, for repayment. But we must
determine whether the request for payment on March 22 was itself discriminatory.
True, Britt's reaction was neither timid, tame, nor tepid. But her defiance was
of the request at that time made for payment; if the request was discriminatory,
the reply which it evoked was not so extreme or dangerous as to justify her
discharge.
Maltz testified that he keeps a list of what each employee owes, but not the
date when the loans were made. On March 22 he did not know what Britt's debt
was for or when it arose, nor did he inquire. He asked for the money because
she owed it. Asked to explain his concern with collecting it that evening, he
could at first say only, "It was due me and I wanted it." That the $15 had remained
unpaid for approximately a month did not create a right to refuse payment or
bar a demand for it But that lapse, whatever the right to repayment, is relevant
as we consider the practice followed and the issue of discrimination, particularly as
the demand immediately followed the employees' appearance at the representation
hearing. Casting further light on the practice theretofore pursued is testimony
concerning earlier delays in repayment by other employees and the reference which
we have noted to an earlier 3-year delay by Britt in repaying $5. Britt also testified,
without contradiction, that about 3 years earlier, owing $25, she had borrowed $50
more, which she repaid over a period of 3 years, $2, $3, or $5 at a time, never more
than $5. Clearly, there had been lengthy periods when no payments were made.
The extent of the earlier assistance to Britt, as Marshall Maltz detailed it, is in
marked contrast to the calling in of the balance on March 22.
Benjamin Maltz was a frank, straightforward, and honest witness. No more
censurable than his credibility are his personal treatment of and general attitude
1012 - DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
toward his employees prior to their organizational activities. But he, was com-
pletely in error in his estimate of how he might lawfully react to their union
activities. His demand that Britt repay the entire $15 on March 22 was not in
keeping with his practice with respect to loans to some of the other employees and
other loans to Britt.' He could offer no explanation for this sudden and unusual
demand on Britt; certainly none to meet the inference and his later testimony that
it was prompted by the organizational activities and the employees' appearance at
the. representation hearing. Whether or not Maltz knew that Britt was a leader in
the union activities, she had appeared at the hearing 3 days before (he told his
son that the employees who signed cards attended the hearing) and, as in' Pate's
case, he evidently considered this an unfriendly act.
As the Company's brief declares, Maltz felt that he was "trapped." He regarded
the bringing of employees to the Board hearing as an improper and coercive act by
the Union, and mistakenly concluded that whatever action he then took could be
charged as violative of the Act. This explains his reaction and the steps which he
took; it does not justify them. If employees were ungrateful, or the Company
thought they were, corrective measures so-called must nevertheless be lawful.
I find that Maltz' demand of Britt for repayment on March 22 was itself a
discriminatory withdrawal of benefit under the Act even if prompted only by the
appearance of Britt and others at the Board hearing on March 19, and aside from
any company knowledge of Britt's leading role in the organizational activities.
However, explained as an attempt to guard against loss of money loaned, the
withdrawal of benefit was triggered by the employees' lawful concerted activities.
It is unnecessary here to consider instances of similar demands on other employees
for repayment on March 22, since these would but accentuate the discrimination
which is already clear; or those cases where employees were not requested to pay,
since some of those employees did not attend the Board hearing on March 19 and
in any event it is unnecessary to establish interference with or discrimination against
all.
As indicated supra, we need not decide whether under the debtor-creditor rela-
tionship which existed between Britt and Benjamin Maltz, the latter was entitled to
full repayment on March 22. But whatever Britt's obligation with respect to the
debt, her statement concerning garnishee proceedings stemmed from Maltz' request
for repayment, which was discriminatory under the Act. Britt's discharge on
March 25 was thus likewise discriminatory. As for the suggestion that Britt was
a trusted employee and, if reinstated, could cause damage to the Company, her
work was similar to that performed by other rank-and-file employees and, in the
words of Benjamin Maltz, she was "just another employee." As Marshall Maltz
declared, confusion and damage can be caused in any department. Whatever
defects were later discovered, they could not have motivated, much less justified,
the Company's action on March 22 and 25; nor were they traced to Britt.
