Peerless Food Products, Inc.

National Labor Relations Board - Board Decisions

Aug 22, 1977

231 N.L.R.B. 530 (N.L.R.B. 1977)

DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
Peerless Food Products, Inc. and Amalgamated Meat
Cutters & Butcher Workmen of North America,
AFl-CIO, Local Union No. 553. Case 19-CA-
8880
August 22, 1977
DECISION AND ORDER
BY MEMBERS JENKINS, MURPHY, AND
WALTHER
On March 15, 1977, Administrative Law Judge
James M. Kennedy issued the attached Decision in
this proceeding. Thereafter, Respondent filed excep-
tions and General Counsel filed cross-exceptions and
a brief in support thereof.
Pursuant to the provisions of Section 3(b) of the
National Labor Relations Act, as amended, the
National Labor Relations Board has delegated its
authority in this proceeding to a three-member panel.
The Board has considered the record and the
attached Decision in light of the exceptions and brief
and has decided to affirm the rulings, findings, and
conclusions of the Administrative Law Judge and to
adopt his recommended Order, as modified herein.
We adopt the Administrative Law Judge's finding
that Respondent violated Section 8(a)(5) of the Act,
but as a basis for this finding we rely solely on
Respondent's conduct at the August 31, 1976,
negotiating session, in which Respondent agreed to
sign the collective-bargaining agreement, the final
terms of which were negotiated on August 3, 1976-
only on the condition that the Union drop its lawsuit
against Respondent. In agreement with the Adminis-
trative Law Judge, we find that Respondent's
insistence on the dropping of the lawsuit as a
precondition to signing the agreement violated
Section 8(a)(5).
But we disagree with the Administrative Law
Judge's failure to direct the parties to sign the
collective-bargaining agreement which the Union
submitted to Respondent in the final negotiating
session on August 31, 1976. For, as we stated above,
the final terms of the parties' collective-bargaining
agreement were hammered out on August 3. At that
meeting Respondent's representative merely asked
for time to obtain final approval from Respondent's
president, Jerry Morris, and its attorney, John L.
Vogel, on the inclusion of two sentences-one stating
that the bargaining unit would include both full-time
and part-time production employees, and the other
stating that the agreement would not have any effect
on the prior agreements of the parties.
On August 31, both Vogel and Morris were present
at the negotiations. At that meeting they agreed to
sign the contract, as worked out on August 3. But
231 NLRB No. 95
they conditioned agreement on the further under-
standing that the Union would drop the lawsuit.
Thus, but for the illegal condition, the parties, as of
August 31, had a complete collective-bargaining
agreement. Accordingly, we shall modify the Admin-
istrative Law Judge's recommended Order to direct
the parties to sign the August 31 agreement.
ORDER
Pursuant to Section 10(c) of the National Labor
Relations Act, as amended, the National Labor
Relations Board adopts as its Order the recommend-
ed Order of the Administrative Law Judge, as
modified below, and hereby orders that the Respon-
dent, Peerless Food Products, Inc., Chehalis, Wash-
ington, its officers, agents, successors, and assigns,
shall take the action set forth in the said recommend-
ed Order, as so modified:
1. Substitute the following for paragraph l(a):
"(a) Insisting to impasse upon the settlement of a
lawsuit as a condition for a new collective-bargaining
agreement."
2. Substitute the following for paragraph 2(a):
"(a) Upon request by the Union, Amalgamated
Meat Cutters & Butcher Workmen of North Ameri-
ca, AFL-CIO, Local Union No. 553, sign the
collective-bargaining agreement, as agreed to on
August 31, 1976, and as set out in General Counsel
Exhibit 3."
3. Substitute the attached notice for that of the
Administrative Law Judge.
APPENDIX
NOTICE To EMPLOYEES
POSTED BY ORDER OF THE
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
An Agency of the United States Government
After a hearing at which all parties had the
opportunity to present evidence, the National Labor
Relations Board has found that we violated the
National Labor Relations Act and we have been
ordered to post this notice to our employees.
