PAYIT, LLC

Patent Trials and Appeals Board

Mar 24, 2020

14469372 - (D) (P.T.A.B. Mar. 24, 2020)

UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE
United States Patent and Trademark Office
Address: COMMISSIONER FOR PATENTS
P.O. Box 1450
Alexandria, Virginia 22313-1450
www.uspto.gov
APPLICATION NO. FILING DATE FIRST NAMED INVENTOR ATTORNEY DOCKET NO. CONFIRMATION NO.
14/469,372 08/26/2014 JOHN THOMSON 218711-2.3 2315
97242 7590 03/24/2020
Kutak Rock LLP
2300 Main Street, Suite 800
Kansas City, MO 64108
EXAMINER
ANDERSON, MICHAEL W
ART UNIT PAPER NUMBER
3694
NOTIFICATION DATE DELIVERY MODE
03/24/2020 ELECTRONIC
Please find below and/or attached an Office communication concerning this application or proceeding.
The time period for reply, if any, is set in the attached communication.
Notice of the Office communication was sent electronically on above-indicated "Notification Date" to the
following e-mail address(es):
patents@kutakrock.com
PTOL-90A (Rev. 04/07)

UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
____________________

BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD
____________________

Ex parte JOHN THOMSON
____________________

Appeal 2019-003452
Application 14/469,372
Technology Center 3600
____________________

Before ALLEN R. MacDONALD, KALYAN K. DESHPANDE, and
JON M. JURGOVAN, Administrative Patent Judges.

MacDONALD, Administrative Patent Judge.

DECISION ON APPEAL

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Pursuant to 35 U.S.C. § 134(a), Appellant1 appeals from the
Examiner’s decision to reject claims 1–9. We have jurisdiction under
35 U.S.C. § 6(b). We AFFIRM.

1 Appellant identifies real party in interest in the present appeal is PAYIT,
LLC. Appeal Br. 2.
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CLAIMED SUBJECT MATTER
Claims 5 and 7 are illustrative of the claimed subject matter
(emphasis, formatting, and bracketed material added):
5. A method of collecting payment from the user and processing
the payment from the user, the method comprising the steps
of:
[A.] storing in a database information related to a plurality
of electronic payment work flows;
[B.] transmitting from a processor via a user application
interface operably connecting said processor to an
application on a remote user device information
regarding at least one of said plurality of electronic
payment work flows;
[C.] receiving at said processor from said application
information required pursuant to said at least one of
said plurality of electronic payment work flows to
complete a payment transaction;
[D.] communicating said information to a processing
system associated with said at least one of said
plurality of electronic payment work flows to
complete said payment transaction.
7. The method as claimed in claim 5 wherein the plurality of
electronic payment work flows includes a first payment work
flow and a second payment work flow, said first and second
payment work flows being associated with respective first
and second payments made by the user to one or more third
party,
wherein completion of the first payment work flow
requires completion of the first payment, and
wherein completion of the second payment work flow
requires completion of the second payment and
completion of the first payment work flow.

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REFERENCE
The Examiner relies on the following prior art:
Name Reference Date
Dearworth US 8,587,454 B1 Nov. 19, 2013

REJECTIONS2
A.
The Examiner rejects claims 1–9 under 35 U.S.C. § 101 because “the
claimed invention is directed to a judicial exception (i.e., a law of nature, a
natural phenomenon, or an abstract idea) without significantly more.” (Final
Act. 5), i.e., the claimed invention is directed to patent-ineligible subject
matter. Final Act. 5–7.
We select claim 5 as representative. See 37 C.F.R. § 41.37(c)(1)(iv).
Appellant does not separately argue claims 1–4 and 6–9. Except for our
ultimate decision, we do not discuss the § 101 rejection of claims 1–4 and 6–
9 further herein.
B.3
The Examiner rejects claims 1–9 under 35 U.S.C. § 102(b) as being
anticipated by Dearworth. Final Act. 7–9.

