Patriot Computer Corp.

Trademark Trial and Appeal Board

Nov 2, 2000

No. 75324788 (T.T.A.B. Nov. 2, 2000)

Hearing: Paper No. 21
June 7, 2000 11/2/00
PTH
UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
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Trademark Trial and Appeal Board
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In re Patriot Computer Corporation
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Serial No. 75/324,788
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Michael A. Grow and Sheldon Klein of Arent Fox Kintner
Plotkin & Kahn, PLLC for Patriot Computer Corporation.
Mark Sparacino, Trademark Examining Attorney, Law Office
103 (Michael Szoke, Managing Attorney).
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Before Cissel, Hairston and Wendel, Administrative
Trademark Judges.
Opinion by Hairston, Administrative Trademark Judge:
This is an appeal from the Trademark Examining
Attorney’s final refusal to register the mark PATRIOT for
“personal computers and computer peripherals, namely
printers.”
Registration has been finally refused under Section
2(d) of the Trademark Act, 15 U.S.C. §1052(d), on the
ground that applicant’s mark, if used in connection with
the identified goods, would so resemble the registered mark
THIS DISPOSITION
IS NOT CITABLE AS PRECEDENT
OF THE T.T.A.B.
Ser No. 75/324,788
2
PATRIOT for “video monitors,”1 as to be likely to cause
confusion.
Both applicant and the Examining Attorney have filed
briefs and an oral hearing was held.
We note at the outset that the marks are identical.
The Board has stated in the past that “[i]f the marks are
the same or almost so, it is only necessary that there be a
viable relationship between the goods or services in order
to support a likelihood of confusion.” In re Concordia
International Forwarding Corp., 222 USPQ 355, 356 (TTAB
1983).
We turn our attention then, as have applicant and the
Examining Attorney, to the relationship between the
respective goods. The Examining Attorney maintains that
video monitors and personal computers, in particular, are
related because they are commonly used together and are
often sold by the same manufacturers under the same marks.
Applicant, in urging reversal of the refusal to
register, argues that the respective goods are distinct,
are sold to different purchasers and travel through
entirely different channels of trade. Further, applicant
contends that marks consisting of or containing the word

1 Registration No. 1,255,915 issued November 1, 1983; Section 8 &
15 affidavit accepted and acknowledged, respectively.
Ser No. 75/324,788
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“PATRIOT” are weak marks which are therefore entitled to
only a limited scope of protection. In support of its
contention, applicant has submitted copies of ten third-
party registrations for “PATRIOT” marks.
As has been frequently stated, it is not necessary
that the goods of the parties be similar or competitive, or
even that they move in the same channels of trade to
support a likelihood of confusion. It is sufficient that
the respective goods of the parties be related in some
manner, and/or that the conditions and activities
surrounding the marketing of the goods are such that they
would or could be encountered by the same persons under
circumstances that could, because of the similarity of the
marks, give rise to the mistaken belief that they originate
from the same producer. In re International Telephone &
Telegraph Corp., 197 USPQ 910, 911 (TTAB 1978).
In this case, we find that the Examining Attorney has
submitted sufficient evidence to establish a viable
relationship between personal computers and video monitors.
In particular, the Examining Attorney made of record
an excerpt from the American Heritage Dictionary of the
English Language (3d. ed.) which defines “monitor” as “a
device that accepts video signals from a computer and
displays information on a screen.” In addition, he
Ser No. 75/324,788
4
submitted twenty excerpts from the NEXIS database which
show that the monitors which are used with personal
computers are described as “video monitors.” The following
are representative samples of these excerpts:
Seven personal computers feed information
from around the world into the four, color
video monitors lined up in front of the
traders.
(The New York Times, December 2, 1990);
For the budget-conscious, a lower cost
alternative to some pricey data display
equipment are computer-to-video interfaces
that link personal computers to conventional
video monitors . . .
(Computer Pictures, November 1992);
Gateway 2000, a major mail-order computer
company, has taken a more restrained approach
to the range of home entertainment in its new
Destination televisions. Each model combines
a personal computer with a 31-inch video
monitor that doubles as a conventional
television.
(The New York Times, May 16, 1996); and
Nortech Engineering Inc.’s operator interface
work station, MODEL NWS, is available in a full
length, stand-alone cabinet mounted on lockable
casters for ease of positioning, according
to the firm. A large-screen video-monitor,
industrial personal computer and keyboard is
mounted to the upper cabinet.
(Rubber & Plastics, May 19, 1997).
Further, the Examining Attorney submitted copies of a
number of third-party registrations to show that goods of
the type involved herein may emanate from the same source
under the same mark. A portion of this evidence is of
Ser No. 75/324,788
5
limited probative value given the fact that some of the
registrations are for house marks or are based under
Section 44 of the Act with no claim of any use in this
country. Nonetheless, the rest of the registrations tend
to suggest that goods of the type involved in this appeal
may emanate from a single source under the same mark.2 In
re Mucky Duck Mustard Co. Inc., 6 USPQ2d 1467 (TTAB 1988).
With respect to applicant’s argument that there is no
overlap among purchasers and channels of trade because the
registrant’s video monitors are specialized in nature and
are marketed to the defense and aerospace industry, we note
that the identification of goods in the cited registration
contains no restrictions as to type, purchasers, or
channels of trade. In the absence of any restrictions, we
must assume that registrant’s video monitors are of a type
which could be used with personal computers and that they
are marketed to all available purchasers, not only those in
the defense and aerospace industry, through all normal
channels of trade. In short, for purposes of our
likelihood of confusion analysis, we can draw no

