Patricia L. Milby, Complainant,v.Patrick R. Donahoe, Postmaster General, United States Postal Service (Southeast Area), Agency.

Equal Employment Opportunity CommissionOct 10, 2012
0120122200 (E.E.O.C. Oct. 10, 2012)

0120122200

10-10-2012

Patricia L. Milby, Complainant, v. Patrick R. Donahoe, Postmaster General, United States Postal Service (Southeast Area), Agency.


Patricia L. Milby,

Complainant,

v.

Patrick R. Donahoe,

Postmaster General,

United States Postal Service

(Southeast Area),

Agency.

Appeal No. 0120122200

Hearing No. 430-2011-00386X

Agency No. 4K-270-0039-11

DECISION

Complainant filed an appeal from the Agency's March 29, 2012 Final Order concerning her equal employment opportunity (EEO) complaint alleging employment discrimination in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (Title VII), as amended, 42 U.S.C. � 2000e et seq. and the Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967 (ADEA), as amended, 29 U.S.C. � 621 et seq. For the following reasons, the Commission AFFIRMS the Agency's Final Order.

BACKGROUND

At the time of events giving rise to this complaint, Complainant worked as a City Letter Carrier at the Agency's Hilburn Station facility in Raleigh, North Carolina. On April 27, 2011, Complainant filed an EEO complaint alleging that the Agency discriminated against her on the bases of race (African-American), sex (female), and age (53) when:

Complainant received a Notice of Removal dated December 27, 2010, for Insubordination and Improper Conduct, as a result of actions that occurred December 7-11, 2010.

At the conclusion of the investigation, the Agency provided Complainant with a copy of the report of investigation and notice of her right to request a hearing before an EEOC Administrative Judge (AJ). Complainant requested a hearing. The AJ assigned to the case granted the Agency's February 21, 2012 motion for a decision without a hearing and issued a decision without a hearing on March 22, 2012.

In her Decision, the AJ found that the material facts were not in dispute. The AJ found that Complainant failed to present any evidence from which a reasonable inference could be drawn that she was treated differently because of her race, sex or age. Specifically, the AJ found that Complainant received a notice of removal when she had deviated from her assigned route and incurred multiple instances of unaccounted time in December 2010. Also, the AJ noted that Complainant was charged with using unauthorized overtime when she requested 1.5 hours of overtime, but only one hour was approved and Complainant returned two hours late delivering her route. The AJ also found that Complainant was charged with refusing a direct order to give a piece of express mail to her supervisor (S1). The AJ found that the Agency articulated legitimate reasons for issuing the notice of removal that Complainant failed to show were pretext and motivated by discrimination.

The AJ considered Complainant's contentions that her route deviations and what appeared to be missing time was actually lunch time and delays caused by traffic. Additionally, the AJ considered Complainant's belief that S1 had failed to communicate clearly concerning the express mail article, and overtime, both of which were ordinary business decisions that Complainant may not have agreed with, but the AJ found they did not demonstrate discrimination based on Complainant's race, sex, or age.

The Agency subsequently issued a Final Order adopting the AJ's finding that Complainant failed to prove that the Agency subjected her to discrimination as alleged.

ANALYSIS AND FINDINGS

The Commission's regulations allow an AJ to issue a decision without a hearing when he or she finds that there is no genuine issue of material fact. 29 C.F.R. � 1614.109(g). This regulation is patterned after the summary judgment procedure set forth in Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. The U.S. Supreme Court has held that summary judgment is appropriate where a court determines that, given the substantive legal and evidentiary standards that apply to the case, there exists no genuine issue of material fact. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 255 (1986). In ruling on a motion for summary judgment, a court's function is not to weigh the evidence but rather to determine whether there are genuine issues for trial. Id. at 249. The evidence of the non-moving party must be believed at the summary judgment stage and all justifiable inferences must be drawn in the non-moving party's favor. Id. at 255. An issue of fact is "genuine" if the evidence is such that a reasonable fact finder could find in favor of the non-moving party. Celotex v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322-23 (1986); Oliver v. Digital Equip. Corp., 846 F.2d 103, 105 (1st Cir. 1988). A fact is "material" if it has the potential to affect the outcome of the case.

If a case can only be resolved by weighing conflicting evidence, issuing a decision without holding a hearing is not appropriate. In the context of an administrative proceeding, an AJ may properly consider issuing a decision without holding a hearing only upon a determination that the record has been adequately developed for summary disposition. See Petty v. Dep't of Def., EEOC Appeal No. 01A24206 (July 11, 2003). Finally, an AJ should not rule in favor of one party without holding a hearing unless he or she ensures that the party opposing the ruling is given (1) ample notice of the proposal to issue a decision without a hearing, (2) a comprehensive statement of the allegedly undisputed material facts, (3) the opportunity to respond to such a statement, and (4) the chance to engage in discovery before responding, if necessary. According to the Supreme Court, Rule 56 itself precludes summary judgment "where the [party opposing summary judgment] has not had the opportunity to discover information that is essential to his opposition." Anderson, 477 U.S. at 250. In the hearing context, this means that the administrative judge must enable the parties to engage in the amount of discovery necessary to properly respond to any motion for a decision without a hearing. Cf. 29 C.F.R. � 1614.109(g)(2) (suggesting that an administrative judge could order discovery, if necessary, after receiving an opposition to a motion for a decision without a hearing).

