Patrick O'Sullivan et al.

Patent Trials and Appeals Board

May 20, 2020

12827309 - (D) (P.T.A.B. May. 20, 2020)

UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE
United States Patent and Trademark Office
Address: COMMISSIONER FOR PATENTS
P.O. Box 1450
Alexandria, Virginia 22313-1450
www.uspto.gov
APPLICATION NO. FILING DATE FIRST NAMED INVENTOR ATTORNEY DOCKET NO. CONFIRMATION NO.
12/827,309 06/30/2010 Patrick Joseph O'Sullivan CAM9200100003US1 4886
106324 7590 05/20/2020
IBM Corp. - Fishkill Drafting Center
SVL
650 Harry Road, Almaden Research Center
C4TA/J2B
San Jose, CA 95120
EXAMINER
SCHEUNEMANN, RICHARD N
ART UNIT PAPER NUMBER
3624
NOTIFICATION DATE DELIVERY MODE
05/20/2020 ELECTRONIC
Please find below and/or attached an Office communication concerning this application or proceeding.
The time period for reply, if any, is set in the attached communication.
Notice of the Office communication was sent electronically on above-indicated "Notification Date" to the
following e-mail address(es):
fdciplaw@us.ibm.com
PTOL-90A (Rev. 04/07)
UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
____________

BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD
____________

Ex parte PATRICK JOSEPH O’SULLIVAN, CAROL SUE ZIMMET,
RUTHIE D. LYLE, FRED RAGUILLAT,
and SEAN CALLANAN
____________

Appeal 2019-005847
Application 12/827,309
Technology Center 3600
____________

Before ANTON W. FETTING, BIBHU R. MOHANTY, and
MATTHEW S. MEYERS, Administrative Patent Judges.

MEYERS, Administrative Patent Judge.

DECISION ON APPEAL

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Appellant1 appeals under 35 U.S.C. § 134(a) from the Examiner’s
Final Rejection of claims 1, 2, 4–9, 11–14, 16–21, 23, and 24. We have
jurisdiction under 35 U.S.C. § 6(b).

1 We use the term “Appellant” to refer to “applicants” as defined in
37 C.F.R. § 1.42. Our decision references Appellant’s Appeal Brief
(“Appeal Br.,” filed April 17, 2019) and Reply Brief (“Reply Br.,” filed July
30, 2019), and the Examiner’s Answer (“Ans.,” mailed May 30, 2019) and
Final Office Action (“Final Act.,” mailed November 29, 2018). Appellant
identifies the real party in interest as “INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS
MACHINES CORPORATION.” Appeal Br. 4.
Appeal 2019-005847
Application 12/827,309

2
We AFFIRM.
CLAIMED INVENTION
Appellant’s claims relate generally “to creating and managing location
based meetings and, more particularly, to methodologies for managing
schedule changes and resources reserved for location based meetings.”
Spec. ¶ 1.
Claims 1 and 13 are the independent claims on appeal. Claim 1,
reproduced below with bracketed matter added, is illustrative of the claimed
subject matter:
1. A method comprising:
[a] receiving, via at least one of a client electronic device
and a server computer, a global meeting entry, wherein the global
meeting entry is an entry associated with a meeting that is
displayed in a calendar-based graphical user interface and
wherein the global meeting entry defines a location for the
meeting and is addressed to one or more invitees;
[b] creating, via at least one of a client electronic device
and a server computer, a local meeting entry in response to
receiving the global meeting entry and determining that the
invitee is in a different location than the location for the meeting
included in the global meeting entry, wherein the local meeting
entry is created by copying the global meeting entry, wherein a
first invitee to accept the local meeting entry is assigned as a local
meeting entry creator for a location associated with the local
meeting entry, wherein the local meeting entry includes a first
start time and a first end time, and wherein the global meeting
entry includes a second start time and a second end time;
[c] scheduling, via at least one of the client electronic
device and the server computer, a resource to reserve for the local
meeting entry, wherein the resource is scheduled via a window,
and wherein the window inherits at least one of the first location,
the first start time and the first end time from the local meeting
Appeal 2019-005847
Application 12/827,309