The National Labor Relations Act, as amended,
gives all employees the following rights:
To organize themselves
To form, join, or support unions
To bargain as a group through a represen-
tative they choose
To act together for collective bargaining
or other mutual aid or protection
To refrain from any or all such activity
except to the extent that the employees'
bargaining representative and employer
530
PEERLESS FOOD PRODUCTS
have a collective-bargaining agreement
which imposes a lawful requirement that
employees become union members.
WE WILL NOT refuse to bargain collectively with
Amalgamated Meat Cutters & Butcher Workmen
of North America, AFL-CIO, Local Union No.
553, by conditioning a collective-bargaining
contract upon the Union's settling a pending
lawsuit.
WE WILL NOT in any other manner interfere
with, restrain, or coerce our employees in the
exercise of their rights guaranteed by the National
Labor Relations Act.
WE WILL, upon request, sign the collective-
bargaining agreement reached on August 31,
1976.
PEERLESS FOOD
PRODUCTS, INC.
DECISION
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
JAMES M. KENNEDY, Administrative Law Judge: This
case was heard before me at Olympia, Washington, on
February 17, 1977, based upon a complaint issued on
October 15, 1976,1 by the Acting Regional Director of the
National Labor Relations Board for Region 19. The
complaint was based upon a charge filed by Amalgamated
Meat Cutters & Butcher Workmen of North America,
AFL-CIO, Local Union No. 553, herein called the Union,
on September 9. The complaint alleges that Peerless Food
Products, Inc., herein called Respondent, has engaged in
certain violations of Section 8(a)(5) and (I) of the National
Labor Relations Act, as amended.
Issues
The principal issues are whether or not: (I) The parties
reached an agreement which Respondent was obligated to
sign; and (2) if not, whether or not Respondent insisted
upon the inclusion of certain nonmandatory subjects of
bargaining to the point of impasse.
All parties were given full opportunity to participate, to
introduce relevant evidence, and to examine and cross-
examine witnesses. The parties waived both their right to
oral argument and their right to file briefs.
Upon the entire record of the case and from my
observation of the witnesses and their demeanor, I make
the following:
FINDINGS OF FACT
I. THE BUSINESS OF THE EMPLOYER
Respondent admits, and I find, that at all material times
it has been a State of Washington corporation with an
office and place of business located at Chehalis, Washing-
ton, where it is engaged in the business of manufacturing
sausages. During the past year, a representative period, it
sold and shipped products valued in excess of $50,000 to
customers outside the State of Washington and during the
same period purchased from sources outside the State
goods and materials valued in excess of $50,000 which were
directly transported to Respondent from those out-of-state
suppliers. Accordingly, Respondent admits, and I find, that
it is an employer engaged in commerce within the meaning
of Section 2(6) and (7) of the Act.
n1. THE LABOR ORGANIZATION
Respondent admits, and I find, that the Union is, and
has been at all material times, a labor organization within
the meaning of Section 2(5) of the Act.
III. THE ALLEGED UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES
A. Background
Respondent has had a collective-bargaining relationship
with a local of the Amalgamated Meat Cutters & Butcher
Workmen of North America, AFL-CIO, for over 20 years.
In 1972, apparently as a result of a merger of locals,
Respondent entered into its first agreement with the
Union, the survivor of the merger. Prior to May 1, 1976,
when the last agreement expired, each of the previous
contracts had a duration of only 1 year. Thus, until the
instant dispute, Respondent and the Union had negotiated
four successive collective-bargaining contracts and the
parties had a reasonably good collective-bargaining rela-
tionship.
Each of the expired agreements contained identical
"Recognition and Bargaining Unit" clauses in which
Respondent recognized the Union as the exclusive bargain-
ing agent for its employees and the Union recognized
Respondent as the exclusive bargaining agency for itself.
