Patricia M. All, Appellant,v.Lt. Gen. Kenneth A. Minihan, Director, National Security Agency, Agency.

Equal Employment Opportunity CommissionSep 3, 1999
01975200 (E.E.O.C. Sep. 3, 1999)

01975200

09-03-1999

Patricia M. All, Appellant, v. Lt. Gen. Kenneth A. Minihan, Director, National Security Agency, Agency.


Patricia M. All, )

Appellant, )

) Appeal No. 01971040

) 01975200

v. ) Agency No. 96-008

)

Lt. Gen. Kenneth A. Minihan, )

Director, )

National Security Agency, )

Agency. )

)

DECISION

Appellant timely initiated appeals of two final agency decisions (FAD)

concerning her complaints of unlawful employment discrimination on

the basis age (DOB:6/25/40) in violation the Age Discrimination in

Employment Act of 1967 (ADEA), as amended, 29 U.S.C. � 621 et seq.

Appellant alleges she was discriminated against when: (1) she learned

she was not being considered for the Deputy Chief, M35 position; and (2)

she was not selected for the Deputy Chief, M33 position. The Commission

has reviewed the appeals together and consolidates the appeals pursuant

to 29 C.F.R. �1614.606. The Commission accepts the appeals in accordance

with EEOC Order No. 960.001. For the following reasons, the agency's

decision is VACATED AND REMANDED.

BACKGROUND

The record reveals that during the relevant time, appellant was employed

as a Senior Personnel Officer, M35<1>, Support Services Organization,

at the agency's Fort Meade facility. In the fall of 1995, appellant

applied for, and was not selected for two positions within the Support

Services Organization. Appellant's affidavit reveals that because of

her nonselection for the aforementioned positions, she believed that

there were no other career opportunities for her within the agency,

and she retired effective December 1995. Believing she was the victim

of age discrimination, she filed the instant complaint. Following the

agency's investigation, appellant failed to request a hearing, and the

agency subsequently issued two FADs.

Allegation 1 (Deputy Chief, M35 position)

With respect to the M35 position, appellant alleged that she became

aware of an impending vacancy of the Deputy Chief, M35 position in the

fall of 1995. At that time, she told the Division Chief, M35 that she

was interested in the position, as she had previously acted in the Deputy

position for one and a half years. She alleged that soon after she spoke

with the Division Chief, M35, he told her that although he had presented

her as his first choice to the position to the Career Management Board

(CMB), the CMB had decided not to consider her for the position.

The Division Chief, M35 testified that he presented appellant and three

other choices to the CMB, as he was requested to do by the Chief, M3.

He further testified that he was aware appellant was considering retiring

soon, and that she had in fact submitted her retirement paperwork, only

to remove it once she learned about the vacancy for the M35 position.

The Division Chief, M35 testified that although nothing was specifically

mentioned during the course of the meeting about appellant's retirement,

he believed that Board members may have had the impression that appellant

was going to retire soon. The Division Chief, M35 also testified that

he recommended appellant as his first choice, the ultimate selectee for

the position was his second choice (DOB: 2/17/49), followed by two other

individuals not selected for the position (DOB: 11/22/42 and 10/12/52).

He testified that it was clear that the selectee was the choice of the

Deputy Chief, M3, who was the Chair of the CMB, and therefore, all of the

members agreed that the selectee was the most qualified. After it became

clear to him that the CMB was rejecting his recommendation of appellant

for the position, he told appellant that she was not being considered.

Appellant's retirement followed.

According to the ROI, the CMB then refers the selection to the Chief M,

and the Deputy Director of Support Services (DDSS). Testimony in the

record reveals that the agency was looking for someone who could meet the

position's criteria in terms of leadership, innovativeness, ability and

willingness to bring about change to better service the organization's

customers. Members of the CMB testified that the selectee met these

qualifications. In addition, the selectee was noted as the preferred

candidate due to her career which involved an overseas assignment,

as well as advanced educational credentials. As such, the selectee was

referred as the number one candidate, followed by the other 2 candidates.

Appellant was not referred.

It appears from the record that after a choice had been made by the

CMB, the agency then decided to announce the position competitively.