3
entry, and the second location, the second start time and the
second end time from the global meeting entry;
[d] propagating, via at least one of the client electronic
device and the server computer, a schedule change in the global
meeting entry to the local meeting entry, wherein the schedule
change is a time change;
[e] simultaneously displaying, via at least one of the client
electronic device and the server computer, the global meeting
entry and the local meeting entry in a single calendar view of the
[]calendar-based graphical user interface, wherein the local
meeting entry includes a local meeting entry identifier, wherein
the local meeting entry identifier includes an icon to distinguish
the local meeting entry from the global meeting entry in the
single calendar view, wherein the global meeting entry is
displayed to each invitee of the global meeting entry and the local
meeting entry, and the local meeting entry is displayed to only
those invitees included in the local meeting entry;
[f] automatically rescheduling, via at least one of the client
electronic device and the server computer, the resource reserved
for the local meeting entry based upon, at least in part, the
schedule change in the global meeting entry; and
[g] restricting alternative resources available to be selected
if the resource is no longer available for the new meeting time as
a result of rescheduling.

REJECTION
Claims 1, 2, 4–9, 11–14, 16–21, 23, and 24 are rejected under 35
U.S.C. § 101 as directed to a judicial exception without significantly more.

ANALYSIS
Patent-Ineligible Subject Matter
Appellant argues claims 1, 2, 4–9, 11–14, 16–21, 23, and 24 as a
group. Appeal Br. 11–21; Reply Br. 2–8. We select independent claim 1 as
Appeal 2019-005847
Application 12/827,309

4
representative. The remaining claims stand or fall with claim 1. See
37 C.F.R. § 41.37(c)(1)(iv).
A. Section 101
An invention is patent-eligible if it claims a “new and useful process,
machine, manufacture, or composition of matter.” 35 U.S.C. § 101.
However, the U.S. Supreme Court has long interpreted 35 U.S.C. § 101 to
include implicit exceptions: “[l]aws of nature, natural phenomena, and
abstract ideas” are not patentable. E.g., Alice Corp. v. CLS Bank Int’l, 573
U.S. 208, 216 (2014).
In determining whether a claim falls within an excluded category, we
are guided by the Court’s two-part framework, described in Mayo and Alice.
Id. at 217–18 (citing Mayo Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus Labs., Inc.,
566 U.S. 66, 75–77 (2012)). In accordance with that framework, we first
determine what concept the claim is “directed to.” See Alice, 573 U.S. at
219 (“On their face, the claims before us are drawn to the concept of
intermediated settlement, i.e., the use of a third party to mitigate settlement
risk.”); see also Bilski v. Kappos, 561 U.S. 593, 611 (2010) (“Claims 1 and 4
in petitioners’ application explain the basic concept of hedging, or protecting
against risk.”).
Concepts determined to be abstract ideas, and thus patent ineligible,
include certain methods of organizing human activity, such as fundamental
economic practices (Alice, 573 U.S. at 219–20; Bilski, 561 U.S. at 611);
mathematical formulas (Parker v. Flook, 437 U.S. 584, 594–95 (1978)); and
mental processes (Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63, 67 (1972)). Concepts
determined to be patent eligible include physical and chemical processes,
such as “molding rubber products” (Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175, 191
Appeal 2019-005847
Application 12/827,309