That portion of the clause relating to Respondent's
recognition of the Union is set forth in full as follows:
Peerless Food Products Co. Inc. hereby recognizes,
during the term of this Agreement, Amalgamated Meat
Cutters & Butcher Workmen of North America, AFL-
CIO, Local Union No. 553, as the sole and exclusive
collective bargaining agency for all employees of the
Employer working under this Agreement.
Despite the language stating that the Union was the sole
bargaining agent for "all employees of the Employer
working under this Agreement," nowhere in the agreement
are the job classifications listed. Instead, section 8(1) of the
contract divides the jobs into heavy and light duty wage
rates. Section 8(3) states: "A list of heavy and light duties
shall be attached to this agreement and also posted on the
bulletin board." The parties are in a minor disagreement
with regard to the manner in which section 8(3) was carried
out, but it appears that at least in 1972 such a list was
prepared, though perhaps not for the following agreements.
I Hereinafter all dates are 1976 unless otherwise noted.
531
DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
The 1972 list, prepared on Respondent's stationery, listed
the following jobs as heavy and light:
Heavy
Sausage Kitchen
Manufacturing
Stuffing Machine Operator
Grinding
Boner
Shipping Clerk
Truck loading
Light
Sausage Kitchen
Stuffers Assistant
Packaging Room
Packaging
Peeling
Slicing
Curing Dept.
Cure pump operator
Ham stuffer & hanger
Fresh meat slicer
Fresh meat packaging
As Respondent changed the products it was manufactur-
ing, these classifications changed slightly, apparently
without effect on wage rates.
Other pertinent contract clauses included a standard
union-shop clause and a requirement that Respondent
make contributions to the Washington Meat Industry
Pension Trust "on account of each member of the
bargaining unit."
At some point not shown in the record, but apparently
during the life of the 1975-76 agreement, the Washington
Meat Industry Pension Trust instituted a lawsuit against
Respondent in state court in order to collect contributions
it contended were due on behalf of certain employees it
believed to be in the bargaining unit. Respondent success-
fully resisted the lawsuit at the trial level but, as of the date
of the hearing in this matter, the Trust had filed an appeal
which has not yet been decided. The principal question
presented in the lawsuit is the scope and definition of the
bargaining unit covered by the past contracts. The Trust
contends that the contracts covered all production employ-
ees while Respondent contends that certain part-time
production employees were not in the bargaining unit. This
dispute will be more fully explicated below, as it has a
bearing on the instant matter.
B. The 1976 Negotiations
After the 1975-76 contract was timely reopened for
negotiations, the parties held a number of negotiation
meetings. The first five meetings took place on April 14,
June 16, and July 8, 23, and 27. Attending these meetings
on behalf of Respondent were Jerry Morris, its president;
Karl Muller, its manager; and John L. Vogel, its attorney.
Attending on behalf of the Union were Marvin Jacka, its
financial secretary and business representative, and Leon-
ard Folino, a vice president of District 2, Washington State
Federation of Butchers.
The July 27 meeting was conducted under the auspices of
the Federal Mediation and Conciliation Service. At that
meeting, according to Folino, there was some discussion of
the pending lawsuit. He testified that, although they did
not reach an agreement on that date, Attorney Vogel
"agreed to include the part-time help, and make the
contributions [to the Trust] on the part-time help on the
outcome of the appeal." He recalls that during the meeting
Respondent's representatives "kept maintaining that if we
would drop the appeal [of the lawsuit], they would sign the
agreement." Folino replied that the Union did not have the
authority to make such a trade-off, but agreed to telephone
the Trust's administrator and ask him about it. During a
caucus, he did so and learned that, as he had suspected, the
Union did not have the authority to enter into such an
arrangement. He told Vogel that the Union could not
approach the problem that way and that dropping the
appeal was up to the trustees of the pension plan.