2. Benson and Nichols
When Spiegel, the Union's local representative, and the employees' committee
were unable to persuade Maltz to reemploy Britt on March 25, there was a general
walkout. It was thereafter decided to utilize Board processes on Britt 's behalf, the
others to return to work, and on March 27 the Union made an unconditional offer
on behalf of all of the employees to return to work. In the meantime , Maltz had
canceled orders and instructed his salesmen not to accept new ones. As the
strikers came back to work, he told various ones that there was then no need for
them but that he would call them back as they were needed. Except for Benson
and Nichols, the Company did ultimately reinstate all who had struck on March 25.
Between March 28 and April 23, the Company reinstated all of the strikers except
Benson and Nichols. Thereafter, beginning on July 2, new employees were hired.
Maltz testified that he did not call Benson or Nichols back because they had
quit and because they had filed charges. It is clear that their so-called quitting
IIf similar treatment was accorded to employee Pate (she replaced Britt on the organ-
izing committee on March 25, when the committee and the union representative spoke
with Maltz), who repaid $3 on a $13 loan and then was required to pay the balance
on March 22, when Benjamin Maltz remarked that she was tor the Union and their
friendship had ceased, that does not disprove the general practice or lessen the discrim-
ination against Britt. Nor is it clear that Pate's case was similar to Britt's at the time
of demand Pate testified that she was to have paid the $10 balance in $5 weekly
installments, and she was evidently in arrears under a specific agreement. We have no
such testimony concerning Britt.
PEERLESS PRODUCTS, INC. 1013
consisted of.their joining the strike. In this respect they were no different from
the other strikers and, like the others, were entitled to reinstatement. From the
Union's offer of March 27 and from their own subsequent applications at the plant,
both Benson and Nichols were no longer strikers. To regard them as having quit
when they joined the strike, and therefore to fail and refuse to reinstate them was
discriminatory within the meaning of Section 8 (a) (3) of the Act. Also evident
from Maltz' testimony is the violation of Section 8 (a) (4) with respect to these
two employees.
We need not consider Nichols' role as a member of the organizing committee,
nor. need we reflect on the fact that Benson, although she joined in the union
activities, did not play a leading part. It is unnecessary to search for motivation for
the Company's action: the testimony by Benjamin Maltz, supra, clearly sets it
forth. -
Maltz further testified, that when the strike was called, he promptly took steps to
limit the Company's commitments to its customers in order to avoid or minimize
disappointments to the latter. There is no evidence that these steps were taken to
interfere with employees' rights. The employees having adopted self-help measures,
the Company is not liable for the time which they lost while they were on strike and
for a later period until their services were again needed. The duration of such later
period, or the date when, but for the discrimination, Benson and Nichols would
have been recalled, does not appear. We can here make no pretense at precision.
But, on an economic and nondiscriminatory basis, Benson and Nichols would pre-
sumably have been reinstated with the other strikers sometime between March 28
and April 23, and certainly before new employees were hired on July 2. It is not
unreasonable to declare their entitlement to back pay from that period, leaving the
exact date for compliance proceedings. After the Company, on September 30,
declared its willingness to reinstate Benson and Nichols, the General Counsel agreed
that back pay for them would be terminated as of that date, and that there need
be no order that the Company reinstate them.
B. The alleged independent violation of Section 8 (a) (1)
Various alleged statements interspersed in the testimony suggest violations which
have not been alleged. As was stated at the hearing without objection, such state-
ments are not within the issues and they are not considered herein.
In connection with the allegation of interrogation, Britt testified that before the
hearing on March 19 Marshall Maltz said to her in the plant that he had heard that
they were starting aunion, and asked whether she knew anything about it. (When
she replied in the negative, he told her to keep her ears open.) Whether before that
incident or after is not clear, but Britt testified also that a week or two before
March 19 she met Marshall Maltz in front of the plant, and he asked whether she
had heard anything about the Union. Employee Jenkins testified that one afternoon
in March before the 19th Marshall Maltz asked her and Benson whether they knew
anything about signing union cards and whether a union man had been to their
house; both replied in the negative. Benson did not mention this incident.
Marshall Maltz testified that: On receipt of the Union's claim early in March
that it represented more than 30 percent of the employees, he asked more than half
of the 18 or 20 who were in the unit whether they had signed cards; each answer
was in the negative; and he told them that they could have a union if they wanted it.
