Paula Scott, Complainant,v.William J. Henderson, Postmaster General, United States Postal Service, Agency.

Equal Employment Opportunity CommissionMar 31, 2000
01985922 (E.E.O.C. Mar. 31, 2000)

01985922

03-31-2000

Paula Scott, Complainant, v. William J. Henderson, Postmaster General, United States Postal Service, Agency.


Paula Scott v. United States Postal Service

01985922

March 31, 2000

Paula Scott, )

Complainant, )

)

v. ) Appeal No. 01985922

William J. Henderson, ) Agency Nos. 1-D-211-1008-94

Postmaster General, ) 1-D-211-2592-93

United States Postal Service, ) Hearing Nos. 120-94-5832X

Agency. ) 120-94-5849X

____________________________________)

DECISION

On July 28, 1998, complainant filed a timely appeal with this Commission

from a final decision (FAD) by the agency dated July 14, 1998, finding

that it was in compliance with the terms of the August 1, 1996 settlement

agreement into which the parties entered.<1> See 64 Fed. Reg. 37,644,

37,659, 37,660 (1999)(to be codified and hereinafter referred to as

EEOC Regulation 29 C.F.R. � 1614.402); 29 C.F.R. � 1614.504(b); and 64

Fed. Reg. 37,644, 37,659 (1999)(to be codified at 29 C.F.R. � 1614.405).

The settlement agreement provided, in pertinent part, that:

. . . .

(3) The Agency agrees to offer, and the Complainant agrees to accept,

a position at the Incoming Mail Facility (IMF) of Distribution Clerk,

PS-5, part-time flexible, Grade 5, Step L, Tour I, start time 2300,

end time 0730, starting salary, including COLA, at $17.34/hour.

. . . .

(9) Should a dispute arise regarding implementation of this Agreement,

it is expressly agreed that the Complainant is restricted to seeking

enforcement of such Agreement, and that she may not seek to rescind

such Agreement.

. . . .

(12) In executing this Agreement, both parties state that they have read

the Agreement, and that they fully understand and agree to its provisions.

(13) The Agreement embodies the entire agreement between the two parties

hereto. There are no promises, terms, conditions or obligations other

than those contained herein.

By letter to the agency dated April 24, 1998, complainant alleged that

the agency breached the settlement agreement when it failed to negotiate

in good faith during settlement negotiations and misrepresented many

material facts. In the April 24, 1998 letter alleging noncompliance,

complainant specifically requested that the agency re-open her case in

order to have the issues regarding seniority and job placement revisited

by an EEOC Administrative Judge (AJ). Complainant cited several

instances of misrepresentation and breach. Specifically, complainant

alleged that the agency told her that there was no light/limited duty

assignment at the IMF; however, she claims that she later learned that

there were people holding limited/light duty assignments at the IMF.

Also, complainant stated that both the attorney for the agency and the

Labor Representative promised complainant that it would take only six

months for her to become a Full-Time Regular (FTR) employee again if

she were to accept a position at the IMF. Complainant stated that she

reported to the IMF on October 25, 1995, however, she was not promoted

to a full time employee until April 1998. Finally, complainant stated

that despite the agency's representation that in August 1995, it had

contacted individuals complainant identified as interested in a swap,

on November 6, 1995, complainant discovered that the agency did not

pursue the actions it claimed to have taken regarding the swap.

In its July 14, 1998 FAD, the agency concluded that it did not breach

the terms of the settlement agreement.

On appeal, and in support of her position to vacate that portion of

the settlement agreement pertaining to the issue of seniority status,

complainant identifies four areas of alleged agency misrepresentation.

First, complainant states that despite their contentions during

negotiations, union and management could have allowed her to transfer

to the IMF with her seniority intact. Complainant points to the fact

that in 1996, city zones (zip codes) were transferred from the IMF to

the GMF. In addition, complainant relies on the 1994 Contract between

the agency and the union to support her contention. Second, complainant

states that the agency did not timely pursue the possibility of allowing

complainant a mutual swap in order to allow her to retain her seniority.

Third, complainant contends that despite the assertions of the agency

during negotiations, she later learned that the IMF did have workers in

a light duty status, who received accommodations for various injuries.

Finally, complainant claims that the agency delayed in making her a

full-time employee which made it difficult for her to bid on positions.

In response to complainant's appeal, the agency asserts that

complainant's appeal was untimely since she failed to notify the agency

of the alleged noncompliance within thirty (30) days of learning of the

alleged noncompliance. Specifically, the agency claims that with regard

to her allegation that she was not converted to full-time status within

six months of commencing work at IMF, she clearly knew about the alleged

noncompliance long before she filed her request to reopen. In addition,

the agency states that with regard to her allegations concerning IMF

employees willing to switch jobs, she knew of this in November 1995,

but did not allege noncompliance until 1998. Finally, the agency notes

that with regard to complainant's contentions concerning the light duty

assignments, she relies on events that occurred in 1997; therefore she

did not raise her allegations of noncompliance in a timely manner.

In addition, the agency argues that even if complainant's request

to reopen is considered timely filed, the agency did not breach the

settlement agreement.

Volume 64 Fed. Reg. 37,644, 37,660 (1999)(to be codified and hereinafter

referred to as EEOC Regulation 29 C.F.R. � 1614.504(a)) provides that

if the complainant believes that the agency has failed to comply with

the terms of a settlement agreement or decision, the complainant shall

notify the EEO Director, in writing, of the alleged noncompliance within

30 days of when the complainant knew or should have known of the alleged

noncompliance.