2 All citations to the “Final Act.” are to the Final Action mailed on
September 19, 2017.
3 Although “[t]he present application, filed on or after March 16, 2013, is
being examined under the first inventor to file provisions of the AIA” (Final
Act. 2) and 35 U.S.C. § 102(a)(2) is the applicable rejection, the Examiner
labels this as a rejection under pre-AIA 35 U.S.C. § 102(b). We label it
similarly.
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The Examiner correctly points out that Appellant does not present
arguments directed to the § 102(b) rejection of claims 1–6. Ans. 7.
Appellant responds:
[A]pplicant previously argued that “Dearworth does not teach
every element required by the claims” prior to providing specific
examples of how Dearworth does not teach certain specific
limitations of claims 7, 8, and 9. (Appeal Brief, pg. 9). The
inclusion of illustrative arguments associated with claims 7, 8,
and 9 should not be construed as Applicant acquiescing to the
rejection of claims 1-6.
Reply Br. 5. A mere statement asserting the cited prior art reference does
not teach every element required by claims 1–6, without more, fails to
constitute an argument on the merits of claims 1–6. See 37 C.F.R.
§ 41.37(c)(1)(iv); In re Lovin, 652 F.3d 1349, 1357 (Fed. Cir. 2011).
Therefore, we affirm pro forma the § 102(b) rejection of claims 1–6.
We determine that Appellant’s § 102(b) arguments group claims 7–9.
We select claim 7 as representative. Except for our ultimate decision, we do
not address this rejection of claims 8 and 9 further herein.

OPINION
We have reviewed the Examiner’s rejections in light of Appellant’s
arguments that the Examiner has erred. We concur with the conclusions
reached by the Examiner. We highlight the following points.
A. Section 101
An invention is patent-eligible if it claims a “new and useful process,
machine, manufacture, or composition of matter.” 35 U.S.C. § 101.
However, the U.S. Supreme Court has long interpreted 35 U.S.C. § 101 to
include implicit exceptions: “[l]aws of nature, natural phenomena, and
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abstract ideas” are not patentable. E.g., Alice Corp. v. CLS Bank Int’l, 573
U.S. 208, 216 (2014).
In determining whether a claim falls within an excluded category, we
are guided by the Court’s two-part framework, described in Mayo and Alice.
Id. at 217–18 (citing Mayo Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus Labs., Inc.,
566 U.S. 66, 75–77 (2012)). In accordance with that framework, we first
determine what concept the claim is “directed to.” See Alice, 573 U.S. at
219 (“On their face, the claims before us are drawn to the concept of
intermediated settlement, i.e., the use of a third party to mitigate settlement
risk.”); see also Bilski v. Kappos, 561 U.S. 593, 611 (2010) (“Claims 1 and 4
in petitioners’ application explain the basic concept of hedging, or protecting
against risk.”).
Concepts determined to be abstract ideas, and thus patent ineligible,
include certain methods of organizing human activity, such as fundamental
economic practices (Alice, 573 U.S. at 219–20; Bilski, 561 U.S. at 611);
mathematical formulas (Parker v. Flook, 437 U.S. 584, 594–95 (1978)); and
mental processes (Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63, 67 (1972)). Concepts
determined to be patent eligible include physical and chemical processes,
such as “molding rubber products” (Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175, 191
(1981)); “tanning, dyeing, making waterproof cloth, vulcanizing India
rubber, smelting ores” (id. at 182 n.7 (quoting Corning v. Burden, 56 U.S.
252, 267–68 (1853))); and manufacturing flour (Benson, 409 U.S. at 69
(citing Cochrane v. Deener, 94 U.S. 780, 785 (1876))).
In Diehr, the claim at issue recited a mathematical formula, but the
Court held that “a claim drawn to subject matter otherwise statutory does not
become nonstatutory simply because it uses a mathematical formula.”
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Diehr, 450 U.S. at 187; see also id. at 191 (“We view respondents’ claims as
nothing more than a process for molding rubber products and not as an
attempt to patent a mathematical formula.”). Having said that, the Court
also indicated that a claim “seeking patent protection for that formula in the
abstract . . . is not accorded the protection of our patent laws, and this
principle cannot be circumvented by attempting to limit the use of the
formula to a particular technological environment.” Id. (citation omitted)
(citing Benson and Flook); see, e.g., id. at 187 (“It is now commonplace that
an application of a law of nature or mathematical formula to a known
structure or process may well be deserving of patent protection.”).
If the claim is “directed to” an abstract idea, we turn to the second part
of the Alice and Mayo framework, where “we must examine the elements of
the claim to determine whether it contains an ‘inventive concept’ sufficient
to ‘transform’ the claimed abstract idea into a patent-eligible application.”
Alice, 573 U.S. at 221 (quotation marks omitted). “A claim that recites an
abstract idea must include ‘additional features’ to ensure ‘that the [claim] is
more than a drafting effort designed to monopolize the [abstract idea].’” Id.
(alterations in original) (quoting Mayo, 566 U.S. at 77). “[M]erely
requir[ing] generic computer implementation[] fail[s] to transform that
abstract idea into a patent-eligible invention.” Id.
B. USPTO § 101 Guidance
In January 2019, the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO)
published revised guidance on the application of § 101. See 2019 Revised
Patent Subject Matter Eligibility Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. 50 (Jan. 7, 2019)
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(“2019 Revised Guidance”).4 “All USPTO personnel are, as a matter of
internal agency management, expected to follow the guidance.” Id. at 51;
see also October 2019 Update at 1.
Under the 2019 Revised Guidance and the October 2019 Update, we
first look to whether the claim recites:
(1) any judicial exceptions, including certain groupings of abstract
ideas (i.e., mathematical concepts, certain methods of organizing
human activity such as a fundamental economic practice, or mental
processes) (“Step 2A, Prong One”); and
(2) additional elements that integrate the judicial exception into a
practical application (see MPEP § 2106.05(a)–(c), (e)–(h) (9th ed.
Rev. 08.2017, Jan. 2018)) (“Step 2A, Prong Two”).5
2019 Revised Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. at 52–55.
Only if a claim (1) recites a judicial exception and (2) does not
integrate that exception into a practical application, do we then look, under
Step 2B, to whether the claim:

