01985961
03-06-2000
Patricia Ward, Complainant, v. William J. Henderson, Postmaster General, United States Postal Service, Agency.
Patricia Ward v. United States Postal Service
01985961
March 6, 2000
Patricia Ward, )
Complainant, )
) Appeal No. 01985961
v. ) Agency No. 1-G-708-1028-96
)
William J. Henderson, )
Postmaster General, )
United States Postal Service, )
Agency. )
)
DECISION
The complainant timely initiated an appeal to the Equal Employment
Opportunity Commission (Commission) from the final decision of the
agency concerning her claim that the agency violated Title VII of the
Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended, 42 U.S.C. � 2000e et seq., and the
Rehabilitation Act of 1973, as amended, 29 U.S.C. � 791 et seq.<0> The
appeal is accepted by the Commission in accordance with the provisions
of EEOC Order No. 960.001.
ISSUE PRESENTED
The issue presented herein is whether the agency discriminated against
the complainant based on race (Black), color (brown), sex (female),
physical disability (degenerative disc disease), mental disability
(stress), and reprisal (prior EEO activity) when she was required to
provide medical documentation prior to returning to work.
BACKGROUND
The complainant filed a formal complaint in April 1996 in which she
raised the issue set forth above. Following an investigation of the
complaint, the complainant requested a hearing but subsequently withdrew
that request. The agency thereafter issued a final decision (FAD) dated
June 25, 1998, finding no discrimination. It is from this decision that
the complainant now appeals.
The record reveals that the complainant, an employee at the agency's
Baton Rouge Processing and Distribution Center, sustained an on-the-job
injury in October 1993. The complainant thereafter filed a claim with
the Office of Workers' Compensation Programs (OWCP) and was placed in
a limited duty position consistent with restrictions set forth by an
orthopedic specialist (the Physician). In May 1995, an agency Injury
Compensation Specialist (ICS) asked the Physician to provide updated
medical information. In response, the Physician replied that he had
not treated the complainant since April 1994 and that the complainant's
current limitations were related to degenerative disc disease rather
than her 1993 injury.
By letter dated January 10, 1996, the complainant was informed that
she would no longer be allowed to work in her limited duty position.
The letter states further that, because there were no permanent light
duty positions available, the complainant would be placed in sick leave
status until she could present medical evidence reducing her restrictions.
In support of this action, the official who issued the letter testified
that updated medical information was necessary to determine what
duties the complainant could perform at that point. The complainant
thereafter saw the Physician, who prepared a report dated January 22,
1996, setting forth a number of restrictions. These included lifting 50
pounds no more than two hours per day, no reaching above the shoulder, and
intermittent walking, bending, pushing, and simple grasping. The report
also states that the complainant "needs to have a straight-back chair
at table top level." Upon submitting this report to agency officials,
the complainant was permitted to return to work in a light duty capacity
on January 23, 1996.
ANALYSIS AND FINDINGS
Disability
The burdens of proof required in a disparate treatment claim brought
pursuant to the Rehabilitation Act are modeled after those used in
Title VII law. See Prewitt v. U.S. Postal Service, 662 F.2d 292 (5th
Cir. 1981). To establish a prima facie case of disability discrimination,
the complainant must demonstrate that: 1) she is an "individual
with a disability" as defined in 29 C.F.R. � 1630.2(g);<0> 2) she is a
"qualified individual with a disability" as defined in 29 C.F.R.
� 1630.2(m); and (3) the agency took an adverse action against her. Id.
The complainant must also demonstrate a causal relationship between her
disability and the adverse action.
An "individual with a disability" is defined as someone who: (1) has
a physical or mental impairment which substantially limits one or more
of such person's major life activities; (2) has a record of such an
impairment; or (3) is regarded as having such an impairment. 29 C.F.R. �
1630.2(g)(1)-(3). "Major life activities" include functions such as
caring for one's self, performing manual tasks, walking, seeing, hearing,
speaking, breathing, learning, and working. 29 C.F.R. � 1630.2(i).