The agency has not provided any reason for this decision, nor was it

indicated who made this decision. The Division Chief, M35 testified

he was responsible for interviewing and ranking all those who responded

to the vacancy announcement, including appellant. He testified that he

again, supported appellant's application.

Sometime thereafter, subsequent to the Division Chief, M35's retirement in

December 1995, the new Division Chief, M35 was instructed to reinterview

the candidates for the position. The new Division Chief testified he

did not think this was necessary and selected the choice of the CMB.

In sum, the new Division Chief, M35 testified that he did not rank

appellant as the number one candidate because he did not see her as a

�change agent�, and because appellant had given him the impression that

she would be retiring.

An examination of the testimony of the members of the CMB reveal the

possibility that an age bias against appellant existed. For example,

those members of the CMB who concurred with the selection decision

testified that appellant was not a �future leader.� Instead, appellant

was referred to as the type of person which the agency would not �want

in a leadership role in terms of her ability to move M3 forward with new

thoughts and ideas.� Furthermore, one member remarked that, appellant

�had been in the organization too long [so] that her thought process and

way of thinking was too narrow.� Other members stated that appellant's

way of thinking was not in line with the �Malcolm Baldridge�<2> way

of thinking. One member of the Board who stated appellant was not a

�visionary thinker� or on board with �Malcolm Baldridge� thinking also

testified that he did not �think [appellant's] ultimately unsuccessful

candidacy had anything to do with her age (other than sometime younger

people are being perceived - and perhaps rightly so - as more open

to radical change.� He added that a �new reality with different

needs/values/expectations has dawned and made the practices of the past

obsolete and irrelevant.� Most members cited the fact that the selectee

had field experience and an advanced degree as reasons for the selection.

In addition, appellant's prior supervisor testified that although she

believed appellant could have handled the Deputy Chief, M35 position,

she did not believe appellant was viewed by management as having the

right mind set towards change. She added, �it also seems that �years

of service� tends to equate to the �old way� of doing business, and

[appellant] may have been viewed as part of the �old culture.��

In its FAD, which was issued on October 17, 1996, the agency found that

it had articulated a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for its actions.

Specifically, the agency found that appellant had not been chosen for the

position because of management's desire to select an �individual with

broad leadership skills, strong professional credentials and a diverse

background.� Specifically, the agency mentioned that appellant was not

the strongest candidate in terms of level of education, field assignments,

and experience outside of the Human Resources Organization. With that,

the agency found that the selectee brought to the job �both breadth

and depth of experience.� Finally, the agency found that appellant had

failed to prove that the agency's reason for its action was pretext for

discrimination, and that she was not discriminated against.

Allegation 2 (Deputy Chief, M33 Position)

Testimony from the ROI for the M33 position reveals that a competitive

vacancy announcement was advertised in September 1995. The Chief,

M33 reviewed the applications of seven individuals, and then chose the

ultimate selectee (DOB: 4/20/50) for nomination to the Human Resources

Board (HRB). The HRB then discussed the candidates, agreed with the

selection, and passed the selection on to the DS HRB and ultimately to

the Chief M, and the DDSS.

Appellant alleged that she was not selected for the position because of

age discrimination. She further alleges that the selectee, who did not

have managerial experience, did not originally apply for the position,

but that someone suggested she apply. Appellant suggested that the

selection procedures were suspect in that not all of the applicants

were interviewed for the position. She argued that the DDSS wanted to

downsize the agency, and as such, move towards a younger workforce.

In its final decision, issued on March 14, 1997, the agency found that it

had articulated a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for its action.

Specifically, although appellant had managerial experience which the

selectee did not have, appellant was not as qualified as the selectee.

For example, the agency found that the selectee was most qualified in

the areas of broad experience, continued training, formal education,

leadership and creativity, which were the qualifications for the

position. Furthermore, the agency cited the selectee's formal education

and field assignment as further justification for the selection.

Although the agency noted a downward trend in the age of managers in

the M3 organization, the agency found that the decision was not based on

appellant's age. In sum, the agency found that appellant had not proved

that the agency's reasons for its actions were pretext for discrimination.