5
(1981)); “tanning, dyeing, making waterproof cloth, vulcanizing India
rubber, smelting ores” (id. at 182 n.7 (quoting Corning v. Burden, 56 U.S.
252, 267–68 (1853))); and manufacturing flour (Benson, 409 U.S. at 69
(citing Cochrane v. Deener, 94 U.S. 780, 785 (1876))).
In Diehr, the claim at issue recited a mathematical formula, but the
Court held that “a claim drawn to subject matter otherwise statutory does not
become nonstatutory simply because it uses a mathematical formula.”
Diehr, 450 U.S. at 187; see also id. at 191 (“We view respondents’ claims as
nothing more than a process for molding rubber products and not as an
attempt to patent a mathematical formula.”). Having said that, the Court
also indicated that a claim “seeking patent protection for that formula in the
abstract . . . is not accorded the protection of our patent laws, and this
principle cannot be circumvented by attempting to limit the use of the
formula to a particular technological environment.” Id. (citation omitted)
(citing Benson and Flook); see, e.g., id. at 187 (“It is now commonplace that
an application of a law of nature or mathematical formula to a known
structure or process may well be deserving of patent protection.”).
If the claim is “directed to” an abstract idea, we turn to the second
step of the Alice and Mayo framework, where “we must examine the
elements of the claim to determine whether it contains an ‘inventive
concept’ sufficient to ‘transform’ the claimed abstract idea into a patent-
eligible application.” Alice, 573 U.S. at 221 (quotation marks omitted).
“A claim that recites an abstract idea must include ‘additional features’ to
ensure ‘that the [claim] is more than a drafting effort designed to
monopolize the [abstract idea].’” Id. (alterations in original) (quoting Mayo,
Appeal 2019-005847
Application 12/827,309

6
566 U.S. at 77). “[M]erely requir[ing] generic computer implementation[]
fail[s] to transform that abstract idea into a patent-eligible invention.” Id.
B. USPTO Section 101 Guidance
In January 2019, the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO)
published revised guidance on the application of § 101. 2019 Revised Patent
Subject Matter Eligibility Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. 50 (Jan. 7, 2019)
(“2019 Revised Guidance”).2 “All USPTO personnel are, as a matter of
internal agency management, expected to follow the guidance.” Id. at 51;
see also October 2019 Update at 1.
Under the 2019 Revised Guidance and the October 2019 Update, we
first look to whether the claim recites:
(1) any judicial exceptions, including certain groupings of abstract
ideas (i.e., mathematical concepts, certain methods of organizing
human activity such as a fundamental economic practice, or mental
processes) (“Step 2A, Prong One”); and
(2) additional elements that integrate the judicial exception into a
practical application (see MPEP § 2106.05(a)–(c), (e)–(h) (9th ed.
Rev. 08.2017, Jan. 2018)) (“Step 2A, Prong Two”).3

2 In response to received public comments, the Office issued further
guidance on October 17, 2019, clarifying the 2019 Revised Guidance.
USPTO, October 2019 Update: Subject Matter Eligibility (the “October
2019 Update”) (available at
https://www.uspto.gov/sites/default/files/documents/peg_oct_2019_update.p
df).
3 This evaluation is performed by (a) identifying whether there are any
additional elements recited in the claim beyond the judicial exception, and
(b) evaluating those additional elements individually and in combination to
determine whether the claim as a whole integrates the exception into a
Appeal 2019-005847
Application 12/827,309

7
2019 Revised Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. at 52–55.
Only if a claim (1) recites a judicial exception and (2) does not
integrate that exception into a practical application, do we then look, under
Step 2B, to whether the claim:
(3) adds a specific limitation beyond the judicial exception that is not
“well-understood, routine, conventional” in the field (see MPEP
§ 2106.05(d)); or
(4) simply appends well-understood, routine, conventional activities
previously known to the industry, specified at a high level of
generality, to the judicial exception.
2019 Revised Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. at 52–56.
Step One of the Mayo/Alice Framework
With regard to the first step of the Mayo/Alice framework and
Step 2A, Prong One of the 2019 Revised Guidelines, 84 Fed. Reg. at 54, the
Examiner determines that exemplary independent claim 1 broadly recites
“steps for data collection, data analysis and data display related to the
abstract idea of scheduling resources for meetings.” Final Act. 5; Ans. 4. In
this regard, the Examiner states that
[t]he limitations of exemplary claim 1 include: “receiving ... a
global meeting entry,” “creating ... a local meeting entry,”
“scheduling ... a resource to reserve for the local meeting entry,”
“propagating ... a schedule change," "simultaneously displaying
... the global meeting entry and the local meeting entry,”
“automatically rescheduling ... the resource reserved for the local
meeting entry,” and “restricting alternative resources available to
be selected.” The steps are all steps for data collection, data

practical application. See 2019 Revised Guidance - Section III(A)(2), 84
Fed. Reg. 54–55.
Appeal 2019-005847
Application 12/827,309

