Patricia Richmond, Complainant,v.Dr. Francis J. Harvey, Secretary, Department of the Army, Agency.

Equal Employment Opportunity CommissionAug 11, 2005
01a53429 (E.E.O.C. Aug. 11, 2005)

01a53429

08-11-2005

Patricia Richmond, Complainant, v. Dr. Francis J. Harvey, Secretary, Department of the Army, Agency.


Patricia Richmond v. Department of the Army

01A53429

August 11, 2005

.

Patricia Richmond,

Complainant,

v.

Dr. Francis J. Harvey,

Secretary,

Department of the Army,

Agency.

Appeal No. 01A53429

Agency No. ARCEMEM02SEP0037

Hearing No. 250-2003-08217X

DECISION

Complainant initiated an appeal from the agency's final order, dated

March 17, 2005, concerning her equal employment opportunity (EEO)

complaint of unlawful employment discrimination. For the following

reasons, the Commission AFFIRMS the agency's final order.

The record reveals that complainant, an Accounting Technician at the

agency's US Army Corp of Engineers Finance Center, Millington, Tennessee

facility, filed a formal EEO complaint dated October 1, 2002, alleging

that the agency discriminated against her on the bases of race (Black),

sex (female), disability (sleep apnea), age (46), and retaliation, when:

In July 2002, complainant was not selected for the position of Accountant,

GS-510-05/11, Vacancy Announcement #243521DH2M.

At the conclusion of the investigation, complainant received a copy

of the investigative report and requested a hearing before an EEOC

Administrative Judge (AJ). The AJ issued a decision, dated February 24,

2005,<1> without a hearing, finding no discrimination.

The AJ concluded that complainant failed to establish a prima facie

case of race, sex, disability or age discrimination. Specifically, the

AJ found that complainant failed to demonstrate that similarly situated

employees not in complainant's protected classes were treated differently

under similar circumstances when eight candidates were selected for

the Accountant positions. The AJ noted that four of the selectees were

also Black, that all of the selectees were female and that three of the

selectees were also over 40 years of age and many of the unsuccessful

candidates were younger than complainant.<2> Accordingly, the AJ found

that complainant did not present evidence which leads to an inference

of race, sex, or age discrimination.

The AJ further found that by her own testimony, complainant admitted

that she was not substantially limited by her disability (sleep apnea),

in any major life activity. Thus, the AJ found that complainant did

not establish a prima facie case of discrimination based on disability

because she was not a qualified individual with a disability as defined

by the Rehabilitation Act.

Similarly, the AJ found that complainant did not show the necessary causal

connection between complainant's association with another employee,

who had previously engaged in the EEO process, and her non-selection.

That is, the AJ found that none of the panel members were aware that

complainant was associated with another employee who had previously filed

an EEO complaint and that complainant had no other prior EEO activity

of her own.

Moreover, the AJ found that although complainant alleged that the agency

made its selections in order to fulfill a �quota system,� and pointed

out several discrepancies in the numerical scores given to applicants as

a result of a points system used by panel members to rate and compare

each applicant's education, experience, awards and performance, the AJ

determined that complainant did not show that her qualifications were

plainly superior to those possessed by the selectees. The AJ also found

that complainant did not show that the allegedly unfair rating system

had a disparate impact on any protected group. The AJ concluded that

complainant essentially argued that the selection process had been unfair,

but complainant did not show any causal connection between that unfairness

and complainant's race, sex, disability, or age or in retaliation for

prior protected activity. Accordingly, the AJ found that complainant

had not shown by a preponderance of the evidence that discrimination

had occurred in the selection process.

The agency's final order implemented the AJ's decision.

The Commission's regulations allow an AJ to issue a decision without a

hearing when he or she finds that there is no genuine issue of material

fact. 29 C.F.R. � 1614.109(g). This regulation is patterned after the

summary judgment procedure set forth in Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of

Civil Procedure. The U.S. Supreme Court has held that summary judgment

is appropriate where a court determines that, given the substantive

legal and evidentiary standards that apply to the case, there exists

no genuine issue of material fact. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc.,

477 U.S. 242, 255 (1986). In ruling on a motion for summary judgment,

a court's function is not to weigh the evidence but rather to determine

whether there are genuine issues for trial. Id. at 249. The evidence of

the non-moving party must be believed at the summary judgment stage and

all justifiable inferences must be drawn in the non-moving party's favor.