Whatever the propriety of an attempt to check on the Union' s claim , for guidance
in future action, this interrogation went beyond such a check as he questioned Britt
twice, and in the last instance cited inquired about a union representative visiting
Benson and Jenkins at home. Presumably, Maltz had completed any necessary
check before he notified the Board on March 5 that the Union did not represent
30 percent of the employees.
The allegation of interrogation is further noted as Benjamin Maltz on March 18,
after he told Britt that he had heard that 7 or 8 employees had signed union cards,
asked her whether Hayes, another employee, with whom Britt was working, was
"the trouble-maker.'" Both Britt and Hayes testified concerning this. Like the
threat, infra, which he equivocally denied making, this detail appears to have escaped
Maltz' recollection. I do not credit his denial.
Benson testified that on March 18 Dortch , concerning . whose status as a supervisor
a question was belatedly raised, came by her machine and asked her and Jenkins
whether they had signed union cards. Jenkins did not mention this in her testimony,
nor did Dortch deny it although he did deny that he made a threat which Benson
attributed to him . It is now clear that any finding of violation by Dortch would
1014 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
be cumulative and would add nothing to any remedial order herein.2 It is there-
fore unnecessary to find that Dortch did or did not interrogate employees as alleged.
No more is it necessary to decide whether Dortch is a supervisor within the meaning
of the Act. During the course of the hearing, although the admission that Dortch
is an officer, agent, or supervisor within the meaning of Section 2 (11) of the Act
had been several times referred to and discussed, counsel for the Company sought
-to amend the answer further to deny that Dortch is a supervisor. (The answer had
previously been amended to deny a discriminatory refusal to reinstate Nichols.)
,It was'pointed out that the admission was not a "misapprehension," and this motion
to amend was denied; the ruling stands. But, as noted, the entire issue concerning
Dortch is cumulative.
As for the allegation that Dortch said that the Company was going to keep
employees' concerted activities under observation, that allegation is not supported
by any testimony. It differs from a threat which" was attributed to Dortch, but
not alleged.
Benson testified that a few days after March 19 Benjamin Maltz said to her, in
Jenkins' presence, "You don't have to be afraid of me [erroneously reported as
`them,' but later correctly], you are not going to be fired . . . (I'm) going to work
the hell out of you." Jenkins testified that they laughed or smiled and that she
'did not think he meant it. According to Maltz, he did not say that, but, if he
did, it was in jest. Whatever Jenkins' reaction, and even if Maltz smiled as he
said it, such a statement under these circumstances at least suggests a threat; its
tendency is to interfere with employees' concerted activities, and it is violative of
the Act. The generally jocular relations and friendly atmosphere which prevailed
in the plant at least until organizational activities commenced no more bar a
finding of interference 3 or tendency to interfere than they do the finding of
discrimination.
Whether or not he threatened to do so, we have already seen that Benjamin Maltz
discriminated against Britt by calling her loan on March 22. He similarly and
admittedly withdrew economic benefits from various employees on that day, thereby
interfering with their concerted activities.
III. THE EFFECT OF THE UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES UPON COMMERCE
The activities of the Company set forth in section II, above, occurring in connection
with the operations described in section I, above, have a close, intimate, and
substantial relation to trade, traffic, and commerce among the several States, and
tend to lead to labor disputes burdening and obstructing commerce and the free
flow of commerce.
IV. THE REMEDY
Having found that the Company engaged in and is engaging in certain unfair
labor practices affecting commerce, I shall recommend that it cease and desist
.,,therefrom and take certain affirmative action to effectuate the policies of the Act.
It has been found that the Company, by discharging Britt and refusing until
September 30 to reinstate Benson and Nichols, discriminated against them in respect
to their hire and tenure of employment in violation of Section 8 (a) (3) of the
Act; and that, by discriminating against Benson and Nichols because they filed
charges, violated Section 8 (a) (4) of the Act. I shall therefore recommend that
the Company offer to Britt immediate reinstatement to her former or substantially
equivalent position, and make her and Benson and Nichols whole for any loss of
pay sustained by each of them, computation to be made in the customary manner.4
It had been further found that the Company, by interrogation, threat, and
withdrawal of economic 'benefits, interfered with, restrained, and coerced its
employees in violation of Section 8 (a) (1) of the Act. I shall therefore further
recommend that the Company cease and desist therefrom.
