PAYIT, LLCDownload PDFPatent Trials and Appeals BoardMar 24, 202014469372 - (D) (P.T.A.B. Mar. 24, 2020) Copy Citation UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE United States Patent and Trademark Office Address: COMMISSIONER FOR PATENTS P.O. Box 1450 Alexandria, Virginia 22313-1450 www.uspto.gov APPLICATION NO. FILING DATE FIRST NAMED INVENTOR ATTORNEY DOCKET NO. CONFIRMATION NO. 14/469,372 08/26/2014 JOHN THOMSON 218711-2.3 2315 97242 7590 03/24/2020 Kutak Rock LLP 2300 Main Street, Suite 800 Kansas City, MO 64108 EXAMINER ANDERSON, MICHAEL W ART UNIT PAPER NUMBER 3694 NOTIFICATION DATE DELIVERY MODE 03/24/2020 ELECTRONIC Please find below and/or attached an Office communication concerning this application or proceeding. The time period for reply, if any, is set in the attached communication. Notice of the Office communication was sent electronically on above-indicated "Notification Date" to the following e-mail address(es): patents@kutakrock.com PTOL-90A (Rev. 04/07) UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE ____________________ BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD ____________________ Ex parte JOHN THOMSON ____________________ Appeal 2019-003452 Application 14/469,372 Technology Center 3600 ____________________ Before ALLEN R. MacDONALD, KALYAN K. DESHPANDE, and JON M. JURGOVAN, Administrative Patent Judges. MacDONALD, Administrative Patent Judge. DECISION ON APPEAL STATEMENT OF THE CASE Pursuant to 35 U.S.C. § 134(a), Appellant1 appeals from the Examiner’s decision to reject claims 1–9. We have jurisdiction under 35 U.S.C. § 6(b). We AFFIRM. 1 Appellant identifies real party in interest in the present appeal is PAYIT, LLC. Appeal Br. 2. Appeal 2019-003452 Application 14/469,372 2 CLAIMED SUBJECT MATTER Claims 5 and 7 are illustrative of the claimed subject matter (emphasis, formatting, and bracketed material added): 5. A method of collecting payment from the user and processing the payment from the user, the method comprising the steps of: [A.] storing in a database information related to a plurality of electronic payment work flows; [B.] transmitting from a processor via a user application interface operably connecting said processor to an application on a remote user device information regarding at least one of said plurality of electronic payment work flows; [C.] receiving at said processor from said application information required pursuant to said at least one of said plurality of electronic payment work flows to complete a payment transaction; [D.] communicating said information to a processing system associated with said at least one of said plurality of electronic payment work flows to complete said payment transaction. 7. The method as claimed in claim 5 wherein the plurality of electronic payment work flows includes a first payment work flow and a second payment work flow, said first and second payment work flows being associated with respective first and second payments made by the user to one or more third party, wherein completion of the first payment work flow requires completion of the first payment, and wherein completion of the second payment work flow requires completion of the second payment and completion of the first payment work flow. Appeal 2019-003452 Application 14/469,372 3 REFERENCE The Examiner relies on the following prior art: Name Reference Date Dearworth US 8,587,454 B1 Nov. 19, 2013 REJECTIONS2 A. The Examiner rejects claims 1–9 under 35 U.S.C. § 101 because “the claimed invention is directed to a judicial exception (i.e., a law of nature, a natural phenomenon, or an abstract idea) without significantly more.” (Final Act. 5), i.e., the claimed invention is directed to patent-ineligible subject matter. Final Act. 5–7. We select claim 5 as representative. See 37 C.F.R. § 41.37(c)(1)(iv). Appellant does not separately argue claims 1–4 and 6–9. Except for our ultimate decision, we do not discuss the § 101 rejection of claims 1–4 and 6– 9 further herein. B.3 The Examiner rejects claims 1–9 under 35 U.S.C. § 102(b) as being anticipated by Dearworth. Final Act. 7–9. 2 All citations to the “Final Act.” are to the Final Action mailed on September 19, 2017. 