Jacka did not testify in great detail with regard to the
meeting of July 27, saying only that a wage offer was made
which was taken to the union membership for approval
and rejected. Both he and Folino testified that Folino then
made a telephone call to Morris, asking for an additional
10-cent-per-hour wage increase. Morris agreed to that
figure. When the additional 10 cents per hour was
presented to the membership, they approved.
Within a day or two, Jacka, following the form of the
past agreements, had had his Tacoma office type a
complete, clean agreement. This agreement was nearly
identical to the past agreements but differed in two
principal ways from them. Except for vacation eligibility
language, wage scales, pension contributions, and renum-
bering some clauses, it, like the others, consisted of seven
pages, with signature lines for both parties on page 7. It
also contained a page 8, together with separate signature
lines on that page, and an unnumbered ninth page. The
"Recognition and Bargaining Unit" clause remained the
same as in the previous contracts.
On August 3, Jacka and Union Vice President Harold
Hansen took this document to Respondent's Chehalis
plant and met with Muller. At the hearing Respondent
conceded that, except for material which appeared on the
new page 8, Muller agreed to the terms of the contract,
including, at least in principle, the wage scales contained
on the unnumbered ninth page.
Page 8 began with the sentence "All workers working
under the classifications listed below must be members of
the bargaining unit regardless if they are full time or part
time employees." Below that sentence was a list of the
"heavy" and "light" job classifications. These were similar
to the classifications contained in the 1972 list, but
contained some differences. Under the "heavy" classifica-
tion in the sausage kitchen, the classification "linker" had
been added. At the meeting, Muller asked that the "night
smoker" be added to the sausage kitchen as a "heavy"
classification. Jacka agreed and inked in the change. The
new page 8, unlike the 1972 list, also contained as a
532
PEERLESS FOOD PRODUCTS
"heavy" classification "Truck Drivers working inside."
Muller asked that that classification be changed so that it
covered truckdrivers working inside "more than 50% of the
time." Jacka agreed and inked in the change. Muller noted
that under the "light" category the classification of "Corn
Dog Manufacturing employees" appeared. He questioned
its inclusion on the list as the "corn dog" employee was a
part-time employee. Believing that the inclusion of a part-
time employee might have an effect on the lawsuit, the
parties agreed to insert the following conclusionary
language: "This page pertains to this Agreement only and
does not have any bearing on previous Agreements."
Muller testified that he then offered to sign the signature
line on page 7 but did not believe he could sign page 8 until
he had given Morris and Vogel an opportunity to go over
it, as it might have affected the pending litigation. He said
Jacka insisted that he sign both pages 7 and 8, and that
Jacka said the Union couldn't sign page 7 without both
parties signing both pages. At the hearing Muller added
that he couldn't sign page 8 because it referred to the "corn
dog" employee and Respondent did not consider that
employee as a part of the unit.
Hansen testified that he did not recall if Muller said
anything at all about it being necessary to discuss page 8
with Morris or Vogel, but conceded that it might have
happened. Jacka was not asked if Muller made that
statement.
In any event, Jacka and Hansen returned to Tacoma
where the contract, reflecting the changes made on August
3, was typed in final form. Jacka caused three copies to be
sent to Respondent. He testified that on several occasions
thereafter he asked Muller to sign and return two copies.
Muller did not do so.
On August 31, a meeting was held in Attorney Vogel's
office in Seattle. Representing Respondent were Vogel,
Morris, and Muller; representing the Union were Jacka
and Folino. Also attending was Attorney Dusty McCreary,
who represented the Washington Meat Industry Pension
Trust. Folino testified that the purpose of the meeting was
to try to come to a compromise on what would be paid on
contributions to the Trust, apparently in an attempt to
settle the lawsuit. When asked what if anything was said
about the unsigned contract, he stated that he could not
recall. Jacka testified, without specifying who was speak-
ing, that Respondent's representatives said they would not
sign the agreement until the lawsuit was over. He also
testified that Respondent's representatives said that if the
Union would drop the suit, they would sign the agreement.