4 In response to received public comments, the Office issued further
guidance on October 17, 2019, clarifying the 2019 Revised Guidance.
USPTO, October 2019 Update: Subject Matter Eligibility (the “October
2019 Update”) (available at https://www.uspto.gov/sites/default/files/
documents/peg_oct_2019_update.pdf).
5 This evaluation is performed by (a) identifying whether there are any
additional elements recited in the claim beyond the judicial exception, and
(b) evaluating those additional elements individually and in combination to
determine whether the claim as a whole integrates the exception into a
practical application. See 2019 Revised Guidance - Section III(A)(2), 84
Fed. Reg. 54–55.
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(3) adds a specific limitation beyond the judicial exception that is not
“well-understood, routine, conventional” in the field (see MPEP
§ 2106.05(d)); or
(4) simply appends well-understood, routine, conventional activities
previously known to the industry, specified at a high level of
generality, to the judicial exception.
2019 Revised Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. at 52–56.
C. Examiner’s § 101 Rejection - Alice/Mayo - Steps 1 and 2
C.1. 2019 Revised Guidance Step 2A – Prong One
Applying the Alice/Mayo analysis, the Examiner determines that
claim 5 recites an abstract idea:
Claim(s) 1-9 are directed to a series of steps instructing
how to collect payment from the user and processing the payment
from the user (including: . . . receiving and storing . . .
information . . . , . . . transmitting . . . information . . . , . . .
receiving . . . information . . . , and . . . communicating . . .
information . . . ), which is a fundamental economic practice, as
well as a method of organizing human activities and an idea of
itself, and thus an abstract idea. Additionally, the courts have
recognized similar claims to be abstract ideas from the Federal
Register I Vol. 79, No. 241 I Tuesday, December 16, 2014 I
Rules and Regulations” such as collecting information,
analyzing it, and displaying certain results of the collection and
analysis (Electric Power Group), creating a contractual
relationship (buySAFE), collecting and comparing known
information (Classen), obtaining and comparing intangible data
(Cybersource), data recognition and storage (Content
Extraction), managing an insurance policy (Bancorp), generating
rule-based tasks for processing an insurance claim (Accenture),
and processing information through a clearinghouse
(Dealertrack).
Final Act. 6 (emphasis omitted).
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C.2. 2019 Revised Guidance Step 2A – Prong Two
Further applying the Alice/Mayo analysis, the Examiner determines
claim 5 is directed to an abstract idea.
The only additional limitations in the claims that relate to
computerization is a database, processor, and remote user device.
The additional limitations when taken individually and in
combination are not sufficient to amount to significantly more
than the judicial exception because the claims do not provide
improvements to another technology or technical field,
improvements to the functioning of the computer itself, and do
not provide meaningful limitations beyond general linking the
use of an abstract idea to a particular technological environment.
Final Act. 6.
C.3. 2019 Revised Guidance Step 2B
Applying the Alice/Mayo analysis, the Examiner determines:
Additionally, the claims are directed to an abstract idea with
additional generic computer elements that do not add meaningful
limitations to the abstract idea because they require no more than
a generic computer to perform generic computer functions that
are well-understood, routine, and conventional activities
previously known to the industry. The additional limitations are
merely performing repetitive calculations; receiving, processing,
and storing data; electronic recordkeeping; automating mental
tasks; and receiving or transmitting data over a network all of
which have been held by the courts to be well understood,
routine, and conventional computer functions.
Final Act. 6 (emphasis omitted).
D. Appellant’s § 101 Arguments & Board’s Analysis