3 Although “[t]he present application, filed on or after March 16, 2013, is being examined under the first inventor to file provisions of the AIA” (Final Act. 2) and 35 U.S.C. § 102(a)(2) is the applicable rejection, the Examiner labels this as a rejection under pre-AIA 35 U.S.C. § 102(b). We label it similarly. Appeal 2019-003452 Application 14/469,372 4 The Examiner correctly points out that Appellant does not present arguments directed to the § 102(b) rejection of claims 1–6. Ans. 7. Appellant responds: [A]pplicant previously argued that “Dearworth does not teach every element required by the claims” prior to providing specific examples of how Dearworth does not teach certain specific limitations of claims 7, 8, and 9. (Appeal Brief, pg. 9). The inclusion of illustrative arguments associated with claims 7, 8, and 9 should not be construed as Applicant acquiescing to the rejection of claims 1-6. Reply Br. 5. A mere statement asserting the cited prior art reference does not teach every element required by claims 1–6, without more, fails to constitute an argument on the merits of claims 1–6. See 37 C.F.R. § 41.37(c)(1)(iv); In re Lovin, 652 F.3d 1349, 1357 (Fed. Cir. 2011). Therefore, we affirm pro forma the § 102(b) rejection of claims 1–6. We determine that Appellant’s § 102(b) arguments group claims 7–9. We select claim 7 as representative. Except for our ultimate decision, we do not address this rejection of claims 8 and 9 further herein. OPINION We have reviewed the Examiner’s rejections in light of Appellant’s arguments that the Examiner has erred. We concur with the conclusions reached by the Examiner. We highlight the following points. A. Section 101 An invention is patent-eligible if it claims a “new and useful process, machine, manufacture, or composition of matter.” 35 U.S.C. § 101. However, the U.S. Supreme Court has long interpreted 35 U.S.C. § 101 to include implicit exceptions: “[l]aws of nature, natural phenomena, and Appeal 2019-003452 Application 14/469,372 5 abstract ideas” are not patentable. E.g., Alice Corp. v. CLS Bank Int’l, 573 U.S. 208, 216 (2014). In determining whether a claim falls within an excluded category, we are guided by the Court’s two-part framework, described in Mayo and Alice. Id. at 217–18 (citing Mayo Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus Labs., Inc., 566 U.S. 66, 75–77 (2012)). In accordance with that framework, we first determine what concept the claim is “directed to.” See Alice, 573 U.S. at 219 (“On their face, the claims before us are drawn to the concept of intermediated settlement, i.e., the use of a third party to mitigate settlement risk.”); see also Bilski v. Kappos, 561 U.S. 593, 611 (2010) (“Claims 1 and 4 in petitioners’ application explain the basic concept of hedging, or protecting against risk.”). Concepts determined to be abstract ideas, and thus patent ineligible, include certain methods of organizing human activity, such as fundamental economic practices (Alice, 573 U.S. at 219–20; Bilski, 561 U.S. at 611); mathematical formulas (Parker v. Flook, 437 U.S. 584, 594–95 (1978)); and mental processes (Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63, 67 (1972)). Concepts determined to be patent eligible include physical and chemical processes, such as “molding rubber products” (Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175, 191 (1981)); “tanning, dyeing, making waterproof cloth, vulcanizing India rubber, smelting ores” (id. at 182 n.7 (quoting Corning v. Burden, 56 U.S. 252, 267–68 (1853))); and manufacturing flour (Benson, 409 U.S. at 69 (citing Cochrane v. Deener, 94 U.S. 780, 785 (1876))). In Diehr, the claim at issue recited a mathematical formula, but the Court held that “a claim drawn to subject matter otherwise statutory does not become nonstatutory simply because it uses a mathematical formula.” Appeal 2019-003452 Application 14/469,372 6 Diehr, 450 U.S. at 187; see also id. at 191 (“We view respondents’ claims as nothing more than a process for molding rubber products and not as an attempt to patent a mathematical formula.”). Having said that, the Court also indicated that a claim “seeking patent protection for that formula in the abstract . . . is not accorded the protection of our patent laws, and this principle cannot be circumvented by attempting to limit the use of the formula to a particular technological environment.” Id. (citation omitted) (citing Benson and Flook); see, e.g., id. at 187 (“It is now commonplace that an application of a law of nature or mathematical formula to a known structure or process may well be deserving of patent protection.”). If the claim is “directed to” an abstract idea, we turn to the second part of the Alice and Mayo framework, where “we must examine the elements of the claim to determine whether it contains an ‘inventive concept’ sufficient to ‘transform’ the claimed abstract idea into a patent-eligible application.” Alice, 573 U.S. at 221 (quotation marks omitted). “A claim that recites an abstract idea must include ‘additional features’ to ensure ‘that the [claim] is more than a drafting effort designed to monopolize the [abstract idea].’” Id. (alterations in original) (quoting Mayo, 566 U.S. at 77). “[M]erely requir[ing] generic computer implementation[] fail[s] to transform that abstract idea into a patent-eligible invention.” Id. B. USPTO § 101 Guidance In January 2019, the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO) published revised guidance on the application of § 101. See 2019 Revised Patent Subject Matter Eligibility Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. 