The meeting ended without the contract being signed or
the lawsuit being resolved.
IV. ANALYSIS AND CONCLUSIONS
A. Matters Relating to the Unit
Illustrative of the manner in which Respondent defined
the bargaining unit is Muller's testimony regarding the two
pension plans. He testified that Respondent paid into two
pension plans on behalf of its employees. These plans were
the Washington Meat Industry Pension Trust and Respon-
2 A classification which the parties agree is clearly within the contract
unit. See both the 1972 and 1976 lists.
dent's own private plan for nonunit employees. When I
asked Muller a hypothetical question regarding the pension
plan to which Respondent would contribute if a newly
hired full-time "stuffing machine operator" 2 refused to join
the Union, he replied: "Well, if he isn't a member of the
union, and I don't receive a letter from Marvin Jacka
stating or asking me to discharge that man [for being in
violation of the union-shop clause], I'm under the under-
standing that Marvin Jacka does not consider this man a
member of the bargaining unit. So, therefore, he goes into
our other pension plan as soon as he qualifies into it."
From the foregoing testimony it is fair to conclude that
Respondent equates unit membership (coverage under the
contract) with union membership. Muller also testified that
from time to time Respondent employed part-time employ-
ees in all the production jobs. When this occurred, he ,aid,
that employee was paid either the "light" or "heavy" wage
scale, depending on which scale applied to the job being
performed.
It is clear from the record, the past contracts, and the
past practice, that the parties intended the bargaining unit
to cover production employees only. It has long been
Board law to include regular part-time employees in any
appropriate unit. Farmers Insurance Group, et aL, 143
NLRB 240, 244-245 (1963). It appears clear to me that
Respondent has distorted the unit because of its misunder-
standing of the law in this regard. Certainly Muller's
reliance on the Union's vigor, or lack thereof, in enforcing
the union-shop clause is not a sufficient ground on which
to define the bargaining unit. Indeed, it has no bearing on
the unit whatsoever.
If I were to accept Muller's logic, I would be constrained
to find that the past contracts were "members only"
contracts. Certainly the contracts contain no language
justifying that conclusion. Nowhere do the past agree-
ments, or even any of the terms of the proposed new
agreement, say that the contract shall apply only to union
members.
Accordingly, I conclude, as a matter of law that the
appropriate bargaining unit was, and is: 3
All full-time and regular part-time production employ-
ees employed by Respondent at its Chehalis, Washing-
ton, packing plant, excluding office clerical employees,
guards and supervisors as defined in the Act.
B. Offer and Acceptance
The General Counsel contends that the August 3 meeting
between Muller, Jacka, and Hansen resulted in an offer
and an acceptance of the collective-bargaining agreement.
I am unable to accept that contention, because it is clear to
me that Muller told the union officials that the new page 8
would have to be submitted to the corporate president and
the corporation's attorney for final approval. I reach this
conclusion because this was the only meeting not attended
by Morris and Vogel, and page 8 contained material which
Muller recognized might be viewed as a retreat from the
position taken in the lawsuit. It seems reasonable to me
that, before signifying Respondent's acceptance of such
3 Respondent does not contend that the Union has lost its majority
status in the unit as clarified herein.
533
DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
material, he wished to consult with the company attorney
to determine if it might have an undesired legal effect on
the lawsuit.