The Commission finds that the first time complainant raised the breach

allegations in writing per the agreement and EEOC Regulation 29 C.F.R. �

1614.504(a), was on April 24, 1998, which was more than thirty days after

complainant knew or should have known of the alleged breach. Complainant

has not claimed that she was not reasonably aware of the breach until

thirty days or less before she raised the breach allegation in April 1998.

In her request to reopen, complainant alleges that she was not converted

to full-time status within six months of her transfer to IMF. The record

reveals that complainant was transferred to IMF on October 25, 1996,

and consequently learned that she had not been converted to full-time

status within six months of her transfer to IMF on or around April

25, 1997. In addition, the record reveals that complainant learned of

the agency's alleged failure to pursue a mutual swap in November 1995,

prior to the conclusion of negotiations. Thus, the Commission agrees

with the agency that by waiting until April 1998, complainant failed to

timely raise the breach allegations. Because of our disposition we do

not address the agency's alternative argument that the agency did not

breach the agreement.

Accordingly, the agency's decision is AFFIRMED for the reasons set

forth herein.

STATEMENT OF RIGHTS - ON APPEAL

RECONSIDERATION (M0300)

The Commission may, in its discretion, reconsider the decision in this

case if the complainant or the agency submits a written request containing

arguments or evidence which tend to establish that:

1. The appellate decision involved a clearly erroneous interpretation

of material fact or law; or

2. The appellate decision will have a substantial impact on the policies,

practices, or operations of the agency.

Requests to reconsider, with supporting statement or brief, MUST BE FILED

WITH THE OFFICE OF FEDERAL OPERATIONS (OFO) WITHIN THIRTY (30) CALENDAR

DAYS of receipt of this decision or WITHIN TWENTY (20) CALENDAR DAYS OF

RECEIPT OF ANOTHER PARTY'S TIMELY REQUEST FOR RECONSIDERATION. See 64

Fed. Reg. 37,644, 37,659 (1999) (to be codified and hereinafter referred

to as 29 C.F.R. � 1614.405); Equal Employment Opportunity Management

Directive for 29 C.F.R. Part 1614 (EEO MD-110), 9-18 (November 9, 1999).

All requests and arguments must be submitted to the Director, Office of

Federal Operations, Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, P.O. Box

19848, Washington, D.C. 20036. In the absence of a legible postmark, the

request to reconsider shall be deemed timely filed if it is received by

mail within five days of the expiration of the applicable filing period.

See 64 Fed. Reg. 37,644, 37,661 (1999) (to be codified and hereinafter

referred to as 29 C.F.R. � 1614.604). The request or opposition must

also include proof of service on the other party.

Failure to file within the time period will result in dismissal of your

request for reconsideration as untimely, unless extenuating circumstances

prevented the timely filing of the request. Any supporting documentation

must be submitted with your request for reconsideration. The Commission

will consider requests for reconsideration filed after the deadline only

in very limited circumstances. See 29 C.F.R. � 1614.604(c).

COMPLAINANT'S RIGHT TO FILE A CIVIL ACTION (S1199)

You have the right to file a civil action in an appropriate United States

District Court WITHIN NINETY (90) CALENDAR DAYS from the date that you

receive this decision. If you file a civil action, YOU MUST NAME AS

THE DEFENDANT IN THE COMPLAINT THE PERSON WHO IS THE OFFICIAL AGENCY HEAD

OR DEPARTMENT HEAD, IDENTIFYING THAT PERSON BY HIS OR HER FULL NAME AND

OFFICIAL TITLE. Failure to do so may result in the dismissal of your

case in court. "Agency" or "department" means the national organization,

and not the local office, facility or department in which you work. If you

file a request to reconsider and also file a civil action, filing a civil

action will terminate the administrative processing of your complaint.

RIGHT TO REQUEST COUNSEL (Z1199)

If you decide to file a civil action, and if you do not have or cannot

afford the services of an attorney, you may request that the Court appoint

an attorney to represent you and that the Court permit you to file the

action without payment of fees, costs, or other security. See Title VII

of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended, 42 U.S.C. � 2000e et seq.;

the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, as amended, 29 U.S.C. �� 791, 794(c).

The grant or denial of the request is within the sole discretion of

the Court. Filing a request for an attorney does not extend your time

in which to file a civil action. Both the request and the civil action

must be filed within the time limits as stated in the paragraph above

("Right to File A Civil Action").

FOR THE COMMISSION:

March 31, 2000

____________________________

Date Carlton M. Hadden, Acting Director

Office of Federal Operations

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING

For timeliness purposes, the Commission will presume that this decision

was received within five (5) calendar days of mailing. I certify that

the decision was mailed to complainant, complainant's representative

(if applicable), and the agency on:

_______________ __________________________

Date

1On November 9, 1999, revised regulations governing the EEOC's

federal sector complaint process went into effect. These regulations

apply to all federal sector EEO complaints pending at any stage in

the administrative process. Consequently, the Commission will apply

the revised regulations found at 64 Fed. Reg. 37,644 (1999), where

applicable, in deciding the present appeal. The regulations, as amended,

may also be found at the Commission's website at www.eeoc.gov.