Upon the basis of the above findings of fact and upon the entire record in the
case, I make the following:
a United Steelworkers of America, QI0 (Metal Fabricators 4 "Finishers, Inc, et at.),
114 NLRB 532; Southeastern Motor Truck Ltines, 115 NLRB 1122, 1124.
3 Commercial Chemical Company, 103 NLRB 465, 466, 475.
4 The Chase National Bank of the City of New York, San Juan, Puerto Rico, Branch,
65 NLRB 827; Crossett Lumber Company, 8 NLRB 440 ;, Republic Steel Corporation v.
N. L. R. B., 311 U. S. 7; F. W. Woolworth Company, 90 NLRB 289.
PEERLESS PRODUCTS, INC. 1015
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1. Allied Crafts Division, United Textile Workers of America, AFL-CIO, is a
labor organization within the meaning of Section 2 (5) of the Act.
2. By discriminating in regard to the hire and tenure of employment of its
'employees, thereby discouraging membership in a labor organization, the Company
,has engaged in and is engaging in unfair labor practices within the meaning of
Section 8 (a) (3) of the Act.
3. By discriminating against its employees because they filed charges under this
Act, the Company has engaged in and is engaging -in unfair labor practices within
the meaning of Section 8 (a) (4) of the Act.
4. By interrogating employees concerning union activities and affiliation, and
threatening reprisal and withdrawing economic benefits from employees because
of their concerted activities, thereby interfering with, restraining, and coercing
employees in the exercise of the rights guaranteed in Section 7 of the Act, the
Company has engaged in and is engaging in unfair labor practices within the meaning
of Section 8 (a) (1) of the Act.
5. The aforesaid labor practices are unfair labor practices affecting commerce,
within the meaning of Section 2 (6) and (7) of the Act.
[Recommendations omitted from publication.]
APPENDIX
NOTICE TO ALL EMPLOYEES
Pursuant to the recommendations of a Trial Examiner ,6f the National Labor Rela-
tions Board, and in order to effectuate the policies of the Labor Management Rela-
tions Act, we hereby notify our employees that:
WE WILL NOT discourage membership in Allied Crafts Division, United
Textile Workers of America, AFL-CIO, or any other labor organization of
our employees by discharging or refusing to reinstate our employees or dis-
criminating in any other manner in respect to their hire or tenure of employ-
ment, or any term or condition of employment.
WE WILL NOT discriminate against our employees because they filed charges
under this Act.
WE WILL NOT interrogate our employees concerning union activities or
affiliations, or threaten reprisal or withdraw economic benefits from our
employees because of their concerted activities.
WE WILL NOT in any other manner interfere with, restrain, or coerce our
employees in the exercise of the right to self-organization, to form labor organ-
izations, to join or assist Allied Crafts Division, United Textile Workers of
America, AFL-CIO, or any other labor organization, to bargain collectively
through representatives of their own choosing, and to engage in other concerted
activities for the purpose of collective bargaining or other mutual aid or pro-
tection, or to refrain from any or all such activities, except to the extent that
such right may be affected by an agreement requiring membership in a labor
organization as a condition of employment, as authorized in Section 8 (a) (3)
of the Act.
WE WILL offer to Mary Britt immediate and full reinstatement to her former
or substantially equivalent position, without prejudice to her seniority or other
rights and privileges, and make her and Mary Benson and Verbie Lee Nichols
whole for loss of pay suffered by reason of the discrimination against them.
All of our employees are free to become, remain,, or to refrain from becoming
or remaining, members in good standing of Allied Crafts Division, United Textile
Workers of America, AFL-CIO, or any other labor organization, except to the
-extent that this right may be affected by an agreement in conformity with Section
8 (a) (3) of the Act.
PEERLESS PRODUCTS, INC.,
Employer.
Dated------------------- By-------------------------------------------
(Representative) (Title)
This notice must remain posted for 60 days from the date hereof, and must not be
altered, defaced, or covered by any other material.