Having reviewed the restrictions set forth in the Physician's January
22, 1996, report, we find they are insufficient to conclude that the
complainant's degenerative disc disease substantially limits any of
her major life activities. Specifically, although it is apparent that
the complainant's ability to perform certain activities, e.g., lifting
and walking, are limited, these limitations appear to be moderate in
nature rather than substantial. For example, although the complainant
was precluded from lifting 50 pounds more than two hours per day, the
fact that she could lift 50 pounds at all indicates that her ability to
lift was not substantially limited. Furthermore, we find insufficient
evidence in the record to conclude that the complainant had a record of
a substantially limiting impairment or that she was regarded as having
such an impairment. Accordingly, we find that the complainant cannot
establish that she is an "individual with a disability."<0>
Assuming, arguendo, that the complainant could demonstrate that she is
an "individual with a disability," as well as a "qualified individual
with a disability," we still conclude that she has not established
disability discrimination. The impetus for the agency's decision
to remove the complainant from her limited duty position was the
Physician's statement that the limitations she had were the result of
disc disease rather than her work-related injury. The Commission finds
that this action was not inappropriate, to the extent the agency was
willing to accommodate the complainant and by placing her in a light
duty position. Furthermore, we find that, to the extent the complainant
still had physical limitations, it was not improper for the agency to
request updated medical information prior to placing the complainant
in that position. See 29 C.F.R. � 1630.14 (medical inquiries must be
"job-related and consistent with business necessity"). In so finding,
we note that the most recent medical evidence regarding the complainant's
limitations was nearly two years old, and, as such, did not accurately
reflect her limitations as of January 1996.
Race, Color, Sex, and Reprisal
In the absence of direct evidence of discrimination, the allocation
of burdens and order of presentation of proof in a Title VII case
alleging discrimination is a three-step process. The complainant has
the initial burden of establishing a prima facie case of discrimination.
If the complainant meets this burden, then the burden shifts to the
agency to articulate some legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for its
challenged action. The complainant must then prove, by a preponderance
of the evidence, that the legitimate reason articulated by the agency
was not its true reason, but was a pretext for discrimination. McDonnell
Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973).
The complainant can establish a prima facie case of discrimination
based on race, color, and sex by showing that: (1) she is a member
of the protected groups; and (2) she was treated differently than
a similarly situated nonmember of her protected groups. See Potter
v. Goodwill Industries of Cleveland, 518 F.2d 864, 865 (6th Cir. 1975).
We find that the complainant has not established a prima facie case
insofar as she has not demonstrated that she was treated differently
than a similarly situated nonmember of any of her protected groups.<0>
Regarding the complainant's claim of reprisal, we note that she has not
identified any prior EEO activity. Therefore, we find the complainant
cannot establish a prima facie case under that basis. See Hochstadt
v. Worcester Foundation for Experimental Biology, Inc., 425 F. Supp. 318
(D. Mass. 1976), aff'd 545 F.2d 222 (1st Cir. 1976).
Assuming, arguendo, that the complainant could establish a prima facie
case, the agency, as we discussed in the context of the complainant's
disability claim, has articulated a legitimate, nondiscriminatory
reason for the challenged action. See Texas Dep't of Community Affairs
v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 254 (1981). We find further that the
complainant has not established that this reason is pretextual. See
St. Mary's Honor Center v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502 (1993).
CONCLUSION
It is the decision of the Commission to AFFIRM the FAD and find the
complainant has not established that she was discriminated against
as alleged.
STATEMENT OF RIGHTS - ON APPEAL
RECONSIDERATION (M1199)
The Commission may, in its discretion, reconsider the decision in this
case if the complainant or the agency submits a written request containing
arguments or evidence which tend to establish that:
1. The appellate decision involved a clearly erroneous interpretation
of material fact or law; or
2. The appellate decision will have a substantial impact on the policies,
practices, or operations of the agency.
Requests to reconsider, with supporting statement or brief, MUST BE
FILED WITH THE OFFICE OF FEDERAL OPERATIONS (OFO) WITHIN THIRTY (30)
CALENDAR DAYS of receipt of this decision or WITHIN TWENTY (20) CALENDAR
DAYS OF RECEIPT OF ANOTHER PARTY'S TIMELY REQUEST FOR RECONSIDERATION.