CONTENTIONS ON APPEAL

On appeal, appellant argues that the agency's reason for its actions are

a pretext for age discrimination. She argues, through her attorney, that

the agency has been moving towards a younger workforce by implementing

the �Malcolm Baldrige� management style. Furthermore, she presents

documentation which she argues is direct evidence of age discrimination.

In response to appellant's appeal, the agency argues that the complaint is

moot because appellant has since retired from the agency, and accordingly,

is not entitled to any relief. Furthermore, the agency argues that

appellant has failed to prove that the agency's reasons for its actions

were a pretext for discrimination. Finally, the agency makes the argument

that advertising the M35 position cured any possible harm which may have

occurred during the CMB.

ANALYSIS AND FINDINGS

EEOC Regulation 29 C.F.R. �1614.107(e) provides for the dismissal of a

complaint, or portion thereof, when the issues raised therein are moot.

To determine whether the issues raised in appellant's complaint are moot,

it must be ascertained (1) if it can be said with assurance that there is

no reasonable expectation that the alleged violation will recur, and (2)

if interim relief or events have completely and irrevocably eradicated the

effects of the alleged violation. See County of Los Angeles v. Davis, 440

U.S. 62S (1979). When such circumstances exist, no relief is available

and no need for a determination of the rights of the parties is presented.

A determination of whether a case is moot often turns on the second

element of the Davis test, that is, whether interim relief or events

have completely eradicated the effects of the alleged discrimination.

In this case, the agency dismissed appellant's complaint as moot because

of her voluntary retirement.

However, we disagree with the agency's arguments that appellant's

retirement has eradicated the effects of the alleged discrimination. The

remedy sought by appellant, promotion to the GS-15 level, raises the

possibility of recovery of back pay if appellant prevails on the merits

of her complaint. Based on the foregoing, we find that appellant's

decision to retire did not render her complaint moot. Furthermore, we

note that appellant claims in her affidavit and on appeal that she was

forced to retire. Specifically, in her affidavit, she testified that

once she learned that she would not be considered for the M35 position,

she �felt that M3 management had ruined [her] career, that [she] had no

career opportunities, and that [she] had no other alternative than to

retire.� Appellant also presented testimonial evidence which reveals

that she submitted paperwork for retirement, only to withdraw such when

she learned of the vacancies. She also presented her own testimony,

as well as that of other co-workers, which alludes to the belief that

had appellant not been discriminated against, she would not have retired.

Therefore, since the record reveals that appellant would not have retired,

but for her non-selections, we find that the allegations in the instant

complaint have not been rendered moot by her retirement.

With respect to the agency's remaining arguments, after a thorough review

of the record, we find that the evidence is insufficient to allow a

determination on the merits of appellant's age discrimination allegations.

Our regulations and the EEOC Management Directive for 29 C.F.R. Part

1614 require agencies to develop a complete and impartial factual

record. See 29 C.F.R. �1614.108(b) and EEOC Management Directive for 29

C.F.R. Part 1614, EEO-MD-110, at 5-1 (October 22, 1992). Specifically,

we are unable to determine from the record whether the agency's reasons

for its actions are credible or a pretext for age discrimination.

For example, although the two ROI's contain various computer generated

�Personnel Profiles� of some of the candidates, the records do not

contain the application packages of all the individuals who applied

for each of the positions. In fact, the application of the selectee

for the M35 position is not contained in the record. As such, we are

unable to determine from the record the qualifications of the candidates,

and examine their relevant work experience, educational background and

field experience.

We further note that official job or vacancy announcements listing

the minimum educational and time in grade requirements, as well as

the specific experience required for the position, are not included in

the ROI. Furthermore, there is insufficient evidence in the ROI as to

the selection process itself, and the reasons why the M35 position was

reannounced after a selection had already been made. Finally, there is

no information in the record as to the ranking factors used in either

of the positions, or how the applicants ranked against each other.

The ROI contains a selection certificate for the M33 position only.

Furthermore, testimony revealed that appellant may not have been chosen

because she was not in line with �Malcolm Baldridge� theory of management.