D.1. 2019 Revised Guidance Step 2A, Prong 1
Appellant contends:
“[T]he ‘directed to’ inquiry applies a stage-one filter to
claims, considered in light of the specification, based on whether
‘their character as a whole is directed to excluded subject
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matter’.” Enfish, LLC v. Microsoft Corp., 822 F.3d 1327, 1335
(Fed. Cir. 2016) (emphasis added). Yet Examiner strips certain
limitations from the claims and analyzes them independently in
an apparent attempt to justify running mere portions of the claims
through the stage one (Step 2A) filter. Furthermore, Examiner’s
own arguments suggest that Examiner did not run each of the
dependent claims through the stage one (Step 2A) filter. See
Infra. Consequently, the present rejection is improper at least
because each claim was not considered at Step 2A as a whole.
Furthermore, Examiner did not even attempt to pass each of the
claims through the stage-one (Step 2A) filter. Because this
“threshold determination” was not even addressed for such
claims, it was improper to analyze them under Step 2B. See
Enfish at 1334.
Appeal Br. 7 (emphasis added).
The Examiner correctly determines that claim 5 recites “a series of
steps instructing how to collect payment from the user and processing the
payment from the user” (Final Act. 6 (emphasis omitted)) including the
following limitations:
[A.] receiving and storing . . . information . . . ,
[B.] transmitting . . . information . . . ,
[C.] receiving . . . information . . . ,
[D.] communicating . . . information . . . .
Final Act. 6 (emphasis, formatting and bracketed material added).
Similarly, our review determines that claim 5 recites “[a] method of
collecting payment from the user and processing the payment from the user”
including the following limitations:
[A.] storing . . . information related to a plurality of . . .
payment work flows;
[B.] transmitting . . . information regarding at least one of
said plurality of . . . payment work flows;
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[C.] receiving . . . information required pursuant to said at
least one of said plurality of . . . payment work flows to complete
a payment transaction;
[D.] communicating . . . information . . . of . . . payment
work flows to complete said payment transaction
communications relating to a plurality of said subscribers
resulting in said subscribers being sent one or more client
advertising contents.
Claim 5 (formatting and bracketed material added).
Appellant’s argument begins by correctly stating that as to the rejected
claims, the evaluation is based on whether “their character as a whole is
directed to excluded subject matter.” Appeal Br. 7. “[W]e evaluate the
focus of the claimed advance over the prior art to determine if the character
of the claim as a whole, considered in light of the specification, is directed to
excluded subject matter.” Trading Techs. Int’l, Inc. v. IBG LLC, 921 F.3d
1084, 1092 (Fed. Cir. 2019) (quotation omitted). However, Appellant’s
argument then conflates the “character of the claim as a whole” with the
“limitations” of “the claim as a whole.” Contrary to Appellant’s argument,
we conclude, the Examiner correctly determines that claim 5 recites a series
of steps instructing how to collect payment from the user and processing the
payment from the user (i.e., commercial interaction); and a commercial
interaction is one of certain methods of organizing human activity identified
in the 2019 Revised Guidance, and thus an abstract idea. 84 Fed. Reg. at 52.
D.2. 2019 Revised Guidance Step 2A, Prong 2
Having determined that claim 5 recites an abstract idea, we now turn
to whether claim 5 is directed to that abstract idea, or instead integrates the
judicial exception into a practical application.
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The Examiner determined:
[T]he claims do not provide improvements to another technology
or technical field, improvements to the functioning of the
computer itself, and do not provide meaningful limitations
beyond general linking the use of an abstract idea to a particular
technological environment.
Final Act. 6.
Appellant contends:
[T]o the extent that the present claims possibly recite an abstract
idea, the claims recite specific, discrete implementations of such
abstract idea. As such, the claims cannot possibly preempt all
ways of performing the abstract idea.
Appeal Br. 7.
Further, Appellant contends:
Under Prong Two, Examiner fails to provide sufficient
weight to each additional element of the claims. Instead,
Examiner discounts certain limitations by classifying them as
“extra solution activity.” Such classifications are improper and
inaccurate. For instance, whether steps required to associate an
electronic payment work flow to a payment transaction could be
classified as an extra solution activity is irrelevant to the 101
analysis at least because the claims do not recite such a
limitation. Instead, the claims recite the limitations of
“completion of [a] first payment work flow require[ing]
completion of [a] first payment” and “completion of [a] second
payment work flow require[ing] completion of [a] second
payment and completion of the first payment work flow.” The
Office fails to provide any weight, whatsoever, to such
limitations.
Reply Br. 3–4.
Appellant’s arguments are not persuasive. First, Appellant’s
“preemption” argument is not persuasive because although “preemption may
signal patent ineligible subject matter, the absence of complete preemption
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does not demonstrate patent eligibility.” Ariosa Diagnostics, Inc. v.
Sequenom, Inc., 788 F.3d 1371, 1379 (Fed. Cir. 2015). We are instructed
that “[w]here a patent’s claims are deemed only to disclose patent ineligible
subject matter under the [Alice/Mayo] framework . . . , preemption concerns
are fully addressed and made moot.” Id.
Second, Appellant’s “sufficient weight” argument essentially asserts
that the collecting and processing of a payment from the user can result in a
non-abstract improvement to technology. Like the Examiner, we determine
that limitations such as “electronic,” “processor,” and “database” are merely
“linking the use of an abstract idea to a particular technological
environment” and “do not provide improvements to another technology or
technical field.” The focus of claim 5 is not on an improvement in
computer-functionality, as in Enfish, but on an abstract idea that uses a
computer as a tool for collecting and processing of a payment from the user.
In Trading Technologies, the Federal Circuit agreed with the district court
explanation that:
The claims require a specific, structured graphical user interface
paired with a prescribed functionality directly related to the
graphical user interface’s structure that is addressed to and
resolves a specifically identified problem in the prior state of the
art.
Trading Techs. Int’l, Inc. v. CQG, INC., 675 F. App’x 1001, 1004 (Fed. Cir.
2017). In contrast, in Appellant’s claim 5, we find only abstract
improvements to collecting and processing of a payment from the user. A
claim directed to a unique and advantageous method for collecting and
processing of a payment from the user is nonetheless directed to an abstract
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idea.6 “[U]nder the Mayo/Alice framework, a claim directed to a newly
discovered law of nature (or natural phenomenon or abstract idea) cannot
rely on the novelty of that discovery for the inventive concept necessary for
patent eligibility.” Genetic Techs. Ltd. v. Merial L.L.C., 818 F.3d 1369,
1376 (Fed. Cir. 2016); see Diehr, 450 U.S. at 188–89.
We agree with the Examiner that as to claim 5, “the claimed invention
does not represent a technological improvement in the operation of the
claimed system.” Ans. 5. In view of Appellant’s Specification, and
consistent with the Examiner’s determinations, we conclude that claim 5
does not integrate the judicial exception into a practical application. We
determine claim 5 does not recite:
(i) an improvement to the functioning of a computer;
(ii) an improvement to another technology or technical field;
(iii) an application of the abstract idea with, or by use of, a
particular machine;
(iv) a transformation or reduction of a particular article to a
different state or thing; or