It may also be contended that Respondent's statements
at the August 31 meeting as recounted by Jacka should be
considered as an admission that an agreement had been
reached on August 3. Jacka stated, without specifying who
was speaking, that Respondent's representatives offered to
sign the agreement in the event that the Union dropped its
appeal of the lawsuit. First, Jacka was not corroborated by
Folino. Folino recalled Vogel made a similar remark at the
July 27 meeting, but not on August 31. Perhaps Folino is
mistaken about the date. Assuming that Folino is mistaken
about the date and that it did occur on August 31, I cannot
regard the statement as an admission. In my opinion the
remark is ambiguous. Certainly Respondent could make
such a statement without conceding the acceptance of the
offer. In fact the statement constitutes a counteroffer
perfectly consistent with Respondent's stance-it no doubt
means: "We will accept your offer of August 3 if you drop
the appeal of the lawsuit." Under these circumstances, I am
unable to conclude that Respondent accepted the offer of
August 3, and therefore I conclude that no contract was
agreed to on that date. Accordingly, I reject the General
Counsel's contention that any agreement was reached on
August 3. Nor is there any evidence that Respondent
accepted it at a later date. Since there has been no
acceptance of the offer, I cannot order Respondent to
execute the contract. H. K. Porter Co., Inc., Disston
Division-Danville Works v. N.LR.B., 397 U.S. 99 at 105-
106, 108 (1970); cf. Lathers Local No. 42 of the Wood Wire
and Metal Lathers International Union (Lathing Contractors
Association of Southern California, Inc.), 223 NLRB 37
(1976).
C. The Impasse Was Unlawful
Two factors, injected into the bargaining process by
Respondent, interfered with the bargaining process. The
first was Respondent's continued insistence on distorting
the appropriate bargaining unit by excluding a regular
part-time production employee, the corn dog maker.
Muller testified that he could not sign page 8 because it
caused the corn dog maker to be included in the unit.
Section 8(d) of the Act states that the collective-bargain-
ing obligation requires the parties to bargain in good faith
with respect to wages, hours, and other terms and
conditions of employment. Both the Board and the courts
have held that bargaining unit considerations are not
within the scope of Section 8(d). N.L.R.B. v. Southland
Cork Company, 342 F.2d 702 (C.A. 4, 1965); Hess Oil &
Chemical Corporation v. N.L.R.B., 415 F.2d 440, 443-445
(C.A. 5, 1969), cert. denied 397 U.S. 916 (1978). Thus, while
the parties are not prohibited from negotiating changes in
the bargaining unit, they may not condition an agreement
upon such changes, without running afoul of Section 8(d)
and 8(a)(5) and (1). N.LR.B. v. Wooster Division of Borg-
Warner Corp., 356 U.S. 342 (1958). It is clear to me that this
4 Jacka's testimony is not free from doubt. He did not, and perhaps could
not, say which of Respondent's representatives made the remark, and
Folino does not corroborate him. If Folino was mistaken about the date,
and the conversation he reported as having occurred on July 27 really
is exactly what Respondent has done here. It conditioned
the contract on the exclusion of the corn dog maker (and
inferentially all other regular part-time production employ-
ees) from the bargaining unit. By imposing such an
impediment on the bargaining process, Respondent failed
to meet its bargaining obligation under Section 8(d) and
thereby violated Section 8(a)(5) and (1). N.LR.B. v.
Southland Cork Co., supra; Hess Oil & Chemical Corp. v.
N.L.R.B., supra; see also McQuay-Norris Manufacturing
Company v. N.LR.B., 116 F.2d 748, 751 (C.A. 7, 1940),
cert. denied 313 U.S. 565 (1941).
The second factor contributing to the failure to reach an
agreement was Respondent's conditioning a contract upon
the Union's dropping the appeal of the lawsuit. Aside from
whether the Union had the power to make such an
arrangement, it is Jacka's testimony that on August 31, at
Vogel's office, Respondent's representatives said they
would not sign the agreement until the lawsuit was over.
Respondent did not refute Jacka's testimony and I shall
accept it as it is undisputed.4
Settlement of the lawsuit as a condition for agreeing to a
contract, like the unit issue, is a nonmandatory bargaining
subject. By insisting that the lawsuit be settled as a
condition precedent to entering into a collective-bargaining
contract Respondent violated Section 8(a)(5) and (1) of the
Act.