50 (Jan. 7, 2019) Appeal 2019-003452 Application 14/469,372 7 (“2019 Revised Guidance”).4 “All USPTO personnel are, as a matter of internal agency management, expected to follow the guidance.” Id. at 51; see also October 2019 Update at 1. Under the 2019 Revised Guidance and the October 2019 Update, we first look to whether the claim recites: (1) any judicial exceptions, including certain groupings of abstract ideas (i.e., mathematical concepts, certain methods of organizing human activity such as a fundamental economic practice, or mental processes) (“Step 2A, Prong One”); and (2) additional elements that integrate the judicial exception into a practical application (see MPEP § 2106.05(a)–(c), (e)–(h) (9th ed. Rev. 08.2017, Jan. 2018)) (“Step 2A, Prong Two”).5 2019 Revised Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. at 52–55. Only if a claim (1) recites a judicial exception and (2) does not integrate that exception into a practical application, do we then look, under Step 2B, to whether the claim: 4 In response to received public comments, the Office issued further guidance on October 17, 2019, clarifying the 2019 Revised Guidance. USPTO, October 2019 Update: Subject Matter Eligibility (the “October 2019 Update”) (available at https://www.uspto.gov/sites/default/files/ documents/peg_oct_2019_update.pdf). 5 This evaluation is performed by (a) identifying whether there are any additional elements recited in the claim beyond the judicial exception, and (b) evaluating those additional elements individually and in combination to determine whether the claim as a whole integrates the exception into a practical application. See 2019 Revised Guidance - Section III(A)(2), 84 Fed. Reg. 54–55. Appeal 2019-003452 Application 14/469,372 8 (3) adds a specific limitation beyond the judicial exception that is not “well-understood, routine, conventional” in the field (see MPEP § 2106.05(d)); or (4) simply appends well-understood, routine, conventional activities previously known to the industry, specified at a high level of generality, to the judicial exception. 2019 Revised Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. at 52–56. C. Examiner’s § 101 Rejection - Alice/Mayo - Steps 1 and 2 C.1. 2019 Revised Guidance Step 2A – Prong One Applying the Alice/Mayo analysis, the Examiner determines that claim 5 recites an abstract idea: Claim(s) 1-9 are directed to a series of steps instructing how to collect payment from the user and processing the payment from the user (including: . . . receiving and storing . . . information . . . , . . . transmitting . . . information . . . , . . . receiving . . . information . . . , and . . . communicating . . . information . . . ), which is a fundamental economic practice, as well as a method of organizing human activities and an idea of itself, and thus an abstract idea. Additionally, the courts have recognized similar claims to be abstract ideas from the Federal Register I Vol. 79, No. 241 I Tuesday, December 16, 2014 I Rules and Regulations” such as collecting information, analyzing it, and displaying certain results of the collection and analysis (Electric Power Group), creating a contractual relationship (buySAFE), collecting and comparing known information (Classen), obtaining and comparing intangible data (Cybersource), data recognition and storage (Content Extraction), managing an insurance policy (Bancorp), generating rule-based tasks for processing an insurance claim (Accenture), and processing information through a clearinghouse (Dealertrack). Final Act. 6 (emphasis omitted). Appeal 2019-003452 Application 14/469,372 9 C.2. 2019 Revised Guidance Step 2A – Prong Two Further applying the Alice/Mayo analysis, the Examiner determines claim 5 is directed to an abstract idea. The only additional limitations in the claims that relate to computerization is a database, processor, and remote user device. The additional limitations when taken individually and in combination are not sufficient to amount to significantly more than the judicial exception because the claims do not provide improvements to another technology or technical field, improvements to the functioning of the computer itself, and do not provide meaningful limitations beyond general linking the use of an abstract idea to a particular technological environment. Final Act. 6. C.3. 2019 Revised Guidance Step 2B Applying the Alice/Mayo analysis, the Examiner determines: Additionally, the claims are directed to an abstract idea with additional generic computer elements that do not add meaningful limitations to the abstract idea because they require no more than a generic computer to perform generic computer functions that are well-understood, routine, and conventional activities previously known to the industry. The additional limitations are merely performing repetitive calculations; receiving, processing, and storing data; electronic recordkeeping; automating mental tasks; and receiving or transmitting data over a network all of which have been held by the courts to be well understood, routine, and conventional computer functions. Final Act. 6 (emphasis omitted). D. Appellant’s § 101 Arguments & Board’s Analysis D.1. 