Id. at 255. An issue of fact is "genuine" if the evidence is such that

a reasonable fact finder could find in favor of the non-moving party.

Celotex v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322-23 (1986); Oliver v. Digital

Equip. Corp., 846 F.2D 103, 105 (1st Cir. 1988). A fact is "material"

if it has the potential to affect the outcome of the case. If a case

can only be resolved by weighing conflicting evidence, summary judgment

is not appropriate. In the context of an administrative proceeding,

an AJ may properly consider summary judgment only upon a determination

that the record has been adequately developed for summary disposition.

After a careful review of the record, the Commission finds that grant

of summary judgment was appropriate, as no genuine dispute of material

fact exists. We find that the AJ's decision properly summarized the

relevant facts and referenced the appropriate regulations, policies,

and laws. Further, construing the evidence to be most favorable to

complainant, we note that complainant failed to present evidence that

any of the agency's actions were motivated by discriminatory animus

toward complainant's protected classes. We do not address in this

decision whether complainant is an individual with a disability under

the Rehabilitation Act.

We therefore AFFIRM the agency's final order finding no discrimination.

STATEMENT OF RIGHTS - ON APPEAL

RECONSIDERATION (M0701)

The Commission may, in its discretion, reconsider the decision in this

case if the complainant or the agency submits a written request containing

arguments or evidence which tend to establish that:

1. The appellate decision involved a clearly erroneous interpretation

of material fact or law; or

2. The appellate decision will have a substantial impact on the policies,

practices, or operations of the agency.

Requests to reconsider, with supporting statement or brief, must be filed

with the Office of Federal Operations (OFO) within thirty (30) calendar

days of receipt of this decision or within twenty (20) calendar days of

receipt of another party's timely request for reconsideration. See 29

C.F.R. � 1614.405; Equal Employment Opportunity Management Directive for

29 C.F.R. Part 1614 (EEO MD-110), 9-18 (November 9, 1999). All requests

and arguments must be submitted to the Director, Office of Federal

Operations, Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, P.O. Box 19848,

Washington, D.C. 20036. In the absence of a legible postmark, the

request to reconsider shall be deemed timely filed if it is received by

mail within five days of the expiration of the applicable filing period.

See 29 C.F.R. � 1614.604. The request or opposition must also include

proof of service on the other party.

Failure to file within the time period will result in dismissal of your

request for reconsideration as untimely, unless extenuating circumstances

prevented the timely filing of the request. Any supporting documentation

must be submitted with your request for reconsideration. The Commission

will consider requests for reconsideration filed after the deadline only

in very limited circumstances. See 29 C.F.R. � 1614.604(c).

COMPLAINANT'S RIGHT TO FILE A CIVIL ACTION (S0900)

You have the right to file a civil action in an appropriate United States

District Court within ninety (90) calendar days from the date that you

receive this decision. If you file a civil action, you must name as

the defendant in the complaint the person who is the official agency head

or department head, identifying that person by his or her full name and

official title. Failure to do so may result in the dismissal of your

case in court. "Agency" or "department" means the national organization,

and not the local office, facility or department in which you work. If you

file a request to reconsider and also file a civil action, filing a civil

action will terminate the administrative processing of your complaint.

RIGHT TO REQUEST COUNSEL (Z1199)

If you decide to file a civil action, and if you do not have or cannot

afford the services of an attorney, you may request that the Court appoint

an attorney to represent you and that the Court permit you to file the

action without payment of fees, costs, or other security. See Title VII

of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended, 42 U.S.C. � 2000e et seq.;

the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, as amended, 29 U.S.C. �� 791, 794(c).

The grant or denial of the request is within the sole discretion of

the Court. Filing a request for an attorney does not extend your time

in which to file a civil action. Both the request and the civil action

must be filed within the time limits as stated in the paragraph above

("Right to File A Civil Action").

FOR THE COMMISSION:

August 11, 2005

______________________________

Carlton M. Hadden, Director

Office of Federal Operations

__________________

Date

1The AJ's decision, bearing an issue date of

December 29, 2004, was transmitted to the agency, and by copy, to the

complainant, by letter dated February 24, 2005.

2The Commission observes that the three selectees over 40 years of

age were 49, 48 and 47 years of age at the time of the selection,

respectively.