2 For example, the mark ONLINE and design is registered for,
inter alia, personal computer terminals and video monitors (Reg.
No. 1,780,112); the mark COMPAQ is registered for, inter alia,
personal computers and video monitors (Reg. No. 1,993,756); the
mark IR and design is registered for computers and video monitors
(Reg. No. 2,012,551); and the mark ELLCON and design is
registered for PC’s and video monitors (Reg. No. 1,831,944).
Ser No. 75/324,788
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distinctions between the purchasers and channels of trade
for the respective goods.3
As to applicant’s argument that the cited mark is weak
and therefore entitled to only a limited scope of
protection, we should point out the third-party
registrations made of record by applicant, in and of
themselves, are entitled to little weight in evaluating
whether there is a likelihood of confusion. See, e.g., AMF
Inc. v American Leisure Products, Inc., 474 F.2d 1403, 177
USPQ 268, 269 (CCPA 1973); and In re Hub Distributing,
Inc., 218 USPQ 284, 285-86 (TTAB 1983). This is because
third-party registrations are not evidence of what happens

3 We note that applicant submitted a print-out of registrant’s
web site in support of its contention that registrant’s video
monitors are marketed only to the defense and aerospace industry.
Even if we could limit registrant’s goods in the manner urged by
applicant, the web site would not support such a limitation. Our
review of the site reveals that registrant supplies products not
only to companies in the defense and aerospace industry, but to
utility companies, medical diagnostic and treatment centers and
financial services companies. Also, such a limitation on
registrant’s goods would not necessarily avoid a likelihood of
confusion here because applicant’s identification of goods
contains no restrictions.
Ser No. 75/324,788
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in the marketplace. Also, we note that none of the third-
party registrations include goods of the type involved in
this appeal.4
Finally, to the extent that we have any doubt on the
issue of likelihood of confusion, we resolve that doubt, as
we must, in favor of the prior registrant. In re Hyper
Shoppes (Ohio), Inc., 837 F.2d 463, 6 USPQ2d 1025 (Fed.
Cir. 1988); and In re Martin’s Famous Pastry Shoppe, Inc.,
748 F.2d 1565, 223 USPQ 1289 (Fed. Cir. 1984).
In view of the foregoing, we conclude that purchasers
familiar with registrant’s video monitors offered under the
mark PATRIOT would be likely to believe, upon encountering
applicant’s mark PATRIOT for personal computers, that the
goods originated with or were somehow associated with or
sponsored by the same entity.

4 In particular, applicant contends that its mark should be
allowed in view of the coexistence of the cited mark and
Registration No. 1,902,410 for the mark PATRIOT for “gaming
equipment, namely slot machines and video slot machines with
video output capability.” Applicant’s reasoning is that video
slot machines are more closely related to video monitors than are
applicant’s personal computers. We are not convinced that these
goods are more closely related and, in any event, as has often
been stated, each case must be decided on its own set of facts.
In re Half Price Books, Records, Magazines, Inc., 225 USPQ 219,
221 (TTAB 1984). We are not privy to the file record of this
third-party registration and thus have no way of knowing the
reason(s) why such registration was allowed.
Ser No. 75/324,788
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Decision: The refusal to register under Section 2(d)
of the Trademark Act is affirmed.
R. F. Cissel
P. T. Hairston
H. R. Wendel
Administrative Trademark Judges
Trademark Trial and Appeal Board