2019 Revised Guidance Step 2A, Prong 1 Appellant contends: “[T]he ‘directed to’ inquiry applies a stage-one filter to claims, considered in light of the specification, based on whether ‘their character as a whole is directed to excluded subject Appeal 2019-003452 Application 14/469,372 10 matter’.” Enfish, LLC v. Microsoft Corp., 822 F.3d 1327, 1335 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (emphasis added). Yet Examiner strips certain limitations from the claims and analyzes them independently in an apparent attempt to justify running mere portions of the claims through the stage one (Step 2A) filter. Furthermore, Examiner’s own arguments suggest that Examiner did not run each of the dependent claims through the stage one (Step 2A) filter. See Infra. Consequently, the present rejection is improper at least because each claim was not considered at Step 2A as a whole. Furthermore, Examiner did not even attempt to pass each of the claims through the stage-one (Step 2A) filter. Because this “threshold determination” was not even addressed for such claims, it was improper to analyze them under Step 2B. See Enfish at 1334. Appeal Br. 7 (emphasis added). The Examiner correctly determines that claim 5 recites “a series of steps instructing how to collect payment from the user and processing the payment from the user” (Final Act. 6 (emphasis omitted)) including the following limitations: [A.] receiving and storing . . . information . . . , [B.] transmitting . . . information . . . , [C.] receiving . . . information . . . , [D.] communicating . . . information . . . . Final Act. 6 (emphasis, formatting and bracketed material added). Similarly, our review determines that claim 5 recites “[a] method of collecting payment from the user and processing the payment from the user” including the following limitations: [A.] storing . . . information related to a plurality of . . . payment work flows; [B.] transmitting . . . information regarding at least one of said plurality of . . . payment work flows; Appeal 2019-003452 Application 14/469,372 11 [C.] receiving . . . information required pursuant to said at least one of said plurality of . . . payment work flows to complete a payment transaction; [D.] communicating . . . information . . . of . . . payment work flows to complete said payment transaction communications relating to a plurality of said subscribers resulting in said subscribers being sent one or more client advertising contents. Claim 5 (formatting and bracketed material added). Appellant’s argument begins by correctly stating that as to the rejected claims, the evaluation is based on whether “their character as a whole is directed to excluded subject matter.” Appeal Br. 7. “[W]e evaluate the focus of the claimed advance over the prior art to determine if the character of the claim as a whole, considered in light of the specification, is directed to excluded subject matter.” Trading Techs. Int’l, Inc. v. IBG LLC, 921 F.3d 1084, 1092 (Fed. Cir. 2019) (quotation omitted). However, Appellant’s argument then conflates the “character of the claim as a whole” with the “limitations” of “the claim as a whole.” Contrary to Appellant’s argument, we conclude, the Examiner correctly determines that claim 5 recites a series of steps instructing how to collect payment from the user and processing the payment from the user (i.e., commercial interaction); and a commercial interaction is one of certain methods of organizing human activity identified in the 2019 Revised Guidance, and thus an abstract idea. 84 Fed. Reg. at 52. D.2. 2019 Revised Guidance Step 2A, Prong 2 Having determined that claim 5 recites an abstract idea, we now turn to whether claim 5 is directed to that abstract idea, or instead integrates the judicial exception into a practical application. Appeal 2019-003452 Application 14/469,372 12 The Examiner determined: [T]he claims do not provide improvements to another technology or technical field, improvements to the functioning of the computer itself, and do not provide meaningful limitations beyond general linking the use of an abstract idea to a particular technological environment. Final Act. 6. Appellant contends: [T]o the extent that the present claims possibly recite an abstract idea, the claims recite specific, discrete implementations of such abstract idea. As such, the claims cannot possibly preempt all ways of performing the abstract idea. Appeal Br. 7. Further, Appellant contends: Under Prong Two, Examiner fails to provide sufficient weight to each additional element of the claims. Instead, Examiner discounts certain limitations by classifying them as “extra solution activity.” Such classifications are improper