8
analysis and data display related to the abstract idea of
scheduling resources for meetings.
Final Act. 5. The Examiner considers exemplary independent claim 1 to be
an abstract idea, inasmuch as the claimed concept is similar to abstract ideas
identified by the Federal Circuit, and states that the “claims fall into the
category of ‘certain methods of organizing human activity,’ identified in
the” 2019 Revised Guidance. Ans. 3–4 (citing Electric Power Grp., LLC v.
Alstom S.A., 830 F.3d 1350 (Fed. Cir. 2016)).
In response, Appellant argues that independent claim 1 is “not
directed to an abstract idea because the claims do not recite a judicial
exception.” Appeal Br. 13. According to Appellant, the Examiner erred in
not identifying “specific limitations in the claims under examination that are
within the subject matter groupings of abstract ideas enumerated in Section I
of the 2019 Examination Guidance (i.e., mathematical concepts, certain
methods of organizing human activity, or mental processes).” Appeal Br.
14.
We are not persuaded that the Examiner erred in determining that
independent claim 1 is directed to an abstract idea. The Federal Circuit has
explained that “the ‘directed to’ inquiry applies a stage-one filter to claims,
considered in light of the specification, based on whether ‘their character as
a whole is directed to excluded subject matter.’” Enfish, LLC v. Microsoft
Corp., 822 F.3d 1327, 1335 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (quoting Internet Patents Corp.
v. Active Network, Inc., 790 F.3d 1343, 1346 (Fed. Cir. 2015)). It asks
whether the focus of the claims is on a specific improvement in relevant
technology or on a process that itself qualifies as an “abstract idea” for
which computers are invoked merely as a tool. See id. at 1335–36. Here, it
is clear from the Specification (including the claim language) that the claims
Appeal 2019-005847
Application 12/827,309

9
focus on an abstract idea, and not on any improvement to technology and/or
a technical field.
In making this determination, we note that the Specification is entitled
“CREATING AND MANAGING LOCATION BASED MEETINGS,” and
states that the disclosure “relates to creating and managing location based
meetings and, more particularly, to methodologies for managing schedule
changes and resources reserved for location based meetings.” Spec. ¶ 1.
According to the Specification,
[p]eople in an organization may have meetings with colleagues
in other locations. Meeting times may be adjusted to each
location’s local time. Users of calendar and scheduling
applications may associate different resources to a meeting such
as a room, projector, and/or other resources. These resources
may often be dependent on location. When a user receives an
invitation for a meeting from colleagues in a different location,
the invitation may include information about the meeting room
in the different location. The user may then need to book a
meeting room, projector, and/or other resources locally. If the
meeting time is changed, the user may then need to rearrange a
meeting time in a meeting entry, or manually reschedule meeting
resources including, but not limited to, booking of the meeting
room and/or a projector. Accordingly, there may be a need to
improve ways to create and manage meetings across multiple
locations.
Id. ¶ 2.
To address these drawbacks, the present invention “allow[s] a user to
create a location based copy of a meeting, which may be referred to as a
local meeting entry. The local copy may respond to schedule changes in a
global copy of the meeting, which may be referred to as a global meeting
entry.” Id. ¶ 27. The Specification similarly sets forth that resources
required for a global meeting entry may be imposed on all local meeting
Appeal 2019-005847
Application 12/827,309