As such, we are unable to determine what it consists of, and whether its

criteria is age based as appellant alleges. The agency also failed to

provide an affidavit of the DDSS.

Contained in the ROI for the M33 position, is a performance award from the

Division Chief, M35, signed off by the Chief, M3 in April, 1995. Therein,

the remarks section mentions, among other things, that appellant has

outstanding leadership skills, and notes that she proposed several ideas

which had been implemented. This mentions appellant's organizational

skills, her ability to adapt to the needs of M3 and M35 organizations, as

well as her effective problem solving skills. We note that this relevant

narrative information was not contained in the ROI pertaining to the

M35 position. Rather, only the cover sheet was submitted with the ROI.

As important records and affidavits which would buttress or rebut the

agency's stated reasons are not in the record, we VACATE the agency's

findings of no discrimination, and REMAND these matters for a supplemental

investigation in accordance with the following order, and the applicable

EEOC Regulations.

ORDER

The agency shall conduct a supplemental investigation which shall include

the following actions:

The agency shall provide an affidavit from the Deputy Director of Support

Services, responding to appellant's allegations contained in her complaint

and affidavit with respect to both positions.

The agency shall provide all documentation used in the selection process

for both the M35 and M33 positions, including, but not limited to the

following:

complete application packages for those applicants considered for the

positions. Included in the packages must be the complete applications

used to apply for the position, as well as the complete performance

evaluations and complete performance awards;

the official vacancy announcement for both the M33 and M35 positions;

documentation detailing the method by which the applicants for the

positions were ranked, as well as all materials used in the ranking

process such as factors or criteria used, and the results of the

rankings;

questions and interview notes used during the interview process; and

a description of the �Malcolm Baldridge� criteria used in the selection

process.

The agency shall provide an affidavit from the individual responsible for

the decision to advertise the M35 position. The affidavit shall state

the basis for, as well as the method by which the position was advertised.

The Appellant shall be provided the opportunity to respond to the

affidavits obtained during the supplemental investigation.

During its supplemental investigation, the agency shall keep the two

ROI's together and process the investigations of the two positions

together in accordance with 29 C.F.R. �1614.108.

The supplemental investigation must be completed within sixty

(60) calendar days of the date this decision becomes final. 29

C.F.R. �1614.108(e). The agency then shall provide appellant with a

copy of the investigative file. Thereafter, the agency shall issue a

final agency decision within sixty (60) calendar days. A copy of the

agency's notice transmitting the investigative file to the appellant

must be submitted to the Compliance Officer, as referenced below.

IMPLEMENTATION OF THE COMMISSION'S DECISION (K0595)

Compliance with the Commission's corrective action is mandatory.

The agency shall submit its compliance report within thirty (30)

calendar days of the completion of all ordered corrective action. The

report shall be submitted to the Compliance Officer, Office of Federal

Operations, Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, P.O. Box 19848,

Washington, D.C. 20036. The agency's report must contain supporting

documentation, and the agency must send a copy of all submissions to

the appellant. If the agency does not comply with the Commission's

order, the appellant may petition the Commission for enforcement of

the order. 29 C.F.R. �1614.503 (a). The appellant also has the right

to file a civil action to enforce compliance with the Commission's

order prior to or following an administrative petition for enforcement.

See 29 C.F.R. �� 1614.408, 1614.409, and 1614.503 (g). Alternatively,

the appellant has the right to file a civil action on the underlying

complaint in accordance with the paragraph below entitled "Right to File

A Civil Action." 29 C.F.R. �� 1614.408 and 1614.409. A civil action for

enforcement or a civil action on the underlying complaint is subject to

the deadline stated in 42 U.S.C. �2000e-16(c) (Supp. V 1993). If the

appellant files a civil action, the administrative processing of the

complaint, including any petition for enforcement, will be terminated.

See 29 C.F.R. �1614.410.

STATEMENT OF RIGHTS - ON APPEAL

RECONSIDERATION (M0795)

The Commission may, in its discretion, reconsider the decision in the

case if the appellant or the agency submits a written request containing

arguments or evidence which tend to establish that:

1. New and material evidence is available that was not readily available

when the previous decision was issued; or

2. The previous decision involved an erroneous interpretation of law,

regulation or material fact, or misapplication of established policy; or

3. The decision is of such exceptional nature as to have substantial

precedential implications.