and inaccurate. For instance, whether steps required to associate an electronic payment work flow to a payment transaction could be classified as an extra solution activity is irrelevant to the 101 analysis at least because the claims do not recite such a limitation. Instead, the claims recite the limitations of “completion of [a] first payment work flow require[ing] completion of [a] first payment” and “completion of [a] second payment work flow require[ing] completion of [a] second payment and completion of the first payment work flow.” The Office fails to provide any weight, whatsoever, to such limitations. Reply Br. 3–4. Appellant’s arguments are not persuasive. First, Appellant’s “preemption” argument is not persuasive because although “preemption may signal patent ineligible subject matter, the absence of complete preemption Appeal 2019-003452 Application 14/469,372 13 does not demonstrate patent eligibility.” Ariosa Diagnostics, Inc. v. Sequenom, Inc., 788 F.3d 1371, 1379 (Fed. Cir. 2015). We are instructed that “[w]here a patent’s claims are deemed only to disclose patent ineligible subject matter under the [Alice/Mayo] framework . . . , preemption concerns are fully addressed and made moot.” Id. Second, Appellant’s “sufficient weight” argument essentially asserts that the collecting and processing of a payment from the user can result in a non-abstract improvement to technology. Like the Examiner, we determine that limitations such as “electronic,” “processor,” and “database” are merely “linking the use of an abstract idea to a particular technological environment” and “do not provide improvements to another technology or technical field.” The focus of claim 5 is not on an improvement in computer-functionality, as in Enfish, but on an abstract idea that uses a computer as a tool for collecting and processing of a payment from the user. In Trading Technologies, the Federal Circuit agreed with the district court explanation that: The claims require a specific, structured graphical user interface paired with a prescribed functionality directly related to the graphical user interface’s structure that is addressed to and resolves a specifically identified problem in the prior state of the art. Trading Techs. Int’l, Inc. v. CQG, INC., 675 F. App’x 1001, 1004 (Fed. Cir. 2017). In contrast, in Appellant’s claim 5, we find only abstract improvements to collecting and processing of a payment from the user. A claim directed to a unique and advantageous method for collecting and processing of a payment from the user is nonetheless directed to an abstract Appeal 2019-003452 Application 14/469,372 14 idea.6 “[U]nder the Mayo/Alice framework, a claim directed to a newly discovered law of nature (or natural phenomenon or abstract idea) cannot rely on the novelty of that discovery for the inventive concept necessary for patent eligibility.” Genetic Techs. Ltd. v. Merial L.L.C., 818 F.3d 1369, 1376 (Fed. Cir. 2016); see Diehr, 450 U.S. at 188–89. We agree with the Examiner that as to claim 5, “the claimed invention does not represent a technological improvement in the operation of the claimed system.” Ans. 5. In view of Appellant’s Specification, and consistent with the Examiner’s determinations, we conclude that claim 5 does not integrate the judicial exception into a practical application. We determine claim 5 does not recite: (i) an improvement to the functioning of a computer; (ii) an improvement to another technology or technical field; (iii) an application of the abstract idea with, or by use of, a particular machine; (iv) a transformation or reduction of a particular article to a different state or thing; or 6 See Ultramercial, Inc. v. Hulu LLC, 772 F.3d. 709 (Fed. Cir. 2014). In that case, the patentee argued that its financial arrangement (a method of using advertising as an exchange or currency) was distinguishable from the “routine,” “long prevalent,” or “conventional” abstract idea in Alice because it was “directed to a specific method of advertising and content distribution that was previously unknown.” Id. at 714. The court rejected the patentee’s position that “abstract ideas remain patent-eligible under § 101 as long as they are new ideas, not previously well known, and not routine activity.” Id. Appeal 2019-003452 Application 14/469,372 15 (v) other meaningful limitations beyond generally linking the use of the abstract idea to a particular technological environment. See MPEP §§ 2106.05(a)–(c), (e)–(h). We agree with the Examiner that claim 5 is directed to a judicial exception, and does not integrate the judicial exception into a practical application. D.3. 2019 Revised Guidance Step 2B Appellant contends: [T]he present claims are patent eligible at least to the extent that they recite unconventional limitations, as discussed herein with regards to the prior art rejections. Reply Br. 4 (emphasis added). Appellant’s argument is not persuasive. Again, “under the Mayo/Alice framework, a claim directed to a newly discovered law of nature (or natural phenomenon or abstract idea) cannot rely on the novelty of that discovery for the inventive concept necessary for patent eligibility.” Genetic Techs. 