10
entries. Id. ¶ 42. As a result, resources reserved for a local meeting may be
rescheduled based on schedule changes to the global meeting entry. Id. ¶ 43.
Consistent with this disclosure, independent claim 1 recites a method
comprising steps for (1) receiving a global meeting entry and creating a local
meeting entry in response to receiving the global meeting entry, i.e.,
“receiving … a global meeting entry” and “creating … a local meeting
entry” (steps [a], [b]); (2) scheduling a resource to reserve for the local
meeting entry, i.e., “scheduling … a resource to reserve for the local meeting
entry” (step [c]); (3) propogating a schedule change from the global meeting
entry to the local meeting entry and displaying both the global meeting entry
and the local meeting entry in a calendar view, i.e., “propogating … a
schedule change” and “simultaneously displaying … the global meeting
entry and the local meeting entry” (steps [d], [e]); and (4) rescheduling the
reserved local resource based on a schedule change in the global meeting
entry and restricting alternative resources according to availability, i.e.,
“automatically rescheduling … the resource reserved” and “restricting
alternative resources available to be selected” (steps [f], [g]).
Upon reviewing the Specification and independent claim 1, as
summarized above, we agree with the Examiner that independent claim
1 recites broadly “steps for data collection, data analysis and data display
related to the abstract idea of scheduling resources for meetings” (Final Act.
5; Ans. 4.), which can be characterized as a certain method of organizing
human activity. Here, independent claim 1 receives a global meeting entry
and creates a local meeting entry (steps [a], [b]), schedules resources (step
[c]), propagates changes from the global meeting to the local meeting and
displays both the global and local meeting entries (steps [d], [e]), and then
Appeal 2019-005847
Application 12/827,309

11
reschedules local resources according to availability (steps [f], [g]). In other
words, claim 1 broadly recites a method for scheduling resources for
meetings by receiving information (e.g., a global meeting entry), recording
information (e.g., creating a local meeting entry), receiving additional
information (e.g., scheduling a resource), sending information (e.g., a
schedule change), displaying information (e.g., the global meeting entry and
the local meeting entry), and receiving and analyzing information (e.g.,
rescheduling the resource and restricting alternative resources). Cf. Final
Act. 4–5.
Thus, it is clear that independent claim 1 recites a form of resource
scheduling that, under the 2019 Revised Guidance, falls under the category
of “[c]ertain methods of organizing human activity” and more specifically
“managing personal behavior or relationships or interactions between people
(including social activities, teaching, and following rules or instructions).”
2019 Revised Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. at 52. Accordingly, independent
claim 1 recites an abstract idea. Cf. Electric Power Grp., 830 F.3d at 1351–
54 (claim for detecting events by receiving, detecting, analyzing, displaying,
accumulating, and updating data, and deriving a composite indicator from
that data was directed to the abstract idea of “collecting information,
analyzing it, and displaying certain results of the collection and analysis”).
Having concluded that claim 1 recites a judicial exception, i.e., an
abstract idea, we turn to the Step 2A, Prong Two of the 2019 Revised
Guidance and determine whether the claim integrates the recited judicial
exception into a practical application of the judicial exception. We look to
see if, for example, any additional elements of the claim (i) reflect an
improvement in the functioning of a computer or to another technological
Appeal 2019-005847
Application 12/827,309

12
field, (ii) implement the judicial exception with, or by use of, a particular
machine, (iii) effect a transformation or reduction of a particular article to a
different state or thing, or (iv) use the judicial exception in some other
meaningful way beyond generally linking the use of the judicial exception to
a particular technological environment. See 2019 Revised Guidance, 84
Fed. Reg. at 55; see also MPEP §§ 2106.05(a)–(c), (e)–(h).
Here, the only additional elements recited in independent claim 1
beyond the abstract idea are “at least one of a client electronic device and a
server computer” that perform the claimed steps. However, these additional
elements are described generically in the Specification (see, e.g., Spec.
¶¶ 16–26). We find no indication in the Specification, nor does Appellant
direct us to any indication, that the steps recited in claim 1 invoke any
assertedly inventive programming, require any specialized computer
hardware or other inventive computer components, i.e., a particular machine,
or that the claimed invention is implemented using other than generic
computer components to perform generic computer functions. See DDR
Holdings, LLC v. Hotels.com, L.P., 773 F.3d 1245, 1256 (Fed. Cir. 2014)
(“[A]fter Alice, there can remain no doubt: recitation of generic computer
limitations does not make an otherwise ineligible claim patent-eligible.”).
We also find no indication in the Specification that the claimed
invention effects a transformation or reduction of a particular article to a
different state or thing. Nor do we find anything of record that attributes an
improvement in computer technology and/or functionality to the claimed
invention or that otherwise indicates that the claimed invention integrates the
Appeal 2019-005847
Application 12/827,309