6 See Ultramercial, Inc. v. Hulu LLC, 772 F.3d. 709 (Fed. Cir. 2014). In
that case, the patentee argued that its financial arrangement (a method of
using advertising as an exchange or currency) was distinguishable from the
“routine,” “long prevalent,” or “conventional” abstract idea in Alice
because it was “directed to a specific method of advertising and content
distribution that was previously unknown.” Id. at 714. The court rejected
the patentee’s position that “abstract ideas remain patent-eligible under
§ 101 as long as they are new ideas, not previously well known, and not
routine activity.” Id.
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(v) other meaningful limitations beyond generally linking the
use of the abstract idea to a particular technological
environment.
See MPEP §§ 2106.05(a)–(c), (e)–(h). We agree with the Examiner that
claim 5 is directed to a judicial exception, and does not integrate the judicial
exception into a practical application.
D.3. 2019 Revised Guidance Step 2B
Appellant contends:
[T]he present claims are patent eligible at least to the extent that
they recite unconventional limitations, as discussed herein with
regards to the prior art rejections.
Reply Br. 4 (emphasis added).
Appellant’s argument is not persuasive. Again, “under the
Mayo/Alice framework, a claim directed to a newly discovered law of nature
(or natural phenomenon or abstract idea) cannot rely on the novelty of that
discovery for the inventive concept necessary for patent eligibility.” Genetic
Techs. 818 F.3d at 1376; see Diehr, 450 U.S. at 188–89. Further,
Appellant’s “prior art rejection” argument lacks merit because, even though
the Section 101 inquiry and the Section 102/103 inquiry might sometimes
overlap, a novel and nonobvious claim directed to a purely abstract idea is,
nonetheless, patent-ineligible. See Mayo Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus
Labs., Inc., 566 U.S. at 89 (rejecting the suggestion that Sections 102, 103,
and 112 might perform the appropriate screening function and noting that in
Mayo such an approach “would make the ‘law of nature’ exception . . . a
dead letter”).
We agree that the Examiner correctly determines that in addition to
the abstract idea, claim 5 recites only well-understood, routine, conventional
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elements/ combination of elements previously known in the industry. In
view of Appellant’s Specification, and consistent with the Examiner’s
determinations, we determine that beyond the abstract idea, the claims do
not recite:
(vi) a specific limitation other than what is well-understood,
routine, conventional activity in the field or
unconventional steps that confine the claim to a particular
useful application.
See MPEP § 2106.05(d).
E.
Appellant raises the following arguments in contending that the
Examiner erred in rejecting claim 7 under 35 U.S.C. § 102(b).
Dearworth does not teach every element required by the
claims. For instance, Dearworth does not teach at least first and
second payment work flows associated with respective first and
second payments, as recited in each of recently added claims 7,
8, and 9. Instead, at best, Dearworth merely recites a single
payment (the mobile device is charged a toll and a service fee,
but these combined are simply one payment) that is associated
with, and requires, the occurrence of an event (mobile device
passing through a virtual toll location), but the event is NOT a
payment.
Appeal Br. 9.
Examiner argues that “Appellant did not provide where in the
specification the terms first and second payment are defined,”
but fails to provide any analysis, whatsoever, indicating how
Examiner is interpreting the terms “first and second payment”.
(Examiner’s Answer, pg. 7). Instead, to the extent Examiner
provides any analysis, such analysis is associated with work
flows, NOT payments. In other words, Examiner is essentially
ignoring the terms first and second payments.
Applicant need not provide where in the specification the
terms first and second payment are defined at least because
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a person having ordinary skill in the art will readily understand
that each of the first and second payments of claims 7, 8, and 9
are separate “payments made by the user.” Examiner merely
identifies a single payment made by the user at least because, as
Applicant previously argued and Examiner does not contest,
charging a toll, even if the toll includes a service fee, merely
requires a user to make a single payment.
Reply Br. 2 (additional emphasis added).
Appellant’s argument is not persuasive. Essentially, Appellant argues
that while Dearworth (Figure 8, item 816) teaches a toll (a first charge) plus
a service fee (a second charge), an artisan would not understand
Dearworth’s simultaneous payment of the two related charges as the
required “respective first and second payments made by the user to one or
more third party.” We disagree. Contrary to Appellant’s argument, an
artisan would immediately recognize that a user simultaneously paying two
related charges is making two payments to one or more third party. A
common form of this is a first payment of a sales tax (to a state)
simultaneous with a second payment of a purchase price (to a vendor).

CONCLUSION
The Examiner has not erred in rejecting claims 1–9 under 35 U.S.C.
§ 101, as being directed to patent-ineligible subject matter.
The Examiner has not erred in rejecting claims 1–9 as being
anticipated under 35 U.S.C. § 102(b).
The Examiner’s rejection of claims 1–9 under 35 U.S.C. § 101, as
being directed to patent-ineligible subject matter, is affirmed.
The Examiner’s rejection of claims 1–9 as being anticipated under
35 U.S.C. § 102(b) is affirmed.
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DECISION SUMMARY
In summary:
Claims
Rejected
35 U.S.C. § Reference(s)/Basis Affirmed Reversed
1–9 101 Eligibility 1–9
1–9 102 Dearworth 1–9
Overall
Outcome

1–9
TIME PERIOD FOR RESPONSE
No time period for taking any subsequent action in connection with
this appeal may be extended under 37 C.F.R. § 1.136(a). See 37 C.F.R.
§ 1.136(a)(1)(iv).
AFFIRMED