V. THE REMEDY
Having found that Respondent has engaged in unfair
labor practices by insisting to impasse upon the inclusion
of nonmandatory bargaining subjects in a new collective-
bargaining agreement, I shall recommend that it be
ordered to cease and desist therefrom and to take certain
affirmative action designed to effectuate the policies of the
Act.
Upon the basis of the foregoing findings of fact and upon
the entire record in this case, I make the following:
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1. Respondent Peerless Food Products, Inc., is an
employer engaged in commerce and in an industry
affecting commerce within the meaning of Section 2(6) and
(7) of the Act.
2. Amalgamated Meat Cutters & Butcher Workmen of
North America, AFL-CIO, Local Union No. 553, is a
labor organization within the meaning of Section 2(5) of
the Act.
3. The appropriate bargaining unit is:
All full-time and regular part-time production employ-
ees employed by Respondent at its Chehalis, Washing-
ton, packing plant, excluding office clerical employees,
guards and supervisors as defined in the Act.
4. By insisting to impasse upon the inclusion or
resolution of nonmandatory bargaining subjects as a
condition for a new collective-bargaining agreement
occurred on August 31, he only corroborates Jacka to the extent that Vogel,
or someone else from Respondent, offered to sign the agreement if the
appeal were dropped.
534
PEERLESS FOOD PRODUCTS
Respondent has engaged in violations of Section 8(aX5)
and (I) of the Act.
Upon the basis of the foregoing findings of fact,
conclusions of law, and the entire record, and pursuant to
Section 10(c) of the Act, I hereby issue the following
recommended:
ORDER 5
Respondent Peerless Food Products, Inc., Chehalis,
Washington, its officers, agents, successors, and assigns,
shall:
I. Cease and desist from:
(a) Insisting to impasse upon the inclusion or resolution
of nonmandatory bargaining subjects as a condition for a
new collective-bargaining agreement.
(b) In any other manner interfering with, restraining, or
coercing employees in the exercise of rights guaranteed
them by Section 7 of the Act.
2. Take the following affirmative action necessary to
effectuate the policies of the Act:
(a) Upon request, bargain in good faith with Amalga-
mated Meat Cutters & Butcher Workmen of North
America, AFL-CIO, Local Union No. 553, as the exclusive
representative of the employees in the unit described below
I In the event no exceptions are filed as provided by Sec. 102.46 of the
Rules and Regulations of the National Labor Relations Board, the findings,
conclusions, and recommended Order herein shall, as provided in Sec.
102.48 of the Rules and Regulations, be adopted by the Board and become
its findings, conclusions, and Order, and all objections thereto shall be
deemed waived for all purposes.
with respect to rates of pay, wages, and other terms and
conditions of employment, and, if an understanding is
reached, embody such understanding in a signed agree-
ment:
All full-time and regular part-time production employ-
ees employed by Respondent at its Chehalis, Washing-
ton, packing plant, excluding office clerical employees,
guards and supervisors as defined in the Act.
(b) Post at its Chehalis, Washington, place of business
copies of the attached notice marked "Appenoix." 6 Copies
of said notice, on forms provided by the Regional Director
for Region 19, after being duly signed by an authorized
representative of Respondent, shall be posted immediately
upon receipt thereof, and be maintained by it for a period
of 60 consecutive days thereafter, in conspicuous places,
including all places where notices to employees are
customarily posted. Reasonable steps shall be taken by
Respondent to insure that said notices are not altered,
defaced, or covered by any other material.
(c) Notify the Regional Director for Region 19, in
writing, within 20 days from the date of this Order, what
steps Respondent has taken to comply herewith.
6 In the event that the Board's Order is enforced by a Judgment of a
United States Court of Appeals, the words in the notice reading "Posted by
Order of the National Labor Relations Board" shall read "Posted Pursuant
to a Judgment of the United States Court of Appeals Enforcing an Order of
the National Labor Relations Board."
535