13
abstract idea into a “practical application,” as that phrase is used in the
2019 Revised Guidance.4
Appellant argues that independent claim 1 “recite[s] a practical
application of any alleged judicial exception by reciting an improvement in
the technological field of computer scheduling systems”. Appeal Br. 16.
Appellant attributes this purported technical improvement to “the particular
manner of presenting information upon a user interface and efficiency of
creating, scheduling, and managing meetings across multiple locations”.
Appeal Br. 16–17.
Appellant’s argument is not persuasive. Here, the focus of
independent claim 1 is not on any technological advancement, but rather on
the implementation of the abstract idea, “for which computers are invoked
merely as a tool.” See Enfish, LLC v. Microsoft Corp., 822 F.3d 1327, 1336
(Fed. Cir. 2016). In this regard, the Specification discloses that “[e]xamples
of server computer 20 may include, but are not limited to: a personal
computer, a server computer, a series of server computers, a mini computer,
and/or a mainframe computer.” Spec. ¶ 18. Similarly, the Specification
discloses that client electronic devices “may include but are not limited to
personal computer 28, laptop computer 30, a data-enabled mobile telephone

4 The 2019 Revised Guidance references MPEP § 2106.05(a)–(c) and (e) in
describing the considerations that are indicative that an additional element or
combination of elements integrates the judicial exception, e.g., the abstract
idea, into a practical application. 2019 Revised Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg.
at 55. If the recited judicial exception is integrated into a practical
application, as determined under one or more of these MPEP sections, the
claim is not “directed to” the judicial exception.
Appeal 2019-005847
Application 12/827,309

14
32, notebook computer 34, personal digital assistant (not shown), smart
phone (not shown) and a dedicated network device (not shown).” Id. ¶ 21.
Independent claim 1, unlike the claims found to be non-abstract in
prior cases, uses generic technology to perform the functions of receiving
information, recording information, sending information, displaying
information, and analyzing information, and does not recite an improvement
to a particular computer technology. See McRO, Inc. v. Bandai Namco
Games Am. Inc., 837 F.3d 1299, 1314–15 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (finding claims
not abstract because they “focused on a specific asserted improvement in
computer animation”).
Appellant asserts that the present claims are similar to the claims of
those in Core Wireless Licensing S.A.R.L. v. LG Elecs., Inc., 880 F.3d 1356
(Fed. Cir. 2018). Appeal Br. 17–18. Appellant argues that like the claims in
Core Wireless, the present “claims recite specific features that improve the
technological field of computer scheduling systems and, more particularly,
improve the method of creating and managing meetings across multiple
locations.” Id. at 18. According to Appellant, the present claims are
directed to patentable subject matter “because (1) the specification discloses
sufficient details such that one of ordinary skill in the art would recognize
the claimed invention as providing an improvement in the technological
field of computer scheduling systems and (2) the claims reflect this
improvement.” Id. at 20 (citing Spec. ¶¶ 27, 31, 37; Fig. 4). We cannot
agree.
In Core Wireless, the claims were directed to “an improved user
interface for electronic devices, particularly those with small screens.” Core
Wireless, 880 F.3d at 1363. The specification described that “prior art
Appeal 2019-005847
Application 12/827,309