Requests to reconsider, with supporting arguments or evidence, MUST

BE FILED WITHIN THIRTY (30) CALENDAR DAYS of the date you receive the

decision, or WITHIN TWENTY (20) CALENDAR DAYS of the date you receive

a timely request to reconsider filed by another party. Any argument in

opposition to the request to reconsider or cross request to reconsider

MUST be submitted to the Commission and to the requesting party

WITHIN TWENTY (20) CALENDAR DAYS of the date you receive the request

to reconsider. See 29 C.F.R. � 1614.407. All requests and arguments

must bear proof of postmark and be submitted to the Director, Office of

Federal Operations, Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, P.O. Box

19848, Washington, D.C. 20036. In the absence of a legible postmark, the

request to reconsider shall be deemed filed on the date it is received

by the Commission.

Failure to file within the time period will result in dismissal of your

request for reconsideration as untimely. If extenuating circumstances

have prevented the timely filing of a request for reconsideration,

a written statement setting forth the circumstances which caused the

delay and any supporting documentation must be submitted with your

request for reconsideration. The Commission will consider requests

for reconsideration filed after the deadline only in very limited

circumstances. See 29 C.F.R. � 1614.604(c).

RIGHT TO FILE A CIVIL ACTION (R0993)

This is a decision requiring the agency to continue its administrative

processing of your complaint. However, if you wish to file a civil

action, you have the right to file such action in an appropriate United

States District Court. It is the position of the Commission that you

have the right to file a civil action in an appropriate United States

District Court WITHIN NINETY (90) CALENDAR DAYS from the date that you

receive this decision. You should be aware, however, that courts in some

jurisdictions have interpreted the Civil Rights Act of 1991 in a manner

suggesting that a civil action must be filed WITHIN THIRTY (30) CALENDAR

DAYS from the date that you receive this decision. To ensure that your

civil action is considered timely, you are advised to file it WITHIN

THIRTY (30) CALENDAR DAYS from the date that you receive this decision

or to consult an attorney concerning the applicable time period in the

jurisdiction in which your action would be filed. In the alternative,

you may file a civil action AFTER ONE HUNDRED AND EIGHTY (180) CALENDAR

DAYS of the date you filed your complaint with the agency, or filed your

appeal with the Commission. If you file a civil action, YOU MUST NAME

AS THE DEFENDANT IN THE COMPLAINT THE PERSON WHO IS THE OFFICIAL AGENCY

HEAD OR DEPARTMENT HEAD, IDENTIFYING THAT PERSON BY HIS OR HER FULL NAME

AND OFFICIAL TITLE. Failure to do so may result in the dismissal of your

case in court. "Agency" or "department" means the national organization,

and not the local office, facility or department in which you work.

Filing a civil action will terminate the administrative processing of

your complaint.

RIGHT TO REQUEST COUNSEL (Z1092)

If you decide to file a civil action, and if you do not have or cannot

afford the services of an attorney, you may request that the Court appoint

an attorney to represent you and that the Court permit you to file the

action without payment of fees, costs, or other security. See Title VII

of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended, 42 U.S.C. � 2000e et seq.;

the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, as amended, 29 U.S.C. �� 791, 794(c).

The grant or denial of the request is within the sole discretion of

the Court. Filing a request for an attorney does not extend your time

in which to file a civil action. Both the request and the civil

action must be

filed within the time limits as stated in the paragraph above ("Right

to File A Civil Action").

FOR THE COMMISSION:

September 3, 1999

DATE Carlton M. Hadden, Acting Director

Office of Federal Operations1According to the

Report of Investigation, the agency's hierarchy

is lead by the agency's Director and is organized

into five key components, once of which Support

Services. Support Services is headed by a Deputy

Director and is further divided into Offices (M),

Groups, (M3), Divisions (M35) and Branches (M351).

2The record does not explain what the �Malcolm Baldridge� management

style is, despite the agency's reliance on it during the selection.