See 64 Fed. Reg. 37,644, 37,659 (1999) (to be codified and hereinafter
referred to as 29 C.F.R. � 1614.405). All requests and arguments must be
submitted to the Director, Office of Federal Operations, Equal Employment
Opportunity Commission, P.O. Box 19848, Washington, D.C. 20036. In the
absence of a legible postmark, the request to reconsider shall be deemed
timely filed if it is received by mail within five days of the expiration
of the applicable filing period. See 64 Fed. Reg. 37,644, 37,661 (1999)
(to be codified and hereinafter referred to as 29 C.F.R. � 1614.604).
The request or opposition must also include proof of service on the
other party.
Failure to file within the time period will result in dismissal of your
request for reconsideration as untimely, unless extenuating circumstances
prevented the timely filing of the request. Any supporting documentation
must be submitted with your request for reconsideration. The Commission
will consider requests for reconsideration filed after the deadline only
in very limited circumstances. See 29 C.F.R. � 1614.604(c).
COMPLAINANT'S RIGHT TO FILE A CIVIL ACTION (S1199)
You have the right to file a civil action in an appropriate United States
District Court WITHIN NINETY (90) CALENDAR DAYS from the date that you
receive this decision. If you file a civil action, YOU MUST NAME AS
THE DEFENDANT IN THE COMPLAINT THE PERSON WHO IS THE OFFICIAL AGENCY HEAD
OR DEPARTMENT HEAD, IDENTIFYING THAT PERSON BY HIS OR HER FULL NAME AND
OFFICIAL TITLE. Failure to do so may result in the dismissal of your
case in court. "Agency" or "department" means the national organization,
and not the local office, facility or department in which you work. If you
file a request to reconsider and also file a civil action, filing a civil
action will terminate the administrative processing of your complaint.
RIGHT TO REQUEST COUNSEL (Z1199)
If you decide to file a civil action, and if you do not have or cannot
afford the services of an attorney, you may request that the Court appoint
an attorney to represent you and that the Court permit you to file the
action without payment of fees, costs, or other security. See Title VII
of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended, 42 U.S.C. � 2000e et seq.;
the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, as amended, 29 U.S.C. �� 791, 794(c).
The grant or denial of the request is within the sole discretion of
the Court. Filing a request for an attorney does not extend your time
in which to file a civil action. Both the request and the civil action
must be filed within the time limits as stated in the paragraph above
("Right to File A Civil Action").
FOR THE COMMISSION:
March 6, 2000
Date Frances M. Hart
Executive Officer
Executive Secretariat
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
For timeliness purposes, the Commission will presume that this decision
was received within five (5) calendar days after it was mailed. I certify
that this decision was mailed to complainant, complainant's representative
(if applicable), and the agency on:
Date Equal Employment Assistant
01 On November 9, 1999, revised regulations governing the EEOC's
federal sector complaint process went into effect. These regulations
apply to all Federal sector EEO complaints pending at any stage in the
administrative process. Consequently, the Commission will apply the
revised regulations found at 64 Fed. Reg. 37,644 (1999), where applicable,
in deciding the present appeal. The regulations, as amended, may also
be found at the Commission's website at WWW.EEOC.GOV.
02 The Rehabilitation Act was amended in 1992 to apply the standards in
the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) to complaints of discrimination
by federal employees or applicants for employment. Since that time,
the ADA regulations set out at 29 C.F.R. Part 1630 apply to complaints
of disability discrimination. These regulations can be found on EEOC's
website: WWW.EEOC.GOV.
03 Although the complainant alleged in her complaint that she is
also disabled as a result of stress, she has offered no evidence in
support of that assertion.
04 Although comparative evidence is only one method of establishing
a prima facie case, the complainant has not presented any other evidence
sufficient to support an inference of discrimination under the alleged
bases. See Enforcement Guidance on O'Connor v. Consolidated Coin Caters
Corp., EEOC Notice 915.002 (September 18, 1996).