15
interfaces had many deficits relating to the efficient functioning of the
computer, requiring a user ‘to scroll around and switch views many times to
find the right data/functionality,’” and disclosed that the claimed invention
improved the “efficiency of using the electronic device by bringing together
‘a limited list of common functions and commonly accessed stored data,’
which can be accessed directly from the main menu.” Id. The specification
also disclosed that “[t]he speed of a user’s navigation through various views
and windows” was improved because it “saves the user from navigating to
the required application, opening it up, and then navigating within that
application to enable the data of interest to be seen or a function of interest
to be activated” — disclosure that the Federal Circuit concluded “clearly
indicates that the claims are directed to an improvement in the functioning of
computers, particularly those with small screens.” Id.
Here, we note that independent claim 1 recites no more than
“simultaneously displaying the global meeting entry and the local meeting
entry in a single calendar view of the calendar-based graphical user
interface,” and as a result, the claimed “user interface” does no more than
present information for display. And, as discussed above, independent claim
1 recites generic computer components performing generic computer
functions associated with receiving information (e.g., a global meeting
entry), recording information (e.g., creating a local meeting entry), receiving
additional information (e.g., scheduling a resource), sending information
(e.g., a schedule change), displaying information (e.g., the global meeting
entry and the local meeting entry), and receiving and analyzing information
(e.g., rescheduling the resource and restricting alternative resources) without
any technological improvement to the computer components themselves.
Appeal 2019-005847
Application 12/827,309

16
Accordingly, we find no indication in the claims or Specification, nor does
Appellant direct us to any indication, that independent claim 1 is directed to
an improved interface analogous to the one in Core Wireless or any other
technical improvement that provides an improvement in computer
functionality.
We also note that the Court in Trading Techs. Int’l, Inc. v. IBG LLC
addressed Appellant’s Core Wireless argument.
Relying principally on Core Wireless, TT argues the claimed
invention provides an improvement in the way a computer
operates. We do not agree. The claims of the ’999 patent do not
improve the functioning of the computer, make it operate more
efficiently, or solve any technological problem. Instead, they
recite a purportedly new arrangement of generic information that
assists traders in processing information more quickly.
Trading Techs. Int’l, Inc. v. IBG LLC, 921 F.3d at 1093 (citations omitted).
Similarly, the instant claims do not improve the functioning of the computer,
make it operate more efficiently, or solve any technological problem.
Instead, they recite a purportedly new arrangement of generic information
that assists users in processing information more quickly.
Appellant last argues that the present claims are patent-eligible
because they are similar to claim 1 of the USPTO’s Example 42 in the
“Subject Matter Eligibility Examples: Abstract Ideas,” published January 7,
2019 (“2019 Eligibility Examples”). Reply Br. 6–9. More particularly,
Appellant argues that the limitations of independent claim 1 provide
“leverage for propagating updates to a master meeting entry in real-time to
all users who directly accept the original meeting, as well as the local copied
meetings.” Reply Br. 7.
Appeal 2019-005847
Application 12/827,309

17
The difficulty with Appellant’s argument is that exemplary claim 1 of
Example 42 was deemed patent-eligible because it provided a specific
improvement over prior art systems by allowing remote users to share
information in real time in a standardized format regardless of the format in
which the information was input by the user. See 2019 Eligibility Examples,
18–19. Thus, exemplary claim 1 of Example 42 addressed technological
difficulties related to incompatible computer formats, disparate geographic
locations, and the untimely sharing of information. See id. at 17. As
discussed above, Appellant has neither identified nor demonstrated that the
present claims provide such a specific improvement over prior art systems.