818 F.3d at 1376; see Diehr, 450 U.S. at 188–89. Further, Appellant’s “prior art rejection” argument lacks merit because, even though the Section 101 inquiry and the Section 102/103 inquiry might sometimes overlap, a novel and nonobvious claim directed to a purely abstract idea is, nonetheless, patent-ineligible. See Mayo Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus Labs., Inc., 566 U.S. at 89 (rejecting the suggestion that Sections 102, 103, and 112 might perform the appropriate screening function and noting that in Mayo such an approach “would make the ‘law of nature’ exception . . . a dead letter”). We agree that the Examiner correctly determines that in addition to the abstract idea, claim 5 recites only well-understood, routine, conventional Appeal 2019-003452 Application 14/469,372 16 elements/ combination of elements previously known in the industry. In view of Appellant’s Specification, and consistent with the Examiner’s determinations, we determine that beyond the abstract idea, the claims do not recite: (vi) a specific limitation other than what is well-understood, routine, conventional activity in the field or unconventional steps that confine the claim to a particular useful application. See MPEP § 2106.05(d). E. Appellant raises the following arguments in contending that the Examiner erred in rejecting claim 7 under 35 U.S.C. § 102(b). Dearworth does not teach every element required by the claims. For instance, Dearworth does not teach at least first and second payment work flows associated with respective first and second payments, as recited in each of recently added claims 7, 8, and 9. Instead, at best, Dearworth merely recites a single payment (the mobile device is charged a toll and a service fee, but these combined are simply one payment) that is associated with, and requires, the occurrence of an event (mobile device passing through a virtual toll location), but the event is NOT a payment. Appeal Br. 9. Examiner argues that “Appellant did not provide where in the specification the terms first and second payment are defined,” but fails to provide any analysis, whatsoever, indicating how Examiner is interpreting the terms “first and second payment”. (Examiner’s Answer, pg. 7). Instead, to the extent Examiner provides any analysis, such analysis is associated with work flows, NOT payments. In other words, Examiner is essentially ignoring the terms first and second payments. Applicant need not provide where in the specification the terms first and second payment are defined at least because Appeal 2019-003452 Application 14/469,372 17 a person having ordinary skill in the art will readily understand that each of the first and second payments of claims 7, 8, and 9 are separate “payments made by the user.” Examiner merely identifies a single payment made by the user at least because, as Applicant previously argued and Examiner does not contest, charging a toll, even if the toll includes a service fee, merely requires a user to make a single payment. Reply Br. 2 (additional emphasis added). Appellant’s argument is not persuasive. Essentially, Appellant argues that while Dearworth (Figure 8, item 816) teaches a toll (a first charge) plus a service fee (a second charge), an artisan would not understand Dearworth’s simultaneous payment of the two related charges as the required “respective first and second payments made by the user to one or more third party.” We disagree. Contrary to Appellant’s argument, an artisan would immediately recognize that a user simultaneously paying two related charges is making two payments to one or more third party. A common form of this is a first payment of a sales tax (to a state) simultaneous with a second payment of a purchase price (to a vendor). CONCLUSION The Examiner has not erred in rejecting claims 1–9 under 35 U.S.C. § 101, as being directed to patent-ineligible subject matter. The Examiner has not erred in rejecting claims 1–9 as being anticipated under 35 U.S.C. § 102(b). The Examiner’s rejection of claims 1–9 under 35 U.S.C. § 101, as being directed to patent-ineligible subject matter, is affirmed. The Examiner’s rejection of claims 1–9 as being anticipated under 35 U.S.C. § 102(b) is affirmed. Appeal 2019-003452 Application 14/469,372 18 DECISION SUMMARY In summary: Claims Rejected 35 U.S.C. § Reference(s)/Basis Affirmed Reversed 1–9 101 Eligibility 1–9 1–9 102 Dearworth 1–9 Overall Outcome 1–9 TIME PERIOD FOR RESPONSE No time period for taking any subsequent action in connection with this appeal may be extended under 37 C.F.R. § 1.136(a). See 37 C.F.R. § 1.136(a)(1)(iv). AFFIRMED Copy with citationCopy as parenthetical citation