To prevail in a disparate treatment claim such as this, Complainant must satisfy the three-part evidentiary scheme fashioned by the Supreme Court in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973). He must generally establish a prima facie case by demonstrating that he was subjected to an adverse employment action under circumstances that would support an inference of discrimination. Furnco Constr. Co. v. Waters, 438 U.S. 567, 576 (1978). The prima facie inquiry may be dispensed with in this case, however, since the Agency has articulated legitimate and nondiscriminatory reasons for its conduct. See U.S. Postal Serv. Bd. of Governors v. Aikens, 460 U.S. 711, 713-17 (1983); Holley v. Dep't of Veterans Affairs, EEOC Request No. 05950842 (Nov. 13, 1997). To ultimately prevail, Complainant must prove, by a preponderance of the evidence, that the Agency's explanation is a pretext for discrimination. Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Products, Inc., 530 U.S. 133 (2000); St. Mary's Honor Ctr. v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502, 519 (1993); Tex. Dep't of Cmty. Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 256 (1981); Holley, supra; Pavelka v. Dep't of the Navy, EEOC Request No. 05950351 (Dec. 14, 1995).

In the instant case, we find the AJ properly issued her decision without a hearing. We find, as did the Agency and the AJ, that Complainant has not shown that S1 issued the notice of removal taking into consideration Complainant's race, sex, or age. We do not find that Complainant was singled out for excessive discipline when compared to other employees not in her protected groups. The evidence shows that S1 issued discipline to other employees for similar infractions, including removal notices. We find Complainant did not present evidence from which to conclude that discrimination was the real reason for the Agency's actions.

CONCLUSION

We therefore AFFIRM the Agency's Final Order.

STATEMENT OF RIGHTS - ON APPEAL

RECONSIDERATION (M0610)

The Commission may, in its discretion, reconsider the decision in this case if the Complainant or the Agency submits a written request containing arguments or evidence which tend to establish that:

1. The appellate decision involved a clearly erroneous interpretation of material fact or law; or

2. The appellate decision will have a substantial impact on the policies, practices, or operations of the Agency.

Requests to reconsider, with supporting statement or brief, must be filed with the Office of Federal Operations (OFO) within thirty (30) calendar days of receipt of this decision or within twenty (20) calendar days of receipt of another party's timely request for reconsideration. See 29 C.F.R. � 1614.405; Equal Employment Opportunity Management Directive for 29 C.F.R. Part 1614 (EEO MD-110), at 9-18 (November 9, 1999). All requests and arguments must be submitted to the Director, Office of Federal Operations, Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, P.O. Box 77960, Washington, DC 20013. In the absence of a legible postmark, the request to reconsider shall be deemed timely filed if it is received by mail within five days of the expiration of the applicable filing period. See 29 C.F.R. � 1614.604. The request or opposition must also include proof of service on the other party.

Failure to file within the time period will result in dismissal of your request for reconsideration as untimely, unless extenuating circumstances prevented the timely filing of the request. Any supporting documentation must be submitted with your request for reconsideration. The Commission will consider requests for reconsideration filed after the deadline only in very limited circumstances. See 29 C.F.R. � 1614.604(c).

COMPLAINANT'S RIGHT TO FILE A CIVIL ACTION (S0610)

You have the right to file a civil action in an appropriate United States District Court within ninety (90) calendar days from the date that you receive this decision. If you file a civil action, you must name as the defendant in the complaint the person who is the official Agency head or department head, identifying that person by his or her full name and official title. Failure to do so may result in the dismissal of your case in court. "Agency" or "department" means the national organization, and not the local office, facility or department in which you work. If you file a request to reconsider and also file a civil action, filing a civil action will terminate the administrative processing of your complaint.

RIGHT TO REQUEST COUNSEL (Z0610)

If you decide to file a civil action, and if you do not have or cannot afford the services of an attorney, you may request from the Court that the Court appoint an attorney to represent you and that the Court also permit you to file the action without payment of fees, costs, or other security. See Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended, 42 U.S.C. � 2000e et seq.; the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, as amended, 29 U.S.C. �� 791, 794(c). The grant or denial of the request is within the sole discretion of the Court. Filing a request for an attorney with the Court does not extend your time in which to file a civil action. Both the request and the civil action must be filed within the time limits as stated in the paragraph above ("Right to File a Civil Action").

FOR THE COMMISSION:

______________________________

Carlton M. Hadden, Director

Office of Federal Operations

October 10, 2012

__________________

Date

2

0120122200

U.S. EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION

Office of Federal Operations

P.O. Box 77960

Washington, DC 20013

2

0120122200