Step Two of the Mayo/Alice Framework
Having determined under step one of the Mayo/Alice framework that
claim 1 is directed to an abstract idea, we next consider under Step 2B of the
2019 Revised Guidance, the second step of the Mayo/Alice framework,
whether claim 1 includes additional elements or a combination of elements
that provides an “inventive concept,” i.e., whether the additional elements
amount to “significantly more” than the judicial exception itself.
2019 Revised Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. at 56.
Appellant generally argues that “the claims institute additional
features that, when reviewed under Step 2B, recite significantly more than
the alleged abstract idea.” Reply Br. 5. Here, however, the Examiner
determined that
[t]he claims do not include additional elements that are sufficient
to amount to significantly more than the judicial exception
because the claims do not recite an improvement to another
technology or technical field, nor do they recite an improvement
Appeal 2019-005847
Application 12/827,309

18
to the functioning of the computer itself. The claims require no
more than a generic computer network (client devices and a
server computer) to implement the abstract idea, which does not
amount to significantly more than an abstract idea.
Final Act. 5; see also Ans. 4.
We agree with the Examiner that the steps performed by these
components are well-understood, routine, or conventional. As discussed
above, there is nothing in the Specification to indicate that the steps recited
in claim 1 require any specialized hardware or inventive computer
components or that the claimed invention is implemented using anything
other than generic computer components to perform generic computer
functions, e.g., receiving information, recording information, sending
information, displaying information, and analyzing information.
Viewed as a whole, independent claim 1 simply recites a series of
steps instructing how to schedule resources for meetings. See Ultramercial,
Inc. v. Hulu, LLC, 772 F.3d 709, 716 (Fed. Cir. 2014) (“[T]he claimed
sequence of steps comprises only ‘conventional steps, specified at a high
level of generality,’ which is insufficient to supply an ‘inventive concept.’”)
(Citing Alice, 573 U.S. at 222). Here, independent claim 1 does not, for
example, purport to improve the functioning of the computer itself. Nor
does it effect an improvement in any other technology or technical field, as
discussed above with respect to prong two of step 2A. Instead, independent
claim 1 amounts to nothing significantly more than an instruction to apply
the abstract idea using generic computing elements, which under our
precedents, is not enough to transform an abstract idea into a patent-eligible
invention. See Alice, 573 U.S. at 226.
Appeal 2019-005847
Application 12/827,309

19
We also are not persuaded of Examiner error to the extent Appellant
maintains that claim 1 is patent eligible because there is no risk of
preemption. Appeal Br. 15. Although the Supreme Court has described “the
concern that drives [the exclusion of abstract ideas from patent-eligible
subject matter] as one of pre-emption,” Alice Corp., 573 U.S. at 216,
characterizing preemption as a driving concern for patent eligibility is not
the same as characterizing preemption as the sole test for patent eligibility.
“The Supreme Court has made clear that the principle of preemption is the
basis for the judicial exceptions to patentability” and “[f]or this reason,
questions on preemption are inherent in and resolved by the § 101 analysis.”
Ariosa Diagnostics, Inc. v. Sequenom, Inc., 788 F.3d 1371, 1379 (Fed. Cir.
2015) (citing Alice Corp., 573 U.S. at 216). “[P]reemption may signal patent
ineligible subject matter, [but] the absence of complete preemption does not
demonstrate patent eligibility.” Id.
Appellant’s other arguments, including those directed to now-
superseded USPTO guidance, have been considered but are not persuasive
of error. (See 2019 Revised Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. at 51 (“Eligibility-
related guidance issued prior to the Ninth Edition, R-08.2017, of the MPEP
(published Jan. 2018) should not be relied upon.”))).
We are not persuaded, on the present record, that the Examiner erred
in rejecting independent claim 1 under 35 U.S.C. § 101. Therefore, we
sustain the Examiner’s rejection of independent claim 1, and claims 2, 4–9,
11–14, 16–21, 23, and 24, which fall with independent claim 1.

Appeal 2019-005847
Application 12/827,309

20
CONCLUSION
In summary:
Claims Rejected 35
U.S.C.
§
Reference(s)/Basis Affirmed Reversed
1, 2, 4–9, 11–14,
16–21, 23, 24
101 Eligibility 1, 2, 4–9, 11–14,
16–21, 23, 24

No time period for taking any subsequent action in connection with
this appeal may be extended under 37 C.F.R. § 1.136(a). See 37 C.F.R.
§ 1.136(a)(1)(iv).

AFFIRMED